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**HOW DO LABOUR MARKET EXPERIENCES
AFFECT POLITICAL ATTITUDES?**

**ANALYSING THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF
LABOUR MARKET DUALISATION IN SPAIN**

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the effects of labour market dualisation in Spain on political attitudes. It explores the extent to which the very high levels of labour market precarity attached to fixed-term contracts in Spain might have led to 1) political radicalisation; 2) political apathy; 4) electoral abstention and 3) punishment voting against the incumbent party. The research is based on a survey undertaken in 1995 by the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research on a representative sample of 4,000 adults. Our analysis shows that labour market experiences in the flexible segment of the Spanish labour market might have had significant effects on political attitudes and electoral behaviour. These effects are largely mediated by ideological maps. Further research on the micro mechanisms that link labour market experiences to attitudinal outcomes casts doubts as to the importance of economic deprivation in the causal process. Our analysis suggests that it is rather the experience of labour insecurity per se that triggers attitudinal effects. It is hoped that this paper will generate discussion on the formation of new political cleavages in Spain and that it will contribute to further our understanding of the mechanisms that link labour market experiences to attitudinal outcomes.

Introduction¹

In 1984 the first Socialist government of Spanish contemporary democracy undertook a major reform of the labour market in a bid to reduce unemployment, which had just surpassed the 20 per cent level. The flexibilisation strategy implemented in the 1984 labour market reform --which was reinforced through further legislative changes in 1992, 1993 and 1994-- constitutes a prototypical case of what Esping-Andersen (1998) has recently labelled as *two-tier selective labour market policy*. Two-tier selective policies de-regulate conditions only for some workers but not for others. In the Spanish case, flexibilisation was exclusively applied to new entrants in the labour market via the introduction of fixed-term contracts. Yet workers on permanent contracts continued to enjoy the privileges of a rigid employment security legislation inherited from the Franco regime, which makes their dismissal comparatively very costly for employers.

The introduction of fixed-term contracts in the Spanish labour market has had important consequences for the mechanisms of employment adjustment. Fixed-term contracts in Spain have become the principal channel of entry into employment and also the principal channel of exit from employment to unemployment. For instance, our own analysis of the Spanish Labour Force Survey has shown that 89 per cent of all contracts signed in 1995 were fixed-term, and that 83 per cent of all job-losses amongst salaried employees between 1994 and 1995 were due to the termination of fixed-term contracts (see: Polavieja 1998a, 1999a). The average duration of fixed-term contracts in Spain is only around 12 months (see: Polavieja 1999a), whilst the proportion of fixed-term contracts that are eventually converted into permanent ones is less than 12 per cent per year (see for example Alba 1997; Güell-

¹ The author wishes to thank Fran McGinnity, Lucinda Platt, Ilcheong Yi and Gorana Djoric for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper presented at the *Oxford Sociology Graduate Student Research Seminar*. I am also grateful to Modesto Escobar and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, of the Juan March Institute, and to David Firth, Sophocles Mavroeidis and Susanne Choi, Nuffield College, for providing helpful comments and criticisms. Some of the hypotheses tested in this paper were previously presented at the *Harvard-Oxford-Stockholm Graduate Student Conference*, Harvard University, April 9-11 1999. This paper in its current version was presented at the *IV Congreso Español de Ciencia Política y de La Administración*, Granada, September 30th-October 2nd 1999. I am grateful to all the participants at the workshop on electoral behaviour for their comments and in particular to Mariano Torcal who was the discussant of the session.

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Rollan and Petrongolo 1998). Thus fixed-term workers in Spain constitute a very flexible segment of the labour market in which the brunt of transitions between employment and unemployment takes place at a quite rapid pace. The flexible segment is also very large in Spain as fixed-term workers account for one third of the employed workforce. In sharp contrast to this flexible segment, permanent workers constitute a rather rigid labour market segment, where access is limited and where exits to unemployment are rare. For instance, in 1995 only around 11 per cent of all contracts signed were permanent and only around 17 per cent all the job losses amongst salaried employees that occurred that year corresponded to the termination of permanent contracts. The average duration of permanent contracts in Spain is around 12 years (see: Polavieja 1999a).

In sum, the particular characteristics of the labour market flexibilisation strategy implemented in Spain have implied that employment adjustments have been concentrated on fixed-term workers, whilst the high levels of employment protection of permanent workers have remained largely untouched. As a result, the labour market has segmented along the lines of an insider-outsider divide. Unemployment risks are clearly distributed according to which type of contract the worker has.

This paper follows up on previous research on the attitudinal consequences of type-of-contract segmentation in Spain. Our previous research has shown that both unemployed workers and workers on fixed-term contracts in Spain show significantly lower levels of pro-union behaviour and subjective identification with unions than workers on permanent contracts. Outsiders in the Spanish labour market thus seem to blame the trade unions for not representing their interests. Our analysis has also shown that this attitudinal impact of labour market precarity is mediated by ideological maps, being actually stronger precisely amongst those holding leftist or pro-worker views. This latter phenomenon has been explained as the result of *expectation-disillusion* mechanisms (see: Polavieja 1999a).

These findings encourage us to explore the extent to which the labour market precarity attached to fixed-term work might also influence attitudes towards party politics. Does labour

market segmentation also have an impact on general attitudes towards the political system? Does it affect voting behaviour? And, if so, which are the mechanisms whereby labour market experiences affect political attitudes?

What follows here is a first attempt to tackle these questions. In so doing, we hope to provide further empirical evidence on the attitudinal effects of labour market segmentation in the Spanish case and to advance our general understanding of the processes that link labour market experiences to socio-political attitudes.

The paper is divided into three sections. In Section One, we discuss the main working-hypotheses that guide this research. In Section Two, we test the hypotheses that labour market precarity could increase political radicalisation and favour political disaffection. Finally, Section Three explores the impact of labour market dualisation on voting behaviour and tests the hypotheses that labour market insecurity attached to fixed-term work could have encouraged electoral abstention and favoured *punishment voting* against the incumbent party.

THE DATA

Our analysis is based on the original exploitation of a survey on Political Culture carried out in April 1995 by the *Spanish Centre for Sociological Research* (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) on a representative sample of 4,000 adults. The survey includes 1060 wage earners and 409 unemployed with previous job experience. Of the employed wage earners, 778 are employed on permanent contracts and 413 are employed on fixed-term contracts. 282 of the unemployed respondents are unemployed as a result of the termination of their fixed-term contracts, whilst 127 held a permanent contract in their last job. At the time the survey took place, the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), which had been in power for thirteen years, after winning four consecutive elections (1982,1986,1989,1993), was only a

few months away from electoral defeat to the conservatives of the Popular Party (PP). This makes the data on vote intention particularly interesting².

SECTION ONE: Working Hypotheses

In this section we present a simple theoretical working-framework consisting of two general hypotheses regarding the effects of labour market *precarity* on political attitudes, two general hypotheses regarding its effects on voting behaviour, and a simple causal model that establishes certain assumptions on the role that household income and general ideological maps might play in mediating the impact of labour market experiences on political attitudes and voting behaviour.

Hypotheses on political attitudes

There are two *classical* views about the effects of labour market insecurity on political attitudes. The first suggests that labour market insecurity --unemployment in particular-- provokes political radicalisation, leading to a greater support for unconventional and direct forms of political action. According to this view, labour insecurity would make individuals more willing to support radical measures for social change and more prone to identify with extremist political ideologies. This radicalisation hypothesis was the view defended for instance by Kornhouser (1960), Leggett (1964) or Giddens (1973) (for more recent formulations see: Banks and Ullah 1987, 209-13 in de Witte 1992a; Banks 1990 in de Witte 1992b; Offe 1986; López-Aranguren 1988; Golding and Middleton 1982 in Gallie and Vogler 1994, 299; Gallie 1988, 1993; Paugam 1998).

² The questionnaire and research design of the survey was drawn up by José María Maravall. The

The second view, in contrast, emphasises that the main effect of labour market insecurity is political apathy. According to this second view, the experiences of labour market insecurity would increase disaffection with the political system, which would be viewed as largely insensitive to (or incapable of meeting) the needs of those unemployed or insecurely employed. Yet the outcome this time would not be political radicalisation but political indifference, fatalism, cynicism and quiescence (see for example: Johoda, Lazarsfeld and Zeizel 1972; Scholzman and Verba 1979; Marshall et al. 1988; Gaskell and Smith 1981, 190; Feather 1982; Fonk and Van Deun 1983 in de Witte 1992a, 135 Gallie 1993; Paugam 1998).

These two basic hypotheses will be tested in Section Two.

Hypothesis on voting behaviour

If labour market precarity generates disaffection with the political system, it is reasonable to assume that it will also increase the chances of electoral abstention (see: Scholzman and Verba 1979 in Lewin 1991; Paugam 1998). This will be our first hypothesis regarding the electoral effects of labour market dualisation in Spain.

Also, to the extent that labour market dualisation influences electoral choices, those negatively affected by its consequences could in principle have blamed the Socialist government for its labour market policies and thus could have been more willing to give their support to the opposition (see: Maravall and Fraile 1998). If this phenomenon has taken place *within* the *natural* ideological sphere of influence of the Socialists Party (that is, left-wing voters) we will refer to it as a *punishment effect*. Left-wing (and/or ex-socialist) voters in the

flexible segment of the Spanish labour market could have been willing to *punish* the socialists for its labour market policies³ by voting for the conservatives in the opposition.

These two hypotheses will be tested in Section Three.

A simple model regarding mediating mechanisms

These general working-hypotheses can help us guide our exploration of the data. Yet it should be clear from the outset that we do not expect to find a homogenous type of response to the same labour market experiences for this would be too mechanistic and unrealistic outcome to expect. In our view, the intensity of the impact of labour market precarity on political attitudes and on voting behaviour will depend on at least two other factors:

First, the likelihood that the experience of labour market precarity (and the potential labour market interests they entail) shape political views and affect voting choices might depend upon the centrality that an individual's labour market position has on her material well-being. The more an individual's life-chances depend on her own personal labour market situation, the more likely it should be that these experiences become ideologically relevant to her. Here, family structures and welfare provision schemes might be crucial, since by providing alternative sources of income, they might ease the impact of labour market insecurity on life-chances and thus soften its possible attitudinal effects (see: Boix 1996,241-6; Maravall 1997, 95-98 in Maravall and Fraile 1998,25-6; Polavieja 1999b).

³ Despite the fact that there is still little empirical evidence at the individual level on the attitudinal effects of labour market insecurity in Spain, recent analyses of the political effects of unemployment seem to suggest that unemployed voters might have indeed been less likely to vote for the Socialist Party (the incumbent party until the last 1996 national elections) than employed voters of the same characteristics (see: González 1998; González Álvarez 1998; Maravall and Fraile 1998). These findings, although not totally conclusive, encourage us to test the punishment effect hypothesis.

Secondly, general ideological maps acquired through processes of political socialisation that take place outside the labour market will inform individuals' opinions on different political issues to a larger extent than (and independently of) their own labour market experiences. Apart from having a direct effect (probably the most important one) on political attitudes and voting choices, these general ideological maps can predispose the individual to be more or less sensitive to her location in the labour market. Ideology therefore could be key in determining the importance that the individual gives to her own labour market situation as a factor informing her general political views (see for example Maravall and Przeworski 1998). Ideology, in other words, is also expected to mediate the impact of labour market insecurity on political attitudes and voting behaviour. Interaction effects between general ideological maps and labour market insecurity on political attitudes and voting behaviour are expected, since there is no reason to assume (as most theoretical models actually do) that ideology and labour market insecurity act in an additive manner. (Notice that the punishment effect hypothesis implies explicitly an interaction effect between ideology and labour market situation. See Section Three).

This section has provided us with a basic theoretical framework and a set of working hypotheses with which to test it. Let us now proceed to test the model.

SECTION TWO: The effects of labour market segmentation by type of contract on political attitudes. Testing the radicalisation and apathy hypotheses

H1 Testing the radicalisation hypothesis

The 1995 SCSR survey on political culture includes only two indicators relevant for the testing of the radicalisation hypothesis. Although both of these indicators seem appropriate for testing this hypothesis, they do not exhaust the possibilities of research on

radicalisation. It should also be noted that both indicators as they appear in the questionnaire pose some technical problems as to the fitting of statistical models, all of which advises us to be a little more cautious than usual in the interpretation of our results.

Radicalisation of attitudes regarding social change

The first indicator of radicalisation in the SCSR survey is a question in which respondents are asked to reveal their opinions regarding the necessary level of transformation that Spanish society requires. The following four possible answers are offered: 1 “*Society is all right as it is*”; 2, “*Society can improve with minor changes*”, 3 “*Society needs deep reform*”; and 4 “*Society must be radically changed*”. We believe answers to this question provide a valid and reliable measure of radicalisation.

Ordered categorical responses of this kind are not accurately modelled using OLS regression because of the non-interval nature of the response variable (the spacing of the outcomes cannot be assumed to be uniform, particularly when, as is the case, the variable only has four possible values). On the other hand, multinomial logit regression would not be extremely appropriate either, since it does not account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable (that is, a multinomial model would not use all of the information available in the variable). Thus in order to test the radicalisation hypothesis on our first indicator of the the SCSR survey, we have fitted *ordinal logit* equations to our data. *Ordinal logit* models are an extension of binary-outcome logistic models. They are more appropriate for modelling ordered Likert-type responses than either OLS or multinomial regressions (see: Greene 1990; Liao 1994). The interpretation of the estimated coefficients of the ordinal logit is rather straightforward, not different from the interpretation of the coefficients of a binary logit model (for the technical statistical aspects of ordinal logit models see: Liao 1994,37-48).

Table 1 shows the results of three nested ordinal logit regressions on our first radicalisation indicator. Model A predicts that radicalisation depends on education, ideology and labour market situation, and controls for age and gender. The education scale is that used in the Casmin project (see: Polavieja 1998b) used here as a continuous interval scale (results do not change if the educational scale is introduced as a set of dummies). Previous models controlled by class, but the influence of class disappeared altogether once education was introduced in the equation. It seems thus that higher levels of education make people more critical of the social system and thus more prone to express the necessity of radical transformation. Model A also suggests that, irrespectively of the level of education, the experience of unemployment has a radicalising impact for those workers who find themselves unemployed due to the termination of their fixed-term contracts. Yet no radicalising effect seems significant for employed fixed-term workers nor for unemployed workers coming from permanent contracts. Notice, lastly, that model A also tests a linear relation between ideology, measured in a ten-point-interval-left-to-right scale, and our indicator of radicalisation, which could lead us to conclude that the radicalising effects of unemployment for fixed-term workers is independent of ideological maps.

We are, however, rather sceptical of the supposition that the effect of ideology is linear (in particular when it points in the direction of an increase as respondents move to the ideological right). Actually, it seems conceptually more plausible to assume a convex curvilinear relation between ideology and radicalisation, whereby those in both extremes of the ideological spectrum would show higher levels of radicalisation than those holding more moderated political views. Model B tests this curvilinear hypothesis against model A. Since the coefficient of the quadratic term is positive and highly significant, it can be concluded that the expected convex relation between ideology and the radicalisation indicator finds indeed empirical support⁴. Model B is a better description of the data than model A. Model B does

⁴ To avoid a strong correlation between ideology and its squared term, the ideological scale has been centred (that is, it has been re-coded so that the mean value of the old scale coincides with value 0 in the new one). The square term is the square of the re-coded variable centred around 0. We have followed the same procedure for all the tests of curvilinear relationships in the paper (see below).

not alter our conclusions regarding the radicalising impact of unemployment for fixed-term workers.

Table 1. Ordinal Logit Regressions on Opinions Towards Social Change

MODELS Explanatory variables	OPINIONS TOWARDS SOCIAL CHANGE		
	Coeff.	Sig.	Models' Characteristics
A Age Female Educational Level Scale (Casmin) Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent) Employed Fixed-Term Unemployed Fixed-Term Unemployed Permanent Ideology (L-R)	.006 .13 .10 .20 .41 .31 .077	n.s. n.s. **** n.s. ** n.s. ***	Ordered logit estimates: Number of obs = 1314 LR chi2(7) = 31.45 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Log likelihood = -1391.5349 Ancillary parameters: _cut1 -2.515644 .3100006 _cut2 .1909324 .2831661 _cut3 2.874466 .2969147
B Age Female Educational Level Scale (Casmin) Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent) Employed Fixed-Term Unemployed Fixed-Term Unemployed Permanent Ideology (L-R) Squared Ideology	.007 .17 .10 .21 .38 .25 .084 .046	n.s. n. s. **** n.s. ** n.s. *** ****	Ordered logit estimates: Number of obs = 1314 LR chi2(8) = 49.39 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Log likelihood = -1382.5634 Ancillary parameters: _cut1 -2.279278 .3153095 _cut2 .4361453 .2897649 _cut3 3.15267 .3057338
C Age Female Educational Level Scale (Casmin) Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent) Employed Fixed-Term Unemployed Fixed-Term Unemployed Permanent Ideology (L-R) Squared Ideology Interaction Labour Market S.*Squared Ideology Squared Ideology*Employed Fixed-Term Squared Ideology*Unemployed Fixed-Term Squared Ideology*Unemployed Permanent	.007 .18 .10 .29 .64 .57 .085 .072 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07	n.s. n.s. **** *(.09) *** ** *** **** n.s. ** **	Ordered logit estimates: Number of obs = 1314 LR chi2(8) = 56.17 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Log likelihood = -1379.1753 Ancillary parameters: _cut1 -2.181837 .3192217 _cut2 .5373676 .2945681 _cut3 3.265152 .310969 Comparing Model C against Model B: Ologit: likelihood-ratio test chi2(3)= 6.78 Prob > chi2 = 0.0794
D Age Female Educational Level Scale (Casmin) Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent) Employed Fixed-Term Unemployed Fixed-Term Unemployed Permanent Ideology (L-R) Squared Ideology Interaction Labour Market S.*Squared Ideology Squared Ideology*Employed Fixed-Term Squared Ideology*Unemployed Fixed-Term Squared Ideology*Unemployed Permanent Household Income	.005 .22 .13 .19 .74 .49 .11 .08 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07	n.s. *(.10) **** *(.09) *** ** *** **** n.s. *(.06) n.s. n.s.	Ordered logit estimates: Number of obs = 1032 LR chi2(12) = 61.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Log likelihood = -1078.8424 Ancillary parameters: _cut1 -2.424862 .4009717 _cut2 .3643036 .3737246 _cut3 3.074606 .3888079

****sig. = 0.000 ***sig. ≤ 0.01 **sig. ≤ 0.05 *sig. approximately 0.10 (significance level in parenthesis)

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995. (Calculated by the author)

But what about ideological mediation? Can we assume that the effects of ideological maps and labour market experiences on attitudes towards social change work in an additive manner? We think there are *a priori* no reasons to make such an assumption. Why should the experience of labour market precarity be able to change the attitudes of a leftwing or a rightwing *extremist* to the same extent that it changes the attitudes of a more moderated person? If fact, one could argue that the impact of labour market precarity should be less strong precisely amongst ideological *extremists* since these respondents are, by virtue of their ideologies, *already* more prone to believe in the necessity of radical social change (that is, they are already radical irrespective of their own labour market situation). In contrast, the impact of precarity could be stronger amongst moderated respondents who are not a priori particularly radical and for whom personal experiences in the labour market could make much more of a difference. Or to put it rather differently, one could expect that variation in our response variable by ideology was greater amongst insider workers precisely because their personal experiences in the labour market are not a source of distress. Yet ideological variation in the responses to our dependent variable could be less pronounced amongst outsider workers since, in this case, not only ideological extremists, but also moderated respondents, could be more willing to support societal change. What any of these two complementary views actually predicts is, in other words, the existence of an interaction effect between ideological extremism and labour market situation. Ideological extremism is represented in the equations by the quadratic term since this term actually measures the *distance* from the ideological centre.

Model C in Table 1 tests this hypothesised interaction effect and indeed finds empirical evidence that seems to support it. Accounting for an interaction term seems to improve our understanding of the causal processes and therefore helps us to obtain a better picture of the structure of the data than previous models. At a level of confidence of 92 per cent we can assume that Model C is a better explanation of the data than model B (see likelihood ratio test in Table 1). Model C finds significant radicalising effects associated to the experience of unemployment. It also suggests that both in the case of unemployed workers coming from fixed-term work and unemployed workers coming from permanent work

ATTITUDES FAVOURABLE TO
RADICAL SOCIAL CHANGE

Unemployed FT

Unemployed PC

Employed FT

Employed PC

Areas of non-significant differences

Left Centre Right IDEOLOGY

Model C gives empirical support to our hypothesis that ideological maps mediate the attitudinal effects of labour market experiences. We also expected that these experiences were mediated by the economic situation of the household. Yet model D shows that household income is not significantly related to the social change indicator. We certainly cannot reject the null hypothesis that household income is irrelevant to the model. Household income is

measured in the data set as the respondent-reported total disposable net monthly income that is brought to the household by all its members (the respondent included) and for all concepts. Thus it seems that whatever it is that makes unemployed workers more likely to support radical social change is not related to the economic situation of their households. We shall return to this point.

Direct action

The radicalisation hypothesis also predicts greater support for direct measures of political action. The SCSR survey on Political Culture includes one set of five questions which might allow us to test this prediction. In these questions, respondents are asked to state whether they approve or disapprove of the following actions as a means of political protest: 1 “*illegal strikes*”; 2 “*disruption of road traffic*”; 3 “*street graffiti*”; 4 “*occupation of factories or buildings*”; and 5 “*causing damage to things (cars, shop windows, buildings, etc...)*”. Maximum likelihood factor analysis has been undertaken to test whether these indicators form part of a single latent variable or dimension. Factor analysis shows that, with the exception of opinions on street graffiti, the rest of the variables are clearly related to each other and form indeed part of the same ideological dimension (results are available for the interested reader). Notice that all the variables in the factor imply the possibility of the use of violence. Do labour market experiences related to the type-of-contract segmentation process affect this ideological dimension?

In order to answer this question, we have constructed an index combining the responses to the variables above referred as 1, 2, 4 and 5 (that is, all but the one referring to street graffiti). Opinions favourable to any of the four questions have been coded +1, whilst opinions against have been coded -1. Re-coded opinions have then been added up. The resulting variable is a 9-point-interval scale that ranges from -4 to +4. Cronbach’s reliability test for the variables that form the index has yielded an Alpha coefficient of value 0.83.

The use of this index as a continuous variable, however, poses a serious problem for the fitting of OLS models (the most reasonable option for this type of variable), because frequencies decrease dramatically as we move up in the scale (almost 70 per cent of all responses are concentrated in the two lower intervals, whereas only less than 1 per cent can be found in the two higher ones). This total lack of normality in the distribution of responses in the index is due to the small proportion of respondents who declare themselves favourable to any of the direct action measures that form the scale⁵. This makes the use of the index as a continuous variable, and thus the fitting of OLS regression models, rather problematic. To overcome these difficulties, we have dichotomised the index. Respondents with negative scores have been coded as 0 (anti-direct action responses), and respondents with positive scores have been coded as 1 (pro-direct action responses)⁶. 82 per cent of respondents are classified as holding anti-direct action views, whilst the remaining 18 per cent have been classified as holding pro-direct action views. Dichotomisation allows us to fit a series of logistic regressions on the probability of holding pro-direct action opinions and thus to test an important assumption of the radicalisation hypothesis.

At first sight, it would seem as if labour market situation did not have any impact on the chances of legitimising the use of direct means of action. Model A shows that these opinions are more likely to be found amongst youngsters, the educated, and those holding a leftist ideology, but that one's position in the labour market seems utterly irrelevant to the dependent variable. Our discussion on the mediating role of ideologies, however, should make us particularly cautious about the accuracy of this model for, as we have argued, to suppose linear and additive relations between ideology, labour market experiences and attitudinal outcomes can be a highly over-simplified assumption. The apparent lack of significance of the labour market variable in the additive model could actually hide real causal effects if the actual causal relation between ideology and legitimisation of direct action

⁵ Gallie found a similar distribution of "radicalised" respondents in the British case using data from the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative project. See: Gallie 1993.

⁶ Respondents who scored 0 have been included in the pro-action value, as they must at least have been favourable to one of the four direct action measures.

was curvilinear or if the likelihood of labour market effects occurring depended itself on respondents' general ideological maps.

Thus we have first tested whether the linear effect of ideology on the dependent variable is indeed a good description of the causal effect of ideology as model A presupposes. A quadratic term of ideology has been introduced in the regression to test a possible convex relationship between ideology and holding favourable opinions on direct action. However, this time the curvilinear hypothesis has been rejected (results are not shown but are available for the interested reader). The chances of favouring direct means of action seem indeed to be linearly related to leftist views.

Table 2. *Logistic regression on the probability of supporting direct means of action*


MODELS	Odds Ratio	Sig.	Models' Characteristics
A			
Age	.97	***	N = 1041
Female	1.16	n.s.	LR Chi2(8) = 97.82
Educational Level Scale (Casmin)	1.09	**	Pseudo R2= 0.0865
Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent)			Log Likelihood = -516.75432
Employed Fixed-Term	.82	n.s.	Goodness of fit Test:
Unemployed Fixed-Term	1.36	n.s.	Prob>Chi2= 0.5327
Unemployed Permanent	1.14	n.s.	Sensitivity 63.79%
Household Income	1.02	n.s.	Specificity 62.66%
Ideology (L-R)	.71	***	Correctly class. 62.92% (Cutoff (.24))
B			
Age	.97	***	N = 1041
Female	1.18	n.s.	LR Chi2(11) = 114.87
Educational Level Scale (Casmin)	1.10	**	Pseudo R2= 0.1015
Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent)			Log Likelihood = -508.23295
Employed Fixed-Term	1.28	n..s.	Goodness of fit Test:
Unemployed Fixed-Term	2.19	**	Prob>Chi2= 0.4678
Unemployed Permanent	1.63	n.s.	Sensitivity 68.31%
Household Income	1.01	n.s.	Specificity 62.28%
Ideology (L-R)	.56	***	Correctly class. 63.69% (Cutoff (.24))
Interaction: Ideology*Labour Market Situation			Likelihood ratio Test of Model B
Ideology*Employed Fixed-Term	1.43	**	against Model A:
Ideology*Unemployed Fixed-Term	1.55	***	Prob > chi2 = 0.0007
Ideology* Unemployed Permanent	1.35	*(.06)	

****sig. = 0.000 ***significance ≤ 0.001 **significance ≤ 0.05 *significance ≤ 0.07 (Significance level in parenthesis) SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995. (Calculated by the author)

As to the interaction effect, we have checked whether the linear impact of ideology on the support for direct action is the same for all labour market situations, which of course is the same as testing whether labour market experiences have the same impact for individuals of different ideologies. As Model B shows, the results suggest that there is indeed a significant interaction effect between ideology and labour market experiences on the dependent variable. For all outsider categories (and in particular for those associated with fixed-term work) ideology has much less of a mediating role on the chances of favouring direct political action. Likelihood-ratio test of model B against model A shows at a total level of confidence that model B is a statistically better model than model A ($\text{Prob} > \chi^2 = 0.0007$).

What model B shows is that the impact of being in the flexible segment of the Spanish labour market on our second indicator of radicalisation is mediated by ideological maps being actually significantly stronger on the right side of the ideological spectrum. Both rightwing fixed-term workers, rightwing unemployed workers coming from fixed-term work, and rightwing unemployed workers coming from permanent employment show significantly higher chances of being in favour of direct political action than their rightwing permanently employed counterparts. Yet the experiences of labour market precarity do not seem to increase support for direct action amongst leftwing respondents. A different way of interpreting this interaction is noticing that the impact of ideology on the dependent variable decreases as we move away from the core of stable employment. The lowest impact of ideology on the dependent variable is found amongst the unemployed coming from fixed-term work, followed by fixed-term workers, and by unemployed workers coming from permanent employment. In other words, ideological considerations, although still very important, have a lesser impact on the dependent variable for respondents that lack permanent contracts. Figure 2 provides the reader with a graphical representation of these effects described by Model B.

FIGURE 2. *The interaction effect between Ideology, Labour Market Situation and opinions supporting Direct Means of Political Action according to Model B in Table 2*



Our models also suggest that the mechanisms provoking this form of radicalisation amongst rightwing respondents are not related to household income. Economic deprivation fails again to explain why some respondents are in favour of direct action and others against it.

In spite of some technical difficulties with our indicators⁷, and keeping in mind that other variables could provide further testing for the radicalisation hypothesis, our statistical

⁷ Namely, that it is difficult to assess the goodness of fit of our ordinal logit models; and that using a binary response indicator for the direct action variable implies the possibility of losing some information regarding the 'intensity' of the effect. This intensity could be better captured with an OLS model, which would be the most logical statistical option if the distribution of the continuous index approached some normality.

In order to assess the goodness of fit of our final ordinal logit model, we have fitted an OLS model to the dependent variable (treated as continuous) and then we have tested its goodness of fit using our usual statistical package. The OLS regression fitted the data reasonably well and no important changes occurred in the significance of the explanatory variables in comparison with our ordinal logit model. Thus we have assumed that our ordinal logit should be reasonably well fitted.

analysis leads us to conclude that the radicalisation hypothesis cannot be rejected with the SCSR data. What finds no convincing support is the assumption that labour market experiences could have a radicalising impact that is independent of the different ideological lenses individuals use to see the world through. Models *controlling for* ideology fail to account for the fact that similar labour market experiences can have very different attitudinal effects depending on respondents' ideological maps. Non-linear causality and interaction effects have proved to be empirically fruitful. Our discussion on the mediating role of ideology has found empirical support in the analysis of radicalisation processes.

Yet our analysis on the impact of household income on the radicalisation indicators have shown that, contrary to our expectations, the processes of ideological radicalisation of outsiders seem not to be related to the economic deprivation attached to labour market precarity. Interaction effects between household income and labour market situation on the radicalisation indicators have been tested and rejected so that the lack of significance of the income variable cannot be attributable to interaction effects. Household income seems indeed rather irrelevant to the mechanisms of attitudinal radicalisation. We shall go back to these points in the following discussion of our findings regarding the apathy hypothesis.

H2 Testing the apathy hypothesis

Being a survey on political culture, the SCSRS includes several indicators that could in principle be used to test the hypothesis that the labour market precarity attached to fixed-term employment could enhance political apathy. Our first task, therefore, consist of discriminating amongst these different possible indicators as to find valid and reliable

Finally, a note of caution on the use of quadratic models is provided by Agresti and Finlay (1997, 549-50). As these authors reminds us, interaction effects in a polynomial model might run against the principle of parsimony because they make models particularly difficult to interpret. This risk is aggravated in the case of ordinal logit models for which we have only been able to assess the goodness of fit by approximation as explained above.

measures to test the hypothesised effects. Further conceptual clarification can help us to better determine which type of indicators we should be looking for.

In a recent article, Montero, Gunther and Torcal (1998) have defended the theoretical and empirical usefulness of distinguishing attitudes on democratic legitimacy from attitudes on political discontent and disaffection. Understood in a *minimalist* fashion, democratic legitimacy is defined by the authors as the belief that the democratic regime, no matter how imperfect, is always preferable to an authoritarian one (see: Linz 1978,16 and 1988,65 in Montero, Gunther and Torcal 1998,12). *Political disaffection* is however, according to the authors, a rather more complex concept that includes at least two different dimensions. The first dimension of political disaffection is subjective (the authors speak of 'psychological') political involvement. *Subjective political involvement* is defined as interest for politics and frequency of political discussion in primary groups (friends, relatives, work mates...). The second dimension of disaffection is *political efficacy*, which refers specifically to feelings of political alienation and powerlessness. Within this latter dimension, the authors further distinguish between *internal* and *external* efficacy. *Internal efficacy* refers to the assessment of one's political competence as a citizen. Internal inefficacy can thus be defined as the feeling of being ill prepared to understand the complexity of politics (for example 'politics are so complex that people like me cannot understand what is going on'). *External efficacy*, in contrast, refers to evaluations of the competence of the existing political system. External inefficacy will be high if citizens think that the political system is unable (or unwilling) to properly represent their political demands, interests, and expectations (for example 'politicians do not care much about what people like me might think' or 'parties criticise each other a lot but at the end of the day they are all the same')⁸.

⁸ According to Montero, Gunther and Torcal, the levels of democratic *legitimacy* in Spain are comparable to those found in many other Western European democracies. They are also very stable across time despite the economic and (at first) political difficulties that have surrounded Spanish democracy since the political transition. Yet levels of political involvement and evaluations of the internal and external efficacy are very low in Spain, when compared to other EU countries (that is, political disaffection is comparably high in Spain). Moreover, political disaffection in Spain shows high intergenerational continuity. These high and stable levels of democratic legitimacy, on the one hand, combined with high and stable political disaffection, on the other, are one of the main characteristics of Spanish political culture (see also: Maravall 1995; Torcal 1995,150; Morlino and Montero 1995,251-2 in Montero, Gunther and Torcal 1998).

Drawing on Montero *et al*'s discussion, we can further specify the expected effects of the apathy hypothesis as the following: 1) increase in political disaffection via erosion of subjective political involvement (that is, decrease in political interest and in the frequency of political discussion); 2) increase in political disaffection via a decrease in *external* political efficacy; and, 3) possible reduction of democratic legitimacy.

Notice that our hypothesised effects of labour market precarity on political disaffection are effects on subjective political involvement and external efficacy. There are no reasons to expect that labour market experiences per se can change internal efficacy, which will probably depend almost exclusively on factors such as age, class, political interest and educational levels. Notice also that finding labour market effects on democratic legitimacy should be more difficult (and thus less likely) than finding effects on the other two indicators, since, as Montero *et al* argue, democratic legitimacy in Spain is much higher than political disaffection and seems to be largely isolated from political and economic events. Therefore, evidence of a decrease in democratic legitimacy as a result of precarious labour market experiences would be interpreted as a proof that labour market effects are indeed intense.

But how can we measure subjective involvement, external efficacy and democratic legitimacy? In order to obtain valid and reliable indicators for our concepts and, at the same time, to test whether the conceptual distinctions discussed above hold empirically, we have undertaken factor analysis⁹. Factor analysis (which is available for the interested reader) has shown, first of all, that *democratic legitimacy*, *external efficacy* and *subjective involvement* are indeed different dimensions. With respect to the latter, factor analysis also has shown that the indicators on political interest and the indicators on frequency of political discussion need not be separated as they form in fact part of the same latent subjective political involvement factor. Thus factor analysis confirms the existence of three ideological dimensions easily

⁹ In their article, Montero, Gunther and Torcal also apply factor analysis to a survey on political attitudes carried out in 1993, which gives empirical support for their conceptual distinctions and, in particular, for their claim that democratic legitimacy and political disaffection are not part of the same attitudinal dimension (see: Montero, Gunther and Torcal 1998). On the difference between democratic legitimacy and political discontent see also: Craig, Niemy and Silver 1990,306 and Maravall 1995,279 in Montero, Gunther and Torcal 1999,33,ft27).

identifiable with *subjective political involvement*, *external efficacy* and *democratic legitimacy*. Let us now present our findings regarding the effects of labour market segmentation by type on contract in Spain on these three different indicators.

Subjective involvement in politics

Once the existence of a subjective involvement dimension was confirmed by factor analysis, we constructed an index with the variables that appeared as forming part of the latent dimension. The political involvement index includes 7 items regarding respondents' level of interests¹⁰ taken in: 1) *parliamentary discussions*, 2) *national government policies*, 3) *regional government policies*, 4) *local-government policies*, 5) *the activities of political parties*, 6) *trade union activities*, and 7) *international political affairs*. To this, the scale adds three more items regarding the frequency in which respondents: 1) *read political sections in the newspapers*, 2) *listen to the radio programmes on politics*, and 3), *see T.V. programmes on politics*¹¹. Finally, the index adds one more item that measures the frequency of political discussion with friends, families and/or work mates¹². The index sums up these items in a 44-interval point scale, ranging from -22 to +22. The Cronbach's Alpha for this scale is 0.90.

We have fitted three OLS models to the political involvement scale (see Table 3). Model A includes age, gender, educational level and labour market situation¹³. It shows that political involvement does in fact depend on all these variables¹⁴. Crucially, Model A

¹⁰ All these seven items are measured in a Likert-scale ranging from 'a lot' to 'nothing'.

¹¹ These items are also measured in a Likert scale that goes from. 1. *Every or almost every day*; 2. *Once or twice a week*; 3. *Occasionally during the month*; and, 4. *Never or hardly ever*.

¹² This latter item is also measured in a Likert scale that goes from. 1. *Every day or more several times a week*; 2. *Once or twice a week*; 3. *Sometime during the month*; and, 4. *Never or hardly ever*.

¹³ In all the statistical models presented in this section, the effects of class disappeared altogether once we controlled for education. The class variable was thus removed from the models, which implied no significant loss of information and made thus the models more parsimonious.

¹⁴ Notice that political involvement increases with age until the age group 46-55 and then decreases again, being particularly low amongst the elderly. Political involvement also increases if the respondent is male and the higher the educational level, which seems to be the most important variable.

provides evidence in favour of the hypothesis that being in the flexible segment of the Spanish labour market reduces subjective political involvement. Both employed fixed-term workers and unemployed workers coming from fixed-term work show lower levels of subjective involvement than the rest of the labour market categories. The difference is actually higher for the former category. Model B tests the hypothesis that ideology could have an impact on political involvement. This hypothesis is however rejected. Models not shown here further tested the hypotheses that the effect of ideology was curvilinear and that there was an interaction effect between ideology and labour market situation, both of which were also rejected. Ideology simply does not seem to explain the variance in political involvement.

Finally, model C tests our hypothesis that household income is one of the mechanisms that connects labour market experiences to the erosion of political involvement. This time there is partial evidence in favour of this hypothesis since the introduction of this variable in our model lowers the coefficient of our outsider labour market categories. In fact, the coefficient of the unemployed coming from fixed-term work loses its statistical significance when we control for household income, which suggests that economic deprivation could indeed be one of the mechanisms that connects labour market experiences with this indicator of political disaffection¹⁵. Yet as the statistical significance of the employed fixed-term workers category reminds us, economic deprivation does not tell us the whole story.

The loss of interest in politics was indeed one of the hypothesised manifestations of the political apathy hypothesis. It is not however the most crucial. For confirmation of the apathy hypothesis, it seems much more important to find evidence that the experience of being an outsider in the Spanish labour market increases attitudes towards the efficacy of the political system as defined above.

¹⁵ The loss of statistical significance of the unemployed coming from fixed-term work is not due to the loss of cases between model C and model B. Model B has been run with the same number of observations of model B and the coefficient of this category is -1.91, which is significant at the 96% level of confidence. It should be however noticed that if ideology, which is not significant, is removed from the model, the introduction of the income variable does not imply the total loss of significance of the unemployed coming from fixed-term work (Coeff.= -1.52; sig.=0.085).

Table 3. OLS Regression Models on Subjective Political Involvement

MODELS Explanatory variables	POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT		
	Coeff.	Sig.	Models' Characteristics
Age Groups =>(Ref. 18-25) 26-35 A	2.22	***	N= 1567
36-45	3.79	****	R-sq.=0.1706
46-55	3.85	****	Adj R-sq.= 0.1653
56-65	1.79	*(.087)	Root MSE= 9.5878
More than 65	-7.34	**	Ovtest
Female	-1.41	***	F(3,1553)=2.12
Education Level Scale (Casmin)	1.52	****	Prob>F=0.0958
Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent)			Hetest
Employed Fixed-Term	-2.38	****	Chi2(1)=0.00
Unemployed Fixed-Term	-2.14	***	Prob>chi2=0.9859
Unemployed Permanent	.40	n.s.	
Intercept	-4.65		
Age Groups =>(Ref. 18-25) 26-35 B	2.26	***	N= 1310
36-45	3.89	****	R-sq.=0.1590
46-55	3.73	****	Adj R-sq.= 0.1518
56-65	2.30	**	Root MSE= 9.3742
More than 65	-8.44	**	Ovtest
Female	-1.44	**	F(3,1295)=1.20
Education Level Scale (Casmin)	1.40	****	Prob>F=0.3101
Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent)			Hetest
Employed Fixed-Term	-2.19	****	Chi2(1)=0.31
Unemployed Fixed-Term	-1.66	**	Prob>chi2=0.5769
Unemployed Permanent	.29	n.s.	
Ideology (L-R)	-.095	n.s.	
Intercept	-3.63		
Age Groups =>(Ref. 18-25) 26-35 C	1.90	**	N= 1027
36-45	3.21	***	R-sq.=0.1534
46-55	3.46	***	Adj R-sq.= 0.1434
56-65	1.36	n.s.	Root MSE= 9.5232
More than 65	-6.82	n.s.	Ovtest
Female	-1.38	**	F(3,1011)=1.88
Education Level Scale (Casmin)	1.20	****	Prob>F=0.1318
Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent)			Hetest
Employed Fixed-Term	-2.02	**	Chi2(1)=0.28
Unemployed Fixed-Term	-1.31	n.s.(.170)	Prob>chi2=0.5961
Unemployed Permanent	.50	n.s.	
Ideology (L-R)	-.11	n.s.	
Household Income	.64	**	
Intercept	-5.12		

****sig. .≤ 0.001 ***sig. .≤ 0.01 **sig. ≤ 0.05 *sig. approximately 0.10 (significance level in parenthesis)

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995. (Calculated by the author)

External Efficacy

Our original factor analysis showed that responses to the following four indicators were part of the same latent variable: 1) *“Politicians do not care much about what people like me might think”*; 2) *“No matter who is in government, he will always look for his own personal interest”*; 3) *“Political parties are only good at dividing people”*, and 4), *“Parties criticise each other a lot but at the end of the day they are all the same”*. The SCSR survey asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with these statements. Affirmative responses have been coded +1, negative responses have been coded -1, whereas those indicating lack of knowledge or willingness to respond were coded as 0. Responses were then added up in a 9-point interval scale that ranges from -4 to 4. Cronbach’s reliability test on this scale yields an Alpha of 0.77. We believe this scale is a valid and reliable indicator of external efficacy.

A series of three nested OLS models were fitted on the scores to this second political disaffection scale (see Table 4). These models show, first of all, that, as expected, after controlling for age, gender, educational level and ideology (see Model B), experiences in the flexible segment of the Spanish labour market increase the scores in the scale. Both employed fixed-term workers and unemployed workers coming from fixed-term employment show higher levels of political disaffection than their permanently employed counterparts. In contrast, the scores of the unemployed coming from permanent contracts are indistinguishable from those of the reference category. Model B also suggests that the effect of ideology on the political disaffection scale could be curvilinear (and convex), so that individuals in the ideological extremes could be more prone to show higher levels of disaffection than more moderated individuals. Interaction effects between ideology and our indicator political disaffection have been tested and rejected. The impact of labour market experiences on the response variable does not seem to vary by ideology. As to the mechanisms that link labour market inequalities to political disaffection, we can identify economic deprivation (measured as household income) as being one of these factors, since its introduction in the model reduces the impact of the labour market categories (see Model C). Yet again, household income cannot explain all the effects of labour market situation.

Table 4. OLS Regression Models on Political Disaffection

MODELS Explanatory variables	POLITICAL DISAFFECTION (External Inefficacy)		
	Coeff.	Sig.	Model's Characteristics
Age Groups =>(Ref. 18-25) A			N= 1572
26-35	-.43	**	R-sq.=0.0830
36-45	-.42	**	Adj R-sq.= 0.077
46-55	-.11	n.s.	Root MSE= 2.30
56-65	-.07	n.s.	
Older 65	-.27	n.s.	Ovtest
Female	.23	*(.066)	F(3,1558)=0.28
Education Level Scale (casmin)	-.24	****	Prob>F=0.8394
Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent)			Hetest
Employed Fixed-Term	.42	***	Chi2(1)=1.98
Unemployed Fixed-Term	.56	***	Prob>chi2=0.159
Unemployed Permanent	-.11	n.s	
Intercept	1.24		
Age Groups =>(Ref. 18-25) B			N= 1313
26-35	-.43	**	R-sq.=0.0960
36-45	-.43	*(.051)	Adj R-sq.= 0.0876
46-55	-.03	n.s.	Root MSE= 2.3273
56-65	-.09	n.s.	
Older 65	-.14	n.s.	Ovtest
Female	.21	n.s.	F(3,1297)=0.66
Education Level Scale (casmin)	-.23	****	Prob>F=0.5738
Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent)			Hetest
Employed Fixed-Term	.55	****	Chi2(1)=0.72
Unemployed Fixed-Term	.49	**	Prob>chi2=0.3967
Unemployed Permanent	-.07	n.s	
Ideology	.13	****	
Squared Ideology (L-R)	.022	*(.092)	
Intercept	1.08		
Age Groups =>(Ref. 18-25) C			N= 1033
26-35	-.42	*(.088)	R-sq.=0.1000
36-45	-.27	n.s.	Adj R-sq.= 0.0885
46-55	.05	n.s.	Root MSE= 2.3602
56-65	-.03	n.s.	
Older 65	-.90	n.s.	Ovtest
Female	.25	n.s.	F(3,1016)=0.88
Education Level Scale (casmin)	-.19	****	Prob>F=0.4509
Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent)			Hetest
Employed Fixed-Term	.42	**	Chi2(1)=0.43
Unemployed Fixed-Term	.40	*(.084)	Prob>chi2=0.5114
Unemployed Permanent	-.19	n.s	
Ideology	.16	****	
Squared Ideology (L-R)	.016	*(.109)	
Household income	-.15	**	
Intercept	1.42		

****significance ≤ 0.001 ***significance ≤ 0.01 **significance ≤ 0.05 *significance approx. 0.10

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995. (Calculated by the author)

Democratic legitimacy

Perhaps the most surprising findings regarding the apathy hypothesis are related to the indicator of democratic legitimacy. This indicator consists of a survey question in which respondents are asked to choose amongst the following political views; 1), "*Democracy is preferable to any other form of government*", 2) "*Under some circumstances, an authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, could be preferable*" 3) "*To people like me, it does not matter which political regime*".

There are three ways of modelling an indicator like this. First, we could do multinomial logit (comparing two of the responses to the remaining one). We could alternatively, model the chances of identifying with (any) non-democratic response against the chances of choosing the pro-democratic view via a logistic regression. Or, finally, we could also assume that the three responses define a basic range of intensity simply by altering the order of the two latter responses and fitting an ordinal logit model to the re-coded variable. This latter option makes sense if we notice that the three responses form a logical order: total support for the democratic regime (1), indifference (3) and authoritarian preferences --under some unspecified circumstances-- (2).

Actually, we have fitted both multinomial, logistic and ordinal logit regressions to the data and the choice of model does not seem to alter our main findings: both being employed on a fixed-term contract, being unemployed as a result of the termination of fixed-term employment, and being unemployed as a result of the end of a hitherto permanent contract all seem to increase significantly the chances of not identifying with the democratic response. We can thus conclude that experiences outside the core of insider workforce might enhance the erosion of democratic legitimacy which, as discussed above, is taken as evidence that these experience are able to produce intense effects.

Table 5. Logistic and Ordinal Logit Regression Models on The (Erosion of) Democratic Legitimacy

MODELS Explanatory variables	EROSION OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY LOGISTIC REGRESSION			EROSION OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY ORDINAL LOGIT		
	Odds Ratio	Sig	Models' Characteristics	Coeff- icient	Sig.	Models' Characteristics
Age Groups =>(Ref. 18-25) A			N = 1541			N = 1541
26-35	.54	***	Chi2(10) = 70.60	-.62	***	Chi2(10) = 72.48
36-45	.56	***	Pseudo R2= 0.0486	-.57	***	Pseudo R2= 0.0395
46-55	.76	n.s.		-.27	n.s.	
56-65	.91	n.s.	Log Likelihood	-.16	n.s.	Log Likelihood
Older 65	2.19	n.s.	= -690.54257	.63	n.s.	= -881.58406
Female	1.05	n.s.	Goodness of fit Test:	.056	n.s.	
Education Level Scale (casmin)	.85	****	Prob>Chi2=0.3216	-.17	****	
Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent)						Ancillary parameters:
Employed Fixed-Term	1.34	*(.110)	Sensitivity 56.32%	.31	*(.091)	_cut1 1.0807 .2874
Unemployed Fixed-Term	1.74	***	Specificity 67.64%	.57	***	_cut2 1.8957 .2930
Unemployed Permanent	2.17	***	Correctly Classified 65.61% (Cutoff (.2))	.69	***	
Age Groups =>(Ref. 18-25) B			N = 1306			N = 1306
26-35	.64	*(.056)	Chi2(11) = 111.72	-.46	**	Chi2(11) = 112.33
36-45	.58	**	Pseudo R2= 0.0954	-.51	**	Pseudo R2= 0.0764
46-55	.87	n.s.		-.16	n.s.	
56-65	.94	n.s.	Log Likelihood	-.09	n.s.	Log Likelihood
Older 65	3.26	n.s.	= -529.88269	1.0	n.s.	= -679.06487
Female	.98	n.s.		-.01	n.s.	
Education Level Scale (casmin)	.85	****		-.17	****	
Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent)			Goodness of fit Test:			Ancillary parameters:
Employed Fixed-Term	1.48	*(.060)	Prob>Chi2=0.4075	.42	**	_cut1 1.1647 .3305
Unemployed Fixed-Term	1.93	***		.67	**	_cut2 2.0683 .3380
Unemployed Permanent	2.08	***	Sensitivity 62.50%	.68	**	
			Specificity 69.45%			
Ideology	1.02	****	Correctly Classified 68.30% (Cutoff (.18))	.28	****	
Age Groups =>(Ref. 18-25) C			N = 1024			N = 1024
26-35	.54	**	Chi2(12) = 92.44	-.63	**	Chi2(12) = 93.95
36-45	.47	**	Pseudo R2= 0.0994	-.73	**	Pseudo R2= 0.0803
46-55	.65	n.s.		-.44	n.s.	
56-65	.76	n.s.	Log Likelihood	-.30	n.s.	Log Likelihood
Older 65	.89	n.s.	= -418.88944	-.31	n.s.	= -537.97815
Female	1.00	n.s.		.047	n.s.	
Education Level Scale (casmin)	.89	**		-.13	**	
Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent)			Goodness of fit Test:			Ancillary parameters:
Employed Fixed-Term	1.54	*(.067)	Prob>Chi2=0.7402	.46	**	_cut1 .59351 .4576
Unemployed Fixed-Term	1.57	*(.095)		.44	*(.097)	_cut2 1.4843 .4627
Unemployed Permanent	2.38	***	Sensitivity 61.85%	.77	**	
			Specificity 70.74%			
Ideology	1.32	****	Correctly	.27	****	
Household income	.88	*(.092)	Classified 69.24% (Cutoff (.18))	-.145	*(.059)	

****significance ≤ 0.000 ***significance ≤ 0.01 **significance ≤ 0.05 *significance approx. 0.10

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995. (Calculated by the author)

Table 5 shows the results of both our logistic models and our ordinal logit models (for reasons of space, we do not show the multinomial models, which are of course available for the interested reader). The reader is invited to compare both modelling strategies for each of the three nested models shown keeping in mind that, in the case of the logistic models we report the odds ratio, whereas for the ordered logit ones we report the coefficients. Our following comments are supported by the results obtained by both modelling strategies (they can be thus referred to any of them).

Models A and B show that democratic legitimacy seems to depend on age, educational and ideological factors and, crucially, that, even after controlling for these factors, the three outsider categories of our labour market variable are significantly related to higher anti-democratic responses. As usual, both the existence of a curvilinear effect of ideology on the response variable and of an interaction effect between labour market situation and ideology have been checked. Both hypotheses have been rejected¹⁶. Democratic legitimacy decreases as we move to the ideological right (which is not at all surprising given the political history of Spain). But the fact is that both right-wing and left-wing individuals seem to be less supportive of the democratic regime when they are not employed on a permanent basis. Labour insecurity thus seems to have a direct effect on democratic legitimacy.

Introducing household income seems to improve our models (particularly if the equation has the form of an ordinal logit) and to reduce the impact of unemployment originated in the termination of fixed-term contracts. But even after controlling for household income the impact of 'fixed-term' unemployment remains significant at a level of confidence above the 90 per cent threshold. Moreover, the introduction of household income in our equations if anything increases the coefficients of both fixed-term employment and unemployment originated in permanent work. Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that there is no evidence to support the view that the mechanisms whereby labour market experiences in

¹⁶ Multinomial analysis however shows some indication that the impact of ideology could be actually convex-curvilinear in the case of indifferent responses (*"To people like me, it does not matter the type of political regime"*) and linear in the case of the less democratic responses (*"under some circumstances, an authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, could be preferable"*).

the flexible segment of the Spanish labour market favour the erosion of democratic legitimacy originate in economic deprivation. What makes (at least some) outsiders less identified with the democratic system seems not to be related to the decrease in household income associated to the lack of stable employment¹⁷.

In sum, all the analysed indicators point towards the confirmation of the apathy hypothesis. With relatively high levels of confidence, we can conclude that labour market precarity seems indeed to be causally related to higher levels of political disaffection (that is, lower levels of subjective involvement and external efficacy), and even to an erosion in democratic legitimacy. Those unable to enter the core of stable employment are more likely to feel alienated from the political process, to lose interest in it and to become more sceptic of the virtues of the democratic regime.

And all this happens irrespectively of ideological maps. Our interaction models do not seem to work when it comes to analyse political apathy. We must therefore conclude that, in sharp contrast to the processes of radicalisation analysed above, the intensity of the process of political disaffection associated with labour market precarity is independent of respondents' ideological maps. This lack of ideological mediation could be pointing in the direction of a general *propensity* to political disaffection that spreads across the ideological spectrum. It could thus be perhaps understood as reflecting a general feature of Spanish political culture.

We have also found that household income seems to be able to soften the intensity of these processes of disaffection (since disaffection is lower the higher the income) but it is not able to impede them being set in motion (since disaffection occurs irrespectively of the household income). This suggests that in order to understand the causes of disaffection, we should be looking for mechanisms other than pure economic deprivation.

In this section we have provided empirical evidence which seems to support both the radicalisation and the apathy hypothesis. Moreover, our data seems to suggest that, in the

¹⁷ Interaction effects between household income and labour market situation have been tested and

Spanish case, the apathetic reaction to labour market precarity is more generalised than the radical one. This is due to the fact that the apathetic response seems to be independent of ideological mediation (that is, it occurs with the same intensity amongst individuals of all ideologies) whereas the activation of a radical response seems to depend very much on individuals' own ideological maps. This of course implies that, for some individuals, the experience of labour market precarity could enhance simultaneously apathy and radicalisation. In this sense both hypotheses need not be seen as necessarily alternative ones but as two manifestations of the same general process of *political detachment*, the symptoms of which would include political cynicism, distrust, lack of interest, and, in some cases, also radicalisation of political attitudes.

We are now in the position to suggest that these general processes of *political detachment* are not originated in economic deprivation (at least not alone). This is an important finding in itself, which suggests that, contrary to our original expectations and to what has been recently argued (see: Maravall and Fraile 1998), family-based economic resources and welfare unemployment provision schemes might not be effective in mitigating the political consequences of labour market dualisation. This finding is further reinforced in the following section, which shows that household income is irrelevant to the electoral consequences of labour market dualisation.

SECTION THREE: The effects of labour market segmentation by type of contract on voting behaviour. Testing the electoral abstention and punishment effect hypotheses

Do the attitudinal consequences of labour market dualisation translate into voting behaviour? In order to answer this question we have tested the abstention and the punishment hypotheses using the CSR survey. Let us present our basic findings.

rejected.

Electoral abstention

In the previous section, we have provided sufficient evidence to support the existence of a causal connection between the experience of labour market precarity and political apathy. It seems reasonable to assume that if the experiences in the flexible segment of the Spanish labour market enhance political disaffection, they should also translate into a higher rate of electoral abstention. Our analysis of the causal determinants of electoral abstention (measured as reported intention of not voting in the forthcoming elections¹⁸) shows however that the overall impact of labour market experiences on electoral participation is much more tenuous than expected. This could be due to lack of reliability of our indicator (that is, the lack of motivation for voting might not be accurately captured in a survey that asks respondents to reveal their political preferences since answering that question requires much less effort than casting the actual vote). But it could also be a reflection of the complexity of *reality*. In what follows we will provide evidence that suggests that the overall impact of labour market precarity on electoral abstention is small because it only operates at the extremes of the ideological spectrum, therefore affecting a minority of respondents. This complex effect can be modelled as a non-linear (concave) interaction effect between ideological maps and labour market experiences. Let us show how this interaction works.

Table 6 below shows a series of four nested models on electoral abstention. Each of them tests a particular hypothesis regarding the effects of ideology and labour market experiences on electoral participation. Model A, for instance, tests the hypothesis that there is a linear effect of ideology on electoral participation which *adds to* the effect of labour market situation. If there was a direct and unmediated translation of labour market experiences into participation patterns, model A should provide an accurate description of the data. Yet model A fails completely in explaining the data structure (see the models' characteristics in Table 6).

¹⁸ The SCSR survey asks two questions consecutively on vote intention. Respondents who do not give a vote intention in the first question are asked again to identify the party for which they feel more sympathy. We have considered as abstentions those respondents who declared that they would not be voting in the coming elections in both of these questions. The model presented in Table 6 models the possibility of abstentions against declared vote intention (that is, those who give a preferred party in the first question on vote intention).

Table 6. Probability of Declaring Intention of Electoral Abstention

MODELS Explanatory variables	PROBABILITY OF INTENDED ELECTORAL ABSTENTION		
	Odds R.	Sig	Models' Characteristics
A Age Female Education Level Scale (casmin) Ideology (L-R) Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent) Employed Fixed-Term Unemployed Fixed-Term Unemployed Permanent	.98 1.27 .98 .95 .86 .89 .68	** n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.	N = 1031 Chi2(7) = 8.27 Prob> chi2=0.3092 Pseudo R2= 0.0111 Log Likelihood = -368.71
B Age Female Education Level Scale (casmin) Ideology (L-R) Squared Ideology Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent) Employed Fixed-Term Unemployed Fixed-Term Unemployed Permanent	.98 1.23 .98 .89 .90 .87 .95 .75	** n.s. n.s. * (.08) **** n.s. n.s. n.s.	N = 1031 Chi2(8) = 26.99 Prob> chi2=0.0007 Pseudo R2= 0.0362 Log Likelihood = -359.35193 Goodness of fit Test: Prob>Chi2=0.2505 Sensitivity 56.32% Specificity 67.64% Correctly Classified 65.61% (Cutoff (.2))
C Age Female Education Level Scale (casmin) Ideology (L-R) Squared Ideology Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent) Employed Fixed-Term Unemployed Fixed-Term Unemployed Permanent Interaction Labour Market Situation*Squared Ideology Squared Ideology*Employed Fixed-Term Squared Ideology*Unemployed Fixed-Term Squared Ideology*Unemployed Permanent	.98 1.22 .98 .88 .84 .63 .66 1.48 1.12 1.13 .60	** n.s. n.s. * (.07) **** n.s. n.s. n.s. * (.08) * (.07) n.s.	N = 1031 Chi2(11) = 36.61 Prob> chi2=0.0001 Pseudo R2= 0.0491 Log Likelihood = -354.54077 Goodness of fit Test: Prob>Chi2=0.4492 Sensitivity 61.16% Specificity 57.25% Correctly Classified 57.71% (Cutoff (.13)) Model C against model B Likelihood-ratio test chi2(3) = 9.62 Prob > chi2 = 0.0221
D Age Female Education Level Scale (casmin) Ideology (L-R) Squared Ideology Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent) Employed Fixed-Term Unemployed Fixed-Term Unemployed Permanent Interaction Labour Market Situation*Squared Ideology Squared Ideology*Employed Fixed-Term Squared Ideology*Unemployed Fixed-Term Squared Ideology*Unemployed Permanent Subjective Political Involvement Political Disaffection (Feelings of External Inefficacy) Attitudes Pro-Radical Social Change	.98 1.10 1.09 .84 .83 .50 .53 1.60 1.12 1.13 .64 .96 1.24 1.37	n.s. n.s. * (.09) * (.12) *** ** * (.11) n.s. * (.10) * (.07) no variance **** **** **	N = 1002 Chi2(14) = 87.88 Prob> chi2=0.0000 Pseudo R2= 0.1224 Log Likelihood = -315.18438 Goodness of fit Test: Prob>Chi2=0.9635 Sensitivity 68.97% Specificity 68.85% Correctly Classified 68.86% (Cutoff (.129))

****significance ≤ 0.001 ***significance ≤ 0.01 **significance ≤ 0.05 *significance approx. 0.10

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995. (Calculated by the author)

Model B tests the hypothesis that the impact of ideology is non-linear but still views this impact as independent of the labour market situation. Model B shows indeed evidence of a non-linear effect of ideology on electoral abstention. Since the quadratic term has a negative sign (that is, it reduces the odds ratio), we can conclude that the effect of ideology is concave so that electoral abstention is lower in the ideological extremes and increases in the centred ideological positions. A different way of looking at the quadratic term (particularly advised for readers not familiar with the interpretation of curvilinear relationships) consists of viewing it as an index of ideological extremism that measures the ‘distance’ from ideologically centred (that is, moderated) positions. Thus our model shows that the more ideologically extremist the respondent, the less likely he or she will be to abstain in the coming elections. Yet model B provides no evidence that labour market experiences have any independent or direct impact on electoral participation¹⁹.

Model C, however, tests a more complex relation between labour market experiences and ideology: that is, the existence of an interaction effect between the non-linear impact of ideology and labour market experiences on electoral participation. More precisely, it tests the hypothesis that the impact of being an outsider in the Spanish labour market on the chances of electoral abstention is much higher for those respondents who place themselves on the ideological extremes than for those ideologically moderated²⁰. This actually seems to be a reasonable interaction to expect, since as we have seen in the previous section, political disaffection seems to increase significantly with ideological extremism. Model C shows that these expected interaction effects are indeed significant at a level of confidence above 90 per cent both for fixed-term workers and for unemployed workers coming from fixed-term work. There is also strong statistical evidence that model C provides a better description of the data

¹⁹ We have also tested the hypothesis that there was a linear interaction effect between ideology and labour market situation. This model turned out to be as inaccurate as model A.

²⁰ Notice that this is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that the impact of ideology on the response variable is non-linear for all labour market categories but less intense in the case of outsider respondents. Also, following our interpretation of the quadratic term as an index of radicalisation, this is equivalent to testing that ideological radicalisation has a differentiated impact on electoral abstention depending on the respondent’s labour market situation. More precisely, the hypothesis would be that ideological radicalisation decreases the chances of electoral abstention in all labour market situations but that this reduction is significantly less pronounced in the outsider categories.

than model B, as is shown by the likelihood ratio test reported in Table 6. Figure 3 below describes graphically the non-linear interaction effect hypothesised by Model C.

FIGURE 3. *Relationship between Abstention, Labour Market Situation and Ideology according to the Curvilinear Interaction Effect described by Model C in Table 6*




Table 6b below shows the different probabilities of abstention (in percentages) by ideology and by labour market situation as predicted by the logistic equation of model C. Notice that the differences in the predicted probabilities of abstention between insiders and outsiders are only important in the ideological extremes. Yet for the majority of respondents, who place themselves in the moderate left, centre, and moderate right of the left-right ideological scale, labour market experiences seems to have no significant impact on electoral participation. Unfortunately, we cannot determine whether these limited effects that are observable for fixed-term workers and unemployed workers coming from fixed-term work also apply to the unemployed coming from the insider core of the Spanish labour market. We would need a larger representation of this latter category to test this possibility (that is, model

C cannot estimate the probabilities of abstention for ideologically extremist respondents due to the lack of sufficient cases).

Table 6b. *Predicted Probabilities of Electoral Abstention (in %) by Ideology and Labour Market Situation According to The Curvilinear Interaction Described by Model C*

LABOUR MARKET SITUATION	IDEOLOGY				
	<i>Extreme Left (1-2)</i>	<i>Moderate Left (3-4)</i>	<i>Centre (5-6)</i>	<i>Moderate Right (7-8)</i>	<i>Extreme Right (9-10)</i>
<i>Employed Permanent</i>	4.3	13.2	15.3	6.1	0.5
<i>Employed Fixed-Term</i>	11.0	12.4	15.7	7.3	2.3
<i>Unemployed from Fixed-Term</i>	9.0	12.7	16.0	7.0	2.1
<i>Unemployed from Permanent</i>	no observations	12.2	16.2	7.5	no observations

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995. (Calculated by the author from equation C on Table 6)

What are the mechanisms behind this interaction effect? The most immediate answer to this question would be apathy and radicalisation. It seems however to be more complex than that. Model D in Table 6 shows that even after controlling for political disaffection, subjective political involvement, and attitudes of pro-radical change, the interaction effect between ideology and labour market situation remains significant²¹. If political disaffection and political radicalisation explained all the effect of the interaction, the significance of our labour market categories should disappear in model D, which does not seem to happen. Model D suggests that outsiders who place themselves in the ideological extremes could be less likely to participate in elections, irrespectively of their levels of political disaffection, political involvement and their attitudes regarding pro-radical change (could this finding be a statistical artefact?).

What this later finding suggests is that the complex interaction effect between ideology and labour market position is in itself relevant for the understanding of the

²¹ Neither democratic legitimacy nor opinions regarding the use of direct means of action are significant and have been removed from the model. Attitudes of pro radical social change have been introduced as a five-point interval scale, re-coding those who did not know or did not wish to answer as the third interval.

mechanisms of electoral participation even after controlling for indicators of disaffection and radicalisation. This can be easily confirmed if we compare a simpler model of abstention that does not include labour market situation to our model D and test whether the improvement in the explained variance that occurs when we introduce the interaction term is worth the increase in complexity of the model. Thus testing model D against this simpler models is the same as testing whether accounting for a concave curvilinear interaction effect between labour market experiences and ideological maps improve our understanding of electoral abstention in Spain. Likelihood-ratio test of model D against the simpler model (S) shows that the former indeed provides a better description of the data than the latter (Prob > chi2 = 0.0729) so that we can conclude, with a 93 per cent level of statistical confidence, that accounting for a concave curvilinear interaction effect between labour market situation and ideology is relevant for the interpretation of the determinants of (reported intention of) electoral abstention.

Table 6c. *A Simpler Model of Electoral Abstention*

MODEL S	Odds Ratio	Sig.	Models' Characteristics
Age	.99	n.s.	Number of obs = 1002
Female	1.06	n.s.	LR chi2(8) = 76.33
Educational Level Scale (Casmin)	1.10	* (.056)	Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Ideology	.85	**	Pseudo R2 = 0.1063
Squared Ideology	.89	****	Log likelihood=-320.95786
Subjective Political Involvement Scale	.96	****	Goodness of fit Test:
Political Disaffection (External Efficacy) Scale	1.23	****	Prob>Chi2= 0.8991
Attitudes towards Radical Social Change (5-point scale)	1.37	**	Sensitivity 70.69%
			Specificity 66.03%
			Correctly class. 66.57%
			(Cutoff (.12))
Comparing model D against the simpler model (S)			
Logistic: likelihood-ratio test: chi2(6) = 11.55 Prob > chi2 = 0.0729			

****significance ≤ 0.001 **significance ≤ 0.05 *significance approx. 0.10 (significance level in parenthesis)

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995. (Calculated by the author)

What about economic deprivation? Is it one of the mechanisms that could explain the link between experiences in the flexible segment of the Spanish labour market and electoral abstention? According to our analysis, the answer would be no. Household income does not seem to play any role in the process that links labour market experiences to electoral participation. In fact, as Table 6d below shows, the household income variable is not statistically significant. It thus seems that economic deprivation as measured by household income is irrelevant to the analysed process of electoral participation²².

Table 6d. *A Model Showing that Household Income is not Significant for Electoral Abstention*

	Odds R.	Sig	Models' Characteristics
Age	.98	n.s.	N = 746
Female	1.16	n.s.	Chi2(15) = 57.82
Education Level Scale (casmin)	1.12	*(.09)	Prob> chi2=0.0000
Ideology (L-R)	.87	*(.12)	Pseudo R2= 0.1110
Squared Ideology	.83	***	Log Likelihood = -231.5495
Labour Market Situation =>(Ref. Permanent)			
Employed Fixed-Term	.35	**	Goodness of fit Test:
Unemployed Fixed-Term	.50	*(.11)	Prob>Chi2=0.6718
Unemployed Permanent	1.78	n.s.	Sensitivity 68.67%
Interaction Labour Market Situation*Squared Ideology			Specificity 61.09%
Squared Ideology*Employed Fixed-Term	1.13	* (.10)	Correctly Classified 61.93%
Squared Ideology*Unemployed Fixed-Term	1.14	*(.07)	(Cutoff (.129))
Squared Ideology*Unemployed Permanent	dropped	no variance	
Subjective Political Involvement	.96	***	
Political Disaffection (Feelings of External Inefficacy)	1.20	***	
Attitudes Pro-Radical Social Change	1.40	*(.06)	
Household Income	.88	n.s.	

***significance ≤ 0.001 **significance ≤ 0.01 *significance ≤ 0.05 *significance approx. 0.10)

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995. (Calculated by the author)

To sum up, the SCSR survey provides evidence which suggests that the impact of labour market precarity on electoral abstention is only significant at the extremes of the ideological spectrum. This effect has been modelled as a concave interaction effect between ideology and labour market position. It seems that this interaction effect is relevant for the mechanisms of electoral participation. Once again, its complexity shows that expecting a

²² A curvilinear effect of income has been tested and rejected. Linear and curvilinear interaction effects between income and labour market situation have also been tested and rejected.

direct and unmediated link between labour market experiences and political outcomes is often an oversimplified hypothesis not always supported by empirical evidence. On the other hand, our expectation that household income could mitigate the attitudinal impact of individual experiences in the labour market finds once again no empirical confirmation in the case of electoral participation.

Table 6e . Predicted Probabilities of Electoral Abstention (in %) by Ideology and Labour Market Situation According to a Curvilinear Interaction Model Controlling for Disaffection and Radicalisation Variables as Described by Model D

LABOUR MARKET SITUATION	IDEOLOGY				
	<i>Extreme Left (1-2)</i>	<i>Moderate Left (3-4)</i>	<i>Centre (5-6)</i>	<i>Moderate Right (7-8)</i>	<i>Extreme Right (9-10)</i>
<i>Employed Permanent</i>	4.4	11.9	16.2	6.4	0.4
<i>Employed Fixed-Term</i>	12.1	11.2	16.8	7.8	2.1
<i>Unemployed from Fixed-Term</i>	9.1	11.6	16.9	7.5	1.3
<i>Unemployed from Permanent</i>	no observations	11.1	17.4	6.2	no observations

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995. (Calculated by the author from equation D on Table 6)


Testing the Punishment-Effect Hypothesis

So far, our analysis seems to confirm the importance that ideological mediation mechanisms have on the attitudinal consequences of different labour market experiences. Our expectation regarding interaction effects has been largely supported by empirical evidence.

The *punishment effect* hypothesis explicitly requires the existence of interaction effects since it expects that the electoral effects of labour market dualisation *differ* by ideological position. In order to confirm the existence of punishment effects, we must find convincing evidence that the experience of labour market precarity increases the chances of voting against the government *precisely amongst those outsiders who are located within the ideological sphere of influence of the Socialist Party*. Only then will we be able to talk of punishment effects. Therefore, punishment voting implies by definition that ideology play

less of a mediating role for outsider workers than for insiders (since leftist outsiders will be nevertheless more willing to vote against the Socialist Party).

FIGURE 4. *Expected Relationship between Conservative Vote, Labour Market Situation and Ideology according to the Punishment Effect Hypothesis*



To put it in the terms of the voting literature, the punishment effect hypothesis predicts that *retrospective economic* mechanisms (of an *egocentric* nature) activated by the experience of labour market precarity counter-act the effects of *ideological* mechanisms so that the final vote is a vote *against* what otherwise would be seen as a more ideologically coherent political option. Therefore a punishment vote cannot be reasonably expected to occur in the case of respondents outside the ideological sphere of influence of the incumbent party since, for these voters, economic voting and ideological voting will be conceptually and empirically indistinguishable. In other words, rightwing insiders and rightwing outsiders are not expected to differ in their chances of voting conservative and, even if they did, such behaviour could not possibly be described as a ‘punishment’ effect. Figure 4 above describes graphically what are, according to the punishment effect hypothesis, the expected relations between vote, ideology and labour market experiences in the case of the vote for the conservatives (compared to the vote for the socialists)²³.

²³ Notice that, in order to test the existence of punishment effects, it is this comparison between the conservative and socialist vote which really matters since it is the only one that allows us to test economic factors *against* ideological ones. Also in terms of the overall political consequences of labour market precarity in

Table 7 below shows four different explanations as to which might be the determinants of the odds of voting for the conservative party (PP) --which eventually won the 1996 elections--, versus the odds of voting for the incumbent socialist party (PSOE). Vote is measured as vote intention. Model A includes class, age, gender, ideology and labour market situation as explanatory factors. It assumes that there is a direct impact of labour market experiences, which is independent of the rest of the variables in the model. Model A shows that class, gender, and ideology have an impact on the chances of voting for the conservatives. The chances of voting for the PP increase for professionals in the service class, for men, and (not surprisingly) for those with rightwing views. Yet model A finds no empirical confirmation of a direct effect of labour market experiences on the electoral outcome. This is not surprising. If the actual structure of data resembles the hypothesised relation presented in Figure 4, a main effect model should not be able to describe it. What we should expect instead is a very poor fit of the data. Model A shows a very poor fit indeed (see goodness of fit test in Table 7), which in itself suggests that this model does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the data structure.


In contrast to model A, model B does allow for an interaction effect between ideology and labour market situation. Introducing this interaction term improves our explanation of the data structure significantly (see likelihood ratio test in Table 7). The rather impressive increase in the odds ratio of the unemployed fixed-term category could be interpreted as a sign that model B is on the right track. This odds ratio refers to the increase in the chances of voting conservative of unemployed workers coming from fixed-term employment (compared to permanent workers) for a value of ideology equal to 1. Since the ideological scale used in

Spain, this is the relevant comparison to make since by 1995 it was clear that the 1996 elections could only be won by either the socialists or the conservatives. A left-wing vote for the conservatives in 1996 can thus be reasonably interpreted as a *punishment* vote.

We have also modelled vote transfers from PSOE to IU (ex-communists) under the hypothesis that labour market precarity could enhance the vote intention for IU amongst those voters who voted socialist in the 1993 national elections. This hypothesis has been confirmed by the data in the case of unemployed workers coming from fixed-term jobs. Results are available for the interested reader (see also: Polavieja 1999c). Yet it should be noted that these findings cannot be so easily interpreted as a confirmation of the existence of 'punishment' vote since vote transfers between parties that compete for the same ideological segment of the electorate could be viewed as 'natural'. To repeat, the existence of a punishment vote becomes uncontroversial if voters 'jump' over their ideological fences to vote for a party that is clearly situated in a different ideological camp.

this table ranges from 1 to 10, the odds ratio for unemployed fixed-term respondents that appears in Table 7 describes the impact of being in this labour market position for people placed in the extreme left. The fact that the increase in the odds ratio is significant is thus good news for the punishment hypothesis.

FIGURE 5. *Relationship between Conservative Vote, Labour Market Situation and Ideology according to Model B compared to an Hypothesised Structure of the Data expected by the Punishment Effect Hypothesis*



Equally important news for the testing of the punishment effect hypothesis is (although it might seem surprising) that Model B does *not* fit the data well. Figure 5 below shows graphically why this should be the case. The explanation is simple. If we assume that the effect of ideology is linear, once we specify a change of slope in the ideology function by

labour market situation (as model B does), we are actually and irreversibly assuming a x-shape structure of the data. That is, model B actually assumes that, at some point, the ideology functions of insiders and unemployed fixed-term outsiders will cross and that, from this point onwards, we will actually find an increase in the odds of voting for the socialists amongst right-wing outsiders. This x-shape relation modelled by B *should* therefore *not* fit the data well at the right side of the spectrum (if the punishment hypothesis is correct).

In other words, in order to test our punishment effect hypothesis we should find that labour market effects occur on the left side of the ideological spectrum but not on the right side. Our last model (model C) provides a solid test as to whether this is indeed the case. Model C accounts for the interaction effect between ideology and labour market situation but this time this effect is modelled as a set of dummies representing all possible combinations between the different labour market positions and the two ideological blocks (left and right). In order to make our results interpretable, on the last row of table 7 we present model C in two different forms, each of which chooses a different reference category of the interaction variable. The first column of model C shows that when compared to leftwing respondents on permanent contracts, leftwing respondents who are unemployed due to the termination of their fixed-term contracts are significantly more likely to vote for the conservative party. Also the second column of Model C shows that labour market situation has no significant impact for rightwing respondents. When we use rightwing permanent respondents as the reference category we find no significant labour market effects for rightwing respondents. Model C thus shows that, as expected, labour market effects occur only on the left side of the ideological spectrum.

Table 7. Logistic Regressions on Vote Intention for the Conservative Party (PP) vs. Vote Intention for the Socialists (PSOE)

MODELS			Explanatory variables		Odds Ratio	Sig.	Models' Characteristics
Age			A		1.01	n.s.	N = 503 Chi2(9) = 302.04 Pseudo R2= 0.4332 Log Likelihood = -197.62481 Goodness of fit Test: Prob>Chi2= 0.0001 Sensitivity 82.61% Specificity 84.80% Correctly class. 83.70% (Cutoff (.5))
Female					.57	**	
Class =>(Ref. Service)			Intermediate		.31	***	
			Skilled Manual		.15	****	
			Unskilled		.11	****	
Labour Market Situation=>(Ref. Permanent)							
			Employed Fixed-Term		1.46	n.s.	
			Unemployed Fixed-Term		1.51	n.s.	
			Unemployed Permanent		1.10	n.s.	
Ideology (L-R)					2.86	****	
Age			B		1.07	n.s.	N = 503 Chi2(12) = 308.42 Pseudo R2= 0.4423 Log Likelihood = -194.4332 Goodness of fit Test: Prob>Chi2= 0.0044 Sensitivity 81.82% Specificity 84.80% Correctly class. 83.30% (Cutoff (.5)) Comparing Model B against Model A: Logistic: likelihood-ratio test chi2(3) = 6.38 Prob > chi2 = 0.0944
Female					.54	**	
Class =>(Ref. Service)			Intermediate		.28	**	
			Skilled Manual		.14	***	
			Unskilled		.11	***	
Labour Market Situation=>(Ref. Permanent)							
			Employed Fixed-Term		3.23	n.s.	
			Unemployed Fixed-Term		28.20	**	
			Unemployed Permanent		2.68	n.s.	
Ideology (L-R)					3.48	***	
Interaction: Ideology*Labour Market Sit.							
			Ideology*Employed Fixed-Term		.85	n.s.	
			Ideology*Unemployed Fixed-Term		.57	**	
			Ideology*Unemployed Permanent		.83	n.s.	

MODEL C						
Reference Category of the Interaction Term: Employed Permanent of Left Wing Ideology			Reference Category of the Interaction Term: Employed Permanent of Right Wing Ideology			Model Characteristics
Explanatory Variables	Odds Ratio	Sig.	Explanatory Variables	Odds Ratio	Sig.	
Age	1.01	n.s.	Age	1.01	n.s.	N = 503 Chi2(12) = 267.52 Pseudo R2= 0.3837 Log Likelihood = -214.88244 Goodness of fit Test: Prob>Chi2= 0.1465
Female	.48	***	Female	.48	***	
Class =>(Ref. Service)			Class =>(Ref. Service)			
Intermediate	.27	****	Intermediate	.27	****	
Skilled Manual	.12	****	Skilled Manual	.12	****	
Unskilled	.13	****	Unskilled	.13	****	Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of fit Test (group(10)): Prob>Chi2= 0.7572 Sensitivity 79.45% Specificity 83.20% Correctly class. 81.31% (Cutoff (.5))
INTERACTION			INTERACTION			
==>(Ref. Permanent and leftwing)			==>(Ref. Permanent and rightwing)			
Unemployed Fixed-Term & Left	2.57	**	Unemployed Fixed-Term & Right	.55	n.s.	
Employed Fixed-Term & Left	1.59	n.s.	Employed Fixed-Term & Right	1.31	n.s.	
Unemployed Permanent & Left	1.38	n.s.	Unemployed Permanent & Right	.76	n.s.	
Employed Permanent & Right	44.4	****	Employed Permanent & Left	.02	****	
Unemployed Fixed-Term & Right	24.5	****	Unemployed Fixed-Term & Left	.06	****	
Employed Fixed-Term & Right	58.3	****	Employed Fixed-Term & Left	.036	****	
Unemployed Permanent & Right	33.6	****	Unemployed Permanent & Left	.031	****	

****significance ≤ 0.001 ***significance ≤ 0.01 **significance ≤ 0.05 *significance ≤ 0.07 (Significance level in parenthesis)

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995. (Calculated by the author)

We can interpret these findings as empirical confirmation of the punishment effect hypothesis. Leftwing unemployed fixed-term workers are more likely to vote for the conservative party than the rest of their leftwing labour market counterparts, even after controlling for age, gender and class, whereas no effects of labour market situation are found within rightwing workers. The x-shape interaction implicit in model B finds no empirical support. All the evidence points indeed in the direction of a y-shape interaction effect²⁴.

The punishment effect hypothesis finds further empirical support in the model presented in Table 8. This model applies exclusively to ex-socialist voters (that is, respondents who declare having voted for the socialists in the 1993 elections). What we are measuring thus is vote transfers from the PSOE to the PP (on the assumption that vote intention materialised in a real vote a few months after the 1995 survey). This is another way of investigating punishment effects, focusing this time on the testing of *economic voting* mechanisms against *party loyalty* ones. Model A shows that the chances that respondents who voted for the socialists in 1993 changed their vote to the conservatives in 1996 increased significantly if respondents were unemployed as a result of the termination of their fixed-term contracts. Transfers from PSOE to PP were thus significantly more likely to occur in the flexible segment of the labour market. The model shows a good fit and good predictive capacity. An interaction effect between ideology and labour market position has been tested. It has however been rejected (results are available for the interested reader). But this is hardly surprising given that we are modelling the responses of ex-socialist voters, the majority of whom will be situated on the left side of the ideological scale.

²⁴ Results are also confirmed if we split the sample into two different ideological blocks (left and right) and then fit two different logistic models for each ideological sub-sample. This alternative strategy shows a significant increase in the odds ratio for unemployed workers coming from fixed-term work in the leftwing sub-sample and, as expected, no labour market effects in the case of the rightwing sub-sample. Results of these two logistic models are available for the interested reader. Model C shown in Table 7 has the virtue that it allows us to test the y-shape interaction effect without having to sub-divide the sample.

Table 8. *Logistic Regressions on Vote Intention for the Conservative Party (PP) vs. Vote Intention for the Socialist (PSOE) for Ex-Socialist Respondents*

EX-SOCIALIST RESPONDENTS		
Explanatory Variables	Odds Sig.	Characteristics
Age	1.02 n.s.	N = 230
Female	.78 n.s.	Chi2(9) = 28.24
Class =>(Ref. Service) Intermediate	.56 n.s.	Prob>Chi2= 0.0009
Skilled Manual	.23 n.s.	Pseudo R2= 0.2153
Unskilled	.17 *(.081)	Log Likelihood = -51.451133
Labour Market Situation=>(Ref. Permanent)		
Employed Fixed-Term	2.78 n.s.	Goodness of fitTest:
Unemployed Fixed-Term	9.44 ***	Prob>Chi2= 0.8525
Unemployed Permanent	1.60 n.s.	Sensitivity 68.42%
Ideology (L-R)	2.00 ****	Specificity 81.04%
		Correctly class. 80.0%
		(Cutoff (.10))

**** sig. ≤ 0.001 ***sig. ≤ 0.01 **sig. ≤ 0.05 *sig. approx. .10 (Significance level in parenthesis)

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995 (Calculated by the author)

Table 9 below shows different probabilities of voting conservative instead of socialist for left-wing and for ex-socialist voters as predicted by Model C in Table 7 and by the model shown in Table 8. What these models thus suggest is that *economic voting* mechanisms seem to work for those voters who are unemployed as a result of the termination of their fixed-term contracts and who are within what we could call *the natural sphere of influence* of the Socialist Party (that is, left-wing respondents and/or ex-socialist voters). Are these mechanisms activated as a result of economic deprivation? We think not.

Table 9. Predicted probabilities (in %) of voting conservative (PP) instead of voting socialist (PSOE) for left-wing and exsocialist voters by different occupational classes and labor market categories according to the punishment effect models

<i>Occupational Classes</i>	LEFT-WING VOTERS* (CALCULATED FROM MODEL C IN TABLE 7)		EX-SOCIALIST VOTERS (CALCULATED FROM MODEL IN TABLE 8)	
	<i>Rest of the Labour Market categories</i>	<i>Unemployed from Fixed-Term</i>	<i>Rest of the Labour Market categories</i>	<i>Unemployed from Fixed-Term</i>
<i>Service Class (I)</i>	50.8	66.4	9.1	27.8
<i>Intermediate Class (III)</i>	21.8	30.5	8.1	21.3
<i>Skilled Manual Class (VI/VII)</i>	14.8	25.8	3.7	11.3
<i>Unskilled Manual Class (VII)</i>	13.8	20.3	7.8	13.0

*Those who place themselves between 1 and 5 in the 1-to-10 ideology scale.

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995. (Calculated by the author from model C in Table 7 and model presented in Table 8)

The household income variable has been introduced both in models B and C1 of Table 7 and in the model presented in Table 8. If the processes whereby unemployment for fixed-term workers translates into a punishment vote were activated by the experiences of economic deprivation, one should expect some sort of reduction in the impact of labour market situation on the vote after controlling for household income. This however does not happen (see Table 10). In fact, including household income in all these models does not add anything to the explanation of the outcome. Interaction effects between income and labour market situation have also been tested and rejected in all cases (results on these interactions are available for the interested reader). Once again, household income does not seem to be behind the observed political effects of labour market segmentation by type of contract in Spain.

Subjective mechanisms behind the punishment vote can be more easily identified than ‘objective’ ones. As the models presented in Table 11 show, both political disaffection (that is, feelings of external inefficacy) and attitudes favourable to social change can explain by themselves why left-wing unemployed voters coming from fixed-term work might have chosen to vote for the conservative Popular Party in the 1996 Spanish general elections. Once

we control for (either of) these two variables, the significant effect of labour market situation disappears²⁵.

This suggests, on the one hand, that political disaffection is one of the links that connects the experience of labour market precarity to punishment vote. Negative evaluations of the external efficacy of the political system facilitate cross-ideological voting because they imply the erosion of party identification removing the weight that 'loyalty' considerations could otherwise have on voting choices. Similarly, if voters do not feel represented politically, their voting behaviour will become less dependent on ideological allegiances and more likely to be influenced by economic considerations. On the other hand, the perception that society needs radical changes might increase frustration with the incumbent party, which will facilitate a punishment vote. Greater demands for social change could also convince some left-wing outsiders to give conservatives a chance, particularly if political disaffection makes them believe that *'no one can do it worse'*.

²⁵ Neither subjective political involvement, democratic legitimacy, nor opinions regarding direct means of political action seem to be significantly related to punishment vote (results are available for the interested reader).

Table 10. *The Effects of Household Income on Vote Intention (Logistic Regressions on Vote Intention for the Conservative Party (PP) vs. Vote Intention for the Socialist (PSOE))*

MODELS	Explanatory variables	Odds Ratio	Sig.	Models' Characteristics
ALL RESPONDENTS				
	Age	1.0	n.s.	N = 400
	Female	.47	**	Chi2(13) = 261.63
	Class =>(Ref. Service) Intermediate	.20	***	Pseudo R2= 0.4720
	Skilled Manual	.12	****	Log Likelihood = -146.36291
	Unskilled	.12	****	
	Labour Market Situation=>(Ref. Permanent)			Goodness of fit Test:
	Employed Fixed-Term	.46	n.s.	Prob>Chi2= 0.4393
	Unemployed Fixed-Term	35.44	***	
	Unemployed Permanent	.05	n.s.	*This model comes from a previous model that did not pass the goodness of fit test.
	Ideology (L-R)	3.37	****	Analysis of influential cases through the Pregibon's dbeta scores showed 1 influential case. It was deleted. Not a single variable has changed its significance.
	Interaction: Ideology*Labour Market Sit.			
	Ideology*Employed Fixed-Term	1.38	n.s.	
	Ideology*Unemployed Fixed-Term	.56	**	
	Ideology*Unemployed Permanent	2.02	n.s.	Sensitivity 85.29% Specificity 84.18%
	Household Income	1.13	n.s.	Correctly class. 84.75% (Cutoff (.5))
LEFT-WING RESPONDENTS				
Explanatory Variables		Odds	Sig.	Characteristics
	Age	1.0	n.s.	N = 236
	Female	.70	n.s.	LR Chi2(10) =82.38
	Class =>(Ref. Service) Intermediate	.17	***	Pseudo R2= 0.3104
	Skilled Manual	.11	****	Log Likelihood = -91.520687
	Unskilled	.08	****	
	Labour Market Situation=>(Ref. Permanent)			Goodness of fit Test:
	Employed Fixed-Term	1.58	n.s.	Prob>Chi2= 0.5421
	Unemployed Fixed-Term	2.67	*(.10)	
	Unemployed Permanent	1.50	n.s.	Sensitivity 77.97%
	Ideology (L-R)	4.42	***	Specificity 78.53%
	Household Income	.99	n.s.	Correctly class. 78.39% (Cutoff (.3))
EX-SOCIALIST RESPONDENTS				
Explanatory Variables		Odds	Sig.	Characteristics
	Age	1.02	n.s.	N = 189
	Female	.88	n.s.	LR Chi2(10) = 32.87
	Class =>(Ref. Service) Intermediate	.64	n.s.	Pseudo R2= 0.2765
	Skilled Manual	.40	n.s.	Log Likelihood = -43.005956
	Unskilled	.30	n.s.	
	Labour Market Situation=>(Ref. Permanent)			Goodness of fitTest:
	Employed Fixed-Term	3.33	n.s.	Prob>Chi2= 0.9983
	Unemployed Fixed-Term	16.08	***	
	Unemployed Permanent	1.32	n.s.	Sensitivity 83.33%
	Ideology (L-R)	2.08	****	Specificity80.70%
	Household Income	1.45	n.s.	Correctly class. 80.95%(Cutoff (.10))

**** sig. ≤ 0.001 ***sig. ≤ 0.01 **sig. ≤ 0.05 *sig. approx. .10 (Significance level in parenthesis)

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995 (Calculated by the author)

Table 11. *The Mediating Impact of Political Disaffection and Radicalisation Mechanisms on Punishment Vote (Logistic Regressions on Vote Intention for The Conservative Party (PP) Vs. Vote Intention For The Socialist (PSOE) For Left-Wing Respondents)*

LEFT-WING RESPONDENTS			
MODELS	Explanatory variables	Odds Ratio Sig.	Models' Characteristics
	Age	1.0 n.s.	N = 290 LR Chi2(10) =95.35 Pseudo R2= 0.3041 Log Likelihood = -109.07695 Goodness of fit Test (Group 10): Prob>Chi2= 0.469521 Sensitivity 71.64% Specificity 81.61% Correctly class. 79.31% (Cutoff (.3))
	Female	.82 n.s.	
	Class =>(Ref. Service) Intermediate	.19 ***	
	Skilled Manual	.12 ****	
	Unskilled	.08 ****	
	Labour Market Situation=>(Ref. Permanent)		
	Employed Fixed-Term	1.14 n.s.	
	Unemployed Fixed-Term	1.88 n.s.	
	Unemployed Permanent	1.15 n.s.	
	Ideology (L-R)	4.08 ***	
	Political Disaffection (External Efficacy) Index	1.21 **	
	Age	1.0 n.s.	N = 291 LR Chi2(10) =103.47 Pseudo R2= 0.3270 Log Likelihood = -106.47383 Goodness of fit Test (Group 10): Prob>Chi2= 0.2055 Sensitivity 70.59% Specificity 83.41% Correctly class. 80.41% (Cutoff (.3))
	Female	1.0 n.s.	
	Class =>(Ref. Service) Intermediate	.31 ***	
	Skilled Manual	.20 ****	
	Unskilled	.13 ****	
	Labour Market Situation=>(Ref. Permanent)		
	Employed Fixed-Term	1.17 n.s.	
	Unemployed Fixed-Term	1.57 n.s.	
	Unemployed Permanent	.93 n.s.	
	Ideology (L-R)	3.83 ***	
	Attitudes Pro-radical Social Change*	2.41 **	
	Age	1.0 n.s.	N = 2901 LR Chi2(11) =105365.47 Pseudo R2= 0.3370 Log Likelihood = -103.92638 Goodness of fit Test: Prob>Chi2= 0.9769 Sensitivity 74.63% Specificity 84.30% Correctly class. 82.07% (Cutoff (.3))
	Female	.94 n.s.	
	Class =>(Ref. Service) Intermediate	.25 ***	
	Skilled Manual	.16 ****	
	Unskilled	.10 ****	
	Labour Market Situation=>(Ref. Permanent)		
	Employed Fixed-Term	1.05 n.s.	
	Unemployed Fixed-Term	1.30 n.s.	
	Unemployed Permanent	.92 n.s.	
	Ideology (L-R)	3.82 ***	
	Political Disaffection (External Efficacy) Index	1.18 **	
	Attitudes Pro-radical Social Change*	2.23 ***	

* The 4-interval likert variable has been transformed into a 5-interval variable by creating a new mid-interval with those who did not know or want to answer the question. The variable has been then introduced as continuous.

**** sig. ≤ 0.001 ***sig. ≤ 0.01 **sig. ≤ 0.05 *sig. approx. .10 (Significance level in parenthesis)

SOURCE: CIS 2154, 1995 (Calculated by the author)

DISCUSSION

In this paper, we have investigated the causal links that connect individuals' experiences in an insider-outsider labour market to their political attitudes and voting behaviour. Evidence based on multivariate analysis of data from the 1995 SCSR survey on political culture has shown that being in the flexible segment of the Spanish labour market (and particularly being unemployed as a result of the termination of a fixed-term contract) seems to have attitudinal consequences. In fact, our analysis suggests that labour market precarity is likely to enhance attitudes favourable to radical social change and the use of direct means of political action, create feelings of external political inefficacy, and erode both subjective political identification and democratic legitimacy. We have interpreted all these findings as the symptom of a more general process of *political detachment* born out of outsiders' frustration with their own labour market situation.

This frustration, however, does not seem to be originated (at least not exclusively so) in the economic deprivation attached to the experience of being an outsider in the Spanish labour market. Contrary to our expectations, household income has little impact in mediating the attitudinal effects of labour market experiences. This suggests that family-based economic resources and welfare unemployment provision schemes might not be effective in mitigating the political consequences of labour market dualisation, which contradicts a recent argument put forward by Maravall and Fraile²⁶ (1998).

²⁶ "Our evidence shows that both amongst voters who were unemployed and voters who were not, ideology and income could contribute to explain the persistence of partisan loyalties. It also demonstrates that, while support for the government was lower when a voter was unemployed.... comparatively higher levels of income among those unemployed due to welfare protection, mitigated or even reversed these effects" (Maravall and Fraile 1998,38-39).

In our opinion this conclusion is open to criticism on the following grounds. First, the authors model the chances of voting for the Socialist Party versus the chances of choosing any other electoral option. This construction of the dependent variable becomes problematic with respect to interpreting the effect of ideology in the models since within the non-socialist vote other leftist options are included. Secondly, the authors choose to operationalise their independent labour market variable by distinguishing the unemployed from the rest of the sample (including the non-active population). This strategy does not seem to be the best way of analysing the effects of unemployment for these effects can only be isolated if we compare the unemployed to the employed. Thirdly, the modelling strategy raises doubts as to whether the income effect is correctly isolated since their models do not control for individuals' class. Instead, the models use educational level. We think, however, that

In fact, household income seems to have no significant impact whatsoever on the electoral consequences of dualisation. In Section Three we have provided abundant empirical evidence which suggests that ideology alone could explain the limited electoral consequences of dualisation at the aggregate level²⁷. This analysis confirms our expectation that similar labour market experiences have different electoral outcomes depending on the ideological maps individuals use to make political sense out of their every-day experiences. In other words, it is ideology, rather than income support, the mechanism that seems to mitigate the electoral effects of labour market insecurity. Our multivariate modelling has shown how ideological mediation can sometimes take the form of rather complex interaction effects.

But if economic deprivation is not the key factor linking labour market precarity to political effects, what is it? Our analysis suggests that what triggers punishment voting does not seem to be related to unemployment in general but to the unemployment experiences of fixed-term workers. What distinguishes these experiences from the experiences of their ex-permanently employed counterparts is that they are more likely to be recurrent episodes in labour market trajectories characterised by labour insecurity (see: Polavieja 1998a). Our conclusion is that the feelings of employment insecurity, atomisation, lack of employment prospects and uncertainty regarding the future in the labour market could alone provoke political radicalisation, apathy, disaffection and fatalism even if outsiders do not suffer from economic hardship. In other words, they could alone provoke political frustration.

Frustration could have been particularly high precisely amongst those outsider voters who, by virtue of their ideological allegiances, were within the 'natural' sphere of influence of the Socialist Party. For these voters, the socialist government's failure to eliminate labour market dualism (not to mention its prominent role in its creation) could have generated

educational level is in general a bad proxy for position in the class structure (and even more so in the Spanish case where a considerable number of older employers and even service class employees have few educational credentials). Finally, even if the models were correctly measuring the effects of family income, it is arguable that the household income variable is actually reflecting the impact of welfare protection. Since unemployment benefits are linked to last-job tenure and since in Spain the majority of the unemployed come from the termination of fixed-term contracts characterised by their short duration (see: Polavieja 1998a), it is doubtful that unemployment benefits play such an important role in income protection as the authors conclude.

greater political disillusion because their ideological maps should lead them to expect more and to expect differently from a socialist party. In this sense, punishment effects can be interpreted along the lines of the expectation-disillusion mechanisms found when analysing attitudes towards trade unions in Spain (see: Polavieja 1999a). If this interpretation is correct, the Spanish conservative party (PP) could paradoxically benefit in the future from lower expectations amongst *flexible* workers.

²⁷ It is however arguable that one should accept that electoral consequences have been 'limited'. What are these 'limited' experiences compared to?

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Hypothesised Structure
of the Data