

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Author(s): Diamond, Larry Jay
Date 1997
Type Working Paper
Series Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 1997/101
City: Madrid
Publisher: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales

Civil Society and the Development of Democracy

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Estudio/Working Paper 1997/101
June 1997

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Advanced Study in the Social Sciences of the Juan March Institute in Madrid on 7, 12, 13 and 14 November 1996.

In the burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature on democratization, few issues are more central and diffuse than the question of elite versus mass influence. Is it *primarily* elites who make, shape, and consolidate democracy? Or does the public matter? If so, how, when, and to what degree?

Since the early 1980s, most scholarly studies of democratization have given primary emphasis to the divisions, alliances, choices, calculations, and strategic alliances among elites in both the authoritarian regime and its democratic opposition. A prominent line of work on democratic consolidation has also centered quite explicitly and unapologetically on the behavior, organization, and culture of political elites. It considers that democratic consolidation occurs once there emerges a "consensually unified elite" that shares a common commitment to the rules of the democratic game, a broader set of norms about the rules of political conduct, and a dense structure of interaction that fosters personal familiarity and trust.[1] This line of thinking bears a strong kinship to theories that locate the origins of democracy in political pacts among contending, even violently opposed, political elites.[2]

Without question, political elites - and thus politicians - are indispensable to bringing about democracy and making it work. Particularly in the delicately balanced, unstable, and highly uncertain periods of authoritarian breakdown and regime transition, the choices made and

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[1] Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, "Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes," in J. Higley and R .Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). See also Michael G. Burton and John Higley, "Elite Settlements," *American Sociological Review* 52 (1987): 295-307, and Higley and Burton, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns," *American Sociological Review* 54 (1989): 17-32.

[2] The most influential early work in this regard was the four-volume study by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), particularly the theoretical volume by O'Donnell and Schmitter subtitled *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.* Treatments of the role of elite pacts in the process of transition are also found (more or less explicitly) in Adam Przeworski, "The Games of Transition," in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame: University of Indiana Press, 1992); Donald Share, "Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction," *Comparative Political Studies* 19 (1987): 525-548; Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 1 (October 1990): 1-21; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), and the above cited works on elite settlements by Higley and Gunther. For a treatment of elite pacts within a broader approach that locates democratic stability in the emergence of self-enforcing limits on the state, to solve intrinsic coordination problems among citizens, see Barry R. Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," *American Political Science Review,* June 1997, forthcoming.

alliances forged among a relatively small set of leaders and strategists in the government, the military, political parties, trade unions, other interest groups, and various types of civic organizations do play the key role in shaping whether regime change will occur, and *how* it will occur - violently or peacefully, gradually or abruptly, to democracy or to some new authoritarian or hybrid regime.

Beyond the transition, elites have a profound - and I would even concede, *preeminent* - impact in determining whether new democracies become stable, effective, and consolidated. This impact goes well beyond the cultural dimension of forging a common commitment to democracy and its specific constitutional rules. It encompasses the types of institutions and rules that elites craft - whether the system is parliamentary or presidential; whether it facilitates majoritarian or consensual government; whether it concentrates power at the center or disperses it to multiple levels of government; whether it provides for strong, autonomous institutions of accountability - or "agencies of restraint," such as a constitutional court, auditor-general, and central bank - to check the power of elected officials and ensure good governance. And it has to do with how government, party, and interest group leaders exercise their power - not just their commitment to democracy in principle, but their ability to bargain with one another, form coalitions, mobilize public support, and respond to public pressures and preferences.

As these latter two criteria suggest, elites may be preeminent, but they are not the whole story. Democracy is not just a system in which elites acquire the power to rule through a competitive struggle for the people's vote, as Joseph Schumpeter defined it.[3] It is also a political system in which government must be held accountable to the people, and in which mechanisms must exist for making it responsive to their passions, preferences, and interests. Moreover, if it is *liberal* democracy that we have in mind, then the political system must also provide for a rule

[3] *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2nd. ed.. (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 269.

of law, and rigorously protect the right of individuals and groups to speak, publish, assemble, demonstrate, lobby, and organize to pursue their interests and passions.[4]

Without free, fair, and regular electoral competition, government cannot be held truly accountable to the people. But elections are not enough. Democracy, and especially liberal democracy, requires multiple avenues for "the people" to express their interests and preferences, to influence policy, and to scrutinize and check the exercise of state power continuously, in between elections as well as during them.

[4] For elaboration of this distinction, see Larry Diamond, "Is The Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 3 (July 1996): 20-37.

The mass public matters for democratization in two senses: in its often pivotal role (too little appreciated by the scholarly literature) in helping to effect a transition to democracy, and in the never-ending quest to deepen democracy beyond its formal structure. If, with Richard Sklar, we think of democracy in *developmental* terms, as a political system that emerges gradually in fragments or parts, and is always capable of becoming more liberal, inclusive, responsive, accountable, effective, and just, then we must see democratization not simply as a limited period of transition from one set of formal regime rules to another, but rather as an ongoing process, a perpetual challenge, a recurrent struggle.[5]

In many of the new democracies that have emerged during the past two decades - what Samuel Huntington has called the "third wave" of global democratization - competitive elections do not ensure liberty, responsiveness, and a rule of law. To varying but often alarming degrees, human rights are flagrantly abused; ethnic and other minorities suffer not only discrimination but murderous violence; power is heavily if not regally concentrated in the executive branch; and parties, legislators, executives and judicial systems are thoroughly corrupt. In such countries, democracy - if we can call it that - will not become broadly valued, and thus consolidated, unless it also becomes more liberal, transparent, and institutionalized. In these circumstances, governing elites must be made accountable to one another and to the people, not only in theory but in fact. And institutions must be constructed or reformed to ensure that this will happen. In such circumstances of entrenched corruption and repression, the elites who come to govern have a stake in the existing system - and those who favor real reform are too weak to accomplish it by themselves. Only the mass public can generate the political pressure and power necessary to bring about reform.

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[5] Richard L. Sklar: "Developmental Democracy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29, no. 4 (1987) pp. 686-714, and "Towards a Theory of Developmental Democracy," in Adrian Leftwich, ed., *Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 25-44.

Even where democracy is firmly consolidated and its survival not in doubt, its quality may deteriorate and the need for adaptation and reinvoration may become increasingly manifest. Students of democratic development should not ignore the serious problems of democratic functioning in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan: the deeply corrosive influence of big money in politics; the political alienation of large and in some countries growing segments of the population; the decline of political parties as effective instruments of interest articulation and aggregation, and the waning of popular attachment to them; the entrenchment of a culture of entitlements that is fiscally unsustainable; the rising hostility to immigrants and outsiders. In some of these respects, the mass public itself - in its expectations and patterns of behavior - constitutes a major source of the problem. But when the decay of democratic institutions is accompanied by (or even provokes) growing public disengagement from politics, democracy may settle into a low-level equlibrium that persists until it is shaken by genuine crisis. In the absence of such fiscal or political crisis, political leaders themselves typically cannot muster the will, courage or power to bring about change on their own. They need the stimulus and the support of a mobilized public.

"The public" - like "the people" - is a concept that is diffuse, and easily misused or abused. Politicians invoke it for their own ends. Demagogues manipulate it in attempting to ride to power. Without organization, structure, and principles, the public may not matter for democracy, or its impact may be negative. Certainly, a politically active public is not all that matters.

Democracy - in particular, a healthy liberal democracy - also requires a public that is *organized* for democracy, socialized to its norms and values, and committed not just to its myriad narrow interests but to larger, common, "civic," ends. Such a civic public is only possible with a vibrant "civil society."

What Civil Society Is and Is Not

Civil society is the *realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.* It is distinct from "society" in general in that it involves citizens *acting collectively in a public sphere* to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable. Civil society is an intermediary phenomenon, standing between the private sphere and the state. Thus, it excludes individual and family life, inward-looking group activity (for example, for recreation, entertainment, religious worship or spirituality), and the profit-making enterprise of individual business firms. These are all dimensions of "parochial society" (or, in the commercial, profit-making sphere, of "economic society") that do not concern themselves with civic life and the public realm - and yet, as we will see, they may help to generate cultural norms and patterns of engagement that spill over into the civic realm. Similarly, civil society is distinct from "political society," which encompasses all those organized actors (in a democracy, primarily political parties and campaign organizations) whose primarily goal is to win control of the state or at least some position for themselves within it. Organizations and networks in civil society may form alliances with parties, but if they become captured by parties, or hegemonic within them, they move their primary locus of activity to political society and lose much of their ability to perform certain unique mediating and democracy-building functions

Being essentially market-oriented, actors in civil society *recognize the principles of state authority and the rule of law*, and need the protection of an institutionalized legal order to prosper and be secure. Thus, civil society not only restricts state power but legitimates state authority when that authority is based on the rule of law. However, when the state itself is lawless and contemptuous of individual and group autonomy, civil society may still exist (albeit in tentative or battered form) if its constituent elements operate by some set of shared rules (which, for example, eschew violence and respect pluralism). This is the irreducible condition of its "civil" dimension.[6]

[6] This conceptual formulation draws from a number of sources but has been especially

Civil society encompasses a vast array of organizations, formal and informal: These include (1) *economic* (productive and commercial associations and networks); (2) *cultural* (religious, ethnic, communal, and other institutions and associations that defend collective rights, values, faiths, beliefs, and symbols); (3) *informational and educational*, devoted to the production and dissemination (whether for profit or not) of public knowledge, ideas, news, and information; (4) *interest* groups, which seek to advance or defend the common functional or material interests of their members (for example, trade unions, associations of veterans and pensioners, and professional groups); (5) *developmental* organizations, which pool individual resources and talents to improve the infrastructure, institutions, and quality of life of the community; (6) *issue-oriented* movements (for example, for environmental protection, land reform, consumer protection, and the rights of women, ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, the disabled, and other victims of discrimination and abuse); and (7) *civic* groups, which seek (in

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influenced by Naomi Chazan. See in particular his "Africa's Democratic Challenge: Strengthening Civil Society and the State," *World Policy Journal* 9 (Spring 1992): 279-308. See also S. N. Eisenstadt, "Civil Society," in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1995), Vol. 1, pp. 240-242; Edward Shils, "The Virtue of Civil Society," *Government and Opposition* 26, no. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 9-10, 15-16; Peter Lewis, "Political Transition and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa," *Journal of International Affairs* 27, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 31-54; Marcia A. Weigle and Jim Butterfield, "Civil Society in Reforming Communist Regimes: The Logic of Emergence," *Comparative Politics* 25 (October 1992): 3-4; and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Civil Society East and West ," in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 240-262. (The latter essay has circulated in several previous drafts, including "Some Propositions about Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy," paper presented to the Conference on "Reconfiguring State and Society," University of California, Berkeley, 22-23 April 1993.)

nonpartisan fashion) to improve the political system and make it more democratic (for example, working for human rights, voter education and mobilization, election monitoring, and exposure and reform of corrupt practices).

In addition, civil society encompasses "the ideological marketplace," the flow of information and ideas, including those which evaluate and critique the state. This includes not only independent mass media but the broader field of autonomous cultural and intellectual activity - universities, think tanks, publishing houses, theaters, film makers, and artistic performances and networks.

From the above, it should be clear that civil society is not some mere residual category, synonymous with "society" or with everything that is not the state or the formal political system. One of the most misleading and even trivializiing conceptualizations of civil society is to treat it as simply "organizations that are independent of the state." Beyond being voluntary, self-generating, autonomous, and rule-abiding, civil society organizations are distinct from other groups in society in several respects.

First, to reiterate, civil society is concerned with *public* rather than private ends. It is distinct from parochial society. And it is "accessible to citizens and open to public deliberation - not embedded in exclusive, secretive, or corporate settings."[7]

Second, civil society *relates to the state* in some way but does not seek to win control over or position within the state; it does not seek to "govern the polity as a whole."[8] Rather, civil society actors pursue from the state concessions, benefits, policy changes, institutional reforms, relief, redress, justice, and accountability to their scrutiny. Organizations, movements, and networks that seek to displace ruling authorities from power, to change the nature of the state - and in particular, to democratize it - remain part of civil society if their goal is to reform the structure of power rather than to take power themselves as organizations. Thus, a liberation party

[7] Eisenstadt, "Civil Society," p. 240.

[8] To a considerable degree, this is what Schmitter means by "nonusurpation" in his "Civil Society East and West," p. 240.

like the Indian National Congress in pre-independence India or the African National Congress of South Africa is acting essentially in political society; it seeks not only a democratic transition but control of the state. Supporting movements and allied organizations, however, like the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), spring from civil society.

A third distinguishing feature of civil society is that it encompasses *pluralism* and diversity. To the extent that an organization - such as a religious fundamentalist, ethnic chauvinist, revolutionary or millenarian movement - seeks to monopolize a functional or political space in society, crowding out all competitors while claiming that it represents the only legitimate path, it contradicts the pluralistic and market-oriented nature of civil society.[9] Related to this is a fourth distinction, *partiality*, in the sense that no group in civil society seeks to represent the whole of a person's or a community's interests. Rather different groups represent or encompass different aspects of interest.[10] This partiality is crucial to generating one of the important consequences of a truly civil society: the profusion of different organizations and, for individuals, multiple organizational ties that cross-cut and complicate existing cleavages and generate moderating "cross-pressures" on individual preferences, attitudes, and beliefs. By contrast, parties or organizations of "integration" seek to encapsulate their members within a totalistic environment that isolates them from alternative views and ties, inculcates a rigid, comprehensive ideological or philosophical belief system, and demands total obedience. As

[9] Of course, corporatist systems of interest representation are distinctive in that they deliberately grant monopolies of interest representation to "peak associations" (usually of labor and capital) that represent all the constituent organizations and actors within particular sectors of the economy. If these arrangements are arrived at through a democratic process, then the resulting actors constitute part of civil society. The nature of this process, and the degree to which interest organizations with such broad "encompassing scope" (in Schmitter's term) are nevertheless autonomous from the state, constitutes the key distinction between democratic (societal) corporatism and authoritarian (state) corporatism. Philippe C. Schmitter goes so far as to argue that such democratic corporatist organizations - with strategic capacity and encompassing scope, play a more significant role in the consolidation of democracy than "a great multiplicity of narrowly specialized and overlapping organizations," because the latter pluralist structures "weaken the role of interest intermediaries." At a minimum, his theoretical argument remains to be demonstrated (and I myself am dubious). However, the key point is that democratic corporatist structures do not violate the principles of civil society when their functional monopoly is democratically established, subject to law, and embedded in a larger structure of democratic bargaining and organizational freedom. For his latest perspective, see his "Civil Society East and West," pp. 246-247.

[10] Chazan, "Africa's Democratic Challenge,", pp. 288-289; Peter Lewis, "Political Transition and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa," pp. 35-36.

Lipset has argued, following the work of Sigmund Neumann, such totalistic parties or movements weaken democracy and, I would argue, are fundamentally uncivil, while more pluralistic or at least limited organizations strengthen democracy.[11]

Confusion about the boundaries of civil society and the location of particular actors derives in part from the multiple and shifting nature of organizational goals. A religious congregation or establishment - a church or mosque or synagogue - may mainly function to cater to the spiritual needs of its members in parochial society. But when it becomes engaged in efforts to fight poverty, crime, and drug addiction, to improve human capital and organize efforts for community self-improvement, or to lobby legislatures (or join constitutional cases) about public policies on abortion, sexuality, poverty, human rights, the legal treatment of religion, or a myriad of other issues, then the religious institution is acting in civil society. Many times, organizations based in one sphere temporarily cross the boundary into another. Trade unions constitute themselves as virtual campaign organizations for particular candidates or parties at election times. The church throws its leadership, resources, and moral authority into a broad national movement for democratic change - as has occurred to varying degrees in Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, the Philippines, South Korea, Poland, South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, and elsewhere during the third wave. Recreational organizations may become politicized into civic action - for example, if the birds they watch or the trails they hike become threatened by pollution or business development. Frequently, organizations and networks pursue multifaceted agendas that straddle the boundary between parochial and civil society, or between civil and political society, or even between all three sectors (as with religious organizations, when religion gets politicized).

[11] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Democracy*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 74-75.

The balance of organizational activities tells us something about the character of a political system. At the level of individual belief and behavior, Almond and Verba theorize that stable democracy requires a "mixed political culture" in which the "participant" orientation - to vote and demonstrate and lobby and organize on the basis of rational interests - is tempered by a "subject" orientation of loyalty to the political community and constitutional order and by a "parochial" orientation that involves the individual in more traditional or at least private and non-political concerns, and that "expects nothing from the political system."[12] As a result of this mix, they argue, citizens do not participate incessantly and with equal intensity on all issues. Rather, they exercise "a reserve of influence" with a disposition to political activity that is "intermittent and potential." It is precisely the "comparative infrequency of political participation, its relative lack of importance for the [typical] individual, and the objective weakness" of the average citizen that "allow governmental elites to act" and preserve a healthy balance between conflict and consensus.[13] Democratic governability is facilitated on the one hand and democratic responsiveness and accountability on the other by "cycles of citizen involvement, elite response, and citizen withdrawal."[14]

Although their theory has been criticized as conservative in its structural-functional emphasis on system maintenance, it can comprehend change and reform as well as stability. And it has a parallel at the broader level of organization life. Democracy differs in form across countries: some are more structured and dominated by elites, some more pluralistic, competitive and conflictual. But in every democracy, effective governance requires some restraint in the number and intensity of demands upon the state, and in the intensity with which conflicting parties and organizations press incompatible public policy agendas. When organizations that are primarily (or in theory) parochial become drawn into repeated and intense public policy debates, and when organizations in civil society become intensely and enduringly politicized along partisan lines of division, society may polarize, as the cross-cutting bonds of solidarity and

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[12] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1965), pp. 16-30.

[13] Ibid, pp. 346-347.

[14] Ibid, p. 350.

civility dissolve. Such polarization may be creative and advantageous for social justice and democracy at moments of political crisis, bringing the downfall of an authoritarian regime, the reform of a decadent and occluded democratic system, the permanent expansion of participation and enlargement of civil liberties, the impeachment and removal of a corrupt president from office, the cancellation of a fraudulent election. But democracy cannot function indefinitely on the basis of crisis, polarization, and pervasive civic and political mobilization by every type of organization imaginable. Eventually, democratic governability requires a return to normality - not to apathy or withdrawal, but to a boundary between civic and parochial society.

This raises a fifth intriguing and theoretically rich distinction, between civil society and what Robert Putnam calls a "civic community." Putnam's model of the civic community has profound implications for the quality and consolidation of democracy, and for the bridging of the literatures on political culture and civil society. The essential building block of this bridge is the concept of "social capital," the "features of social organization" and of culture "that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." Both for economic development and effective democracy, voluntary cooperation - to pool resources, to engage in exchange, to organize for common ends - is crucial. Voluntary cooperation is greatly facilitated by interpersonal trust and norms of reciprocity, and these cultural orientations in turn are fostered by (but also deepen) "networks of civic engagement," in which citizens are drawn together as equals in "intense horizontal interaction."[15] For Putnam, the key to constructing a "civic community" is not whether an organization has an explicitly "civic" (public) or political versus private purpose. Mutual aid organizations (for example, rotating credit associations), neighborhood associations, choral societies, cooperatives, sports clubs, and mass-based political

[15] Robert Putnam, with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), quoted from pp. 167 and 173.

parties may all be constituent elements of a civic community. The key is whether associational life is structured horizontally so as to generate trust, cooperation, free flows of communication, and generalized, "robust norms of reciprocity."

Viewed in this way, civic community is both a broader and narrower concept than civil society: broader in that it encompasses all manner of associations (parochial included), narrower in that it includes only associations structured horizontally around ties that are more or less mutual, cooperative, symmetrical, and trusting. By contrast, there are many organizations active in democratic civil societies - even "civic organizations" whose goal is to reform the polity or advocate human rights - that are not "civic" in Putnam's sense. Instead, of bringing together people as trusting equals cooperating in relations of "generalized reciprocity" and mutual benefit and respect, these organizations tend to reproduce within themselves hierarchical cultural tendencies of the wider society: vertical structures of authority and flows of information, asymmetrical patterns of exchange between patron and clients, scant horizontal ties among the general membership, and weak levels of trust (at best). To the extent that hierarchy and suspicion rule the organization, cooperation becomes difficult, both among members of the organization and between it and other organizations. The organization then becomes dependent on a leader or ruling clique, and may manifest a debilitating and all-too-apparent contradiction between its internal style of governance and the goals its professes to seek for the polity. As a result, the organization cannot widen its base, or it loses support and credibility in society, or it descends into fractious and internecine conflict with similar organizations professing similar ends and characterized by similar patterns of hierarchical, unaccountable internal leadership. In the most extreme cases, civil society organizations may become hobbled and hollowed out by the personalistic, dependent, coercive, and exploitative authority relations of the "uncivic community," and its consequent vulnerability to "defection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and stagnation."[16]

Putnam's notion of "civicness" - of reciprocity, cooperation, and distrust, versus hierarchy, fragmentation, and endemic suspicion - is not simply a tidy and appealing theoretical

[16] Ibid, p. 177.

construct, or a regress into cultural determinism. It is a powerful perspective for understanding *why* organizations that may be considered (and certainly consider themselves) part of civil society nevertheless fail to function effectively to develop democracy in the ways I describe below. The problem has been particularly severe in many African countries, where even many human rights organizations have been unable to build broad anti-authoritarian fronts because of paralyzing divisions that keep different organizations from coalescing with one another, while old organizations split and divide around leadership disputes and new organizations take shape (hierarchically) around alternative leaders. To some extent, these types of divisions account for the weakness of the pro-democracy civic organizations in Nigeria, particularly since the annulment of the (largely successful and democratic) June 1993 presidential elections and the abortion of the democratic transition that the military had pledged to complete that year. Indeed, most African dictators who have managed to withstand the winds of democratic change in the early 1990s have done so in part by using money and manipulating ethnicity to entrench the uncivic tendencies that civil society organizations have inherited from the larger society, and thus to foment suspicion, division, cooptation, and defection.

The distinction between "civic community" and civil society underscores a more general theoretical caveat and caution. If civil society is to be a theoretically useful construct for studying democratic development, it is important to avoid the tautology that equates it with everything that is democratic, noble, decent, and good. I have argued that civil society must be refined to a degree that distinguishes it from the much wider and more general arena of (independent) associational life. But an association may be more or less autonomous from the state, voluntary, self-generating, and respectful of the letter of the law, and still be highly undemocratic, paternalistic, and particularistic in its internal structure and norms, and distrustful, unreliable, even domineering, exploitative, and cynical in its dealings with other organizations and the state and society more broadly. To the extent that such organizations characterize civil society, it will be less effective and liberal - and so will be democracy. Alternatively, to the extent that civil society is characterized instead by "civic" norms and structures that induce trust and cooperation, this probably reflects a wider pattern that is fostered and nurtured throughout parochial society as well. In this sense, Putnam (like Tocqueville) sensitizes us to the importance of the nature and

intensity of associational life in general - of social capital - as a crucial cultural foundation of liberal democracy.

Features of a Democratic Civil Society

From the above it is clear that not all associations, and not even all associations in civil society, have the same potential to foster and deepen democracy. Certain variable features of civil society generally and individual organizations are important to consider.

Putting Putnam's concerns for "civicness" somewhat differently, an important issue concerns how (indeed whether) an organization formally governs its own internal affairs. To what extent does it practice democratic principles of constitutionalism, transparency, accountability, participation, deliberation, representation, and rotation of leaders in the way it makes decisions and allocates its own power and resources? An organization may be able to represent group interests, check the power of the state, and perform many other democratic functions I describe below even if it is not internally democratic.[17] But if, in its own patterns of governance, it perpetuates norms that penalize dissent, exalt the leader over the group, and cloak the exercise of power, one thing it will not do is build a culture of democracy. If civil society organizations are to function as "large free schools" for democracy, they must function democratically in their internal processes of decision-making and leadership selection. And they

[17] This was the finding of an assessment of international donor support for civil society, as an approach to assisting democratization in less developed countries. Based on intensive country assessments of programs in Bangladesh, Chile, El Salvador, Kenya, and Thailand, and sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the study found: "No more than a handful of all the CSOs [civil society organizations] observed across the five countries exhibited any serious internal democracy, but this did not appear to inhibit their effectiveness at moving democracy forward and playing democratic politics." Nondemocratic CSOs can generate democratic interest competition and responsiveness to the needs of various communities if there is pluralism and space for different interests to organize and be heard. The study does not appear to have examined, however, the longer-term implications for democratic culture change and social capital accumulation of autocratic versus democratic patterns of governance within organizations. Harry Blair, "Civil Society and Building Democracy: Lessons from International Donor Experience." Paper presented to the 1995 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 31-September 3, 1996, p. 14.

should encourage and institutionalize multiple avenues for active participation among the members. The more their own organizational practices are based on political equality, reciprocal communication, mutual respect, and the rule of law, the more civil society organizations will socialize members into these democratic norms - and the more they will generate the social trust, tolerance, cooperativeness, and civic competence that undergird a vibrant and liberal democracy.[18]

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[18] I offer this as a theoretical observation which conforms with what I have observed anecdotally in developing countries, rather than as a proposition that has the support of systematic empirical evidence. Almond and Verba do present extensive evidence that membership in voluntary associations promotes greater social trust, political participation, political knowledge, and political efficacy ("subjective civic competence"). And membership in a politically oriented organization breeds political opinions, participation, and self-confidence even somewhat more readily. (See their Chapter 10, "Organizational Membership and Civic Competence" of the 1965 edition of *The Civic Culture*.) Putnam, too, finds a correlation between associational activity and civic culture, although it is somewhat more inferential. The prevalence of associations is one of four components of his Civic Community Index (along with newspaper readership and voter turnout in referendums), and elite and mass attitudes and values appear markedly more civic (more trusting, efficacious, law-abiding, cooperative, and politically satisfied) in the regions that are structurally and behaviorally more civic. (*Making Democracy Work*, pp. 91-115.) What does not seem to exist is any direct, formal test of whether members of associations that are more democratically governed manifest more democratic

norms and values than members of associations that are more hierarchically and arbitrarily governed. The one inference that can be drawn comes again from *The Civic Culture* (pp. 260-261): members who have held an official position in their organization are much more likely to have a sense of political efficacy than passive members (and passive members more than non-members). To the extent that democratic organizations rotate individuals in and out of offices more, they will advance this element of democratic culture, and one may surmise, others as well. Their data do show the U.S. sample as having by far the highest proportions of total citizens and of organizational members who have held an office. More explicit research (both survey research and organizational case studies) on how the internal structure of organizational life affects the development of political norms and values should be a high priority.

A second variable concerns the goals and methods of groups in civil society, especially organized associations. The chances to develop stable democracy improve significantly if a society's array of organizations and movements does not contain maximalist, uncompromising interest groups, or groups with undemocratic goals and methods. To the extent that a group seeks to conquer the state or other competitors, or rejects the rule of law and the authority of the democratic state, it is not a component of civil society at all, but it may nevertheless do much damage to democratic aspirations. Powerful, militant interest groups pull parties toward populist and extreme political promises, polarizing the party system, and are more likely to bring down state repression that may have a broad and indiscriminate character, weakening or radicalizing more democratic elements of civil society. Even within civil society, some groups are more inclined to cooperation and compromise than others. This returns us to Putnam's variable of "civicness."

A third, feature of civil society is its level of organizational institutionalization. As with political parties, institutionalized interest groups contribute to the stability, predictability, and governability of a democratic regime. Where interests are organized in a structured, stable manner, bargaining and the growth of cooperative networks are facilitated. Social forces do not face the continual cost of setting up new structures. And if the organization expects to continue to operate in the society over a sustained period of time, its leaders will have more reason to be accountable and responsive to the constituency, and may take a longer-range view of the group's interests and policy goals, rather than seeking to maximize short-term benefits in an uncompromising manner. Institutionalization has a strong affinity with constitutionalism. It involves established procedures that are widely and reliably known and regularly practiced, as opposed to personalized, arbitrary, and unpredictable modes of operation.

As with the structures and organizations in political society and the state, so with civil society we can measure the institutionalization of civil society actors with Huntington's four criteria of autonomy, adaptability, coherence, and complexity.[19] Autonomy must insulate a civil society actor from dominance or control not only by the state but by an individual leader,

[19] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 12-24.

founder, or ruling clique. To the extent that the purpose and functioning of the organization are subverted by other social or political actors, hijacked to their agendas, or subordinated to the whims and interests of a personalized ruler or a particular faction, a civil society organization's effectiveness is undermined, its potential base of support is narrowed (and so, again, is its ability to develop a democratic culture). This relates also to the criterion of coherence. A civil society organization will be most effective and will best contribute to the development of democracy when it has a coherent purpose, structure, and organizational identity broadly shared among its members. Coherence requires consensus about the mission of the organization, its functional boundaries, and its procedures for resolving disputes. Here again we see a value to internal democracy: consensus about goals, priorities, projects, and methods is more likely to be broad and sustainable if it emerges organically from a deliberative process and if it is transparent and codified in a constitutional framework.

Complexity involves elaboration of functions and sub-units, and this can potentially diminish coherence. But it need not negate it. A key element of complexity for civil society organizations at the national level is vertical depth: the extent to which they are able to organize provincial and local chapters that pursue the same goals at lower levels of public life. This is important not only for interest groups - where trade unions and chambers of commerce have long perceived the need to be organized in a wide range of sectors and at more local levels of authority - but with civic organizations of various kinds. The most effective civic education, human rights, environmental, and democratic reform organizations in developing democracies have established local chapters and field offices in many or most of the states or provinces of their countries. This dispersed presence broadens the membership base of the organization, increases active participation in its affairs, and enables it to pursue a more complex policy agenda. This is especially vital where power is at least somewhat decentralized, and government decisions or activities bearing on the organization's goals are made at the provincial and local levels. Decentralized structures of national civil society organizations also build social capital by bringing citizens together in face-to-face interaction concerning the problems of their immediate communities.

Complexity can also emerge, from the bottom up, through the growth of local organizations into more broad-based national structures, or it can come through the horizontal aggregation of many distinct organizations that share underlying interests or a common purpose and functional identity. Both of these processes have characterized the institutionalization of Korean civil society in the past decade. South Korea's most important civic organization, the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), was established by reformers in the Seoul metropolitan area, then initiated other local and regional branch organizations, and only somewhat later did it formally come together as a national-level association. And national-level associations in Korea have established (on their own initiative and control, not that of the state) peak associations, more in the nature of loose confederations, to coordinate their sectoral activities and formulate common strategies. In 1995, the Korea Association of Civic Organizations was founded with the participation of 54 national organizations, including eight civic organizations.[20]

[20] Kyoung-Ryung Seong, "Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Korea, 1987-1996: Great Achievements and Remaining Problems," in Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim, eds., *Consolidating Korean Democracy*, forthcoming. Seong notes that horizontal cooperation among civil society organizations also occurs more informally and episodically at the local level, as when the CCEJ local branch may ally with its local counterpart of the National Coalition for Environmental Movement and purely local activists to protest pollution or mediate a conflict between villages over the location of a waste-disposal site. As at the level of individual citizens, voluntary, horizontal cooperation between associations generates social capital and a richer, more vibrant civil society.

Finally, civil society organizations become institutionalized when they learn to adapt their missions, functions, and structures to an altered political and social context, new imperatives, and different opportunities. This, too, overlaps with other criteria, in particular complexity. Adaptation also involves elaborating the functional agenda of the organization and deepening its local sub-structures. This adaptation has been vividly evidenced in the growth of election monitoring organizations beyond their original mission of ensuring free and fair elections, forged in the crucible of tense and uncertain transitions from authoritarian rule. Such highly successful groups as the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) in the Philippines, the Crusade for Civic Participation in Chile (which later evolved into PARTICIPA), the Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections (BAFECR), the Paraguayan organization SAKA (a Guarani word for "transparency"), and the Civic Alliance in Mexico have moved beyond their original urgent purpose of educating voters and mobilizing volunteer pollwatchers in crucial transitional or founding elections. While continuing their election monitoring work, they have also broadened the scope of their activity (either themselves or by spawning new, affiliated civic organizations) to encompass more comprehensive programs to educate, inform, and empower citizens, to foster and mediate debate on public issues, to train candidates and local government officials, to advocate institutional reforms to improve democracy and transparency, to promote dialogue between citizens and public officials, and to monitor the performance of elected officials.[21] Similarly, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) has dramatically expanded from its focus on voter education and general civic education before the April 1994 founding elections in South Africa to undertake a much broader range of activities, including a Parliamentary Information and Monitoring Service, a Budget Information Service, and a Public Opinion Service that collects, analyzes, and disseminates public opinion survey data on current

[21] Neil Nevitte and Santiago Canton, "Rethinking Election Observation," *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 3 (July 1997, forthcoming). See also the following first-person accounts of organizational evolution beyond an initial focus on founding elections: María Rosa de Martini, "Civil Participation in the Argentine Democratic Process," pp. 29-52, Dette Pascual, "Building a Democratic Culture in the Philippines," pp. 53-72, and Mónica Jiménez de Barros, "Mobilizing for Democracy in Chile: The Crusade for Citizen Participation and Beyond," in Larry Diamond, ed., *The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World* (New York: Freedom House, 1992). In Chile, as described below, PARTICIPA, the immediate successor to the Crusade, eventually took on a much wider range of social functions, as described later in this paper. NAMFREL did not in itself move beyond election monitoring, but many of its activists started new kinds of civic organizations, as Pascual describes.

public issues and perceptions of democratic performance. In this way, as it becomes more functionally complex and institutionalized, IDASA is not only growing in resources, staff, influence, and connectedness, it is also working on a greater variety of fronts, with growing technical sophistication, to improve the functioning of democratic institutions.[22]

As a country moves from the exigencies and drama of a transition struggle to the more prosaic challenges of governance, incorporation, enculturation, and service delivery, civil society organizations must often evolve and adapt if they are to remain relevant and viable. The course of adaptation, however, is not necessarily an unmixed blessing, as it may risk taking the organization far from its original mission while compromising its autonomy from the state. This is one of several dilemmas of civil society I will consider in conclusion.

[22] Information on these ongoing activities is available from IDASA's regular publications, *Parliamentary Whip*, *Budget Watch*, and *Public Opinion Service Reports*.

A fourth feature of civil society is its variety or pluralism. Of course, some degree of pluralism is necessary by definition for civil society; no organization that is civil can claim to represent *all* the interests of its members. Still, within various sectors and issue arenas, there is an obvious tension between strength of combined numbers and the vitality of diversity. On the one hand, to the extent that advocates of particular interests unify into a single organization or confederation possessing what Schmitter has called "strategic capacity" (to define and sustain a course of action independent of immediate member preferences, as well as outside pressures) and "encompassing scope" (in the domain of interests represented), they will be more powerful actors, and Schmitter believes, will produce more stable "partial regimes" of interest mediation. Indeed, Schmitter argues that civil society contributes most positively to democratic consolidation not in a pluralist system - "where a great multiplicity of narrowly specialized and overlapping organizations emerge with close dependencies upon their members or interlocutors" - but in corporatist systems, in which interest associations with monopolistic scope in specific interest domains are nationally focused and hierarchically coordinated into sole peak associations with clear capacities for "class governance."[23] No doubt, corporatist associations with broader memberships and a representational monopoly make for stronger interest intermediaries, and more stable bargaining as well. But they also tend to be less democratic in their internal governance. Before long, "autonomy" from member preferences not only opens wider space for bargaining but also activates Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" - the tendency of organizational leaders to entrench themselves or their faction indefinitely in organizational power and become unaccountable to their members.[24] Apart from political parties, trade unions have been particularly vulnerable to this tendency (given the especially large gap between the time and resources of their members and those of the leaders), and the

[23] Schmitter, "Civil Society East and West," pp. 246-247, 249.

[24] Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (Glencoe, Il: Free Press, 1949). Formal organization, Michels lamented, inevitably "gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors.... Who says organization says oligarchy" (p.401).

larger and more bureaucratic the scale of the organization the more vulnerable it is to an oligarchy of power at the top.[25] The value of corporatism for democratic consolidation is also rendered dubious by the fiscal strains and barriers to global competitiveness such bargaining relations have imposed on European economies, as a result of the benefits that have been extracted by labor and capital.

Extreme pluralism, in which a great multiplicity of groups compete to represent the same narrow interests, can produce disempowering fragmentation. But that is not the only alternative to corporatism. Rather, having within each issue arena or interest sector at least some different organizational alternatives may generate greater pressure for organizations to be responsive and accountable to their constituencies, because those constituencies have other options to which they can turn for representation. In this sense, some degree of competition between organizations may be healthy, and conducive to competition within organizations as well. To the extent that the norms and structures of a "civic community" emerge, such pluralism need not obstruct the ability of these different organizations to coalesce and cooperate for common ends. Moreover, pluralism acts as an insurance policy for any given interest sector, diffusing risk. If one organization suffers decline or confronts extinction as a result of leadership mismanagement or abuse, cooptation, or repression, this does not mean the end of effective organized representation for the interest.

Finally, civil society serves democracy best when it is dense in the sheer number of associations. The greater the density of associational life, the more memberships the average citizen is likely to have, and the wider the range of societal interests and activities that will find organizational expression. The more associations in civil society, the more likely that associations will develop specialized agendas and purposes that do not seek to swallow the lives of their members in one all-compassing organizational framework. More generally, as

[25] Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James S. Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1962).

Tocqueville so trenchantly recognized with respect to democracy in America, the disposition to form and join organizations seems to be a habit, a core feature of political culture. The density of voluntary associational life has three important spillover effects. First, the more associations of all kinds - including those in parochial society - the more people develop the trust, confidence, and skill to cooperate and coalesce, to form new associations, when new needs, exigencies, and interests arise. For this reason, Putnam treats the density of associational life as a key indicator of a "civic community" and the formation of social capital. This leads to the second spillover: the denser a country's associational life, the more democratic the political culture is likely to be in generating political knowledge, interest, efficacy, trust, and tolerance. Third, one reason why tolerance is greater in densely populated civil societies is because multiple memberships reflect and reinforce cross-cutting patterns of cleavage that expose citizens to a wider array of interests, backgrounds, and perspectives.

Civil Society and Democratic Transitions

Civil society advances democracy in two generic ways: by helping to generate a transition from authoritarian rule to (at least) electoral democracy, and by deepening and consolidating democracy once it is established. Because of the longstanding tendency in the scholarly literature (noted at the beginning of this essay) to emphasize the primary role of elites in leading, crafting, negotiating (or imposing) democratic transitions, it is important to stress how crucial has been the role of "the public" - organized and mobilized through civil society - in many prominent cases of democratization during the third wave.

With the Southern European and Latin American transitions of the 1970s and early 1980s in mind, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter advance a model based on the sweeping assertion that "there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence - direct or indirect - of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating

cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners."[26] "Once something has happened" along these lines - once the "soft-liners" in the regime have sufficiently prevailed to widen the space for independent political expression and activity - then citizenship is revived, civil society is "resurrected," and a "general mobilization is likely to occur," or even to snowball into a "popular upsurge" that pushes "the transition further than it otherwise would have gone."[27]

[26] O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, p. 19.

[27] Ibid, chapter 5. The quotes are from pp. 48, 54, and 56.

Although this sequential model has generally been considered valid for the Southern European and Latin American transitions, it is now being questioned even for those foundational cases. In Spain, Peru, and Argentina, Collier and Mahoney argue that protests and strikes led by trade unions "were crucial in destabilizing authoritarianism and opening the way for democratization," fostering divisions among authoritarian incumbents and pressing them to surrender power in a "defensive extrication" when they had not yet "formulated a reform project."[28] And where, as in Uruguay and Brazil, the transition games more closely approximated "the standard model" of elite initiation and strategic interactions between authoritarian and democratic party elites, mass popular opposition in general and labor protest in particular played a crucial role in undermining the "legitimation projects" of the two regimes and their "attempts to control and limit the party system."[29]

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[28] Ruth Berins Collier and James Mahoney, "Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes: Labor and Recent Democratization in South America and Southern Europe," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 3 (April 1997): 287. Their interpretation of the Spanish case in particular challenges the conventional theoretical interpretation, but they note that even before the death of Franco, labor protest "produced a severe challenge to the regime" and altered the terms of elite political calculations (p. 288). Moreover, their arguments accord with historical evidence from earlier periods and other cases that emphasize the role of organized labor (and other mass-based collective actors) in generating and deepening democratization. See Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

[29] Ibid, p. 295.

In fact, the elite-centered model of democratic transitions poorly comprehends the dynamics of many cases around the world during the "third wave," where either the sequence is turned on its head - and it is the mobilization and then "upsurge" of civil society which generates divisions in the ruling regime - or where the causal dynamics are more intricate and subtle, with the growth in civil society pluralism, autonomy, and resistance advancing incrementally and interactively with political liberalization from above and with (shifting or intermittent) regime divisions over the pace of that liberalization. In particular, where authoritarian rule has tended to be highly personalistic and decadent - to the point of what Linz calls "sultanistic"[30] and others "neopatrimonial" - the real impetus for democratic change tends to originate outside the regime in the mobilization of civil society. This has been the case in much of Africa. Where rapid economic development has ineluctably generated a more complex class structure and a diversified associational life, pressure from below has functioned somewhat independently to induce or widen political opening from above in a reciprocal or dialectical process. Thus, although Taiwan is often viewed as a paradigmatic case of controlled political opening from above by a strong and self-confident ruling party, the social movements and protests of the 1980s "translated long-suppressed popular discontent into ardent social forces that eroded the effectiveness of one-party rule and softened the resolve of the state elite to retain the authoritarian arrangements."[31]

In a number of prominent cases civil society has played a crucial role, if not the leading role, in producing a transition to democracy. It was only the courageous mobilization of

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[30] Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975) vol. 3, pp. 175-411.

[31] Yun-han Chu, *Crafting Democratization in Taiwan* (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992), pp. 99.

hundreds of thousands of citizens, surging into the streets to reclaim their stolen election, that enabled the rebellion of military reformers to survive in the Philippines and forced Ferdinand Marcos from power in what came to be known as the "Miracle at Edsa." If civil society had not organized massively through the umbrella organization, NAMFREL, to monitor those 1986 presidential elections, they would never have been able to document to the world Marcos's massive electoral fraud, and thus to rally U.S. and other international support to their cause.

A year later, in South Korea, enormous student and worker demonstrations combined with the more sober pressure of middle-class business and professional groups and opposition politicians to force the authoritarian regime to yield to demands for true democratic change (signified by direct election of the president).[32] The petition campaign of early 1987 demanding direct election - which gathered over a million signatures - can be seen as a classic moment of "civil society upsurge," in which traditionally reserved or compliant middle-class groups and newspapers were emboldened to challenge the authoritarian regime and its propaganda.[33] But by then authoritarian rule had been heavily stripped of legitimacy not only by its own acts of repression but by the mobilization of a civil society coalition of unprecedented breadth, including not only student and labor organizations but peasants, writers, journalists, academics and "most of the country's Buddhist, Protestant, and Roman Catholic clergy and lay groups."[34] The breadth, vigor, and, moral legitimacy of this mobilization, combined with the rapid expansion of Korea's economy and international engagement (with the Olympics headed for Seoul in 1988), all raised the costs of repression enormously. By April of 1987, in the face of massive pro-democracy demonstrations, the authoritarian president, Chun Doo-Hwan, cut off negotiations over democratic reform and appeared ready to launch a wave of repression. It was during those Spring months of peak civil society mobilization, with labor unrest and student demonstrations

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[32] Hsin-Huang, Michael Hsiao and Hagen Koo, "The Middle Classes and Democratization," in Diamond, et al., eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*, pp. 312-333.

[33] David I. Steinberg, "The Republic of Korea: Pluralizing Politics," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 385.

[34] Sun-hyuk Kim, "From Resistance to Representation: Civil Society in South Korean Democratization," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, June 1996, p. 116.

exploding in number and scale, and public protest gathering support from a growing array of previously quiescent "establishment" groups, that the regime suffered its most serious split. On June 29 Chun's close associate and hand-picked presidential successor, Roh Tae Woo, broke ranks with the regime and embraced opposition demands for democratic reforms. This in turn paved the way for full participation in the December 1987 founding elections of a new Korean democracy.[35]

[35] See Steinberg, "The Republic of Korea," pp. 385-6; and for a more detailed account of the civil society dynamics during 1984-1987, Kim, "From Resistance to Representation," Chapter 5. The sequence of civil society mobilization in Korea also challenges the assumption of O'Donnell and Schmitter that the "privileged sectors" of private "industrialists, merchants, bankers, and landowners," assume "a crucial role in the earliest stages of the transition," due to "their superior capacity for action, their lesser exposure to the risks of repression, and their sheer visibility." (p. 50). While this was true to some considerable degree in the Philippines, and in other "sultanistic" states where a decadent personal ruler and ruling party preyed upon private capital, in Korea big capital backed the regime, sat on the sidelines, or defected only in the very final moments. As Hsiao and Koo note (in "The Middle Classes and Democratization"), in both Korea and Taiwan it was the professional and intellectual classes and "petty bourgeoisie," not big business, that led, supported and financed the democratic movements.

In Chile, the stunning defeat of the Pinochet dictatorship in the October 1988 plebiscite was achieved against enormous odds only by the heroic organization of a remarkably broad range of independent organizations that united in the Crusade for Citizen Participation. This case perhaps more closely follows the Schmitter-O'Donnell model, in that there were well-known divisions within the military regime of General Pinochet pitting his loyalists against "soft-liners," but mass mobilization emerged only with the political liberalization of the plebiscite. In any case, it was a gamble that Pinochet did not expect to lose at the polls, and he would not have lost it (and Chile would not have democratized when it did) without unprecedented civic unity and mobilization. At the same time, the communist regime in Poland was crumbling as a result of a decade of independent organization and publishing, particularly through the broad trade-union front, Solidarity. When the walls finally came crashing down around all the Eastern European communist regimes in 1989, many credited Soviet leader Gorbachev for refusing to intervene, but the revolutionary ground had been forcefully tilled and regime legitimacy undermined by courageous networks of dissidents, autonomous groups, and underground publications that represented the re-emergence of civil society.[36]

[36] Christine Sadowski, "Autonomous Groups as Agents of Democratic Change in Communist and Post-Communist Eastern Europe," in Larry Diamond, *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 163-197.

Spawned in the wreckage left by predatory and incompetent states, the catalyzing role of civil society mobilization against dictatorship has perhaps been most striking in Africa. In a wide range of countries in sub-Saharan Africa - including Benin, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and even Zaire - the initial impetus for democratic change has emanated from a vast panoply of autonomous actors in civil society: students, the churches, professional associations, women's groups, trade unions, human rights organizations, producer groups, intellectuals, journalists, civic associations, and informal networks.[37] In contrast to the O'Donnell-Schmitter model, in the African regime transitions of the early 1990s, "'the popular upsurge' preceded elite concessions and was an important factor driving African political leaders to open the door to liberalization."[38] Particularly crucial in leveraging protest into regime change was the formation of broad coalitions of civil society actors, and of linkages between these various groups and powerful, resourceful international actors. Not since the struggle for decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s have Africans united so broadly across ethnic, regional, religious, sectoral and occupational divides for a common - and not coincidentally, similar - purpose: political liberation. These developments created not only opportunities for civil society to dissolve the grip of authoritarian regimes, but also post-transition challenges and dilemmas (explored below).

Unfortunately, even very courageous and wide civil society (and political) mobilization does not always bring an end to authoritarian rule and a transition to democracy. When an authoritarian regime has internal unity, vastly superior resources, at least some measure of

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[37] Lewis, "Political transition and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa;" Chazan, "Africa's Democratic Challenge: Strengthening Civil Society and the State," and "Between Liberalism and Statism: African Political Cultures and Democracy," in Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, pp. 67-105; Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, "Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands and State Response," in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds., *Governance and Politics in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 27-56; Michael Bratton, "Civil Society and Political Transitions in Africa," and E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Associational Life, Civil Society, and Democratization in Ghana," in John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, *Civil Society and the State in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994); Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, forthcoming); E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Civil Society in Africa," *Journal of Democracy* 7,l no. 2 (April 1996): 118-132.

[38] Bratton, "Civil Society and Political Transitions," p. 63.

international support, and the capacity and will to use brutal repression, it may prevail indefinitely against even a very broad base of societal opposition. Such has been the tragedy of Burma, where the National League for Democracy (NLD) of Aung San Suu Kyi won most of the seats in the 1990 parliamentary elections, which the regime then annulled. Although the NLD was able to forge an ethnically broad resistance through the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), it had to do so from exile, and resistance to the regime has been weakened by military pressure, the resurgence of religious and ethnic rivalries (fanned by the regime), and the lack of support from neighboring Asian states and from powerful Western ones as well - all increasingly eager to do business with resource-rich Burma, no matter who governs.[39] A similar situation has prevailed in Nigeria, where, since the annulment of the 1993 opposition electoral victory, ethnic and factional divisions within the democratic movement and international eagerness to mine and market the country's natural wealth (oil) have left the military dictatorship firmly in control.[40]

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[39] Josef Silverstein, "Burma's Uneven Struggle," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 4 (October 1996): 88-102.

[40] For a detailed exploration of the failed transition, see Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran, *Transition without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, forthcoming). On the formidable obstacles to democratic transition under the successor regime of General Abacha, see Diamond's concluding chapter, *supra*; Julius Ihonvbere, "Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, 2 (1996): 193-225; Peter Lewis, "From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, 1 (1996); and Richard Joseph, "The Nigerian Nation-State and the Resurgence of Authoritarianism in Africa," paper presented to the 1996 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30.

What purpose is left to civil society in the wake of such apparent defeat? Here again, even in cases of failed or aborted transitions, it is important to take a long-term, developmental perspective. Even when authoritarianism resurges, civil society may continue to function, both overtly - through a variety of religious, professional, cultural, social, and human rights organizations that may be monitored, subverted, and harassed but barely tolerated - and through covert means, such as underground media. In Nigeria, human rights organizations continue to research, publicize, expose, lobby, and organize, sometimes treading more carefully while still facing arrest and imprisonment; a "pirate" radio station broadcasts news, information, and inspiration from the democratic movement with the support of Western democratic donors; and banned news magazines continue to be produced by plucky journalists who investigate, write, edit, publish, sleep, and eat in hiding, on the run. Throughout the authoritarian, war-torn, and pseudodemocratic states of Africa - from Zaire and Liberia to Kenya and Cameroon - civil society organizations and media struggle against great odds to keep democratic hope and principles alive, to counter the Orwellian propaganda of the regime, to raise the consciousness of society, to preserve some ethic of truthfulness and commitment to the public good, and to contain the worst abuses of the regime (in part by exposing and documenting them to the international community). Such efforts, however Quixotic they may appear at the time, till the soil for a new democratic transition at some point in the future. They limit the capacity of the authoritarian regime to legitimate and consolidate its rule, and to browbeat the public into total resignation. Not least, in the most pervasively corrupt and abusive contexts - like those in Burma, Nigeria, and Zaire - civil society organizations (both to resist authoritarianism and to cooperate for development apart from the state) preserve some kernel of civicness in the culture, some seeds of honesty, trust, solidarity, efficacy, and hope. Some such alternative to the prevailing corruption, cynicism, exploitation, and powerlessness is vital if a society is to have some chance of constructing democracy - and not simply replacing one form of authoritarianism with another - when the opportunity for regime change next presents itself.

A long-term, developmental view of democracy stresses the importance of systematic, grassroots efforts to build social capital and cultivate democratic networks, norms, and expectations. An important example of such an effort is the work of the Zimbabwean human rights organization, Zimrights. It is not only engaging in traditional human rights reporting and

legal defense but is also raising political consciousness and inculcating democratic habits through innovative civic education programs. Utilizing group discussion and community theater, Zimrights first gets people to talk about and portray the everyday shortcomings of governance and public life, and then links those complaints to more systemic issues of human rights, accountability, citizen responsibility, and good governance. In this way, Zimrights is connecting people to one another as citizens, through discussion and organizational membership, and perhaps most dramatically through the collective exercise of writing and staging a community play. Through a week's presence in a community, Zimrights activists begin to lift the fog of civic apathy, resignation, and fear, and to generate a public expectation and demand for real democracy. As the corruption and arrogance of the country's longtime ruling party deepens (following a life cycle strikingly similar to that of neighboring African states), Zimrights' grassroots work at civic education and mobilization is sowing the seeds for an eventual transition to democracy.[41]

Civil society faces the most trying circumstances in collapsed and war-ravaged states. Yet even here it may have the potential to make a positive, even dramatic, contribution. Religious, human rights, women's and student groups, trade unions, and other civic organizations for peace and reconciliation can play a crucial role in helping to provide a neutral framework for negotiation between warring parties and then helping to administer the process of political and societal reconstruction, including the rehabilitation and reintegration into society of former combatants. Such has been the case in Liberia, where hundreds of NGOs have been operating amidst the chaos of the civil war, and have helped provide job training, counseling, food, and medicine to ex-combatants.[42] In Chad, the civic organization Chad Non-Violence is working with other NGOs to teach principles of human rights, non-violence, and peaceful conflict resolution to youth, women, and the military. Such groups may seem to provide a thin reed of hope in a society where arms are plentiful, frustrations pervasive, and state elites still wantonly abusive of

[41] Interviews with Zimrights Executive Director David Chimhini and Zimrights community theatre specialists, Harare, March 17-19, 1997.

[42] David Peterson, "Liberia: Crying for Freedom," *Journal of Democracy* 7, 2 (April 1996): 148-158.

human rights. But a culture of peace and accommodation can only be developed gradually, and the work of civil society organizations is vital to this transformation.

How Civil Society Promotes Democratic Development and Consolidation

A vibrant civil society serves the development, deepening and consolidation of democracy in many ways. The first and most basic democratic function of civil society is to provide "the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control."[43] After the transition, this involves checking, monitoring, and restraining the exercise of power by formally democratic states, and holding them accountable to the law and public expectations of responsible government. Few developments are more destructive to the legitimacy of new democracies than blatant and pervasive political corruption, particularly during periods of painful economic restructuring when many social groups are being asked to sustain tremendous economic and social sacrifices. New democracies, following long periods of arbitrary and statist authoritarian rule, lack the legal and bureaucratic institutions to contain corruption at the outset. Without a vigorously free, independent, and investigative press, and civic groups pressing for institutional reform, corruption is likely to flourish, as it has in Brazil, Argentina, Zambia, Pakistan, Thailand, and most states of the former Soviet Union.

The function of checking and limiting the power of the state overlaps with the “civic” function I will describe below, of institutionally reforming the state. A growing number of civic organizations are turning their agendas to the pursuit of reforms to deter and control political and bureaucratic corruption. But increasingly, as with IDASA in South Africa and the Evilio Javier Foundation in the Philippines, they are also monitoring the performance of government bodies, and even assessing the performance of individual government ministers and representatives. Wider, freer, more open and independent flows of information are the indispensable foundation

[43] Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99, no. 2 (Summer 1984), p. 204. See also Lipset, *Political Man*, p. 52.

for civil society checks against the abuse of state power. In this sense, specialized publications and journals that make the conduct of government affairs accessible to the more educated and informed public of opinion leaders, academics, associational officers, and the like play a crucial role in facilitating scrutiny and critical evaluation.

The mass media in general play a vital role. In a democracy, the abuse of power thrives behind a veil of secrecy and opaque procedures. Transparency is a precondition for accountability and reform (which is why the most important anti-corruption organization in the world has chosen for its name Transparency International). Investigation and exposure does not guarantee popular reaction, punishment, disgrace, and deterrence, but it can facilitate it, and galvanize a civil society into motion. The gathering public and civil society pressure to reform Mexico's political institutions and push the country past the threshold of real electoral democracy owes in part to the emergence of an increasingly independent press that has broken free of the historic chains of deference, dependence, cooptation, and corruption that made Mexican newspapers accomplices of the state and the ruling party. With the "awakening" of organized forces in civil society and the liberalization of the Mexican economy and polity, financially autonomous and politically independent newspapers have emerged to take on previously taboo subjects, such as drug trafficking, official corruption, electoral fraud, opposition protest, political repression, and the Mexican Military.[44] At least, the struggle is now engaged and out in the open. A similar effect has been observable - within a much more democratic context - in South Korea, where growing press freedom, pluralism, and assertiveness has brought much more frequent exposure of government corruption and a significantly lower threshold of public tolerance for it. This, in conjunction with the mobilization of civic organizations and the close cooperation

[44] Chappell Lawson, "New Media, New Democracies: Political Transition and the Emergence of a Free Press," Ph.D. Dissertation (in process), Department of Political Science, Stanford University.

between them and the independent press, has helped produce reform laws to make banking and real estate transactions more transparent.[45]

[45] Seong, "Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Korea," and David Steinberg, "Continuing Democratic Reform: The Unfinished Symphony", in Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim, eds., *Consolidating Democracy in the Republic of Korea* (forthcoming).

The "checking and limiting" function of civil society is a particularly clear manifestation of the "reserve of influence" that organized citizens retain but only periodically exercise with vigor in the "civic culture."[46] Monitoring is a constant function which must be performed by the press and various civic, interest, and "watchdog" groups. But broad civic mobilization to contain or punish abuse occurs only in cases of serious abuse, where the institutions of "horizontal accountability" - the courts, the legislature, the central bank, and so on - are either implicated themselves or too weak and compromised to act on their own. The broad outpouring of press scrutiny and opinion and organizational mobilization against the corruption and illegal acts of Presidents Richard Nixon in the United States (in 1974), Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil (in 1992), and Carlos Andres Pérez in Venezuela (in 1992-93) in each case induced Congress to move toward impeachment, removing Pérez and prompting Collor and Nixon to resign in disgrace.

The sting of civil society readiness to criticize and mobilize over perceived abuse of state authority has been repeatedly felt by President Kim Young Sam of Korea, who began as a popular political reformer but was increasingly forced to backtrack and humbly apologize in the face of public scandals and controversies during the latter half of his five-year term (1993-1998). In a particularly momentous showdown, President Kim and his party were forced to back down in early 1997 after they passed new labor reform and national security laws in a secretive pre-dawn meeting of the National Assembly with opposition party members absent. The actions triggered several weeks of labor strikes (the largest and costliest in the country's history), public demonstrations joined by tens of thousands of students, support from the Church and other middle-class sympathizers, and vociferous condemnation from both the Korean and international press. What fueled the scope and intensity of public outrage was not so much the labor reform itself, making it easier for business to lay off workers (which Korean organized labor had long opposed but was badly needed to improve the Korean economy's sagging competitiveness). Rather, civil society was provoked by what it perceived as violations of democratic principle: the rushed and furtive manner in which the bill was passed; the deferral for five years of a parallel promised reform, sought by labor, that would have made it easier for unions to organize (by

[46] Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 347.

lifting the old corporatist prohibition on more than one union in an industry); and the passage during that secret session of other legislation, including a bill to give broad new investigative powers to the nation's intelligence agency.[47]

[47] "South Korea: Culture Clash," *The Economist,* January 11, 1997, pp. 35-36; "Seoul Leader Fails to Halt Labor Strife," *New York Times*, January 23, 1997, p. A6. "Labor Rivals Team Up in South Korea," *San Francisco Chronicle,* January 27, 1997, p. A8. In a partial concession, the ruling party passed legislation in March 1997 recognizing multiple unions at both the national and company levels and in essence dismantling the old state corporatist arrangements for labor control. Particularly revealing of the broadly political scope of the protest was that the government-sanctioned Korean Federation of Trade Unions joined the protest that had been launched by the alternative and unrecognized National Federation of Democratic Labor Unions.

A second democracy-building function of civil society is to supplement the role of political parties in stimulating political participation, increasing the political efficacy and skill of democratic citizens, and promoting an appreciation of the obligations as well as rights of democratic citizenship. For too many Americans (barely half of whom vote in presidential elections), this seems merely a quaint homily. But for civil society leaders like Poland's Bronislaw Geremek who have risked everything in the struggle for democracy, "There is no greater threat to democracy than indifference and passivity on the part of citizens."[48] A century and a half ago, the voluntary participation of citizens in all manner of associations outside the state struck Tocqueville as a bedrock of democratic practice and culture, and of independent economic vitality, in the young United States. Voluntary "associations may therefore be considered as large free schools, where all the members of the community go to learn the general theory of association."[49] And in particular (to reiterate), voluntary participation in horizontal networks breeds the social capital that spawns wider participation and cooperation.

[48] Ibid, 11.

[49] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* Vol. 2 (New York: Vintage Books, 1945 [1840]): 124.

The generation of democratic habits and skills is not merely (or inevitably) a fortuitous byproduct of associational activity, As I have already suggested, civil society can also be a vital and intentional arena for inculcating not only the participatory habits, interests and skills of democratic citizenship, but the deeper values of a democratic political culture, such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, and a respect for opposing viewpoints. These values and norms become most stable when they emerge through intense practice, and organizational participation in civil society provides an important form of practice in political advocacy and contestation (particularly if authority relations within the organization are structured along horizontal rather than hierarchical, domineering lines). Beyond this, many civic organizations - such as *Conciencia* (a network of women's organizations which began in Argentina and has since spread to fourteen other Latin American countries) - are working directly in the schools and among groups of adult citizens to cultivate democratic norms and values through interactive programs that demonstrate the dynamics of reaching consensus in a group, the possibility for respectful debate between competing viewpoints, and the means by which people can cooperate to solve the problems of their own communities.[50]

[50] María Rosa de Martini and Sofía de Pinedo, *Journal of Democracy* 3 (July 1992): 138-146; and María Rosa de Martini, "Civic Participation in the Argentine Democratic Process," in Larry Diamond, ed., *The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World* (New York: Freedom House, 1992), pp. 29-52.

More than ever before, education for democracy has become an explicit project of civil society organizations in new democracies, and an international cause. Beginning in 1996 with support from the United States Information Agency, regional and international networks under the rubric of CIVITAS have begun to meet and organize to share techniques, strategies, and curricula for democratic civic education, to be employed both in formal schooling at all grade levels and in a variety of informal civil society programs to socialize young people and adults and stimulate their active participation in community affairs.[51] Over the long run, this could lead to profound cultural changes, reshaping the way children are educated and relate to authority, the way they understand their country's political history, and their readiness to trust and cooperate with their peers. Increasingly, civic organizations and state educational officials (as well as official multilateral donors like the Inter-American Development Bank, and to some extent private enterprise) are cooperating in reforming curricula, training civics teachers, writing standards for teaching civics and government, and creating new instructional materials for teaching participatory democracy, economic citizenship, and human rights,. This nicely demonstrates an essential point of this essay: that if civil society is to help develop and consolidate democracy, its mission cannot simply be to check, criticize, and resist the state. It must also involve complementing and improving the state, and enhancing its democratic legitimacy and effectiveness.

A fourth way in which civil society may serve democracy is by structuring multiple channels, beyond the political party, for articulating, aggregating, and representing interests. This function is particularly important for providing traditionally excluded groups - such as women

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[51] On June 2-6, 1995, civic activists, educators, and thinkers from 52 countries met in Prague to initiate CIVITAS, "an international consortium for civic education that aims to strengthen effective education for informed and responsible citizenship in new and established democracies." This was followed by a meeting in Buenos Aires, September 29-October 1, 1996 which brought together representatives (of civic and community organizations, government education ministries, international organizations, and the press) from 19 North and South American countries and 20 other countries worldwide. A similar meeting was planned in South Africa for May 1997. The CIVITAS project is significant not only for the scope and depth of its emphasis on "education for democracy" through a variety of means, but on the unprecedented international cooperation it has stimulated toward this end. In this sense it represents the rapid growth of a new phenomenon I discuss below, international civil society. And consistent with its desire to use the latest technology to foster connectedness and improve civic education techniques, it has an Internet site to facilitate the exchange of information and resources: http://www.civnet.org.

and racial or ethnic minorities - access to power that has been denied them in the "upper institutional echelons" of formal politics. Even where (as in South America) women have played, through various movements and organizations, prominent roles in mobilizing against authoritarian rule, democratic politics and governance after the transition have typically reverted to previous exclusionary patterns. In Eastern Europe, there are many signs of deterioration in the political and social status of women after the transition. Only with sustained, organized pressure from below, in civil society, can political and social equality be advanced, and the quality, responsiveness, and legitimacy of democracy thus deepened.[52]

[52] Georgina Waylen, "Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics," *World Politics* 46 (April 1994): 327-354. Although Waylen is correct that O'Donnell and Schmitter speak to the dangers of excessive popular mobilization during the transition, her criticism of the democracy literature as a whole for trivializing the role of civil society is unfairly overgeneralized and certainly inapplicable to work on Africa. Moreover, accepting her challenge to treat civil society as a centrally important phenomenon in democratization does not require one to accept her insistence on *defining* democracy to include economic and social rights as well as political ones.

This points to a fifth, related way civil society can deepen democracy - by effecting what Jonathan Fox calls a "transition from clientelism to citizenship" at the local level. Democratization inevitably proceeds unevenly, and "authoritarian enclaves" frequently persist most stubbornly at the local or provincial level, especially in rural and less developed areas of a country. In Mexico and Brazil, India and Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines, Nigeria and Ghana, Turkey and Russia, the story is more or less the same. It is the local level that provides the anchor, the social foundation for national chains of patron-client relations. It is at the locality where lords, *caciques*, chiefs, and bosses purchase deference and control through the particularistic dispensation of material rewards. It is first and foremost at the local level where the horizontal ties and autonomous participation of democratic citizenship are blocked by the vertical dependence of clientelism.[53] Just as horizontal relations of trust and reciprocity are the building blocks of the civic community, so the "vertical relations of authority and dependency, as embodied in patron-client networks," are the building blocks of the uncivic community.[54] The autonomous organization of historically marginalized and dependent people - landless laborers, indigenous peoples, women, the poor in general - represents a watershed in the struggle for democracy and social justice, for a society in which citizens can advance and defend "their own interests and identities without fear of external intervention and punishment."[55] At one and the same time it empowers the powerless to advance their interests and it severs the psychological and structural bonds of clientelism that have historically locked them in a dependent and

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[53] Jonathan Fox, "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico," *World Politics* 46, no. 2 (January 1994): 151-184, and "Latin America's Emerging Local Politics," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (April 1994): 105-116.

[54] Putnam, "Making Democracy Work," p. 101.

[55] Fox, "The Difficult Transition," p. 152.

subordinated status, isolated from one another and unable to rally around their common material or cultural interests.

As Fox emphasizes, the struggle for empowerment and citizenship at the local level is not smooth and pretty, but dialectical and often violent - "constructed gradually and unevenly through cycles of conflict that leave nascent democratic forces with political resources to draw on in successive rounds."[56] That is why, as in India and Brazil, conflicts may intensify and human rights violations increase as newly conscious groups organize autonomously to assert their rights and deepen democracy. However, movements of the poor and marginal have two assets that were not nearly so widely available in previous eras: international media and political attention to their plights, which often constrains the state's ability to utilize or condone repression against them, and linkages to a growing array of international civil society organizations (concerned with human rights, indigenous rights, the rights of women and children, sustainable development, and the environment). The growing density of these transnational civil-society linkages (often completely skipping over the political level of the nation-state) has significantly strengthened the ability of marginalized groups to defend their cultures, identities, lands, environments, and human rights (and in extreme cases their very lives) against abuses by landlords, developers, miners, security forces, and other agents of state authority.[57] In India and elsewhere around the world, it is effectively grinding to a halt the formidable momentum of the post-World War II period for the construction of large-scale dams.[58]

Sixth, as I have already suggested, a rich and pluralistic civil society, particularly in a relatively developed economy, will tend to generate a wide range of interests that may cross-cut, and so mitigate, the principal polarities of political conflict. As new class-based organizations

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[56] Ibid, p. 155.

[57] Kathryn A. Sikkink, "Nongovernmental Organizations, Human Rights, and Democracy in Latin America," in Tom Farer, ed., *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 150-168; Allison Brysk, "Turning Weakness into Strength: The Internationalization of Indian Rights," *Latin American Perspectives* 23, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 38-57.

[58] Sanjeev Khagram, *Dams, Development, and Democracy: Transnational Struggles for Power and Water*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Stanford University (August 1997, forthcoming).

and issue-oriented movements arise, they draw together new constituencies that cut across longstanding regional, religious, ethnic, or partisan cleavages. In toppling communist (and other) dictatorships and mobilizing for democracy, these new formations may generate a more liberal type of citizenship that transcends historic divisions and preempts the resurgence of narrow, ethnically exclusivist nationalist impulses.[59] To the extent that individuals have multiple interests and join a wide variety of organizations to pursue and advance those interests, they will be more likely to associate with different types of people who have divergent political interests and opinions. These attitudinal cross-pressures will tend to soften the militancy of their own views, generate a more expansive and sophisticated political outlook, and so encourage tolerance for differences and a greater readiness to compromise.[60]

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[59] On the important distinction between *political* (liberal, inclusionary) nationalism and *ethnic* (exclusivist) nationalism, see Ghia Nodia, "Nationalism and Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 3, no. 4 (October 1992): 3-22. Nodia argues that it was precisely "totalitarianism's decades-long assault on the structures of civil society," and the "rubble" it left behind "of atomized individuals searching frantically for a common principle" that made conditions ripe for a revival of nationalism. Because political or civic nationalism was interrupted or aborted by communism, "the *ethnic* element has become especially strong" (p. 18).

[60] Lipset, *Political Man,*70-79.

A seventh function of a democratic civil society is recruiting and training new political leaders. In a few cases, this is a deliberate purpose of civic organizations. As they grow beyond election monitoring and voter education, a growing number of civic organizations in new democracies are conducting (typically with support from international foundations) training programs, on a nonpartisan basis, for local and state elected officials and candidates, emphasizing not only technical and administrative skills but normative standards of public accountability and transparency.[61] More often, recruitment and training are merely a byproduct of the successful functioning and engagement with the state of civil society organizations over a long period of time. Civil society leaders and activists acquire through rising in the internal politics of their organization and through articulating and representing the interests of their members in public policy arenas a range of leadership and advocacy skills (and self-confidence) that qualify them well for service in government and party politics. They learn how to organize and motivate people, debate issues, raise and account for funds, craft budgets, publicize programs, administer staffs, canvass for support, negotiate agreements, and build coalitions. At the same time, their work on behalf of their constituency, or of what they see to be the public interest, and their articulation of clear and compelling policy alternatives, may gain for them a wider political following. Interest groups, social movements, and community efforts of various kinds may therefore train, toughen, and thrust into public notice a richer (and more representative) array of potential new political leaders than might otherwise be recruited by political parties. Because of the traditional dominance by men of the corridors of power, civil society is a particularly important base for the training and recruitment of women (and members of other marginalized groups) into positions of formal political power. Where the recruitment of new political leaders within the established political parties has become narrow or stagnant, this function of civil society may play a crucial role in revitalizing democracy and renewing its legitimacy.

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[61] The Evilio Javier Foundation was a relatively early entrant into this type of activity. Dette Pascual, "Organizing People Power in the Philippines," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Winter 1990): 102-109.

Eighth, as I have indicated earlier in this essay, many civic organizations, institutes, and foundations have explicit democracy-building purposes, beyond leadership training. Non-partisan election-monitoring efforts have been critical to deterring fraud, enhancing confidence in the electoral process, affirming the legitimacy of the result, or in some cases (as in the Philippines in 1986 and Panama in 1989) demonstrating an opposition victory despite government fraud. This function is particularly crucial in founding elections like those which initiated democracy in Chile, Nicaragua, Bulgaria, Zambia, and South Africa.[62] Democracy institutes and think tanks are working in a number of countries to reform the electoral system, democratize political parties, decentralize and open up government, strengthen the legislature, and enhance government accountability.[63] Even to stimulate debate on and awareness of institutional alternatives is an important contribution to the improvement of democracy. Beyond thinking and debate, civil society organizations mobilize the broad public support and pressure that is vital to win the adoption of institutional reforms that may not be appealing to the politicians as a group. One recent historic instance of this was the concerted public mobilization of the Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice and other civic groups to reform Korea's banking and real estate registration laws so as to require that the real names of the transacting parties be recorded. An important legal tool in the battle against corruption, this reform was finally adopted by the new Kim Young Sam government soon after it came to power in 1993, as a way of demonstrating its democratic commitment and reformist credentials. Human rights organizations also play a crucial role in democratic reform and deepening, even after the transition to formal democracy, lobbying for greater judicial efficiency and impartiality, improved prison conditions, justice with

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[62] Larry Garber and Glenn Cowan, "The Virtues of Parallel Vote Tabulations," *Journal of Democracy* 4 (April 1993): 94-107.

[63] Arye Carmon, "Israel's 'Age of Reform,'" *Journal of Democracy* 4 (July 1993): 114-123; Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Promoting Democracy and Building Institutions in Thailand," in Diamond, ed., *The Democratic Revolution*, 125-144.

respect to particular individuals, increased public awareness of human rights, and greater institutionalized respect for individual liberties and minority rights.

Ninth, a vigorous civil society widely disseminates information and so empowers citizens in the collective pursuit and defense of their interests and values. While civil society groups may sometimes prevail temporarily through the raw political power of their numbers (for example, in strikes and demonstrations), they generally cannot be effective in contesting government policies or defending their interests unless they are well informed. This is strikingly true in debates over military and national security policy, where civilians in developing countries have generally been lacking woefully in even the most elementary knowledge. An autonomous and pluralistic press is only one way of providing the public with a wealth of news and alternative perspectives. Independent organizations may also provide citizens information about government activities that does not depend on what government *says* it is doing, and that may only have been gathered through exhaustive and enterprising investigation. This is a vital technique of human rights organizations: By contradicting the official story, they make it more difficult to cover up repression and abuses of power.

The mobilization of new information and understanding are essential to the achievement of economic reform in a democracy, and this is a tenth function that civil society can play. While economic stabilization policies typically must be implemented quickly and forcefully by elected executives in crisis situations, without widespread consultation, more structural economic reforms - privatization, trade and financial liberalization - appear to be more sustainable and far-

reaching (or in many postcommunist countries, only feasible) when they are pursued through the democratic process.[64]

[64] This is a notable conclusion of a number of the essays in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Economic Reform and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). See also Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, José María Maravall, and Adam Przeworski, *Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social Democratic Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Larry Diamond, "Democracy and Economic Reform: Tensions, Compatibilities, and Strategies for Reconciliation," in Edward P. Lazear, *Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1995), pp.107-158.

Successful economic reform requires the support of political coalitions in society and the legislature. These coalitions do not emerge spontaneously; they must be fashioned. Here the problem is not so much the scale, autonomy, and resources of civil society as the distribution across interests. Old, established interests that stand to lose from reform tend to be well organized into, for example, state-sector trade unions and networks that tie the managers of state enterprises or owners of favored industries to ruling party bosses. These are precisely the interests that stand to lose from economic reforms that close down inefficient industries, reduce state intervention, and open the economy to greater domestic and international competition. Newly emergent and more diffuse interests that stand to gain from reform - for example, farmers, small-scale entrepreneurs, and consumers - tend to be weakly organized and poorly informed about how new policies will ultimately affect them. In Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, new actors in civil society - such as economic policy think tanks, chambers of commerce, and economically literate journalists, commentators, and television producers - are beginning to overcome the barriers to information and organization, mobilizing support for (and neutralizing resistance to) reform policies.[65]

[65] John Sullivan, "Democratization and Business Interests," in Diamond and Plattner, *Economic Reform and Democracy*, pp. 182-196.

Eleventh, a growing number of civil society organizations (emanating especially from the religious and human rights communities) are attempting to offer services and develop techniques of conflict mediation and resolution. Some of these efforts involve formal programs and training of trainers to relieve political and ethnic conflict and teach groups to solve their disputes through bargaining and accommodation. But where civil society organizations build up respect and credibility among a wide ranger of political actors who come to trust in their integrity and political neutrality, they develop an additional type of “reserve of influence” that can be drawn on in a political crisis. This was the case in the Central African Republic, where the Ligue Centrafricaine des Droits de l'Homme (LCDH) played a crucial mediating rule during two Army uprisings in 1996. During the first Army mutiny in April 1996 (which claimed at least ten lives), Ligue officials played the chief mediating role between the military mutineers and the government, "drafting the protocols [to provide the soldiers their back pay] and ultimately persuading the soldiers to lay down their arms."[66] A second, more serious uprising, beginning May 18 and lasting ten days, took more the form of a military coup attempt, and threatened not only democracy but even civil war with its ethnic overtones, internal military divisions, distribution of arms, demands for the resignation of the president, and looting and terrorizing of the civilian population. Although this uprising was ultimately put down by French military intervention, its political resolution, which saw the society rally behind democracy, was catalyzed by the Ligue's declared support for the regime and its mediation of negotiations between government and opposition forces within the political arena, as well as between the regime and the military rebels. The Ligue drafted and won acceptance for "the political accord, including amnesty, disarmament, and resignation of the head of the army, that actually resolved the crisis."[67] The ability of the Ligue to perform this democracy-saving role owed to the "consistent neutrality and objectivity" and widespread image of "moral credibility" it had established during the country's previous five years of democratic struggle.[68]

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[66] David Peterson, private communication, August 1996.

[67] Peterson, ibid.

[68] Ibid.

Twelfth, a vigorous civil society can strengthen the social foundations of democracy even when its activities focus on community development and have no explicit connection to or concern with political democracy *per se*.[69] Effective grassroots development efforts may relieve the burden of expectations fixed on the state, and so relieve the intensity of politics. At the same time, they build social capital by bringing citizens together to cooperate as peers for their common advancement. A particularly noteworthy example of this is the general phenomenon of "microenterprise lending" and the specific success of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. The bank lends money in small amounts to two million poor people in Bangladesh to enable them to start small enterprises (farming, livestock raising, food processing, petty trade, and so on). By dispersing access to capital that has typically been monopolized by rural elites, it is not only fighting poverty but undermining the deeply entrenched dependence of the rural poor on local elites for credit, wages, and agricultural inputs. At the same time that it weakens vertical chains of clientage, it builds new horizontal solidarities by using "peer monitoring" to substitute for the physical and monetary collateral that the poor cannot provide. In this peer system, poverty-stricken loan recipients are organized into groups of five, "and any unpaid loans become the responsibility of the whole group." That such an institutional innovation can change lives and build social capital is attested to by the exceptional loan-recovery rate of the Bank - 98 percent.

[69] Yasmen Murshed and Nazim Kamran Choudhury, "Bangladesh's Second Chance," *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 1 (January 1997): 80.

A final, overarching function of civil society - to which I have already referred - derives from the success of the above twelve. "Freedom of association," Tocqueville mused, may, "after having agitated society for some time, ... strengthen the state in the end."[70] By enhancing the accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, effectiveness and hence legitimacy of the political system, a vigorous civil society gives citizens respect for the state and positive engagement with it. In the end, this improves the ability of the state to govern, and to command voluntary obedience from its citizens. In addition, "By bringing people together in endless combinations for a great diversity of purposes, a rich associational life may not only multiply demands on the state, it may also multiply the capacities of groups to improve their own welfare, independently of the state, especially at the local level."[71]

Dilemmas and Caveats

[70] Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 2, p. 126.

[71] Larry Diamond, "Civil Society and the Struggle for Democracy," in Diamond, ed., *The Democratic Revolution*, p. 11.

To the above list of democratic functions of civil society, I attach some important caveats and dilemmas for civil society. To begin with, associations and mass media can only perform their democracy-building roles if they have at least some autonomy from the state in their financing, operations, and legal standing. As I have noted, democracies vary in the degree to which they structure interest representation on pluralist as opposed to corporatist lines. However, while corporatist-style pacts or contracts between the state and peak interest associations may make for stable macroeconomic management, corporatist arrangements pose a serious threat to democracy in transitional or newly emerging constitutional regimes. The risk appears greatest in countries with a history of authoritarian *state corporatism* - such as Mexico, Egypt, and Indonesia - where the state has created, organized, licensed, funded, subordinated, and controlled "interest" groups (and also most of the mass media that it does not officially own and control), with a view to cooptation, repression, and domination rather than ordered bargaining. By contrast, the transition to a democratic form of corporatism "seems to depend very much on a liberal-pluralist past," which most developing and postcommunist states lack.[72] Limited levels of economic development, or the absence of a fully functioning market economy, further increase the danger that corporatism will stifle civil society, even under a formally democratic framework, because there are fewer autonomous resources and less interest pluralism in society. Even in countries that have vigorous market economies and now rate as liberal democracies, like South Korea and Taiwan, the state corporatist legacy casts a certain lingering, neo-authoritarian shadow over the structure of interest representation. Experience teaches that state corporatist structures and rules must be completely dismantled if a fully democratic system is to be constructed. Only after that dismantling, on wholly new foundations, is a *democratic* corporatist pattern of interest representation likely to be feasible (if it is even preferred).

By coopting, preempting, or constraining the most serious sources of potential challenge to its domination (and thus minimizing the amount of actual repression that has to be employed), state corporatist regimes may purchase a longer lease on authoritarian life. However, such

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[72] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in Wolfgang Streeck and Schmitter, eds., *Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984), p. 126. On the important distinction between societal (democratic) and state corporatism, see pp. 102-108.

regimes eventually come under pressure from social, economic, and demographic forces. Successful socioeconomic development, as in Mexico and Indonesia, produces a profusion of authentic civil society groups that demand political freedom and autonomy, protected by law. Social and economic decay, along with massive political corruption, weaken the hold of the authoritarian corporatist state, undermine the legitimacy of its sponsored associations, and may give rise to revolutionary movements, like the Islamic fundamentalist movements in Egypt and Algeria, that promise popular redemption through a new form of state hegemony.

Societal autonomy can go too far, however, even for the purposes of democracy. This is a second caveat. A hyperactive, confrontational, and relentlessly rent-seeking civil society can overwhelm a weak, penetrated state with the diversity and magnitude of its demands, saddling the state with unsustainable and inflationary fiscal obligations, and leaving little in the way of a truly "public" sector concerned for the overall welfare of society. The state itself must have sufficient autonomy, legitimacy, capacity, and support to mediate among the various interest groups, and to implement policies and allocate resources in ways that balance the claims of competing groups. This is a particularly pressing dilemma for new democracies that seek to implement much needed economic reform programs in the face of stiff opposition from trade unions, pensioners, and the state-protected bourgeoisie, which is why countervailing forces in civil society must be educated and mobilized.

In many new democracies emerging out of long periods of totalitarian, highly repressive, or abusive rule, there is a deeper problem, stemming from the orientation of civil society as movements of resistance to the state or disengagement from its authority. As Geremek observes, this revives the original eighteenth century conception of civil society as *in opposition* to the state.[73] Where authoritarian rule is the most arbitrary, lawless, and exploitative, social mobilization against it also tends to be not merely risky but lawless, angry, and anomic - or in Putnam's term, "uncivic." The legacy in much of Africa is what Célestin Monga calls a "civic deficit."

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[73] Bronislaw Geremek, "Civil Society Then and Now," *Journal of Democracy* 3 (April 1992): 3-12.

> Thirty years of authoritarian rule have forged a concept of indiscipline as a method of popular resistance. In order to survive and resist laws and rules judged to be antiquated, people have had to resort to the treasury of their imagination. Given that life is one long fight against the state, the collective imagination has gradually conspired to craftily defy everything which symbolizes public authority.[74]

[74] Célestin Monga, "Civil Society and Democratisation in Francophone Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 33, no. 3 (September 1995): 363. See also Monga, *Anthropologie de la Colère: Société et Démocratie en Afrique Noire* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994), and the English-language edition, *The Anthropology of Anger* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996). For an earlier treatment of African societies' progressive economic and political disengagement from the state, see Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988).

In many respects, a similar broad cynicism, indiscipline, and alienation from state authority - indeed from politics altogether - was bred by decades of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, though it led to somewhat different (and in Poland, much more broadly organized) forms of dissidence and resistance. Some countries, like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states, had previous civic traditions that could be recovered. These countries have generally made the most progress (though still quite partial) toward reconstructing state authority on a democratic foundation while beginning to constitute a modern, liberal-pluralist civil society. Those states where civic traditions were weakest and predatory rule greatest - Romania, Albania, Russia, the Central Asian republics, and most of sub-Saharan Africa - face a far more difficult time, with civil societies still fragmented and emergent market economies still heavily outside the framework of law and thus "uncivil."[75]

This civic deficit constitutes a third major caveat with respect to the positive value of civil society for democracy. Civil society must be autonomous from the state, but not alienated from it. It must be watchful but respectful of state authority; it must manifest some degree of balance between the subject and participant orientations. The image of a noble, vigilant, organized civil society checking at every turn the predations of a self-serving state, preserving a pure detachment from its corrupting embrace, is highly romanticized and misleading in the construction of a viable democracy.

[75] Richard Rose, "Toward a Civil Economy," *Journal of Democracy* 3 (April 1992): 13-26.

A fourth caveat or dilemma concerns a different and growing type of dependence - not on the state but on the international community. The character and possibilities of civil society mobilization in nascent democracies and less developed countries have been transformed in the past few decades by three dramatic changes in the world system: the rapid growth of transnational linkages among civil society organizations from different countries, the emergence of truly *international* movements and organizations (such as Amnesty International, Transparency International, Survival International, the World Council of Churches, and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples), and the explosion of democracy assistance programs in the wealthier democracies.[76] From the international environment, civil society organizations have drawn ideas, inspiration, skills, and most of all funding. This has facilitated activity on a scale that would otherwise have been unimaginable in poorer countries where resources in the private sector are scarce, or controlled by authoritarian elites, or where (as in most of Latin America) there simply is not a tradition of large-scale private philanthropy for civic purposes. In many less developed countries, quite a number of civil society organizations have sprung into being because international funding was available, and they could not exist without it.

International support is enabling, but it also imposes, actively or passively, an agenda of its own. At one level, there is a philosophical or conceptual problem: to what extent are today's non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in less developed countries *self-generating* when they are so heavily reliant on support from abroad? It depends. Some NGOs really are creatures of international support and have at best a thin base of indigenous initiative, support, and organization. This does not mean that they do not do valuable work for democracy and development (this varies widely), but it may call into question the extent to which they are truly civil society actors *of* their own country.[77] Other NGOs are no less heavily dependent on

[76] The latter are channeling tens of millions of dollars (quite possibly hundreds of millions total) to civil society organizations, institutes, and media both through official development assistance organizations and through nongovernmental democracy promotion foundations like the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, the British Westminster Foundation, the Canadian International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development and the German political party foundations (which have been operating the longest). For an account of many of the principal actors and illustrations of recipients, see Larry Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives* (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1995).

[77] In one sense, the problem was much more severe during the Cold War, when the Soviet

international funding, but have a broad base of participation and a consciousness and agenda that is clearly self-generated. And there are many collective actors who inhabit a gray zone in between. To some extent, this is a dilemma or challenge for international civil society, to evaluate carefully applicants for funding to determine what kind of base they have in their own society, and who they represent (if, really, anybody beyond themselves).

Representation is another pointed horn of the international dilemma. Popular constituencies may be organized by a variety of groups which then compete to speak for the entire constituency on the international stage (and to receive international funding to advance its cause domestically). International organizations sometimes also compete for influence on the ground (even out of good intentions). These forms of competition may foster healthy pluralism in interest representation, or they may unwittingly heighten a divisiveness that disperses scarce human resources and weakens the voice and impact of the movement. The question of voice can be particularly crucial. Effective transnational linkages require the ability to communicate with sophisticated interlocutors and funders in the developed world. But the more representative social movement leaders are *of* marginalized and oppressed peoples, the less effectively they may be able to present their cause *to* the outside world. The poignancy of this dilemma, which has also fanned division in the movements of indigenous peoples, has been captured by Alison Brysk:

Union (and its communist allies) and the United States (and its allies) covertly supported various front organizations that did their bidding in the struggle for international supremacy. Today, assistance to NGOs is mainly overt rather than covert, and is much less driven by strategic calculations. Still, even if money is given openly and for more idealistic intentions, those intentions impose priorities and conditions on recipients, and favor some types of activity over others.

> Those with the skills to lead internationally may be the least "representative": for example, one extremely effective Indian leader encountered at the UN Working Group [on Indigenous Peoples] was a law student, another was a former Congressional representative in his country, and a third was one of his people's eight college graduates. Conversely, one of the few truly grassroots delegates at the UN [meeting] - an Andean peasant woman - was ultimately unable to deliver her prepared statement.[78]

Beyond all questions of organizational authenticity, legitimacy, and voice, there is the simple existential problem of surviving in the face of changing international funding priorities and diminishing assistance budgets. In a context where the state is manifestly repressive and unrepresentative, development assistance increasingly gravitates to NGOs as a vehicle for raising human capacities (economic and political) and improving the quality of life. As authoritarian rule liberalizes to allow more space for civil society, more international donor funding is channeled to NGOs, and then, at that historical moment when the transition is clearly "on" - when voters must be educated and trainers and monitors mobilized on a crash basis - the channels of funding swell into a mighty river. Participation in civil society (separate and apart from party politics) rises, and the civic quest to build democracy reaches new heights. Then the transition happens and the bubble bursts. Some international donors move on to political dramas in other countries, while many transfer the bulk of their attention and investment to the now (presumably legitimate) governmental agencies of the new democracy.

This life cycle of international enthusiasm for civil society has two major consequences. For a great many NGOs, it means extinction. And as I will explore below shortly, for others it means a growing dependence on agencies of the state as the primary alternative source of funding. The post-transition recession of civil society has greatly concerned democratic activists and thinkers in South Africa, where human rights and developmental NGOs, and more loosely structured, grassroots "community-based organizations" (CBOs), proliferated in the later years of the anti-apartheid struggle with the dramatic expansion of international donor support.

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[78] Brysk, "Turning Weakness into Strength," p. 52.

> Immediately preceding the April [founding] 1994 elections, the sector was probably at its peak, with approximately 54,000 NGOs and CBOs, of which about 20,000 could be considered to be development-oriented. These organizations provided a broad range of services, from educational support and training (particularly for blacks) to rural development and media services; many were involved in the promotion of human rights. Since the elections, a significant number of NGOs, including many that had existed for a long time, have closed or drastically curtailed their operations.[79]

And many others fell into dire financial straits. As James and Caliguire note, it is natural that a legitimate government, more concerned with real and equitable development, will become more active in service delivery after the transition. But the legitimacy, networks, expertise, and experience of NGOs make them important intermediaries and partners in this task, and in any case, the need for effective organization and representation of a myriad of grassroots interests does not cease with the transition to democracy. Moreover, in many statist and communist systems, the post-transitional shrinkage of civil society is also apparent, even though economic reforms are often shrinking the state's involvement in delivering social services.

[79] Wilmot James and Daria Caliguire, "The New South Africa: Renewing Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (January 1996): 61.

Domestic political dynamics, flowing from what seems to be an internal life cycle of many democratic transitions, also weaken civil society. Once the authoritarian regime disappears, the focus of political life shifts from a unifying struggle against an odious enemy to a much more dispersed and normal competition among parties and interests in the emerging democratic state. Inevitably, civil society and especially democratizing and single-issue social movements lose their "primacy." Political parties and more conventional interest groups take center stage, and many individuals and groups turn to more "private-regarding" concerns as "the mere advent of democracy satisfies some of the most passionate revindications of movements."[80] The euphoria of the immediate post-transition period quickly wanes, and the broad associational fronts that struggled against authoritarian rule break apart.

"What had been 'moral political societies' became political blocs" in Europe's postcommunist states, and in Africa as well.[81] Class and ethnic divisions once again fragmented society, and the leadership ranks (and thus operational capacities) of civil society organizations were rapidly depleted as activists were massively drawn into politics, government, and (in Europe) business. The social inheritances of communism in Europe and neopatrimonial statism in Africa also reasserted themselves in renewed state dependence, cooptation, mistrust, and societal atomization, revealing the scarcity of social capital and "the lack of a culture of a free collective activity."[82] In fact, "preliberal," illiberal, and uncivic cultural orientations constitute a major obstacle to democratic consolidation in much of Africa and the postcommunist world. In both regions as well, civil society has been further hampered after the transition by the harsh

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[80] Schmitter, "Civil Society East and West," p. 242.

[81] Aleksander Smolar, "Civil Society after Communism: From Opposition to Atomization," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (January 1996): 29. See also Gyimah-Boadi, "Civil Society in Africa."

[82] Smolar, "Civil Society after Communism," p. 33.

economic conditions of the 1990s, which have driven people to more urgent preoccupations with the exigencies of daily survival, and have rendered African associations much more vulnerable to the compromising blandishments of domineering states.

Many of those NGOs that did not die after the transition have had to adapt their mission fairly dramatically in order to continue to function on anything like their existing scale. Adaptation, as I have suggested, is a dimension of institutionalization and can be a healthy phenomenon: after some period, voter education becomes a less compelling priority and the autonomous public procedures for free and fair elections may become institutionalized. At that point, civil society organizations need to tackle other challenges to deepen democracy. But where adaptation diminishes the autonomy, shrinks the grassroots base, and dilutes the democratic zeal of the organization, it comes at a price.

Chile is another instance of a civil society that had an intense romance with the international donor community and then was jilted after the transition. For international donors with limited and even declining budgets, the impulse to withdraw is even more powerful in "upper-middle-income" countries like Chile because the assumption is that political repression is the main obstacle to a vibrant civil society, and once the lid of authoritarianism is lifted the country ought to be rich enough to support its own NGOs. The problem in such countries (including prominently Argentina as well) is that these countries are weak in the social capital and sense of public-spiritedness that enables civil society organizations to raise substantial funds from the private sectors of their own countries. Moreover, many of the most important NGOs represent women, youth, informal workers, the poor, ethnic minorities, and others who collectively tend to lack the material resources to sustain collective organization on a large scale. Thus, NGOs often decide that they must turn to the state to survive. Chile's PARTICIPA evolved from a focus on citizenship education and participation to a wider range of strategic goals concerned with youth, local development, social integration, and public sector training. When international funding for these programs (primarily from the U.S. Agency for International Development) dried up, PARTICIPA began to secure contracts from its own government to continue these types of efforts. Now, "PARTICIPA's role as an implementing agent of government policy may limit its role as a critic of those policies. Time will tell whether the

survival of the institution alters its role as an independent agent of social change."[83] As major international funding dries up for civil society organizations in South Africa, they face a similar dilemma. Many are already evolving in a similar direction, with possibly greater dangers to autonomy given the proclivity to corporatist relations of both government and many civil society leaders, and given as well the constraining hangover of "repressive policies, laws, and structures inherited from the old regime."[84]

There is no easy answer for this dilemma of international dependence. My own view is that civil society organizations are likely to have more space to act independently and define their own agendas when their financial dependence is on foreign donors than on their own government, especially when that international dependence is dispersed among a number of different donors (public and private) from many different countries. In that case, no established democracy or donor organization is in a position to dictate an agenda, and the loss of one large grant does not threaten the survival of the organization. For that reason, and because NGOs in most developing and postcommunist countries are unlikely to be able to raise from their own societies in the near future anything like the funding they need to perform the democracy-building functions they are capable of performing, on the scale of which they are capable of acting, international donor priorities and strategies need to be rethought. Relative to the massive aid that flows to government programs and agencies, international donor funding for civil society is a small trickle. A modest shift in the balance between state and civil society, coupled with a reconsidered willingness to remain engaged longer with the civil societies of some more advanced developing countries, could make possible very substantial continuing investments in building the civic infrastructure of democracy.

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[83] Joel M. Jutkowitz, "Civil Society and Democratic Development in Chile." Paper presented to the 1995 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 31-September 3, 1995, p. 21.

[84] James and Caliguire, "The New South Africa," p. 64.

Without question, civil society makes its deepest, most organic and sustainable contribution to democracy when it cultivates a significant base of financial support among a broad and indigenous constituency. Beyond the greater autonomy it confers, this is true for two additional reasons. When members give money voluntarily to an organization, they are more likely to feel some sense of identity with it and ownership of it. Ironically, perhaps, this is particularly true for members of modest means who are only able to give in small amounts (as opposed to upper middle-class Americans who write checks to dozens of organizations a year). When such financial donations are combined with broad grassroots organization and participation, they are likely to produce a particularly strong membership commitment and demand for democratic control. This is why a mass-membership campaign is a shrewd long-run tactic for organizational development. In the case of the Zimbabwean human rights organization, Zimrights, the annual dues of thousands of members account for only a small portion of the total budget, but they generate a widely dispersed base of committed supporters around the country.[85] Beyond the depth of commitment that is generated, raising indigenous financial contributions - in amounts large and small - creates cultural norms of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, and public-spiritedness; it generates social as well as financial capital. This is why international support for civil society organizations should increasingly focus on strategies to encourage and institutionalize this giving. Matching funding provides one potential method: if an NGO can honestly say it will receive five or ten dollars in international support for every dollar it raises locally, that sharply increases the incentive of the organization to raise locally and of local donors (large and small) to give. (It also increases the efficacy of small donors who can see that their contributions are being multiplied to much larger effect). Other methods could seek to build organizational endowments (in part again with matching or challenge grants), and to help

[85] With its 6,000-plus members (as of March 1997) and organizers in 8 of 11 provinces, Zimrights represents the most substantial grassroots political base of any organization in the country, outside of the country's ruling party. Interviews with Zimrights Executive Director, David Chimhini, and with Zimbabwean journalists and political scientists, March 17-19, 1997.

motivate and assist major owners of private wealth to set up philanthropic trusts as a way to leave an enduring legacy for their society.

Institutionalization raises a fifth dilemma or caveat for civil society. A social or political movement is only sustainable with organization. Sustainable organization means, to some extent, bureaucratization, the development of more complex vertical structure and more permanent and professional staff. This returns us to Michels' dilemma: "who says organization says oligarchy." This dimension of the organizational life cycle parallels and interacts with the diminution of autonomy. Again, the evolution of Chile's PARTICIPA provides a graphic illustration. "Once PARTICIPA became an institution, questions of membership and control became important issues. As is usually the case when volunteer movements become institutionalized, a certain tension developed between the role of the professionals and the volunteers, which in the case of PARTICIPA has been resolved through the professionalization of the organization."[86] This has led to a distinctly less mass-based organization, utilizing fewer volunteers.

A sixth caveat concerns the role of politics, as I have already suggested. Interest groups and civic organizations cannot substitute for coherent political parties with broad and relatively enduring bases of popular support. For interest groups cannot aggregate interests as broadly across social groups and political issues as political parties can. Nor can they provide the discipline necessary to form and maintain governments and pass legislation. In this respect (and not only this one), one may question the thesis that a strong civil society is strictly complementary to the political and state structures of democracy. To the extent that interest groups dominate, enervate, or crowd out political parties as conveyors and aggregators of interests, they can present a problem for democratic consolidation. And in an age when the electronic media, increased mobility, and the profusion and fragmentation of discrete interests

[86] Jutkowitz, "Civil Society and Democratic Development in Chile," p. 19.

are all undermining the organizational bases for strong parties and party systems, this is something democrats everywhere need to worry about.[87]

In fact, a stronger and broader generalization appears warranted. The single most important and urgent factor in the consolidation of democracy is not civil society but political institutionalization. If consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes "the only game in town," broadly and profoundly legitimate at both the elite and mass levels, cultural change is crucial, but it must be reinforced by a political system that works to deliver the political goods of democracy, and eventually, at least to some degree, the economic and social goods people expect as well. The normalization of politics and entrenchment of legitimacy that consolidation entails requires the expansion of citizen access, the development of democratic citizenship and culture, the broadening of leadership recruitment and training, and other functions that civil society performs. But it also requires orderly and effective democratic governance, and that is something that civil society cannot in and of itself provide. Political institutions - parties, legislatures, judicial systems, local governments, and the bureaucratic structures of the state more generally - must become more capable, complex, coherent, and responsive.

Despite their impressive capacity to survive years (in cases a decade or more) of social strife and economic instability and decline, many new democracies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa will probably break down in the medium to long run unless they can reduce their often appalling levels of poverty, inequality, and social injustice and, through market-oriented reforms, lay the basis for sustainable growth. For these and other policy challenges, not only strong parties but effective state institutions are vital. They do not guarantee wise and effective policies, but they do ensure that government will be able to make and implement policies of some kind, and not flail about, impotent or deadlocked.

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[87] Juan J. Linz, "Change and Continuity in the Nature of Contemporary Democracies," in Marks and Diamond, eds., *Reexamining Democracy*, 184-190.

Robust political institutions are needed to accomplish economic reform under democratic conditions. Strong, well structured executives, buttressed by a team of technocratic experts at least somewhat insulated from the day-to-day pressures of politics, make possible the implementation of painful and disruptive reform measures. Settled and aggregative (as opposed to fragmented and volatile) party systems - in which one or two broadly based, centrist parties consistently obtain electoral majorities or near majorities - are better positioned to resist narrow class and sectoral interests and maintain the continuity of economic reforms across administrations.[88] Effective legislatures may sometimes obstruct reforms, but if they are composed of strong, coherent parties with a centrist dominance, in the end they will do more to reconcile democracy and economic reform by providing a political base of support and some means for absorbing and mediating protests in society. More broadly, autonomous, professional and well staffed judicial systems are indispensable to securing a rule of law.

These caveats and dilemmas are sobering, but they do not nullify my principal thesis. Civil society can, and typically must, play a central role in building and consolidating democracy. Its role is not decisive, not even the most important, at least not initially. However, the more active, pluralistic, resourceful, institutionalized, and internally democratic is civil society, and the more effectively it balances the tensions in its relations with the state - between autonomy and cooperation, vigilance and loyalty, skepticism and trust, assertiveness and civility - the more likely democracy will be to emerge and endure.

[88] For a particularly compelling analysis of the importance of political institutional structures and designs for accomplishing economic reform under democracy, see Haggard and Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.*