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**GERMAN UNIFICATION 1990-1997:
THE LONG, LONG ROAD**

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Max Kaase is Research Professor at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. This paper is based on two seminars that he gave at the *Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences* of the Juan March Institute in Madrid on 11 and 12 March 1996 entitled, respectively, “The Future of Democratic Government” and “Some Reflections with Data on the Process of German Unification”.

1. Inner Unity, and What It May Mean

In July of 1997, the Federal Government for the first time provided the Bundestag with an extensive report on the state of German unity (Bundesregierung 1997). In this 304 page document (in its mimeographed format of July 1) a broad array of fields with respect to all major aspects of unification is presented, culminating in the statement (ibid.: 13) that the goal of inner unity (*innere Einheit*) will be achieved when the great majority of citizens also in the new Länder speak of the united Germany as their "Land".

This view is buffered in the report by the observation that the rapidly moving material unification in many respects is now completed, but that the process of "inner unification" is going at a much slower pace. Among the reasons given for this are a) emotional barriers of the East vis à vis the West as well as the West vis à vis the East, which can be described in a nutshell as suspected arrogance of the West Germans (on the part of East Germans), and the suspected lack of gratitude and unwillingness to learn on the side of the East Germans (on the part of West Germans); b) too little self esteem on the side of the East Germans who often think of themselves as second class citizens and suffer from the lack of appreciation (*Gering-schaetzung*) of their previous history in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (ibid.: 10-11).

The concept of inner unity, which is frequently referred to when the mentalities and mental states of the West Germans and East Germans are contrasted, lacks a clear theoretical underpinning, as Kaase already observed in 1993 when he wrote the entry on *Innere Einheit* (Kaase 1993: 372) in the *Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit* (Weidenfeld and Korte 1993). Kaase conceptualized *innere Einheit* as individual characteristics assessed by representative sample surveys and emphasizing (1) similarities and dissimilarities between the two German populations at the time of unification with respect to their mentalities, ways of life and political orientations, and (2) the extent to which these factors have undergone changes since the time of unification (Kaase 1993: 372).

In an article for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Veen (1997a; further elaborated in Veen 1997b) has criticized this notion of inner unity as much too encompassing (... die prozessuale Begriffsbestimmung eröffnet der Sozialforschung ein grenzenloses Feld [the processual definition (of inner unity; M.K./P.B.-K.) opens up an unlimited field for social research]) and has proposed a functionalist definition which "needs to be strictly oriented towards the legitimacy bases of the Federal Republic" (ibid.). The context of his argument makes clear that he proposes to concentrate on the acceptance of the constitutional order in both parts of Germany, plus the regulative idea of the market economy and the embeddedness of Germany in the European Union and in NATO. This perspective -at least with respect to the constitutional dimension- is very much in line with pluralist thinking on the consensual sector as the essence of the basic institutions and procedures of the polity and the controversial sector as the field where democratic conflict can rage (Fraenkel 1964: 152-155). However, although Veen's suggestion for conceptual clarity is, in principle, well taken, he tends to ignore the fact that, in a dynamic perspective, core systemic political beliefs are influenced also by factors outside the political realm, resulting in the need to cast the empirical net much wider (though with a clear theoretical rationale in mind). Second, the analytical focus Veen chooses does not relieve him of the need to acknowledge the large differences in many political beliefs and attitudes between West Germans and East Germans. These differences are emphasized by Fuchs *et al.* (1997) in an article written as a direct reaction to Veen's analysis.

There is little point in dwelling too long on definitional matters since the data analyzed in this article can only contribute to one particular aspect of the ongoing West-East divide. Thus, the focal point of this empirical scrutiny will be the way West Germans and East Germans look at each other in the long haul in searching for the causes of some of the cognitive and emotional problems in the minds of the German people which have resulted from German unification. This goal will be approached by adding a 1997 data point to a series of surveys which were conducted since 1992 in both the old and new Länder (for previous empirical work along the same lines see Bauer-Kaase 1993; Kaase 1993; Kaase 1995; Bauer-Kaase and Kaase 1996; Kaase 1996).

Before these data are presented, in the next section we review briefly the extent to which the two Germanies have changed their mental outlook, especially in the political realm, since 1990, to see whether there is a uniform tendency over time for the two populations to become more similar or more different.

2. What Has Happened Since 1990?

Reading a review article on "Germany after Unification - Normal at Last?" (McAdams 1997), one can rightfully wonder whether Germany, given two World wars and the Shoah, can ever become a "normal" democratic nation. While historians, journalists and political philosophers are apparently able to continue this debate without ever reaching a conclusion, social scientists looking at reliable data on the West German public's political orientations were fairly much agreed that with the government turnover in 1969 from the Christian Democrats to the Social Democrats under Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel, the Federal Republic had become a stable democracy (Conradt 1980). Needless to say that such an observation easily squares with a belief that German democracy can well be improved and that the united Germany is still in search of a new international identity.

Given Germany's historical predicament in this century, it was reasonable to ask, as unification became a realistic option, what the joining forty-year-old liberal democracy and a forty-year-old totalitarian system meant regarding the future of the united Germany. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1994: 230) voiced a skeptical view on the matter when, after an analysis of the democratic beliefs of East Germans, she concluded that "one cannot help wondering whether democracy will ever gain acceptance (in the new Laender; M.K./P.B.-K.) under these circumstances".

While understandable in a historical perspective, this skepticism nevertheless overlooks two simple but important facts. First of all, the two Germanies did not unite on an even basis. East Germany ceased to exist as an independent state and acquired more or less com-

pletely the constitutional and legal framework of the Federal Republic (for details see Kaase et al. 1996; Wollmann et al. 1997). In addition, one must bear in mind that (in 1989) 79 percent of the all-German population lived in the old and only 21 percent in the new *Länder* (by December 1996 the proportion was 81 percent to 19 percent). This is not a trivial ratio when one reflects on the future of German democracy and worries about the entrance of a citizenry which was politically socialized under totalitarian rule.

Second, a democracy in the long run may well be destabilized when their citizens completely and vigorously turn away from it. Nevertheless, a democracy is also, and not least, defined by its constitutional-legal institutions; these have to be considered in their own right when one reflects on the persistence of a democratic polity.

2.1 *Attitudes Towards Democracy in Germany*

Before findings on this topic are discussed, a reminder is in order. If one considers that since 1990 1000 Billion DM in net transfers have gone from the old to the new *Länder* (Bundesregierung 1997: 2), then one can imagine the economic strain on Germany which has resulted from unification. However, this strain became effective exactly at a time when the trend towards globalization of industry and trade, accompanied by electronic networking, gained full force and deeply challenged the established notion of the West German welfare state as the epitome of *rheinischer Kapitalismus*. Both developments have helped to create and perpetuate the sense of gloom which now lies as a veil over all of Germany and its four to six million unemployed (depending on the method of counting). Thus, democracy in Germany faces a two-fold challenge: the "new" Germans have to get accustomed to a complex set of political institutions and procedures at a time of special regional, as well as general, strain, and the "old" Germans are facing a challenge to their welfare entitlements at a time when the legitimating and stabilizing nature of the negative counter image of the totalitarian communist states, and particularly the GDR, is no longer available.

With the first free *Volkskammer* election approaching and signs of an eventual unification accumulating in early 1990 in the GDR, West German market research firms very quickly, competently and efficiently extended their services into East Germany, one consequence being that West German social research could study the process of transition in the East (and its perceptions as well as its repercussions in the West) from the beginning on a reliable basis. Especially with respect to attitudes towards democracy, surprising similarities between West Germans and East Germans were discovered, similarities which in fact made an American observer wonder whether in the East one was not dealing with "questionnaire democrats" (Dalton 1994).

More recent research has qualified the early findings in various ways (for an overview of these findings see Gabriel 1996). Owing much to David Easton's (1965; 1975) differentiation into a hierarchy of political objects, analyses showed that there was relatively little difference between the West and the East in the (large) amount of support for the principal idea of democracy (Fuchs 1997a: 106).

As Figures 1-3 indicate, however, the data reveal a substantially different picture when it comes to the West-East assessment of the kind of democracy, institutions (Walz 1997) and economic system developed in the Federal Republic and transferred to the East, as well as their performance.

Without discussing these data in any greater detail, three observations stand out. First, there is a consistent and substantial difference between the West and the East in that in the latter, support for the West German democracy, market economy and overall democratic performance are lower by a 20 to 40 percentage point margin. One may speculate here that as the economic situation in the East improves (in the long run at least) and as new generations of East Germans enter the electorate, this state of affairs will improve. However, based on a 1997 youth survey (14 to 29 years) by the *Allensbach Institut für Demoskopie*, Noelle-Neumann (1997a) observes that 49 percent of the young East Germans, but only 15 percent of the young West Germans (in 1994, 40 percent to 8 percent) would have preferred unification to have led to a new kind of state with a mixture of market economy, humanity and socialism

(the so-called third way). Thus there is no question that in this sense the citizens in the new *Länder* have not yet fully arrived in the new, united Germany, and that at present, little change for the better can be expected from fresh young cohorts moving into the East German citizenry.

Second, in the West there still remains a gap between the evaluation of democracy and its concrete performance (the latter being lower), as one would expect from theoretical considerations, which cannot equally be found in the East. Third, there is a downward trend in these data in both parts of Germany on all the dimensions covered here. This points to an impact of the obvious gross dissatisfaction, in particular, with the high level of unemployment, but also with the perceived lack of action by the federal government in coping with problems which carries over from the authorities to the regime level. (This transfer hypothesis is further corroborated in a paper by Cusack [1997] who uses an econometric model to assess these effects).

Summarizing the findings from the literature, there is little question that the much lower satisfaction with (the West German) democracy in the new *Länder* reflects socialization effects from the previous totalitarian regime (Fuchs et al. 1997; Noelle-Neumann 1997b) as well as the economic difficulties which, despite all financial transfers from the West and from the EU, are still prevalent there (Conradt 1997; Walz and Brunner 1997). But this explanation does not suffice. Fuchs (1997a; 1997b) has also analyzed the extent to which this discrepancy in satisfaction is related to a difference in concepts of democracy in the two parts of Germany. His conclusion is that there are three such factors in the East which can be regarded as legacies of socialization and need to be considered here: 1) the desire for a variety of social rights to be **constitutionally** established (such as a right to housing, work); 2) more emphasis on plebiscitary elements in political participation; 3) a more extensive role of the state in guaranteeing social welfare rights and equality (see also Veen and Zelle 1995: 5; Roller 1997; Fuchs et al. 1997: 6-8). Fuchs (1997b: 281) concludes that the two Germanies differ in these attitudes to the extent "of a breakage of the political community" (translation M.K./P.B.-K.). It may well be that Fuchs here overstates his case; nevertheless, empirical evidence abounds that with respect to orientations towards the democratic system of governance even in 1997 a major West-East cleavage can be observed.

2.2 *The Problem of Political Identity*

Based on the 1995-97 wave of the World Values Survey coordinated by Inglehart, Klingemann (1997) has shown that from twenty-four countries around the globe, Germany and Japan continue to be last in rank with respect to pride in one's country and willingness to fight for it should the need arise. Apparently, the effect of the two countries' active involvement in the Second World War lingers on even forty years after the end of that war. Whatever (little) surge in these feelings could be observed in Germany around the time of unification has by now withered away again (Westle 1997: 68; Veen and Zelle 1995: 8).

One important additional finding is that both Germanies can be characterized by a multiplicity of simultaneous identifications with the town/community, the *Bundesland* (state), and the nation, thereby neutralizing the impact of one overarching national identity. Also, it will surprise no one that in the West there is almost a complete convergence of identities between the "old" Federal Republic and the "new" united Germany; after all, in almost all respects they are the same. However, a look at the East German data tells a different story. While shortly after unification identification with the former GDR fell below 50 percent, by 1994 it had regained about 20 percentage points, thereby indicating that the East Germans were in the process of establishing an identity of their own and making their GDR biography a part of it (Westle 1997: 67-69).

One of the most cited findings from the Almond and Verba Civic Culture Study was that in West Germany pride in one's country was hardly related at all to the new democratic political institutions. A substantial increase by 1978 in that dimension as a reason for pride was one of the reasons why Conradt (1980: 229-231) could speak of a "Changing German Political Culture". Westle (1997: 70-74) has updated this time series for the West up to 1994 and has also included the new *Länder* since 1991. Without dealing with the details of this analysis, it is worthwhile summarizing the main finding: West and East Germany at least in 1992 differed dramatically in the extent to which national pride is based on objects of the political system (much lower in the East). While it is unsatisfactory that no recent data are available covering the period after 1992 on this dimension, the existing analyses reinforce the point made above that at least in the East the old GDR identity continues to play an important role in helping the citizens in the new *Länder* to reestablish their own biographies.

One interesting problem raised by Veen (1997a) refers to the extent to which the analytical concentration on the West-East divide artificially inflates its impact, while in reality this divide is not principally different from other, historically developed regional identities and potential cleavages in West Germany, such as between the Bavarians and the North Germans. However, research shows that the West-East distinction at least at this point in time still continues to be special and relevant, and for good theoretical reasons (Schneider 1997). But there is also convincing empirical evidence buffering this point. First, in a longitudinal

study of communication behavior between West Germans and East Germans in panel group discussions between 1992 and 1994, it was shown that the West-East category was and remains an important as well as easily accessible code for social interactions. However, as the contact groups continued to meet (for a maximum of three encounters), becoming acquainted with each other reduced the saliency of the West-East distinction (Piontkowski, Öhlschlegel-Haubrock and Hölker 1997). Thus, since at the German aggregate level the probability of regular personal encounters among Western and Eastern individuals will remain rather low, there is little reason to expect that the easy accessibility and potential salience of the West-East category will diminish in the near future, particularly given the fact that in public political discourse (such as with respect to sustained financial transfers from the West to the East for economic development) this cleavage is constantly reinforced.

Secondly, in a re-analysis of a 1996 survey on behalf of the *Kommission für die Erforschung des sozialen und politischen Wandels in den neuen Bundesländern* (KSPW) by the authors of this article, Veen's hypothesis (see above) was tested in a regression analysis with a set of dummy variables as independent variables representing the five regions of Northern Germany (the four *Länder* Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, Lower Saxony, plus West Berlin), North Rhine-Westphalia, Central Germany (Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland), Southern Germany (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria) and East Germany (the five new *Länder* plus East Berlin). In these analyses, regarding the orientations towards democracy and the political system previously discussed as dependent variables, East Germany consistently turned out to be by far the most distinctive regional category.

2.3 *Values and Value Change*

In many ways, the former GDR was *terra incognita* with respect to what should be expected in terms of value orientations when representative survey research in the East became routinely possible after 1989. Given the impact of the materialism-postmaterialism conceptualization *à la* Inglehart, it does not come as a surprise that the Inglehart scheme was

replicated in the East after 1990. Beyond this, a large set of other values was also empirically scrutinized. The topic of values is briefly taken up in this article because previous research has shown that value orientations can be very consequential also for political attitudes and behaviors.

Before some selected findings on values are discussed, a qualifying remark is in order. For the dimensions of materialism/postmaterialism and duty- and acceptance/self realization, time series data point to the fact that the early 1990s are witnessing a change away from postmaterialism (Bauer-Kaase and Kaase 1998) and self realization values (Veen and Graf 1997), most likely reflecting the negative turn of the economic tide. However, this point is not pursued further because it is marginal to the West-East perspective of this article.

Instead, the question is to what extent research on values since 1990 can say something on the structure of, and changes in, value orientations. It has to be kept in mind, though, that a summary discussion of these aspects of values is hampered by the fact that different authors have concentrated on quite different value dimensions. Certainly, the most encompassing stocktaking in this field is a book by Meulemann (1996), the main findings of which are summarized in a recent research report (Meulemann 1997). His main assumption is that, based on the contrasting systemic characteristics for the acquisition of values in the two German states before 1990, substantial differences in value orientations between the two can be expected (this is the **structure hypothesis**). The alternative is the **delay hypothesis** which argues that, since in the GDR developments were suppressed which were permitted freely in the Federal Republic, East German values in 1990 should resemble West German values before the mid-1960s when the value change started there. Both hypotheses predict an assimilation of the Eastern to Western standards, though differently depending on the four value dimensions scrutinized by Meulemann: equality, achievement, co-determination, and religiosity and morality as indicators for the acceptance of institutions.

Without following Meulemann's analysis in detail, the main findings can be summarized as follows: 1) after unification, West-East differences were much more frequent than similarities; 2) for **changes** in value orientations in East Germany, the prevailing pattern is

one of increasing West-East separation and differences, triggered mostly by the devaluation after 1990 in the East of the metaphysical component in work values inflicted upon GDR citizens by their authorities (Meulemann 1997: 133-136).

In a dimensionally much more limited analysis, Arzheimer and Klein (1997: 39-43) test three hypotheses: 1) **the conservation hypothesis** which postulates that the East Germans were not substantially influenced by the GDR regime structures, but rather stuck to the value system predominant in Germany around the middle of the century (this somewhat resembles Meulemann's delay hypothesis); 2) **the socialization hypothesis** which pertains that there was a value change in the GDR, but one which took place under the specific conditions of the GDR, resulting in an emphasis on both equality and achievement; 3) **the congruence hypothesis** arguing that both in the GDR and in the FRG a (similar) value change has taken place.

These authors test these hypotheses with longitudinal data spanning the 1990-1995 period and conclude *grosso modo* that only the socialization hypothesis is sustainable (as was mentioned before, the same claim is made by Fuchs *et al.* 1997 for the political realm). This hypothesis, of course, emphasizes the **differences** in value orientations between West Germans and East Germans. This concerns in particular a stronger preponderance in the East of welfare, stateness and participatory orientations, thereby reinforcing aspects of difference which were already mentioned in the section on attitudes towards democracy (these findings receive further support through analyses by Roller [1997] as well as Jagodzinski and Kühnel [1997]).

The same can be said regarding a traditional *Allensbach* question which juxtaposes the two values of freedom and equality. As Figure 4 shows, the by now well-known difference between liberal and socialist concepts of society surfaces again, with the East Germans emphasizing freedom at a 20 percentage point margin **less** than equality (Köcher 1996; as Noelle-Neumann [1997b] shows, this cleavage has become even deeper in 1997).

2.4 *A First Summary*

Hans-Joachim Veen has argued that the notion of "inner unity" in describing East-West differences should be limited to basic matters of constitutional and institutional design. Furthermore, he suggested that one should be cautious in concentrating just on the two Germanies, since it may be very likely that similar differences also exist within West German regions. On both accounts, the situation in 1997 is clear: *vis à vis* German democracy there have been, and persist, substantial differences between the two populations, including those between West German and East German elites (Bürklin 1997: 242-246, 256-261), in the sense that East Germans are more skeptical, distant and differ in their concept of what a democracy is, and that these differences by far outweigh differences within West Germany which mostly reflect the various party colorings of the West German regions.

Beyond attitudes towards democracy, the analysis of value orientations has also confirmed that in most cases (for an exception see Veen and Graf 1997) the two Germanies have not moved closer, but rather apart, a consideration which is reinforced by the observation that East Germans increasingly rediscover their former GDR identity as a positive element in their biography.

3. **A Longitudinal Analysis of East-West Stereotypes**

3.1 *Theoretical Considerations*

In an article on East-West stereotypes based on theories of identity construction, Doll, Mielke and Mentz (1994: 501-503) developed two hypotheses about the way East-West mutual stereotypes and autostereotypes will develop over time. They argued that, provided the East-West distinction is salient, no social discrimination will ensue if status differences between the two groups are accepted by both. However, once consensus on those differences is (constitutionally) put into question (as in the case of German unification) both groups will

have to emphasize their own position- the one (West Germans) being challenged in terms of their status, and the other (East Germans) being in danger of losing its identity and self esteem altogether.

These theoretical considerations lead the authors to speculate (hypothesis one) that the "dominant" West Germans generally favor their own group by ascribing important positive features to it and granting positive evaluations to the "out" group only on those characteristics deemed less important (indirect discrimination). For the East Germans, the authors presume that in order to cope with the danger of losing or diminishing their own identity, they emphasize positive traits of their own group and at the same time assimilate to the "dominant" (West German) "out" group by accepting certain generally positive qualities.

What these reflections point to is the assumption that positive social identities are extremely important for individuals and that the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of social identities take place through processes of social comparison. Since positive identities are thus regarded as highly desirable, individuals search for ways of selecting for these comparisons objects and dimensions which will produce a positive identity (Haeger et al. 1996: 259-263). Obviously, for the type of social comparisons triggered by German unification, the West-East dimension is very salient (Piontkowski, Öhlschlegel-Haubrock and Hölker 1997), although less so for the West Germans than for the East Germans (Haeger et al. 1996: 270-271, 275).

The Doll, Mielke and Mentz (1994) study covered the 1992-1994 period and was based on an aggregate analysis of data on thirteen individual property pairs which had to be attributed both by West German and East German representative samples to the respective "in" and "out" group. The thirteen bipolar item sets were grouped into the two dimensions of first, competence, and then morality and working virtues, to facilitate the analysis. The main results were that West Germans are ranked highest, though **decreasing** over time, by the East Germans and themselves on the competence dimension, while East Germans ranked themselves highest (and **increasingly** so) and West Germans lowest (and spectacularly declining from 1990 to 1991) on the dimension of morality and working virtues (ibid.: 511-513).

These findings may be summarized by saying that the East Germans compensated for their potential loss of identity ensuing from the consequences of unification by increasingly emphasizing their own strengths as they saw them, and by deemphasizing the perceived strengths of the West German "out" group. Thus, the mutual evaluations of the two groups became **more** rather than **less** divergent over time, and this is mostly due to the East German respondents, although the West German respondents also became more skeptical regarding the morality and work virtues of East Germans. These findings are generally reinforced and differentiated through the study by Haeger et al. (1996: 274-277) in the sense that East Germans emphasize the dimension of social competence, where they see themselves doing much better than the West Germans (this is reinforced by a 1994 comparison based on the so-called Giessen test; see Brähler and Richter 1995: 8-10), the West Germans being more or less in agreement with this assessment. This points, generally speaking, to the dynamic compensatory and voluntaristic nature of comparisons in order to ascertain one's own identity.

One first conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that as long as the West-East category remains salient in public discourse and private perceptions, and the East Germans are still fighting for the positive reconstruction of their identity in a united Germany, it cannot be expected that the East Germans in particular will take a more relaxed stance *vis à vis* their fellow countrymen in the West. It remains to be seen now how this analysis squares with the data from a May/June 1997 representative sample survey conducted by the Hamburg GFM-GETAS institute for the *Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung*.

3.2 *An Analysis of Anti-West and Anti-East Stereotypes*

In the spring of 1992, *Der Spiegel* commissioned a survey with the Bielefeld EMNID survey research institute on political attitudes in East and West Germany. The survey included a set of questions about the mutual perceptions and self-perceptions of the two populations regarding the problems of unification. The data from this study were made available to the authors for secondary analysis and were replicated in further studies in 1993, 1994, 1995

and 1997. Thus a longitudinal analysis of aggregate stability and change in these orientations was possible, covering five points in time.

The initial formulation of the item battery was not derived from any specific theory and cannot be regarded as an established, well-anchored measurement instrument. Furthermore, it needs to be kept in mind from the outset that an anti-west item has a different meaning in the West than in the East (the same is, of course, true for the anti-east items). This ambiguity, however, is a major asset for the later index and typology construction.

Table 1 documents the wording of the five anti-west items and the three anti-east items as well as the responses (in percentages) across time. A certain methodological complication arises from the fact that the initial designers of the instrument decided in favor of a one-dimensional intensity rating: the given statements may correspond to the position of the respondent 'completely', 'somewhat', 'a little' or 'not at all'. Instead, it would have been preferable to apply a differentiated agree-disagree format with an equal number of agree and disagree categories, which would have permitted an unambiguous allocation of the responses to the overall agree and disagree option. Since this was not possible *ex post*, for the subsequent analyses the 'completely' and 'somewhat' categories were collapsed to indicate approval, and the 'little' and 'not at all' categories were joined to show disapproval.

Without dwelling too much on the individual items, two general findings stand out. First, and most importantly, regarding both sets of items (except the one item stating that there are people in the West who would rather live as if unification had not happened), in gross terms there are consistent and substantial differences in the way both samples see each other and the respective "out" group: the West Germans do not accept the criticism insinuated by the respective items, but agree with the negative statements about the Easterners, and vice versa. Second, over the six year period under scrutiny here, West Germans and East Germans in unification matters become less skeptical of themselves whereas the East Germans remain as skeptical and the West Germans almost as skeptical as they were from the beginning of these surveys *vis à vis* their counterparts. The following Table 2 summarizes these data by averaging percentages across the five anti-west and the three anti-east items separately for the

two samples for each point in time and also showing the percentage point differences from the two types of comparisons to be found in the table.

This display accentuates the findings just discussed. In the first five rows of the table, the general picture prevails in that both samples see their own group in a much more favorable light than the "out" group. Rows six through ten, however, are even more interesting because they reveal that the assessment of the respective "out" group by the "in" group is moderately more favorable in the West than in the East, and that the East Germans from the start were much more favorable towards their own group than were the West Germans.

Thus it seems that the continued high salience of the East-West divide has not permitted the growth over time of more friendly East-West feelings regarding problems with the unification process. Rather, the contrary seems true: while it appeared that the 1995 data signalled a slight closing of this gap, 1997 now points in a more negative direction again. Thus no assimilation between the two Germanies can be registered, pointing not only - as just mentioned - to the continued saliency of the East-West dimension, but also to the fact that for the East Germans more than for the West Germans, feelings about the role of the West Germans in the unification process constitute an important aspect of their identity construction.

In Table 3, the data on the individual East-West items are condensed into two indices and one typology. Data reduction, however, first requires a look at the way the individual items statistically relate. Here the question is particularly whether - separate for the West and the East - all eight items form one (unidimensional) scale or not. Factor analysis has been used to answer this question (results not shown here): consistently, an anti-west and an anti-east dimension emerged both after an orthogonal and an oblique rotation. The structure of correlations displayed in Table 3 explains why this is the case: both in the West and in the East at all five points in time, the anti-west and the anti-east items, when separated, correlated positively and in a satisfactory magnitude among themselves, whereas the pooling of all eight items results in close to zero inter-item correlations.

Table 2: <i>Average Criticism of West and East Germans vis à vis the In-Group and Out-Group 1992-1997 (percentages and percentage point differences)</i>						
Years of Survey	Approval of					
	Anti--West-Items in the			Anti-East-Items in the		
	West	East	PPD (W-E)	West	East	PPD (W-E)
1992	49	79	-30	68	26	42
1993	50	84	-34	66	28	38
1994	47	74	-27	63	28	35
1995	37	73	-36	58	23	35
1997	39	78	-39	61	18	43
	Approval of					
	Anti-East-Items in the	Anti-West-Items in the		Anti-West-Items in the	Anti-East-Items in the	
	West	East	PPD (W-E)	West	East	PPD (W-E)
1992	68	79	-11	49	26	23
1993	66	84	-18	50	28	22
1994	63	74	-11	47	28	19
1995	58	73	-15	37	23	14
1997	61	78	-17	39	18	21

This data structure suggests that the most parsimonious way of condensing the data is to use summary indices where the number of approved items is simply counted. Obviously, for the resulting Anti-West-Index the range of values is 0 (no item approved by the respondent) to 5 (all items approved by the respondent); the corresponding Anti-East-Index, because of the smaller number of items, ranges from 0 to 3. The resulting two indices are displayed in Tables 4 and 5 for the two samples.

Table 3. <i>Average Correlations (Pearson's r) Within and Between the Five Anti-West-Items and the Three Anti-East-Items in the West and in the East: 1992-1997</i>						
Year	Ø r within the 5 Anti-West-Items n = 10 ¹⁾		Ø r within the 3 Anti-East-Items n = 3 ¹⁾		Ø r between the 5 Anti-West-Items and the 3 Anti-East-Items n = 15	
	West	East	West	East	West	East
1992 ²⁾	.32	.35	.47	.33	-.03	-.05
1993 ³⁾	.29	.36	.49	.41	-.04	-.05
1994 ⁴⁾	.29	.42	.41	.45	-.02	.16
1995 ⁵⁾	.34	.40	.57	.35	.09	.13
1997 ⁶⁾	.34	.33	.55	.36	.04	-.05
¹⁾ This number is calculated as: $\frac{n \text{ (total number of items)} \times (n - 1)}{2}$ ²⁾ Source: EMNID/Spiegel-Study 1992; voting-age population ³⁾ Source: Study of the <i>Lehrstuhl für Politische Wissenschaft und International Vergleichende Sozialforschung</i> of the University of Mannheim 1993; voting-age population ⁴⁾ Source: WZB /ZUMA Post-election study 1994; voting-age population ⁵⁾ Source: WZB 1995; voting-age population ⁶⁾ Source: WZB 1997; voting-age population						

Compared to the previous analysis, at least one interesting qualification pertains. In 1997, West Germans reject the negative stereotypes the East Germans might harbor against them, even slightly less than in 1995. Secondly, the index reinforces the observation that the East Germans are much more polarized in their views than the West Germans. There is little disagreement in the East that the West Germans are guilty of mishandling the affairs of their Eastern compatriots, and there is also little disagreement among the Easterners that they are not guilty in unification matters.

All in all, there can be no question on the basis also of this analysis that the East-West cleavage in these attitudes has not narrowed, but widened, from 1995 to 1997.

Given the substantial statistical independence between the two indices (in 1994, 1995 and 1997 the correlations in the West were respectively $r = -.004$, $.166$ and $.091$, and in the East $r = .001$, $-.024$ and $-.052$), from the earliest analyses on (Bauer-Kaase 1993; Kaase 1993) it had seemed attractive to combine both indices into one single typology. This would answer the question of whether there was an identifiable political belief context behind the response patterns in the data, as contrasted with the possibility that **on the individual level** the responses just represent idiosyncratic reactions to day-to-day political stimuli. Table 6 documents the construction of the typology both in the West and in the East. Whereas the types of 'Positivist' and 'Negativist' are constructed identically in both instances, it must be understood that in order to be functionally equivalent, the types of 'Internalizer' and 'Externalizer' must be established differently for the West German and East German samples.

While the 'Positivist' rejects notions of inadequate behavior both for the Westerners and the Easterners, the 'Negativist' does just the opposite in supporting both. 'Internalizer' means that one sees the reasons for the problems with unification only in one's own group and not in the other group, while the 'Externalizer' attributes all responsibility to the other group and not to his or her own group.

Of course, an examination of the percentage distributions of the types, given their construction, cannot alter the basic conclusions previously drawn. It does, however, serve to sharpen the contours of the findings, particularly with respect to the fact that the majority of the East Germans consistently sees all fault with the West Germans and hardly any with themselves.

While the election year of 1994 and also the following year seemed to signal an improvement in East-West ingroup and outgroup attitudes in the direction of a more favorable evaluation of the situation, 1997 has partly reversed this development. Compared to 1995 in the West, the 1997 data foremost show stability, with a small decrease in the number of Positivists and an even smaller increase in the number of Negativists. By contrast, in the East the name of the game is outright externalization: more than three quarters of the East German citizens now feel that whatever went wrong with the unification process is to be attributed to the West Germans. If one accepts the conceptualization of inner unity as was done in this article, then there is little question that the two Germanies held different view points in this matter to start with, and that seven years of a unified Germany have not produced a West-East rapprochement, at least not on the basis of the data used in this analysis (and certainly not, as shown before, on the basis of other findings).

Unfortunately, for lack of funds, the 1997 survey did not contain any additional questions which would have permitted the placement of the four types into a general politico-attitudinal context, such as with respect to the three dimensions covered before in this article: legitimacy beliefs, identities and values. One set of information available as a comparative yardstick across the time dimension pertains to the two sociostructural criteria of age and education. As Table 7 shows, both variables are not very strongly related to the typology. Two differences between the types are nevertheless worth noticing. Particularly in the West, higher education is above average with the Positivists, and it is this type which is also by far the youngest of the four types both in the West and the East. While one could be tempted to speculate that these characteristics make the Positivists an especially promising type for inner unity, the empirical basis for this speculation is, without additional pertinent data, too shaky for building a strong argument.

Beyond education and age, party preference (operationalized by the question of party choice at a hypothetical election next Sunday) is also available for elaboration on what the four types stand for. As in previous analyses, the parties in Table 8 are ordered along the left-right continuum, joining the actual or potential coalition partners of SPD/B 90-Greens and CDU-CSU/FDP. For this analysis, it has to be kept in mind first that in 1997 about 40 percent

of the respondents in both samples could not be classified on the voting question because they either did not know, or refused to answer, or indicated they would not vote. In addition, in the West the present government received only 34 percent and in the East a 21 percent share of a potential vote. Observing the correlation coefficients (Cramer's V) along the time dimension first, it is interesting to observe that of all five points in time both in the West and in the East, these coefficients in 1997 are lower than before, indicating that the partisan component in the evaluation of the unification process is losing some of its bite. In the early summer of 1997, there is not a single type in both parts of Germany where the conservative-liberal government can muster a majority. This is a major change certainly with the Positivists who were favoring the present coalition all along the way, but also for the Eastern Internalizers and the Western Externalizers. However, in the East, the two types of Externalizers and Negativists who put the blame for the problems with unification on the West Germans are still a stronghold for the postcommunist PDS. In sum, though, one can maintain that the differences with respect to how the process of unification is perceived are no longer related to the partisanship of the respondents in as similarly clear-cut fashion as before.

Table 7. *Correlations of Typology and Education, Age, Political Interest in West and East Germany: 1992-1997: Cramer's V¹⁾*

Years	Education		Age		Political interest	
	West	East	West	East	West	East
1992	.129	.089	.061	.089	.093	.081
1993	.133	.087	.083	.057	.125	.050
1994	.155	.096	.114	.058	.081	.070
1995	.119	.087	.093	.073	.087	.090
1997	.175	.082	.109	.074	-	-

¹⁾ Cramer's V is a correlation coefficient for nominal variables. It varies between 0 (statistical independence) and 1 (perfect dependence). It only measures the **degree** of covariation between two variables, but does not indicate its **direction**.

Given the findings reported in section 2.1 of this article on attitudes towards democracy, it is therefore more pertinent to ask to what extent the relationship between attitudes towards democracy and the typology reported in previous work (Kaase 1995: 173-179; Bauer-Kaase and Kaase 1996: 15-21) is still operational. While such data were not available for the 1995 survey, the authors of this article were permitted access to three questions which were asked by the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in the same 1997 study from which the typology was derived (see Table 9).

If one starts by looking at the East-West marginals for the three questions, the differences in basic political outlook discussed before with data from other surveys are clearly confirmed: the East Germans are less satisfied with German democracy, favor democratic rule on a substantially reduced scale and are still more favorable towards socialism than their West German compatriots. These differences, it was argued, reflect the effects both of political socialization under totalitarian rule and of context, particularly the high rate of unemployment in the East (this latter point is strongly emphasized by Zelle 1997).

With respect to the relationship of the three indicators of attitudes towards democracy and socialism to the typology, the first observation to be stressed is that the differences between types are considerably larger in the East than in the West. This finding reinforces a previous point regarding the relationship between the typology and voting intention (coded along the left-right dimension) that attitudes with respect to unification in the West are becoming less relevant in relation to other dimensions of the individual political belief system (for the 1993/1994 period see Kaase 1995: 177).

In the new *Länder*, the quantitatively largest type of Externalizers and the Negativists on all three counts are above average in their dissatisfaction with democracy and approval of socialism. While it is not possible to derive a causal interpretation from these cross-sectional data, it can at least be reasonably speculated that the lagging acceptance of democratic rule and the favorable recollections of socialism are both welded together with a feeling that the West Germans have not done enough to make unification work in the East, as epitomized by the economic strains there.

One more aspect which arises from analyzing these data deserves attention. In the West, the attitudes on democracy and socialism are, as in 1993 and other than in 1994, not very much related to left-right vote intention: support for democracy as a political system, different from that for the incumbents, is very much above partisan conflict, as it should be in a mature democracy. By contrast, in the East these attitudes are still substantially shaped by partisan cues not least because there still exists a strong PDS at the extreme left pole which crystallizes the frustrations and dissatisfactions in the new *Länder* regarding the unification process. In this sense, the consolidation phase in the East has, even seven years after the transformation of the political system, not yet come to an end.

4. Conclusions

In this article the question was raised as to the status in 1997 of inner unity between the two German populations, in the sense of similar beliefs in important dimensions of political orientation, and what changes, if any, can be observed in this matter.

However one approaches this question in terms of concepts and indicators, the results are highly consistent in that with respect to major political belief elements a rapprochement has not taken place; the two German populations have, rather, grown more distant than similar. Based on social-psychological identity theories, the reasons for this development have become a little clearer. The threat to the social identity of the East Germans through unification has been underestimated, and they are now reconstructing their biographies in a manner which helps them to establish a positive self image: they emphasize their own strengths and have become more critical of what they initially thought to be West German strengths. Since the constitutional and practical logic of unification makes the West Germans the most plausible reference group for East-West comparisons, it therefore cannot come as a surprise that these comparisons, for purposes of Eastern identity building, must result in a distancing and not in a narrowing process. On the side of the West Germans, increasing malfunctions in policy making and the economic challenges of globalization and transnational competition

have taken away some of their lacklustre image not only in the East Germans' view, but also in their own view. This now puts a sudden identity strain on the West Germans which makes it difficult for them to give away some of their perceived dominance *vis à vis* the East Germans, resulting, equally, in enlarging the distance between the two Germanies.

These are not the only reasons for the difficulties in achieving more inner unity in Germany. For one, the economic strains have increased to a point where the name of the political game is no longer the distribution of growth, but of losses in the German welfare state. This process has not yet fully started even in 1997, and more changes and conflict are around the corner, not least in the light of the upcoming national election in September 1998. In addition, the analyses have shown that beyond these concrete policy strains, West Germans and East Germans also represent differences in socialization experience regarding their expectations of what a democracy is supposed to be.

Still, this article does not end on an exclusively negative note. First, one must recall that all of the above *gravamina* do not extend to a situation where German democracy is at stake again, as is insinuated in the title of Cusack's (1997) paper. This is not only because the political attitudes of the two Germanies permit no such interpretation, but also because the citizens' orientations are embedded in and constrained by both a proven institutional framework and by the integration of Germany into a network of established democracies and international organizations around the globe. Second, it may well be suspected that successful identity reconstruction of the citizens in the new *Länder* is a favorable condition for a situation sometime in the future where West Germans and East Germans will have finally constructed 'e pluribus unum'.

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Table 1: Approval of West-East-Stereotypes by West Germans and East Germans 1992-1997 (percentages; all respondents)										
	West					East				
Items	1992	1993	1994	1995	1997	1992	1993	1994	1995	1997
“Anti-West”-Items	30	34	33	29	26	64	72	63	62	62
1. “The West Germans have conquered the former GDR in a colonial style.”	44	49	47	34	33	71	78	67	62	67
2. “In spite of all their wealth, West Germans have not learned to share.”	56	51	49	35	38	92	91	86	84	91
3. “East German is almost exclusively regarded under market sales terms; too little is done to maintain it as a production area.”	66	70	63	54	62	78	85	72	72	79
4. “In the West, there are people who would prefer to live as if unification had not taken place.”	47	48	44	35	36	88	92	84	84	92
5. “The Bonn government does too little to save jobs in the Ex-GDR.”										
“Anti-East”- Items										
1. “Many former GDR citizens think too easy: they want to live like the people in the West and to work like formerly in the East.”	70	68	64	59	65	29	30	33	25	21
2. “East Germans tend to feel sorry for themselves.”	62	63	60	58	61	26	30	26	21	19
3. “Many workers and employees in East Germany simply cannot stand the work pressures in the West.”	72	68	64	58	58	23	23	25	22	14
All respondents n =	2037	1014	1000	1038	1029	1013	982	1046	1054	1015

Table 4. Index Anti-West-Stereotypes in West and East Germany (percentages)															
Index Anti-West															
Index values	West					East					Percentage point differences (W-E)				
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1997	1992	1993	1994	1995	1997	1992	1993	1994	1995	1997
0 (low)	12,9	10,8	12,9	22,8	19,4	1,4	0,9	2,1	3,7	1,1	+11,5	+9,9	+10,8	+19,1	+18,3
1	19,3	18,2	20,2	27,3	27,6	2,9	2,6	5,5	5,5	3,9	+16,4	+15,6	+14,7	+21,8	+23,7
2	20,5	21,4	20,6	18,9	18,9	9,9	5,9	10,4	13,7	8,3	+10,6	+15,5	+10,2	+5,2	+10,6
3	18,5	21,1	19,7	15,2	15,3	14,4	13,3	15,9	15,9	18,3	+4,1	+7,8	+3,8	-0,7	-3,0
4	17,7	16,4	16,0	9,8	10,9	28,1	21,8	29,7	21,8	26,8	-10,4	-5,4	-13,7	-12,0	-15,9
5 (high)	11,1	12,1	10,6	6,0	7,9	43,3	55,5	36,4	39,4	41,6	-32,2	-43,4	-25,8	-33,4	-33,7
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0					
Valid cases n =	1969	981	990	1013	1019	968	949	1032	1043	1004					
Missing values in %	3,3	3,3	1,0	2,4	1,0	4,4	3,4	1,3	1,0	1,1					

Table 5. Index Anti-East-Stereotypes in West and East Germany (percentages)															
Index Anti-East															
Index values	West					East					Percentage point differences (W-E)				
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1997	1992	1993	1994	1995	1997	1992	1993	1994	1995	1997
0 (low)	12,8	14,7	16,7	23,4	18,4	51,7	52,7	48,8	56,9	63,5	-38,9	-38,0	-32,1	-33,5	-45,1
1	16,4	16,2	17,1	16,6	19,1	25,8	21,6	26,2	24,2	22,7	-9,4	-5,4	-9,1	-7,6	-3,6
2	25,3	23,8	27,1	21,6	23,0	15,6	15,7	17,2	12,9	10,0	+9,7	+8,1	+9,9	+8,7	+13,0
3 (high)	45,5	45,3	39,1	38,4	39,6	6,9	10,0	7,8	6,0	3,8	+38,6	+35,3	+31,3	+32,4	35,8
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0					
Valid cases n =	1983	990	993	1019	1018	991	955	1038	1044	999					
Missing values in %	2,7	2,4	0,7	1,8	1,1	2,2	2,7	0,8	0,9	1,6					

Table 6. <i>Typology of West-East German Stereotypes 1993-1997 (percentages)</i>							
West			1992	1993	1994	1995	1997
<u>Anti-West</u>	<u>Anti-East</u>						
low (0-2)	low (0-1)	Positivist	14,3	13,6	16,6	29,1	25,3
low(0-2)	high (2-3)	Externalizer	38,6	37,2	37,0	39,8	40,7
high (3-5)	low (0-1)	Internalizer	14,9	17,2	17,4	10,8	12,3
high (3-5)	high (2-3)	Negativist	32,2	32,0	29,0	20,3	21,8
Total			100	100	100	100	100
Valid cases	n=		1936	969	988	1010	1011
Missing values	in %		5,0	4,4	1,2	2,7	1,7
East			1992	1993	1994	1995	1997
<u>Anti-West</u>	<u>Anti-East</u>						
low (0-2)	low (0-1)	Positivist	10,3	6,2	13,4	18,5	10,9
high (3-5)	low (0-1)	Externalizer	67,5	67,9	61,7	62,4	75,5
low (0-2)	high (2-3)	Internalizer	3,8	3,4	4,6	4,4	2,5
high (3-5)	high (2-3)	Negativist	18,4	22,5	20,3	14,6	11,2
Total			100	100	100	100	100
Valid cases	n=		956	936	1029	1038	994
Missing values	in %		5,6	4,7	1,6	1,5	2,1

Table 8. *Typology and Voting Intentions in West and East Germany 1992-1997 (percentages; valid cases)*

Left-right party preference	Positivists										Internalizers									
	West					East					West					East				
	92	93	94	95	97	92	93	94	95	97	92	93	94	95	97	92	93	94	95	97
PDS	0,9	-	-	-	1,3	5,6	4,3	5,9	9,7	3,3	2,0	-	6,7	-	2,4	-	-	2,4	-	6,3
SPD/B90-Greens	42,1	50,9	47,5	46,0	57,9	38,0	42,5	35,3	30,6	63,4	68,1	69,6	74,6	73,0	73,4	24,0	39,3	26,1	23,7	50,
CDU-CSU/FDP	48,2	44,5	52,5	54,0	38,8	54,9	53,2	57,8	58,8	33,3	24,7	27,6	17,2	27,0	21,7	64,0	53,6	71,5	71,0	0
Republikaner	8,8	4,6	-	-	2,0	1,5	-	1,0	0,8	-	5,2	2,8	1,5	-	2,5	12,0	7,1	-	5,3	37,
																				4
																				6,3
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Percentage share of type (valid cases)	14,1	13,9	16,5	28,9	25,2	10,3	6,6	14,0	19,6	11,1	15,7	17,7	18,5	10,4	13,7	3,6	3,9	5,8	6,0	3,0

[illegible]

Table 9. Typology and Support for Democracy and Socialism in West and East Germany in 1997 (percentages; valid cases)¹										
	Positivists		Internalizers		Externalizers		Negativists		Total	
	West	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West	East
<i>Satisfaction with German Democracy</i>										
Very satisfied	14,6	4,8	13,8	12,0	10,5	2,8	14,7	7,3	13,8	3,8
Somewhat satisfied	61,1	67,3	58,0	72,0	60,5	45,1	55,8	52,3	58,6	49,0
Not satisfied	24,3	27,9	28,2	16,0	29,0	52,1	29,5	40,4	27,6	47,2
Total (percent)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	247	104	390	25	124	714	217	109	978	952
Cramer's V: West = .041; East = .146										
In a democracy not everything goes the way it should, but there is no better form of government										
	66,4	47,2	71,5	56,0	58,9	31,1	58,5	42,3	65,8	34,7
Agree (+3/+2)	30,8	47,2	26,3	44,0	33,9	54,6	36,5	49,6	30,6	53,0
Ambivalent (+1/0/-1)	2,8	5,6	2,2	-	7,2	14,3	5,0	8,1	3,6	12,3
Disagree (-2/-3)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total (percent)	256	108	411	25	124	748	219	111	1010	992
N =										
Cramer's V: West = .104; East = .112										
<i>In principle, socialism is meaningful, and it can work</i>										
	7,5	10,2	9,0	16,0	16,9	27,7	15,0	19,8	10,9	24,6
Agree (+3/+2)	48,8	59,3	48,4	32,0	46,9	52,8	49,1	47,8	48,5	52,4
Ambivalent (+1/0/-1)	43,7	30,5	42,6	52,0	36,2	19,5	35,9	32,4	40,7	23,0
Disagree (-2/-3)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total (percent)	256	108	409	25	124	748	220	111	1009	992
N =										
Cramer's V: West = .113; East = .127										

¹ The support by Hans-Joachim Veen and Carsten Zelle in providing access to these data is greatly appreciated.

