

Instituto Juan March

Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (CEACS)

Juan March Institute

Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (CEACS)

Civil war narratives

Author(s): Fearon, James D.;Laitin, David D.

Date 2005

Type Working Paper

Series Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones,
Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 2004/218

City: Madrid

Publisher: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales

Your use of the CEACS Repository indicates your acceptance of individual author and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any document(s) only for academic research and teaching purposes.

CIVIL WAR NARRATIVES

James Fearon and David Laitin

Estudio/Working Paper 2005/218
June 2005

James Fearon is Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and David Laitin is James T. Watkins IV and Elise V. Watkins Professor of Political Science at the same university. This paper is based on a seminar that David Laitin presented at the *Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences*, Juan March Institute, Madrid, on 17 March 2005, under the same title.

In our project,¹ we have sought principally to discover the factors that differentiate countries that have experienced civil war onsets in the second half of the twentieth century from those that have not. The importance of this question can hardly be understated. In this half-century, there were some 127 civil wars fought in seventy-three states that resulted in at least sixteen million deaths. Reversing a ratio from the first half of the century, civil war deaths killed five times as many people as did interstate wars. Civil wars are undoubtedly one of the gravest public health problems of the past fifty years.²

Our statistically-based research has already discredited two well-entrenched theories of civil war onset. First, our data show that by most measures of grievance – for example, lack of democracy, lack of religious or linguistic rights, inequality – knowing the level of grievances in a country does not help differentiate countries susceptible to a civil war from those that are not. Second, our data show that by most measures of civilizational divides – for example the level of ethnic heterogeneity or the degree of cultural distance – knowing the depth of the division does not help differentiate countries susceptible to a civil war from those that are not.

In their stead, we have advanced a theory that points to the conditions that favor insurgency, a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. This theory ties together a set of variables that correlate with civil war onset. Our interpretation of all of them is that they point to the relative incapacity of a state to quell insurgencies, and thus they serve as signals to potential insurgents (who are latent in all countries) that the time is ripe for the application of this rural technology. The key variables that are robust in our statistical models are listed below.

¹ For a book that we tentatively call *Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War*. The statistical results that guide the narratives and the tables in this paper was published in James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War” *American Political Science Review* 97, 1 (February) 2003: 75-90. All the variables discussed in this paper are elaborated in that paper. Readers who want to play with the replication dataset are invited to work with it at: <http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/publicdata/publicdata.html>

² Civil wars, by our definition, involve fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate groups who seek either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change policies. The conflict must kill at least 1,000 over its course, and at least 100 need to be killed on each side (to rule out massacres where there is no organized or effective opposition). For further qualifications, see Fearon and Laitin (2003), p. 76.

* Country wealth – we interpret low values on this variable as a proxy for a weak central government incapable of deterring potential insurgents;

* Mountainous Terrain – we interpret high degrees of mountainous terrain in a country as a tactical advantage to potential insurgents for hiding from government forces;

* Population – we interpret high population as a signal to insurgents that central governments will have a harder time tracking them;

* Oil – we interpret high levels of oil exports as a predictor of weak governmental institutions, inasmuch as oil revenues make it unnecessary to develop intrusive tax bureaus that need to track individual citizens;

* Instability – this is defined as a rapid shift in the regime type (a two or more shift in a single year in the Polity score for democracy) and it signals new and untested state institutions;

* New State – the first two years of independence are interpreted as ones in which regimes are especially fragile;

* Anocracy – this is defined as a regime type that is in the zone in between democracy and autocracy (in the Polity index) and being in this zone signals state institutions in transition, and thus potential weakness in the face of internal threat.

Statistical correlation – in a multivariate analysis with civil war onset as the dependent variables -- hardly provides a sufficient answer to the question of what distinguishes countries that have experienced civil war onsets from those that have not. In fact, to develop a more comprehensive answer, we are committed to a tripartite method, one in which statistical, formal and narrative accounts of civil war are mutually informative.³ In

³ On the tripartite method, see David D. Laitin “Comparative Politics: The State of the Subdiscipline”. In Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (2002) *Political Science: State of the Discipline* (New York: Norton), 630-659.

the part of our project that this paper belongs, and to fulfill the tripartite vision, we attempt a new approach to the use of narrative.

The first question we asked to develop our narrative approach is which narratives to tell? In statistical work, there are some methodological standards for case selection and analysis. In formal analysis, what constitutes an appropriate formal representation of a class of political phenomena remains somewhat contested – but the notion that the model should be simple, capturing the nub of the strategic situation, and offering at least some unexpected observable implications is a developing standard.

There is no intellectual consensus, however, on the choice for narrative exposition of cases. There is a literature on Mill's principle of similarity and difference, but when choosing from a universe of cases on a scatterplot, it is invariably tempting to use this method of selection in a biased way in order to illustrate what the statistical or formal models have already illustrated. Using Millian case selection criteria when the statistical distribution of cases is already known may help to add real-life examples of the general processes that have been discovered, but they provide little new intellectual grist for the theoretical mill.

Another principle – and not really different from Mill's methods – is to choose cases for narrative exposition that are off the regression line, say for example at the same point on the x axis but below and above the regression line as indicated by different positions on the y axis. The assumption here is that those cases on the regression line are confirming the theory while those off of it are disconfirming the theory, and possibly offering (through careful process tracing of case material) new variables that would yield ultimately higher r-squares if entered into the general model.

The idea of choosing only cases off the regression line is attractive but flawed. We cannot assume that cases on the regression line are in fact confirmatory – as we shall illustrate in our analysis, cases that are on the regression line may, after careful narrative exposition, prove to have been predicted correctly for the wrong reasons.

Complementary to the unwarranted assumption that cases on the regression line are confirmatory of theory are the cases that are off the regression line but not disconfirmatory. In these cases, careful narrative scrutiny we might reveal that a rather arbitrary coding decision was decisive (or perhaps the predicted event was in the process of unfolding but some random, unmeasured other factor prevented it) and therefore the case is not really disconfirming. Such demonstrations are perhaps part of what we mean when we say that a particular case is an exception that proves the rule. In light of false positives and faulty negatives, any assumption that a scatterplot allows for a methodologically sound selection of cases for narrative analysis is suspect.

The most attractive criterion for choosing cases for narrative exposition is that of investigator expertise. Narratives are far richer if the investigator has a reading knowledge of the country's language, has done fieldwork in that country, and knows best how to navigate the secondary literature. This is the Benthamite criterion of propinquity – the closer you are to the material, the more utility that you will derive from it. The philosophy of science problem with this criterion is huge. Since it was likely that the theory being tested derived from an intimate knowledge of a particular case, putting the theory to further test by systematic examination of that case is a form of scientific double dipping. Methodological cookbooks are clear on this point – you need to test your theories from out of sample data! While expert narratives make for the most compelling and cogent reading, they fail the test of non-bias in selection of cases.

There is an alternative to the goal of seeking a non-biased sample of cases for narrative exposition. Based on Elster, it could be argued that knowing the values on significant independent variables (and interaction terms) is not the same thing as knowing the mechanisms that map values on significant independent variables to particular values on dependent variables. In fact, he argues, there can be several mechanisms that link values on independent variables to predicted outcomes.⁴ With this perspective in mind, one can read narratives of all observations in a dataset with an eye toward mechanisms. One can then differentiate a variety of paths that can lead to civil wars with similar values on the key

⁴ Jon Elster (1998) "A Plea for Mechanisms". In P. Hedstrom and R. Swedberg (eds.), *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

independent variables. These mechanisms are not likely to show up in statistical analysis because each of them doesn't account for a sufficient number of cases. However, it would need to be shown that these mechanisms are unleashed under conditions where the theory predicts a civil war onset and not unleashed where the theory predicts no civil war.

We have in the course of our research on civil wars explored such mechanisms. One example is that of "sons of the soil". We found (through barefoot empiricism walking through the cases) that in countries with high population density (mostly in south Asia), leaders representing a dominant ethnic group will sometimes seek to relieve land pressure on that group by opening up new lands in less developed parts of the country through irrigation schemes. Internal migration to these new lands follows. In several remarkable cases (Sinhalese in the northeastern province of Sri Lanka; Bengalis in the Chittagong Hills; Javanese in Aceh) these efforts blew back on the dominant ethnic group, unleashing a civil war in the name of indigenous rights of the peoples who were indigenous to the area in which the migration was fostered. This mechanism of "sons of the soil" required a narrative that was consistent with the theory (and thus could not be told as a grievance story, as our statistical work showed that we could not predict civil war onset by knowing levels of grievance), yet true to the facts of the cases. The story had also to look at all cases in the world of "sons of the soil", even those that did not yield civil war. If successful, the narrative would show how under conditions that the statistical and formal models showed were propitious for civil war onset the mechanism of "sons of the soil" could provide the narrative link. Other mechanisms – commitment problems at the time of independence and the seeding of insurgents in country x by a leader in country y seeking to destabilize that country – were similarly identified. Each helped trace the route from high probability of civil war to actual onset.

The problem with this approach to mechanisms is that it provides no principles for choice of mechanism, other than what hits the researcher between the eyes in looking over cases. (Though the commitment mechanism was first proposed theoretically, and then found empirically). This empiricist approach may be useful in developing theory, but not in justifying which expositions are most relevant to provide. This approach while attractive is too *ad hoc*.

Another possible approach is simple random selection. Here, every unit of observation is given a random number. The investigator is then asked to write narratives for cases that were chosen *for* him or her by a random number generator. The investigator would need to go from the first case on the list to some number down the list and to link through narrative the statistically significant independent variables to the coded value on the dependent variable. There could be no claim of bias in case selection. Cases on the regression line would be subject to the same narrative tests as those off of the regression line. If there were missing variables previously unexamined that would have improved the initial statistical analysis, they are more likely to be found in cases forced upon the investigator than in cases she or he chose. To be sure, the narratives will lack the expert's eye for nuance; but they will gain from a fresh reading of the standard literature about a country with an eye on how much mileage can be gotten in understanding outcomes through a focus only on significant independent variables validated from time series cross sectional analysis.

For our choice of narratives, we rely on a slightly modified form of random selection of cases. We have stratified our random sampling on two variables. We took our list of 161 countries, and organized it (1) by region, and (2) within region, by whether the country had at least one civil war. We then randomly ordered the countries within the twelve subsets that result (6 regions, war/no war for each one). We next proceed to select countries for case studies by starting at the top of each of the twelve lists. (In fact, we started by randomly selecting two from the "war" countries and two from the "no-war" countries at the top of the regional lists).

The rationale for stratifying by region is to ensure an even distribution across a factor that is correlated with common historical experience, culture, religion, and level of economic development. We were concerned that if we did not do this, a relatively small random sample (e.g., 20 countries) would have a fairly good chance of over- or under-representing at least one region pretty badly, making our inferences more open to the charge that (say) "they neglect the experience of Latin America, which is very different."

We distinguished between "war" and "no war" countries for a different reason. We expect that there is more to be learned by studying a country that had an outbreak of war at

some time than one that never did, because a “war” country has periods of both peace and war (variation), whereas a “no war” country has only peace. There is certainly information in the “no war” cases, and we thought it would be quite wrong to exclude them entirely. But we wanted to make possible the over sampling of countries that experienced a transition from peace to war, as this provides “within country” variation on the dependent variable in which, in effect, a great many country-specific factors are controlled for.

For each country (and year), we produce a graph illustrating how well our statistical model performs. The x axis lists all years in which the country was independent. The y axis gives the probability that there would be a civil war onset in that country based on the values of the independent variables of our statistical model.⁵ The principal line on the graph is the trend of probable civil war onset in the country from 1945 (or first year of independence) to 1999. Also on the graph is a horizontal line indicating the average for all country/years of civil war onset. Finally, we place a tick on the x axis if the country was experiencing a civil war during that particular year. An accompanying table provides values on the significant independent variables for each country year; a second accompanying table provides some descriptive statistics of these values averaged over the entire period in comparison to other countries in its region and to all countries in the world.

Given the graph and tables, the task given the narrator is to provide value added for our general understanding of civil war by accounting for both good and bad model predictions for all country years for the randomly generated countries. The narrator is in a sense writing history under statistical constraint. It would be out of line, for example, to appeal to high levels of grievance over a certain policy as an explanation for a particular civil war onset unless it were shown why this particular grievance had properties different from other types of grievance *and* that if all grievances were coded by type, this type of grievance would have a significant and positive coefficient in a new statistical model. Thus the

⁵ We compute this predicted probability based on the coefficients of the statistical model estimated *without using the data for the country in question*. Otherwise, the experience of the country would be going into the coefficients of a model then be used to postdict the country’s civil war experience, which seems slightly biasing things in our favor. We also make the predictions for the country under the assumption that the country never had a civil war, so that the variable “prior war” in our model is always set to zero (i.e., whether the country had a prior civil war already in progress in the year for the prediction is being made).

narrative would need not only to be consistent with the historical record of the country under analysis but it would also need to be consistent with the statistical model that sets limits to what can be appealed to in the narrative.

The value added of the narrative would come from the stark realization that however strong our statistical model, it is far away from being a complete explanation for civil war onsets. In our dataset is Cyprus in 1974 (at the outbreak of the Turkish/Cypriot civil war) when our model estimated the probability of an onset at less than .2 percent. The model's most successful postdiction (nearly two times the second most successful) was in giving the South Moluccan insurgency against Indonesia in 1950 a probability of 45 percent. Even in this case, the odds were against there being a civil war onset in that particular year.

Thus there is much still to be learned by using other methods than large-n analysis, and narratives of particular countries are a useful complement to the statistical method. Through narrative, it should be possible to point to interactions among variables already discredited that together yield civil war susceptibility. It should be possible to specify more sharply the conditions when a variable will have the effect we have theorized. It should be possible to point to micro-factors for future coding such as tactical decisions by states and by insurgents that are usually ignored in large-n data collection exercises. (And finally, it should provide a benchmark to see, under more careful scrutiny, how accurate our codings are on key variables, to get a sense of the magnitude of coder bias.)

How many narratives to tell? Our intuition is that once the investigator experiences severely diminishing returns to the researching of the next narrative, it is time to stop. There is no principled stopping point. At the time of diminished returns to new cases, it would be worth the effort to summarize an updated version of the theory due to narrative analysis.⁶

⁶ One problem here is if a new variable, or a new specification of an interaction term, compels the reworking of the statistical model, and the statistical model is thereby strengthened, then all the graphs that guided the narratives would be defunct, and would need to be redone. Since the narratives of one set of countries fed into a revised model, narratives would need to be written for a newly (and of course randomly) selected set of countries. This process should continue (at least logically) until the narratives added no more value. If the process is done to its logical conclusion, it will appear to the reader that the narratives have added no value!

Following this procedure, we include here the two countries that were chosen for us – Burkina Faso (no war) and Algeria (war). For each country we provide the graph and tables generated by our statistical models. We accompany this with our (early draft) narratives that seek to account for both model successes and failures.

Burkina Faso

Despite an abysmally low GDP/cap, Burkina Faso's predicted probability of civil war onset has on average been lower than the average for the Africa region as a whole and only marginally higher than the world's average. Low population, no mountains (Burkina Faso is located in the savanna zone on a granite and gneiss plateau some 650 to 1,000 feet above sea level),⁷ and lack of oil exports have kept Burkina Faso below the world's average for 28 of its 40 years of independence, but with a peak at only 5.4 percent in 1960 and 1961. Furthermore, the sum of the civil war probabilities over 40 years is .74, implying that there was, by our model, only .74 expected civil wars over the entire period of Burkina's independence. Therefore, the outcome of no civil war is not violated in any sense by Burkina's history.

Our theoretical account of civil wars ignored political culture arguments and arguments having to do with ethnic fractionalization. The Burkina case supports both of these positions. An overview of colonial history allows us to rule out any suggestion that the population within the boundaries of today's Burkina Faso had a docile political culture, and were therefore less inclined toward violence. Early in the colonial period, there was violent resistance in the West -- the Samo revolts in 1898 and the Bwa clashes with the French in 1899. That year the Mossi staged a quick rebellion after the death of their monarch and the appointment of a new one. In 1908 there was a resistance movement near Koudougou, when a Muslim leader asked Mossi not to pay taxes and marched onto the capital with 2,000 troops. The French responded by burning villages, seizing goods and animals, imprisoning some

⁷ Its elevation differential is only 549 meters, with the world median at 2762. Burkina Faso is flat.

chiefs, and lowering chiefly stipends. In 1914 there was another Muslim rebellion at the bend of the Black Volta. In 1914 conscription led to another bout of rebellion in the West, among the Marka and Bwa (Englebert 1996, 22).

Moreover, Burkina Faso bears out and provides insight into our finding that high levels of ethnic diversity do not predict civil war. There is great linguistic and ethnic diversity among Burkina's inhabitants (who are commonly known as "burkinabè"). The Voltaic linguistic grouping includes the Mossi (50.2% of the population), Gurunshi (5%), Lobi (7%), Gurmanche (4.5%) and Senufo (5%). Mande-speakers include the Mandigue (7%), Bobo (6.7%), Bissa-Boussanse (4.7%), Marka, and Samo and the Dyula, whose language is the commercial lingua franca. The final grouping includes the Peul (10%). About 50% of burkinabè adhere to traditional religions. About 31% are Muslims, a faith that was historically resisted. Roman Catholics form a small (10.3% for all Christians) but influential educated minority. Burkina's ethnic fractionalization score is .68, with the world mean at .38. That it is highly fractionalized and without civil war would have troubled some theoretical models, but not ours. Those models that see a single group with a majority (the Mossi) and one other group with at least 8% of the population (the Peul) as especially subject to civil war would also have trouble accounting for peace in Burkina.

However, the perpetual political instability in Burkina Faso, in which our model puts great weight as a predictor of civil war, should give us pause. Several political upheavals, which our model holds as conducive to civil war, had no such affect in Burkina. Independence (coded as "new state") in 1960 did not set off a war by threatened minorities. In the early 1970s, there was a regime change toward democracy, leading to ten years of a mixed democratic/authoritarian rule, which we call anocracy. Anocracy correlates strongly with civil war, but had no such affect in Burkina. In 1977 a new constitution was approved and Burkina experienced two years of vibrant democracy. This begins a six year period of continued political instability, first toward democracy, and then a reversal in 1980 when labor unrest induced the military to stage a coup suspending the constitution. By the 1990s, the autocratic elements of military rule were relaxed, and for nine years from 1991-99 Burkina is coded again as anocratic. That Burkina was a new state, suffered from seven years of political instability, and experienced nineteen years of anocracy -- all of which by our model made it

susceptible to civil war -- illustrates a weakness in our model. Our model should reveal greater possibilities in those periods of political instability in which the predicted probability of civil war went above .02.

Lack of outbreak during periods of political instability therefore requires some account. In our account, we show first that at the time of independence there was a near civil war onset, one that is often ignored in accounts of Burkina's history that have no theoretical reason to look for it. Second, we show why French colonialism in Africa tended to cauterize rebellion, as our model predicted it would. Third, we develop a conjecture that the possibilities for emigration of young men to labor shortage countries has a dampening affect on civil war onsets, overcoming the incentives for civil war that come with poverty and instability.

Our narrative should therefore focus on the three periods when the probability of civil war jumped higher than the world average, and account for why in each of these periods there was no civil war. First is the period of initial independence (1960-61), a time when the commitment mechanism might have been expected to have given minorities the incentive to rebel earlier rather than later. Second is the period of anocracy (1970-79) followed by political instability (1978-81), a period in which there should be signals to potential rebels that the state would be less capable to effectively repress a rebellion. Third is the period of anocracy, from 1991 through 1999, as the country became quasi-democratic. In none of these periods was there a civil war. That none has occurred is not anomalous, but it would be useful to see what factors worked against civil war in the periods that the country was more susceptible to an outbreak.

Early Independence (1960-61)

A Mossi-dominated political party headed by Maurice Yaméogo led Upper Volta to independence in 1960. Political life has since been dominated by the small educated elite, military officers, and labor unions. Yaméogo was overthrown by the military in 1966 after

trade-union protests. The question here is why anti-Mossi or pro-rural forces did not take the opportunity to exploit the weaknesses of a newly independent state before it had sufficient organizational experience and capabilities to repress rebellions?

There were two deep cleavages in Upper Volta as independence approached, both of which could have ignited a civil war, with losers in the transition fearing that they could be further marginalized by the winners once the winners consolidated power. The first cleavage was between the aristocratic Mossi, who tended to keep their children away from European schools and the commoners who sent their children to foreign schools and were favored in the transition to independence. The Mossi emperor (the *mogho naba*) died in 1957, and was succeeded by his 27 year old son, who wanted to be constitutional monarch. His claims were rejected by the new political class, which was mostly Mossi commoners. In fear of losing all power, the young emperor sent 3,000 warriors with primitive weapons to surround the territorial assembly. This insurgency was decisively put down by French troops (Englebert 1996, 33)

The second cleavage pitted the Mossi against the cosmopolitan traders of the West who were culturally united through the use of Dyula as a lingua franca. In the colonial period, the French allowed the Dyulas freedom to travel, and this allowed them to trade as well as to proselytize their Muslim faith. While Westerners were largely Muslim, Mossi remained animist and some became Christian (Englebert 1996, 127). On the political dimension, westerners favored a federation of French West Africa, and the broad political program of the Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, whose Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) had branches throughout French West Africa. Later on, as nationalism outpaced federation, a Mali Federation was envisioned, again with Dyula support for Upper Volta's participation. In Upper Volta, Nazi Boni, a Bwa-Bono of the West sought entente with Côte d'Ivoire and later membership in the Mali Federation. Maurice Yaméogo, as first president of Upper Volta, was able to marginalize and eventually exile Boni (Englebert 1996, 34-5), thereby cutting the wings off a potential insurgency.

Our principal explanation for lack of onset in the early independence period focuses on the role of France. As Jacques Foccart reveals (1995, vol. 1, 96) Upper Volta was a

country that France had great influence over. There was a missionary Révérend Père François (who was known as RPF, the party of Houphouët-Boigny by his initials, but also for his support for Houphouët's party) who everyone knew was a nephew of De Gaulle, and through him France exerted much direct influence. For example, on the eve of independence, Yaméogo was committed to support for the Mali Federation, but through the pressure of French High Commissioner Paul Masson (who so angered Yaméogo, he demanded that Masson be recalled) and France's alter ego in Africa, Houphouët-Boigny (who saw the Federation as a threat to his hegemony in French Africa), Yaméogo without explanation pulled out.

France was committed not so much to the tenure of its African client leaders, but rather to a political process in which successors to the presidential palace would be cooperative, not create blood-baths, and to maintain alliance relations with Houphouët.⁸ When Yaméogo faced a popular rebellion (as he did in regard to the aristocratic Mossi symbolic rebellion in 1958) France nipped this challenge in its bud. However, the French weren't overly concerned with coups d'état. In regard to the coup that overthrew Yaméogo in 1966, De Gaulle said to Foccart "All of them [those several leaders including Yaméogo who fell in coups in 1966] will pass." Yaméogo, Foccart recalled, did not call for French help. In fact he urged his army chief of staff, Sangoulé Lamizana, to take power. "It is true," Foccart observed, that De Gaulle did not like coups d'état, "but he appreciated the efforts of soldiers who restored order, as did Lamizana..." But, consistent with a politics of clientage, De Gaulle tried numerous times to get Lamizana to free Yaméogo from house arrest, even though Lamizana was afraid of Yaméogo, for his charisma, for his cunning, and for the money Houphouët was sending him to pay his supporters in the military to mount a coup in the name of the restoration of the first republic. Eventually, during Pompidou's visit to Africa in 1972, Foccart was able to manage Yaméogo's freedom and retirement in safety in Ivory Coast (Foccart, vol. 1, 148, 150, 286-7; 324). France followed then a consistent policy in this period of peaceful if unconstitutional transition of rule, and the protection of its trustworthy clients.

⁸ Although this latter goal was difficult for Mitterand, whom Houphouët despised going back to the days when Mitterand's SFIO appointed several reactionary governors to French West Africa (Foccart, vol. 2, 335).

Two general points about civil wars follow from this observation. First, the transfer of power from metropole to colony leads to a challenge by minorities only if potential insurgents see the newly independent country weaker at the time of independence than it would be after some period of consolidation. This was certainly true when the metropolises were weak -- after World War II when the imperial powers had virtually no control over the postindependence politics in Asia and the Middle East. It was equally true of post-communism, when there was no metropole -- Russia seceded from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was a rump state -- to protect the leaders of the successor states. The era of the 1960s and independence granted to African states was quite different. The metropolises were relatively stronger, less willing to tolerate partition (having “learned” from India and Palestine), and challengers to new states in Africa rarely had external homelands to support their secessionist desires. These factors (summarized on the Table below) reduced the incentive of potential insurgents to challenge the new state. Furthermore, despite the political transition, French and British civil servants, judges, and military officers remained on seat for several years [GIVE CITE]. Potential insurgents, if they calculated their opportunities, would rather have waited for the European support structure to disappear (and in most cases they did wait), rather than fight early. Thus, Africa is an exception to the commitment logic underlying the incentive for insurgents to move early against new states rather than late.

The Political Context of Independence Over Three Eras

	Power of Metropole	International Norms	State Coherence	External Homelands
1945-49	Weakened by WWII	Partition is acceptable	Moderately strong, with no indication of direction	Mixed
1960-64	Strong	Partition is unacceptable	Weak, propped up by colonial powers, without evidence of strengthening	Few
1990-94	Chaotic, nonexistent	Partition is acceptable	Weak, but getting stronger	Many

A second observation is that French neocolonialism in this regard was exceptionally powerful. French decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa (outside of Guinea, in which a referendum rejected future membership in the French Community) did not involve handing over power to the sort of “lame leviathans” (Callaghy, 1987) who could massacre minorities but could not sustain an orderly society. France took responsibility for order. French President Charles De Gaulle saw strategic importance for France in Africa, in part due to the support he received there for his Free France in World War II. This view gave France a special role in the Cold War, outside of the superpower rivalry. France’s west African colonies remained under the monetary protection of the French franc, and the military protection of the French foreign legion.⁹ In light of this, and our adding the variable of French colonialism in Africa up through 1990 (when policy changed in regard to its former colonies in Africa) its estimated affect is a near threefold reduction in the annual odds of a civil war. Therefore, while our model predicts a .054 probability of civil war onset in Upper Volta for 1960 and 1961, the predicted probability for Nigeria (a British colony) in its first two years of independence is nearly three times higher. Thus our model correctly lowers the estimated probability of civil war onset in Upper Volta, due to French colonialism, in the first two years of independence. If our model further specified era of independence, with a dummy for the 1960s, it would have done better.

Period of Anocracy and Political Instability (1970-83)

Under the benign hand of Lt. Col. (later Gen.) Sangoulé Lamizana (president, 1966-80), Upper Volta enjoyed more civil liberties than most other African countries. Anocracy begins with the creation of a civilian legislature from 1970 and continues through 1980, when renewed union pressures and military impatience with squabbling civilian politicians led to a coup. A politicized officer corps mounted new coups in 1982 and 1983, when Capt. Thomas Sankara and a young, radical officer group seized power and sought to revolutionize society.

⁹ Where France was relatively strong compared to its colony, it was able to sustain a post-colonial order to its interest. Where it was weak (e.g. in Algeria and Vietnam), theorized commitment problems were apparent.

This moved Burkina Faso in our coding from anocracy towards autocracy, but with higher than average rebellion scores due to political instability from 1978-83. Common people were encouraged to create Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) in cities and villages through which to build schools and clinics, run local cooperatives, and exercise local power. The CDRs and Sankara sought to divert funds from the costly urban civil service to rural development, and Sankara came to symbolize popular democracy in ideology but brutal authoritarianism by regime type. The question here is during the anocratic rule of Lamizana or the subsequent period of instability were there pressures for rebellion, and if not, why not? If so, were they not unleashed during this propitious period?

The country literature offers two explanations here for peace in this anocratic and unstable era. The first focuses on the supply of potential insurgents. Upper Volta from the early 20th century had been the principal supplier of labor to Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. After the World War I, Upper Volta became a source for forced labor recruitment. It was used to build infrastructure, and cotton production. But by 1922 it became a reserve labor pool as it was asked to provide 6,000 workers for the Thies-Kayes railway and 2,000 men for railway work in Côte d'Ivoire. Agricultural workers were sent to French Soudan (today's Mali) and Senegal, and in Côte d'Ivoire to the timber industry (Englebert 1996, 22-25). This opportunity for young men to work abroad reduces substantially the recruitment pool for potential insurgents. The 1985 census estimated 749,220 emigrants, twice that of the 1975 census. The actual figures may be closer to 1-2 million, and their remittances amounted to 18.4% of imports in the 1980s (Englebert 1996, 111-12).

The second explanation has to do with Mossi culture. Many commentators have noted the assimilationist nature of the Mossi that "blends ethnic distinctions." This assimilationist project was not too difficult to carry out given the considerable cultural unity of the area. As noted by Skinner (1989, 17) there is a "Voltaic culture area, all of whom speak languages belong to the Gur or Moshi-Grunshi group of the Niger-Congo family of African languages" who are primarily horticultural (growing cereals, and yams when conditions permit), venerate ancestors, recognize an otiose high god, pay homage to a female earth deity called *Tenga*, have priests (Tengsobadamba) who are custodians of shrines, have secular chiefs called Naba, Na, or Nab, and acknowledge the same totems.

In this light consider the charismatic leader of the period, Thomas Sankara, who staged a coup in 1983, at the end of the period of political instability. Sankara became a national hero in fighting a border war with Mali in 1974. He was the darling of the marxist ideologues. His is a Mossi by mother and a Peul by father. His blending of ethnic categories fed into his renaming of the country to unify the three Sahelian cultures. The etymology of country name Burkina Faso and the citizen name burkinabè is as follows:

Burkina = “men of dignity” in the Mossi language

Faso = “republic” in Dioula language

Nabè = “inhabitants” in the Peul language

By our model, however, ethnic similarity should have no impact on the probability of peace. These arguments are therefore hardly convincing. Perhaps it could be argued that assimilationist policies offered by leaders born themselves from mixed marriages (as with Tito in Yugoslavia and Rawlings in Ghana) seem to be able to stave off -- at least during their time of rule -- ethnic rebellion. But this conjecture is highly speculative, and hard to test.

An alternative viewpoint on the effects of Mossi assimilation is that it has led to the broad geographical spread of Mossi throughout the territory. Here, consistent with our findings about territorial concentration, the blending of groups has made secession for any other ethnic group hard to justify by claims to ownership of territory or by the strategic advantage for insurgency that concentration of population provides (Englebert 1996, 125-6).

The New Anocracy (1991-1999)

Disputes among the ruling group led to Sankara's assassination by his deputy, Capt. Blaise Compaoré, in October 1987. This act and the new military government provoked popular revulsion and anger. Marxism-Leninism was abandoned as the official ideology. But Compaoré resisted the national conference route to democratization (as was taking place in Benin), and with his autocratic style of democratization he faced urban rioting and violence

in September 1991. A new constitution approved by voters in 1991 reduced the powers of the presidency and provided for direct multiparty elections. The relatively small change towards freedom made Burkina Faso an anocracy by our coding, yet without political instability (as the change in the democracy score was too small). Thus the predicted probability for civil war in 1991 was only .01, and our model conditioning on the minimal change in the democracy score (a proxy for regime coherence) would have correctly predicted no escalation of the 1991 violence.

Compaoré and his party won the presidential election of 1991 and the nation's first legislative elections in 14 years, held May 1992. Compaoré's supporters won 101 of 111 seats in the May 1997 legislative elections. After the constitution had been revised to allow him to run for reelection, Compaoré won another term in presidential elections held on Nov. 15, 1998, that were boycotted by the major opposition parties. Early in 1999 the opposition called for an investigation into the government's alleged support of rebel forces in Sierra Leone's civil war. Later that year a committee of "wise men" convened by Compaoré in an effort to end the ongoing political crisis recommended the formation of a government of national unity. Compaoré revamped his cabinet in late 1999 and again a year later in an effort to meet continuing demands that he include more parties in his government. When new national legislative elections were held in May 2002, Compaoré's party (which had previously held 103 of 111 seats) barely retained its majority, with the remaining seats divided among a number of opposition parties.

The 1990s have been peaceful when our model predicts a slightly higher than the world mean for predicted civil war onset. One explanation might be the relatively impressive economic gains of the previous decade, as GDP/cap had a growth rate of 1.6% per year through the 1980s, going from \$448 to \$515 (Penn World Tables). Our model doesn't include growth, so Burkina would still have been coded in this period as destitute. Furthermore, in 1991, Compaoré accepted a World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme and the IMF quickly provided a Special Drawing Right of \$31 million. This money was quickly spent to buy off opposition.

One problem here is how Compaoré survives with a weakening of ties to France? The blood bath he drew in his overthrow of Sankara (in which he killed several of his closest allies from the 1960s) only sickened France's Africanists. His public marxism went against the French tide in the late 1980s. Libya's Qadaffi supplied Sankara militarily to stave off the coup, and this further isolated him in the region. However, Compaoré has a retinue of Israelis providing him private protection. Through marriage, he was related to Houphouët, and Houphouët clearly encouraged Compaoré to stage the coup against Sankara, whom Houphouët despised. With Houphouët's strong support, France continued to supply military aid to Burkina (Foccart, vol. 2, 332-33). Under these conditions, even with a general weakening of France's military support of African régimes, the likelihood of rebellion in Burkina Faso remains relatively low.

To be sure, careful observers note imminent insurgencies. Pillet-Schwartz (1996, 24) has noted that the droughts of the 1980s in the Sahel have ethnicized Burkina's population to new heights. From the perspective of the burkinabè, she reasons, if you are going to die, at least you should not die anonymously. The political troubles in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002-03, in which many burkinabè have been forced back home, presents a new pool of potential insurgents to challenge the well-entrenched political class of Mossi soldiers that has ruled Burkina for most of its history. Finally, there is a time-bomb in the agricultural colonization of the west and southwest by Mossi migrants that began in the drought years of the 1970s into the western Bobo and Bwa region, which was fertile and underpopulated. Mossi, to be sure, got land from local chiefs, so there is no suggestion that this was a plot by the center to colonize non-Mossi areas. But with a 20%/year growth in Mossi population in these areas, there is much deforestation. Autochthonous populations have become leery of these settlers, raising ethnic tensions (Englebert 1996, 126). Given our model's predictions, none of these should drive civil war; but the fact of continued anocracy makes these trends more likely to drive Burkina Faso into civil war than was the case from 1984-90.

Algeria

Our model tracks with near perfection Algeria's two civil war onsets since independence in 1962. Over the course of the thirty-eight years since independence, its mean probability of civil war onset is .04, which translates into a predicted probability of 1.44 onsets since independence. Algeria's average probability is quite high, about two and a half times the regional average for states in the North Africa / Middle East region. Like many states in the region, Algeria's oil exports -- 96 percent of total exports of US\$12.7 billion in 1990 (Metz 1993, Society) -- make it more susceptible to civil war than if it had been without oil. Its rather large population estimated at 32.5 million in 2003 -- some 1.7 times greater than the regional average -- makes civil war even more probable. And its GDP per capita is less than half the regional average. Since country poverty is the strongest predictor of civil war, Algeria's weak economy makes insurgency more likely. (Algeria's mountain coverage is somewhat below the regional average, and if anything, lowers the expected probability of civil war). Oil, poverty, and large population work in concert to make Algeria a likely victim of civil war onset in general.

But the model does even better. Algeria's onsets in 1962 and again in 1992 both occurred precisely when the model indicated heightened probability. In 1962 and 1963, as a new state, our model gives Algeria a .14 probability of onset, among the highest in our entire sample. In 1990, with regime instability and anocracy, the model predicts a tripling in the likelihood of a second civil war, from .02 to .06. Within two years a second civil war broke out, one that still rages.

Not having ethnic fractionalization as an explanatory variable lost us next-to-nothing in our civil war estimates for Algeria. Its population is a mixture of Arab and indigenous Berber that are largely integrated with little social stratification along racial or ethnic lines. While there are several other ethnic groups present in small numbers, Arabs constitute about 80 percent of total (Metz 1993, Society 1.1). In our index of ethnic fractionalization, Algeria scores .43. This is higher than the mean for all countries in the region (average = .22), but low as compared to the other countries in West Africa (average = .65). In fact, Algeria in terms of ethnic fractionalization is close to the world average (.37), so little is gained by pointing to

levels of heterogeneity. In terms of religious fractionalization, Sunni Muslims are dominant. Non-Muslim minorities include about 45,000 Roman Catholics, small number of Protestants, and very small Jewish community, and these are trivial numbers. There is clear religious homogeneity. Insurgency in Algeria cannot be accounted for on grounds of civilizational difference or any other theory of ethnic or religious factionalization.

The fact that our model does well in this case, however, does not assure us that we have the mechanisms correct. In fact, there is reason to look carefully at this case to reassess our principal storyline in regard to mechanisms. The principal mechanism we have theorized linking low GDP per capita to insurgency is to portray poverty as a proxy for state weakness in confronting insurgents. This story doesn't quite fit the Algerian case. Although Algeria is relatively poor for its region in terms of GDP per capita, it has a formidable army, honed by years of anti-French guerrilla struggle. Its infrastructure is moderately well developed. There are more than 90,000 kilometers of roads in Algeria's network, 58,868 of them paved (Metz 1993, Transportation). Its army is formidable. In late 1993, it consisted of 121,700 total active forces. Algeria's internal security forces included a Gendarmerie Nationale of 24,000, Sûreté Nationale force of 16,000, and 1,200-member Republican Guard Brigade (Metz 1993, Armed Forces). So we shouldn't assume that because our model did well, a close examination of the case would provide strong support for our theory.

Here we focus on three periods.¹⁰ First we examine the transition from colonial rule to independence so that we can isolate the mechanisms that translated high likelihood of civil war to its actual occurrence. Second, we survey the nearly three-decade period when civil war probability stayed within a range of .02 and .03. Algeria in this period hovered slightly above the world average in its susceptibility for civil war, which of course is a quite low likelihood. And in this period of lowered probability, while there were near-outbreaks, there was no new civil war. Third, we analyze the period of anocracy and political instability, when the

¹⁰ The structure of this narrative relies heavily on Metz (1993). Since we used the electronic version (where no page numbers are provided), citations give the section of the book from which the material was quoted. We did not use quotation marks where material from Metz was combined with material from other sources. Among our sources, there was no consistent spelling of Algerian names. Even in quotation, we retain a consistent spelling of all names, mostly using Metz (1993) as the standard.

likelihood of civil war heightens, again to isolate the mechanisms that translated this different source of susceptibility into an actual onset.

The Immediate Post-Independence Period

Algerians fought a civil war in the wake of their own independence on June 5, 1962. It was the direct result of several anticolonial leaders jockeying for control over the state, each of them representing different factions. In Evian on the Swiss border, after an unimaginably brutal war for independence, the French government capitulated and signed an accord with the GPRA (Gouvernement Provisoire de la Révolution Algérienne), based in Tunis, with Benyousséf Ben Khedda as its leader, paving the way to Algerian independence. With this document signed, the French government released the so-called “historic chiefs” who had long been incarcerated. Once released, the most powerful of these chiefs, Ahmed Ben Bella, denounced the Evian accords as a sell-out, and accused Ben Khedda of making a secret deal with the *colon* settler terrorists (in the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète – the OAS). Ben Bella at a meeting of his faithful in Libya then created a Political Bureau that would replace the GPRA.

Both Ben Bella and Ben Khedda saw it as essential to control the liberation army, the ALN. Ben Khedda, fearing that Houari Boumedienne of the General Staff was disloyal, released him from his duties. Boumedienne refused to obey this order, and allied with Ben Bella, bringing with him both divisions of the ALN (from Tunisia and Morocco), amounting to 45,000 troops. Losing support from the national army, Ben Khedda sought alliances among the so-called *wilayat*, the regional armies that were quasi-autonomous throughout the independence war. His strongest alliance was in *wilaya* III, the Kabyle, and the Tizi Ouzou (the major city of the Kabyle) group made up of Berbers. Berber leaders (who were more closely tied to the French) felt disenfranchised in Ben Bella’s Political Bureau, as they received only one marginal seat. Ben Khedda was also able to get the support of *wilaya* IV (Algiers) under the control of Colonel Youssef Khatib. In response, Ben Bella quickly brought several *wilaya* warlords to his side, and was able to trump Ben Khedda when Colonel

Chaabani of *wilaya* VI, a province that controlled the passageways to Algiers, declared for Ben Bella.

Ben Khedda recognized that he was without a chance for a military victory, and negotiated a compromise with Ben Bella. But Col. Khatib refused to abide by this deal, and he deployed the 2,000 guerrillas that he had mobilized to block the armies of the Political Bureau from entering Algiers. In response, Mohammed Khider, one of the historic chiefs and a member of Ben Bella's Political Bureau, organized a rump leadership group in the Algiers *wilaya*, forcing Ben Khedda's ministers to flee the capital. Colonel Khatib, with his guerrilla band, found itself defending a government that no longer existed. His armed bands confronted the ALN in an anarchic chaos, in which 2,000 people were killed. Many Algerians used the resulting chaos to settle old scores, as members of the FLN were able to secure revenge against the pro-French Muslims (known as the *harkis*) who had fought against them.¹¹

There is hardly consensus in Algerian historiography on how to represent these events. A government brochure of 1965 called *Algeria on the Move*, prepared for the Afro-Asian Conference avoided giving any categorization of the events. It read "July 1962 was a black month in Algeria. Not enough doctors for the mutilated victims of the last bombs...The departing French officials had left nothing but emptiness...There would be no bread, perhaps no water....Alarming rumors spread through the back streets" (Ottaways 1970, 9). Monneret (2000, 286) in his impressive documentary of the period entitled the section minutely describing the events as "the summer crisis" of 1962. The Ottaways (1970, 92, 177) in their comprehensive journalistic account describe it alternatively as the "summer civil war," the "summer struggle," and at one time as the "civil war in 1962." Quandt (1969, 171) does not refer to the events as a civil war, but his authoritative account makes clear that by our definition, post-independence Algeria experienced a civil war. He writes that "Open fighting between the troops of *wilayas* 3 and 4 and the forces of the *Etat Major* broke out during late August and early September, causing several thousand casualties."

¹¹ This skeletal account is based on Humbaraci (1966, chap. 4); Stone (1997, pp. 37-47); and Jackson (1977, 66-72).

Given that it was a civil war (at least by our criteria), we now ask what were the mechanisms linking the propitious conditions for civil war in 1962 to its actual outbreak? One might have expected that Algeria would be the exception, for historical reasons. Algeria's War of Independence (1954-62) was brutal and long. Although often fratricidal, analysts point out, as is the case more generally for wars of independence, "it ultimately united Algerians and seared the value of independence and the philosophy of anticolonialism into the national consciousness" (Metz 1993, chap. 1). If this is the case, it needs to be asked why civil war broke out in independence's wake.

Going back further, Algerian historiography records a genuine nationalist figure around whose image all Algerians could unite. This is Abd al Qadir, who fought battles across Algeria against French forces seeking to pacify the country. His forces were defeated in 1836, but when the French broke the treaty that had ended hostilities, he rebooted his holy war. He failed, but took refuge in Morocco and used his friendship with the sultan to conduct raids into Algeria. He was again defeated and promised safe conduct in Palestine, and he agreed to those terms. But he was tricked and incarcerated in a French prison. Napoleon III took compassion and freed him, and Abd al Qadir resettled in Damascus, where he intervened during an Ottoman massacre of civilians to save the lives of some 12,000 Christians, including the French consul. For that he received the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honor. He turned not to politics but became an ascetic, gripped by his religious studies, and died quietly in Damascus in 1883. Few countries have such grist for the mythmaking mill, to feed the name of national unity. Yet any hope for unity in Algeria collapsed on the eve of independence.

One explanation for post-independence insurgency is that in Algeria, insurgency is part of what social movement theory calls its "repertoire of contention" (Tarrow 1998). In our model, as in many models of contentious politics, having a past episode of some form of contentious politics is a good predictor that it will recur. Our dataset begins in 1945 and misses pre World War II episodes. Moreover, until 1962, violence in Algeria is coded as civil war in France. But a perusal of Algerian history would clearly support the view that past violent episodes predict future ones. In the course of French colonization of Algeria, uprisings were endemic. In 1832, two years after French conquest, the superior of a religious

brotherhood, Muhyi ad Din, who had spent time in Ottoman jails for opposing the dey's rule, launched attacks against the French and their allies at Oran in 1832. In the same year, tribal elders chose Muhyi ad Din's son, twenty-five-year-old Abd al Qadir who immediately began his storied rebellion ending in 1847. Twenty-four years later in 1871, a revolt originated in the Kabyle region, when the French ceded local authority to the European settlers, called *colons*. These colons, amid a food shortage, repudiated guarantees to local chiefs that seeds would be re-supplied, and this incited a rebellion. Other Berber uprisings occurred in 1876, 1882 and 1879.

In the period covered by our dataset, the first Algerian uprising was set off on V-E (Victory in Europe) Day, 1945, when French police shot at nationalist demonstrators. The marchers retaliated and killed over 100 colons and the violence quickly spread into the countryside. In what the French called *ratissage* (raking-over), French authorities killed more than 1,500 Algerians and arrested more than 5,400. Nine years later, with crucial external support from Egypt, the war for independence began, at the cost of as many as 300,000 Algerian dead (Metz 1993 "Introduction"). A string of civil wars in the past 90 years (as part of France) made insurgency in newly independent Algeria a well-understood and cognitively available part of Algerians' repertoire of contention. Despite this plausible interpretation, the data do not support the view that colonial wars presage post-independence wars, as part of repertoires of contention.

A second plausible account for Algeria's descent into immediate post-independence civil war is that its independence, although it took place in 1962, had all the appearance of the unruly dispensation of colonies that took place after World War II. France was defeated in World War II. Yet all too soon its army was called upon to retain Vietnam and then Algeria. The unsuccessful management of the war in Algeria was a principal cause of the fall of the 4th Republic; and a putsch by Algerian army officers in 1960 nearly destroyed the 5th Republic. France had neither the means nor the will to provide assurance to the regime to which it transferred power. De Gaulle played a dangerous game. He signed the Treaty of Evian with Ben Khedda. Yet he secretly supported Ben Khedda's rival, Ben Bella, who had been a sergeant in the French army, and it was rumored at the time that he was once decorated personally by De Gaulle. The French presence in Algeria disappeared quickly, along with the

fleeing and angry colons. As described by the Ottaways (1970, 10), “the last months of “Algérie Française” had the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS) race through the streets of the major cities gunning down innocent Moslems. Two days after independence a Moslem demonstration in Oran touched off a gun battle that killed ninety-five. The OAS targeted hospitals, schools, power plants and burned the University of Algiers library. But they failed in their primary goal -- to induce a massacre of French civilians that would have called in the French army.” France in regard to Algeria in June 1962 was like UK in regard to India and the Palestinian Mandate in the post-World War II decolonization era -- get out quickly before the blood of the transition stains your own hands.

French authorities were barely able to facilitate Ben Bella’s coup against Ben Khedda, but not strong enough to foil all Ben Bella’s enemies. A weak metropole relative to the large forces mobilized by the National Liberation Front on Algeria was clearly unable to commit to the leadership to which it transferred power. In fact, relative weakness of the metropole emboldens challengers to seek power. (See the discussion of Burkina Faso. There, a much stronger France relative to any opposition force in the colony could assure a more orderly transfer of power). Indeed, in Monneret’s judgment (2000, chap. 14) the violence in summer 1962 can be attributed to French President Charles de Gaulle, who ordered after self-determination was granted “if the people massacre themselves it will be the business of the new authorities.”

Sure the French abandoned responsibility. But how and why did the FLN lose control over the transition? Fractionalization within a highly divided independence movement, which played out in an ugly moment when each sought to grab power, is a dominant theme in Algerian historiography. The Ottaways use factionalization as their leitmotif, explaining the summer struggles of 1962 -- as well as the rebellion in 1963-64 and the coup in 1965 -- to factional splits in a multi-dimensionalized divided FLN. The FLN, they point out, was never dominated by a single figure. In the 1930s, Messali Hadj created the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA); shortly thereafter Ferhad Abbas organized the Union Populaire Algérienne (UPA), which called for the integration of Algeria into France with equal rights. These parties were banned and were resurrected under different names, but both of these leaders contended for leadership in the FLN. A break-away faction of Messali Hadj’s Mouvement pour le Triomphe

des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), called itself the FLN. Abbas joined, but Messali Hadj refused and his Mouvement National Algérien waged as much war against the FLN as it did against the French. The FLN, reacting to Messali Hadj's dictatorial rule, organized a form of collective leadership while paying due respect to Algeria's "historic nine" leaders, who maintained their revolutionary purity due to their long-term imprisonment. In 1956 the top FLN leaders in the Soummam Valley in Algeria created a Conseil National de la Révolution (CNRA), first with 34 members but later went up to 72, and was referred to in documents as "the supreme body of the FLN". It was headed by a five man Committee of Coordination and Execution (CCE). The solution of collective leadership consecrated the principle of collegiality, but led to personal rivalries and factional disputes as a constant in FLN affairs.

The decentralization of the FLN required provisional pacts of solidarity that rarely held. In September 1958, in response to De Gaulle's offer of equality of political rights to Moslem Algerians, the FLN replaced the CCE and created a Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA) in Tunis as a solidarity pact against any agreement less than independence. Abbas was first president, but in August 1961 he and his moderate allies were ousted from the GPRA and Ben Khedda became president. However, the seed of the national army (ALN) in Tunisia was independent of the GPRA. Both the General Staff of the ALN and the GPRA were cut off from the war theatre by the barbed wire and mines the French built in 1957 along Algeria's borders with Morocco and Tunisia. Thus the *wilayas* were isolated from the General Staff. Their warlords had autonomy, and took the brunt of the killings. They were disdainful of the "outside army". By 1962, there were perhaps only 6,000 *wilaya* forces remaining. Factional fighting was rampant in the last years of the war. ALN officers attempted a coup against the GPRA; and *wilaya* commanders were said to have been killed by other *wilaya* leaders and not by the French.

All factional leaders met in May 1962 in Tripoli as the CNRA. The GPRA was castigated as impure, for not attacking the feudalism remaining in the Maghreb. Its "Tripoli Program" was unanimously accepted, but the leaders could reach no agreement on the composition of the Political Bureau. CNRA president Ben Khedda, not included in Ben Bella's list of the Political Bureau, stormed out of the meeting with a minority group. At the Tripoli meeting, commanders of *wilaya* 5 (Oran), *wilaya* 1 (Aurès Mountains), and *wilaya* 6

(Sahara) supported Ben Bella's "Tlemcen" faction, with close links to the ALN stationed in Morocco. Meanwhile *wilayas* 2 (North Constantine), 3 (Kabylia), and 4 (Algiers) lined up with opposed "Tizi Ouzou" -- the largest city in the Kabyle -- faction. The closer to the frontiers, the Ottaways observed, the better the contacts with Ben Bella's Political Bureau and the Tlemcens (Ottaways 1970, 13-21).

Quandt's work (1969, 11-22, 69, 167) equally focuses on elite fractionalization as the source of Algeria's instability. He saw his study as a disconfirmation of a widely held thesis that revolution works to unite a revolutionary elite. In fact, he shows, in Algeria "intraelite conflict has dominated internal politics during the entire period from 1954... There has been a constant turnover in top political leadership, and political careers are made and unmade with great rapidity." There were no stable alliances within the political elite, and no one in the elite represented in any substantive way the powerful groups in society -- thus incumbency was based primarily on deals within the political elite that were usually short-lived.

In 1962, Quandt reports, the FLN contained at least ten relatively independent centers of authority: six *wilayas*, the forces of the Etat Major of the ALN in Morocco and Tunisia, the GPRA (recognized internationally as the legal representative of the FLN), the FFFLN (The French federation of the FLN which was the financial source of the revolution), and the "historic leaders". Reconciling these forces was too difficult a task in a couple of months.

But the FLN was divided not only into factions, but into generations as well. To demonstrate this, Quandt compiled biographies of the top 87 leaders and 273 secondary leaders of the FLN, with attention to their political socialization (family, school, occupation, and political faction). From these data, he identified four separate strands: (a) Liberal Politicians -- the first generation of nationalists who were moderates and sought to act within the legitimate confines of the French parliamentary system; (b) Radical Politicians -- they got their first experience in the colonial period, but were active politically in the GPRA; (c) Revolutionaries -- these broke with the political process in 1954 and assumed military roles within the revolution; (d) Military -- these rose to influence within the ALN. Within the military there were two separate strands: those mostly organized in Tunisia and Morocco as part of well-organized armies; and those who fought a guerilla war within Algeria, the

maquisards; and (e) Intellectuals – skilled and educated elites brought into the political class in the final years of the revolution, and were brought into high bureaucratic positions. It was these five groups – not connected to any social base – that fought it out among themselves in post-independence Algeria.

With the FLN's acquisition of power, there were incompatible demands for a large number of contenders for top positions in government. Given the rivalries, winners in this struggle promoted men from the secondary elite from a younger generation, which in the Algerian case were people of greater cosmopolitanism, who pushed for an even more rapid change in leadership.

Why were these interfactional and intergenerational rivalries so irreconcilable? Quandt provides a new answer: viz., that it was the revolutionary process, one that socialized new cadres at different moments, and each generation reacted to the failures of the previous generation, and this reinforced deep differences. A discontinuous development of the opposition to French rule meant that there was no on-going political process that established rules of the political game. As long as the war was going on, these problems were latent, and no means were developed to resolve them.

But the question remains open as to why the many fractionalizations of the FLN could not have been negotiated in a power sharing agreement? Our theoretical answer to this question is to focus on the *commitment problem* faced by the occupants of the presidential office in newly independent states to respect the rights and deliver a fair share of the goods to out of power factions. There are two possible groups whose leaders may have been impelled to challenge the new leadership in fear that if they failed to do so immediately, the opportunity would dissipate once the Ben Bella junta controlled the reigns of state power. The first is the Berber population; and the second are the *wilaya* commanders. We will now look at both of these groups in order. But because the region of the Kabyle is implicated in both of these stories, they are not completely independent of one another.

Let us begin with the Berbers. Berber converts to Islam from the time of the initial invasion of the Arabs in the 7th century were treated as inferior and many were enslaved. In

the 8th century, many Berbers flocked to a religious sect built on egalitarian principles (the Kharijites) and was at the time at war with the Umayyad caliphs. The Berbers never quite assimilated to Arab cultural hegemony. Centuries later, the Berbers were more-or-less protected from the Arabs under French rule, and did relatively well in the colonial period. It was clear that the Arabs would control the independence government. Ben Bella's inclusion of a Berber lightweight (who had little standing in Berber society) into his Political Bureau was perceived as mere tokenism by the Berbers of Kabyle.

Monneret (2000, 281-2), who in general does not support an Arab/Berber divide as an explanation for the bloody summer provides some material to give this view credence. Ben Bella, once he was freed from prison, by his pro Arab statements (promising in April that he would send 100,000 troops in aid of the PLO), and thereby alienated the Berbers. Ben Bella, he points out, was worried about the Kabyle, and of Krim Belkacem in particular, and feared an alliance between Krim and Boudiaf. He wanted to build a centralized state and worried that the Berbers would want to preserve regional peculiarities. Boudiaf while not a Berber himself, developed hostility toward Ben Bella during the detention in France, and was willing to become a champion of Berber aspirations. As Monneret (2000, 289) summarizes, "The Berbers and their leader Krim Belkacem had no illusions of what would be reserved for them if Ben Bella and the Arabists took power." It was only after the victory over the French that this underlying tension could be revealed.

Berber aspirations were not ephemeral. Berbers at the time of independence had an advantage in French (through their migration patterns and through their colonial collaboration with the French), and thus they were threatened by any suggestion of Arabization. Nearly eighteen years later, Chadli Benjadid's first challenge in his presidency was the "Berber Spring" of 1980, set off when a Kabyle writer was prevented by the police from delivering a lecture on Berber culture. Students of Tizi Ouzou went on strike, leading to a government crackdown. Back to 1962, Berber fear of Arabization and latent aspirations to an imagined state (Tamazight) might help explain not only the activation of *wilaya* III in Kabyle against Ben Bella's forces, but also why Colonel Youssef Khatib, who commanded *wilaya* IV (Algiers), was able to take advantage of Berber discontent and to recruit so successfully among the Berbers of Algiers.

Quandt (1969, 12), however, puts little faith in highlighting the Arab/Kabyle split. He acknowledges that to some extent this cleavage resonates in society. However, he points out that within the elites there was no clear divide on this dimension, and much conflict between members of the same ethnic group. In a later work (1998, 95) he reiterates this view. The Berbers he writes, the only recognizable minority in Algeria, “have had relatively little problem identifying with the nation, and generally they have been well represented in all the political movements and institutions of the country...there is no separatist movement among Berbers....” Monneret (2000, chap. 15) concurs. As the two opposing camps emerged in spring 1962, he points out, Col. Youssef Khatib, who refused to join either camp, held the balance. He railed against the “cult of personality” with Ben Bella in mind. He had little respect for the historic leaders. But it was a *wilaya* that had both Berbers and Arabs in its ranks. If Berbers feared marginalization in a state ruled by Arabs, why would they have aligned with Khatib in Algiers? It is not as if they were seeking a separate bargain from Ben Khedda, leader of the opposition to Ben Bella. In fact, there is no record of his offering a better deal to Berbers, *qua* Berbers. While there was (and remains) an Arab/Berber cleavage in Algeria, there is little evidence that Berber leaders were seeking in the violence of 1962 a special deal for Berbers to protect them from a future Arabizing state.

The second commitment story, and a more compelling one, pits the forces of the new state army that was moving into Algeria from Tunisia and Morocco against the local guerrilla forces, organized territorially as *wilayas*.

The *wilaya* leaders faced a greater fear, for it was they or the ALN that would have control over the peace. Monneret (2000, 316) reports that in order to crush *wilaya*-ism, Ben Bella on 8 August decreed an end to the territorial principles of the along which the *wilayas* were organized. The Ottaways (1969, 22) note that the *wilaya* leaders opposed to the Political Bureau were especially wary of the plan to convert the ALN into an Armée Nationale Populaire. Such a move they suggest would have incorporated the *wilaya* forces into this army, and taken them out of politics. On September 28th, after the GPRA approved the Ben Bella Cabinet, Si Larbi (a *wilaya* leader who supported Ben Bella) had still not given up his control over Constantine, and guerilla bands were roaming the country. As the Ottaways describe it, the problem was in integrating the *wilayas* into the system without letting them

get the political power they thought they deserved. Ben Bella never succeeded at that, they argue, and he thus remained somewhat distanced from local political power.

What links the Berber and the *wilaya* support for an anti-Ben Bella insurgency is the topography of the Kabyle that favored an insurgency. Kabyle villages, built on the crests of hills, are close-knit, independent, social and political units composed of a number of extended patrilineal kin groups. Traditionally, local government consisted of a village council (the *jamaa*), which included all adult males and legislated according to local custom and law. Efforts to modify this democratic system were only partially successful, and the *jamaa* has continued to function alongside the civil administration. Set apart by their habitat, language, and well-organized village and social life, Kabyle villages have a highly developed sense of independence and group solidarity. Moreover, living at the edge of mountains, they had the strategic advantage of rough terrain, making their insurgents hard to find. That the Kabyle was the home of both the Berbers and the *wilaya* leaders most strongly valuing local autonomy against a centralizing national army suggests that an interaction of a history of local autonomy along with geographical favorable conditions can turn commitment problems into insurgencies. While insurgents in the Kabyle played somewhat to the Berber aspirations, these insurgents were too mixed culturally to identify their opposition in cultural terms. However, the real threat they faced was of state incorporation of those guerrilla fighters most strongly identified with on-the-ground revolution. A commitment logic clearly motivated *wilaya* leaders furthest from Algeria's frontiers -- and therefore furthest from the influence of the Etat Major -- to challenge militarily Ben Bella's claim to centralized rule before he could actualize that authority.¹²

Although this civil war occurred when our model predicts a war driven by the commitment logic, and it is "on the regression line", the theoretical mechanisms of our model were not fully decisive. To be sure, the Ben Bella leadership faced a commitment problem in regard to the Berbers, and a stronger one in regard to the *wilaya* commanders. This supports our view that for new states, commitment problems enhance the probability of civil war

¹² The *wilaya* leaders were probably correct that 1962 was their last good chance. Five years later President Boumediene faced a coup attempt led by Col. Tahar Zbiri, who organized remnants of the *wilaya* guerrilla leaders. It failed against what was by then a powerful state army (Quandt 1998, 24).

before the new state can get its organizational bearings. But the summer struggle in Algeria of 1962 looks not unlike cases of *coups d'état*, where urban violence follows from a period of contested rule. This case was one of palace politics that spilled over into urban Algiers as the troops of one contestant refused to lay down arms when their own leader sued for peace. The failure to control his own forces by the coup aspirant (Ben Khedda), and the inability of France to make an orderly retreat (having already lost a war to the NLF, it could not play a neocolonial role) -- in conjunction with the commitment problem -- helped to send some 2,000 Algerians to their deaths.

The Thirty-Year Peace

The thirty-year peace was hardly peaceful -- it is just that no political violence attained 1,000 deaths to be counted as a civil war by our criteria. Most of the period could be seen as attempts by the political leadership to enhance its power and to subdue opposition. Our model predicts, given that there were no constitutional changes and unambiguous autocracy, that there was only an above average probability of civil war. In fact, the country teetered on civil war, but avoided it.

Ben Bella, once the 1962 insurgency was squashed, controlled a majority in the National Assembly. But an opposition bloc, led by another of the historic chiefs, Ait Ahmed, soon emerged. Ait Ahmed soon quit the National Assembly to protest the increasingly dictatorial tendencies of the regime, which had reduced the functions of the legislature to rubber-stamping presidential directives. He formed in the Kabyle a clandestine resistance movement -- the Front of Socialist Forces (Front des Forces Socialistes--FFS) -- dedicated to overthrowing the Ben Bella regime by force. FFS activities in 1963 drew regular army troops into the Kabyle.

Ait Ahmed was not the only active regime opponent. There were many others, all working outside the legal political institutions. These included the supporters of Messali Hadj of the Algerian Communist Party (PCA). The communists, who were excluded from the FLN

and therefore from any direct political role, had allies in the post-independence press. Also active was the left-wing Socialist Revolution Party (Parti de la Révolution Socialiste--PRS) led by Mohamed Boudiaf. The activities of all these groups were subsequently banned, and Boudiaf was arrested. When opposition from the General Union of Algerian Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens--UGTA) strengthened, the trade union organization was forcibly subsumed under FLN control.

Serious fighting broke out in 1964 in the Kabyle as well as in southern Sahara. The insurgent movement was organized by the National Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (Comité National pour la Défense de la Révolution-- CNDR), which joined the remnants of Ait Ahmed's FFS and Boudiaf's PRS with several surviving *wilaya* military leaders. Two of Ben Bella's allies who helped bring him to power in 1962 now turned against him. Mohammad Khider was believed to have helped finance Ait Ahmed's operation. And Col. Chabaani led insurgents in the Sahara.

But there were insufficient deaths to meet our criterion for a civil war. As minister of defense, Boumediene ordered Algeria's well-equipped army to crush regional uprisings. However, when Ben Bella attempted to co-opt allies from among some of the same *wilayat* commanders whom the army had been called out to suppress, tensions increased between Boumediene and Ben Bella. In June 1965, on the eve of the Afro-Asian conference, shortly after Ben Bella had tried a second attempt to oust Boumediene from control over the ALN, Boumediene's army arrested Ben Bella in his bed. There was no resistance because Ben Bella's inner circle created to protect him from a coup had joined the plot. In fact Tahar Zbiri, whom Ben Bella had tried to use to supplant Boumediene, was the one who arrested Ben Bella. Only one of Ben Bella's key allies put up a struggle. The next day people went to work without knowing of the coup, but when it was announced, it caused little stir. The communists organized demonstrations against the coup, but they were rapidly dispersed by army troops. In Annaba and Oran demonstrations drew large crowds, and perhaps fifty were killed at the hands of the army (Ottaways 1969, 185-9). This was a coup but not a civil war.

Boumediene quickly established a no-nonsense autocracy. He dissolved the National Assembly, suspended the 1963 constitution, disbanded the militia, and abolished the Political

Bureau, which he considered an instrument of Ben Bella's personal rule. Political power would now reside in the Council of the Revolution, a predominantly military body intended to foster cooperation among various factions in the army and the party. The council's original twenty-six members included former internal military leaders, former Political Bureau members, and senior officers of the Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP--People's National Army) closely associated with Boumediene in the coup. A largely civilian Council of Ministers, or cabinet, appointed by Boumediene, ran the government. The cabinet was inclusive, having an Islamic leader, technical experts, FLN regulars, as well as others representing a broad range of Algerian political and institutional life. Boumediene beefed up the Sécurité Militaire, a secret police force, that assiduously enforced the banning of any political organization operating independently of the FLN. This security force has gotten credit for the assassinations of two leading independence figures (Mohammed Khider and Belkacem Krim) while they were living in Europe.

Boumediene died in 1978, but his system of rule persisted under Chadli Bendjedid for nearly a decade. In 1965, when Boumediene came to power, Algeria's autocracy score went from 8 to 9 (its democracy score remained at nil), and that score held steady through 1987.

However authoritarian, Algeria through the 1980s was apparently on the brink of civil war. Boumediene had to counter several coup attempts and a failed assassination attempt in 1967-68. Each time he exiled or imprisoned his opponents and further consolidated his autocratic rule. In 1980, after Arabization policies were decreed, Berber students (who saw their own social mobility to be based largely on French education) launched a general strike. Protests were organized and there were several deaths as a result. The government agreed to support teaching in Berber languages, and this helped quiet those protests.

But protests over religion became far more incendiary. By the late 1970s the Islamists mobilized. They engaged in fundamentalist policing of society in their initial years of activity, but in 1982 they called for the abrogation of the National Charter and the formation of an Islamic government. Amidst an increasing number of violent incidents on campuses, Islamists killed one student. After police arrested 400 Islamists, about 100,000 demonstrators thronged to Friday prayers at the university mosque. The arrests of hundreds more activists,

including prominent leaders of the movement, Shaykh Abdelatif Sultani and Shaykh Ahmed Sahnoun, resulted in a reduced level of Islamist political action for several years. Nonetheless, in light of the massive support the Islamists could muster, the authorities henceforth viewed them as a potentially grave threat to the state and alternately treated them with harshness and respect. In 1984, for example, the government opened in Constantine one of the largest Islamic universities in the world. In the same year, acceding to Islamist demands, the government changed family status law to deprive women of freedom by making them wards of their families before marriage and of their husbands after marriage.

The waves of protest crested in October 1988 when a series of strikes and walkouts by students and workers in Algiers degenerated into rioting by thousands of young men, who destroyed government and FLN property. When the violence spread to several other cities and towns, the government declared a state of emergency and began using force to quell the unrest. The security forces restored a semblance of order. Estimates reckon that more than 500 people were killed and more than 3,500 arrested. The stringent measures used to put down the riots of "Black October" engendered popular outrage. Islamists took control of some areas. Unsanctioned independent organizations of lawyers, students, journalists, and physicians sprang up to demand justice and change. In response, Bendjedid conducted a house cleaning of senior officials and drew up a program of political reform. He ushered in a new constitution in 1989 that allowed for the creation and participation of competitive political associations, and diminished the political role of military. Once the new constitution was ratified, the Law Relative to Political Associations legalized political parties. More than thirty parties contested the first multiparty local and regional elections that were held in June 1990. This opened the era of instability and anocracy.

Our model performs well in the previous era. Algeria had an above average likelihood of a successful insurgency, and it seemed always to be on the brink of one. What saved the regime from successful challenge was political unity at the center (maintaining authoritarian structures) and resisting calls to democracy (which would have brought "instability"). Its military -- given its long war against the French -- was much stronger than would be predicted by its GDP, and therefore, as long as it was united, it posed a powerful counterforce

to any potential insurgency. No special explanation is therefore needed for the outcome in this period.

Instability, Anocracy and Civil War

As would be predicted by our model, insurgency followed a period of economic decline, anocracy, and political instability. The economic situation was from a long-term point of view perilous (Quandt 1998, 23-6, 120). Boumediene's policies -- the political allocation of free housing, and as a consequence no investment in new housing; free services in the cities leading to mass urbanization; collectivization of French agricultural properties with below market state prices, making for regular food shortages -- kept the population quiescent but with a false sense of security. Oil subsidized these gross inefficiencies, and there was no apparent need for taxation. However, Algeria was getting only about \$350/capita each year in oil revenues (Saudi Arabia, with its greater reserves and lower population, was getting about \$5000/capita). Boumediene's economic policies therefore left little margin for safety.

The drop in world oil prices in 1986 (when GDP reached its height) aggravated Algeria's already depressed economic situation. Despite some attempts at diversification, the oil industry and especially natural gas remained major sources of national income. The economy was characterized by high unemployment, particularly among younger males in the cities. (About 70 percent of Algerians were under thirty years old, and 44 percent of the total population was under the age of fifteen).

Because of France's changing immigration policies, unemployed youth did not have an easy exit option.¹³ The resulting social unrest stemmed from the discontent of those youths

¹³ In 1968 the Algerian and French governments set a quota on migrants of 35,000 per year, which was reduced to 25,000 in 1971. In the aftermath of the oil embargo of 1973, France enforced migration control more vigorously. (Metz 1993, "Migration"). Martin (2000) points to the changed policies during the *cohabitation* régime (1986-88). Not only was there a "drastic reduction in the delivery of entry visas in France," but also there were "multiplication of administrative obstacles and extreme bureaucratization of the visa issuance process [as well as] forced expulsion on charter planes of 'illegal' immigrants..." As European countries follow suit (in

who were either unemployed or in dead-end jobs and unable to find better jobs in France. The unrest culminated in a series of strikes in late September and early October 1988 in major industrial areas and cities, including Algiers. The strikes were repressed by the military with considerable force and a loss of life estimated in the hundreds.

To counter this unrest and the rising appeal of the Islamists, Benjedid instituted political reforms, a most dangerous game. Boumediene had really begun that process. In light of opposition on the right -- basically Islamic culturalists who decried the socialist message in the 1976 constitution -- Boumediene used repression, but as noted adopted some of their agenda as his own: Arabization of education, the building of mosques, and state training of imams, a "kind of state-controlled Islam" (Quandt 1998, 28).

In 1982 now under Chadli, a form of militant Islam, rejecting the government's "official Islam" emerged on university campuses. Mustafa Bouyali (whose brother had been killed by the police) created the Algerian Islamic Movement in 1982 in the countryside, forming maquis, inflicting small damage. Bouyali was killed in 1987. Indeed, with the mass protests of October 1988, pictures show that the dress *du jour* was of the muhajadiin fighting the Russians in Afghanistan (Quandt 1998, 37-41).

"Try as they might to impose official Islam in the mosques," Quandt (1998, 49-50) reports, "the regime could not keep control." Ali Ben Hadj (a young militant and charismatic speaker in the mosques) and Abbassi Madani (an elder, and more respectable type) were co-leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) when it was approved in 1989. They were able to grow a movement through preaching in mosques. The FIS associated with small armed militias that from 1990 were in skirmishes with the regime. If Ben Hadj and Madani were denied access to state mosques, they would simply go to one of the popular mosques that were cropping up." Later in 1991, while the government supported Kuwait after Iraq's invasion, the FIS picked up the anti-Islam theme popular in the streets against American support for a corrupt sheikhdom.

the 2000's) in forestalling the free movement of labor, they may well be creating the conditions for refugee flows that their policies were designed to stop!

The FIS won the battle of the street on this issue and was feeling strong. It demanded parliamentary elections, to which Chadli agreed. He also agreed to grant freedom of expression, association, and congregation. This liberalization hardly stemmed but rather facilitated the rise of Islamists. In response to the newly gained right to form political organizations, parties proliferated, of which the FIS constituted the leading opposition party. The FIS demonstrated its appeal, or perhaps the extent of popular disillusionment with the FLN, by defeating the FLN in June 1990 local and provincial elections, winning in such major cities as Algiers, Constantine, and Oran. The Berber party, the Front of Socialist Forces (Front des Forces Socialistes--FFS), and Ben Bella's Movement for Democracy in Algeria (Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie--MDA) and several other small opposition parties did not participate.¹⁴ Again in the December 1991 national elections, the FIS surprised many by its large-scale victories despite the presence in jail of the party's leadership, including Abbassi Madani and Ahmed Belhadj. To prevent the holding of second-stage, run-off elections in mid-January 1992, which the FIS presumably would have won decisively, the army staged a coup led by Minister of Defense General Khaled Nezzar. Martial law was re-imposed, and Benjedid resigned. The military named Sid Ahmed Ghozali as acting president and head of the high military council. Ultimately army leaders recalled Mohamed Boudiaf from his self-imposed exile in Morocco to serve as head of state.

Re-imposition of authoritarian rule followed. In response to the demonstrations that occurred in February 1992, the authorities banned the FIS in early March and dissolved the communal and municipal assemblies. The court banned the FIS on the ground that it violated the constitution, which prohibited political parties based on religion, race, or regional identity. After the cancelled elections, the state engaged in systematic repression of known Islamicists, upholding laws demanding that beards be shaved off, and humiliating and even torturing urban activists suspected of Islamicist sympathies.

Surely the army must have known they were courting an insurgency. Perhaps the military could have allowed the FIS to rule thereby ruling out by definition the possibility of an FIS-led civil war. But, according to Quandt (1998, 61) they feared an alliance of Chadli

¹⁴ On Ben Bella's political activities in his 80s, see Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, "Ahmed Ben Bella: Plus ça change", 10 - 16 May 2001, Issue No. 533 [<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/533/profile.htm>]

and FIS against the military. Indeed, the FIS leadership “threatened to eliminate the top generals when it came to power.” The military saw its role as the protector of the FLN goals of secularism and modernity. An alliance between the FIS and Chadli would not only have marginalized the army from the political process for the first time in Algeria’s history, but it would also have compromised, from the senior military staff’s point of view, the revolution’s core goals.

The army was at first moderately successful. The radicals’ promised revolution (if the elections were cancelled) did not come. There was no spontaneous uprising. People who were willing to vote for the FIS were not willing to risk their lives for it. The generation that had experienced the war against France, especially those that became well-to-do, was opposed to their children taking up Islamicist ideas and joining in with FIS activists. These parents said that the proposed war against the military was a cover for settling old scores from previous violent episodes, and would be uglier than their own war against the French.¹⁵ Thus there was a tacit acceptance by the population of the cancellation of the election. Moreover, the military moved with brutal clarity. Many Islamists were arrested and tried by military courts, receiving severe sentences. In 1992 about 10,000 Algerians were sent to prison camps in the Sahara. A senior military officer even reported to *Le Monde*, “At the beginning, we thought we could win” (Martinez 2000, 58-63).

But after this initial period of calm, a low-level insurgency began. The military government’s repression of the FIS brought sharp responses from other political parties. The FLN and the FFS sought an alliance with the FIS to preserve the democratic process. Furthermore, the repression radicalized some elements in the FIS and in the military. In this violent environment, Boudiaf was assassinated in June 1992. Terrorist attacks on civilians as well as military personnel ensued. Ali Kafi of the military high command succeeded Boudiaf as head of state.

¹⁵ Indeed, Quandt (1998, 99) gives an example. In one terrible episode during FLN rule, the inhabitants of Melouza were all massacred by FLN forces; years later this village voted largely for the FIS. The GIA successfully recruits from this and similar villages. The 1992 war in many ways is a continuation of a series of blood feuds going back to the war for independence.

Insurgency was fostered by FIS fractionating. The main body of the FIS was willing to consider reconciliation with the authorities under certain conditions, such as the freeing of FIS members who had been imprisoned and the legalization of the party. The most radical group, however, the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé -- GIA), had split from the FIS, which it considered too conciliatory, and rejected any compromise. Instead, the GIA, an urban terrorist group, began its own military action in November 1991. It claimed responsibility for killing scores of foreigners and the targeting of oil installation personnel. Particularly embarrassing to the government was the GIA's kidnapping (and subsequent release) of the Omani and Yemeni ambassadors in July 1994.

Another Muslim activist group, the FIS-sponsored Armed Islamic Movement (Mouvement Islamique Armé--MIA), later renamed the Islamic Salvation Army (Armée Islamique du Salut--AIS), engaged in traditional guerrilla warfare. The AIS consisted in late 1994 of about 10,000 men and concentrated its violence on military bases, abjuring opportunities to attack civilians or foreigners.

While working on the one hand to promote dialogue, the government on the other hand instituted sharp repressive measures on Islamists. Curfews designed to counter terrorism, instituted in December 1992, were not lifted until 1994, and martial law continued to apply. The government undertook a counteroffensive against radical Islamist groups beginning in 1992, and had succeeded in killing several leaders of the GIA, including the group's head, Mourad Sid Ahmed (known as Djafar al Afghani), in February 1994 and Cherif Gousmi, Djafar al Afghani's successor, in September 1994.

Meanwhile, violence increased, and more than 10,000 (some estimates range as high as 30,000) Algerians are reliably reported to have been killed between January 1992 and October 1994, and up to 80,000 by the end of the decade. The war, even though largely urban, took on aspects of a classic insurgency.¹⁶ Prospective insurgents were urban youth. Algeria had unemployment at the time of its 1988 riots over 30%, mostly among the young.

¹⁶ While it is true that this urban war had elements of a rural insurgency, it lacked a focal rural base, a major city that insurgents controlled and formed the base of their operations. Without such a rural base, insurgents have no place to hide, and no place to return for rest.

These youths lived at home, sleeping in shifts, with working members sleeping at night, and they hung out in mosques, having no other places to go. With the austerity program of 1986, the small payoffs to them by the government ceased, and two years later they were in rebellion on the streets of the leading cities, set off by water shortages in the hot season. These youths are popularly called “Brooms”, who in their capacity for revolt have been called an urbanized peasantry (Pelletiere 1992).

Most fighting was done at night, and fighting units became anonymous urban residents (or occupiers of their siblings’ beds) during the day. Security forces fought at night, and rounded up suspects during the day. One strategy was for security forces to grow beards, disguising as Islamists, in order to extract local information. The café became dangerous as people couldn’t read who informers were. Young men who spent evenings on the beach or in cafés (and who did not have beds at home for them to sleep in at night) were open for recruitment into the armed bands, joining urban guerrilla forces as a form of recreation. But there were other motivations to join in. Guerillas urged conscripted young men to join the bands, threatening death to those who served in the army. Meanwhile the army threatened that young men whose identity papers did not show correct military service were subject to arrest. This led to a wave of murders against young men by both sides. Families hedged their bets to provide brothers with information from both sides. In 1994, with the creation of “liberated areas” in the suburbs of Algiers by the armed bands, the guerilla armies (MIA, GIA, MEI) felt that victory was near. This was an illusion as the districts were “swarming with plain-clothes government agents...military reinforcements were stationed around the Islamist communes...” But still the army was confused as to how the guerrillas continued their operations given the arrests of ex-FIS personnel and the neutralization of most of the armed Islamist groups (Martinez 2000, 76-82).

The GIA decreed “total war” in October 1994, and sought, in maintaining command, to kill the leadership of the FIS, and sought to wipe out the competing guerrilla army, the AIS. People then began to join war machines for protection, not wanting to be “a floating target.” The war became embedded into the local economy, with protection rackets, and the “Emirs” of the militias taking advantage of trade liberalization to jump-start import-export companies (Martinez 2000, 94-112). The war has now dragged on for a decade.

But has this been a civil war? Algerian historiography is not unanimous. Martinez (2000) assumes that it is. But Roberts (2003, 257) -- a sophisticated on-the-ground analyst of Algerian affairs -- says no. Only Paris called the events of 1992 a civil war. The authorities in Algiers don't (who say a "legitimate state is confronting the illegitimate violence of a terrorist movement"); nor does the opposition (which calls itself a jihad, or as a "legitimate rebellion to persuade the 'sincere' and 'patriotic' elements of the regime to recognise the error of their ways and readmit the banned FIS to the legal political process.")

What then is it? Roberts (2003, 258-9) summarizes his answer. What occurred in Algeria in 1992 and its aftermath was: (a) a thoroughly fragmented set of actors all combined into a "notionally Islamist rebellion" (b) lacking in support of its own ex-FIS electorate, or any other popular base (c) the complete non-involvement of the Algerian population into the conflict, except when dragooned into it; (d) the lack of a clear frontier of battle; and (e) the lack of any political or ideological division despite the so-called Islamic/nationalist interpretations others put on it. What this adds up to is (f) that this is another aspect of the incessant factional struggle within the Algerian power structure itself. Despite the subtlety of Roberts' characterization, since there has been a set of quasi-coordinated insurgents who are all at war with armies of the state, and casualties have gone way beyond the 1,000 threshold, by our definition this violent set of episodes in Algeria since 1992 constitute a civil war. We must now ask, what accounts for its onset?

Since the FIS was a religious mobilization, can the civil war of 1992 be explained by some religious factor? There can be little doubt that Islamic symbols had a powerful emotional impact on the population. In the late 1970s, Muslim activists engaged in isolated and relatively small-scale assertions of fundamentalist principles: harassing women whom they felt were inappropriately dressed, smashing establishments that served alcohol, and evicting official imams from their mosques. The Islamists escalated their actions in 1982, when they called for the abrogation of the National Charter and for the formation of an Islamic government. Amidst an increasing number of violent incidents on campuses, Islamists killed one student. After police arrested 400 Islamists, about 100,000 demonstrators thronged to Friday prayers at the university mosque. Islamists were also able to mobilize large numbers of supporters successfully to demand of the government the abrogation of

rights given to women in the colonial period. And of course, the Islamist political party shocked and awed the military authorities in their impressive first round electoral victory in December 1991 (Metz 1993, Chadli Bendjedid and Afterward). Fundamentalism was popular!

However, the FIS hardly represented a deep ideological cleavage to the FLN. Going back to the colonial era, the French denied citizenship to Muslims in the 1870 Cremieux Decree. Algerian nationalism was consequently always “Islamic” in sentiment. The FLN was never considered, as many in the army command considered themselves, secular and perhaps even anti-Islam. Some FLN leaders such as Ben Badis were Islamists. The FIS did not represent a deep cultural cleavage in Algeria. In fact, there is a popular pun among Algerians, “le FIS est le fils du FLN” (Quandt 1998, 96-7). The trump in the FIS hand was not its religious devotion or its sole identification with Islam.

Furthermore, our cross-sectional data show no significant relationships linking a particular religious faith to insurgency. And a careful examination of the FIS reveals little about Islam as the source for the Algerian rebellion. For one, the clerics followed the urban proletariat into war rather than led them. There is evidence that in fact the clerics sought in the late 1980s to calm the riots in the streets instigated by the unemployed youth (Pelletiere 1992, 6). The case is similar after the onset of war, when the armies of principle lost out to the armies divorced from Islamic principles. The AIS and MIA focused on the injustices of the canceled election and focused on the practical meaning of *jihad*. But the GIA, incorporating armed urban bands and ignoring Islamic ideology altogether, was able to take strategic control of the insurgency. To be sure, the GIA relies on fundamentalist ideology in order to finance the war through the “Islamic rent” paid by Middle East states (Martinez 2000, 198-206, 240). But in Algeria, it is the tactics of insurgency rather than the principles of Islamic revival that have turned religious protest into large scale civil war.

Perhaps it was not Islamic fundamentalism, but rather state strategies in regard to religion that played a vital role in driving the insurgency? After independence, the Algerian government asserted state control over religious activities for purposes of national consolidation and political control. Islam became the religion of the state in the new

constitution and the religion of its leaders. No laws could be enacted that would be contrary to Islamic tenets or that would in any way undermine Islamic beliefs and principles. The state monopolized the building of mosques, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs controlled an estimated 5,000 public mosques by the mid-1980s. Imams were trained, appointed, and paid by the state, and the Friday *khutba*, or sermon, was issued to them by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. That ministry also administered religious property, provided for religious education and training in schools, and created special institutes for Islamic learning.

What is the implication of state control over religion? Our data show that religious discrimination or grievance cannot distinguish countries that have experienced civil wars from those that haven't. But the data also show that governments that monitor and control the administration of religious practice in their country, as did the FLN government, are somewhat more likely to experience civil war. In 1969, for example, 59 governments monitored religious organization in their countries; and 35 of these countries (59%) have had civil wars in the past half century; meanwhile only 43% of the entire sample of cases (70/161) have had a civil war. Under conditions of state monitoring, religious protest necessarily becomes protest against the state, with far greater ramifications.

How does this happen? In Algeria, as early as 1964 a militant Islamic movement, called Al Qiyam (values), emerged and became the precursor of the Islamic Salvation Front of the 1990s. Al Qiyam called for a more dominant role for Islam in Algeria's legal and political systems and opposed what it saw as Western practices in the social and cultural life of Algerians. Militant Islamism was suppressed. It reappeared, however, in the 1970s under a different name and with a new organization. The movement began spreading to university campuses, where it was encouraged by the state as a counterbalance to left-wing student movements. By the 1980s, the movement had become even stronger, and bloody clashes erupted at the Ben Aknoun campus of the University of Algiers in November 1982. The violence resulted in the state's cracking down on the movement, a confrontation that would intensify throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.

Religious parties in many places of the world have the capacity to offer state services, and become state-like in organizational behavior. When the state controls religion, it perhaps

inadvertently aids in this capacity, by authorizing an organizational structure that it can control. This dynamic appears to have operated in Algeria. The FIS in the 1980s mobilized the Algerian urban populations through performing many normal state welfare functions. For example, the FIS capitalized on its well-organized party structure after the 1989 earthquake by distributing food and medical supplies in affected areas and providing such services as garbage collection and school tutoring. Such social service programs, when added to the FIS's role of providing religious instruction, met with a positive popular response and constituted a threat in the eyes of many of those in positions of government power.

In sum, rather than some deep religious message of FIS that articulated with the religious sentiments of the people, it was the situation in which the state, by seeking to co-opt religious opposition, that gave that opposition a visible stage to articulate a clear anti-regime message. State sponsorship of religion backfired grievously.

State monitoring of religious elites cannot be the whole answer to the question of how the FIS was able to effectuate a successful insurgency. As Martinez points out, Tunisia did not fall after its government's refusal to recognize the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique. Nor, he points out, did Syria's after the repression against the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982. Martinez then articulates a theory consistent with the "repertoires of contention" discussed in conjunction with the post-independence period. The answer, he writes, is in the "war-oriented *imaginaire* common to the warring parties in Algeria, making violence a method of accumulation of wealth and prestige." Thus, he continues, "The 'Emirs' – the leaders of the armed Islamic groups – prefer to define themselves...in relation to certain historical models that have achieved distinction...by social advancement through war." The models to which Martinez refers were the corsair in Ottoman times, the Caïd (native official) in French period, and Colonel during the period of the FLN against the French. "This process of advancement," he concludes, "placed violence in a 'cultural code of social improvement' where the dominant figure is that of the political bandit" (Martinez 2000, 7-10). As we noted in our discussion of the 1962 insurgency, these available repertoires of contention may well play a role in the strategic calculus of opposition groups.

Mountains also mattered. Although Algeria falls a bit below the regional and world mean for mountainous territory, the geographical reality of the Atlas Mountains standing just south of the major cities had a profound effect on the logic of insurgency. In this case, Abdelkader Chébouti, the leader of the MIA, was known to his followers as “the lion of the mountains”. His people came down to the plains to recruit young people, especially those that had been ill-treated by the Algerian army, and brought them up to the mountain camps for military training (Martinez 2000, 60). The mountains, however, were not unambiguously in favor of the insurgents. Many of the veterans of the war against France were not only veterans of the mountain hide-outs but strongly secularist as well. These veterans became the principal informers for the regime (Martinez 2000, 84-91).

What about our most powerful predictor of insurgency -- low GDP proxying for a weak state with a low-information army? While the Algerian economy was half that of the regional average and was in decline, its army did not reflect its economic weakness. To be sure, there were signs at the early stages of the war of gaps in military preparedness. The army at the start of the insurgency seemed unable or unwilling to prevent Islamist attacks on Berbers. In consequence, in 1993 Berbers began arming themselves in self-defense, adding to the carnage. Also indicative of the questionable effectiveness of government security measures was the successful escape of about 1,000 prisoners from the Tazoult high-security prison near Batna in March 1994 (Metz 1993, Introduction).

Indeed (and despite some brutal slayings of the militant opposition in the opening salvos) the military was not in great fighting shape in 1992. The military budget of Algeria was typically less than 3% of GDP compared to Syria and Iraq where it was 10-20% of GDP. So the military did not make strong demands on the country's resources. Its short border war with Morocco in 1963 was the only military engagement of Algeria's independent history, with no foreign threat. In consequence, the army was hardly battle ready. Furthermore, “the military had clearly been caught off guard. They were not prepared to fight a guerrilla war against their own people. They were not trained for it, they did not have the equipment, and they did not have special units available” (Quandt 1998, 67, 84).

But the bigger picture is of army learning. Anti guerrilla activity was carried out originally by the regular army, the gendarmerie (about 25,000 men in 1992, modeled after the French gendarmerie which until 1990 was training Algerian officers and NCOs), and the National Security forces (about 20,000 men) – neither of which had training in counter-insurgency warfare.

In 1993, however, General Mohamed Lamari borrowed a page from General Challe's play-book of 1957 by organizing *harkis* to fight against the ALN. Lamari organized a counter-insurgency force that reached 60,000 men by 1995. This force encircled GIA-held communes, allowing these areas to "rot" economically. Local merchants in these GIA strongholds felt the pain, and began to urge their local militias to change sides, and to join forces with the army. Thus local militias began to re-form under the protection of the army (but some under private funding) to combat the GIA. These militias remained in the towns and villages where they were formed, and freed the army from responsibility for control of these places.

Using another counter-insurgency tactic, the Minister of Interior in 1994 set up a "Commune Guard" to give protection to local councils that were activated in towns from which the *Moudjahidin* fled. This unit recruited from the same pool that the local armed bands were recruiting. The regime was able to offer nice career opportunities to recruits. These Guards were backed up by the "Intelligence and Surveillance Group" (called Ninjas) to counter commando operations. The Ninjas were themselves backed by plainclothesmen, driving expensive sports cars and sporting American sun glasses. They served as bounty hunters searching for militants.

Meanwhile the army modernized its information gathering systems, relying extensively on computer datasets. To run these systems, the army recruited from college graduates. By 1996 the war college graduated its first class specializing as Special Forces.

The government encouraged "repentant" guerrillas to speak out publicly and to ask for greater support for the government. These broadcasts were not initially seen as credible by the FIS, and were written off by the guerrillas as of limited value. The ones who believed

them were petty traders, who already saw the economic advantage of switching to the side of the government. However, to the surprise of the Islamists (who saw in the Army conscripts a Trojan Horse to fight against the regime), the Algerian army recruited successfully and avoided mass desertions. Young men especially from the interior were attracted to the army, as the army was increasingly well-respected in the interior. Also the army was the first step in a future official career. Once in, it should be added, it was unsafe to leave. With both inducements and threats, army personnel often re-enlisted (Martinez 2000, chap. 7). This story of Algerian military flexibility in the face of a new threat hardly confirms a theory that points to economic weakness as a proxy for a bad army. While the army may not have been prepared for counter insurgency activities in 1962, surely its history and its professionalism should have made it a daunting barrier for Islamist insurgents to even instigate a rebellion against its hegemony. It was only the fact that the army and government in 1992 were divided that may have given Islamist insurgents a false sense of their potential armed power in confronting the Algerian military.

Conclusion for Algeria

In the case of Algeria's two civil wars, practitioners in the field of comparative politics examining our statistical model showing such a nice fit between model and the real world would let sleeping dogs lie. Algeria, with its poverty, its oil, its large population, and its mountains was a likely candidate for civil war. This was especially the case for two periods, 1962-63 and 1991-1992, when political factors (being a new state in 1962; political instability and the movement toward anocracy beginning in 1990) pushed the expected probability of civil war way over the world average. And in fact, the onsets of civil war took place precisely when our models showed that Algeria was especially prone to such violence.

Why examine with a fine toothed comb cases for which no explanation is needed? In our method, however, Algeria was chosen through random selection, and so we could not let this sleeping dog lie. Waking him up proved rewarding.

The civil war onset when Algeria was a new state did not have a commitment logic in precisely the way we theorized it would. To be sure, the Berbers in *wilaya* III gave support to the insurgency because at least some of them feared a loss of status in the move from French to Algerian rule. And the *wilaya* commanders had every reason to fear that if they did not fight for power in the summer of 1962, they would be marginalized forever. But the rebellion had as much to do with the ineffectiveness of France's transfer of power than it had to do with commitment. France left the scene when the independence movement was divided in several ways, with no constitutional mechanism to decide. With urban warfare a core part of the repertoire of contention, local warlords employed this repertoire to seek advantage in controlling the state. Independence to a new state without a credible commitment by the former metropole to support the leadership to which it transfers power yields a vacuum that draws in insurgents. It was France's inability to commit to Ben Bella rather than Ben Bella's inability to commit to the future security of minorities that accounts for insurgency violence in 1962.

The onset of civil war in 1992 is, as the model highlights, well-explained by the political opening granted by the authoritarian regime, and its own movement from autocracy to anocracy. Given the apparent loss of will to rule by the government (or else, why would they have opened up the political process), clerics were emboldened to exploit the economic crisis to challenge the regime in the name of fundamentalist ideals. This is consistent with our theoretical account linking anocracy and instability to civil war.

However, a careful look at the civil war that ensued brought into question our interpretation of country wealth. We have portrayed country poverty as a proxy for a weak army, unable to collect information on its own population or to use information strategically to root out insurgents. In the Algerian case, we find an army that had learned much from the French experience in fighting Algerian insurgents during the long war of independence. Moreover, it had the resources and will to develop sophisticated counter-insurgency units. Thus the war that we so successfully post-dicted opens up new questions for explanation.

Based on the Algerian narrative, we can provide conjectures to address two new questions that are raised. First, what work is GDP doing in our statistical models? We

conjecture that low GDP matters for civil war onsets not only because it is a proxy for a weak military, but also because it is a proxy for available rebels who cannot be absorbed by the local economy. To the extent that unemployed youth have an exit option (moving to the labor markets of France), the recruitment pool will be depleted for potential rebel leaders. In this case, the rebellion came shortly after France cut off the immigration spigot. Instead of inciting even further the anti-immigration program of M. Le Pen and his Front National in France, these young Algerians were being recruited into the FIS. And so, the low GDP in Algeria worked through the second mechanism (available recruits) rather than the first (weak military) to translate high likelihood to actual onset.

Second, why, if the Algerian military was strong, did it not deter potential insurgent armies? Here we conjecture that the political instability within the Algerian army make it unclear to potential insurgents whether the military was in fact sufficiently united to counter an insurgency. It was only after the insurgency had some initial success that the military was able to regain sufficient unity to successfully battle the rebels. Splits between the military and the government also induced guerrilla entrepreneurs to organize an insurgency in the name of an Islamist agenda against the Algerian state.

Conclusion

These two narratives compel a return to high-n analysis with several new ideas. First, the variable “new state” could be productively interacted with either “era of independence” or even better “relative strength of metropole and new state at the moment of independence”. The expectation is that a new state that is relatively strong vis-à-vis its metropole would be more susceptible to a civil war, with a smaller standard error than “new state” standing alone.

Second, the narratives suggest that the project develop a coding rule for “blocked migration” patterns. Here the expectation would be that countries where young men have traditionally escaped unemployment through migration to industrialized countries would be


more easily subject to insurgent recruitment if that foreign country closed its borders. (Subsequent narratives found support for this formulation in Jamaica and Haiti.)

Third, the narratives suggest a new way to think about the religious sources of insurgency. Instead of modeling hatreds between people of different religions (discredited in the model's evidence for civilizational divides), it might be more productive to model the relationship of dominant religious authority and the state. The more the state seeks to regulate the dominant religious organization, the more it is setting up a recruitment base against the state within the religious organization. Preliminary data collection for the large-n dataset gives support to this narrative-inspired conjecture.

Fourth – and not revealed in the two narratives told here – this method has revealed not insubstantial error in the coding of the dependent variable. To give but one example, northern Thailand has been held by area experts to be a zone of peace compared to the mountainous rebellions in neighboring Burma and Laos. Coders of large-n datasets have therefore ignored the northern troubles in Thailand as possible civil wars. As a result of the research that went into the random narrative, however, we found that northern insurgents clearly passed the death threshold that our scheme determines as a civil war. In general, we estimate that as many as five percent of the codings on the dependent variable are erroneous – and this level of bias is troubling for our statistical estimates.

These random narratives, in sum, have already proven both troubling and useful as a complement to high-n analysis of civil war onsets.

Predicted Probabilities for Algeria



cname	year	pr	gdp~1	pop	mtn~t	Oil	ins~b	anocl
ALGERIA	1962	.1438914	1.275	11236	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1963	.1438914	1.275	11460	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1964	.0299269	1.517	11690	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1965	.0294119	1.589	11923	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1966	.0296131	1.584	12267	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1967	.0301775	1.548	12622	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1968	.0299141	1.6	12986	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1969	.0286795	1.758	13360	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1970	.0282048	1.835	13746	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1971	.0285001	1.826	14169	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1972	.0301191	1.676	14609	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1973	.027326	2.011	15064	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1974	.0275415	2.012	15534	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1975	.0257108	2.256	16018	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1976	.0252196	2.343	16516	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1977	.0245347	2.456	17030	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1978	.0242563	2.518	17559	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1979	.0238973	2.591	18105	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1980	.0225013	2.807	18669	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1981	.0230417	2.758	19254	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1982	.0232107	2.761	19862	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1983	.0229497	2.823	20495	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1984	.0225642	2.903	21173	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1985	.0223402	2.962	21848	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1986	.0223439	2.988	22497	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1987	.0226486	2.97	23124	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1988	.0232314	2.913	23758	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1989	.0244908	2.769	24374	15.7	1	0	0
ALGERIA	1990	.0606509	2.843	25003	15.7	1	1	1
ALGERIA	1991	.0622876	2.777	25680	15.7	1	1	1
ALGERIA	1992	.0638113	2.72	26254	15.7	1	1	1
ALGERIA	1993	.0410341	2.719	26852.84	15.7	1	1	0
ALGERIA	1994	.0428582	2.598	27454.32	15.7	1	1	0
ALGERIA	1995	.044286	2.511	28058	15.7	1	1	0
ALGERIA	1996	.0686159	2.555	28678.96	15.7	1	1	1
ALGERIA	1997	.0679664	2.605	29317.75	15.7	1	1	1
ALGERIA	1998	.0686392	2.591	29974.95	15.7	1	1	1
ALGERIA	1999	.042282	2.68	.	15.7	1	0	1

Algeria

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	38	.0400676	.0289218	.0223402	.1438914
gdpenl	38	2.340079	.541402	1.275	2.988
pop	37	19411.4	5901.332	11236	29974.95
mtnest	38	15.7	0	15.7	15.7
Oil	38	1	0	1	1
instab	38	.2368421	.4308515	0	1
anocl	38	.1842105	.3928595	0	1

North Africa / Middle East Region


Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	845	.0160012	.0215488	3.10e-10	.2527809
gdpenl	857	5.430375	7.802111	.048	66.735
pop	889	11482.33	14302.43	222	63451
mtnest	910	18.61816	21.26137	0	71.3
Oil	910	.4901099	.5001771	0	1
instab	906	.1335541	.3403605	0	1
anocl	890	.2348315	.4241318	0	1

World

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	6327	.0166781	.0223868	3.10e-10	.4785439
gdpenl	6373	3.651117	4.536645	.048	66.735
pop	6433	31786.92	102560.8	222	1238599
mtnest	6610	18.08833	20.96648	0	94.3
Oil	6610	.1295008	.3357787	0	1
instab	6596	.1464524	.353586	0	1
anocl	6541	.2256536	.418044	0	1

.

Predicted Probabilities for Burkina Faso



cname	year	pr	gdp~1	pop	mtn~t	Oil	ins~b	anocl
BURKINA	1960	.0484575	.456	4340	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1961	.0484575	.456	4483	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1962	.0101827	.413	4630	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1963	.0102229	.428	4783	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1964	.0103965	.403	4940	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1965	.0104812	.405	5103	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1966	.0106829	.373	5207	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1967	.0107621	.367	5313	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1968	.0107106	.399	5419	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1969	.0107267	.411	5526	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1970	.0107837	.411	5633	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1971	.0174694	.374	5741	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1972	.0175589	.374	5848	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1973	.0176295	.377	5959	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1974	.0177246	.376	6076	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1975	.0177214	.393	6202	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1976	.0176896	.416	6341	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1977	.0176881	.435	6487	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1978	.0285993	.448	6639	0	0	1	1
BURKINA	1979	.0288033	.445	6798	0	0	1	1
BURKINA	1980	.0288396	.461	6962	0	0	1	1
BURKINA	1981	.0183274	.457	7132	0	0	1	0
BURKINA	1982	.018394	.466	7308	0	0	1	0
BURKINA	1983	.018246	.512	7491	0	0	1	0
BURKINA	1984	.0113736	.502	7682	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1985	.0115546	.474	7881	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1986	.0115569	.495	8089	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1987	.0115792	.511	8307	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1988	.0116629	.511	8534	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1989	.011707	.522	8770	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1990	.0118052	.519	9016	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1991	.0119244	.511	9272	0	0	0	0
BURKINA	1992	.0190562	.522	9546	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1993	.0192548	.514	9527.9	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1994	.0193431	.498	9755.03	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1995	.0195031	.492	9988	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1996	.0195773	.5	10225	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1997	.0195887	.518	10473.53	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1998	.0196466	.529	10730.33	0	0	0	1
BURKINA	1999	.0196558	.548	.	0	0	0	1

Burkina Faso

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	40	.0176336	.0088263	.0101827	.0484575
gdpenl	40	.45555	.0548667	.367	.548
pop	39	7132.251	1885.083	4340	10730.33
mtnest	40	0	0	0	0
Oil	40	0	0	0	0
instab	40	.15	.3616203	0	1
anocl	40	.45	.5038315	0	1

Africa Region

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	1550	.0185108	.0185154	.0006524	.2022668
gdpenl	1561	1.095448	.9549041	.196	7.777
pop	1550	10008.91	14530.35	270	121257.3
mtnest	1593	12.75548	22.33017	0	82.20001
Oil	1593	.0803515	.271922	0	1
instab	1587	.1770636	.3818429	0	1
anocl	1582	.2237674	.4168998	0	1

World

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	6327	.0166781	.0223868	3.10e-10	.4785439
gdpenl	6373	3.651117	4.536645	.048	66.735
pop	6433	31786.92	102560.8	222	1238599
mtnest	6610	18.08833	20.96648	0	94.3
Oil	6610	.1295008	.3357787	0	1
instab	6596	.1464524	.353586	0	1
anocl	6541	.2256536	.418044	0	1

References

- Englebert, Pierre (1996) *Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa* (Boulder: Westview)
- Foccart Parle: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard* vol. 1-2 (Paris: Fayard, 1995)
- Humbaraci, Aslan (1966) *Algeria: A Revolution that Failed* (NY: Praeger)
- Jackson, Henry F. (1977) *The FLN in Algeria* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press)
- Martin, Guy (2000) "France's African Policy In Transition: Disengagement And Redeployment" Paper prepared for presentation at the African Studies Interdisciplinary Seminar, Center for African Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Il (3 March) (http://www.afrst.uiuc.edu/SEMINAR/newFrench_African_Policy.pdf)
- Martinez, Luis (2000) *The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998* (London: Hurst), trans. Jonathan Derrick
- Metz, Helen Chapan ed. (1993) *ALGERIA: a country Study* Federal Research Division, Library of Congress ([http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query2/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID\)+dz0000](http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query2/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID)+dz0000))
- Monneret, Jean (2000) *La phase finale de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: L'Harmattan)
- Ottaway, David and Marina (1970) *Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press)
- Pelletiere, Stephen C. (1992) *Mass Action and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Revolt of the Brooms* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College)
- Pillet-Schwartz, Anne-Marie (1996) "Ethnisme et régionalisme dans l'ancien Liptako: un effect de la sécheresse ou de la révolution?" in René Otayek et al *Le Burkina entre révolution et démocratie* (Paris: Karthala)
- Quandt, William B. (1969) *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968* (Cambridge: MIT Press)
- Quandt, William B. (1998) *Between Ballots and Bullets* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings)
- Roberts, Hugh (2003) *The Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002* (London: Verso)
- Stone, Martin (1997) *The Agony of Algeria* (London: Hurst & Company)
- Tarrow, Sidney (1998) *Power in Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

The Economist Intelligence Unit (1992-93) *Niger, Burkina: Annual Survey of Political and Economic Background* (London), pp. 31-56 for Burkina

Zartman, I. William (1966) *International Relations in the New Africa*. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall).

Zartman, I. William (1970) "The Algerian Army in Politics". In Claude Welch, ed. (1970) *Soldier and State in Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern).

Zartman, I. William (1975) "Algeria: A Post-Revolutionary Elite" in Frank Tachau, ed., *Political Development in the Middle East* (New York: Wiley).