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in eight post-communist countries**

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**UNDERSTANDING SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
AND ETHNIC EXPLANATION IN EIGHT POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES**

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Abstract

Satisfaction with democracy is normally explained using individual socio-demographic variables. In this paper, I show that another important set of variables is also key to understanding this phenomenon. I argue that the influence of those institutions acquired to implement a liberal democracy will play a key role to understand the issue at stake. I test two different hypotheses. The first one refers to the institutional design. If the resulting institutions that a country adopts only defend and reflect the interests of the majority group of the population, then we can expect that members of minority groups will value democracy very low. The second hypothesis refers to the degree of accommodation that these countries have adopted towards their minorities. In this sense, when the level of accommodation is very high, satisfaction with democracy should also be high. These two hypotheses are very closely linked and allow us to test under what type of institutions and under what degree of accommodation are we more likely to find the higher values of satisfaction with democracy.

Introduction¹

The fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) during the nineties symbolised the end of the third wave of democratisation. The symbolic fall of the Berlin wall was the beginning of a rather considerable change in the political map of that European region. Both the Soviet influence and the communist regime were successfully challenged by political actors clearly influenced by Western liberal democracies. Regimes moved away from single party systems towards multiparty democracies where competitive and free elections were allowed. More than a decade later, it is normal that we start asking questions about these important political changes. Are the citizens of these countries satisfied with the changes they lived? Is democracy fulfilling the expectations citizens had about this regime? In other words, are citizens satisfied with the way democracy works in their countries? If they are, what are the variables that help explain this satisfaction?

Satisfaction with democracy is normally explained using individual socio-demographic variables. In this paper, I will try to show that another important set of variables is also key to understand this phenomenon. I will argue that the influence of those institutions acquired to implement a liberal democracy will play a key role to understand the issue at stake. I think institutions are important for the following reason. The adhesion to the new regime will depend upon the way citizens perceive that their fundamental rights and freedoms associated with that regime are respected. In this sense, political institutions are the instruments that better show this situation. But institutions are not only important to understand satisfaction with democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. These countries are primarily characterised by a multiethnic nature. To forget this issue would bring misleading results to this paper. For this reason, another important variable that I would like to incorporate is the way in which these countries have accommodated minorities not only into political life through institutions but also into social life.

The hypotheses that I would like to test here refer, then, to these two issues. The first hypothesis refers to the institutional design. If the resulting institutions that a country adopts

¹ I would like to thank Yasemin Soysal, José Ramón Montero and Ignacio Lago for their helpful comments. The responsibility for any mistake that might appear in this article belongs exclusively to the author.

only defend and reflect the interests of the majority group of the population, then we can expect that members of minority groups will value democracy very low. On the other hand, if institutions try to incorporate the voices of all members of society, it is more likely that support to democracy is more homogenous between all different ethnic groups. The second hypothesis that I will test in this paper refers to the degree of accommodation that these countries have adopted towards their minorities. By accommodation, I will refer here to the recognition from the state of the value that minorities have for the country as a whole and its explicit incorporation in society. In this sense, when the level of accommodation is very high, satisfaction with democracy should also be high. These two hypotheses are very closely linked and allow us to test under what type of institutions and under what degree of accommodation are we more likely to find the higher values of satisfaction with democracy.

I will start by giving an account of the literature covering attitudes towards democracy from an institutional point of view. I will follow with a discussion of why it is plausible to think of ethnic accommodation as a key variable to study satisfaction with democracy in multiethnic countries. Then I develop my hypotheses and present the main variables that I use in the empirical section of the next section. Finally, I present some conclusions and suggest further lines of investigation in this field.

An Institutional Approach

As is well known, a key characteristic of any democracy is that it produces winners and losers after any election. This relation between winners and losers can be understood differently if we observe the distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracy. The main theorist of this distinction is Arend Lijphart² who in his book *Democracies* describes in detail the main features of these two types of democracy and the countries where they can be found. Lijphart's work is an excellent starting point to understand the impact of political institutions in relation with political attitudes towards democracy. In Lijphart's words, the

² A very good paper about the origin of this discussion can be found in Kenneth D. McRae 1997.

distinguishing feature of either type of democracy is the answer to the question *who governs?* A member of a majoritarian democracy will respond to this question by arguing that government belongs to the majority of the people, whereas a member of a consensual democracy will argue that the government belongs to as many people as possible (Lijphart 1984: 4) The main ideas of the distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies are shown in Table 1.

Table 1.- Distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies

	Majoritarian	Consensual
Type of Cabinet	Executive composed of a member from a single political party.	Government divided by a coalition of the most important political parties.
Relation Cabinet/ Parliament	The executive power controls the Parliament. There exists certain fusion between both legislative and executive power.	Both powers are separated. The coalition government is subordinated to the decision of the parliament
Number of Chambers	Unicameral	Bicameral
Electoral System	Majoritarian system	Proportional Representation System
Party System	Biparty system	Pluriparty system
Territorial Organisation	Centralised	Decentralised

Source: Own elaboration

The idea of using this distinction to explain satisfaction with democracy is very plausible. In fact, the main novelty of an article written by Christopher Anderson and Christine Guillory is precisely the incorporation of institutional variables in a model that tried to explain different levels of satisfaction with democracy in eleven Western democracies (Anderson and Guillory 1997) Concretely, Anderson and Guillory classify the sample of countries they used into consensual or majoritarian democracies following Lipjhart's distinction. This classification is one of their main independent variables used to test their hypothesis.

One of the hypotheses they defend asserts that those citizens belonging to the group of winners after an electoral election were more satisfied with the way democracy works than those citizens belonging to the group of losers. Furthermore, Anderson and Guillory show how this trend was different depending upon the kind of democracy the citizens belonged to. If citizens belonging to the losers' group lived in a majoritarian democracy their level of

satisfaction with democracy was lower than if they lived in a consensual democracy. Conversely, if the winners lived under a majoritarian democracy their level of satisfaction with democracy was higher than if they lived under a consensual democracy. The explanation that justifies this hypothesis can be found in the nature of both political systems. A consensual democracy provides minorities, see Table 1, with mechanisms to incorporate their voices into the decision-making process that do not exist in majoritarian democracies. In this sense, the more consensual a democracy is, the narrower the domain where dissidence can be found. Oppositely, the more majoritarian a democracy is, the easier for the winning majority to impose their decision over minorities (Anderson and Guillory 1997: 68).

As I said, I find these arguments quite plausible. As Pippa Norris points out, the pattern that is established between winners and losers is structured from constitutional arrangements; that is to say, from the main political institutions and from those constitutional norms both written and non-written (Norris 1997: 219) However, the use of the distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies for the purpose of this paper is not correct. This is so for several reasons. Firstly, because of the very special nature of the countries that are included in the sample. It is true that since Lijphart's first publications about this distinction, political scientists have worried in finding out as many countries as possible that fit this distinction. Lijphart himself in his revision of *Democracies* expand the initial sample up to thirty six countries (Lijphart 1999) To try to classify CEE countries into this distinction is possible, though I do not think it plausible. Above all, and secondly, because as Rudy Andeweg explains, to reduce every country to a bipolar classification can lead us to a very simplified analysis of political regimes (Andeweg 2000). CEE countries are still embedded in a process of institutional design and to classify them into either type of this distinction today can be useless tomorrow (Steiner 1981a, Steiner 1981b, Boggards 1998).

Apart from introducing institutional variables as key elements to understand satisfaction with democracy, Anderson and Guillory's paper presents other interesting points that should be noted. As Norris points out (Norris 1999), the way in which these authors do their empirical work is very interesting since they used in the same analysis both individual and aggregate data. However, there are important critiques that have some importance for the purpose of this paper. One of them is the limitation of the sample of countries they used in

their analysis. Anderson and Guillory analyse eleven countries belonging to Western Europe where democracies are mainly parliamentary, forgetting, therefore, the impact that presidential democracies may have for their analysis (Norris 1999:220). The article also forgets young democracies and democratising countries. Are their hypotheses still plausible in these kinds of countries? As we know, in these types of countries we cannot know what specific institutions among the existing ones are the best indicators to explain support to democracy. Is it the type of electoral regime? Or is it the degree of centralisation that a country has?

These critiques do not invalidate the conclusions presented by Anderson and Guillory, though we should take them with some reserve. In fact, though I agree with some of Norris's critiques, I still believe, as I will try to show, that the incorporation of young democracies will bring about results that will complement Anderson and Guillory's. In this sense, and since we are going to find in these countries different kinds of electoral regimes, effective number of parties and even different levels of presidentialism, the empirical analysis will allow us to find out which of these institutions is the most influential one in relation with the satisfaction that citizens feels about democracy.

The model is, however, still incomplete. Institutions are important to understand the issue at stake but we cannot forget another important variable given the multiethnic nature of these countries. The way in which minorities are accommodated in society is, I think, another important element that should be taken into account in our analysis.

Introducing a third level of analysis: The accommodation of ethnic minorities as a key factor to explain satisfaction with democracy.

In this paper, I have argued that the the study of political attitudes towards regimes can be approached from at least two different, though complementary, perspectives, namely using socio-demographic variables and aggregated institutional variables. In this paper, I would like to go further and incorporate a third level in the analysis of this issue. This incorporation is mainly due to the very special nature that CEE countries have. I am referring

to its multiethnic nature. Practically, all countries of this European region have within their borders different ethnic groups. This issue should, from my point of view, not be forgotten in any study concerning political attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe. The way in which these new democracies incorporate ethnic minority groups into society should have an effect upon the perception citizens have about democracy. This argument, though close to the previous one, tries to put more emphasis not only on the political incorporation of ethnic minority voices but also on the social incorporation of these groups. What I try to include in the analysis is whether the level of accommodation and respect for minorities is relevant to explain satisfaction with democracy in the countries under study. As Kymlicka points out,

“recent political events and trends throughout the world have made clear that the health and stability of a modern democracy depends not only on the justice of its basic institutions, but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens: for example, their sense of identity and how they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different of themselves” (Kymlicka 1998: 168)

Concretely, the hypothesis that I would like to test is the following: if a country has a serious commitment to incorporate ethnic minorities in society as distinctive groups and to respect their different identities, then, levels of satisfaction with democracy in these countries will be higher than in countries where the opposite situation can be found. Citizens living in countries that accommodate ethnic groups will have the perception that there exists an institutional commitment to take not only their political voice but also their cultural identity into consideration. Citizens should perceive that under a democratic regime of this type their particular differences are respected and protected and therefore it is logical to think that support towards this regime should be higher than the support professed for countries where no accommodation is practiced at all.

The argument can be extended to the institutional arena that I mentioned in the previous section. As I said before, this cultural argument is closely linked to the discussion about majoritarian and consensual democracies. In fact, I believe that both arguments are the two sides of the same coin. We should expect that support for democracy will be higher in those multiethnic countries where there exist consensual type institutions as well as a political commitment to incorporate and accommodate all different groups into social, political and religious life.

Debates about the desirability to recognise different identities cohabitating within the same borders are somehow recent. Charles Taylor is one of those political philosophers who has written about this issue and has given reasons about how this accommodation should be carried out. As opposed to the historical fact of one dominating culture ruling for the whole state, Taylor proposes a *politics of recognition* where no cultural group is overshadowed by any other and where the identity of different members is recognised as valuable. Taylor's idea is not only to let these minority cultures develop freely and without any coercion, but also to recognise their intrinsic worth. As he points out:

“The demand (...) was that we let cultures defend themselves, within reasonable bounds. But the further demand we're looking at here is that we all recognise the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their worth.” (Taylor 1995: 250).

Accommodating minority ethnic groups could be understood, following these ideas, as the recognition of group-differentiated rights in a society where the individual of a certain group feels that she is not only incorporated into the political community as an individual but also as member of a distinctive group (Kymlicka 1998: 167) Recognition of rights that defend the identity and protect the value of different ethnic groups can be understood in at least two ways. On the one hand, we can understand recognition of rights in a broad sense. This approach would include a combination of what Kymlicka calls *internal restrictions* and *external protections* (Kymlicka 1995:36) The latter refers to those *intra-group* relations that the ethnic or national group may seek to use state power to restrict the freedom of its own member in the name of group solidarity. The former refers to those *inter-group* relations and to the actions that minorities seek to protect their identity as against mainstream society. On the other hand, we can understand recognition of minority rights in a narrow sense. Following this approach, accommodation would express a commitment that the state establishes with all composing ethnic groups to protect them and not discriminate. This approach would only include Kymlicka's *external protection* and it is the approach used in this paper.

The mechanisms that explain why recognition of group-differentiated rights and ethnic accommodation will bring about a higher support towards political regime in new democracies of CEE countries can be found within the frame of a habermasian discourse. Habermas's latest work on jurisprudence establishes a criterion that is necessary to acquire a

fully legitimated piece of law. He calls this criterion deliberative principle (D) which asserts: “Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse.” (Habermas, 1996:107)

From Habermas’s we learn that the necessary condition to give validity to an act is precisely participation in society as a full member. Furthermore, participation has to be understood in a very positive way; the act will be valid if the actor has had the chance to agree upon it. By using these ideas, I just want to highlight the importance of inclusion in social systems like political regimes. To be part of a political regime means that citizens have the capacity to act and participate in it in order to be active actors in a process where dispositions that will regulate their behaviour are decided. Moreover, inclusion as it has been discussed here, also means that there is a commitment by the state to protect and promote those features that make up their identity.

The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of the model that I will be using to test the hypotheses that I have been describing in the previous sections is the level of satisfaction with democracy that citizens from eight CEE countries have. Respondents are from Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine. The answers are given using a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is completely dissatisfied with democracy and 10 is completely satisfied with it³. This way of ordering the preferences towards democracy is very similar to those surveys designed by Richard Rose (CEEB). In these surveys, citizens are requested to value their satisfaction with democracy on a scale ranging from –100 to +100. The logic behind this large scale is to give the respondent the chance to express her most negative feelings for this form of regime –negatives figures- or to express her most positive feelings- positive figures. Eurobarometers, however, offer the respondent a question with just four answers: very

³ The survey that I have used in this paper was designed and carried out by the Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung (WZB) and was coordinated by Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Dieter Fuchs, Edeltraud Roller, Bernhard Wessels and Janus Simon. It was performed between September 1998 and March 2000.

satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied and not at all satisfied. From my point of view, this way of measuring satisfaction with democracy is the most accurate. The question offers in just four categories a very broad range where respondents can express their preferences. It is therefore an ordinal variable and not a continuous one like those based upon evaluations using a scale.

Eurobarometers are the kind of surveys used by Anderson and Guillory to test their hypotheses. However, the results they obtain should be read with certain caution since they use a wrongful way of analysing their data given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. They use an ordinal least square regression treating the dependent variable as a continuous one instead of an ordinal variable. To use ordinal least square regressions for a categorical dependent variable the authors should have shown evidence that the distance between all categories is the same. This evidence is lacking in the article and we should, therefore, interpret their results very cautiously. Since Anderson and Guillory have not shown equidistance between the different categories of the dependent variable, they should have opted for a more appropriate model such as an ordinal logit (Long 1997: 115). It is also very unconvincing the transformation into two categories that they do with the dependent variable and their analysis using a probit model. This is so, because transforming a four categories dependent variable into a two categories variable produces a considerable loss of information. The results obtained in the analysis using this new dependent variable do not reflect the whole range of information that is included in the original dependent variable.

Given that the dependent variable that I will be using is, as I said, the result of a evaluation using a 1 to 10 scale, the use of ordinal least square regression to estimate the parameters of the model is fully justified.

Independent variables

1. - Satisfaction with current economic situation

As the literature shows, a very important variable to understand satisfaction with democracy is the perception citizens have in relation with the economy (Przeworski 1991; Maravall 1997; Tóka 1995; Duch 1995). This variable measures this satisfaction from a sociotropic point of view. In other words, the respondent values the economic situation in its globality and not basing her opinion upon her personal economic situation. The hypothesis to be tested here is that in those countries where the economic situation is more prosperous, the likelihood of finding citizens more satisfied with democracy is higher than in countries where the economy is doing badly. However, the literature does not seem to find a focal point in this issue, though the dominant empirical evidence suggests the high correlation between both variables (Fuchs et al. 1995; Mishler and Rose 1996). This variable is measured following the same criterion as the dependent variable, i.e., respondents answer the question using a scale ranging from 1- completely dissatisfied - to 10- completely satisfied.

2. - Education

This variable measures the highest degree obtained by the respondent. Given that education is measured differently for each country, the results are calculated individually for each country. Concretely, this variable has 5 categories where the lowest category indicates that the respondent has no education at all and where the highest category indicates that the respondent has at least a university degree. The hypothesis to be tested here is that those citizens with higher levels of education will have a higher valuation of democracy than those citizens that are less educated.

3. – Age

Age is a variable that cannot be omitted in a study about satisfaction with democracy. Given the context of the countries under scrutiny, we could say that younger persons are more likely to be satisfied with democracy than older persons. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that younger people will have more positive expectations regarding democracy than autocracy.

4. - Electoral System (*propor*)

This is an institutional variable that measures the type of electoral system that can be found in every country of the sample. The variable is dichotomic. It has the value 0 if the country has a majoritarian or a mixed electoral system. As is known, majoritarian electoral systems work by choosing a single member in each constituency. Normally, this election is carried out using the procedure *First Past the Post* (FPP), that is to say, the seat is won by the candidate that gets more votes in the circumscription. Mixed electoral systems are characterised by using in the same election a combination of both majoritarian and proportional mechanisms to assign seats. The variable gets the value 1 for those countries where a proportional representation system can be found. These systems work assigning seats using a function of the proportion of votes that each political party gets (IDEA 1997) The hypothesis behind this hypothesis is that moving from a majoritarian or a mixed electoral system towards a proportional representation one will increase the level of satisfaction with democracy.

5. - Index of Presidential Authority (*IPA*)

This variable explains the degree of influence that the president of the republic has in the political life of the country. It is an index that indicates in percentages the power that the president has attending to constitutional criteria. It is an indicator about the relations between the executive and the legislative. A country with a lower level of presidential authority will

amount to a parliamentary democracy. Conversely, when the country has a very high level in the index, it will be closer to the presidential model. In this sense, we can think that in those countries where the IPA is low, satisfaction with democracy will be higher than in those countries where the IPA is high⁴.

6. - Territorial Organisation (territor)

This variable refers to the degree of centralisation in every country. It is also a dummy variable where 1 indicates complete territorial centralisation and 0 means that the country has whatever formula of decentralisation. This territorial decentralisation goes from total federalism- Russia- to recognition of autonomous regions –Crimea in Ukraine. Thinking in terms of political attitudes, we can think that in multiethnic countries where some groups are dominant in some regions, satisfaction with democracy will be higher in countries that are territorially decentralised than in centralised countries.

7. - *Effective number of political parties (ENP)*

This variable shows the level of party fragmentation in every country. Recall that Lijphart conceived majoritarian democracies as political systems with mainly two political parties and consensual democracies as systems with a greater number of political parties. This variable tells us the effective number of parties that would exist in a country considering the weight of every political party that has representation in the parliament. For example, if the NEP is 2, it means that there would be only two predominant political parties in the parliament; if the NEP were 3, it would amount to having three political parties in the parliaments each with a third of parliamentary seats (Taagepera and Shugart 1989)

⁴ A complete description of this index is provided by Norgaard 1999.

8. - *Ethnic Fragmentation Index (EFI)*

This is a control variable. Since we are measuring the effect of political institutions in multiethnic societies, this variable is necessary to control for that effect. The index that I use in this paper comes from a weighted mean between the proportion of minority groups in each country in relation with the total population of that country and the Ethnic Differentiation Index created by Ted Gurr in his database *Minorities at Risk*⁵. The resulting variable shows how heterogeneous every country of the sample is. Its values range from 0 to 11. Details about the index are provided in the appendix.

9. - *Ethnic Accommodation Index (EAI)*

This variable reflects the degree of accommodation that ethnic minority groups find in their countries. As I pointed out in the previous section, this variable is the main novelty of this paper since it introduces the impact of minority inclusion into the empirical analysis. The variable is also an index measured in percentage units. The index is built attending to constitutional texts and it is centred on three main issues: language rights, religion rights and political rights. Since this is a first approximation to this index, I do not expect it to be exhaustive; however, I think, that it collects the most important features that should be taken into consideration to measure minority accommodation. The index should be interpreted as follows: the higher the index, the more committed the country to accommodate its minorities. So, a higher level of the EAI will show very inclusive countries and lower levels of the EAI will show very exclusive ones. Details about how the index is built are offered in the appendix.

⁵ Details and access to the dataset *Minorities at Risk* can be obtained in www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar.

Empirical analysis using sociodemographic variables.

I would like to start the empirical analysis by testing the validity of the most commonly accepted hypothesis in the literature (Mishler and Rose 1996, 1999; Duch 1995; Tóka 1995). It is the case, for example, of the impact of economy upon satisfaction with democracy as I have already mentioned. An analysis at the individual level using sociodemographic variables can also bring to light some new conclusions about the importance of education and age in relation with the issue at stake. The results are presented in Table 2.

The analysis of sociodemographic factors is shown in model 1 of the regression analysis. At first glance, we can observe the high statistical significance as well as the high value of the coefficient related to satisfaction with economy. An increase of a unit in the measurement of this variable will produce an increase of 0.63 units in the scale used to measure the level of satisfaction with democracy. In other words, satisfaction with democracy will increase by almost two thirds of a unit for each unit increase in the satisfaction with the economy. The high influence of the economy upon the dependent variable can be observed a bit more clearly in models 2 and 3. In model 2, I run the regression omitting precisely the economy and including all other variables in the model. As can be observed, all variables are significant at 0.01 but the goodness of fit, measured by the determination coefficient (R^2), is not very big. It is just 11%. In this model we can already see how other variables such as the type of electoral system or the degree of ethnic accommodation are very influential. I will talk about these variables in the following pages, however. Model 3 shows, in clear contrast with model 2, the results of a regression where I have used satisfaction with the economy as a single independent variable. Again, the value of the coefficient is practically the same as in model 1 as well as the determination coefficient, 37% in both models. All these models seem to show that, in fact, the perception that citizens have about how the economy is doing is, from the respondent's point of view, the best indicator to guess how they value their democratic regime.

Table 2

<i>Satisfaction with democracy</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Econ.	.6329** (.0112)		.6319** (.0111)
Age	-.0006 (.0012)	-.0074** (.0015)	
Education	-.0405* (.0195)		
ENP		.1454** (0.009)	
IPA		-.0307** (.002)	
Propor		1.009** (.0645)	
Territor			
EFI		.1233** (.0093)	
EAI		.0054** (.0014)	
Constant	1.517** (.0992)	2.368** (.2358)	1.3680** (.0400)
R ²	0.37	0.11	0.36
N	7939	7701	7957

* Statistically significant at $p > 0.05$ **Statistically significant at $p > 0.01$

Model 2: Variable Education omitted by the system

Other variables that traditionally have been included in this type of research are education and age. These variables lose influence in countries with young democracies like CEE countries as we can see in Table 2. In Model 1, we observe how education is statistically significant at 0.05 but the value of its coefficient indicates the weak influence that education has upon satisfaction with democracy. The same can be said about age. Though the sign of the coefficient is the expected one, the fact that the variable is not statistically significant invites us not to take it into further consideration. As I explained in the previous section, the variable education has five values or categories. Given the discrete nature of this variable, I should have disaggregated into different dichotomic variables so that I could measure its impact correctly. In the regression that I run in Model 1 it appears as a continuous variable, however. This is so because I have assumed linearity between the different categories. This assumption is supported by a Wald test that I performed to test the equidistance of the

categories. The result of the test is the expected one and we can assume equidistance and treat the variable, therefore, as a continuous one.

Empirical analysis using institutional variables.

The novelty and originality of Anderson and Guillory's work consisted, above all, in the incorporation of institutional variables measured in an aggregated way and combined in the analysis together with individual data. As I pointed out in the introduction, this approximation to study political satisfaction with democracy is shared in this paper. In the previous section, I showed how satisfaction with democracy was highly related with satisfaction with the economy. Here I will try to show on the one hand how, apart from individual sociodemographic variables, there are other types of variables that also have an important effect upon the issue at stake. These variables will refer to those political institutions that are adopted after the fall of communism. On the other hand, I will try to show how we can introduce a third level of analysis consisting in incorporating into the analysis the level of ethnic accommodation. By introducing this novel approach here I affirm how in multiethnic societies the issue of minority incorporation cannot be forgotten at all. Results are shown in Table 3

Model 4 of Table 3 shows the results obtained after running a regression using only institutional variables as independent variables. The high statistical significance of all the variables shows how, certainly, the effect of institutional variable is to be taken seriously when explaining satisfaction with democracy. One of the variables has a negative sign. This direction is the expected one are given the nature of these variables. The index measuring the effect of presidentialism (IPA) has a negative sign indicating that higher values of it, i.e. more presidential authority, is related to lower levels of satisfaction with democracy. More concretely, an increase of 10 units in this variable – recall that IPA measures the authority of presidents in percentages- will produce a decrease of 0.28 units in the scale used to measure satisfaction with democracy. The positive signs of the rest of variables are also the expected ones. As we can see, the most influential one is the type of electoral system. The data

suggests that the decision between opting for a majoritarian or a mixed electoral system and a proportional representation one will produce an increase of 1.029 units increase in the scale used to measured satisfaction with democracy when a proportional representation system is chosen. The ethnic accommodation index is very significant but its influence when running a regression with just institutional variables is very limited. An increase of 10 units in the index –measured in percentages- will only produce an increase of 0.06 units in the dependent variable, a very small and insignificant effect. The goodness of fit is also very unfortunate, 0.11. This fact is, however, irrelevant and it will not minimise importance to the main conclusion of using these variables, i.e. the high significance of them.

Table 3

<i>Satisfaction with democracy</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5 (A&G)</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
Econ.		.6064** (.0121)	.598** (.012)
Age		-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)
Education		-.013 (.0205)	.031 (.0209)
ENP	.1479** (.0093)	-.005 (.006)	.0198* (.008)
IPA	-.0288** (.002)		-.017** (.002)
Propor	1.029** (.063)	.8473** (.049)	.4720** (.055)
Territor		-.4700** (.0522)	
EFI	.1192** (.009)		.049** (.008)
EAI	.006** (.001)		.003** (.001)
Interparty			
Interpropor			
Interipa			
Constant	2.159** (.2217)	1.083** (.102)	1.222** (.194)
R ²	.11	.41	.42
N	7723	7252	7252

* Statistically significant at p>0.05 **Statistically significant at p>0.01

As can be seen in model 4 the variable about territorial organisation -territor- is not included. I have omitted this variable deliberately to avoid a problem of multicollinearity. The correlation between IAE and the variable territor is very high, 0.76, and running a regression including both variables would have produced a problem of multicollinearity. This problem can be avoided by omitting one of the disturbing variables. I have opted for eliminating the variable territor since I am more interested in testing the effect of the variable relative to ethnic accommodation.

Recall that some critiques of Anderson and Guillory's work was that their sample was reduced to Western countries and that they forgot to include young democracies (Norris 1999) Model 5 in Table 3 shows Anderson and Guillory's model for the case of CEE countries. Focusing on sociodemographic variables, we observe, again, the lack of statistical significance of variables like education and age. Again, that leads us to think that, at least in these countries, those traditional theories stating the importance of age and education to understand political support is not fulfilled here. This is, from my point of view, a very interesting result and I think that further research on this issue should be done to identify why this is so. About the institutional variables that are included in the model, it is remarkable that the effective number of political parties is not only statistically significant but also has a unexpected negative sign. This contradicts Anderson and Guillory's thesis.

Having said this, I think it is appropriate to advance a new model to study satisfaction with democracy in CEE countries. In this sense, both the introduction of a control variable which measures the ethnic fragmentation and an index describing the level of ethnic accommodation in each country have positive effects. This can be seen in model 6. Here, we still observe that satisfaction with economy is the most influential variable but we also observe that the incorporation of these new variables produces an increase in the level of significance and goodness of fit. Concerning the economy, we see how an increase of a unit in this variable will produce an increase of 0.59 units in the scale used to measure satisfaction with democracy. Concerning institutional variables, the most influential one is the electoral system. The change from a majoritarian or mixed electoral system to a proportional representation one increases the level of satisfaction with democracy by 0.50 units. The third level of analysis that I introduced to test the impact of ethnic incorporation in society not only

from an institutional point of view but also from a social and cultural one does not have the strong effect that theory affirms. As we can see, an increase of 10 units in EAI will only produce an increase of 0.03 units in the dependent variable. This effect is very insignificant although we should not undermine this variable given the high statistical significance that it has.

Conclusion

Political institutions are important to understand political attitudes such as satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, in multiethnic societies we can say that the degree of ethnic accommodation is also a relevant factor to understand this issue. The results that I have shown in this paper for a sample of eight CEE countries seem to prove these conclusions as well as other papers showed for Western democracies. The approach that I have been using here is, therefore, not totally new though I think it deepens some of the critiques that previous research on the field had. This paper has followed Anderson and Guillory's approach to the study of political support using institutional variables. However, I have tried to use a better econometric technique in my empirical analysis as well as taking into consideration some relevant substantive issues that were lacking in their paper and that invited the reader to take their results cautiously.

In this paper I have explained and tested two different, though closely linked, hypotheses. On the one hand, I have argued that in CEE countries a study about political support using an institutional approach should take into consideration ethnic fragmentation. In this sense, we should expect to find a higher level of satisfaction with democracy in those countries that being ethnically heterogeneous have institutions based on consensual democracy. If the country is ethnically homogeneous, then satisfaction with democracy will be higher if the types of institutions they adopt are inspired by the majoritarian model. On the other hand, I have argued that social and cultural inclusion should also be a key factor to understand satisfaction with democracy in multiethnic societies. It is plausible to think that in those countries where the inclusion, not on the institutional side but on the social and cultural

arena, is bigger, citizens' support towards democracy will be higher than in countries where having the same ethnic heterogeneity the degree of inclusion is smaller. In terms of analysis, I have created an index, Ethnic Accommodation Index (EAI), that has tried to include, not exhaustively, the degree of inclusion in these countries.

The results that I have obtained in this paper confirm some of the hypotheses and are a bit more pessimistic on others. Firstly, we should say that the key factor in my analysis is satisfaction with the economy followed by the type of electoral system. The hypothesis explained by the literature (Duch 1995; Mishler and Rose 1999) is confirmed here. How citizens perceive economic results is paramount to understanding satisfaction with democracy. But also very interesting is the high relevance of an institutional variable like the type of electoral system. As I have shown, choosing a proportional representation electoral system in multiethnic societies produces a very positive strong effect on the attitudes of citizens towards democracy. It seems that citizens really care about having their voices heard in the decision-making process. This conclusion seems to be stronger than the effect of ethnic accommodation in society. The effect of having a country that is very respectful with minorities does not seem to have the expected strength in the analysis. It is a very significant variable to understand satisfaction with democracy but its effect on it is almost inexistent. It seems that, given the data, for citizens to have institutions that incorporate their voices into politics is more relevant than having other types of cultural recognition. It is not that ethnic accommodation does not matter; I mean that political institutions have a stronger effect on citizens when dealing with satisfaction with democracy.

An interesting result that I have also obtained in this analysis is the small importance of education when explaining political attitudes towards democracy. It seems an accepted idea that the level of culture of citizens is very important to understand how they behave in relation with democracy. In the existing literature, it is accepted that the more educated a citizen is, the more support towards democracy she will show (Almond and Verba 1989) This hypothesis has to be rejected in this paper at least when considering the initial years of democracy in CEE countries. What the data suggest here is that education has nothing to do

with political support to democracy. I think that this is a very interesting point that should be researched further.

As a final conclusion, we could say that using an institutional approach to deal with political attitudes like satisfaction with democracy is not implausible. Furthermore, in multiethnic societies both the level of fragmentation as well as the level of inclusion should not be left apart.

Appendix: Operationalisation of independent variables.

1.- Ethnic Fragmentation Index (EFI)

This index is the weighted mean of two indicators. The first one is the Ethnic Differentiation Index (Et) offered by Ted Gurr in his Minority at Risk database. The value of this index ranges from 0 –no difference among groups- to 11- complete difference. Detailed information about this index can be found in the database codebook in www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar. The second indicator is the proportion of minority groups of each country in relation with the total population (P) The IFE is calculated using the following formula:

$$EFI = \frac{\sum PE_t}{\sum P}$$

2.- Effective number of parties with parliamentary representation (ENP)

This index is calculated following the indications suggested by Taagepera and Lakso (Taagepera and Lakso 1980) and improved by Taagepera and Shugart (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). It is calculated using the following formula:

$$ENP = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2}$$

3.- Ethnic Accommodation Index (EAI)

I have built this index using constitutional legislation and using three types of disposition that I consider reflect the degree of ethnic accommodation. The first types of disposition refer to linguistic rights. I have searched the constitutions of the countries analysed here to see whether the language of the minority was co-official together with the language of the main group. I have also taken into consideration whether the language was official in the region where the minority was settled and finally whether minorities have a

protected right as well as state promotion to be taught in the minority language. The second set of constitutional dispositions refer to religious rights. Here, I have searched to see whether state was separated from church, whether the state promotes any kind of religion and whether religious festivities of any kind were constitutionally or legally recognised and protected. Finally, I have looked at political dispositions. Here I checked whether in the countries under study there was an automatic recognition of citizenship for ethnic minorities⁶. Secondly, I looked at whether minorities were granted a minimum number of parliamentary seat and finally I checked whether minorities could participate in elections in political parties defending the ethnic minority interests.

The weight of the three sets is not the same, so I have considered that political rights are the most important rights and weight 3. Linguistic rights weight 2 and finally religious rights weight 1. The justification for this is that I assume that minorities will be more interested in political life since from participating in the decision-making process can affect the other types of dispositions. The index is calculated using the following formula:

$$3\left(\sum pol\right) + 2\left(\sum ling\right) + 1\left(\sum relig\right) = \text{M.E.A.} / 18 \times 100 = \text{EAI}$$

Where *pol* refers to political dispositions, *ling*, linguistic dispositions and *relig* religious dispositions. M.A.E. stands for Measurement of Ethnic Accommodation and indicates the punctuation that each country has got. The maximum punctuation is 18 and it is multiplied by 100 to have it in percentages.

4.- Institutional Data

<i>Countries</i>	<i>EFI</i>	<i>Electoral System</i>	<i>IPA</i>	<i>Territorial Organisation</i>	<i>NEP</i>	<i>EAI</i>
Belarus	3.70	1.00	45.98	1.00	*	33.33
Bulgaria	9.50	3.00	45.10	1.00	2.52	16.66
Hungary	7.00	3.00	21.00	0.00	3.78	83.33
Poland	0.00	3.00	49.11	1.00	10.85	61.11
Rumania	6.05	3.00	42.50	0.00	2.19	88.88
Russia	7.90	2.00	57.50	0.00	8.64	66.66
Slovenia	0.00	3.00	19.20	0.00	8.18	83.33
Ukraine	3.91	1.00	46.88	0.00	3.66	72.22

* Belarus has no data after 1999

⁶ This is a very important issue in some CEE countries, above all in the Baltic Republics. On this issue see Laitin 1998.

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