

Fascism, breakdown of democracy, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes : coincidences and distinctions

Author(s): Linz, Juan J. (Juan José), 1926-
Date 2002
Type Working Paper
Series Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 2002/179
City: Madrid
Publisher: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales

FASCISM, BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIAN AND TOTALITARIAN REGIMES: COINCIDENCES AND DISTINCTIONS

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Estudio/Working Paper 2002/179
October 2002

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> Neither Fascism nor Communism turned out to be the ensign of a providential destiny for humanity. They were merely brief episodes, framed by what they had sought to destroy. Produced by democracy, they were interred by democracy.
>
> (Furet 1999, 2)

Introduction*

I might start with the paradox that having written extensively on non-democratic regimes, fascism, and breakdown of democracies, I have not systematically linked these three areas of interest and research.[1] The reasons are many, some accidental like the fact that writings were in the context of work focusing on each of those problem areas, but also an intellectual one

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* A first version of this paper was presented at a Conference Internazionale sul Fascismo, organized by Alberto Spreafico, November 1982. I want to acknowledge the comments made by different participants at that meeting and the Conference on Totalitarianism in Geneva in 199__. I am grateful to my wife Rocío de Terán for her constant assistance and editing. Without her help this, like many other of my papers, would never have been finished.

[1] This essay should be read in conjunction with my earlier writings where I have defined, discussed and documented at length my use of terms like authoritarian regime, totalitarianism and fascism. I shall not repeat myself here given the length of this essay, although it might have been helpful for the reader. I would mention now the following:

"Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in N. Polsby and F. Greenstein, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3, Reading, Mass., Addison Wesley Press, pp. 175-411, 1975, reprinted as a book with a new introduction, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 2000, translated into German as *Totalitäre und Autoritäre Regime*, Herausgegeben von Raimund Krämer, Berlin, Berliner Debatte Wissenschaftsverlag, 2000.

"Autoritarismo", *Enciclopedia delle Scienze Sociali*, Roma, Istituto delle Enciclopedia Italiana, 1991, vol. 1, pp. 444-459.

"The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime. The Case of Brazil", in A. Stepan., ed., *Authoritarian Brazil. Origins, Policies and Future*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 233-54.

"Opposition to and under an Authoritarian Regime. The Case of Spain", in R. A. Dahl, ed., *Regimes and Oppositions*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 171-259.

"Political Space and Fascism as a Late-Comer", in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, *et al*, eds., pp. 153-89, 1980.

"From Falange to Movimiento-Organización. The Spanish Single Party and the Franco Regime, 1936-1968", in S.P. Huntington and C.H. Moore., eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Societies. The Dynamics of Established One Party Systems*, New York, Basic Books, 1970, pp. 128-303.

With P. Farneti and M.R. Lepsius, *La Caduta dei regimi democratici*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1981.

"Typen politischer Regime und die Achtung der Menschenrechte: Historische und länderübergreifende Perspektiven", in Eckart Jesse, ed., *Totalitarismus im 20. Jahrhundert, Eine Bilenz der internationalen Forschung*, Bonn, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1999, pp. 519-571.

that I shall try to develop here: the three themes are undoubtedly in many cases interconnected but in many others quite distinct. There have been and will be totalitarian and authoritarian regimes without fascism playing a role in their development, unless we stretch the concept of fascism to a point that it becomes unrecognizable and useless. There have been and will be breakdowns of political democracy in the absence of fascist movements and leading to regimes that cannot be characterized as fascist. Those are the fundamental reasons why I have discussed those three great problems of 20th century politics without linking them systematically. However, there are sufficient cases in which the three were connected in one way or another between the two world wars to attempt a more systematic analysis of the relationship between them.

Let me make a few brief statements. Even after the first World War there were in Europe and elsewhere failures and crises of democratic regimes in which fascist movements played no role or only a minor one; crises leading to the establishment of non-democratic regimes in which fascists had no part, and that even in quite a few cases suppressed fascist movements. The communist parties that grew out of the split of the socialist movement as the result of the opposition to the war after Zimmerwald and of the October Revolution threatened democracies and contributed to the crisis of democracy in the twenties and thirties. The communists only took power temporarily in Hungary (October 1918-August 1919) and permanently in Russia. Even there the independence and resistance of Finland, Poland and the Baltic republics limited the success of the Bolsheviks and the red army.

Contrary to the image of an Europe engulfed by fascism and of democracies overwhelmed by antidemocratic forces, we have to emphasize the large number of the democracies that survived (until German occupation).[2] The list includes: the United Kingdom, France (despite serious threats), Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland (despite a dangerous crisis). A total of ten countries. The number of democracies, not just liberal constitutional states, or developing, emerging, possible,

[2] J.J. Linz, "La crisis de las democracias", in M. Cabrera, et. al., *Europa en crisis 1919-1939*, Madrid, Pablo Iglesias, 1991, pp. 231-280.

democracies, that broke down is much smaller: Italy, Germany, Austria and Spain in 1936. That is four countries. The other cases of breakdown -- Russia, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Spain 1923, Portugal 1917 and 1925, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece -- would perhaps be better defined as breakdowns of liberal constitutional regimes, of countries in the process of democratization, or aborted processes of consolidation of democracy, than of fully democratic regimes. Nine countries, to add to the four and the three Baltic republics, a total of sixteen. We do not count Albania a premodern society and state in the making. Of the states existing before World War I, nine were stable democracies in the interwar years and in six cases democratization was frustrated or democracy broke down. The successor states of Empires: Russia, Turkey, Austro-Hungary and Germany, all experienced breakdown. Eight new states were born in the aftermath of the War and only in three: Finland, Czechoslovakia (until its disintegration under German pressure) and Ireland, democracy survived while five others: Poland, Yugoslavia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia experienced authoritarian breakdowns. Established statehood and being neutral or among the victors were favorable to democracy. Besides, being constitutional monarchies seems to have favored democratic stability. The fascist movements were generally unsuccessful in destroying European democracies, but they contributed to their crises and a few gained power or a share in power. The existence of an Italian fascist regime and after 1933 the Nazi system, exercised an influence in the form authoritarian regimes took in that period, although it would be difficult to say that it was sufficient to characterize those regimes as fascist. This, however, makes it difficult to distinguish fascist, semi-fascist, and non-fascist authoritarian regimes, particularly since there is no consensus on what the Italian fascist regime actually was like. It is easier to distinguish the authoritarian regimes from Nazi totalitarianism after its full consolidation in power. The success and appeal of fascist movements influenced other anti-democratic parties and movements, making clear distinctions difficult.

It is wrong to think of the period after 1918 as one of a "civil war" between fascism and communism as Nolte does. The fight was between both great antidemocratic movements and of both against liberal or social-democratic-liberal democracies. Unfortunately, some democrats felt that in some countries -- generally not their own -- if they were inclined to the left, the communists were the lesser threat, while many conservatives (not always fully happy with democracy) felt that fascism was the best protection against the communist threat. The three-

front conflict became sometimes a two-fronted one. As Furet has shown, one of the tragedies of history was that anti-communism was equated with fascism and antifascism with sympathy for the Soviet Union.

A minority of left fascists even felt an affinity with the Soviet revolution -- as a functional alternative national revolution -- and emphasized the common hostility to the "plutocratic" victorious democracies of the West.[3] For short periods this led to cooperation of fascist regimes with the Soviets that culminated in the Hitler-Stalin pact. The Finnish winter war was an odd moment when the Western democrats could oppose both the Soviet Union and Hitler.

The Communists with their putchist activities contributed to destabilize democracy in Germany and Estonia. Elsewhere they contributed to the fractionalization of the labor movement, particularly in Italy, and to the split between the SPD and the USPD in Germany. In other countries, like Spain, communism contributed to the radicalization, "bolshevization", of the socialist party in 1934 and particularly in 1936, like the preemptive competition with the fascists led to a "fascistization" of a conservative Christian party, the CEDA. It is absurd to write about the demise of the Weimar republic and the incapacity of the Reichstag to support democratic governments without mentioning the negative majority formed by the added votes of the NSDAP

[3] The image of the Soviet Union and even Stalin, as distinct from World Communism, among fascist leaders and intellectuals would deserve study and would reveal the "affinity" with the first and the rejection of the second. It is interesting that Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, ¿*Fascismo en España*?, Esplugues de Llobregat, Ariel, 1968, should write that the "single school would be possible only in a totalitarian state be it fascist or bolshevik", p. 59. Note the use of term "Totalitarian State" applied to both in 1935 and by a fascist! Elsewhere he writes (p.62): "In our epoch, in our own days, the national revolutions develop with incredible success. See the names that represent them: Mussolini, Kemal, Hitler and--why not?--Stalin". Leon Degrelle formulated it in 1941 when he told his audience in German occupied Paris: "It is not to save capitalism that we fight in Russia. . . . It is for a revolution of our own. . . . If Europe were to become once more the Europe of bankers, of fat corrupt bourgeoisies, slack, sloppy, and accommodating. . . we should prefer communism to win and destroy everything. We would rather have it all blow up than see this rottenness resplendent." Quoted in E. Weber, *Varieties of Fascism*, Princeton, D. Van Nostrand, 1964, p.47. Robert Bardeche, the French fascist, expressed it more positively in 1937 when he wrote: "Fascism, we have thought since a long time, is poetry, the poetry itself of the XX century (without doubt together with communism). The little children . . . will learn with. . . amazement the existence of that exultation of millions of men, the youth camps, the glories of the past, the parades, the cathedrals of light . . . And I know well that communism has also its greatness, similarly exultant. Quoted by J. Plumyène and R. Lasierra, *Les Fascismes Français 1923-1963*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1963, p.103.

and the KPD, or the confrontation between the democratic government of Prussia with the Communist violence.

Fascism did not defeat communism but in some cases democracies weakened by the hostility of Communists. The two antidemocratic movements fighting each other in the streets and their common hostility to "bourgeois" democracy (including social democrats labeled "social fascists" by the Communists) complemented each other in the crisis of democracy.

In the interwar crisis one factor that cannot be neglected is the international relations between countries and parties. In the case of the Communist movement, the directives from Moscow and the interventions of the Comintern leadership in the factional fights within the parties made them less responsive to the national political contexts and often contributed to their suicidal policies confronting the fascist threat, most particularly in Germany. In the case of the weaker fascist parties, the existence of two poles of attraction, ideologically and in terms of contacts, the Italian PNF and the German NSDAP, indirectly contributed to the fractionalization of the movement. Even when some parties received subsidies and other forms of support it does not seem that this was a major factor in their success or failure, although on occasion it contributed also to delegitimize them. More important was the attraction of the successes of the Mussolini regime -- for example in the conversion of Mosley into a fascist leader --, and the German "national rebirth", unity, engineered mass support and enthusiasm in impressing foreign visitors, not only fascists but conservative leaders. The image of Italy and later Germany made fascism attractive. Another indirect factor was the desire for peace that led nationalist leaders favor understanding with Germany and appeasement, breaking with parties advocating a harder line and rearmament.

Obviously we cannot ignore how, in the context of post-Versailles politics, the interests of the major powers -- among them Fascist Italy and later Nazi Germany -- contributed to support authoritarian tendencies and authoritarian regimes (and not necessarily the fascist parties). For example: Dollfuss's policies, before his assassination, were influenced by Mussolini and the chancellor's interest facing the nazi threat and the Anschluss. The complex interaction between foreign policy, alignments, ideological or cultural-religious affinities and even personal

sympathies among rulers, was important for the creation, stability and internal politics of authoritarian rule. Such processes were generally not, until the war, the result of direct intervention but of the "rule of anticipated" reactions.

If we were to agree on some basic characterization of fascism as a political movement in the Europe of the interwar years[4] not to be found in that particular form after World War II, a number of questions can be asked about what difference does the presence of fascist movements and of successful fascist regimes make for authoritarian regimes before 1945 and after. Difficult questions because both fascists and anti-fascists had an interest in blurring the distinctions we attempt to make. The fascists in order to legitimate their claim to represent the way of the future, to be the expression of needs felt in the most diverse societies and to further an alliance of the most diverse regimes against Western democracies and the Soviet Union. However, fascist leaders and intellectuals were keenly aware of the differences between their movements and regimes and others, including those imitating them. Democrats, socialists, communists, all victims of anti-democratic and authoritarian movements and regimes, were interested in identifying them first with fascist Italy and particularly later with Nazism since those regimes could mobilize widespread rejection, especially after World War II. The hegemony in Europe or parts of Europe of the axis powers led anti-democratic movements and authoritarian regimes not to underscore their own differences from fascism until after the prospect of victory of those powers became dim.

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[4] S.G. Payne, *A History of Fascism 1914-1945*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1995, is a monumental, documented and insightful work with exhaustive bibliographic references. W. Laqueur, ed., *Fascism. A Reader's Guide*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. R. Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, New York, Routledge, 1991. U. Larsen, B.Hagtvet and J.P. Myklebust, eds., *Who were the Fascists. Social Roots of European Fascism*, Bergen, Universitetsforlaget, 1980. U. Larsen, with the assistance of B. Hagtvet, eds., *Modern Europe After Fascism*, Boulder, Social Science Monographs, 1998, 2 vols. in its 63 chapters covers a large number of countries and themes, focussing on the legacy of fascism and different regimes, discontinuities and continuities and how they dealt with the past.

The chapters dealing with the fascists and radical right in each of these works excuse me from more detailed analyses and bibliographic references.

One way to visualize the problem area we are discussing would be to locate the different countries and regimes--at different times--in circles representing democratic, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, as well as fascism, as in Graph I. We could complicate our representation including a circle for the complex of issues linked with corporativism, that could intersect both authoritarian and democratic politics and partially fascism, as well as circles for other anti-democratic *Ideenkreise*.

The Breakdown of Democracy and Fascism

Even though fascism played a major role in the crisis of democratic regimes, the failure of consolidation of democracy in a number of countries cannot be linked to the presence, strengths or ambitions of fascist movements. A number of democracies established before and immediately after World War I underwent serious crisis in the consolidation process before fascism became an attractive alternative to democracy for significant sectors of the population and elites. Even after fascism had gained power in Italy, no fascist movements of significance emerged in a number of countries where democratic regimes experienced a breakdown. The elites that established authoritarian regimes were not unaware of the fascist experience, and in some cases explored the possibility of incorporating elements of that experience into their regimes. However, their understanding of what fascism was about was limited, and their regimes reflected this lack of understanding and the independent development of their forms of authoritarian rule.[5] The fact that some of those regimes, particularly Hungary, held on to semi-or pseudo-democratic institutions and did not reject outright the liberal heritage proves that non-

[5] J.F. Coverdale, *Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 35-37, on Italian Fascist perceptions of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, on the absence of a "myth", on the patriotic party seen as "completely devoid of soul and vitality", and "the 'condottiero' little more than an intelligent and energetic gentleman".

fascist character of authoritarian rule.[6] Another indication is that in a number of cases the emergent fascist movements appeared as opposition to those authoritarian regimes (particularly in Romania, Hungary and Lithuania) and sometimes experienced discrimination and even persecution (like the murder of Codreanu by the dictatorship of King Carol in 1938).[7]

Those identifying with a Marxist, particularly the vulgar Marxist, interpretation of fascism as an instrument to suppress the emerging working class and the defense of capitalism, tend to forget that the authoritarian solutions appeared in response to other social and political problems, like the building of a state in the case of Turkey, the bitter nationality conflicts in some Eastern European countries, the rural/urban conflict in Bulgaria, and, paradoxically, in the 30's in Estonia and Latvia[8] as a response to a perceived fascist threat. The failure in the consolidation of

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[6] A. C. Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary 1825-1945*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, Chapters V and VI, pp. 201-312. See p. 229 for a chart of the parliamentary parties and factions 1939-1944 and for the "political pluralism" in the regime, and pp. 278-0285 for the social background of elites of government machine and parliament in the Liberal-Conservative Period (1921-1932) and the National Radical Period (1932-1944), and the National-Socialist Leadership. A. C. Janos, "The One-Party State and Social Mobilization: East Europe Between the Wars", in Huntington and Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, *op. cit*., pp. 204-236. I. Deák, "Hungary" in H. Rogger and E. Weber, eds., *The European Right*, Berkeley: University of California, 1966, pp. 364-407. J. Kochanowski, "Horthy und Pildsudski-Vergleich der Autoritären Regime in Ungarn und Polen", in Oberländer, *op. cit*,, pp. 19-94. J. Rothschild, *Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, and S. Andreski, "Poland", in S.J. Woolf, ed., *European Fascism*, New York: Random House (Vintage Books, 1969, pp. 167-183, particularly on the government parties first the Non-Party Bloc of collaboration with the government and then the Camp of National Unity "and the struggle for power between the pseudo-fascist militarized bureaucracy and a semi-fascist party of antisemitic and ultra montane chauvinists". E. D. Wynot, Jr., *Polish Politics in Transition: The Camp of National Unity and the Struggle for Power, 1935-1939*, Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1974.

[7] H. L. Roberts, *Rumania, Political Problems of an Agrarian State*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1951. The fundamental difference in worldview of the royal National Rebirth Front and the Legion of the Archangel has been well captured by A. C. Janos, "Modernization and Decay in Historical Perspective. The Case of Romania", in Kenneth Jowitt, ed., *Social Change in Romania 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation*, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978, pp. 72-116, see pp. 109-112. E. Weber, "Romania", in Rogger and Weber, eds., *The European Right*, *op. cit*., pp. 501-574. For a stimulating excursus comparing politics and society in Romania and Portugal, see P. C. Schmitter, "Manoilescu and Delayed Dependent Development" in Jowitt, ed., *Social Change in Romania 1860-1940*, *op. cit*., pp. 117-139, see pp. 134-139. H.-C. Maier, "Voraussetzungen der Autoritären Monarchie in Rumanien" and F. Müller, "Autoritäre Regime in Rumänien 1938-1944", in Oberländer, *op. cit*., 2001, pp. 431-470 and 471-499, respectively. M. Dogan, "Romania, 1919-1938", in M. Weiner and E. Dzbudun, eds., *Competitive Elections and Development Studies*, Duke, Duke University Press, 1987, pp. 369-389.

[8] On Estonia, A. Kasekamp, *The Radical Right in Interwar Estonia*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000. It includes comparisons with other Baltic republics and a paired comparison between Estonian breakdown and authoritarian regime and the reequilibration of democracy in Finland. See also A. Pajür, "Die Legitimietung

democracy in the years after 1918 cannot be attributed always to the presence of fascist or fascisticized movements nor, if we were to accept the Marxist interpretation, to the solution of the type of problems to which presumably fascism responded.

Table 1. *Monarchies and Republics in Interwar Years and Democratic Stability*

	Monarchies	Republics	Total
Stable democracies	UK Denmark Norway Sweden Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg	Switzerland France Finland Czechoslovakia	
	7	5	12
Democracies in crisis or frustrated democratization	Spain (1923) Italy Yugoslavia Romania Bulgaria Greece	USSR Turkey Poland Hungary Portugal Germany Austria Lithuania Latvia Estonia Spain (1936)	
	6	11	17*
Total	13	16	29*

*Spain counted twice

der Diktatur des Präsidenten Päts und die öffentliche Meinung in Estland", in Oberländer, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-214. A. Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994, chapter 3.

Table 2. *European States, World War I and Democracy*

	States before WWI		States Attaining Independence After WWI	Defected Empires and Successor States		
Stable Democracies	Denmark	n	Finland			
	Luxembourg	n	Czechoslovakia (v)			
	Netherlands	n	Ireland			
	Norway	n				
	Sweden	n				
	Switzerland	n				
	Belgium	v				
	France	v				
	UK	v				
	9		3	12		
Democracies in crisis or frustrated democratization	Spain-(1923, 1936)	n	Poland (v)	Russia-USSR	d	
	Italy,	v	Yugoslavia (v)	Turkey	d	
	Romania	v	Latvia	Hungary	d	
	Greece	v-d	Lithuania	Austria	d	
	Bulgaria	d	Estonia	Germany	d	
	Portugal	v				
	6		5	5		16
Total	15		8	5		28

n – neutral
v – victors
d- defeated

In a number of countries, Spain (1923), Portugal, Poland and the Baltic republics, the crisis of parliamentarism was probably more important than social conflicts and even the economic crisis after 1929. Antiparliamentarism, hostility to parties and politicians, exaltation of society -- of professionals, workers, entrepreneurs, youth, as a new elite -- in the first decades of the century were widespread sentiments, shared by intellectuals and large sectors in many societies. They were articulated by those favoring authoritarian solutions and by no one better than Fascism in Italy and later other fascist movements. Authoritarian non-fascist solutions and

the new movement were born in the same climate of opinion, but Fascism was a much more complex phenomenon. Corporatism was one widely shared alternative as well as a diffuse populism. Both will be found in many authoritarian responses in the crises of the twenties and thirties. Party fractionalization, the result of proportional representation, the presence of multiple ethnic parties (in Latvia and Estonia) and representation of interest groups, led to high government instability and the demand for a stronger executive and presidentialism.

It is, therefore, imperative to keep the question of consolidation and crisis of democratic regimes and the rise of authoritarian rule separate from the question of why fascism and why fascists' success in the overthrow of democratic regimes.

We can distinguish at least five kinds of situations in the Europe of the interwar years:

1. Authoritarian regimes that emerged in the absence of fascist movements and that experienced no or limited influence in their policies and particularly in their institutionalization of fascist regimes (Turkey would be a good example.)

2. Authoritarian regimes that appear in societies in which fascist movements have emerged and where the fascists support the process of destruction of democracy and enter into the anti-democratic coalition that establishes the authoritarian regime. The outcome of that participation varies from those cases where the fascists gain a significant share in power and those in which they are pushed aside and even eliminated as a politically relevant factor. The authoritarian regimes established in the presence of fascist movements and with their participation, although unable to gain a hegemonic or even important position, will be somewhat different and show a number of features that would allow to characterize some of them loosely as fascists. Nonetheless, the remaining differences with truly fascist regimes like the Italian are sufficient to question such a characterization.

3. Only in Italy and Germany the fascist parties played the decisive role in the final destruction of democracy, assumed power with their leader becoming the head of the government, and established regimes in which the fascist movement played a hegemonic role, at

least after a certain point, in the consolidation of the regime. In the process of gaining power, those parties made alliances which, in the case of Italy, might have become more permanent and limited the hegemony of the party, but which, in Germany, soon gave way to a more or less hegemonic position of the Nazis. Only in Romania do we find another case of control of the government by a fascist party in a diarchy with General Antonescu September 15, 1940 to January 23, 1941, though short-lived and overthrown by a military authoritarian regime.

The German-Italian domination of Europe did not bring fascist movements to power in all the countries they controlled; they played an important role as collaborators but only assumed power in Norway with Quisling and in Croatia, if we consider Ustacha a fascist party, to which we might add the more dubious case of the Slovak fascistized nationalist movement. Let us not forget that only for a very short time the Hungarian fascists were given power by the Nazis, that the French fascists had to compete for power with the Etat Français of Petain, that other countries remained under German military occupation, like Belgium and the Netherlands, and that one of them, Denmark, remained a democracy with a free election held in 1943 under the occupation, (in which the DNSA gained 2.15% of the vote). Even one, Finland, *de facto* ally in the war against the USSR, was a democracy.[9]

4. Stable democracies where the fascist movements or parties represented a more or less serious threat like Finland, Belgium and France before World War II, and those where they did not become a danger to stability like the UK, Ireland Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. Czechoslovakia was a special case, since the threat did not come from native fascists but from a nazified Sudeten German minority and the fascistized Catholic Slovak nationalist movement.

5. Only one country where the communists ended the hope for democracy, the USSR, with the October revolution and the disbanding of the Constituent Assembly.

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[9] R. Alapuro and E. Allardt, "The Lapua Movement: The Threat of Rightist Takeover in Finland, 1930-32", in Linz and Stepan, *op. cit*. H. Poulsen and M. Djursaa, "Social Basis of Nazism in Denmark: The DNSAP", in Larsen, et. al., *Who were the Fascists?*, *op. cit*., pp. 702-714.

In this essay I focus on the role of fascism and radical nationalism in the breakdown of democracy. It would require another essay to highlight the hostility to liberal democracy of communist, soviet - Räte - Council, syndicalist, anarchist maximalist socialism, even Austro-marxism, ideologies and movements in shaping the Zeitalter der Ideologien. They did not achieve power, but generated fear and hatred of their opponents and disturbance of public order that challenged democratic governments and presumably showed their weakness (even when they defeated or controlled them).

Our enumeration should make it clear that fascist movements and fascist ideas--the example of Italy and later Germany--did not play a decisive role in the breakdown of many democracies, and that the breakdown of democratic regimes did not always lead to a participation of fascists in power. Nor should we forget that a number of authoritarian regimes not only did not co-opt the fascists, but excluded them from power (like in Portugal)[10] and in a few cases persecuted them (as in Romania, Brazil, Japan, the Baltic countries and in a certain period, Hungary). It could be argued that in those cases the fascists were conceived as competitors for power, but that there was no fundamental difference or conflict with them in the goals of their successful authoritarian opponents. I would argue that in all those cases there were basic conflicts between the political objectives of the fascists and those of the authoritarian

[10] The Portuguese Republic was characterized by extreme instability, 9 presidents, 44 governments, 25 uprisings, 3 counter-revolutionary dictatorships, an average duration of governments of 117 days, in 16 years. It would be misleading to attribute all this instability to social-economic conflicts, particularly considering the low level of industrialization and the presence north of the Tejo of a large small-landowning peasantry. The conflicts within the elite, the role of the armed forces and small but highly activate revolutionary minorities, particularly in Lisbon, provide a better explanation than structural conflicts and certainly the small fascist party founded in 1953 had nothing to do with the breakdown of an unstable democracy. D. L. Wheeler, *Republican Portugal. A Political History*, *1910-1926*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1978. J. Pabón, *La revolución portuguesa (De don Carlos a Sidonio Paes)*, Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1941. T. C. Bruneau, *Politics and Nationhood: Post-Revolutionary Portugal*, New York, Praeger, 1984, Chap. 1. L. S. Graham and H. M. Makler, eds., *Contemporary Portugal. The Revolution and its Antecedents*, Austin, University of Texas 1979; see also the chapters by P. Schmitter, M. de Lucena, H. J. Wiarda, H. M. Makler, J. F. Riegelhaupt and D. L. Wheeler.

S. G. Payne, "Salazarism: 'Fascism' or 'Bureaucratic Authoritarianism'"? in *Estudios de Historia de Portugal*, vol. II, secs. XVI-XX, *Homenagem a A.H. Oliveira Marques*, Lisbon, Estampa, 1983, pp. 525-531, argues against the usefulness to characterize the regime as fascist. J. Medina, *Salazar e os fascistas, Salazarismo e Nacional-Sindicalismo. A historia dum conflicto 1932-1935*, Lisboa, Bertrand, 1978. A. Costa Pinto, *The Salazar "New State" and European Fascism - Problems and Perspective of Interpretation*, New York, Social Science Monographs, Columbia University Press, 1995, and *The Blue Shirts. Portuguese Fascists and the New State*, Boulder, CO, Social Science Monographs, 2000.

rulers, and that those situations allow us to understand better some of the differences between anti-democratic authoritarian conceptions and the fascists movements

The cases in which fascists play the role of a partner, sometimes a minor partner, in the coalition that brings to power an authoritarian regime, pose the interesting question why they were not allowed to play a more important role and why they failed even in a Europe dominated by fascist powers to assume a more hegemonic role. Such an analysis would, to some extent, contribute to answer the question why Papen's dream of having engaged Hitler failed while others succeeded in using the fascists for their own goals, or at the most, sharing power with them. It is difficult to tell in the context of this essay what difference did or would it have made that fascists did not play a greater role in those authoritarian regimes, particularly in analyzing the policies -- social, economic, educational and cultural -- of those regimes and their subsequent development. The comparison of regimes in which fascists played some role with those in which their movements and leaders did not and specially in those in which they were displaced from any participation in power, could tell us something about the distinctive contribution of fascism to authoritarian regimes. The comparison of those authoritarian regimes established before the rise of fascism only superficially and indirectly influenced by fascism (like the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain 1923-1930)[11] and those coming to power at the height of fascist success and with fascist support and participation (like the Franco Regime), or under the ideological influence of fascism, would contribute to our better understanding of the variety of non-democratic politics and of the fascist phenomenon.[12]

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[11] S. Ben-Ami, *Fascism from above. The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983. J. Tusell, Radiografiia de un golpe de Estado. *El Ascenso al poder del General Primo de Rivera*, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1987.

[12]. S. G. Payne, *Spain's First Democracy. The Second Republic 1931-1936*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1993. S. G. Payne, *Fascism in Spain 1923-1977*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1999. S. G. Payne, *The Franco Regime, 1936-1975*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. Spain is, thanks to the monumental effort of Stanley Payne, the best studied case of crisis and breakdown of a democracy and a relatively insignificant fascist movement that is incorporated in the Franco Regime. Nothing can substitute the reading of his three monumental books.

J. Tusell, *Franco en la guerra civil. Una biografía política*, Barcelona, Tusquets, 1992. Linz, "From Falange to Movimiento Organización", *op.cit*., pp. 128-303, J. Tusell, *La dictadura de Franco*, Madrid, Alianza, 1988. E. Ucelay da Cal, "Problemas en la comparación de las dictaduras española e italiana en los años treinta y cuarenta", in E. D'Auric and J. Casassas, eds., *El Estado moderno en Italia y España*, Barcelona, Universitat de Barcelona., Consiglio Nuzionale delle Ricerche, 1993, pp. 155-174.

All these questions justify a separate treatment of the issue of why fascist parties or movements appeared in some societies and not in others and why they were more or less successful in attracting a following and particularly mass support, from the problem of the crisis of democracy and the establishment of authoritarian regimes.[13] I have dealt with the first issue in one of my essays and with the second in a book which, however, does not deal systematically with the type of regimes emerging after the breakdown of democracy and the extent to which they can be considered fascist.[14]

Moreover, there is the theme of the relationship between the more or less totalitarian character of a non-democratic regime and the role of fascism as a movement and an ideology. That is, the emergence of totalitarianism as distinct from other non-democratic regimes that I have described as authoritarian.[15] The question can be raised whether a non-democratic regime

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On the limited pluralism of the Franco elite, see A. de Miguel, *Socioloíia del Franquismo, Análisis ideológico de los ministros del Régimen*, Barcelona: Euros, 1975. C. Viver Pi-Sunyer, *El personal poíitico de Franco (1936-1945)*, Barcelona, Vicens Vives, 1978. Miguel Jerez, *Elites políticas y centros de extracción social en España 1938-1957*, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1982.

[13] 13. Linz, "Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective", *op. cit*., pp. 3-121. Linz, "Political Space and Fascism as a Late-Comer", *op. cit*., pp. 153-89. Linz, "The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes", *op. cit*. Linz, pp. 142-215. Linz, .,"From Great Hopes to Civil War. The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain", in J.J. Linz, and A. Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Europe*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 142-215, 1978. "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", *op. cit*., pp. 175-411.

[14] J.J. Linz, J.J., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Linz, "From Great Hopes to Civil War", *op. cit.*

[15] J.J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime. The Case of Spain", in E. Allardt and A. Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems*, Helsinki, Transactions of the Westermarck Society, vol. X, pp. 291-341, 1964. J.J. Linz, "Totalitarianism and Authoritarianism. My Recollections on the Development of Comparative Politics", in A. Söllner, R. Walkenhaus, K. Wieland, eds., *Totalitarismus, Eine Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1997, pp. 141-157.

Francesc Cambó, *Meditacions. Dietari (1936-1940)*, Barcelona, Alpha, 1982. On the distinction of the totalitarian and authoritarian state, pp. 714-715. I have quoted this text in "Totalitarianism and Authoritarianism", in Söllner, *op. cit*., p. 148. The essay by Ucelay Da Cal, (*op. cit*.), comparing Fascist Italy and Franco Spain, makes the same point as Cambó comparing Fascist Italy and Franco Spain. There can be little doubt that the civil war divided Spanish society, created greater discontinuity in the bureauracy, the judiciary, the officer corps and in intellectual and cultural life, generated more repression and fear, than Italian Fascism in the early years and the "anni del consensu". This, however, should not obscure the different conception and dynamics of both regimes. G. Hermet, "L'Autoritarisme"", in M. Grawitz and J. Leca, eds., *Traité de Science Politique*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, vol. 2, pp. 269-312, 1985. See also K.D. Bracher, "Die Autoritäre Form und die Diktatur: von der ersten zur zweiten Nach-Kriegszeit", in *op. cit*., pp. 253-267. G. Hermet, "Dictature bourgeoise et modernisation conservatrice. Problemes methodologigues de l'analyse des situations authoritaires", *Revue Francaise de Science Politique*, 5, 1975.

that at the same time is non-communist can become fully totalitarian without the presence of a fascist movement. The answer depends very much on the definitions of both fascism and totalitarianism and since those two concepts mean very different things to different people, it would vary accordingly. Using as I do, a restrictive definition of both fascism and totalitarianism, I would argue that a non-democratic regime could not become a fully totalitarian political system in the absence of either a fascist or a communist party. On the other hand, I would argue that the presence of a fascist movement in power, the same as the presence of a communist party, does not always assure the successful transformation of the regime into a totalitarian political system.[16] Indeed, scholars disagree on the place of fascist Italy in relationship to the totalitarian-authoritarian distinction. Even ignoring that problem, it would seem as if without the presence of a fascist movement (or a Leninist party) an anti-democratic regime would be unable to develop many of the characteristics we associate with totalitarianism. I do not mean massive repression and terror since those have been more characteristic of a number of authoritarian regimes than of fascist Italy, and therefore in my view constitute a separate dimension in the analysis of political systems.[17]

Fascism, Totalitarianism and Authoritarianism

In a number of publications I have developed a distinction between totalitarian systems and authoritarian regimes within the general category of non-democratic political systems. As I have emphasized, this is not only a matter of degree of certain variables, but a distinction representing fundamental alternative conceptions of politics. Yet the ideal types developed, in

[16] On the characterization of communist Poland as an Authoritarian regime, see: J. Rupnik, "Le Totalitarisme vu de l'Est.", in G. Hermet, ed., *Totalitarismes*, Paris, Economica, 1984, pp. 60-62, where he discusses the writings of Jerzy Wiatr and Jadwiga Staniszkis, *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. See mainly pp. 19-34, 150-188 on the evolution of the Polish regime between the poles of totalitarianism and authoritarianism and what she calls "lame pluralism".

[17] J.J. Linz, "Types of Political Regimes and Respect for Human Rights. Historical Cross-National Perspectives", in A. Eide and B. Hagtvet, eds., *Human Rights in Perspective. A Global Assessment*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991, pp. 177-222.

reality present some mixture of elements and too many ambiguities (in part due to imperfect descriptions of that social and political reality) for any effort to classify specific, concrete political systems at any time and place in the world. Only the relative predominance of some of the elements entering into the typology rather than others, allows us to speak of some systems as closer to the totalitarian or the authoritarian type.

As any reader on the subject would realize, the totalitarian type is infrequent and appears under quite exceptional circumstances, and not the natural outcome of an evolutionary process.[18] Totalitarianism perhaps cannot be sustained for any great length of time, and that accounts for the transformation into post-totalitarian regimes which have many of the characteristics associated with authoritarian regimes.[19] Since the life of Italian Fascism and Nazism was cut short by defeat, we cannot study a possible post-Mussolini or post-Hitler evolution of those regimes. On the other hand, even an approximation to the ideal type of totalitarianism was not achieved easily. Therefore I have suggested the idea of proto-totalitarian or arrested totalitarianism to describe those situations in which while the ideal type has not been fully achieved, the intent would be there.[20]

I want to make clear that the distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes does not imply that the latter were not terribly repressive, responsible for human rights violations, and in many countries responsible for antisemitic policies and even spontaneous collaboration with the genocidal policies of the Nazis. In fact, if we consider the Italian fascist

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[18] M. Walzer, "On Failed Totalitarianism", in I. Howe, ed., *1984 Revisited Totalitarianism in our Century*, New York: Harper and Row, 1983, pp. 103-221, notes: "But the regime has a short life, and we won't succeed in understanding it if we assign it a permanent place in the typology of political science. That would be like sneaking the Apocalypse into a standard chronology. The end of days is not a date, and totalitarianism is not a regime" (p. 119).

[19] J.J. Linz and A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. M. R. Thompson, "Weder totalitär noch autoritär. Post-Totalitarismus in Osteuropa", in A. Siegel, ed., *Totalitarismustheorien nach dem Ende des Kommunismus*, Köln, Böhlau Verlag, 1998, pp. 309-339.

[20] Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-245.

regime close to the totalitarian model, certainly some regimes clearly fitting into the authoritarian type were more repressive (concretely Franco Spain for many years).

The relationship between fascism as a movement and ideology and totalitarianism is both theoretically and even more empirically extremely complex. We will only outline some of the questions for research and state briefly some of the possible answers that would deserve thorough theoretical discussion and empirical confrontation.

The ideology, the state of mind, the style of politics, the conception of man and society that fascist movements represent have implicit a totalitarian ambition that, if successful, should lead to regimes approaching the totalitarian ideal type.

The averse is, however, not true: the absence of a fascist movement does not necessarily mean that a political system and a society would not show the characteristics of totalitarianism. As the concept was developed already in the 30's and particularly in the classic works on totalitarianism, it is clear that a number of political systems that were not fascist but communist, Soviet, Leninist, Stalinist and Maoist, have been and can be interpreted as pursuing the totalitarian ideal and approximating at one or another time the structures that we identify with totalitarianism.[21] The question therefore is whether non-fascist and non-communist regimes in the conception by their founders and particularly in their realization, approximate the ideal type description of a totalitarian system. Answers to this question vary greatly and depend on the way different scholars use the term totalitarian and the dimensions that for them define a totalitarian system. Even leaving aside the identification of totalitarianism with widespread and irrational repression, (which I do not consider an essential characteristic although a frequent and logical consequence of a totalitarian system) the answers can be quite different. Using as I tend to do, a very restrictive and relatively narrow definition of totalitarianism, which therefore would be

[21] On the different totalitarianisms and the similarities and differences among them, see "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", *op. cit.* and the literature cited there. G. Hermet, ed., *Totalitarismes*, and D. Fisichella, *Analisi del totalitarismo*, Messina: G. D'Anna, 1976.

Guy Hermet, *Aux frontieres de las democratie*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983. In addition to the extensive literature referred to in those publications, we want to call attention to Marco Tarchi, *Partito unico e dinamica Autoritaria*, Naples, Akropolis, 1981.

realized or approximated only in very few cases, I am inclined to think that the non-democratic systems without a hegemonic fascist or communist component are unlikely to fit the characteristics we associate with totalitarianism, and be closer to the model of authoritarian regimes.[22] This does not exclude in principle that in the future regimes based on a movement, an ideology, a conception of man and society that cannot be described as either fascist or communist could not lead to totalitarian systems. In this sense, the death of the fascist movement, of the peculiar historical constellation of factors that we describe as fascism, does in no way assure that the totalitarian temptation will also have disappeared. We know too little about the development of Iran after the fundamentalist Islamic revolution to say whether it approached or not the totalitarian model, although some argue that it did.[23]

Limiting ourselves to the era of fascism, we could analyze the totalitarian potential of different anti-democratic movements, parties and ideologies and ask ourselves if those we can characterize as fascists were different in this respect. Should we agree with those who consider national-socialism as distinct from fascism? We could debate whether the Nazi regime was totalitarian because of that distinctiveness, and question on that account the totalitarian intent of fascist movements defined more narrowly and perhaps limited to the Italian and those influenced by it. There can be no doubt that for whatever reasons, National Socialism led to the development of one of the most totalitarian political systems. We would argue that fascism as a movement presented the basis for the development of a totalitarian regime; that its conception of society, the relation of the individual to the nation and the state, and the full realization of that conception would have led to totalitarian regimes in countries other than Germany.

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[22] E. Oberländer, ed., *Autoritäre Regime in Ostmittle-und Südosteuropa, 1919-1944*, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh, 2001, is an excellent collection of essays by specialists on different countries and a number of comparative chapters. I am grateful to Professor Hans Maier for making this work available to me while I was finishing this essay. I wish I could have referred to it more often. The extensive bibliographic references are particularly useful. E. Oberländer, H. Lemberg and H. Sundhausen, with the collaboration of D. Balke, eds., *Autoritäre Regime in Ostmitteleuropa*, Mainz, Institut für Osteuropäische Geschicle, 1995.

[23] S. A. Arjomand, *The Iranian Revolution in Comparative Perspective*, Working Papers, Department of Sociology, (State University of New York at Stony Brook), 1983, discusses some of the similarities and differences between the Iranian revolution and the rise of fascism. J. Leca, "L'hypothese totalitaire dans le Tiers Monde; les pays araboislamiques", in Hermet, ed., *Totalitarismes*, 215-237. Houchang E. Chehabi, "Das politische System der Islamischen Republik Iran", in Renate Schmidt, ed., *Naher Osten Politik und Gesellschaft*, Berlin, PTB 3, pp. 180-199.

In the political reality, however, fascism outside of Italy (again leaving aside Germany and national-socialism) did not achieve hegemonic power a sufficient length of time to develop its totalitarian potential. The fact that the fascists movements were only one more or less important element in the anti-democratic coalitions often led by leaders and forces not identified with the fascist ideals, prevented the fascists from realizing that totalitarian ambition. Even in the case of Italy the debate is open about the more or less totalitarian character of the regime and the periods in which it would be totalitarian. The degree to which the coalition compromises in the process of taking power, the resilience of the pre-fascist structures of Italian society, and a number of other factors that might be discussed, lead toward what I have called arrested totalitarianism, a situation that shares some characteristics with those of regimes that fit the ideal type of an authoritarian regime.[24]

I remain ambivalent about characterizing the Italian regime as totalitarian, although I have in my work noted its character as "arrested" totalitarianism. In that I am far from alone, since the great scholar De Felice, in the course of his lifelong work, hesitated and evolved -- as Emilio Gentile has shown, quoting the relevant texts.[25] Gentile has persuaded me of his view that Fascism not only had a totalitarian potential but was moving toward a totalitarian regime, particularly in the thirties. This thesis, as I will note later, becomes questionable in view of the performance of the regime in the war and the events in 1943. It would lead me to argue about a "failed" rather than "arrested" totalitarianism and therefore the question: why did Italian totalitarianism fail while Nazism succeeded almost until the suicide of Hitler in the Berlin bunker? Was it that it remained a hostage of the compromises it had made in the process of coming to power, or the latent heterogeneity of the PNF, the important role of elites from other groups like ANI, or was it the personality of the Duce? Was it Italian society and the Italians that

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[24] The Spanish fascist Ledesma Ramos, *Fascismo en Espana? op.cit.,* frequently refers to the need and the costs for the fascists in Italy and Germany of alliances in the process of gaining power.

[25] The hesitation in defining Italian Fascism as totalitarian and shifts in the interpretation of the regime of the great historian Renzo De Felice has been carefully documented and analyzed by Emilio Gentile in "Path to an Interpretation: Renzo De Felice and the Definition of Fascism", *Italian Quarterly*, Summer-Fall, 1999, Dept. of Italian, the State University of New Jersey-Rutgers. E. Gentile, *Le Origini dell'ideologias fascista (1918-1925)*, Bari, Laterza, 1975. E. Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1996.

were not the "material" for the project? Mussolini sometimes hinted that explanation. What was there in Italian society that arrested the realization of a totalitarian blueprint, while elements in German made it possible? As a social scientist -- rather than historian -- I am somewhat uneasy about the "escapism" of the last explanation, but, after all, who would disagree with a statement: Italians were not Germans.

The absence of large scale state terror in Fascist Italy, up to the Republic of Salo, poses an interesting question. If terror is considered one of the defining characteristics of totalitarianism, I would, like Hannah Arendt, be obliged to consider the regime non-totalitarian. If we were to insist in its totalitarian character, we would have to conclude that terror is not one of the defining characteristics (or perhaps that it would have come later). The disagreement between scholars in part depends on the greater emphasis on the ideological formulations and monism the legal system created, or on the actual practice of government and the social reality under Fascism. The more weight we give to the former, the more likely we are to consider the Italian regime totalitarian. The more we pay attention to the latter, the more likely we are to question that totalitarian character.[26]

Any analysis of the failure of fascism to transform politics and society in the totalitarian direction in other countries has to be linked to our previous discussion of the limited success of fascist movements in gaining hegemonic power, their role as coalition partners and subordinated elements, even neutralized or defeated elements in authoritarian regimes. This fact alone would make it difficult to conceive those regimes as totalitarian. The variety of political actors, their different ambitions and their appropiation of parcels of power introduce an ambiguity about the monopolistic assumption of power by the movement and its different factions due to the co-existence of organizations created and inspired by the movement and others also influential in the system not under its control. All this alone would bring those regimes closer to the model of limited pluralism (or limited monism) I used to characterize authoritarian regimes.

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[26] See the interesting analysis by Alberto Aquarone, *L'Organizzazione dello stato totalitario*, Turin, Einandi, 1965, chap. 5, "Stato-totalitario e dittatura personale", where he quotes Mussolini on the "diarchia" with the King, the relations in the Church, and his own confession of the pluralism that limited his power (pp. 290-311).

The co-existence in a coalition of different political tendencies not within the fascist movement but pre-existing it and antagonistic to its hegemony, creates conditions for different social groups, institutions, interests, and individuals in the society pre-existing the takeover by the authoritarian regime to link with those political actors. A certain degree of social pluralism, and with it the possibilities of independent development under the regime of those forces, can thereby be maintained. That is why, in spite of the initial totalitarian ambition of the fascist movement, its relative success in imposing its hegemony, the assimilation by other political forces of the language, style, and ideology of totalitarianism, the evolution toward an authoritarian regime was there from the beginning. That is why the Franco regime, in spite of the strong totalitarian tendencies in some of its early phases, evolved into what I have described for the 60's as an authoritarian regime. The evolution might have gone in a different direction in the case of a victory of the Axis, but probably with the change not only *in* the regime but *of* the regime, including perhaps the displacement of Franco.[27]

To generate a movement and leadership committed to totalitarianism there is need for something more than nationalism and the defense of a status quo.

One cannot emphasize enough how the genesis of a regime in the process of breakdown of democracy (or a democratization process) shapes its future development. Without subscribing to an intentionalist conception, which would assume that the political actors have clear and prior ideas of the type of regime they will found, it is also true that the future development is conditioned by their initial ideas. The same is true for the initial constellation of political forces and resources. Mussolini, when traveling to Rome in 1922 to become Prime Minister, probably did not have in his head the regime he would shape later as the Duce. If a variety of circumstances (to mention just the aftermath of the Matteoti murder) had not intervened, the

[27] S. Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, *op. cit*., p. 374, quotes (p.374) Hitler in an after dinner conversation on July 7: "One must take care not to place the regime of Franco on a level with National Socialism or Fascism" to continue talking formally about Spanish workers "so-called 'Reds'" and about keeping them "as a reserve in case of the outbreak of a second civil war. Together with the survivors of the old Falange, they would be the force at our disposal most worthy of confidence". To continue later, "the Blue Division, at the right time, could play a decisive role when the time comes to overthrow this regime controlled by priests".

fascist regime -- with its totalitarian dimension -- might not have come into being. However, the ideological baggage of Mussolini and of the fascist movement in the early twenties made possible, even likely, those later developments. If we turn to the ideas and actions of Franco in the crucial years of the Civil War and the building and consolidation of his power -- as described by Javier Tusell -- the creation of a totalitarian regime under his leadership seems unlikely, though possible under some circumstances.

I would advance the hypothesis that without a fascist movement with considerable success in mobilizing support before taking power and assuming from the very beginning a hegemonic position, it is difficult to conceive a transition to totalitarianism. Outside of Weimar Germany and earlier Giolittian Italy, I would say that only in Romania there was a chance for such a development in the inter-war Europe. I have argued: "Paradoxically, genuine fascist mass movements could only grow in the context of a liberal, democratic society committed to and recognizing the right to proselytize, regimes which until the middle thirties found it difficult to restrict the fascists' activities" (in contrast to a number of authoritarian regimes).[28]

Should we accept the idea that antidemocratic politics could only lead to totalitarianism on the basis of fascist ideology (aside from communism), we would have to look for the distinctive sources of fascist ideology and movements. Since Italian fascism was the first and the inspiration for other fascisms, we cannot avoid to ask: were there unique factors in Italy accounting for the birth of Fascismo? This is not the place to answer this question. However, I find sufficient evidence in the works on the intellectual-ideological climate, and the mobilization resulting from the nationalist-interventionism-and war to answer in the affirmative.[29]

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[28] Linz,"Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism" in Sociological Historical Perspective", pp. 3-121, 1976.

[29] R. Griffin, "Italian Fascism", in *The Nature of Fascism*, London, Routledge, 1993, pp. 56-84. E. Gentile, *Le Origini dell'ideologia fascista, (1918-1925)*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1975, and E. Gentile, *Il mito dello Stato Nuovo dell'antigiolittismo al fascismo*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1982. J. Gregor, *The Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979. G. L. Mosse, "The Poet and Exercise of Political Power, Gabriele D'Annunzio", in G. L. Mosse, ed., *Masses and Man*, New York, Howard Fertig, 1980, and "The Political Culture of Italian Futurism: A General Perspective", *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 25, no. 2-3, 1990. Paolo Farneti, "Social Conflict, Parliamentary Fragmentation, Institutional Shift, and the Rise of Fascism:

Was there a totalitarian potential in other anti-democratic ideologies and parties?

Our argument would require proof that other anti-democratic ideologies,[30] parties, organizations, and leaders did not conceive as their goal a totalitarian system, and that the fascistization of those parties, leaders, etc., was not sufficient to create a totalitarian system. To prove this would require a case-by-case analysis, but I might refer briefly to some of the most important anti-democratic competitors of fascism.

Political Catholicism since its origin in the 19th century presented an ambivalent attitude toward democracy, particularly liberalism, even though in a large number of countries what would be known as Christian democracy was ready to play a constructive role in democratic, pluralistic regimes (we have only to think of the Benelux countries and the Weimar Republic). There were however Christian parties which put an emphasis on certain ideological traditions, mainly the idea of the corporate state, organic vs. inorganic democracy, and whose hostility to liberalism and socialism, particularly Marxism, was intense and incompatible with a multi-party democracy in which those forces could be governing or stable government would require coalitions with the clerical party. A number of complex circumstances reinforced the anti-liberal, anti-socialist and consequently anti-democratic elements within those parties, and the idea of an authoritarian solution to the crisis of the 20's and 30's became a real possibility advocated by some of their leaders.

Italy", in Linz and Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Europe*, pp. 3-33. A. Lytelton, *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919-1929*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987.

[30] For a chart listing the parties or movements in different countries representing the "three faces of authoritarian nationalism" (fascists, radical right and conservative right), see S. G. Payne, *Fascism, Comparison and Definition*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980, pp. 14-21. For a contemporary nazi account of kindred movements, see W. Haas, *Europa will Leben, Die nationalen Erneurungsbewegungen in Wort und Bild*, Berlin: Batschari, 1936.

The reasons for the adoption or imitation of fascism in the interwar years in different countries are in many respects similar to those noted for the self-designation of a number of African regimes as "scientific socialist" or "Marxist-Leninist", analyzed by K. Jowitt, "Scientific Socialist Regimes in Africa. Political Differentiation, Avoidance and Unawareness", in C. G. Rosberg and T. M. Callaghy, eds., *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment*, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, 1979, pp. 133-173, 391-396.

Confronted with a deep economic and social crisis, an ideological socialist party that had created a sub-culture antagonistic to traditional Catholicism, a rising national-socialist movement, and with many of its followers supporting a conservative para-military organization influenced by Italian fascism, the Austrian Christian social party in the 30's came to establish an authoritarian corporatist state--that incorporated the Austro-fascist -- but anti-Nazi Heimwehr.[31] The Dollfuss-Schussnigg regime, established after a brief Civil War in 1934, became an alternative model to the anti-clerical republic for the Spanish clerical party, the CEDA, whose youth organization, the JAP, clearly advocated a regime like the Austrian.[32] In Spain, the opponents to clericalism, and particularly the socialists, perceived this trend as the real threat to them and to democracy rather than the Falange, the small fascist party, and quickly identified the CEDA as Spanish fascism. Similar tendencies were not absent in the political catholicism of other countries, yet only in Portugal, Lithuania and later with independence in Slovakia, Catholic inspired authoritarianism became established.

The discussion of what has been called *nacional-catolicismo* to describe the Franco regime and the importance of the Catholic conservative corporatist ideology in the Estado Novo in Portugal, raises the question if Catholic lay movements, with their organizational penetration in society and their ideological integrist conceptions, could not be the basis for another type of totalitarianism than the fascist. Since those regimes were established in countries like Austria, Spain, and to some extent, Portugal, close to the fascist powers and often competing for support of the same social bases than the fascist movements, there was considerable mimetism, to the point that many observers speak of clerico-fascism.

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[31] Austria would provide an interesting opportunity to compare the impact on a society, in different spheres of life, at the community level, etc., of an authoritarian regime (1933-1938) and a totalitarian system (1938 to the start of WWII). Tálos, "Zum Herrschaftssystem des Austrofaschismus: Österreich 1934-38", in Oberländer, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-162. V. Kluge, *Der österreichische Ständestaat 1934-1938*, Wien, 1984. E. Tálos and W. Neugebauer, ed., *Austrofaschismus Beiträge über Politik, Okonomie und Kultur*, Wien, 1984. G. Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik. Attentale, Zusnunmenstösse, Putschversuche, Unruhen in Österreich 1918-1938*, München, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1983.

[32] On the CEDA see J.R. Montero, *La CEDA*, Madrid, Editorial de la Revista de Trabajo, 1977, 2 vols. R.A.H. Robinson, *The origins of Franco Spain*, 1970, J. Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana en España*, Madrid, Edicusa, 1974, and the speeches and memoirs of the party's leader, José Maria Gil Robles. The "fascistic" tendencies in the CEDA and especially the JAP are discussed in R. Chueca and J.R. Montero, "El fascismo en España: elementos para una interpretación", in *Historia Contemporánea*, 8, 1992, pp. 215-248.

There is no doubt that the integrist conception of a harmonious, religious, corporatively organized society, excluding liberalism and socialism, in control of the state had considerable potential for another type of totalitarianism. We would argue however that there were inherent limits to such a tendency, derived from the fundamental characteristics of the Catholic Church as an institution. The universal Church could never identify fully and exclusively with the integrist model of a Catholic society, but had to leave room for alternative political philosophies and patterns of action as orthodox Catholic alternatives. This fact alone was a seed for the latter crisis of authoritarian regimes like the Spanish in which the Church played a major role. Ultimately, to build the legitimacy of a regime on an ideology whose formulation and legitimacy is derived from sources outside of the control of the rulers, to use Weber's term "heteronomous",[33] is an inherent weakness for any totalitarian dynamic. The possibility that the universal Church, the Vatican and the Pope would support alternative political formulations remained a constant obstacle. Besides, whatever identification the Catholic political leadership and laymen with social and political power would have with such a regime, the Church as an institution always has a tendency to maintain some distance and independence, and certainly demanded autonomy and respect for its representatives not always compatible with the interests of the political leadership. In the case of Spain, while national-Catholicism became hegemonic in many respects, it was only one of the components of the coalition that created and supported the Franco regime. Others, including the fascist Falange, introduced an element of pluralism that protected some sectors of Spanish life from a total hegemony of national-Catholicism. In a sense, the co-existence of the totalitarian ambitions of fascism with the totalitarian potential of national-Catholicism became, from very early on, a factor in the more authoritarian than totalitarian development of the regime.

Action Française was probably the most influential and largest movement of the radical right.[34] Its ideology found echo among the Portuguese Integralistas, the followers of Calvo

[33] M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds., New York: Bedminster Press, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 49-50.

[34] E. Weber, *Action Française. Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth Century France*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962.

Sotelo of Renovación Española and in Latinamerica. Action Française has been considered as a Fascist or at best proto-Fascist movement. These movements remained elitist, generally unable to organize a mass support and to gain power. However, Renovación Española had a great influence in the Franco regime and the Integralistas in the Salazar regime, but neither articulated a totalitarian conception of politics and society.[35] The non-democratic regimes established by such forces allied with the military and the bureaucracy with the support of powerful economic interests could not develop into totalitarian systems. Indeed, sometimes the radical right was satisfied with establishing pseudo-democratic regimes in which elements of the liberal tradition survived (like in Hungary). Leaders from the democratic period were incorporated or co-opted and did not allow a new political class with popular support to emerge. They were too elitist to even attempt popular mass mobilization. In fact they were fearful when their fascist allies attempted to incorporate the masses, the working class, into the regime.

There is however one antidemocratic, authoritarian and reactionary movement with a popular mobilized mass basis, with links with the clergy and an integrist conception of society: the Spanish Carlists.[36] They distrusted the fascists as too secular and even the conservative Christian democrats for their willingness to make compromises with non-religious parties in a democracy. As some said about them, they were "more papist than the Pope". The *Comunión Tradicionalista* and their militia, the *Requeté*, were a legacy of the counterrevolutionary, popular anti-liberal, resistance in the nineteenth century and its civil wars, aiming at the restoration of a pre-modern monarchy and a state based on traditional territorial units and laws. If their support had not been basically limited to Navarra and the Basque country, they would have established a more socially and culturally hegemonic polity. With all their enthusiasm and local strength they also became a coopted and subordinate element in the Franco coalition.

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[35] J. Gil Pecharromán, *Conservadores subversivos: La derecha autoritaria alfonsina*. (1913-1936), Madrid, 1994.

[36] M. Blinkhorn, *Carlism and the Crisis in Spain, 1931-1939*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976.

We might say that although few fascist movements could realize their totalitarian potential in establishing regimes that we could describe as totalitarian, there was, in the context of the 20's and 30's in Europe, even less opportunity to establish totalitarian systems for other anti-democratic movements and groups. This should account for the fact that, except for brief interludes, those regimes would be or evolve in an authoritarian rather than totalitarian direction.

Authoritarian regimes were ultimately based on interests, while fascism and totalitarianism were built on passion, the first reflected parts of society, the latter a search for community. The first was "cold", the latter "hot". Authoritarian regimes[37] attracted the attention of a few scholars, mainly some law professors and economists; totalitarian regimes that of intellectuals, writers and artists, aesthetes and movie lovers, students and the young. The fascination extends even to the students of the period, those who loath totalitarianism for its horrors but struggle to understand it while neglecting authoritarian regimes, their limited and largely passive support. Authoritarian regimes are interpreted as a product of particular societies, their idiosyncracies and historical legacies, as "ordinary dictatorships", and less as part of the European crisis of the interwar years. One could go even farther: they were also a response, poorly articulated intellectually, to the weaknesses and failures of democracy and capitalism and an alternative to the totalitarian passion. Going out on a limb, one could say that the conflict in the shortened century was between four political alternatives: democracy, totalitarian fascism and communism, and authoritarian rule. The center stage was taken by fascism and communism, while democracy for a short time was relegated to the Atlantic periphery and authoritarianism to the Southern and Eastern lesser states. Democrats were against them for their disregard of freedom and human rights, but the totalitarians scorned them for their lack of revolutionary mystique and their defense of the existing social and economic order. Authoritarian rulers and their supporters in turn rejected fascism, sensing its revolutionary ambitions and potential, and turned to "domesticate" it and sometimes repress the fascist movements.

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[37] Fascists, like José Antonio Primo de Rivera, Ramiro Ledesma Ramos and Rolao Preto, felt a particular antipathy for the conservative-authoritarian-corporativist-Catholic leaders, and have written perceptive characterizations of them, a hostility that was reciprocated. Rolao Preto detested De Valera, Dollfuss, Schuschnigg, Gil Robles and Salazar, for their style, their "common sense", lack of revolutionary spirit, eclecticism, calculating attitudes; he describes them as *tiranos frios*, the "cold" dictators, see J. Medina, *Salazar e os Fascistas*, *op. cit. passim*.

Anti-democratic Politics in the Interwar Years

The 1920's see the crisis of democracy and rise of a number of dictatorships without the participation in the process of fascist movements, nor reference to the March on Rome, nor the Italian fascist regime. This does not mean that after being established some politicians or intellectuals connected with them would not be interested in the Italian experience or import some ideas and institutions from Italy. This is true for regimes created before the rise to power of Mussolini, like the Turkish Republic shaped by Ataturk, and the Hungarian regime established after the Bela Kun led soviet republic was defeated. It is also true for the Primo de Rivera Coup in 1923, although at a later date some fascist influences became manifest when a feeble attempt was made to institutionalize a "civilian" dictatorship.

Those regimes were the response to quite different crises. In the case of Hungary, to a communist revolutionary dictatorship. In Bulgaria, to the hegemonic rule of a populist agrarian leader. In Spain in 1923 to a mixture of crises, defeat in a colonial war, social revolutionary unrest in Catalonia under anarcho-syndicalist leadership and an unstable parliamentary regime. In these three cases, emphasis can be put on the social economic conflicts and a Marxist type of interpretation has some validity, even when nationalism, in Bulgaria, Macedonian, and in Spain, Catalan, contributed to the crisis. There is, however, a paradox in the fact that the counter-revolutionary regime in Hungary would, until the thirties and even then, be a semi-democracy that retained more traditional liberal values, institutions and practices than most authoritarian regimes. The description by István Deák captures very well the politico-social pluralism of Horthy's Hungary, when he writes about the regime under the extreme right prime minister Gyula Gömbös (1932):

> "A pattern was actually set at that time wherein Hungary was governed by people who publicly claimed to represent one and the same right-wing ideology, but who in reality were divided into two distinct camps: one radical and fascistic, which we might call the New Right, and the other conservative with liberal inclinations, which we might call the Old Right. The division ran right through the Government Party, with the right-wing element in this right-wing party secretly collaborating with the openly fascist parties. On the other hand, the liberal and left-wing parties, which were diminishing in size with every election, had no choice but to support the moderates in the Government Party. Thus, in the crazy quilt of Hungarian Politics, we find in one camp Social Democrats, peasant politicians, arch-conservative royalists, rich Jewish liberals, mildly anti-Semitic counterrevolutionary politicians, and such Hungarian racists for whom the German

> minority in Hungary and Nazi imperialism represented more of a threat than the Jews. In the other camp were pro-German counterrevolutionary politicians, most of the army officers, fascist ideologues, rabid anti-semites, much of the non-Jewish middle class and petite bourgeoisie, and masses of poor people for whom National Socialism promised salvation from oppression by Jewish capitalists and aristocratic landowners."[38]

It would be difficult to account for the Pilsudski's "military demonstration", which in part thanks to trade union support toppled a center right government, in Marxist terms, though subsequently the semi-dictatorship would turn out to be conservative.

Even though there are some similarities between the crisis of democracy or democratization in Eastern Europe and the Balkans and Southern Europe there are significant differences. Edward Malefakis[39] has shown both between the four Southern European states from the 19th century, through World War I and the interwar years resulting in authoritarian threats and regimes, as well as the unique appeal of anti-democratic nationalism and the rise of fascism in Italy. The impact of WWI and its aftermath again, particularly in Greece, is central, in addition to the greater mobilization and assertiveness of the left and the working class, in Italy and Spain.

The crisis in recently defeated nations, in countries struggling for their independence often composed by parts with different political cultures and traditional elites, as in the case of Poland, cannot be understood simply in terms of social economic conflicts or economic underdevelopment. Those factors contribute to account for the turn to authoritarian regimes but also for the rise of fascist movements, sometimes in opposition to the authoritarian regimes.

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[38] I. Deák, "A Fatal Compromise? The Debate over Collaboration and Resistance in Hungary", in I. Deák, J. T. Gross and T. Judt, eds., *The Politics of Retribution in Europe. World War I and its Aftermath*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 39-73.

[39] E. Malefakis, *Southern Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries: An Historical Overview,* Working Paper 1992/35, Madrid, Instituto Juan Marc, 1992. See also, S. G. Payne, "Authoritarianism in the Smaller States of Southern Europe", in H. E. Chehabi and A. Stepan, eds., *Politics, Society and Democracy. Comparative Studies* (*essays in honor of Juan J. Linz*), Boulder, 1995, pp. 183-196.

Stateness, National Identity and the Crisis of Democracy

An analysis of the breakdown or crisis of democracy in the interwar years has to consider: (1) the powerful emotions and interests linked to the definition of the nation, (2) the ambiguities of the national identity of citizens in the presence of ethnic and linguistic minorities, (3) the massive population take intodisplacement (for example, in Greece and Rumania), (4) the instability of the borders of the state as a result of international power relations, and (5) the resulting saliency of irredentism.

The problems of the new states are well formulated by Furet:

> The people who negotiated that treaty [of Versailles] (and the series of treaties related to it) were the virtual trustees of promises born of the war. Constricted by the quarrels of "nationalities" and the memories of 1848, which revived half-forgotten passions, they multiplied Slavic states on the ruins of vanquished Germanism, creating everywhere--from Warsaw to Prague, from Bucharest and Belgrade--unlikely parliamentary republics in which the French bourgeois radicals believed themselves to be replanting their traditions though they were merely exporting their form of government. More than a European peace, the treaties of 1919-20 constituted a European revolution. They erased the history of the second half of the nineteenth century to the benefit of a new, abstract division of Europe into small, multi-ethnic states that merely reproduced the shortcomings of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Those little states were as divided within their new frontiers as they had been within the old, and were separated from one another by even greater hostility than they had experienced under German or Hungarian domination. The allies had miniaturized national hatred in the name of the principle of nationhood.
>
> What the Allies had tried [to] do with these improvised, poor, and divided states, most of which contained sizable German populations, was to make them the eastern belt of Anglo-French preponderance in Europe. The October Revolution had liquidated Russia's traditional role as an element of European equilibrium, so that Soviet Russia, far from playing--with Britain's blessing--fraternal policeman to the Slavic nations and the great power to the east, had become the pole of the Communist revolution. The new, composite countries carved out of Central and Eastern Europe immediately had to assume a twofold historical function that was too heavy for them: to stand guard both to the east, against Soviet messianism, and to the west, against Germany--a Germany defeated, disarmed, and broken but still to be feared, and occupying a place more central than ever in the politics of Europe."[40]

In practically all the new states the dominant nationality conceived the state as a nation-state and "nation building" policies alienated the national minorities. The difficulty of consolidating democracy was closely related to those facts. In my work on the breakdown of

[40] F. Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1995. F. Furet, *Das Ende der Ilusion. Der Kommunismus im 20 Jahrhundert*, München, 1996.

democracies focussed on Western Europe, I did not put emphasis on this dimension central in the volume of essays edited by Erwin Oberländer.[41]

Almost all countries experienced changes in their borders leaving behind irredenta, minorities, refugees, whose heightened sense of national identity would question the international order created by the victors or powerful arbiters in state-nationality conflicts. The fact that the victors imposing their order and attempting to guarantee it through the League of Nations were the Western democracies and rich countries, allowed demagogic appeals against plutocratic democracies and the governments willing to cooperate with them.

To the extent that the "stateness" issue and the definition of the national identity were unresolved, the governments -- elected or not -- could be questioned as betraying the state's or national interest.

The authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, even when illiberal and repressive, are not viewed, even today, as equally illegitimate than those in Western Europe. Pilsudski, Ulmanis, Päts, Horthy, even Antonescu and Tisso, are part of the national history not always seen negatively. Their role in the struggle for national independence and the fact they were victims of external enemies contributes to this.

"Ordinary" Dictatorships or Authoritarian Regimes

Some non-democratic governments of the interwar years conceived themselves as dictatorships in the traditional, we could say Roman, conception of interim government, suspending a constitution and civil liberties, presumably to restore them in a near future. The pronunciamiento of general Primo de Rivera in Spain 1923, at least initially, fitted this conception: dictatorships that did not intend to create a regime. The same can be said for Estonia

[41] E. Oberländer, ed., "Autoritäre Regime", *op. cit.*

and Latvia. However, most dictatorships moved toward establishing their own distinct institutions, abolish rather than just suspend the constitution and to the creation of a new regime. In the late twenties and particularly the thirties those regimes that in another context would have been ordinary dictatorships, "regimes d'exception" -- authoritarian situations -- would often become authoritarian regimes.[42] The presence of fascism and sometimes a fascist component made them different.

In a number of authoritarian regimes, particularly the military and royal dictatorships but also the few in which a civilian politician of the democratic period assumes dictatorial powers, there is an allergy to parties. Initially there is sometimes a suspension or outlawing of all parties including (paradoxically) even those supporting the dictatorship. Occasionally a no-party regime with a more corporative system of representation is the choice. However, there are pressures to have a single party, sometimes created from above as a civic movement, inviting those supporting the regime to join it (officeholders, and civil servants are likely to join).[43]

Otto Bauer, a leading Austro-marxist in 1936, describes such a party, the Vaterländische Front of the Austrian authoritarian regime:

> Die VF. war daher, . . . nicht, wie die Faschistische Partei Italiens und die Nationalsozialistische Partei Deutschlands, aus einer volkstümlichen Massenbewegung hervorgegangen, sondern, von der Regierung erfunden und gegründet, mit den Gewaltmitteln des Staates den Volksmassen aufgezwungen worden. In Wirklichkeit ist der Faschismus hier nicht das Naturprodukt elementarer Massenbewegungen und Klassenkämpfe, sondern ein Artefakt, das die gesetzliche Staatsgewalt dem Volke auferlegt hat.
>
> Ahnlich urteilte im übrigen auch jener Sektionschef Hecht, der an der pseudolegalen Etablierung des diktatorischen Regimes so entscheidend mitgewirkt hatte, über die VF.:„ Sie wird, ihrer ganzen Entwicklung und Zusammensetzung nach, niemals ihren österreichischen Vereinscharakter mit ihrer spezifisch wienerischen Kaffeehausfärbung verlieren. Es ist ausgeschlossen, dass etwa die Christllichsoziale Partei, die Heimwehren, die enzelnen Teile der nationalständischen Front wirklich in ihr aufgehen, dass aus ihr sich eine einzige, einheitliche, österreichische, mächtige Volksbewegung bildet . . . Trotz des Bestehens der, Vaterländischen Front'beruht die Autorität der Regierung nicht auf einem Massenmandat zur Führung,

[42] Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation", *op*, *cit*., pp. 233-54.

[43] Ben-Ami, *Fascism from above*, *op. cit.*

> sondern auf dem Willen der Regierung, das Mass an Macht, das das sie besitzt, bis zur Grenze des Möglichen zu Gebrauchen.[44]

In the presence of parties identified with the authoritarian alternative there will be the effort to incorporate them, in some cases creating an unified party, rather than appealing to one of them (which would create a dependence on one). Authoritarian rulers are therefore not very likely to give to *a* fascist party the status of a single party, but to absorb it into a more heterogenous and new organization.

Authoritarian regimes were divided about retaining the institutions inherited from the demo-liberal constitutional past or creating corporatist chambers introducing "organic democracy" and a single party with its own chamber.[45] In some instances they combined in an uneasy set up those different elements, indeed, one of the elements of the limited pluralism. Hungary was the one retaining the façade of limited democracy; Portugal added to some of the institutions inherited from the past -- like the Asamblea Nacional -- the corporative chamber but no body representing the single party (which dominated however the national assembly); Franco Spain started having only a Consejo Nacional in which the appointed representatives of the parties fused in the single party and some military sat, to which in 1942 the Cortes were added as a partly corporative chamber. Nevertheless, in spite of the rejection of the idea of parties, none of the authoritarian regimes of the interwar years in Europe prescinded of a party organization, sometimes calling it a "movement". (Bulgaria after 1934 was the exception). The closer to the fascist model, the greater was the role assigned to the party and its ancillary organizations.

Almost all the authoritarian regimes considered and generally introduced some corporativist institutions, even though their development was often delayed and their political

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[44] O. Bauer, *Zwischen Zwei Weltkriegen?*, Bratislava, 1936, in O. Bauer, *Werkansgabe*, vol. 4, Wien, 1976, p. 37, quoted by G. Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik*, *op. cit*., p. 242.

[45] "Legislatures in Organic Statist-Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Spain", in J. Smith and Ll. D. Musolf, eds., *Legislatures in Development: Dynamics of Change in New and Old States*, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1979, pp. 88-125.

significance limited. Corporatism for them was one of the attractions of[46] Italian fascism (that exploited that appeal) while they had greater doubts about the role of a single disciplined ideological party. They invoked the idea of an "organic democracy" as alternative to "inorganic" party democracy. Obviously, none of the governments needed the confidence of those corporative chambers, indirectly elected and *de-facto* largely appointed by the government. An added attraction of corporativism was that liberal democrats, social democrats, Christian democrats and "pluralist" intellectuals had advocated corporatist institutions to complement parliamentary democracy. It was an ideological *Ideenkreis* tangent to fascism, authoritarianism and democracy. For many authoritarians it was corporatism which they saw as attractive in fascism. (There is a parallel in the attraction of Yugoslav self-management to many who were far from sympathetic to communist rule.)

Crisis and Breakdown of Democracy

In my work on the breakdown of democracy (1976), I have emphasized the strong element of contingency, using the dictum of Friedrich Meinecke: "Dies war nicht notwendig". Since then there have been the important works by Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens and more recently the collection of country case studies with a common framework directed by Berg-Schlosser.[47] Both have a more sociological and therefore more structural perspective which leaves less room for contingency. Both focus on the breakdown, somewhat less on fascism and even less on the type of regime installed after the breakdown. The latter two problems are as or

[46] P. C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism", in E. B. Pike and T. Stritch, eds., *The New Corporatism. Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World*, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1974, pp. 85-131.

Another "Ideenkreis" that cuts even the democratic-non-democratic divide, overlaps with some fascisms and some but not all authoritarianisms is Populism. We are not going to explore it and recommend that the reader turn to the recent work of G. Hermet *Les populismes dans le monde. Une histoire sociologique XIX-XX siècle*, Paris, Fayard, 2001.

[47] H.A. Turner, Jr. *Hitler's Thirty Days to Power. January 1933*, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1996.

more subject to contingency. The brilliant "histoire evidentielle" by Henry Turner[48] by focussing on the small group of men who in January 1933 brought Hitler to the chancellorship (coinciding with my own analysis of the small groups, my small c's, in the final stages of a breakdown) highlights the importance of contingency, individual actors, rather than structural macro-social factors.

In my book I have noted how often it was not the strength of the anti-democratic parties but failures of the democratic leadership in preventing a loss of power, a power vacuum leading to the transfer of power that led to the breakdown. In the case of the breakdowns before the 1930's and even later in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, the same is even truer. The failure of the liberal-democratic political class, the government instability or inefficacy was even more important and allowed small groups of conspirators to end democracy or democratization with the passive acquiescence of Kings, the non-conspiratorial military and a population unwilling to support the regime and even welcoming dictatorship with a sense of relief and even hope. The high level of political mobilization and polarization in Italy and later in Germany, Austria and Spain (1936) should not be generalized to Spain (1923), Poland and Portugal in the twenties, or the Baltics. In those cases, the crisis was as much or more political than social or economic. It was often the making of politicians.

Looking back at my work on the breakdown, at the cases of reequilibration in crises and survival of democracy (1978), and at the important scholarly contributions since then, I would hold to my multicausal and dynamic approach.[49] But would I have to privilege some factors, I would still emphasize the problems of legitimacy of the democratic institutions and the state as well as the role of political actors. The extent to which people believed that democracy is a better way of organizing political life and legitimate those governing than any other alternative, was

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[48] D. Berg-Schlosser, "Bedingungen von Demokratie in Europa in der Zwischenkriegszeit", in D. Berg-Schlosser, *Empirische Demokratieforschung. Exemplarische Analysen*, Frankfurt/Main Campus, 1999, pp. 141-274.

[49] Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, *op. cit.*; See: D. Berg-Schlosser and G. De Meur, "Conditions of Democracy in Inter-War Europe. A Boolean Test of Major Hypotheses", *Comparative Politics*, 26, 3, pp. 253-279, who compare my work systematically with that of other scholars. See also, L. Morlino, *Come cambiano i regimi politici: Strumenti di analisi*, Milan, Franco Angeli, 1980.

crucial. Also, the willingness or capacity of those not committed to an anti-democratic ideological alternative to postpone their legitimate conflicts to assure governability, was very important. Even more was the presence of semi-loyal political actors strategically situated, ready to collaborate with or justify anti-democratic movements and actors.

The authoritarian regimes in the twenties and even some in the thirties were established by coup d'état initiated or accepted by those in power generally with the support or acquiescence of the military. In the twenties only the Hungarian Horthy-Bethlen regime was born in a civil war (with foreign support) against the communists. Later in the thirties the authoritarian turn of the Austrian government encountered popular resistance articulated by the social democratic party that led to a short civil war and nazi putschism that was defeated.

Only in Spain the establishment of authoritarian rule was the result of a long and bloody civil war. This is not the place to analyze the reasons for this unique development, except to call attention to a few decisive differences. The coup was not initiated by a government, but a military uprising against a left-bourgeois minority government. It took place in a Western relatively industrialized society, with well organized working class movements, that in part shared a revolutionary ideology and a class conscious conservative middle class -- in the cities and the countryside -- that felt threatened. By 1936 the European experience of fascism, dictatorship and defeat of the working class, generated a high level of polarization and readiness to fight. It is the failure of the military uprising to gain power due to support of sectors of the armed forces and the police to the government (or not to join the pronunciamiento) and the rapid mobilization of anarchist, socialist and communist militias. The failure of the putsch immediately led to the mobilization of civilian volunteers, particularly carlists and falangists. The social revolution unleashed on the republican side and the counter revolution on the side of the rebels, with all their violence, would turn what could have been a successful coup d'état, or a failed putsch, into a civil war with no parallel in other countries between 1918 and 1939. The victorious Franco would also establish a more exclusionary and repressive authoritarian rule than those in Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Bulgaria, the Baltic states and even Austria (1934-1938). It is worth notice that contrary to a "functionalist" interpretation of totalitarianism as a response to the mobilization and resistance of the working class and the democrats this was not the case.

Greece is a thorn in my flesh since, according to my accounting scheme for the rise of fascism, it should have had a significant fascist movement and it did not. It is not fully clear, if we consider many sociological and economic explanations for the breakdown of democracy, that this should have happened unless we consider the political factors: the legitimacy of the regime, the monarchy - republic conflict, the disunity of the political leadership, and the role of the army as the result of the prolonged state-building in war.

In some authoritarian regimes of the interwar years we find many traces of ideologies which struggled more or less effectively for hegemony, which could have led to a totalitarian outcome. The fact that none of these ideologies was granted full control by rulers without a charismatic appeal to an organized following, more interested in personal power, protecting different interests and playing them against each other, together with complex social-structural characteristics, like the relative autonomy of the Church and the military, prevented totalitarianism. Let it be noted that it did not prevent repression, nor the exclusion from public discourse of many values and ideas. This did not require the hegemony of one dominant and relatively integrated and single set of ideas and certainly not mobilization and participation.

Royal Dictatorships

One particular feature of authoritarian regimes in the Balkans was that in Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece a King was the head of the State and took a more or less direct role in governing.[50] The Kings had at some time ruled as constitutional parliamentary monarchs supporting oligarchic parties and politicians. It is important to remember that they did not displace working parliamentary liberal democratic regimes since constitutionally and/or in practice, monarchs already had a decisive role. They contributed to make and unmake cabinets, granted power to prime ministers and parties, called elections that were largely manipulated. The

[50] H. Sundhaussen, "Die Königsdiktaturen in Südosteuropa: "Umrisse einer Synthese" , in Oberländer, *op. cit*., pp. 337-348, followed by a number of essays on Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia.

assumption of fuller powers by the kings and/or politicians with their support did not represent a dramatic discontinuity, even though they suspended constitutions and civil liberties, closed parliament, and outlawed some parties. In some cases they went further to enact authoritarian constitutions, created corporative systems and formally single parties, while relying on a complex social pluralism, the co-optation of politicians of the old parties and efforts to negotiate with and subordinate a radical right fascist movement. When the latter effort failed, they could turn to brutal repression, as in Romania, which in turn unleashed the terrorist violence that delegitimated the regime. Sometimes they had been forced to turn over power to antidemocratic military leaders, and in few cases, allow the participation in power of fascist movements. The personality and power of the Kings contributed to shape those regimes and their policies as well as their international sympathies. Their presence and the complex "court" politics without question limited the potential for totalitarianism.

"Royal dictatorships" have a built-in stability; the King is ultimately suspicious of the accumulation of independent power by the dictator, and the dictator is suspicious of the King and those who may influence him questioning or threatening his position.

In a monarchy, generally the antidemocratic option involves the military given the traditional link between the "commander in chief" and the armed forces. A military dictatorship or a civilian authoritarian regime backed by the King is likely to preserve a considerable pluralism rather than a search for social and ideological hegemony.

Only in Italy and Romania did Kings face strong fascist movements. In Italy, Fascism had initially been republican but Mussolini was ready to compromise with the monarchy. Vittorio Emanuele, in a crucial moment, was ready to appoint him prime minister, starting the many years of collaboration that would end in 1943 with the dismissal of the Duce and his arrest at the gate of Villa Savoia. The degree to which the monarchy limited or not the Fascist totalitarianism is a complex issue. In Romania King Carol, rather than calling the Iron Guard into power, established his own authoritarian rule and allowed the brutal repression of the movement.

Are monarchs as dictators or supporters of dictatorial regimes different? We might advance the hypothesis that Kings are more likely to act opportunistically, since they believed or could believe that their residual legitimacy would allow them to change course and dismiss their authoritarian collaborators, shifting the blame on them. They would not always succeed in doing so, but they could "dismount the tiger" more easily than other dictators. Nevertheless, in the process after a short interregnum they had to abdicate (like Alfonso XIII in Spain) and the institution ended delegitimated (with Umberto unable to assure the continuity of the Savoya dynasty or King Constantine the monarchy in Greece). In some way they were in the position of the armed forces that could disidentify from the military as government, saving the armed forces as an institution by returning to the barracks (as they did in Greece and Latin American dictatorships in recent years), at a cost of legitimacy, though.

Why Authoritarian Rather Than Totalitarian Regimes?

Why were so many regimes authoritarian rather than totalitarian? The most simple answer would be to say that when the crisis of democracy or constitutional liberal regimes in transition to democracy became acute there was no significant fascist party to take power or to be coopted. That would mean to be pushed back to the question: why successful or unsuccessful fascist parties before the crisis. A question I have tried to answer elsewhere.[51]

A very different approach more congruent with structuralist (and Marxist) interpretations would be that there was little or no need for the penetration of the society by a single party and its organizations to assure control. The police and the army were sufficient. The relative weakness or strength of a civil society committed to democracy or/and of the labor movement would be the explanation.

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[51] Linz, "Political Space and Fascism as a Late-Comer", in Larsen, *et. al*., eds., *op. cit*., and "Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective", in Laqueur, ed., *Fascism a Readers Guide*, *op. cit*., pp. 5-121. The latter essay provides biographical data on the fascist leadership in comparison with the leaders of other parties. There is no comparable analysis of the vitae of authoritarian regime leaders.

Another approach would be a cultural interpretation: the nationalist consensus against ethnic minorities and/or a potential foreign threat would be sufficient to assure a passive consensus. Such would be the case of Poland in the twenties and the Baltic republics in the thirties.

An authoritarian alternative against democracy -- or an oligarchic liberal regime -- can only succeed with the support or acquiescence of the armed forces. Their division between "loyalists" to the democratic regime and "putchists", or based on ideological sympathies, is likely to result in civil war. When the opposition to an authoritarian alternative was strong, almost inevitably the army would have to intervene directly and was likely to assume power.

The limited pluralism like in authoritarian regimes of Eastern European states was not limited to the heterogenous overt or covert alliances in the ruling group, the official party, but for long periods allowed the existence of some opposition parties which could participate in elections, but were not supposed to win. Only the communists were outlawed everywhere. Those parties demanded a return to more parliamentary rule, fairer competition, and at some point the regimes turned more exclusive than inclusive. The transitions to more authoritarian rule were more gradual and often there is no date symbolizing the discontinuity between liberal more or less constitutional and pseudo-democratic rule and the creation of a fully authoritarian regime.

In our analysis we should note how the survival of a traditional conservative liberal ruling class (or group and personalities) while preventing the transition to democracy also opposed modern authoritarianism. The case of Hungary is paradigmatic: many conditions for the rule of fascism were present and the fascist parties gained inordinate strength as electoral data show, but the unity and capacity for elite settlements prevented their assumption of power. Only the war, defeat, and the German presence allowed them to gain for a short time -- with terrible consequences -- power. A symbol of the conflict between the moderate conservative more or less liberal elite and the new forces was the ending of regent admiral Horthy in a Nazi concentration camp.

Authoritarian regimes were counterrevolutionary, or at least conservative, generally led by men formed in the 19th century (Pildsudski, born 1867, Horthy 1868, Päts, Ulmanis and Smetona 1874, Miguel Primo de Rivera 1870, Petain), while Fascism was revolutionary, deeply hostile to the values of that century, anti-bourgeois, not aristocratic but populist, led by a new generation of leaders (Mussolini 1883, Hitler 1889, Codreanu 1900, Rolão Preto 1896, José Antonio Primo de Rivera 1903).

The heads and promoters of authoritarian regimes, the Balkan Kings, Admiral Horthy, old-time politicians like Count Bethelen, military leaders like Pildsudski, Petain, and Franco, had their own basis of power. Their institutional position, their prestige among the elite and their peers, were sufficient to consolidate their power and as to the active opponents, specifically the organized working class, repression generally was sufficient. On the other hand, civilian leaders not coming from the establishment could only gain power and consolidate it by creating a mass movement, a party, its militias and ancillary organizations. This fact also provided those leaders and their followers with the possibility and incentive to penetrate and mobilize civil society, a process which in turn opened the door to totalitarian ambitions and conceptions of society.

The men ruling in authoritarian regimes generally had been educated and trained in traditional institutions: military academies and universities. Their life before coming to power had been in their professions, which in some cases involved a full-time activity probably leaving little time for political activism.

The founders of many fascist parties did not have any or much formal education before or after World War I. They were autodidacts: Mussolini through his involvement in the socialist party, his activity as a journalist and his own intellectual ambitions -- to be a writer -- with a somewhat broader horizon; Hitler with a much narrower range. Only some of the latter, and actually unsuccessful fascist leaders in France and Spain had a broader and more respectable intellectual background.

While strongly inclined to give proper weight to agency, leadership, personality, and conjuncture, even accident, in the uncertain situations surrounding the breakdown of democracy,

I would be the last to ignore structural factors. The question is, which kind of structural factors? I would tend to prioritize the political structural factors. For example, I would question the possibility of a non-democratic leader and his immediate followers taking power without a party with some roots and significant support, to succeed in establishing a totalitarian regime, except when all other groups and institutions are in crisis or delegitimated. Fascist leaders with German support could gain power, destroy and repress their opponents, but not achieve a totalitarian control and mobilization of the society.

The authoritarian regimes in many countries of Europe in the interwar years can be explained largely in terms of the specific national crises and circumstances. Class conflicts, ethnic strife, political schisms (like between monarchy and republic in Greece), secularism and clericalism, are more or less central and sufficient explanations. The coming to power of Communism and Lenin in Russia, of Fascism and Mussolini in Italy and Nazism and Hitler in Germany cannot be fully understood without a much more complex analysis. It has been the great achievement of the distinguished historian of the French revolution François Furet, to bring out their historical parallels between the two antagonistic movements born of the crisis of World War I and their common hatred against the values of the liberal bourgeois nineteenth century, and their machiavellian mobilization of the masses. That is why he also works with the category of totalitarianism. It is also the reason why the categorization and projection of the conflict in countries like Spain, the bloody civil war, just in terms of a struggle between Fascism and Communism, leads to a misunderstanding of that conflict.[52]

Rightly, most attention has been paid to the breakdown of democracy in Germany and the coming to power of Hitler and the NSDAP. It can be argued that would German democracy have survived the crisis of the thirties, there would have been authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Portugal and perhaps Spain, besides the Soviet Union and fascist Italy. One

[52] E. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes. A History of the World, 1914-1991*, New York, Vintage Books, 1996, who write (pp.156-157) that "in fact, and contrary to the beliefs of this author's generation, the Spanish Civil War was not the first phase of the Second World War and the victory of General Franco, who, as we have seen, cannot be even described as a fascist, had no global consequences. . . neither the parties of Muscovit communism nor those inspired by fascism were of serious significance there before the Civil War, for Spain went its own eccentric way both on the anarchist ultra-Left and in the Carlist ultra-Right." See also pp. 157-161. On the crisis of Spanish democracy, see E. Ucelay-Da Cal, "Buscando el levantamiento plebiscitario; insureccionalismo y elecciones", *Ayer* 20, 1995, pp. 49-80.

could go even as far as to argue that authoritarian regimes -- with a fascist streak, veneer or component -- would have survived in much of Europe without World War II for a long time. All Europe, paradoxically, would have not become democratic. A German republic, perhaps after an authoritarian interlude, could have been less committed to democracy than the Bonn (now Berlin) republic.

Why Totalitarianism?

It is not difficult to explain why the crisis and breakdown of democracy or liberal constitutional parliamentarism would lead to one or the other of the authoritarian regimes. It is much more difficult to account for the rise of successful mass fascist movements and the drive toward totalitarianism. This is not the place to review the rich literature on totalitarian movements and totalitarianism but to highlight a few themes.

One, central to this essay, is that without a fascist movement West of the Soviet border, totalitarianism did not develop. Therefore the explanations for the rise and success of fascist movements (*strictu sensu*) are a first step. The incapacity of the democratic parties and leaders to defend the democratic institutions and prevent the breakdown, the second. In view of the resistance of authoritarian regimes to fascist movements, their repression of such movements in a number of countries and their cooptation and "domestication" in others, the absence or failure of authoritarian alternatives is a third factor. These three perspectives still leave open the question: why the totalitarian alternative was so appealing and successful?

The third factor has been noted by the students of the German catastrophe. They ask why in 1931-1933 the presidential governments that represented a break with Weimar democracy did not result in an authoritarian regime, military-bureaucratic-conservative, rather than the Hitler chancellorship on January 30, 1933. Was it just the massive support, the organizational strength, the appeal of the *Bewegung*, the charismatic appeal and political skills of Hitler, that made such an alternative impossible? Or was it the misperception of Nazism? We shall note it was possible to misunderstand what Mussolini's coming to power meant, but it is more difficult in the case of

Hitler. Rereading the history of the period before January 30, 1933 when Hitler was sworn in as *Kanzler* the question comes to mind why did democratic politicians, union leaders, conservatives, not learn from the Italian experience more than a decade earlier. It is understandable that Italian opinion considered the first Mussolini cabinet one more in the unstable politics of the period but is less understandable that Hitler's appointment would be received with similar self-deception and passivity. Perhaps the rule of Mussolini had not revealed yet the novelty of totalitarianism and was still seen as one of the authoritarian takeovers in the twenties. Or, were there distinctive elements in the German situation that precluded the authoritarian regime alternative against Hitler? Hindenburg was not the man to make that decision, nor were the German military motivated or capable to support such an option, not particularly congruent with their traditions and their view of their mission.

We should not forget that in Italy the crisis of parliamentary democracy led to the Mussolini cabinet, certainly the result of the threat of fascist violence, but perceived by many as another transformist solution. Only slowly it resulted in the elimination of all parties, the Fascist hegemony and the unfolding of the totalitarian potential.

The case of Germany is different in that the crisis of the parliamentary republic resulted in the ambiguous presidential cabinets rule -- an authoritarian situation not a regime --without turning to an authoritarian conservative regime but the appointment of Hitler who rapidly moved into the totalitarian direction. The question is therefore why the crisis of democracy did not lead to an authoritarian regime. As Henry Turner writes:

> It was Germany's misfortune that at the moment when military rule offered the best available alternative to Hitler's acquisition of power the general who stood at the head of the government lacked both the ability and the will to grasp the opportunity.
>
> No overt coup d'état of the kind likely to galvanize popular resistance would have been necessary to circumvent the constitution and establish military rule in early 1933. Government by presidential emergency decree during the previous three years provided an ideal political device for gradual transition to an out-and-out authoritarian regime.[53]

[53] H. Turner, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-172 and chapter 7, pp. 163-183.

The same counterfactual question could be asked about what would have happened had the King granted Facta the emergency powers to stop the March on Rome. Perhaps it would not even have led to an authoritarian solution, but it certainly would have broken the spell of Mussolini's drive to power. It is conceivable that a government with a parliamentary base and emergency powers would not have resulted in an authoritarian regime. To repress Fascist squadrist domination of part of the country could have been bloody; perhaps more than a presidentially legitimated rule trying to stop the SA from rebelling.

Turner speculates that Hitler's failure might have provoked a crisis in the NSDAP and he may have ended committing suicide more than a decade earlier. Allowed to speculate, one could wonder whether Mussolini, after some time, may not have ended as one more politician in the system.

Once eliminated a series of factors that could have prevented a totalitarian movement and its leader from coming to power, we can turn to the question why a totalitarian alternative emerged and turned out successful. Here the unique characteristics of a true fascist party become central, particularly the appeal of the leader (we shall discuss later), but also unique characteristics of Italian and particularly German society. Given that the essential element of totalitarianism was ideology, the cultural matrix in which the ideology -- a bastardized cultural product -- could emerge was significant in both countries.

A complex factor: the intellectual crisis associated with modernity and the "fin de siècle", efforts to explain and counter the frustration of backwardness and/or decadence by intellectual elites. Ideas leading to a rejection of the Western democratic liberal path and the search for a genuine national revolution. The palingenesis theory of fascism would fit here.[54]

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[54] R. Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, London, 1991, defines (p.240) palingenetic: "expressing the myth of rebirth, regeneration in a political context, embodying the aspiration to create a new order following a period of perceived decline or decadence", see also pp. 32-6.

The richness of intellectual life would become significant. This does not mean that intellectuals would play a leading role in the implementation of a totalitarian utopia, that their ideas would guide policy, but that ideas incorporated, manipulated, distorted or bastardized by activists would be important. In a sense, the German Sonderweg, the rich but also confused culture of the middle classes made ideological politics -- even "political religions" both possible and perhaps necessary to legitimize non-democratic and illiberal rule. The paradox of a society so culturally rich falling for totalitarianism would then be less paradoxical. Many Germans were ready to identify -- how far and how long is another question -- with the Nazi syncretism of part of their cultural heritage, the rhetoric and the aesthetics of the movement. In this context, the secularization of society comes in by creating a space for ideology and even "political religion".

It is important to emphasize that in the German cultural tradition and in the "los von Weimar" milieu there were many strands of thinking that were incorporated into the Nazi appeal -- besides the diffuse antisemitism -- which made the totalitarian utopia possible. One of them was the yearning for *Gemeinschaft*-community linked with an idealization of "conflictless" preindustrial peasant and small-town society. Ideas all hostile to a complex, modern liberal-democratic view of society and not only class conflict but urban-metropolitan culture.[55]

Essential in the drive to power of fascism was a new type of party that combined the organization for participation in elections (in democratic or quasi-democratic regimes) and the militia organization for violence: the Squadrismo, the S.A. and S.S., etc. The war and post-war experience of ex-combattenti, arditi, the Freikorps, the white guards in the borderlands of the USSR, and the unemployed youth, provided the cadres and activists for the violence. The intellectual currents exalting activism, heroism, enthusiasm, irrationalism, against the traditional bourgeois values and way of life (articulated, for example, in Sorel's *Reflections on Violence* and his theory of the myth) and the notion of an avant-gard legitimated that new style of politics. It served not only to defeat and disorganize its opponents but also to intimidate the establishment

[55] The "longing for community" in the fascist movements has been well analyzed by G. L. Mosse, "Nationalism, racism and the radical right", in E. Kamenka, ed., *Community as a Social Ideal*, London, Edward Arnold 1982, pp. 27-42. It became particularly strong in the Rumanian Legion and its militant organization, the Iron Guard.

and the authorities into hopes to coopt that new force or to domesticate rather than resist it using the resources of the state.

The specific Italian style of politics since the struggles for unification with the myths of Garibaldi, the syndicalist tradition, the incredible mobilization of the heterogeneous coalition of interventionists and its presence on the piazza, the rhetoric of Futurism and D'Annunzio, later Mussolini and Fascism (but also massimalist socialism), the radical nationalism and the imperialist dreams, all added up to the climate in which Fascism could appear as a new politics. Any attempt to understand Fascismo and Mussolini has to focus on the intellectual development of radical nacionalism, the forces converging in interventionism (well summarized by Griffin), the beginning of a revolution with the *maggio radioso* of 1915, the hostility to the politicians who opposed the war, particularly Giolitti.

It is emblematic that Ortega y Gasset, the Spanish philosopher, in January 1915, could write on the symbolism of rising the red shirt of Garibaldi in a Roman piazza and comment: "Blessed the Italians, among whose eyes a red shirt or vest that is raised announces an unlimited hope that opens!"[56] That hope would be the basis for a war nationalism that would make Italians. It was the seed for a new style of politics. A politics that the institutions and the political class sitting in parliament could not channel or resist. It was a unique political revolution.

Those committed to the totalitarian project came to power using violence, but equally or more important was the enthusiasm of cadres and followers, the rewards for their loyalty, the successes in internal and initially in foreign policy. The full development of the coercive capacity, the fear preventing and the ability to crush any resistance was the result of the total control achieved. It was a consequence of totalitarianism. In fact, the stability of authoritarian regimes with less repression suggests that the surplus of wanton, inhuman terror against a largely acquiescent population was unnecessary, except to destroy the autonomy of individuals and society. It ended becoming an end in itself, though its roots were in the ideological utopia.

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[56] J. Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas,* Tomo X. *Escritos Politicos I (1908-1921)*, Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1969.

The temporary success of totalitarian regimes was based on a combination of: 1) the faith and commitment of those who had brought them to power, 2) their real or apparent achievements internally and internationally compared to governments preceding them, 3) the opportunism and passive support of a large part of the population and 4) the fear associated with the unlimited capacity for state terror implemented by the state, the party and ordinary citizens cooperating with them. The weight of each of those factors varied from country to country and very much over time. It therefore would be wrong to characterize the regimes by emphasizing only one of them.

The Role of Intellectuals and Ideas

Few of the significant thinkers and intellectuals of the period are directly responsible for the breakdown of liberal democracies, the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. However, there is no doubt that they are indirectly responsible by their contribution to the debunking of political democracy, liberalism, parliamentarism, and their vague but appealing utopian alternatives, their support at one point or another, sometimes with mental reservations, to the antidemocratic regimes and even more to the totalitarian mass movements of right and left. A few even said so when they saw what was coming, such as Gaetano Mosca in a famous speech.[57]

What is more striking, and this has been brought out by many students of the period, is how few articulated between 1918 (or even the turn of the century) and the 1940's a clear and committed defense of liberal democracy. In my work I have not centered on the contribution of ideas to the disasters of this period (I only touched on it) and this is an additional reason to ask the reader to turn to Bracher, Gentile, Sontheimer, Sternhell, Furet[58] and earlier Aron and

[57] G. Salvemini, introductory essay to A. W. Salomone, *Italian Democracy in the Making,* Philadelphia, 1945, quoting Mosca, pp. XV-XVI.

[58] I have already referred to their contributions in the course of this essay. I would particularly note my indebtedness to Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Zeit der Ideologien. Eine Geschichte des politischen Denkens im 20.*

Hannah Arendt, who have contributed to our understanding of the intellectual climate in which the politico-social processes we have focussed on took place. Ideas, indeed some valuable ideas, did not cause the disaster, but their partly irresponsible formulation, their ambiguity, their negation of the values of civilized liberal politics and of the actual political democracy, allowed the great simplificateurs to manipulate the masses and to legitimize the regimes we are discussing here.

That role of the intellectuals has been described very well by Edgar Jung, one of those intellectuals, who soon became disenchanted with and critical of the Nazis and was murdered in the night of the long knives in 1934:

> Die geistigen Voraussetzungen für die deutsche Revolution wurden auβerhalb des Nationalsozialismus geschaffen. Der Nationalsozialismus hat gewissermaβen das "Referat Volksbewegung" in dieser groβen Werksgemeinschaft (der revolutionären Kräfte, d. Verf.) übernommen. Er hat es grandiose ausgebaut und ist zu einer stolzen Macht geworden. Wir freuen uns darüber nicht nur, sondern wir haben das Unsrige zu diesem Wachstum beigetragen. In unsagbarer Kleinarbeit, besonders in den gebildeten Schichten, haben wir die Voraussetzungen für jenen Tag geschaffen, an dem das deutsche Volk den nationalsozialistischen Kandidaten seine Stimme gab. Diese Arbeit war heroisch, weil sie auf den Erfolg, auf die äuβere Resonanz verzichtete.
>
> Ich habe Achtung vor der Primitivität ciner Volksbewegung, vor der Kämpferkraft siegreicher Gauleiter und Sturmführer. Aber ihre Arriviertheit gibt ihnen nicht das Recht, sich als das Salz der Erde zu betrachten und den geistigen Vorkämpfer geringzuachten…[59]

To emphasize the cultural climate of anti-liberal, anti-democratic thought in Italy and Germany in which fascism could resonate, is not to ignore the rich body of similar thinking in France. (The difference is that probably the democratic thought was also rich and shared by a

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Jahrhundert, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1982 and Maier, ed., *"Totalitarismus" und "Politische Religionen"*, *op. cit*. Gentile, *Le Origini dell'ideologia fascista (1918-1925)*, and call attention to the excellent essays in the volumes edited by Söllner, *et. al*., eds., *Totalitarismus. Eine Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, *op. cit*. and Maier, *Totalitarismus und "Politische Religïonen"*. Some of the writings of E. Nolte would also deserve mention although I disagree strongly with some of his thesis. For Italy, I have already mentioned the work of Emilio Gentile, and for Germany, in addition to that of George Mosse, I would mention Kurt Sontheimer, *Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik*, München, Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, p. 283, 1968.

[59] E. Jung, "Neubelebung von Weimar"*Deutsche Rundschan*, Juni, 1932, p. 153, quoted by Kurt Sontheimer, *op. cit*., p. 283.

larger segment of the educated middle classes in addition to the fact that other "fascisto-genic" factors were absent or weaker). In Spain there was a body of thought ambivalent about liberal democracy, and in particular parliamentarism in response to the 1898 and early 20th century crisis, of which the 1923 coup benefitted. However, the fall of Primo de Rivera and the monarchy generated a renewed hope in a democratic republic that left little room for fascism, while strengthening Catholic-conservative responses to its policies and failures.

The period between the wars represents a paradoxical combination of a belief in "politique d'abord", the belief in the possibility of solving all the problems of society entrusting power to a strong leader and/or choosing the right ideology. A utopia with a misunderstanding of the importance of the Rechtsstaat, freedom and law, constitutions and free elections, individual rights rather than fusion into a national community. This search for community meant the dismissal of the inevitable heterogeneity of society, the distinctive values and rights of institutions like religion and churches, the market and entrepreneurs, professional ethics and the university, class conflict, interest groups, and trade unions. The rejection of a society expressing itself through multiple political channels but not politicized in search of politically-cultural hegemony.

Even though we never will know the extent to which an ideology and its translation into slogans and the constant propaganda really was internalized by the masses, we cannot ignore its impact on a broad stratum of educated (or half-educated) people. Any attempt to understand the difference between totalitarian regimes and most authoritarian regimes focussing only on the institutional and organizational structures is therefore insufficient. I have tried to highlight that difference by using the distinction between ideology and mentality derived from Theodor Geiger.[60] Like all typological concepts, the boundaries between both have a certain fuzziness, but I would insist on the centrality of that distinction. The trouble is that the operationalization of those concepts is extremely difficult and the search for empirical (not to say about quantifiable)

[60] T. Geiger, *Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes*, Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke, 1932, and *Saggi sulla società industriale*, (Introduzione di Paolo Farneti), Torino, Unione Tipografico (UTET), 1970, pp. 23-28.

indicators (particularly many years after) frustrating. This has been the reason why many using the distinction between types of regimes have neglected this dimension.

I myself have not worked enough on the description and analysis of mentalities. Fortunately, thanks to the work of many distinguished scholars, we have gained considerable understanding of totalitarian ideologies, their intellectual roots, their simplification, their use and manipulation, and their appeal: an appeal to otherwise distinguished minds, artists and writers. How much their (sometimes short-lived, it is true) support contributed to the success of totalitarianism is almost impossible to determine. However, after works like those of Aron, Bracher, Furet, Emilio Gentile, and the research on political religions (inspired among others by Erich Voegelin and led by Hans Maier) it should be clear that totalitarianism cannot be understood without the study of ideologies.[61] On the other hand, the non-Marxist work on Fascism has led to accept that fascism, in its variety of formulations, had a powerful complex and rich ideological basis and pedigree, as had the tragic simplifications of Nazi and Hitler's racism.

The weaker articulation of liberal-democratic thought in the *Zeitalter der Ideologien* contributed to the breakdown of democracies, the semi-loyalty of democrats toward the regimes they could and should have defended, and the appeal of totalitarian strains to those not really committed to create a totalitarian regime and basically -- luckily -- not that interested or passionate about ideas.

Legacies of World War I

In accounting for the rise of fascism, in its multiple dimensions, World War I was crucial. We have tended perhaps to underestimate its significance for the breakdown of democracy in the twenties and thirties independently of the fascist factor. The war and the peace that followed it

[61] Maier, ed., *"Totalitarismus" und "Politische Religionen"*, vol. I., 1996, Maier and Schäfer, eds., *"Totalitarismus" und "Politische Religionen",* vol. II, 1997.

divided Europe into losers and victorious states. The new democratic regimes in the defeated states were weakened in their legitimacy for the circumstances of their birth, their acquiescence to the Diktat of the winners, ripe for a Dolchstosslegende, burdened with the economic consequences (including the reparations in the case of Germany) and a broad commitment to revisionism and irredentism.

All those factors affected the Weimar Republik, the new small and unloved Austrian Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria. The new states: Poland, the Baltic Republics and Yugoslavia, faced the problems of nation building with large ethnic and linguistic minorities. Those located in the *cordon sanitaire* with the Soviet Union had the legacy of war with the communists that to some extent had been a civil war. The conflict between Poland and Lithuania contributed much to the crises in the latter country. The invasion of Hungary by the Czechs and Romanians, the war between Greece and Turkey had the same impact in the two defeated states. States of doubtful legitimacy for many of their citizens could not generate the full legitimacy for their democratic institutions. Even among the victors, the hopes generated by the war -- the lost or betrayed victory and the costs of that victory-generated deep divisions, as in Italy, but also in Greece where the flight from Turkey of Greeks led to discontent. In other cases, the incorporation of minorities whose loyalty would be questioned or uncertain, as in the greater Rumania, the Czech lands with the Sudeten Germans, or the doubtful incorporation of the Croats in the new unitary Kingdom of the Southern Slavs, went with victory. Even as far as Portugal the cost in lives of the intervention in the war contributed to the crisis of the republic. The new forms of political violence of the Freikorps, the white-guards and the squadrismo, were born out of the war and post-war experience, as well as the romanticization of war and violence. They would be an essential part of the fascist, and even some antifascist, party organizations, and their confrontations and terror would undermine the legitimacy of democratic governments, blackmail leaders into compromise, *Zähmungskonzepte* that would open the door to totalitarian, and at best, authoritarian regimes.

The war did not only generate a disposition toward violence of right, the patriotic bourgeois ex-soldiers, but also in the working class a violent revolutionary activism. Otto Bauer,

the Austrian social democratic leader, theorist and historian, described this impact of the war in these terms:

> Der Krieg hatte die Struktur und die Geistesverfassung des Proletariats wesentlich verändert. Er hatte die Arbeiter aus Fabrik und Werkstatt herausgerissen. Im Schützengraben litten sie Unsägliches. Im Schützengraben füllen sie ihre Seelen mit Hass gegen die Drückeberger und Kriegsgewinner . . . und gegen die Generale und Offiziere, die üppig tafelten, während sie hungerten . . . Die Jahre im Schützengraben hatten sie der Arbeit entwöhnt, sie an gewalttätige Requisitionen, an Raub und Diebstahl gewöhnt . . .
>
> [The war had changed fundamentally the structure and mental dispositions (Geistesverfussung) of the proletariat. It had taken the workers out of the factory and workplace. In the trenches they filled their souls with hatred against those avoiding service and the war profiteers . . . against generals and officers, which dined in abundance while they starved . . . The years in the trenches had led them to lose the habit of work, accustomed them to violent requisitions, loot and stealing . . .][62]

Religion, Fascism, Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes

Conflicts between Church and State are not characteristic of any type of regime but are constant through history, reaching very different intensity in different societies and political systems.[63] The Russian Revolution generated a real fear in the churches because of its militant commitment to atheism. Marxism and its manifestations in the sub-community generated by some socialist movements, the anti-clerical and anti-religious chiliasm of the anarchism and the militant laicism of bourgeois democratic parties in western and southern Europe linked to masonic influences, were all seen as a threat by the churches whose hierarchy did not always believe that a Christian democratic alternative by mobilizing the electorate for the Church could ward off those dangers. It is, therefore, no accident -- leaving aside the theologically based suspicions of liberalism, radical democracy, socialism and capitalism -- that in the first half of the century important sectors in the Church would look with favor or at least without disfavor upon authoritarian responses to the moral and cultural crisis of societies.

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[62] O. Bauer, *Die österreichische Revolution*, Wien, 1923, p. 120, quoted by G. Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik*, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

[63] J. J. Linz, "Der religiöse Gebrauch der Politik und/oder der Politische Gebrauch der Religion, Ersatz-Ideologie gegen Ersatz-Religion", in H. Maier, ed., *"Totalitarismus" und "Politische Religionen", op.cit.*, 1996, pp. 129-154, explores the whole range from "theocracy" at one end to "political religion" on the other.

There was, though, a very great difference between their feelings toward fascism in all its varieties and right authoritarianism. We do not have to refer only to the explicit opposition to Nazism before coming to power nor to the Church and State struggle under the German totalitarian system, but could find examples in other countries. Not only did the fascists compete for the same type of electorate than the Christian democratic parties, not only did they try to limit the growing Catholic Action movement to a restricted sphere of influence, but their conception of an integrated national community including believers and nonbelievers, their claim of total authority for the state, which sometimes included separation of Church and state in their programs, their nationalism that led them to question any Vatican interference in internal politics of the nation, and their aim to monopolize the socialization of youth, were a source of inherent tensions. This was particularly true when confronted with the sometimes equally totalitarian claims of the integrists in the Church, the defenders of a traditional conception of the role of the Church.

Fascist leaders not infrequently came from the left with its traditional anti-clericalism, from secularized middle classes or from intellectuals who were generally anti-clerical. A few of them for complex reasons, turned to pre-Christian mythic national origins or to the positivist interpretation to Christianity as a social and historical basis for national identity, distinct from the universal Church and from religious belief in the way of a Charles Maurras. Those tendencies, far from reassuring for the Church, were more or less explicitly attacked and in a few cases condemned. The Conciliation with the Italian state and the Lateran treaties generated a positive response, soon dispelled by some of the policies and statements of Mussolini. In the later 30's the Nazi hegemony in the fascist camp led to a more critical and, in the case of the Belgian Bishops in relationship to Rex, hostile response. The presence of fascist clerics not condemned by the hierarchy does not modify this fact, like the presence of communist clerics tolerated after 1945 does not change the anti-communism of the institutional Church.

In authoritarian regimes, the fascist component was forced to moderate its anti-clericalism and, in some cases, to incorporate a religious dimension, even though the "movement in the regime" would continue latently its hostility to clerical hegemony. The anti-liberal and

anti-democratic Catholic ideological tradition and clerical influence became a barrier to fascist totalitarian ambitions, contributing to the limited pluralism. Fascism on its side became a channel for a limited defense of the laic culture against the hegemonic ambitions of Catholic integrist culture.

Authoritarian regimes -- with the exception of the Ataturk secularizing dictatorship -- were respectfully with the Churches, while committed to a certain statism, and the Churches were generally accommodating. Indeed, since these regimes proclaimed their anticommunism, the Churches and many of the lay leaders were favorable to those regimes combatting Godless communism, a few even sympathizing with the local fascists on that account. In Eastern Europe the diffuse anti-semitism reinforced those tendencies. In the case of the Orthodox churches, the traditional caesaropapism contributed to that pattern of cooperation.

It is necessary to distinguish the cases of Austria, Portugal and Spain -- particularly after 1945 -- where the regimes incorporated elements of corporatist authoritarian Catholic thought and made political use of religion, which some of the clerical elements conceived as an opportunity for "religious use of politics". They felt that the state could serve to re-christianize society, giving a privileged position to the Church in public life, education and cultural censorship.

Conservative authoritarian nationalism in Catholic countries could make political use of religion and religious institutions to legitimize its rule but not develop a political religion. Only on the fringe radical right fascist groups could break with the universal church by going as far as defining the conversion to Christianity as the oppression of an Ur-volk with a tribal identity and its own gods. The manipulation of the religious tradition and its symbols was more likely in countries where the national identity was linked to a religious identity, a legacy of crusading against Islam, wars of religion and a missionary expansion. This was the case of Spain.[64] The

[64] J.J. Linz, “Religión y política en España", in R. Díaz de Salazar and S. Giner, eds., *Religión y sociedad en España*, Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, pp. 1-50, 1993. Partly translated into German as "Staat und Kirche in Spanien ed., Vom Bürgerkrieg bis zur Wiederkehr der Demokratie", in M. Greschat und J.-C. Kaiser, ed., *Christentum und Demokratie im 20. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer, 1992, pp. 60-88. On the Church and the Franco regime there is a great deal of literature. See G. Hermet, *Les*

new nationalisms based on a religious distinctiveness like Slovakia and Croatia led to a politics that blurred the borderline between the political use of religion and the transformation into a political religion.

The Ustasha, in the unique situation of the creation of a Croat state under the aegis of the Axis occupation, were able to establish a regime of terror against the Serbian Orthodox minority and the Jews on the basis of a religious-nationalist ideology with the cooperation of some segments of the clergy. The regime of the Poglavnik was closer to the totalitarian than the authoritarian model, given the circumstances in which it was established in war time.

The political use of religion and/or the religious use of nationalism, particularly by the lower clergy and the members of some religious orders -- the Basque, Flemish and Slovak nationalists -- is well known and therefore its perversion in non-democratic contexts should not be surprising. There is no systematic, comparative, empirical and sociological study of the fusion of minority nationalism and religion and the support by some segments of the clergy -- often with the opposition of the hierarchy -- for such movements.

In Slovakia, a nationalist party with a conservative catholic ideology under the leadership of Monsignor Tiso came to power in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia under the dictat of Hitler. It ruled the country as a fascisticized regime from March 1939 to 1945.[65] Having a mass membership, roots in a largely rural society with the support of many clergymen, in a society where some of the elite was alien to the nationalist movement or protestant, the pluralism was largely limited to the more fascist sectors of the hegemonic ruling party.

Catholiques dans l'Espagne Franquiste. Paris: Foundation Nationale de Sciences Politiques, 1980. For a recent work in English, see S. G. Payne, *Spanish Catholicism: A Historical Overview*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, chaps. 6 and following. E. de la Souchére, "Un catholicisme totalitaire", *Les Temps Modernes*, May 1974. On Portugal see M. Braga da Cruz, *Estado Novo e Igreja Católica*, Lisbon, 1998.

[65] Y., Jelinek, "Clergy and Fascism: The Hlinka Party in Slovakia and the Croatian Ustasha Movement", in Larsen, et al., *Who were the Fascists?*, *op. cit*., pp. 367-378. Y. Jelinek, *The Parish Republic, Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1939-1945*, New York: East European Quarterly (distributed by Columbia University Press, 1976), mingling of extreme nationalism, clerical-religious identities, fascist influences, particularly on the "intellectuals" of the party and the working of a client state under its control.

Non-fascist authoritarian regimes very often established a positive relationship with the churches and this was particularly true in some countries with Greek Orthodox state churches. They often supported the Church as one more component of the traditional social order even favoring its role in the educational and cultural sphere, and only when the clergy identified with a minority nationalism conflicts arose.

A totalitarian state and society based on religion ultimately would be possible only as a theocracy, that is a rule both in the religious and the political (state) realm by the clerisy. It probably would not be possible in the absence of a hierarchical church (its absence in Iran prevented the full and stable development of theocracy). Even less likely and stable would be a caesaropapist totalitarianism in which the ruler -- basileus -- would also be the sacralized authority in the church.

Religion has been a brake on absolute power, but in the absence of a transnational center to define authoritatively the sacred texts, it can serve to legitimize power and a society fully subject to its principles, intolerant with diversity. Such a society could represent a new type of theocratic totalitarianism based on the political use of religion or the religious use of politics. In the case of Islam, the absence of such an ultimate center defining orthodoxy and heterodoxy leaves to different religious leaders the power to do so for their followers.

After the second Vatican Council with the greater pluralism within the Church, the autonomy of the clergy from the traditional submission to the hierarchy, new radical theological currents, the greater commitment of the Church to human rights, and the more active participation of the laity independently of the control and sponsorship by the hierarchy, the relationships between authoritarian regimes and the Church have become even more conflictual. However, for reasons which are very different from those that led to the conflicts between the fascists and the Church in the 20's and 30's.

From Ideology to Political Religion

To the extent we see totalitarianism as the result of a unique commitment to ideology, a political faith, a world view, we have to ask ourselves how was that possible. Significantly, as I write this in English, I realize how different *Politische Glauben*, *Weltanschaung* sound in German. It would be tempting to analyze the secularization in different societies and the way in which religious legacies were secularized, as a key to the totalitarian potential. My guess is that anti-clericalism and laicism, in the Western European and Southern-Latin European tradition, were different and produced conservative clerical or national-Catholic reactions. Moreover, the anticlerical, and even antireligious, ideas were largely (although not exclusively) associated with the left, socialist or anarchist.

The secularization of the intelligentsia, the educated, the bourgeoisie, created a vacuum that would be filled by the commitment to ideology in societies in which culture and aesthetic emotions were honored, and therefore ideas and emotions linked to them were widely diffused. Once simplified and sloganized by a political movement, these ideas could become a powerful basis for a pseudo-religious political commitment that justified and made totalitarianism possible. The paradox that German society, with its high cultural level, could fall for the confused *völkisch*, conservative revolution and racist thought, from such a perspective is far from paradoxical. The dense, heavy and heady body of thought and symbolism that the Nazis simplified and then reelaborated did not exist in other societies.

We have no systematic data on the religious beliefs, attitudes or practices of different rulers. We know the lack of vinculation with the Churches, the atheism or deism, the strange religious syncretisms, including pagan elements, of many fascist leaders, particularly Mussolini, Hitler and his closest collaborators, but also the more orthodox Catholicism of others. We do not know much about the religion of a number of authoritarian rulers, but it was closer to orthodoxy in the case of Salazar, Dollfuss, Schussnigg, Franco and Petain, while surprisingly Pildsudski was protestant and Horthy and Bethelen calvinists.

Antisemitism and Racism: Another Dimension

Antisemitic attitudes, prejudices, discriminatory policies, even violence were not exclusive of any type of regime in Europe, particularly Eastern Europe. Italian Fascism originally was not antisemitic and Jews were among its founders and militants.[66] Later movements however incorporated antisemitism, and fascists of the Iron Guard, the Ustacha and the Arrow Cross participated in the genocide of Jews, while conservative French politicians and civil servants also did their share. The Nazi holocaust has become central in one image of totalitarianism and the question can be asked: would it have been possible if this regime had not been totalitarian? Probably not.

However, neither the breakdown of democracy, nor the rise of fascism, are directly linked to antisemitism. Certainly the hostility to Marxist socialism was reinforced by invocations of Marx's Jewishness and the presence -- in some countries -- of Jews among its leaders. It served to reinforce the class hatred that contributed to the breakdown. The antisemites in many countries had channels outside of fascism, but the more radical expression, the fascist violence, made it attractive to radical antisemites in many countries. In turn, the antifascist response of world jewry to nazism made the nazi antisemitism part of fascism even where there was no native antisemitism nor Jews.

It was not only antisemitism, *völkisch* racism, that contributed to Nazi totalitarianism, but the biological pseudo-scientific conception of man and society underlying the eugenic movement. Eugenics as a science was based on a supposedly new understanding of the laws of human heredity. As a social movement, it involved proposals that society ensure the constant improvement of its hereditary makeup by encouraging "fit" individuals and groups to reproduce themselves, and, perhaps more important, by discouraging or preventing the "unfit" from

[66] The relation between Mussolini and Fascism with the Jews is complex going from the initial participation of Jews in founding the party to the 1938 Manifesto of Italian Racism and the racial legislation. See Payne, *A History of Fascism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-242 for the scholarly references in addition to the work of R. Felice, *Storia degli ebrei itliani sotto il fascismo*, Turin, 1988.

contributing their unfitness to future generations.[67] The notion *lebensunwertes Leben* that served as the basis for forced sterilization and euthanasia policies had its roots in that body of thought. An intellectual current that could not find much echo in Catholic societies but was accepted in progressive sectors of democratic societies. Nazi racism[68] was therefore more than antisemitism, hatred toward gypsies and other ethnic categories including the Slavs. Biological racism could only be implemented in a totalitarian system since it implicated a radical intrusion into the private sphere and a break with basic religious values.

In the light of nazi racism far beyond nationalist ethnocentrism, the question can be raised whether it went beyond the extreme nationalism of fascism. I have not questioned if nazism was part of fascism, but I would argue that it was a branch of the fascist tree on which other elements were grafted that grew to be so strong and heavy that it utlimately uprooted the tree.

Imperialist Nationalism

The totalitarian regimes in interwar Europe were major powers with foreign policy pursuing territorial expansion (if necessary by war or the threat of war) and interference in other countries. The authoritarian regimes ruled in lesser countries, though their nationalism also favored international ambitions whose realization was not in their hands and in fact brought them into dependence of the Axis powers.

The students and young in Spain could be mobilized to shout "Gibraltar español", and dream with an African colonial expansion at the cost of France, incited by the falangist

[67] C. B. Davenport, *Heredity in Relation to Eugenics*, New York, Henry Holt, 1911, p. 1, quoted by N. L. Stepan, "The Hour of Eugenics", *Race, Gender and Nation in Latin America*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991.

[68] G. Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1983. There are different shades and emphasis in F.-L. Kroll, *Utopie als Ideologie: Geschichtdenken und politisches Handeln im Dritten Reich*, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1999.

leadership, but without the Axis support, such claims were bound to be unsuccessful. Since for their own and different reasons, Italy and Germany were not ready to support them, they led nowhere. Only the two great powers initiated the wars, in part counting with the totalitarian mobilization potential or/and driven to realize it as a result of war. Fascism reinforced the nationalist, irredentïst, aggressive, tendencies in many countries, but the authoritarian regimes in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, and Spain could not implement them, even when some, like Hungary, benefitted by the Diktat by the Axis, while others were pawns or victims of the decisions of totalitarian great powers.

The relation of totalitarianism and expansionism and international aggression is complex: was totalitarianism the source or the result of those policies? Certainly the international policy goals, the colonialist expansion of Italy for example, preexisted the regime, but appeared as more viable as a result of the consolidation of a more totalitarian regime. One could argue that imperialism, for example the *Drang nach Osten*, contributed to the totalitarian appeal and development, and that the totalitarian mobilization of society was, in the case of Italy, partly a result of the foreign policy ambitions.

The Military and the Authoritarian vs. Totalitarian Alternative

The armed forces, or important sectors within them, have played a major role in the establishment of non-democratic regimes, either by withdrawing their support from the democratic regimes, remaining neutral in the confrontation between democracy and its enemies, entering into an understanding with rising fascism and fascist regimes, or by assuming themselves power overthrowing democratic systems.[69]

[69] It is impossible to refer here to the extensive literature on the military in politics, the conditions leading to military coups d'etat, military regimes, the relations between the armed forces and the fascisRamiosts in the crisis of democracy and the takeover of power in Italy and especially in Germany. In my "Totalitarian and

The military leaders want to be above parties, are unlikely to be committed to a complex ideology, and have limited capacity to mobilize the population. While rejecting the political and social pluralism of a liberal-democratic society, they are not ready to substitute hegemonically elements of a plural society. Military thinking reflects a mentality resulting from their training. For the officers, an ordered society does not require a mobilized society. They can afford to achieve passive obedience without needing or even wanting to convince. While rejecting the interference of the churches in politics, they are likely to tolerate their autonomy in their own sphere. For all these reasons, a military regime or one in which the military are ready to exercise a veto power is likely to be authoritarian rather than totalitarian.

A purely military based authoritarian regime is possible when the armed forces have the monopoly of armed violence, they are not divided ideologically and there is a low level of political mobilization in the society. In the absence of those conditions the military are likely to make coalitions with antidemocratic political groups, particularly if they are able to mobilize armed militias. This was clearly the case in Spain in 1936 when the putchist military immediately had to turn to the traditionalist Requeté militia and the falangist volunteers. Incidentally, the same as the legal government and loyalist forces had to turn to the proletarian militias of anarcho-syndicalists, socialists and communists, unleashing a revolutionary process. On the Franco side, the outcome was an authoritarian regime with an incipient political pluralism rather than a military dictatorship (like Primo de Rivera's in 1923).[70]

In authoritarian regimes there was a strong tendency to retain the monopoly of armed force, of the regular police and the military, and to place party militias under military control. The armed forces were particularly concerned with establishing and retaining that monopoly. In contrast, totalitarianism not only attempts to politicize the army, but establish its control through

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Authoritarian Regimes", *op. cit.*, and in Linz and Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, *op. cit.*, the reader will find references to the relevant literature.

[70] E. Malefakis, "Aspectos históricos y teóricos de la guerra", in E. Malefakis, ed. *La guerra de España (1936-1939)*, Madrid, Taurus, 1986, pp. 11-49, see p. 25.

political commissars and party militias that become ideological party armies. Indeed, one of the distinguishing characteristics of fascism was the organization of party militias before the take-over of power -- the squadrismo and the SA and its imitations elsewhere. The case of the civic guards in Finland and Baltic countries is different since they were born in the wars of independence and subsequent civil war (but subordinate to the state in Finland). In the Soviet Union the NKVD troops constituted a similar praetorian army. Symbolically the Reichskanzelei was guarded by the SS, and the Franco headquarters in 1937 had an external guard by four different party militias with their distinctive uniforms, but soon the party militia disappeared and in the forties even at the party headquarters its weapons were not operational.

There was an affinity between fascist movements and the military. An affinity that grew out of the fact that fascist movements found among their most enthusiastic supporters and often founders those who had participated in the first World War, many who had become reserve officers and the ex-combattenti.[71] All those who rejected the ruling elites of their countries, the conditions under which peace was made, those who remained in the re-guard, war profiteers and the popular movements that used the crisis created by the war and defeat to attempt a revolutionary change. It is therefore no accident that many young officers would feel attracted by fascism and that some of their seniors would look upon the movement with favor.

There were inherent tensions between fascism and the military from the very beginning. Some fascists were thinking of the nation in arms. They envisioned a militia-based army, sometimes organized around the cadres of the para-military organizations of the party, as a future military organization that would break with the classist-bureaucratic-professional army of the past, that for them explained to some extent the anti-militarism of popular strata. The elements advocating such a militia army were perceived by the professionals as a competitor and as a threat to be neutralized or destroyed. Besides, the party militias of many fascist movements were based on principles uncongenial to the officer corps: the condottieri type of leadership, the egalitarianism that did not respect the traditional hierarchical structures of society and even of the

[71] Linz, "Some Notes . . .", *op. cit.*, pp. 36-40, 53-55.

officer corps, the emphasis on youth rather than seniority, the hierarchy based on political commitment rather than professional competence, were all ideas alien to the officer corps.

There were, moreover, tensions derived from the traditional relationship between the armed forces and the state, at least until the takeover of power by the fascists, whatever misgivings officers may have had about the liberal democratic state. Not only did officers feel still attached in the monarchical countries to the authority of the monarch, but many believed in the principle of legal legitimacy. Legality rather than substantive legitimacy of rule led quite a few officers to support the republican government in the Spanish Civil War, in spite of their disagreements with the policies of the Popular Front and a dislike for uncontrolled anarchic violence. On the Franco side, many officers were suspicious of the fascist ideology and rhetoric. Quite a few saw the penetration of fascists within the officer corps as a threat to the institutional political homogeneity, as a source of divisiveness, the same as they could see the penetration of democratic or progressive tendencies as a threat to that sacred unity.

The consequence of this ambivalence in the relationship between the military and fascism was an effort in some cases to maintain their autonomy, their apoliticism, even after the fascists took power, excluding soldiers and officers from party membership or, in other cases, an effort to subordinate the party militias to military officers, to control and limit the mobilizational aspirations of populist fascism. In summary, to attempt to control or neutralize the hegemony to which the fascists aspired. The automatic formal membership of all officers on account of that character in FET y de las Jons is a good example of such an effort.

In spite of the elective affinities between fascism and the military there were inherent tensions between the new political authoritarian rulers and military mentality and institutional interests. These tensions meant that in a number of countries the military became an obstacle to the hegemonic ambitions of fascist movements and supporters of alternative authoritarian forces, and in a few cases, the instrument for the displacement and even repression of the movements. The hope of some weak fascist movements to use the military in overthrowing a democratic regime and to be called later to assume power, with the military retreating to the barracks, was to

be sorely disappointed.[72] This does not mean that for certain functions military dominated regimes would not turn to men with a fascist background and ideology to help them in establishing authoritarian regimes, particularly when the military needed to mobilize a broad segment of the population to win a civil war, as in the case of Spain after the initial failure of the purely military pronunciamiento. In Spain, one could say that it was the failure of the military in taking over power in a few days after the uprising that made the fascists so important, at the same time as the initial weakness of the fascist movement made from the very beginning the military the key to an anti-democratic, anti-socialist, anti-revolutionary alternative.

When the leadership of the overthrow of democracy is assumed by the military, the new regime is born under their hegemony with rare exceptions, and the activists of the fascist movement are not likely to play a central role. Younger officers might have sympathies with such a movement, but their seniors in command who in a more or less institutionalized coup assume power are more likely to have links with the establishment of the society: the politicians of conservative parties, high civil servants, technocratic elites like directors of the central bank, conservative professors, bankers and businessmen, and therefore turn to those elites as their civilian collaborators, cabinet members, head of planning organizations, etc. Only for certain functions like propaganda, the control of the mass media, censorship, and occasionally the creation of functional alternatives to trade unions, they will turn to fascist or fascistized elites, if there are no Catholic integrist or conservative elites available to play those roles. In that case, we are likely to have a takeover of power that represents a conservative counter-revolution rather than the political revolution associated with the rise of a new political elite without ascriptive or achieved status in the pre-coup society.

A military-led authoritarian regime is much less likely to pursue an inclusionary strategy than a fascist regime. There will be no mass membership party with activities between elections, no youth and women's organization, no mass sponsored organizations for workers like the official trade unions in fascist countries, the German *Arbeitsfront*, no equivalent to the

[72] José Antonio Primo de Rivera, *Obras Completas*, Madrid: Vicesecretaría de Educación Popular de F.E.T. y de los JONS, 1945; see "Carta al General Franco", pp. 623-626; and "Carta a un militar español", pp. 645-654.

Doppolavoro, no youth organizations to serve as a recruiting ground for future elites. In such regimes there is little place for an intelligentsia, though there will be a co-optation of academics and liberal professionals with little capacity for the manipulation of ideology and symbols. Intellectuals and artists identified with the opponents of the regime, whose style might not fit with the taste of the new rulers, are likely to suffer persecution or discrimination, but in contrast to fascist regimes there is only a limited effort to create a new culture, a new art, a new architecture to express the values of the regime.

This absence of anything new, the use of timeworn rhetoric, of patriotism and order, and the purely negative response to new ideas limits the capacity of such regimes to attract youth, students and intellectuals. The contrast with fascism in Italy and even Nazism could not be greater. It would be impossible to write a book for authoritarian regimes elsewhere in Europe in the interwar years and particularly for authoritarian regimes of military origin after 1945, like that of Hamilton McCallister on respectable[73] intellectuals and artists that at one point or another, with more or less mental reservations, with greater or lesser independence or servility, more or less loyalty or disappointment, identified with fascism. Even when we turn to the case of Spain under Franco, we find that quite a few of the intellectuals outstanding before the Civil War and respected after 1975 were linked at one point or another with the regime thanks to the initiative of some of the falangist leaders and through institutions of fascist origin, rather than those more directly identified with national-Catholicism.

Military, bureaucratic, technocratic authoritarian regimes have responded in a number of cases to the same crisis of Western societies that led to the rise of fascism, fascist regimes, or regimes with a fascist component, but the absence of this intellectual component has also been one of the weaknesses of those regimes in gaining any international legitimation.

Some of the factors we have just mentioned also account for the lack of a real totalitarian project and the incapacity of penetrating and hegemonizing society, rather than repressing and

[73] A. Hamilton, *The Appeal of Fascism. A Study of Intellectuals and Fascism 1919-1945*, New York, Avon, 1971.

atomizing it. However, the justification and methods of repression might be totalitarian.[74] They also explain the growing autonomy of civil society after those regimes have been in power for some time and their exclusionary objectives have been achieved, their limited capacity to solve the problems of social integration revealed, and their incapacity to solve many basic structural problems become apparent, that we find in the contemporary bureaucratic authoritarian regimes of Latin America. It is no accident that civil society should in some cases like Brazil have gained new strength and autonomy, as Alfred Stepan has noted. The absence of the fascist component (defined as we do) has made those regimes quite different in their political and above all their social development. A difference not to be ignored by those who stress some of the common elements in their functional analysis of anti-democratic, anti-progressive, anti-socialist, anti-popular authoritarian regimes. They are, to use the language of functional analysis, functional alternatives but not functional equivalents.

Civil Society and the Rise to Totalitarianism

In view of the fashionableness of the idea of civil society as a source of democratic values, we can ask ourselves: which was the role of civil society in the interwar disaster? Certainly civil society was weak in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, much of Portugal and Southern Italy. In the case of Spain, we would have to take into account regional differences and argue about the inclusion of politicized trade union movements and Catholic lay organizations into civil society. In many of those countries democracy broke down but the result were authoritarian regimes.

[74] See A. Barahona de Brito, *Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, quoted in Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, "Further Reflections on Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.

The proponents of the civil society supporting democracy thesis obviously can parade the stability of democracy in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Scandinavian and Benelux countries. However, it would be difficult to argue that civil society -- the myriad of voluntary associations serving a wide range of interests -- was weak in Germany, Austria, and relatively speaking, in Northern and Central Italy. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that in Germany, or at least provincial Protestant Germany, civil society organizations in the early thirties were often taken over by the Nazis.[75] They probably contributed to assure the Nazi hegemony in many communities and ultimately the totalitarian control of society. Perhaps it would be to go too far to argue that a rich civil society network in some countries made totalitarianism possible. At least after taking power, many a-political associations and institutions accommodated to the new regime, elected officers identified with it or acceptable to it, became channels for the regime propaganda. Certainly some resisted the *Gleichschaltung* by dissolving or stopping some of their activities rather than cooperating. If they had not existed they would not have been available to the new rulers.

We cannot ignore either the many voluntary associations of veterans, farmers, cooperatives, liberal professionals in that period, some with large memberships in Italy. Some were authentic social movements outside the party system, hostile to the traditional political class. Others were connected with political parties. They represented a new wave of social participation and mobilization. Were they not part of "civil society"? They also contributed to the social-political climate in which Fascism could emerge and thrive. Not a few of their members would even join the Fascist movement.

Totalitarian movements and regimes, to achieve political mobilization, generated a large number of "voluntary" associations -- formally similar to those of civil society in liberal democracies -- actually controlled and coerced: youth, women, student, leisure, sports, cultural,

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[75] W. S. Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power. The Experience of a Single German Town 1922-1945*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1965. B. Hagtvet, "The Theory of Mass Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic: A Re-Examination", in Larsen, et al., ed., *Who were the Fascists*, op. cit., pp. 66-117.

folk dancing and ecological. Paradoxically, with redemocratization, many democratic parties gave up the sponsoring of such activities, and there is evidence that in Eastern Europe people tired of totalitarian "regimented voluntarism" and were reluctant to participate in free and voluntary associations.[76] The different pattern of voluntary association membership in post-totalitarian and post-authoritarian democracies provides a striking confirmation of the difference between the two types of regimes.

The effort of most authoritarian regimes was directed at destruction of the membership organizations of their opponents, the outlawing of many voluntary groups they distrusted and to limit and control associational life. Associations had to be registered and approved and limits were placed on their efforts to federate or have international links. However, the effort was sometimes futile when with economic and cultural development more people were ready to associate. In other countries civil society organizations being less visible and important, protected by one or another political tendency in the regimes, by the Church, a government bureaucracy, could survive (perhaps with a low profile) as I discovered in my research in Spain. Even in contrast to totalitarian regimes most official associations or party linked did not claim an absolute monopoly. Membership remained basically voluntary and was neither sizeable nor active. Many of the more independent organizations were not politicized and in fact they were politicized by the opposition to the regime when it relaxed its controls.

Charismatic Leadership and Totalitarianism

Charisma is a much abused term.[77] By definition it is exceptional and therefore it should not surprise that most of the leaders of non-democratic regimes were not charismatic. The question is whether only totalitarian leaders were charismatic and if any of the authoritarian leaders were truly charismatic.

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[76] M. Howard, *Demobilized Societies. Understanding the Weakness of Civil Societies in Postcommunist Europe*, Ph.D. in Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1999.

[77] A.R. Willner, *The Spellbinders, Charismatic Political Leadership*, New Haven: Yale, 1984. L. Cavalli, *Il capo carismatico*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1981 and *Carisma e tirannide nel secolo XX. Il caso Hitler*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1982.

We know that some democratic leaders enjoyed a charismatic appeal (Churchill) and moreover thought of themselves as having a charismatic calling (De Gaulle). Authoritarian leaders sometimes assumed charismatic stances in their rhetoric and self-presentation or were presented as such by some of their followers and sycophantic scribes (probably Franco). Nevertheless, the convergence between a sense of their unique calling and an acceptance of large masses of that claim can rarely be found. There is no doubt about Hitler's, Lenin's and probably[78] Mussolini's charismatic authority in the Weberian sense. Almost none of the many authoritarian rulers would be considered charismatic, perhaps with the exception of Marshall Petain briefly after the French defeat, and probably early on, Marshall Pilsudski (although he did not seek to rule directly). The gestures of King Carol, the public presence attempting to link to the tradition of the regent Admiral Horthy, do not fit. Perhaps authoritarian regimes outside of Europe: Perón, Vargas, Nasser and Sukarno would be better candidates to being "charismatic" at some point. Stalin is a complicated case: he probably did not enjoy a charismatic appeal during his ascent to power, nor at the height of his repressive rule, but perhaps gained some as a leader in the patriotic war, and strangely enough, for the communists outside of the USSR.

Personal Rule: Another Dimension?

A great question that must be left open is how and why totalitarian *and* authoritarian regimes, fascist and non-fascists, turned more and more into personalized rule, debilitating the single party, the armed forces, and other institutions controlled by the Establishment. How individuals who not always had the respect and esteem even of those close to them, of those who presumably had still strong power bases and had not lost their critical judgment, could not be challenged once in positions of legally unbound power? Without institutionalized, legally established, or "constitutionalized" restraints on power, they could always substitute any -- even

[78] R. Lepsius, "Das Modell der charismatischen Herrschaft und seine Andwendbarkeit auf den 'Führerstaat' Adolf Hitlers", in M. R. Lepsius, *Demokratie in Deutschland*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck 2, Ruprecht, 1998, pp. 95-118. Nyomarkay, *Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1967. A. Campi, *Mussolini*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001. Although not a scholarly book, the volume edited by J.M. Gironella and R. Borrás Betriú, *100 españoles y Franco*, Barcelona, Planeta, 1979, provides the responses of 100 Spaniards of different positions and backgrounds to questions on Franco. Among those with a favorable response it is infrequent to find any reference to "charisma". A. de Miguel, *Franco, Franco, Franco*, Madrid, Ediciones 99, 1976.

loyal -- critics by more subservient personalities; in the case of the limited pluralism in authoritarian regimes, by cautious and machiavellian coalition politics, or by adroit playing with the rivalries of factional subleaders.

Once power is acquired under a variety of circumstances with ill-defined limits, in the absence of the institutional controls of the liberal-democratic Rechtstaat, tends to perpetuate itself. It does so in the absence of ideological or popular legitimation. Leaders who initially had no political project, perhaps no ambition to gain power, once in power are not inclined to give it up. We are reminded of Lord Acton's dictum of the corrupting impact of power. Probably Päts would be an example: an agrarian party leader, a politician in a democracy, who became president thanks to a constitutional reform proposed by the Veterans movement undertaking a preemptive coup d'état (probably unnecessary) with the support of almost all the parties, and established an authoritarian regime. Even more Franco, who had been placed in power by the circumstances and his peers, victorious in the Civil War, would feel entitled to rule for over 35 years.

The development of our thinking about non-democratic politics by the method of differences from the ideal types of democratic political processes, authoritarian regimes and totalitarianism, inevitably has led us to neglect the dimension of "court politics" of those regimes (incidentally, far from absent in democracies). Another aspect deserving more attention is the room for personal arbitrary power, even in those cases farther from the personal rulership model or the extremes of the regimes I have described as sultanistic. It is no accident that in some cases the common man and we ourselves speak of those regimes labelling them by the name of the leaders, and in others, use a more collective name: "the colonels regime", "the Junta". The revelations about Franco's rule, discounting the self-serving aspect of blaming an individual by those who served him, show the dangers of an analysis of Spanish totalitarianism or authoritarianism "without Franco". My own writings are guilty of this since emphasis on it would have made it more difficult to conceptualize the regime as a whole in its origin and its development, as well as its difference from the totalitarian systems. It was also difficult to know much about the relation of Franco with those surrounding him in the exercise of power.

Without falling into the danger of overrating individual personalities, against which Marx already warned in his critique of Victor Hugo's analysis of Napoleon *le petit* that magnified his role, we cannot get around the problem of personal power. In so doing, we should be careful not to misuse the term charisma, and turn to less lofty bases of power: subservience, flattery, selfishness, corruption, fear, petty rivalries, and above all, ambition, mostly petty, that rulers know so well to exploit and manipulate and that also allow subordinates to manipulate rulers.[79] Our theoretical constructs should not prevent us from being more sensitive to those aspects of politics that seem to be the only ones journalistic accounts and many memoirs capture after the ruler's fall, and for whose more systematic study we have neither concepts, methods nor data. Perhaps the tools of network analysis would help us to better study such apparently less structured politics. Politics in which the autonomy and representativeness of their constituencies, of social forces, (even the military and business) are limited. Historians and the students of politics before the rise of sociological thinking and modern political science, were perhaps better equipped to describe and understand those aspects of power of many regimes and we might profit from their reading. The efforts of some of the officers establishing an authoritarian regime to bind the selection of leaders of the regime to internal procedural rules of the armed forces, reflects their awareness of the risks of electing a *comandante en jefe* with unlimited powers.

While a fascist party allows the personal ruler -- Duce or Führer -- a much greater penetration into the society that can reach totalitarian characteristics, it allows such a regime to appear less as the expression of the arbitrary whim of the ruler (although it normally is) than partyless regimes. In the later regimes, the ruler's "transmission belt" to the society appears as "men of his making", serving a man rather than subjectively believing to serve a movement or an ideology, something that ultimately affects the legitimization of the regime among its own supporters or beneficiaries. Authoritarian regimes with no party or a weak party, can only obtain a certain legitimacy if they can define themselves on the basis of traditional or in more modernized societies, "legal" formal legitimacy, which means bureaucratic and to some extent

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[79] Karl Marx in the Preface to *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, wrote on Victor Hugo's *Napoleon le Petit*: "He sees in it only the violent act of a single individual. He does not notice that he makes this individual great instead of little by ascribing to him a personal power of initiative such as would be without parallel in world history", quoted in J. B. Halsted, ed., *December 2, 1851, Contemporary Writings on the Coup d'Etat of Louis Napoleon*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1972, p. 407.

Rechtsstaat principles, that end limiting personal arbitrary power and can facilitate a transition to liberal-democracy after the demise of the ruler. The different patterns of transition from authoritarianism to democracy, particularly the viability of a *reforma pactada--ruptura pactada* model (like the Spanish) and the developments after the return to democracy, may be related to those differences.[80]

Stability of Regimes

We are unable to answer the question of the stability or instability of the nondemocratic regimes, particularly the degree to which the totalitarian project to transform society could result in greater continuity than the less intrusive authoritarian regimes. War and the defeat by the Allies answered the question without allowing endogenous factors to play out. Only the Soviet Union could be considered a test case since the regime lasted decades and there can be no question about the radical transformation of the society. The regime ultimately developed into post-totalitarian and then disintegrated and collapsed leaving a dismal legacy for the building of democracy. The authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, except Greece, succumbed to the Soviet invasion and satellization, or, in the case of Yugoslavia and Albania, communist revolutionary regimes. There were only two authoritarian rightist regimes that did not participate in the war, Portugal and Spain, and they survived into the seventies. Would the same have been the case for Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and the Baltics without the war? Or even Italy should Mussolini have taken the stance of Franco in World War II, a pretty dubious counterfactual to deserve analysis. We cannot even generalize about the legacy of totalitarianism since a comparison of Soviet and Nazi totalitarianism involves other factors than regime type, and fortunately Hitler's rule lasted only from 1933 to 1945, compared to almost 70 years of Soviet rule.

[80] Linz, and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, op. cit., chap. 4, pp. 55-65. M. R. Thompson, "Weder totalitär noch autoritär . . .", *op. cit*., pp. 309-339.

One test of the degree of commitment to the different regimes could be the response to the imminent defeat in World War II. There is no question that Italian elites, including 19 of the 26 voting in the Grand Consiglio of the Party on July 24, 1943, were not ready to support Mussolini to the bitter end, though the Saló republic could rally still some support. The contrast with Hitler's Germany could not be greater: the 1944 conspiracy did not and could not rally any support, and there were no mutinies nor mass desertions even at the end. Was it due to an identification with the regime, patriotism, or just discipline and fear? Or was it the implications of a Soviet invasion. But then we still would have to ask why resistance on the Western front did not crumble faster. In the other countries in the alliance the authoritarian leaders started seeking peace and surrender, even when more or less numerous forces fought to the end. How many were motivated by the ideological commitment? Or was it fear of retribution for their deeds? All questions deserving a systematic and comparative analysis.

The limited pluralism, the absence of an elaborate and binding ideology and the limited involvement in party penetrated organizations, allows for a much greater space for partial oppositions, semi-opposition and even, in some cases, a-legal but not "legal" opposition.[81] These patterns are not possible in a truly totalitarian regime. The degree of intellectual-ideological debate within, tolerated for considerable time in Fascist Italy (sometimes under the "umbrella" of party leaders or organizations) and non-politicized intellectual life, is one of the reasons to question the fully totalitarian character of the regime.

Fascism and Post-1945 Authoritarian Regimes

The relationship between authoritarian regimes after 1945 and fascism has been the object of considerable polemic. If fascism is defined as any antidemocratic, noncommunist political system, the answer would be simple. If fascism is not a distinctive political movement

[81] Linz, "Opposition in and under an Authoritarian Regime" pp. 171-2598, see pp. 197-199. J. J. Linz, "L'opposizione in un regime autoritario: il caso della Spagna", *Storia contemporanea*, 1, 1, Marzo, 1970, pp. 63-102.

with unique characteristics differentiating it from prefascist, conservative and authoritarian politics emerging in Europe in the interwar years, there is no reason to ask the question. Since, however, we have started from the assumption that there is a specific historical phenomenon that we can call fascism, both fascist movements and fascist regimes, the question continues being relevant.

Even though there have been a number of neo-fascist parties, a few gaining some votes, and a number of neo-fascist organizations, some of them engaging in terrorism, that have contributed to crises of democratic regimes, they have not played major roles in those crises, nor have they led to a takeover of power. Only if we were to consider some extreme right organizations in Argentina fascist organizations and perhaps *Patria y Libertad* in Chile, could one say that fascism is still relevant to the understanding of the breakdown of democracy and the rise of authoritarian regimes.[82]

Since 1945 in no country has there been a fascist mass movement remotely comparable to the NSDAP or even the Italian fascists before 1922 and the Iron Guard in the 30's. The debacle of the war and the horror of Nazism have made any mass appeal of a party identifying itself as a neo-fascist or even resembling in its style and ideology the fascist movement, unattractive.[83] Neo-fascism is a survival. The groups identifying with the symbols of the past are more ridiculous than tragic. This does not mean that certain elements of the fascist heritage will not reappear sometimes in the strangest places. However, this uncanny similarity could not lead us to interpret those movements as fascist, as it is sometimes done with the student radicalism of the 60's, with different terrorist groups of the left, and the ETA in the Basque country. Like the Roman Empire left columns to be picked up by Christians to build Romanic churches and by Moslems to build mosques, scattered pieces of the fascist heritage are being used today because

[82] C. Huneeus, *El régimen de Pinochet*, Santiago de Chile, Editorial Sudamericana Chilena, 2000, see chapter VII, "La elite civil. El 'gremialismo' y el papel de Jaime Guzmán", pp. 327-388, one of the few intellectual elaborations of authoritarianism in Latinamerica in recent decades which, however, did not get institutionalized.

[83] Linz, "Fascism is dead. What legacy did it leave? Thoughts and questions on a problematic period of European history", in Larsen with the assistance of Hagtvet, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-54.

they are found either useful or attractive. But, as we would not call the edifices incorporating Roman stones Roman, we should not call those political phenomena fascist.

It could be argued that while there are no significant fascist movements there are regimes that deserve the name fascist.[84] This depends on how we define the fascist regime, and obviously using certain definitions it is possible to characterize many regimes as fascist. If we consider certain elements distinctive, like the presence of bureaucratic but mobilizational mass membership party with affiliated organizations penetrating the society as part of a fascist regime, that identification becomes questionable. Indeed, authoritarian regimes today make a deliberate effort not to include in their ideology, style, rhetoric and organization, those elements that can easily be identified as fascist. They claim with more or less sincerity -- generally less -- to be temporary responses to the crisis of a society, to be regimes d'exception, to make the return to democracy, a renewed democracy, possible. This commitment independently of its sincerity implies a fundamental weakness in their legitimation, even for their own supporters, and is an important factor in their instability and the processes of redemocratization that took place in South America. In contrast to the true fascist regimes they do not claim to be the wave of the future, to represent an historical breakthrough, an alternative to democracy and communism whose example will be followed everywhere. Their claim is to be the solution for their particular society in a particular moment. While in the 30s even the non-fascist authoritarian regimes made an effort to appear to be fascist and were characterized by a mimetism of those purely fascist, authoritarian regimes today adopt pseudo-or semi-democratic forms.

The fact that no leading nation in terms of power, economic success, cultural creativity and military strength has chosen the authoritarian path and can be taken as a model, creates for the authoritarian regimes (with the exception perhaps of Iran) a totally different situation than in the 20's and 30's when two great countries like Italy and later Germany were models.

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[84] On the use of the fascist label for contemporary authoritarian regimes, see the excellent discussion by H. Trinidade in "La question du fascisme en Amerique Latine", *Revue Francaise de Science Politique*, 33, 1983, pp. 281-312 and E.García Méndez, "La teoria del Estado en América Latina: modelo para armar", *Sistema*, 60-61, 1983, pp. 21-36, particularly pp. 24-29.

None of the authoritarian regimes today has developed an ideology and institutional organizational forms that would serve as a functional equivalent to those of fascism in the 20's and 30's. The death of fascism therefore is an important factor in the weakness, the ambiguity and the constant contradictions in the non-communist authoritarian regimes. It is no accident that none of them has attracted outside of its borders enthusiastic supporters among youth, students and distinguished intellectuals as fascist regimes did in the past. Fascism is negatively relevant to our understanding of those regimes.

There are, however, good reasons why the opponents tend to see them and interpret them as fascist, though very often using expressions like dependent fascism, neo-fascism, military fascism, etc. I suspect that those designations, like those of organic, tutelary, basic, popular democracy, only serve to hide the fact that they are not the same thing, even though one would wish to think for political or intellectual reasons that they are. To interpret these regimes as fascist makes easier their delegitimization and to mobilize the opposition of those who know little about them; but there are also serious disadvantages intellectually and even politically in so doing. Such a conceptualization contributes to a lack of understanding of the nature of those regimes, of their sources of weakness, of their internal dynamics, of the opportunities for political action of the opposition and often to perplexity when faced with their evolution. Without ignoring the similarities in some respects -- and I do not mean only their repressive character -- I feel that to apply the analysis of fascist regimes to the authoritarian regimes today can be intellectually and even politically misleading.

We should not be guided by the emphasis on repression and terror since those are phenomena we find in many non-democratic regimes with intensity and forms that do not seem to be systematically related to the more or less fascist, even the more or less totalitarian character of the regimes. There can be little doubt that Mussolini's Italy was closer to the ideal model of fascism and totalitarianism than Franco's Spain, but that repression in Spain was more brutal. Therefore, to question the usefulness of the fascist conceptualization of authoritarian regimes today is in no way to question their repressive character and the moral indignation that it deserves.

Conclusion

Our effort to link some of the most complex issues in the study of politics outside of stable democracies should have several functions: 1) to highlight the need for more careful description, better data, and more precise conceptualization; 2) to call attention to the weaknesses of interpretations based on a "functionalist" approach centered on the crisis leading to the establishment of non-democratic regimes, on assumed motives of the social actors, and on presumed needs of the "system", in explaining the differences between authoritarian regimes and the role of fascist movements and ideological elements; and 3) to note the relevance of those elements to the problems of consolidation, legitimation, crisis, breakdown and transition to democracy.

Even though we have not gone into the problem of the appeal of fascism, we should not forget the mobilization of idealism that fascism achieved in the interwar years among the young, students, even intellectuals of standing, that fortunately contemporary authoritarian opponents of democracy on the right and authoritarian regimes have not attained.

Too many problems in the study of non-democratic politics remain unexplored and, among them, the explanation of the extent and patterns of violence and repression and the inhuman forms it has taken is foremost on the agenda. The distinction of totalitarian systems and authoritarian regimes in my view does not provide us with a full answer, nor do we have an explanation why even autocratic and non-democratic regimes in the 19th century showed a respect for political opponents that in the 20th has been lost, why some regimes content themselves with using coertion rationally and others condone unnecessary vengeance and brutality against fellow humans. There is need for a much more systematic comparative analysis of the variety of forms and intensity of state repression and terrorism, brutality and horror, which might reveal factors not directly related to a typology of regimes or ideologies.

The study of the short twentieth century, fascism and communism, the breakdown of democracy, totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, should and can contribute to a positive commitment to democracy, the *Rechtstaat*, freedom and liberal values, competitive party politics reflecting the plurality of interests and values, respect for the proper place of religion and the Churches, the role of the market, entrepreneurs, trade unions, interest groups, in summary, the complexity of society that totalitarians wanted to destroy and authoritarians to limit. The defense of a society in which, to use a phrase of a Catalan and Spanish politician- intellectual (in his critique of the nationalisms born of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) "nobody was happy but nobody in despair ".[85]

[85] Francesc Cambó, *Meditacions. Dietari (1936-1940)*, Barcelona, Alpha, 1982, pp. 574-575.