Immigrants' educational disadvantage in France : is it an ethnic problem?

Author(s): Cebolla Boado, Héctor
Date 2004
Type Working Paper
Series Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 2004/210
City: Madrid
Publisher: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales

IMMIGRANTS' EDUCATIONAL DISADVANTAGE IN FRANCE: IS IT AN ETHNIC PROBLEM?

Héctor Cebolla Boado
Estudio/Working Paper 2004/210

December 2004

Hétor Cebolla is a PhD candidate at the Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Juan March Institute, Madrid.

Immigrants' educational disadvantage in France: is it an ethnic problem?[1]

Ethnic disadvantage in education is a well documented phenomenon in advanced democracies. In the specialised literature, ethnicity, altogether with class, is seen as a stable ascriptive source of disadvantage. Immigrants tend show high dropout rates and little pursuit of higher types of education (Driesen and Geert 2000, Portes and MacLeod 1996). France is not an exception (Vallet and Caille 1996 and 1999). This is not a minor problem as the proportion of French-born citizens from a foreign origin in the last century, is about one fifth (Tribalat et al. 1991:71).

Until recently the conclusions drawn from the French empirical literature were not very consistent. Some scholars argued that, controlling for class, the foreign born populations did not show any pattern of disadvantage (Clerc 1964, Corgeau 1973, SIGES 1984, Vallet and Caille 1996) while others concluded the opposite (Thélot and Valet 1994). Others argued that immigrants were better off than natives (Mondon 1984 and Seis 1980). This paper follows these series of studies and tries to disentangle the relationship existing between class and ethnicity. It also seeks to identify the precise mechanism operating under the label of ethnicity in multivariate quantitative analyses, instead of following the common practise of measuring the ethnic effect and interpreting the ethnic residuals -a practise that should be rejected in analytical groups for its obscurity-.

I. Class and ethnic disadvantage: the theoretical references

The American sociology of ethnicity has been the main font of theoretical inspiration for European scholars of ethnic disadvantage. The recent theoretical production is strongly centred on the hindering role of ethnicity (Borjas 1992, Chiswick 1988, Portes and Rumbaut 1996). The current irruption of sociological explanations based on the concept of social capital has shaped in a significant way this line of reasoning (Portes 1998). As a result there

[1] This paper was presented in the 8th Congress of the Spanish Sociological Association. I thank all the participants in the Social Stratification Group for the Comments.

is a clear predominance of non-parsimonious explanations based on the assumption that the central element producing differences in the status attainment of immigrant groups is ethnicity and not other factors -such as the unequal stratification of immigrants in the class scheme-[2]. Theoretically my work begins in a previous step. Firstly I shall try to explain immigrants' disadvantage invoking class factors. If this is enough to explain ethnic differences, then it will be possible to argue that the ethnic effect could be reduced to class factors[3]. Only after properly controlling for class-related factors, the role of ethnic specific theories will have a say. To do so I shall try to disentangle the effect of class, ethnicity and immigration-related variables.

Without any normative implication, I define any particular scenario as free of ethnic disadvantage when class and immigration related variables are enough to explain initial differences in the immigrants' educational performance[4]. My argument is anchored in the finding that a concrete part of the individual stock of human capital is country-specific (Friedberg 1996), and thus it is not perfectly portable. Therefore, immigrants may need a period of adaptation to overcome this handicap linked to the migration process itself.

The arrow number 1 represents the scenario where ethnicity is not relevant to explain the unequal educational results obtained by immigrants and natives. In that case, class –and not ethnicity- is the only ascriptive source of educational differentials. Hence immigrants will be educationally stratified according to their class position. Together with class it is possible that the pervasive consequences of the migration process have a constraining effect that may last for a certain period of time. This is why the effect of class is modified in the graphic by a discount factor called ∂. $\partial=1$ for natives and $\partial\leq 1$ for immigrants. This discount factor,

[2] Many empirical works testing these theories lack appropriate controls (Borjas 1995, Portes and Min Zhou 1993). In general the literature of ethnic inequalities in the process of status and educational attainment is not in constant dialogue with its counterparts studying other types of inequalities using the same status indicator. Sociologists of ethnic disadvantage must widen their scope incorporating more in detail the findings of the literature studying non ethnic inequalities.

[3] For example, Marxist scholars of ethnicity and race assume that ethnic and race relations are merely manifestations of class struggles. See Wolpe (1986) for a critical review.

[4] By this I mean that differences across ethnic groups could be due to an unequal degree of stratification across social class and the effect of time since arrival and other variables linked to the migration process that would erase initial differences existing between immigrants and natives over time.

introduces the handicap(s) that is (are) consubstantial to the status of immigrant. It increases or decreases with say, time since arrival, whether the student's parental couple is mixed or made of an immigrant and a French-born, etc. For the moment let's provide no extra-clarification.

Possible scenarios causing educational differentials



For the sake of analytical clarity, in this work, class is not modelled using any occupational classification but its more convenient proxies. Along these lines, the causal mechanism producing **class differentials** in education will be explicitly shown. The literature on class differentials in education identifies a plethora of mechanisms causing inequality. **Material inequalities** can still be a cause of disadvantage even in advanced societies, where the direct costs of education are null (Lucas 2001, Raftery and Hout 1993). The unequal distribution of **cultural capital** across classes (Bourdieu 1974, Bourdieu and Passeron 1977, Bourdieu 1997) is also mentioned in the literature as having this effect (De Graaf 1986, Di Maggio 1982, Halsey, Heath and Ridge 1980, Sullivan 2001). Another field of research that tries to account with the stability of class differentials in education over time addresses the question of whether **preferences for education** are different across classes. Some authors argue that individuals from more privileged social strata value more strongly education than those coming from deprived contexts (Gambetta 1987, MacLeod 1995, Murphy 1981 and 1990, Pearlin 1971, Willis 1977). On the contrary, other scholars support the assumption that preferences for education are homogeneous across groups, including class-groups (Boudon

1974), and that, where groups differ is in their –relative- risk aversion (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997, Goldthorpe 2001)[5].

From the side of **ethnicity**, the literature also identifies several mechanisms responsible for the, generally speaking poorer results of immigrants. Among them **culture** is possibly the most well-known. Following the logic of Weber's Protestant Ethic argument (Weber 1985), some argue that certain cultures are plagued by absenteeism, tardiness or the rejection of effort, while others hold values that enhance the possibility of success (Jelen 1993, Sowell 1981 and 1996). As a reaction to this idea, a number of scholars argue that the roots of ethnic disadvantage are situational and that, **discrimination** is the key for the explanation of the ethnic failure (Steinberg 1981 and 2000)[6]. **More recent theorising** about the effect of ethnicity over status attainment tried to overcome traditional dichotomy between culture and discrimination. This is what Chiswick tries to do in his 'Child Investment Model', rooted on Becker's trade off between the household level value of children's quantity and quality (Chiswick 1988)[7]. Borjas understands ethnicity as an externality on the human capital accumulation process operating through what he calls 'Ethnic Capital' that measures the quality of the ethnic environment –average level of human capital- where the immigrant children and the children of immigrants are raised (Borjas 1992). Finally Portes and Rumbuat's 'Modes of Incorporation' argue that the way in which first-movers are incorporated into the host society, shape the status attainment of future-comers and second generations (Portes and Rumbaut 1996)[8].

[5] Anyhow, a part of the literature argues that immigrant families hold greater educational expectations for their children's (Muller and Kerbow 1993, Kao and Tienda 1995). This has also been maintained in the French empirical literature (Vallet and Caille 1996).

[6] Discrimination can happen at the school level (Troyna and Carrington 1990, Carrington and Troyna 1988, Short and Carrington 1987) or at the labour market level if different returns to education (Betts and Lofstrom 2000, Heath and MacMahon 1998, Loury 1977) disincentive the investment in education.

[7] What is specific to ethnic minorities in this model is that fertility control may have different psychological cost across ethnic groups depending on the religious credo in which the group culture is embedded. Chiswick assumes that the importance of religion may vary from generation to generation.

[8] For them the modes of incorporation are a function of the immigration policies in place, discrimination and the group's ability to neutralize discrimination.

II. Data and categories for this study

Research on ethnic minorities is hindered by the difficulty existing in finding large enough data-sets to ease inter-group comparisons. France has a long tradition in the production of datasets for the study of class inequalities in education. This was the driving reason for the selection of France as the case for this study. The last panel of students -*Panel d'Élèves du Second Degré (1995-2001)*- includes for the first time explicit information about parental migration history, and this allows a proper study of ethnic disadvantage in education.

The Panel sampled a cohort of students entering into lower secondary education –*collège*- in 1995 (18.730). The information was drawn in several stages. Unfortunately, the sampling design is a source of lost cases a "recruitment questionnaire" was filled for all of them in 1995. In 1998 a "family questionnaire" was distributed to extract more information about the students' family entourage. Only some 12.981 completed the whole of this questionnaire. In addition, yearly another questionnaire was distributed to collect information about the students' academic progress[9].

The Panel did not over sampled ethnic minorities but the initial sample shows adequate figures for this study (see table A.1.1 in the appendix). The immigrant status will be introduced in the following way: *French-born* –taken as natives- are the children of French-born father and mother-; first and second generation immigrants from mixed [immigrant+French] and immigrant [immigrant+immigrant] parental couples. The relevance of these categories is justified in that being born in the host country has a potentially beneficial effect because the individual's early socialization happens already in the receiving context (Borjas 1992). For similar reasons mixed parental couples are a well know context for acculturation, whose positive effect is known to affect any indicator –from religious practise to language proficiency- (Tribalat 1995:89). With respect to the ethnic categories, the

[9] As it happen in my other panel surveys, the rate of answers decreases in each of the waves. For that reason, the Panel95 includes appropriate weights to avoid this lost of cases (POND1 and POND2; Caille 2003:212-3). A test was conducted to evaluate the functioning of the weighting protocol with satisfactory results. For more information about lost cases, see the appendix.

figures are logically lower, but still enough for the type of analysis that I conduct (table A.1.2 in the appendix)[10].

III. Empirical analyses

III.1. Differences in the track chosen in upper secondary school

Secondary school in France is divided into two blocks. Lower secondary (*collège:* $6^{ème}$-$3^{ème}$) school is a universal comprehensive system, while upper secondary school is a track system (*lycée*: $2^{ème}$-terminale). At the end of the $3^{ème}$ year, the *class council* -a board conformed by teachers and inspectors-, decides which track the student is going to follow in upper secondary. The decision is taken within the so-called orientation process[11]. The orientation process includes a first consultation where the students' families express their preferred option. This is followed by a complete evaluation of the student's performance in lower secondary. The final decision is taken by the council taking into account the family's wish and the student academic performance. Only if families disagree and complain administrative process will be opened, although this very rarely happens. At the aggregate level, this choice is much more shaped by individual level variables than by school characteristics. This process is known to be a source of inequality: in the 1990s 89,3% of the children from top-executive classes went to the upper track, but only 54,6% did it from manual background; 65,1% of the French natives went to the academic track and only 51,7% could do it among the immigrant students (Duru-Bellat and Mingat 1990)[12]. Some

[10] The use of these categories prevent from introducing a common independent variable *time since arrival*. This is not a problem because part of this effect is already contained in the first and second generation categories. Immigrant students born outside France are the children of families that arrived later to the country than those having born in France. The mean value of arrival for first generation immigrant students is 8.252 while it is 3.888 for second generations. The alternative hypothesis that first generation came later is accepted in a t-test with a t statistic of 20.047***.

[11] The appendix includes a scheme showing the place of this stage in the French educational system (A.2).

[12] Some scholars have argued that immigrants and ethnic minorities are more often orientated towards the academic track than natives (Vallet and Caille 1996, Felouzis 2003).

sociologists have argued against this system because normally, the family's wish is taken as binding information. Families from lower social strata can have a bigger likelihood of sending their children to the vocational option (Duru-Bellat and Mingat 1985 and 1988) because of a mechanism similar to what Gambetta calls a 'Socratic knowledge of ignorance' which leads to self-discrimination (Gambetta 1987:76). Another possible mechanism producing this inequality is the conservatism -risk aversion- of families from more deprived social contexts (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997).

Familychoice is dummy set equal to unity if the first option wished by the families at the beginning of the orientation process is the academic track and 0 otherwise. The table below introduces stepwise the ethnic and immigrant groups to see if, given the pragmatic nature of immigrants. They are more likely to prefer vocational tracks than natives. In the final column I introduce another independent variable -*level_family-estimation*- which is the family's estimation about the student's performance (1 is low, 4 is high)[13]. The literature has shown that the student's subjective probability of succeeding is a determinant factor in the educational decisions taking within families (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997, Breen 1999, Morgan 1998).

[13] The correlation between this subjectively reported estimation of the student's level and his objective level (measured by the results obtained in the *Brevet des Collèges* exams in 3eme) is 0.6538. Although the correlation is high it is far from perfect. Some parents may over-estimate (or under-estimate) their children outcomes. I decided to include the subjective estimation instead of the objective measure because families' preferences are taken given the information that they actually have. Nevertheless, the results in terms of signs and statistical significance are stable after controlling for the results obtained in the *Brevet des Collèges.*

Table III.1.1. LOGIT. Family's first wish in the orientation process

Variable	M1	M2	M3
Algerian	-0.2577*	0.1231	0.1078
	0.122	0.147	0.196
Moroccan	-0.3697*	0.1137	-0.0078
	0.147	0.170	0.229
Tunisian	0.0093	0.4058	-0.2530
	0.259	0.271	0.329
Italian	-0.0276	0.2470	0.0670
	0.315	0.331	0.399
Turkish	-1.2214***	-0.6602*	-0.5460
	0.266	0.284	0.511
Portuguese	-0.2355	0.2053	0.2469
	0.200	0.216	0.315
Spanish	0.0565	0.3314	0.6319
	0.281	0.295	0.385
African	-0.0634	0.3904	0.5196
	0.219	0.227	0.312
Northern	0.6787*	1.0101**	0.8452*
	0.297	0.310	0.337
Indochinese	0.5334	0.9930**	0.9039
	0.380	0.385	0.563
firstimmigrant		-0.8345***	-1.0329***
		0.189	0.224
firstmixed		-0.3119	-0.5289
		0.391	0.453
secondimmigrant		-0.5834***	-0.3206
		0.120	0.166
secondmixed		-0.2328*	-0.1587
		0.098	0.124
level_estimation			1.6345***
			0.051
Constant	1.2967***	1.3398***	-2.8122***
	0.028	0.030	0.127
n	*9491*	*9477*	*8257*
PseudoR²	*0.0043*	*0.0078*	*0.1910*
Wald chi2	*39.88****	*75.21****	*1070.14****

Legend: β and standard errors ; P. level * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

The first model shows a weak pattern of ethnic disadvantage. Although only the Turkish, the Algerian and the Moroccans are negative and significant, most of the ethic groups hold negative signs -being the Indochinese, the Northern and the Spanish the scarce exceptions-. Nevertheless, the second column shows that this predominance of negative signs is mostly coming from the status of immigrant, rather than from the ethnic ascription. It is precisely students coming from immigrant+immigrant parental couples that are more likely to be sent to the vocational track -*secondmixed* is also significant but smaller in size-. Finally, controlling for the family estimation, no ethnic group is disadvantaged and only *firstimmigrant* remains negative and statistically significant -these are the most recently arrived families-[14]. The conclusion is then that, it is the family's impressions about the student

[14] This effect disappears after controlling for father's education and head of the household occupation.

chances of succeeding that condition their say in the orientation process. The following graphic shows this effect:

Graphic III.1.1



Source: M3 in table III.1.1

Finalchoice is also a dummy valuing 1 when the final decision taken by the class council is the academic option and 0 if not. I follow the same protocol. First I introduce the ethnic membership, then I introduce the immigrant status variables and thirdly two measures of successful school outcomes: the number of times repeating any course-*repeatscollege* ranging from 0 to 5- and the grades obtained in the general exam done in 3ème -*meanbrevet* ranging from 0 to 20-.

Here a fourth column includes the family's wish -*familychoice*- to test the extent to which the shaping role of the family's wish at the begging of this process, and given the inertia of this preference, whether it is the main source of disadvantage, as part of the French empirical literature predicts[15].

[15] Note that the lost of cases in the models shown in this table is due to the sampling design. The questionnaire drawn to obtain information about the orientation process was only answered by some 10,940 respondents in 1999, 3,901 in 2000 and 318 in 2001.

Table III.1.2. LOGIT. Final choice in the orientation process

Variable	M1	M2	M3	M4
Algerian	−0.2658**	0.1227	0.3543*	0.2254
	0.093	0.113	0.159	0.414
Moroccan	−0.3466**	0.1297	0.4932*	0.5930
	0.111	0.133	0.194	0.491
Tunisian	−0.1748	0.2355	0.5594	−0.2261
	0.184	0.196	0.305	0.625
Italian	−0.1932	0.0826	0.2790	−0.2691
	0.215	0.225	0.282	0.667
Turkish	−1.2272***	−0.6946**	−0.4162	−1.1763
	0.232	0.247	0.348	0.602
Portuguese	−0.3533	0.0713	0.2586	−0.1837
	0.143	0.158	0.222	0.506
Spanish	0.0014	0.2971	0.3793	0.3394
	0.209	0.220	0.284	0.598
African	−0.2068	0.1892	0.4434	−0.5893
	0.155	0.166	0.231	0.474
Northern	0.5138*	0.7966***	0.1477	0.7382
	0.209	0.222	0.273	0.333
Indochinese	0.0329	0.4843*	0.0923	−0.4186
	0.233	0.245	0.310	0.592
Firstimmigrant		−0.5138**	−0.3483	−0.5037
		0.157	0.203	0.387
firstmixed		−0.0089	0.4468	−0.6539
		0.343	0.379	0.518
secondimmigrant		−0.5937***	−0.1767	−0.3795
		0.095	0.133	0.331
secondmixed		−0.2656***	−0.0741	0.0122
		0.072	0.102	0.236
meanbrevet			0.7203***	0.8033***
			0.017	0.041
Repeatscollege			−0.2685***	−0.0155
			0.015	0.070
familychoice				6.3692***
				0.192
Constant	0.6099***	0.6511***	−6.6096***	−11.6048***
	0.021	0.022	0.180	0.517
n	*12282*	*12264*	*11510*	*8864*
PseudoR²	*0.0040*	*0.0069*	*0.3920*	*0.8006*
Wald chi2	*58.61****	*100.66****	*2821.02****	*1279.44****

Legend: β and standard errors. P level * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

The results are somehow similar to those above presented. In the first model, the pattern of ethnic disadvantage is evidently noteworthy -again only Turkish, Moroccans and Algerian are significantly negative, but the vast majority of the groups hold negative signs-. The predominance of negative signs disappears with the immigrant status dummies. Again, the bigger disadvantage exists among the students coming from immigrant+immgrant type of parental couples -although *secondmixed* is also a moderate source of disadvantage-. Not surprisingly, the two variables used to measure the student's previous performance (M3) account for the unexplained variance among ethnic and immigrant groups -Algerians and Moroccans are now significantly positive-. Finally, the fourth model shows that the track that any native or immigrant student will follow in upper secondary is simply a function of his

performance in the Brevet exams and his family's wishes -which at the time was simply dependent on the family's impression about his academic success-[16]. The following graphic shows the determinant effect of the family's first choice in the final decision made by the class council:

Graphic III.1.2



Source: M4 in table III.1.2

Thus, grades are the source of the unequal distribution of immigrant and native students in the academic-vocational tracks in upper secondary school. For that reason, an analysis follows to explain differences in school performance using the grades obtained in mathematics and French as dependent variable.

III.2. Differences in school performance: grades in mathematics

At the beginning of lower secondary school, the students go through a number of evaluation exams so that teachers could be aware of possible deficiencies and specific needs

[16] Remark that the pseudo-R^2 raises in 40 percentage points when the mean score in the Brevet exam and the number of repeated years are introduced in the model specification. After that when the family's choice is included it raises to 80% of explained variance!!!

that must be faced up before entering upper secondary school. The use of grades as dependent variable in the specialised literature is normally done using registers from mathematics and language[17]. The dataset includes the grades obtained both maths and French language in the evaluation exams at the entrance into *collége*. The one for mathematics is the mean of the score in algebra, numeration and decimal numeration, numeric problems and geometry. The French language one includes the results of reading comprehension, text production and expression and code knowledge. As to avoid duplicating information, this paper only includes the results of the analyses for mathematics and not for French. The results obtained in French were simply confirming the conclusions drawn from the analysis of grades in mathematics[18].

Table III.2.1 presents the results of the regression analysis. The first column only includes the ethnic groups. The second one controls for the immigration status dummies. The third model also controls for class factors. For the sake of analytical clarity, I decided not to include any of the standard class schemes built from the head of the household's occupation. This practise does not provide evidence about the causal mechanism causing the effect under study. Instead, I use proxies obtained from the literature on the stability of class differentials in education, that offer a finer interpretation. This set of variables can be divided into three main blocks, one for each of the main lines of theoretical reasoning in the specialised literature: material resources, cultural ones and preferences for education.

Income, *accommodation*, *siblings* and *motherworks* capture the effect of material -economic- disadvantage. *Income* values 1 when the respondent to the family questionnaire thought that the resources available at the household level are 'very insufficient' for the student to continue his studies for as long as he wants to (4 is 'perfectly sufficient'). Families may differ in their willingness to do economic sacrifices for their children's education (Hauser 1993, Kane 1994). *Income* registers the resources that the family would employ in education, so the analysis requires another variable to control for general resources available. This is found in *accommodation*. This variable ranges from 1 to 4 according to the degree of

[17] While mathematics is more informative about the student's cognitive abilities, language is more graphic for general cultural background (Dronkers and Robert 2003:15).

[18] The results are available under demand.

satisfaction with the family residence (1 not at all satisfied and 4 very satisfied). It is a well-known fact that family structure affects educational attainment, and particularly the number of siblings. Becker explains this through the trade-off between the quality and the quantity of children that parents face (Becker 1993). This trade-off is not relevant for wealthy families but it is determinant for the middle class and poor families. *Siblings* captures the number of brothers and sisters not including the student. It ranges from 0 to 20. The final variable included for the material deprivation argument is *motherworks* that values 1 if the mother actually works out of the household and 0 in the rest of the cases. Female labour market participation is an extra source of income for the household. I particularly see this variable as a black-box explanation, but it is frequently used in the French specialised literature (Vallet and Caille 1996)[19].

With respect to the arguments linking cultural resources and educational attainment, I use another three imperfect measures of cultural capital: father's education, *artactivities* and *TV*. *Educfather* informs about the father's highest diploma reached[20]. Because of the obscurity of Bourdieu's work, the concept of cultural capital has been operationalised in many different ways (Jenkins 1989). Taking father's education as a proxy for cultural capital is not the best empirical option, but it is a common practise in the literature (Halsey, Heath and Ridge 1980:73-89)[21]. Another different way of thinking of cultural capital is the attendance to highbrow cultural activities (De Graaf 1986). *Artactivities* is a dummy that values 1 if the student attended any of these activities: conservatories, school o music and dancing, youth cultural associations and courses of artistic disciplines in 1998. The Panel does not include information about parental attendance to this type of activities. I made the

[19] Mother's labour market participation can enhance the children's outcomes because more material resources are available at the household level. But it can also provide with more cultural resources. Bernardi has shown how female education produces more labour market participation and how, the higher the husband's education the lower the likelihood that the women will work out of the household (Bernardi 1999:142). Given the high rates of educational homogamy in advanced societies, it is not clear which of the two possible mechanisms operating under *motherworks* is stronger. I conducted this analysis for the case of France and this effect is also visible.

[20] 1) No education; 2) Primary; 3) Brevet des Colleges (lower secondary school); 4) Vocational upper secondary (CAP/CAPA and BEP/BEPA); 5) General and Technological BAC; 6) University (1st, 2nd and 3rd cycles).

[21] Correlation father's education-mother's education is 0.6.

assumption that the correlation between the children attendance to these activities and the parent's cultural capital is high. Finally, TV registers the student habits of TV-watching. This is also frequent in the literature on cultural capital (Sullivan 2001). If the family controls the time that the student devotes to watching TV, this variable values 1, and 0 if not. Of course, I had to make the assumption that the time that the families prevent the children from watching TV, is devoted to other activities such as reading or studying.

The final block of explanations to class differentials in education is preferences for education. The operationalisation of parental preferences for education, is indeed a difficult task. In this paper, by preferences for education I shall understand parental expectations for education made up of expected labour market returns for education. Morgan holds that expected returns to the effort invested in education plus an unequal availability of resources is what explains variation in educational attainment (Morgan 1998). The causal mechanisms producing this effect of parental expectations for education is motivation. Motivation boosts the accumulation of cognitive skills.

This possibility will be tested using four dummy variables built from a categorical one where the parents choose the educational track that they thought as the one securing future occupational success. *Utuniversity*, *utBAC*, *utVocational*, *Utnone* and *utdoesnotknow* value 1 if the respondent marked this particular option as the best one to find a job and 0 otherwise[22].

For the moment, let's have a look at the first three columns (M1-M3). The first one proves the existence of a certain degree of ethnic disadvantage. This disadvantage worsens the results of Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, Italians, Turks, Portuguese and Black Africans -the Spanish also have a negative sign but lacks significance-. As before, the following models try to provide with an explanation for this finding.

[22] *Utdoesnotknow* is the answer where the respondent did not know about each track's utility. This had to be integrated in the model specification to avoid the lost of cases. No ordinal version of this variable could be used, as no hypothesis exists on the order of the 'does not know answer'.

Table III.2.1. OLS. Grades in mathematics in the evaluation exams

Variable	M1	M2	M3	M4
Algerian	-4.7064***	-0.2307	0.0395	0.2264
	0.588	0.821	0.886	0.886
Moroccan	-8.1450***	-2.9220***	-0.9853	-0.6664
	0.646	0.925	1.008	1.007
Tunisian	-6.3898***	-0.8140	-1.4361	-0.9511
	1.037	1.401	1.579	1.590
Italian	-5.0610***	-3.5771*	-3.8609*	-3.5148*
	1.422	1.696	1.657	1.612
Turkish	-10.5738***	-2.3370	0.3134	0.3611
	1.402	2.011	2.291	2.484
Portuguese	-4.9981***	0.3307	1.0124	0.8013
	0.838	1.051	1.067	1.055
Spanish	-1.7135	-0.0431	-1.9832	-2.0129
	1.168	1.511	1.557	1.554
African	-8.6184***	-3.4883**	-3.0810*	-2.7191
	1.133	1.275	1.472	1.493
Northern	3.4347***	5.7456***	1.3813	1.3550
	1.029	1.277	1.377	1.356
Indochinese	2.2005*	7.4194***	5.2636***	5.5024***
	1.082	1.355	1.479	1.519
firstimmigrant		-7.8154***	-3.3841*	-2.3822
		1.152	1.336	1.396
firstmixed		-1.3637	3.8930	4.2680
		2.221	2.245	2.282
secondimmigrant		-6.7367***	-2.4603**	-1.3792
		0.692	0.776	0.775
secondmixed		-2.1896***	-0.2929	-0.0743
		0.494	0.593	0.584
sex			-0.5308*	-0.6355*
			0.255	0.254
pre_element			0.7987***	0.7633***
			0.194	0.193
income			0.7409***	0.6605***
			0.145	0.144
accommodation			0.9859***	0.6719**
			0.207	0.208
Siblings			-0.7590***	-0.6121***
			0.131	0.124
motherworks			1.9732***	1.9585***
			0.286	0.282
educfather			1.7365***	1.6357***
			0.095	0.095
artactivities			1.4427***	1.2566***
			0.269	0.268
tv			-1.6066***	-1.7793***
			0.286	0.286
utnone			-6.2331***	-5.2915***
			1.381	1.374
utvocational			-8.7422***	-8.4375***
			0.349	0.348
utBAC			-3.9729***	-3.9914***
			0.420	0.420
utdoesnotknow			-3.0234***	-2.9110***
			0.356	0.356
zep1995				-2.6593***
				0.524
one_five				-0.5401*
				0.267
more_six				-2.5432***
				0.669
information				1.9487***
				0.228
Constant	51.5121***	52.1273***	43.0456***	42.2870***
	0.125	0.144	1.178	1.233
n	*14423*	*12242*	*9148*	*8952*
R2	*0.0312*	*0.0394*	*0.2482*	*0.2612*
F	*40.84****	*28.35****	*102.46****	*91.59****

Legend: β and standard errors ; P. level * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

The second model (M2) shows that a big part of this initial disadvantage is explained by the across group common characteristic of the immigrant status. Remark that the ethnic parameters decrease enormously and loose all/part of their initial statistical significance -only the Moroccans, the Italians and the Africans remain significantly negative-. Among the immigration variables, it is again those students coming from immigrant+immigrant parental couples that suffer from more disadvantages -bigger for first generation ones-. *Secondmixed* is also negatively affecting grades in mathematics. Finally, the third model shows which share of this variation is explained by class. After controlling for class factors, only the Italians and the Africans remain significantly negative, as well as the label for immigrant students from immigrant parental couples. These are the only unexplained ethnic/immigrant categories. With respect to the class independent variables, all the initial hypotheses find here confirmation[23]. The most important effect is found in the dummies capturing the parental expectations for education. Even those respondents that do not have an opinion about the tracks' utility, is significant and negative –meaning that ignorance affects negatively-.

III.3. The unequal distribution of information about the educational system

Up to know, the paper has shown how ethnic residuals are mostly linked to the immigration status. Therefore, the mechanism that produces ethnic disadvantage is not ethnic-group specific, but common to all immigrant students and their families. Also that class, as an ascriptive source of educational differences, something that is common to immigrants and natives, is able to account for the biggest share of the ethnic and immigration significant variance. But the model in column third is not clear from the analytical point of view. It measures the worse performance of *firstimmigrant* and *secondimmigrant*, but it does not explain why it happens. This is what the final model tries to do.

[23] The only exception being *TV*, as the sign obtained in the analysis is opposite to the expected one. The effect found here is robust and remains stable under any model specification. For that reason, I decided to leave it in the final model presented here. The interpretation of this finding is against the common wisdom that reducing the time spent watching TV benefits educational attainment. TV-watching behaviour is indeed relevant for educational results, but this happens because TV is an open window to knowledge, and not the opposite. Alternatively, it could be that control is only imposed to bad students.

My hypothesis here is that, immigrant families lack -in a bigger proportion than native ones- the appropriate information regarding the functioning of the educational system and that this means an extra source of disadvantage. For the test of this hypothesis I built an index ranging the families according to the information that the parents hold about the system itself. *Information* ranges from 0 to 3. This index informs about school choice behaviour and parents-teachers relations. I decided to use these two shares of behaviour because of their specific and determinant importance in the French educational system, especially in secondary education.

- I shall argue that **school choice behaviour** is a good proxy for the information that parents have about the school system. School choice behaviour is thought in a part of the literature to increase class inequalities in education because the more advantaged families profit from their greater knowledge of the school system to place their offspring in better positions (Coleman, Schiller et al. 1993). In France the debate about the normative desirability of the recognition of the right to choose any school -instead of doing it within the administrative department- was central during the 1980s and the 1990s (Ballion 1986). Nowadays this right is widely recognised and its consequence has been the existence of an index of school desirability where schools are ranged depending on their attributes[24]. This index persists because school prestige is much appreciated by higher education institutions. Ideas about the school prestige are not only made of academic success, but also by the type of public that attends the institution (Felouzis 2003:426). I gave a higher score in the index to those families that sent their child to schools for academic reasons: prestige, its general academic level or because the profile of its public.

- **Parents-teachers relations** is central for the conformation of the realistic family's wishes about the children's education, something that, as this paper's first section has shown, is of key importance in the so-called 'orientation process' at the end of lower secondary school. Although over time efforts have been done to simplify the process, it remains obscure both to students and families (Masson 1997). I score higher to those students whose parents met teachers at least once in 1998 -the only register available in the Panel-.

[24] These attributes can be ascriptive -ancientness, area, range of study options- and signs of academic success -rate of retarded students, average orientation at the end of lower secondary school etc-.

Accordingly, the argument proposed here does not mean that school choice and parents-teacher relations affect directly attainment through mechanisms such as school effects, but simply that they imply a higher level of information about the educational system that allows parents channelling their offspring towards the more realistic tracks according to their academic outcomes in lower secondary school[25].

In the final model I also include information about the percentage of students in the school division that have a foreign origin. This is thought as a control for the fact that in France immigrants tend to live in highly concentrated areas (Felouzis 2003). If information is lower among immigrants than among natives, the fact that they tend to live in highly concentrated districts may also decrease their levels of information, as it will be less likely to come through social links. Initially this variable was continuous -from 0 to 29-, but its non-linear effect recommended transforming it into two dummies *one_five* and *more_six*. 0 –no concentration- was the reference category[26]. Although the argument that I am making is not based on the existence of interaction effects (Durlauf and Peyton 2001), some of the criticisms made to these sort of arguments can also be relevant here. For example, the potential existence of problems of endogeneity. People from similar socio-economic background tend to live in the same area within each city. Thus, the selection of the district where families live is not exogenous (Evans et al 1992). In order to escape from this theoretical and technical pitfall I include *zep1995* as another control[27]. This variable values 1 if the school attended by the student in 1995 was in a *zone d'éducation prioritaire* (ZEP). The ZEPs are positive discrimination mechanisms to cope with the high correlation between dropout rates and deprived socio-economic contexts. As a compensation to their entourage, schools in ZEP dispose of more and better material and intellectual resources[28].

---

[25] For example, with respect to school choice, Ballion says that the bad or good reputation of certain schools is -unless exceptions- an imaginary representation based on rumours and partial impressions (Ballion 1986:733). With respect to the effect of meeting teachers, it can be more evident the link with information. This is of a particular importance in lower secondary school because of the obscurity and complexity of the orientation process (Masson 1997)

[26] This non-linearity is similar to the epidemic theory of interaction effects (Crane 1995).

[27] Data-constraints did not allow multilevel modelling, which is the most adequate method for this type of arguments. Using simultaneous equation models to make endogenous the proportion of foreigners in the school division, and making it dependent on zep1995, does not offer relevant changes to the argument.

[28] For more about ZEPs see the special issue in *Éducation et Formation* (2001:67).

Now recall the fifth column (M4) in table III.2.1: the information argument in place seems to be the whole of the explanation of the unexplained variance reflected in the *firstimmigrant* and *secondimmigrant* coefficients in the third model. None of them are significant any longer. As a result we could conclude that the information shortages vis-à-vis the functioning of the school system is the mechanism producing the extra disadvantage proved to exist among immigrants, which class and ethnicity could not explain[29].

IV. Conclusions

This paper has been successful in its goals. It disentangled the relation existing between class, immigration and ethnicity. Few traces of ethnic disadvantage were detected. Most of what can be identified with ethnicity and disadvantage is actually linked to the status of immigrant -a source of disadvantage that operates across ethic groups-. Within the group of immigrant students, those coming from mixed parental couples are clearly better off. The effect of being born in the host country or abroad is also determining.

Class explains a big part of the initial disadvantage seen among immigrants -this explains the whole of the initial differential seen in the track chosen in upper secondary school-. As French-born families do, immigrant families form their wishes with regard to their offspring's education as a function of his/her possibilities of succeeding. Grades are the dependent variable that requires the use of other explanations different than class ascription to account for the immigrant's unexplained variation.

This paper has shown that immigrant families' deficient knowledge of the educational system is indeed able to explain what remains significant after the introduction of class. This is probably the mechanism lying under the effect of time since arrival. This mechanism is not immigration-specific, but operates equally for immigrants and for French-born families, but it

[29] Only the group of Italians remain negative and statistically significant -although it is close to the consensual threshold of 0.05%. This effect disappears after including an interaction with the number of siblings. The surprising and robust positive effect of the Indochinese group cannot find an explanation in this paper.

affects immigrant families in a bigger proportion. This is why, it is the students coming from immigrant+immigrant types of parental couples that are more disadvantaged.

To conclude, the role of ethnicity in the explanation of immigrants' educational disadvantage is at best modest. A class-based approach seems to be more pertinent for the study of immigration differentials in education. The mechanisms producing what is being known as *ethnic disadvantage* is not really an ethnic effect. In fact it is a class effect: immigrants ignore more often –or in bigger proportions- than natives how to orientate/motivate their children because they lack specific information about the host country's educational system. In conclusion, the recent proliferation of theories about the role of ethnicity over educational attainment should be revised. The theoretical production in this field of research should more simple and parsimonious.

Appendix

A.1. Figures for the type of student with respect to immigration status and ethnicity

Table A.1.1. Figures and lost of cases per sample and type of student with respect to immigration

	Both parents born in French territory	First generation immigrant-mixed parental couple	First generation-immigrant parental couple	Second generation-mixed parental couple	Second generation-immigrant parental couple
Recruitment	12.672 (72.19%)	87	426	2.381	1.987
Questionnaire		(0.50%)	(2.43%)	(13.56%)	(11.32%)
...of whom scoring in	12.154 (72.46%)	84	388	2.268	1.867
Math		(0.50%)	(2.32%)	(13.57%)	(11.17%)
Family	11.209 (74.33%)	65	297	1.970	1.540
questionnaire		(0.43%)	(1.97%)	(13.06%)	(10.21%)
...of whom scoring in	10.724 (74.50%)	64	272	1886	1.449
Math		(0.44%)	(1.89%)	(13.10%)	(10.07%)
Postal questionnaire	9.761	51	223	1.662	1.110
	(76.22%)	(0.40%)	(1.74%)	(12.98%)	(8.67%)
...of whom scoring	9.345	50	204	1.596	1.052
in Math	(76.34%)	(0.41%)	(1.67%)	(13.00%)	(8.57%)

Source: Panel95. Percentages within each category of student with respect to immigration in parenthesis

The table shows that the lost of cases is fairly homogeneous across all the categories –being the most worrying case that of second generation immigrant students from immigrant+immigrant parental couple-. The percentage of the total sample that each category represents scarcely varies in each of the questionnaires. I also provide with information about the lost of cases issued from the register of the results that the student obtained in the evaluation exams at the beginning of lower secondary –this is one of the dependent variables-[30]. Given the low initial figures, the lost of cases could be more problematic for the study of first generation immigrant students than in the case of second generation ones. This produces high standard errors in the forthcoming models.

[30] The table only presents the information for mathematics, but rate of answer fairly the same for French language.

Table A.1.2. Ethnic groups (father/mother's country of birth)

	Figures	Percentage
Algeria	828	4.70%
Europe (Western)[31]	184	1.05%
Indochina[32]	154	0.88%
Italy	124	0.70%
Morocco	614	3.49%
Portugal	391	2.22%
Spain	148	0.84%
Sub-Saharan Africa[33]	316	1.80%
Tunisia	240	1.36%
Turkey	131	0.74%

Source: Panel95

The n problem will be reflected in big standard errors, what may represent a problem for the estimation. For that reason I anticipate the reader that I have also run all the models presented in this chapter using a collapsed version for certain nationalities –Southern Europeans, North Africans, Africans and Northern Europeans-. This excluded the Turks and the Indochinese from the analyses. No changes were appreciated.

[31] Denmark, Island, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Austria, Liechtenstein, Belgium, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Monaco

[32] The former territory of Indochina was a French colony. After the defeat of France in Dien Bien Phu, this territory split into three different independent states: Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

[33] Liberia, The Gambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zaire, Ecuadorian Guinea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Congo, Ivory Coast, Benin, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Lion, Sudan, Chad, Togo, The Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Mauricio Island, Swaziland, Bissau Guinea, Mozambique, Saint Tome and Prince, Angola, Green Cape, Comoros, Seychelles Islands and Djibouti.

A.2. The French Educative system: scheme



References

Ballion, R. (1986). “Le choix du collège: le comportement <<éclairé>> des familles”. Revue Française de Sociologie 27(4):719-734.

Becker, G. S. (1993). Human capital: a theoretical and empirical analysis, with special reference to education. Chicago, the University of Chicago Press.

Bernardi, F. (1999). Donne fra famiglia e carriera. Strategie di coppia e vincoli sociali. Milano, Franco Angeli.

Betts, J. R. and M. Lofstrom (2000). The Educational Attainment of Immigrants: Trends and Implications. Issues in the Economics of Immigration. G. Borjas. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

Borjas, G. (1992). "Ethnic Capital and Intergenerational Mobility." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(1): 123-150.

Borjas, G. (1995). "Ethnicity, Neighbourhoods and Human Capital Externalities." The American Economic Review 85(3): 365-390.

Boudon, R. (1974). Education, opportunity, and social inequality; changing prospects in Western society. New York,, Wiley.

Bourdieu, P. (1974). The School as a Conservative Force. Contemporary Research in the Sociology of Education London. S. J. Eggleston. Methuen.

Bourdieu, P. (1977). Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction. Power and ideology in education. J. Karabel and A. H. Halsey. New York, Oxford University Press: 487-511.

Bourdieu, P. and J. C. Passeron (1977). Reproduction in education, society and culture. London ; Beverly Hills, Sage Publications.

Breen, R. (1999). "Beliefs, Rational Choice and Bayesian Learning." Rationality and Society 11(4): 463-480.

Breen, R. and J. H. Goldthorpe (1997). "Explaining Educational Differentials: Towards a Formal Rational Action Theory." Rationality and Society 9(3): 275-305.

Caille, J. P. (2003). Panel d'élèves du second degré. Recrutement 1995. Paris, Ministère de l'Education National.

Carrington, B. and B. Troyna (1988). Combating racism through political education. Children and Controversial Issues: Strategies for the Early and Middle Years of Schooling. B. Carrington and B. Troyna. Lewes, Falmer Press: 205-223.

Chiswick, B. and D. a. I. i. C. Q. Differences in Education and Earnings Across Racial and Ethnic Groups: Tastes (1988). "Differences in Education and Earnings Across Racial and Ethnic Groups: Tastes, Discrimination and Investments in Child Quality." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 103(3): 571-597.

Clerc, P. (1964). "Les élèves de nationalité étrangère." Population 19(5).

Coleman, J. S., K. Schiller, et al. (1993). Parents choice and inequality. Parents, their children and schools. B. Scheneider and J. S. Coleman. Boulder: Colorado, Westview Press: 147-82.

Courgeau, D. (1973). Les enfants nés a l'étranger. Enquête nationale sur le niveau intellectuel des enfants d'age scolaire (Travaux et Documents n.64). INED-INETOP. Paris.

Crane, J. (1995). "The Epidemic Theory of Guettos and Neighbourhood Effects on Dropping Out and Children Childbearing." American Journal of Sociology 96: 1226-1259.

De Graaf, P. M. (1986). "The Impact of Financial and Cultural Resources on Educational Attainment in the Netherlands." Sociology of Education 59(4): 237-246.

Di Maggio, P. (1982). "Cultural Capital and School Success." American Sociological Review 47(2): 189-201.

Driesen, J. M. and W. Geert (2000). "Ethnicity, Forms of Capital and Educational Achievement." International Review of Education 47(6): 513-538.

Dronkers, J. and P. Robert (2003). "The Effectiveness of Public and Private Schools from a Comparative Perspective." EUI Working Papers 2003(13).

Durlauf, S. N. and H. P. Young (2001). Social dynamics. Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press.

Duru-Bellat, M. and A. Mingat (1985). "De l'orientation en fin de 5e au fonctionnement du collège. 1- Evaluation de la procédure." Cahiers de l'IREDU 42.

Duru-Bellat, M. and A. Mingat (1988). "De l'orientation en fin 5e au fonctionnement du collège. 2-Pregression, notation, orientation: l'impact du contexte de scolarisation." Cahiers de l'IREDU 45.

Duru-Bellat, M. and A. Mingat (1990). How do French junior secondary schools operate? academic achievement, grading and streaming of students. The Comprehensive School: Experiement Revisated. Evidence from Western Europe. A. Leschinsky and K. U. Mayer. Frankfurt, Peter Lang.

Evans, W. N., W. E. Oates, et al. (1992). "Measuring Peer Group Effects." Journal of Political Economy 100: 966-991.

Felouzis, G. (2003). "La ségrégation ethnique au collège et ses conséquences." Revue Française de Sociologie 44(3): 413-447.

Friedberg, R. M. (1996). "You Can't Take it with You? Immigrant Assimilation and the Portability of Human Capital." National Bureau of Economic Research/Working Paper 5837.

Gambetta, D. (1987). Were They Pushed or Did They Jump? New York, Cambridge University Press.

Halsey, A. H., A. F. Heath, et al. (1980). Origins and destinations : family, class, and education in modern Britain. Oxford. New York, Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press.

Hauser, R. (1993). The Decline in College Entry among African-Americans: Findings in Search of Explanations. Prejudice, politics, and the American dilemma. P. M. Sniderman, P. Tetlock and E. G. Carmines. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press: 271-309.

Heath, A. and D. MacMahon (1998). Education and Occupational Attainments: The Impact of Ethnic Origin. Education: Culture, Economy and Society. A. H. Halsey, H. Lauder, P. Brown and S. Wells. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 646-662.

Jelen, C. (1993). La Famille, secret de l'intégration. Enquête sur la France immigrée. Paris, Robert Laffont Editions.

Jenkins, R. (1989). "Language, Symbolic Power and Communication: Bourdieu's "Homo Academicus"." Sociology. 23(4): 639-645.

Kane, T. (1994). "College Entry by Blacks Since 1980: The Role of College Costs, Family Background and Returns to Education." Journal of Political Economy 102: 878-911.

Kao, G. and M. Tienda (1995). "Optimism and Achievement: the educational performance of immigrant youth." Social Science Quarterly 76(1): 1-19.

Loury, G. (1977). A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences. Women, minorities, and employment discrimination. P. A. Wallace, A. M. LaMond and M. I. o. T. I. R. Section. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books: 153-186.

Lucas, S. R. (2001). "Effectively Maintained Inequality." American Journal of Sociology 106: 1642-90.

MacLeod, J. (1995). Ain't no makin' it : aspirations and attainment in a low-income neighborhood. Boulder, Westview Press.

Masson, P. (1997). "Élèves, parents d'élèves et agents scolaires dans le processus d'orientation." Revue Française de Sociologie 38(1): 119-142.

Mondon, P. (1984). "Quelques aspects de la scolarisation des enfants étrangers a partir des statistiques." Migrants Formation 58: 6-14.

Morgan, S. L. (1998). "Adolescent Educational Expectations." Rationality and Society 10(2): 131-62.

Muller, C. and D. Kerbow (1993). Parent Involvement in the Home School and the Community. Parents, Their Children, and Schools. B. Scheneider and J. S. Coleman. Boulder, Colorado, West View Press: 13-42.

Murphy, J. (1981). "Class Inequality in Education." The British Journal of Sociology 32: 182-201.

Murphy, J. (1990). "A Most Respectable Prejudice: Inequality in Educational Research Policy." British Journal of Sociology 41(1): 29-54.

Pearlin, L. I. (1971). Class context and family relations; a cross-national study. Boston, Little Brown.

Portes, A. (1998). "Social capital: its origins and applications in modern sociology." Annual Review of Sociology 24(1): 1-24.

Portes, A. and D. MacLeod (1996). "Educational Progress of Children of Immigrants: The Roles of Class, Ethnicity, and School Context." Sociology of Education 64(4): 255-75.

Portes, A. and M. Zhou (1993). "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants." ANNALS, AAPSS 530: 75-96.

Portes, A. and R. G. Rumbaut (1996). Immigrant America : a portrait. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Raftery, A. E. and M. Hout (1993). "Maximally Maintained Inequality." Sociology of Education 66: 41-62.

SEIS (1980). "Comparaison des cursus des élèves étrangers et des élèves français. Regroupement des trois échantillons de suivi d'élèves." Documents de Travail (Ministère de l'Education National) 223.

Short, G. and B. Carrington (1987). Towards and antiriacist initiative in the all-white primary school. Children and their Primary schools: A New Perspective. A. Polland. Lewes, Falmer Press: 220-235.

SIGES (1984). "Les élèves étrangers dans le panel 1978 premier degré." Documents de Travail (Ministère de l'Education National) 309.

Sowell, T. (1981). Ethnic America : a history. New York, Basic Books.

Sowell, T. (1996). Migrations and cultures : a world view. New York, BasicBooks.

Steinberg, S. (1981). The ethnic myth : race, ethnicity, and class in America. New York, Atheneum.

Steinberg, S. (2000). The Cultural Fallacy in Studies of Social Mobility. Immigrants, Schooling and Social Mobility: Does Culture Make a Difference? H. Vermeulen and J. Perlmann. New York, MacMillan Press LTD: 61-71.

Sullivan, A. (2001). "Cultural Capital and Educational Attainment." Sociology of Education 35(4): 893-912.

Thelot, C. and L. A. Vallet (1994). "Compétences en Français et Carrières Scolaires des Elèves Etrangers en France." Actes du Séminaire sur les indicateurs d'intégration des immigrants (Gouvernement Du Québec et Université de Montréal): 179-206.

Tribalat, M. (1995). Faire France: Une enquête sur les immigres et leurs enfants. Paris, La Découverte.

Tribalat, M., J. P. Garson, et al. (1991). Cent ans d'immigration, étrangers d'hier, Français d'aujourd'hui. Paris, Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques.

Troyna, B. and B. Carrington (1990). Education, racism, and reform. London ; New York, Routledge.

Vallet, L. and J. P. Caille (1999). Migration and Integration in France. Academic Careers of Immigrants' Children in Lower and Upper Secondary School. Paper for the ESF Conference. Obernai.

Vallet, L. and V. Caille (1996). Les Elèves Etrangers ou Issus de l'Immigration dans l'Ecole et le College Français. Paris, Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche.

Weber, M. (1985). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London, G. Allen and Unwin.

Willis, P. E. (1977). Learning to Labour. London, Gower.

Wolpe, H. (1986). Class Concepts, Class Struggles and Racism. Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations. J. Rex and D. Mason. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 21-42.