Electoral, partisan, and corporate socialism : organisational consolidation and membership mobilisation in early socialist movement

**Electoral, Partisan, and Corporate Socialism.
Organisational Consolidation and Membership Mobilisation
in Early Socialist Movements**

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Introduction[*]

This paper deals with the relationship between political and corporate Socialism. That is, between forms of *interest representation* and of *political representation* in the early European Socialist movements, between 1860-1880 and 1940. The theme is discussed along the two dimensions of *organisational consolidation* and *membership mobilisation*. The first refers to the process of establishment and consolidation of specific political organisations in the corporate-group channel and in the electoral-party one and to the linkage set up between them. The second to the capacity of the same organisations to mobilise individuals in such channels as Trade Union members, party members and voters.

The paper reviews and discusses the theme of political mobilisation; then a conceptual framework of the cross-linkage between corporate, partisan and electoral mobilisation is presented; thirdly, the national experiences of European Socialist movements are briefly analysed in reference to such conceptual scheme; finally, historical patterns of membership mobilisation are discussed, relating them to those of organisational consolidation.

The First Political Mobilisation Process

"Mobilisation" is an ambiguous term. Imported from totalitarian theory and analysis and later used in all sorts of different contexts, it now conveys the meaning of a complex process of self-mobilisation and hetero-mobilisation - of "being mobilised" and of mobilising.[1] First, mobilisation was a multi-faceted process of the citizenry's involvement in the (post-)national and industrial phases

[1] See Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties", in S. Neumann (ed.), *Modern Political Parties*, Chicago, Chicago University Press 1956, pp. 395-421, on _integration_ parties addressing themselves to specific social groups which they deliberately try to mobilise; integration being at the same time the result of self interest and organisational enterprise.

of modernisation. Citizens were mobilised progressively in various spheres different from that of politics: by capitalism and industrialisation in the economic sphere through media such as exchange and money; through the extension of the market, geographical and labour mobility, the imposition of tariffs, credit and capital procedures and techniques, services and goods availability. They were also mobilised by the military and administrative machine of the state, as soldiers, administrative agencies' subjects, travelling and residential restrictions and/or liberalisation. They were finally mobilised culturally through script and other mass media into ideological, religious, ethno-linguistic movements by socialising agencies of the nationally dominant culture as well as by dissident intellectuals, missionaries and news, etc.[2] In the Western experience of the last two centuries, mobilisation appears to have acquired a self-sustaining logic, with spill-over effects between one sphere and the others. Once started, it has progressively become an ongoing process where change concerned quantitative "growth" - new recruits and generational turnover - and qualitative structural modifications in the main forms and agencies.

Different phases or waves of (economic/administrative/cultural) political mobilisation can therefore be distinguished. However, the first wave was of paramount importance because it not only "opened the door" to any successive one, but also set the original opportunity structure to which the following ones had to accommodate themselves. The first political mobilisation is both part of a global process of citizens' mobilisation into national life *and* also the terminal phase of such a process, which requires a minimum of the other forms of mobilisation to be reached in order to take off. Consequently, two main issues have characterised the study of political mobilisation:

(1) how much non-political (economic/cultural/administrative) mobilisation

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[2] On the relationship between political and other types of mobilisation see P. J. Nettl, *Political Mobilisation*, New York, Basic Books, 1967, pp. 115-122.

is necessary for political mobilisation to take off; what relationship exists between levels and forms of non-political mobilisation and levels and forms of political mobilisation - in a nutshell, the "social mobilisation"[3] preconditions of political mobilisation. In this field a rich tradition of research has related processes of urbanisation, industrialisation, occupational change, communication and literacy development to processes of first political mobilisation, most of the time meant in the narrow sense of suffrage extension.[4]

(2) What is the relationship between *different forms* of political mobilisation; in particular those occurring in the electoral/party channel versus those occurring in the corporate/interest channel. On this second issue comparative research is less copious.[5]

The latter issue is the object of this paper. I will be exclusively concerned with the "first" political mobilisation, that is *the process by which former subject individuals were initially recruited as active participants in forms of nation-wide organisational and electoral activities for influencing political decision making*.[6] Within this

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[3] In the sense of K. Deutsch, _Social Mobilisation and Political Development_, *American Political Science Review*, 55 (1961), pp. 493-502.

[4] See, for instance R. A. Pride, *Origins of Democracy: A Cross National Study of Mobilisation, Party Systems and Democratic Stability*, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1970; P. Flora, "Historical Processes of Social Mobilisation: Urbanisation and Literacy 1850-1965", in E. E. Eisenstadt and S. Rokkan (eds), *Building States and Nations*, Vol. 1, *Models and Data Resources*, London, Sage, 1973, pp. 213-258; S. Kuhnle, *Patterns of Social and Political Mobilisation. A Historical Analysis of the Nordic Countries*, London, Sage, 1975; P. Coulter, *Social Mobilisation and Liberal Democracy. A Macro-quantitative Analysis of Global and Regional Models*, Farnborough, Lexington Books, 1975.

[5] Only one title comes to mind: S. Rokkan and H. Valen, "The Mobilisation of the Periphery: Data on Turnout, Party Membership and Candidate Recruitment in Norway", in S. Rokkan (ed.), *Approaches to the Study of Political Participation*, Bergen, Chr. Micelles Institute, 1962, pp. 111-158.

[6] For an analytical discussion of the concept of political mobilisation, see B. Nedelmann, "Individuals and Parties. Changes in the Processes of Political Mobilisation", *European Sociological Review*, 3 (1987), pp. 181-202; in particular the first part, pp. 181-191, where the distinction between the three dimensions of mobilisation as "formation of interest", "management of emotions" and "development of instrumental capacities" is developed. Nedelmann's general definition of political

process I will focus attention on the *specific relations between the different forms of corporate, partisan and electoral mobilisation.*

Parties and Groups in the First Mobilisation

Vertical and downward first political mobilisation was not necessarily monopolised by the new actors: political parties and interest organisations. Political, and even strictly electoral, mobilisation could also be performed by governments, state bureaucracy, charismatic leadership, etc.. In these cases parties and interest organisations were in competition with other agencies, preceding them.[7] Yet they remained the most important early mobilisation actors. Special attention should be paid to the *specific interaction between the formation of electoral alternatives in the political arena* - i.e. the formation of specific political organisations for the mobilisation of the vote - *and the structuring of mass organisations in the corporate channel of interest organisation*. The set of electoral and corporate organisations and their interaction depended on the structure of political opportunity and on the strategic choice of mobilising actors during the

mobilisation as the "actors' attempts to influence the existing distribution of power" (p. 199) is too broad for our purposes. Such a definition is generated by a dissatisfaction with others which limit political mobilisation to the processes of authority legitimation (Nettl, cited above) or attribute excessive emphasis to the dimension of instrumentality, in the sense of mobilisation as "resource control" (as utilised by C. Tilly, *From Mobilisation to Revolution*, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978). The emphasis on "recruitment of citizens in active political participation", implies a reference to the three dimensions listed by Nedelmann. However, the main concern and empirical data refer here to the development of instrumental capacities.

[7]H. Daalder, "Parties, Elites, and Political Development in Western Europe", in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds), *Political Parties and Political Development*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 43-77, directly tackles the issue of the extent to, and the conditions in, which parties more or less successfully monopolised such role vis-à-vis other agencies.

formation and politicisation of a given cleavage line.

Drawing on the rich contribution left by Rokkan in this field,[8] this process can be summarised in a set of analytical steps. I have slightly modified the terminology as I believe the term cleavage should be kept for the politicised dividing line, not applied to the original functional, cultural or territorial conflict.[9]

(1) the initial generation of oppositions due to differences of interest and/or *Weltanschauung* generated by modernisation's macro-processes: monetarization, urbanisation, secularisation, cultural standardisation, industrialisation, administrative control and centralisation;

(2) the crystallisation of opposition lines into conflicts over public policy once (and if) centralisation of political decision-making was established;[10]

(3) the emergence of alliances of political entrepreneurs engaged in mobilising support for one set of policies against others;

(4) the choice of mobilisation strategy made by such entrepreneurs:

(a) action through and reliance upon pre-established community and other associational networks;

(b) action through and reliance upon the development of purpose-specific membership organisations;

(5) the choice of arena for confrontation of mobilised resources:

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[8] A very large part of Rokkan's work was devoted to the problem of cleavage formation. The classic reference is "Nation Building, Cleavage Formation and the Structuring of Mass Politics", in *Citizens Elections Parties*, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1970, pp. 72-144.

[9] For the argument which leads to this conclusion see S. Bartolini and P. Mair, *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability. The Stabilisation of the European Electorates 1885-1985*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 213-225.

[10] In some cases, like Switzerland and the United States, this never happened.

(a) aggregation of votes/members for political/electoral contest;

(b) direct action (strikes, pressure through public demonstrations, revolt, revolution, etc.).

Historically, different entrepreneurs' alliances have chosen dissimilar strategies, both in term of organisational choice (point 4) and of confrontation-area choice (point 5). Some relied more intensively on pre-existing networks of associational, occupational, cultural, religious groups; others, alternatively, engaged forcefully in the development of their own specific organisational weapon, as distinct and autonomous as possible from others. Some preferred to concentrate their efforts for demand-satisfaction in pure political and electoral strategies; others resorted to more direct claims on the market and society.

Different strategies in different contexts yielded different pay-offs. For parties and groups these pay-offs ranged from gaining public recognition and legitimation to substantial conquest through specific legislation, agreements and package-deals with the state and/or other political forces. In the analysis of historical cases, final pay-offs are of great importance. Their evaluation by the actors implied feedback reactions; dissatisfaction with existing pay-offs and arrangements involved changes in organisational and confrontation-arena strategy.

The most important aspect is the *inter-linkage* between the various arenas and types of mobilisation base. Such linkage varies considerably according to the type of interests and/or identities being mobilised, but also to the general character of the political system environment of the claimant. Table 1 systematises possible forms of this inter-linkage. The scheme is drawn from an article where Rokkan responded to criticism for having overlooked the

interest-groups formation process.[11] It has been developed and modified to suit my perspective.

In Table 1, the two channels of mobilisation, the electoral and the corporate, are separated. Diffuse networks can be the only organisational base present in both of them: professional, craft and other types of organisations on one side; candidates, caucus and club type organisations on the other. At the other extreme one can find formal membership organisations in both channels. Electoral and corporate mobilisation can of course take place without necessarily being dependent on *central* forms of co-ordination. Only party membership mobilisation is necessarily dependent on the consolidation of a central political organisation. The historical experience of Western European parties exhibits various modalities.[12]

Table 1. *Type of Interlinkage between Electoral and Corporate Mobilization*

Mobilization Area/Organizational Base		Type of Relationship between Channels	
Electoral channel	Corporate channel	Cross-linkage	Representation mode
Difuse network	Non-diffuse network	Non-demand	Corporate

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[11] The critique came from R. Alford and R. Friedland, "Nations, Parties and Participation: A Critique of Political Sociology", *Theory and Society*, 1 (1974), pp. 307-328. Rokkan's response, where the scheme is formulated, is "Toward a Generalised Concept of _Verzoiling_; A Preliminary Note", *Political Studies*, 25 (1977), pp. 563-570.

[12] Important analytical considerations concerning the process of party formation are in B. Nedelmann, "Handlungsraum politischer Organisationen", *Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik*, 4 (1975), pp. 9-118; L. Svasand, *On the Formation of Political Parties: Conditions, Causes and Patterns of Development*, Grenoble, ECPR Workshop, April 1978; A. Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organisation and Power*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988.

		group		
Specific organization	Specific organization	Contingent Interlocking Dependency	Fragmented	Segmental Ideological Territorial

The mobilising of voters can take place without building on distinctive membership organisations in either the corporate or the political channel, but relying on a widespread network of professional or other organisations. This is usually the case in countries where enfranchisement came early, extended before decisive waves of urbanisation and industrialisation, and predated organisational developments. France during the Second Empire and Third Republic and the United States are examples of this situation. In this case the forms of representation tend to be territorial in nature, and not easily converted into a cross-local organisational structure. The formation of strong corporate and political mass organisations can prove very difficult later.

A second model is the early foundation of a specific organisation in the electoral channel not matched by and not relying on supporting specific organisations in the corporate channels. This classic model of British (as well as other countries) Liberalism and Conservatism proceeds from electoral caucus to local branches; from registration activities to electioneering, to membership, and organisational development. This model tends to organise support not along a single and easily identifiable cleavage line, but across many, through a variety of alliances, without any of these being "given visible expression in cleavage-specific organisations allied to the party". This modality can be associated with parties which developed in liberalised but not electorally inclusive contexts.

"Indirect" parties, in the terminology introduced by Duverger,[13] are the end result of a political mobilisation which takes place originally through the diffuse electoral network expressions of specific corporate organisations. The development of corporate mobilisation precedes the formation of the political organisation. The support of the corporate organisation for the electoral network of candidates and political associations is contingent at first, and later progressively interlocking. This is the experience of most denominational and agrarian parties and of some Socialist ones. In this case mobilisation tended to be along a single and easily recognisable cleavage line, defined by the pre-existing corporate organisation, and was its political expression.

A further case is the relatively parallel development of specific organisations in both domains, the electoral and the corporate. The relationship is of mutual support and reinforcement; representation is more functional than territorial and takes place along well established cleavage lines.

The relationship between forms of mobilisation in the two channels is represented in the second part of Table 1. The *cross-linkage* between corporate and electoral organisations may be *absent or very weak*. It may be of a *demand-group* type, when organisations in both channels retain a full freedom of support-bargaining. They relate to each other in the classic terms of the pluralist model of democracy; each is a "client" of the other in its respective field of action, exchanging electoral for policy support. The relationship may be *contingent;* that is, expressed through alliances and coalitions based on interest proximity and goal similarity, but deprived of solid organisational, ideological and personnel interpenetration. Although closely allied, the two organisations preserve distinct organisational identities and independent latitude of action. The cross-linkage may be *interlocking*; that is, characterised by a profound interpenetration of

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[13] M. Duverger, *Les partis politiques*, Paris, Colin, 1956.

corporate and electoral organisations, reinforcing each other on the basis of leadership and membership overlap and interchange, support-base coincidence, and wide arena of common collective activities. Finally the relationship may be of *dependency*, where one of the two forms of central organisation tends to direct politically and organisationally the second.

The *mode of representation* does not depend on the organisational base or the cross-linkage, but on the extent to which a one-to-one monopolistic relation of representation in both channels is present. The *fragmented* mode points to a situation of both corporate and electoral fragmentation. Neither in the corporate nor in the electoral channel does a single or dominant organisation exist which can claim a monopoly of representation of the interests to which it refers. The link between the interest sector and electoral politics results in a plurality of actors all claiming a representational right. The fragmentation of both channels is often the consequence of mutual reinforcing drives. Fragmentation[14] can be of a different type: *(a)* segmental pluralism, that is the organisation of competing "pillars", with the close interlocking of social movements, interest groups, educational and cultural agencies and activities *and* political parties divided along culturally distinctive identities (linguistic, religious, or cultural-peripheral)[15]; *(b)* ideological fragmentation along the more classic left-right dimension of competition[16]; *(c)* territorial fragmentation. In this paper the discussion and the implications of

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[14] In the literature the term "fragmentation" is usually reserved for ideological divisions, while "segmentation" points to (sub)-cultural identities. Here, the resort to the term "fragmentation" to encompass ideological, segmental and territorial divisions is not meant to change the terms of the conceptual discussion in this field. This solution was chosen *foute de mieux*, missing a better all-encompassing term which, without being misleading, will not interfere with existing widely accepted meanings.

[15] R. Val Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism, Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies", *Comparative Politics*, 3 (1971), pp. 147-187.

[16] See G. Sani and G. Sartori, "Polarisation, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies", in H. Daalder and P. Mair, *op. cit*, pp. 307-340.

these different forms of fragmentation will nor be pursued. The representation mode labelled *corporate* requires by definition a form of interlocking linkage between the two channels. The corporate organisation is the only, or the dominant, representative of a well defined interest-population in the corporate channel, *and* the electoral organisation with which it is interlocked shares the same prerogatives in the electoral-parliamentary one. Monopoly of representation exists, therefore, both in the corporate and in the electoral channel.

The categories of the scheme in Table 1 are analytical. In historical cases, a representation mode will rarely be satisfactorily depicted as purely corporate or fragmented; rarely will a cross-linkage be totally absent or totally contingent. Moreover, even in the same country, organisational bases, cross linkages and representation modes do change according to the interest sector and the political area. A demand-group cross-linkage can sit next to an interlocking one in a different sector. What matters is the predominant nature. Moreover, not all combinations are possible. Interlocking cross-links demand specific organisations in at least one of the channels; between diffuse networks, links cannot be but contingent. Fragmented modes can be characterised by both contingent or interlocking cross-linkages. Finally, the scheme can be used for developmental or typological purposes. It can be used diacronically, to look at the development over time of the relationship between the two channels, or synchronically, to characterise different types of relationship at each given time. For instance, one may trace in such a scheme catholic mobilisation in Western Europe: from early networks of cultural and religious organisations which started to support, with a contingent linkage, diffuse networks of candidates in the electoral channels, to the crystallisation of specific interlocked organisations in both the electoral and corporate channels. At the same time, one may typologize through the scheme the nature of a specific party or party-family; for instance the Gaullists, a prototype of the electoral party deprived of special relationships to the corporate channel

organisations and which keeps with them demand-group or at most contingent links.

It is tempting to pursue this line and to connect the scheme to the historical examples which best fit its categories; to control for whether more difficult cases can be framed properly in it, and if the interplay of its categories helps to understand the implications of different configurations.[17] However, in this paper I will restrict the analysis to the case of the corporate and electoral organisations within the class cleavage: corporate and electoral Socialism.

Patterns of Organisational Consolidation in Early Corporate and Electoral Socialism

Contrary to other cleavages, for the development of the class cleavage one can concentrate on economic agencies and attribute a secondary role to "cultural agencies". Very much like Agrarian parties, Socialist parties were in general the extension of, or parallel to, organisations already active in the corporate channel. The tendency was to move toward the multiplication of cultural and political organisations built around economy-oriented identities. The result was the development of specific organisations in both the corporate and the political channels. Yet, what is clearly a uniform character with respect to the mobilisation of other cleavages reveals important internal differences with even the most cursory of historical inquiries. If one takes as a *point of reference the moment of the*

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[17] It is possible to discuss the opportunities for access and influence of corporate organisations combining the predominantly fragmented or corporate mode of representation with the dependency, contingent, demand-group or interlocking cross-linkage they have with the electoral organisation. The support-bargaining opportunities of each corporate group is largely dependent upon such combinations.

formation of a nationally centralised organisation in both channels - i.e. the founding of national parties and of central national confederations of Trade Unions - important differences in opportunities, difficulties, and choices emerge within national contexts. The sections which follow are a review of the origins of Socialist organisations focusing exclusively on the relationship between consolidation in the economic and political sphere of action in the pre-world war I.I phase. Historical information is framed within the conceptual scheme summarised in Table 1. A comparative appreciation should pay attention to: (1) the organisational *sequence* of the process; i. e. which of the two organisations centralised first, the political or the economic sector; (2) the *timing* of the process; i. e. whether, in a comparative European perspective, centralisation in the political and economic spheres was early or late; and (3) the *length* of the process, i. e. whether the efforts at national centralisation were long and difficult or, on the contrary, more rapid. This description based on threshold points needs to be complemented with aspects concerning the nature of the relationship between organisations active in the corporate channels and in the electoral/parliamentary one: (4) the corporate/electoral *cross-linkage* and (5) the *mode of representation* (see Table 1). The combination of these five dimensions offers a comparatively perceptive picture of the modalities of organisational consolidation of early European socialist movements.

Organisational Sequence

Raw information concerning organisational consolidation is synthesised in Table 2. For each country a date is suggested which refers to the first push toward the national centralization in Trade Union movements and in party/political

movements. In different columns, the dates corresponding to the successful formation of a national Trade Unions Confederation and Socialist party are reported. Where possible, the Table indicates in parentheses the length of the process of organisational central consolidation in both channels.

Table 2. *Socialist Parties and Trade Union Formation*

Country	Trade Unions			Socialist Parties		
	Initial phase Trade Unions National Centralizatio n	Foundation of Trade Unions	Length	Initial Phase Political National Centralizatio n	Foundation National Political Party	Length
Austria	1867	1893	(26 years)	1874	1889	(15 years)
Belgium	1857-60	1898	(38-41)	1864	1885	(21)
Denmark	~1871	1898	(28)	1871	1876-78	(5-7)
Finland	1896-1900	1907	(11-7)	1893	1899	(6)
France	1886	(1895) 1902	(16)	1880	1905	(25)
Germany	1868	1875	(7)	1863-64	1875	(12)
Ireland	(1880)	1894	(14)	1912	1922-30	(10-18)
Italy	(1880)	1906	(20-26)	~1880	1892	(10)
Netherland	1893	1905-6	(12)	1881	1894	(13)
Norway	1874	1899	(25)	1885	1887	(2)
Sweden	1885	1898	(13)	-	1889	(0)
Switzerland	1873	1880	(7)	(1870) 1880	1887	(7-17)
United Kingdom	-	1868		(1884?-1893?)	1900-06	(6-20)

Table 2 shows that in the majority of cases central co-ordination of the political organisation took place before a similar process was accomplished in the corporate channel. Denmark is the clearest case: a socialist national party was already set up in 1876-78, but it took twenty-two more years to reach a national Trade Unions confederation (1898). Also in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway and Sweden political centralisation was reached before corporate

centralisation, but with a less important delay, ranging from twelve to fourteen years. In Germany, Austria, Finland and France the national political party precedes the national corporate organisation, but the delays are so small that the process is one of almost parallel development. In contrast, Switzerland, Great Britain and Ireland are the only cases where centralisation in the Trade Unions sector preceded that in the political one.

The predominance of "party-led" organisational sequences raises an interesting question. On one side, there is no doubt that in western European countries the process of workers' mobilisation in the corporate channel largely predated attempts at political mobilisation in the electoral one. Craft and local unions, co-operatives and mutualities were everywhere the first organisational forms and mobilisation bases of the socialist movement. This justifies the image of a spill-over from a basically economic response into a political-one. It is also natural: partisan and electoral activities were needed less and were more difficult given the restrictions of the franchise and the limitation of political participation rights. On the other side, however, in most cases the effective organisation and centralisation of the corporate channel occurred after a political party was set up at the national level. In other words, although mobilisation started first in the corporate channel, central co-ordination was achieved first in the political channel. National historical accounts offer interpretations of the country-specific organisational sequence, but the phenomenon is generalised enough to require some general explanation.[18] I believe the important factors are: (1) the cross-country transmission and diffusion of organisational-political forms was easier in the political sphere; (2) the need for centralisation was more easily felt in

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[18] Reference to the more or less advanced industrial development (under the influence of the British case of early industrialisation and early Trade Unions development) does not work in this case. While a pattern of late industrialisation may explain the delayed development of Trade Unions in one country with respect to others, the same can less safely be invoked to explain the late development of corporate mobilisation with respect to electoral mobilisation in the same country.

the political sphere; and (3) there were important intrinsic differences in the opportunities of mobilisation of the very same constituency in the different channels. Let us consider the last two points in more detail.

In their original efforts to politically mobilise previously inactive citizens, socialist "agitators" and parties had to motivate them to commit themselves emotionally to abstract ideas, abstract categories of individuals, and interpersonal relationships. Feelings of solidarity had to be aroused among individuals physically and socially distant; traditional emotional ties to other more direct primary or territorial groups had to be loosened. In most cases socialists had to induce their potential constituency to act contrary to the norms and roles dominant in its geo-social milieu, and in general against the authority of social hierarchy at the local level.[19]

Compared with these difficulties of electoral and partisan mobilisation, corporate mobilisation enjoyed the advantage of making reference to more direct stigmata of the constituency at the work-place, and to less abstract ideas. Direct functional-economic interest and direct experiences of common destiny were more easily perceived than broader national political interests. The local factory "enemy" was nearer than the "capitalist class" and the state. The perception that individual and collective fate could be influenced by remote political decision-making demanded greater intellectual sophistication. Corporate recruitment and mobilisation took place in a far more socially homogeneous environment than partisan and electoral activities.[20] Therefore, it is not surprising that labour mobilisation took place first in workers_ societies, co-operatives, mutualities and

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[19] Note the difference with religious mobilisation: in this case too the emphasis is often on abstract ideals and groups, against the local and central power structure, but it relies on well established identities and on authorities which offer a sense of protection against "external" other authorities. This is not the case for class-mobilisation.

[20] For the significance of the homogeneity of the social context of participation see S. Rokkan, "The Comparative Study of Political Participation" , in *Citizens Elections Parties*, cit., pp. 13-45.

Trade Unions, rather than in more pronounced political associations and in parties.

However, when one considers the problem of national organisational co-ordination and consolidation - as opposed to that of early mobilisation - some of these vantage points fade and even become liabilities. In order to consolidate themselves, national confederations needed - as much as political parties - to establish a growing authority over, and co-ordination of, local organisations, i. e. to overcome territorial fragmentation (chamber of commerce and similar early territorial forms of organisations). While for political parties this process was facilitated by the obvious centralisation of power and decision making in national executives and parliaments, nothing similarly fostered the central organisation of Trade Unions. Policy was of course decided at the centre, but the immediate interests of members were more evidently dealt with at the local factory or branch level. It is not surprising that the element of higher solidarity necessary to foster central confederal development was often produced by the political organisation, more necessarily centre-oriented in its action. Moreover, central confederations had also to overcome problems that did not exist for the political party: *(a)* integration of the different craft traditions, qualifications and professional figures into a single Union in a given sector; *(b)* integration of several sectoral Unions into a single national confederation. In other words, status differences within the working class were less important and less damaging for the party than for Trade Unions which were, since the beginning, highly stratified according to craft and professional qualifications. Within the political sphere, an ideological area of equality among members was established that was far more difficult to achieve in a highly segmented labour market.[21] It was difficult to integrate early craft

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[21] On the crucial importance of "areas of equality" in fostering political participation see A. Pizzorno, "Introduzione allo studio della partecipazione politica", *Quaderni di Sociologia*, 15 (1966), pp. 235-287.

unionism into broader Trade Unions movements; it was equally so to overcome skilled workers' (and Unions') resistance to successive waves of organisational expansion into less skilled sectors of the labour force. It was easier to link these diverse corporate organisations to a single politico-electoral organisation. These elements explain why, historically, corporate mobilisation predates and integrates forms of political mobilisation, but with few exceptions (Ireland, Great Britain, Switzerland) national co-ordination came after the political parties and often under their auspices.

Timing

The sequence of organisational consolidation (party-led, Trade Unions-led or parallel) is specific to each country. The timing of organisational consolidation is a comparative assessment based on a cross-country yard-stick. The dates reported in Table 2 show a modest correspondence between the earliness or lateness of central organisational consolidation in the two channels. In the corporate channel early national consolidation characterises the experience of Great Britain, Germany and Switzerland, where such a process was already set up before the 1880's. At the other extreme, in Italy, the Netherlands and France, national central organisation arrived very late, in the first decade of the 20th century. In all other cases, central national confederations were established in the 1890's. A more complex case of timing is the Irish one, because since the 1860/70's Irish Unions would usually join the British TUC. The creation of an Irish national Trade Unions organisation in 1894 (Irish Trade Union Congress) was the result of the decision to split from the British TUC, accused of not caring enough about Ireland's specific problems.[22] This

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[22] On this problem see P. Berresford Ellis, *A History of the Irish Working Class*, London, Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1972, pp. 167-183.

earliness should not hide the fact that the ITUC was never well organised and never enjoyed much authority over affiliated Unions.[23]

The pattern is different for political organisations. Germany and Denmark set up national party headquarters already in the 1870's; Austria, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland in the 1980's; Finland, Italy and the Netherlands in the 1890's, and finally, the latecomers France, United Kingdom and Ireland set up their political Socialist organisation only in the first quarter of the 20th century.

Germany and France represent homogeneous cases of very early and, respectively, very late organisational consolidation in both channels. The Irish experience approaches that of France; Switzerland that of Germany. All other countries fall in between these extreme cases. Italy and the Netherlands tend to approximate the pattern of France as latecomers in both channels. The United Kingdom stands as a clear-cut case of total bifurcation in development in the two channels: organisational consolidation in the corporate channel was as early as it was late in the corresponding political channel. Denmark is a clear case of the reverse: national party formation is astonishingly early as compared with the relatively late central organisation of Trade Unions.

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[23] Late industrialisation and the prevalence of small, family owned firms are important factors. Still in the 1960's, of the 5000 establishments in manufacturing, building and service (transport, utilities, etc.) more than 80% employed 20 or less workers; Harbridge House Europe, *Business Representation in Irish National affairs*, Dublin, 1967, p. 32. The persistent presence and resistance of Craft Unionism is another one. Unions remained poorly co-ordinated, and small in number of affiliates. In the 1960's, of the 97 Unions affiliated to the ITUC, 51 had less than 1,000 members in a total affiliation to the ITUC of 364,000 members; B. Chubb, *The Government and Politics of Ireland*, London, Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 109. The ITUC never had much authority over affiliated Unions (very often no authority whatsoever until after W.W.II); could not engage in collective negotiations and had no binding central decision-making powers. To speak of central national unions is an overstatement. On the early Irish labour movement see W. K. Roche, *A Model Working Class?. The Liberal Theory of Industrialisation and the Maturation of the Irish Labour Movement*, Oxford, Nuffield College, Conference on The Development of Industrial Society in Ireland, December, 1990; and A. Mitchell, *Labour in Irish History, 1880-1930*, Dublin, Irish University Press, 1974.

Length

The length of the process of organisational consolidation is the most difficult aspect to evaluate. Any appreciation depends on the definition of the starting point of political and corporate national consolidation: the predecessors which failed or which fused with other socialist organisation to give birth to the ultimate national socialist political or corporate organisation. The goal is to appreciate how long and difficult this process of organisational selection and/or fusion was.

However difficult and debatable the evaluation of the length might be, three groups of countries can be safely identified as representing very distinctive experiences. The bulk of the north-east homogeneously Protestant countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland) stand out for the short and apparently non-problematic process of political centralisation. Only six years elapsed in Denmark between the first significant political predecessor - the Danish Federation of the First International (1871) - and the founding of the national political party (1876). Norwegian socialism, which had stayed relatively at the margins of the First International, founded a Social democratic association in 1883 which, two years later, transformed itself into the Norwegian Workers' Party (DNA, 1885). The Swedish Socialdemocratic Workers' Party was founded in 1889, and it is difficult to identify a predecessor.[24] In Finland the first attempt to federate workers' associations, led by the philanthropist industrialist Victor Julius von Wright (1893), preceded by six years the foundation of the Finnish Workers'

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[24] One could possibly mention the *Alm nna Svenske Arbetareförening* (ASA) founded earlier (1885) at Malmoe by August Palm, an emigrant tailor who in Germany and Denmark had come into contact with Socialism of Lassallian inspiration. Although the ASA was certainly the first Socialist association in Sweden, it is improper to regard it as the forerunner of SAP; the following years did not see the slow process of political unification of the different organisations.

Party (1899; Turku Program).

In contrast, political centralisation proved painfully long and difficult in continental Europe; particularly in Catholic countries like France, Belgium, and Austria, but also, to a lesser extent, in the religiously mixed countries like the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany. Problems of political co-ordination were not the same. In Belgium and France the almost quarter of a century which elapses between the first fore-runner political organisations and the establishment of national identifiable political parties was characterised by ideological and organisational divisions, due to the differentiated initial ideological matrix. The difficulties of political co-ordination of the Belgian socialist movement, notwithstanding early industrial development, are attributed to several factors: (1) the early diffusion of socialist ideology came through political emigration: Buonarroti, Proudhon, Rochefort, Marx and the refugees of the French Paris' Commune, gave to Belgian socialism an anticlerical spirit, burning rationalism, and ideological divisions; (2) in its formative period the movement was somehow schizophrenically divided between a Flemish part, where socialist co-operative associations predominated (not only in terms of consumption, but also as meeting points of class organisations), and a Walloon part, where anarchic tendencies were important and strongly opposed to the spread of influence of the political party. Still in 1885-1890 political initiatives and strikes in Wallony were not controlled by the party but by anarchist militants.[25] In France the SFIO, founded in 1905, was a merger of at least 5 distinct formations[26]; it had been delayed by strong antagonism and competition among these different Socialist parties and political

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[25] See L. Delsinne, *Le mouvement sysndicale en Belgique*, Bruxelles, Castaigne, 1936.

[26] The Workers' French Party of Jules Guesdes (Marxist); Broussistes, from Paul Brousse, gradualist, reformist, vaguely *auto-gestionnaire* and open to bourgeois collaboration; the Workers' Socialist Party of Jean Allemande, a fundamentally _workerist_ party devoted to the revolutionary general strike and to extreme forms of anti-militarism and anti-clericalism; the Socialist Revolutionary Party founded by Louis Blanqui and Edouard Vaillant; the Independent Socialists of Millerand and Jaurès.

organisations[27], and by the longstanding syndicalist hegemony over the workers' vanguard.[28]

In Austria, the difficulties which hampered national political centralisation between 1874 - when an *Arbeiter-Bildungsverein* was founded in Neudörfl with a common programme - and 1888-89 - when the process was concluded, under the leadership of Victor Adler, with the formation of the *Sozialdemockratische Arbeiterpartei in Oesterreich* (SDAPO) - were of two types. First of all, a strong repressive policy which nearly made the party disappear between the middle of the 1870's and the end of the 1880's. Second, the key internal organisational problem of appealing to several nationalities existed. Not only in the Empire, but also in Vienna and in all regions, ethnic Germans were predominant, while a large section of the working class was composed of Czech, Polish and other Slavic groups, often with their own organisations.

In the Netherlands between 1881 and 1894 the process leading to the formation of the Dutch Social Democratic Party (SDAP) is characterised by the conflict among socialist Leagues. Those Leagues which viewed political-parliamentary action favourably were defeated in the League Congress of 1893 and split, founding the SDAP the following year. So Dutch political socialism,

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[27] "Control by a Socialist Party might have been endurable. What was unendurable was the competition of rival socialist parties for control of the struggling young unions. The anti-socialist current was strengthened when in the 1890's a considerable number of anarchists went into the Unions", R. Val Lorwin, *The French Labour Movement*, Boston, Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 20-21.

[28] Malefakis has argued that the internal divisions and the syndicalist role in France should not be exaggerated. France should be assimilated more to the _continental_ experience than to the _southern_ cases of Italy and Spain; see *A Comparative Analysis of Workers Movements in Spain and Italy*, San Francisco, American Historical Association, December 1973. He may be right in stressing more differences than similarities in the role of anarcho-syndicalism in France versus Italy and Spain. However, when the comparison of France versus Belgium and the Netherlands is made - the other two countries in which syndicalism played an important role in the early phase of the labour movement - the picture is reversed. Classification of countries in paired comparisons may differ from classification in a European-wide set.

born out of a split in the Socialist movement, and its dominant position within it, was not to be granted until the beginning of the century, when other streams - and in particular the syndicalist one - suffered important strategic setbacks.

In Switzerland the major problem was probably territorial fragmentation. The party formed in 1888, 8 years after the Central Trade Union Confederation and after two failed attempts in 1870 and 1880. Swiss socialism was from the beginning preoccupied with the issue of centralisation against cantonalisation, and for its entire history remained so. Linguistic barriers, and its own early and almost exclusively German Switzerland roots[29] made it difficult to centralise an organisation whose cantonal sections were facing different party systems, alliance opportunities and power structures. If, in comparison with other Swiss parties, its federal organisations remained more important than its cantonal ones, its co-ordination and central authority were unimpressive when compared with other European Socialist parties. Notwithstanding all efforts, the party was best described as a federation of local sections resting on the support of some large Unions (in particular in iron metallurgy and building sectors).

The German and Italian case are more difficult to characterise, as the length of the process of political centralisation is less indicative of its difficulty. In Germany a specific political organisation was set up very early in 1875 (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei*, SAP) as a result of a fusion of earlier organisations (in particular Lassalle's General German Workers' Association (1863) and Babel's Union of German Workers' Societies). The length of the process should be placed in the context of its remarkable earliness (see the discussion on timing). No imitation advantage - like those which certainly played an important

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[29] The German speaking part of the country offered more favourable conditions for socialist mobilisation: higher industrialisation; political influence of emigrated German socialist militants and leaders; absence of the influence of the historical Radical Party. See M. Vuilleumier, *Autour de la _fondation_ du Parti Socialiste Suisse*, in *Les origines du socialisme en Suisse Romande 1880-1920*, Lausanne, Association pour l'Étude du Mouvement Ouvrier, 1988, Cahier n. 5.

role in Scandinavian countries - was available in this case. The Italian experience resembles in many ways the French one in that the specific political organisation founded in 1892/93 was the result of a difficult problem of the amalgamation of several tendencies and the exclusion of others. Anarchist, "workerist", radical-republican (in central Italy) tendencies were finally marginalised, but did not disappear. The awareness of the need for a specific political organisation won over strong resistance. The party (since 1895 the Italian Socialist Party) had at its origins four presidents to guarantee the autonomy and representation of its various ideological components. Yet political centralisation was achieved faster than in France for reasons which are difficult to identify. Probably, the less distinctive ideological and organisational profile of the Italian fore-runner organisations - as compared with the French ones -- facilitated their amalgamation. It is even difficult to clearly identify the beginning of a phase of national political centralisation before 1892, although the experience of the Workers' Italian party in the 1880's should be mentioned.[30]

Finally, the experiences of Ireland and the United Kingdom represent a further modality different from both continental and northern Europe. In these two cases the time that elapsed between first predecessor and the final party formation appears extremely long. The first Irish political organisation with a socialist programme was the Republican Socialist Party (ISRP), founded in 1896 by the legendary figure of James Connolly, but no organisational continuity can be claimed between the ISRP[31] and the Irish Labour Party (ILP), whose foundation date is a matter of debate among Irish historians. Some indicate the date of 1912 for an embryonic political organisation. In 1914, however, the ITUC added "and

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[30] The Socialist Revolutionary Party of Andrea Costa was strongly localised in Romagna and, on top of having its origins mainly among the peasantry and agricultural labourers, incorporated a predominant anarchist component.

[31] Which remained extremely weak and was shattered by the obscure story of its leader's emigration to the United States in 1903.

Labour Party" to its name, indicating at least a situation of minimal differentiation between the two. Formally the party acquired an independent existence in 1922, but it was only in 1930 that the separation between ITUC and ILP was real. Also for the British Labour Party - officially founded in 1906 but actually conceived in 1900 - it is hard to identify clear predecessors. A Marxist Social Democratic Federation was founded in 1884, but remained extremely weak. The Independent Labour Party was founded in 1893 and was less ideologically orthodox and more important from the numerical point of view. Fabian Societies had existed for a long time. All these forces finally joined_, but it is clear that it was the momentous support of the TUC which actually created the party.[32] Strictly speaking, the Labour Representation Committee created in 1900 was a coalition of organisations and not an institution in its own right. Real organisational separation could be dated in 1919, when the party opened itself to individual membership. In both the Irish and British cases, therefore, the process is long but the leading position of the trade unions make this delayed formation different in nature from that of the continental countries.

The four groups of countries discussed in relation to political centralisation (north-east, north-west and continental catholic and mixed) do not show up so neatly when one considers the length of corporate centralisation. Certainly in most cases there is a correspondence between the difficulties experienced in political and corporate centralisation, and as the reasons are often the same no separate discussion is necessary. On the contrary, it is interesting to underline that the three Scandinavian countries have quite long processes of corporate centralisation, and in sharp contrast with their rapid political centralisation. There might be special national reasons for this. In the Danish case, for instance, historians point to the persistent role of Craft Unionism in particular as hampering national

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[32] H. Pelling, *The Origins of the Labour Party*, London, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 205.

confederation development.[33] In Sweden and Norway, however, the problem was not of this kind. Rather, the relationship between the party and the Trade Unions was so intimate that the party simply operated for a long time as the co-ordinating body of local and sectoral unions. Between 1885 and 1899, for instance, the Executive Committee of the Norwegian Labour party functioned as a confederal chamber of the local samorganisasjon, corresponding to continental Chambers of Labour. In these two cases at least, the length of the centralisation process in the corporate channel simply indicates that such a co-ordinating central function was taken over by and performed within the political party, without this provoking significant tensions in the socialist movement.

Finally, in only three cases is the time-span between the first attempt at national co-ordination and the establishment of a central confederation very short: Germany, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

Cross-Linkage

In the experience of the Socialist movement it is no surprise that the prevalent cross-linkage between organisations active in the corporate and electoral channels was, in the long run if not at the beginning, interlocking; of overlapping

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[33] The latter was finally formed only in 1898 by 38 national and 25 separate local Unions, still profoundly divided internally. The degree of authority vested in the new confederation was considered disappointingly low by socialist political leaders, but was a remarkable concession of the still strong craft unions The importance and persistent role of Craft Unionism is a distinctive feature of the Danish Labour movement underlined by historians. Their strength is probably due to the slow industrialisation of the country. This helped Danish Gilds -among the strongest in Europe and whose privileges were not broken until 1862 - to slowly transform themselves into Unions. By 1895 almost all former Gilds had achieved Trade Union organisational format. See W. Galenson, *The Danish System of Labor Relations*, New York, Russel & Russel, 1952, pp. 10-32.

ancillary organisations, leadership and activities. The three Scandinavian countries and Austria are clear-cut cases of initial, uninterrupted and profound interlocking cross-linkage. The early organisational, leadership and activity interpenetration of the Scandinavian cases is well known, unchallenged in the literature and already mentioned in this text. Austria is similar in the end results, if not in the environmental circumstances. Notwithstanding that Austrian socialism was finally split (also in Austria and Bohemia) by the disintegrating force of nationalism, the hostile and problem-ridden environment, and extensive and protracted governmental repression, resulted in a Party-Trade Unions relationship probably closer than anywhere else in continental Europe. Trade Unions always offered nearly unqualified support for the Socialist party, recognising from the beginning, and thereafter, the importance of political action and the essential role of the party in this field. Unlike the German socialist movement, where Unions sympathetic to socialism finally gained the upper hand in the matter of tactics (strike decisions, in particular) notwithstanding an initial position of dependency on the party, Austrian Trade Unions always elaborated their tactical decisions in close consultation with the political party.[34]

In Germany, Finland, Great Britain and Ireland the relationship between parties and unions was characterised by an initial phase of dependency: Trade Unions' dependency over party personnel, political and ideological guidance in the first two cases; party dependency in the latter two. This situation evolved over time in the classic interlocking pattern. However, the idea of "dependency" needs qualification in almost all cases. Germany, for instance, is often regarded as a clear cut case of a "party-led" socialist movement. The Trade Unions movement was initially fostered by socialist political agitators, who saw Unions "primarily as

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[34] For the German/Austrian comparison on this point see G. P. Steenson, *After Marx, Before Lenin. Marxism and Socialist Working-Class Parties in Europe, 1884-1914*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991, pp. 196-213.

recruiting agents for the political labour movement".[35] Once the national centre of early unions was formed under the decisive guidance of the political branch of German Socialism, the Trade Unions movement kept a relatively dependant position due also to Bismarck's *Sozialistengesetz*, which severely circumscribed Unions' activity and pushed them into seeking political allies. Such a situation of dependency did not last, however. The original silent role of Trade Unions in the party's theoretical debate between reformists and revolutionaries, became more and more a decisive casting vote. This relationship between the two was, until 1918, neither one of subordination nor equality, in the classic sense of a division of labour and independent spheres of competence. Rather, it was a form of "convergence" dictated by common goals and forms of struggle imposed by the authoritarian system; by the profoundly solidaristic working-class culture and by basic ideological orientation. All worked in the direction of making inseparable the goals, tactics and strategies of both organisations. In the latter position, however, one recognises easily the result of the early imprint of political Socialism over the corporate one.

In a West European perspective, it is not German socialism that is the clear-cut case of party predominance over the Unions, but rather Finland. Here, Unions' dependency could not be overcome not only because the local as well as central Unions had been fostered by party political activism, but also because they remained for a long time extremely weak in organisational and membership terms. Suffice to mention that still in 1914, while the party enjoyed massive electoral support and claimed 70,000 members, the Trade Unions claimed around 30,000.[36]

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[35] C. E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy 1905-1917*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1955, p. 9. Lassallistes were particularly active in this job since their founding of the first German Trade Union in the cigar-makers sector (1865).

[36] For the early Finnish labour movement see A. J. Suviranta, "Finland", in R. Blainpain (ed.), *International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations*, Deventer, Kluwer, 1987, para

Ireland and United Kingdom are the two cases where a dependency of the party on the Trade Unions is traditionally ascertained. The Irish case should be differentiated from the British one, not only because the dependency position was much more protracted and not overcome until World War II, but also because it was different in nature. Moves to broaden the membership of the Irish Labour Party beyond the collectively affiliated Unions were regularly defeated throughout the 1920's. It is interesting to recall that the 1914 Congress was worried and concerned "to prevent politicians from worming their way into the new party"[37]and ordained that any Labour candidate for a public body *must* be a Trade Unions' member. Until at least the 1930's, the party remained trade-unionist in personnel and mentality; after 1930 it remained so in spirit.[38] In Britain the early party-Trade Unions relationship cannot be depicted as one of pure party dependency. The British Labour party soon developed into an unusual coalition of forces, somewhat similar to the early Belgian Socialist Party. Trade Unions played a predominant role through collective affiliation, but they never "colonised" the party in an Irish type of relationship. A number of circumstances and features of British trade unionism may explain this: its sense of force, autonomy and self-consciousness; its strong concern with organisational integrity; its attention to the priority of industrial issues and, finally, a certain sensibility to party viability and a sense of constitutionality. All this always left the Labour Party a quite large room for manoeuvre. In many ways, although belonging to the same genus of relationships, the difference with the Norwegian and Swedish experience lies in a

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[37] A. Mitchell, *Labour in Irish History* , *cit.*, p. 85.

[38] M. Gallagher, *The Irish Labour Party in Transition 1957-1982*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1982, p. 4. Until W.W.II candidates and party figures were almost exclusively trade unionists. Their explicitly indicated function was to defend Trade Unions' interests in the Dail. Contrary to most other European experiences, the ILP suffered from Trade Unions' conflicts and internal strife more than the other way round.

higher degree of division of labour and in a less intimate interpenetration.

Next to these four cases, even the Belgian socialist movement has been sometimes described as characterised by early Trade Unions' dependency. A national Trade Unions Confederation (CGTB) followed and was the result of party activities. In 1898, at the initiative of the party's 20 original founding local Unions, the party had studied the opportunity to form a Central Trade Union Committee (*Commission Syndicale*), the embryo of the CGTB. This was appointed by the party Executive but had no independent policy line, even if, in principle, it was open to Unions of any political tendency. Only in 1907 the Committee obtained its own statutes and congresses. Some experts argue that since the beginning the BWP brought the Unions' movement "under direct party control". This is correct if one looks at the formal relationship with the National Trade Union Confederation. However, the party continued and would continue to draw large part of its strength from the extraordinary (and outstandingly exceptional in European comparative terms) development of the co-operative and mutuality movement, whose expressions were among the constitutive elements of the party itself. If the party was fostering Unions' centralisation, other forms of corporate organisation were actually feeding the party. This original pattern certainly points to the difficulty of Belgian Unions in organising autonomously at the centre without external co-ordinating help. Yet one hesitates to describe the pattern as being party-dominated.[39]

In the French, Italian and Swiss case I regard the cross-linkage between corporate and electoral organisations as predominantly "contingent". In these countries such cross-linkage was organisationally weaker, less stable, more conflictual and with a less clear division of labour. The French situation is the

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[39] Belgian historians argue that at the national level the development of unionism and Unions' activities was hindered by such extremely widespread co-operative movements; G. Spitaels, *Le mouvement syndical en Belgique*, Bruxelles, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 197 4, pp. 9-21.

purest from this point of view. It is enough to remember the number of occasions in which political and Unions' Socialism have followed conflictual lines; in which the political party was obliged to face autonomous and non-previously agreed upon Trade Unions actions; the continuously reasserted independence of Trade Unions vis-à-vis politics. Actually, in this period the French Trade Unions movement was tempted sometimes by a pure "demand-group" posture vis-à-vis the party. The latter until the inter-war period remained under the hegemony of independent personalities at the political and electoral level. In Italy the socialist party remained extremely weak throughout the 1890's and could not exercise a dominant role. The relationship is more akin to the French type than to the German one; close but problematic and without a clear predominance of one instance over the other. A confusion of roles between the two organisations persisted for long time; the division of labour never prevented the reformist leadership of the Trade Unions from engaging in specific political action; sectors of the Unions' movement debated at length the opportunity to found a political organisation as a direct expression of organised labour.[40] As in France, the politicisation of the Trade Unions' movement was probably the consequence of the internal ideological and organisational fragmentation of the entire socialist movement.[41] The Swiss case is different in nature. Here the organisational weakness and the poor centralisation of both organisations always meant difference of political and Trade Unions stands over the national territory and very poor co-ordination, making impossible and non viable any dependency or strictly interlocking relationships.

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[40] The Labour Party dreamed of by Rigola; see C. Cartiglia, *Rinaldo Rigola e il sindacalismo riformista in Italia*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1976.

[41] On the party-Trade Unions relationship in Italy see D. L. Horowitz, *Storia del movimento sindacale in Italia*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1976; and A. Pappalardo, *I sindacati prefascisti. Ricostruzione e verifica di ipotesi*, Firenze, Edizioni Polistanpa, 1989, who reviews the historians' debate on the issue.

Mode of Representation

The nature of the cross-linkage between political and unions' central organisation should then be put into the context of the broader system of interest representation in the polity. The corporate and fragmented modes of representation point to the presence or absence of a one-to one relationship in the representation of both channels (see Table 1 and its discussion). A socialist inspired Trade Unions organisation can be strongly interlocked with the Socialist party, but be unable to claim full representation of the organised labour movement. On the political side, ideological as well as segmental or territorial fragmentation can give birth to organisations competing for labour political representation. In the corporate channel this issue can be operationalised in terms of how much of the trade-unionised dependent labour is actually represented by the main Socialist Confederation and, secondly and subordinately, whether such a Confederation is more or less internally ideologically divided. In the political channel the issue is whether the political representation of labour is claimed by a single and united political party or by a variety of political formations.

Clear situations of single organisation monopoly of representation in corporate and political channels are those of Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the United Kingdom. A more disputable case is Austria. Both a party and a Union Centre of Catholic inspiration were founded early and in direct competition with the Socialist ones, while no important organisational fragmentation within the left was present. Yet, the superimposition of the class and religious cleavage, rather than their cross-cutting, prevailed with the result that the class alignment tended to coincide with the denominational one far more than in other countries experiencing catholic political and interest organisations. It should also be

underlined that in its formative phase the Trade Unions suffered no ideological competition in workers' organisation (as mentioned, they faced national splits); nearly all organised workers belonged to Unions with close ties to the Socialist Party until the end of World War II. I assimilate the Austrian experience more to the corporate mode of representation than to the fragmented one.

In Italy and the Netherlands, socialist political fragmentation was endemic even before World War I. The finally firmly established close link between political and corporate Socialism was the culmination of a long process of consolidation during which both organisations had finally defeated their left- and/or right-wings (in the Netherlands, as in Italy, political Socialism suffered important splits before World War I). At the same time, however, they had seen the parallel development of competing Catholic and Protestant labour organisations[42] which hindered the development of socialist Trade Unions and fragmented the representation of dependent labour.[43] In Germany, socialist political fragmentation starts during World War I. Political and corporate fragmentation was accentuated by significant communists splits in France, Italy, Finland and Germany after World War II.[44] Religious Unions' mobilisation produced the lack of corporate representation monopoly in Belgium and in Germany very early in the 19th century, and in

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[42] The Christian National Federation of Crafts (Protestant) and the Organisational Office of Crafts (Catholic) were founded at about the same time as the Dutch Federation of Trade Unions.

[43] On the Netherlands see H. Daalder, "The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society", in R. A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Opposition in Western Democracies*, New Haven, Vale University Press, 1966, pp. 188-236; E. H. Kossman, *The Low Countries 1780-1940*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, particularly pp. 344-349.

[44] Also, the Norwegian socialist movement was highly radicalised during the First World War and deeply affected by the Third International split. However, this resulted in minor and short term fragmentation. The Socialist party moved, in majority and orderly fashion to the Third International, just as it returned likewise, to the Second after three years. Organisational and ideological fragmentation were in no way comparable to the other cases listed in the text.

Switzerland at the beginning of the 20th century.[45]

In most cases the fragmentation of representation in one channel was paralleled by fragmentation in the other. Finland is probably the only case of a unified socialist union movement having as a political reference point two political parties of socialist and communist posture. The 1918 civil war left the SAJ largely dominated by the communists until its final dissolution by court order for subversive activities in 1930. The new Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) founded the same year was under socialist control, but although it managed to maintain organisational unity until after World War II[46], internal strife was endemic and profound. To conclude, political representation was fragmented and highly polarised; corporate socialism, although formally unified organisationally, suffered great internal ideological strife.

As mentioned before, the nature of the fragmentation (ideological, segmental, territorial or mixed) is less important for the argument developed here and will not be considered in this paper. Table 3 summarises the statuses of each country's experience, in terms of the five properties of organisational consolidation here selected, distinguishing between the corporate and electoral channels. On the basis of this comparative characterisation we can now turn to the central question of the relationship between organisational consolidation and membership

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[45] In 1906 (Basel Conference), the socialist sympathetic Trade Unions Confederation (SGB-USS) decided to abandon its principle of political and religious neutrality (codified in 1902) in favour of a class-struggle platform. Sources for the Swiss early socialist movement: A. Balthasar, E. Gruner and H. Hirtner, *Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeber auf dem Arbeitsmarkt; Streks, Kampf ums Recht und Verhältnis zu anderen Interessengruppen*, Band 1 of *Arbeiterschaft und Wirtschaft in der Schweiz 1880-1914*, Bern, Chronos, 1988; Garbani P. and J. Schmid, *Le sysndicalisme suisse. Histoire politique de l'Union Syndicale 1880-1980*, Lausanne, Editions d'en Bas, 1980; P. Reymond-Sauvain, *Le syndicalisme en Suisse*, Genève, Editions Générales S. A., 1966.

[46] In 1960 - as in France and Italy somewhat earlier - moderate social-democrats split from the SAK and founded their own confederation which resumed the old name of SAJ. They accused the communists and left-socialists members of the SAK of using the trade Unions movement for their political purposes. Only in 1969, the new internal and international situation permitted a reunification of the labour movement.

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mobilisation.

Table 3. *Trade Unions and Parties: Organisational consolidation (1880-1940)*

Country	Sequence	Timing		Length		Cross-linkage	Mode of representation		Type
		corporate channel	electoral channel	corporate channel	electoral channel		corporate channel	electoral channel	
Austria	parallel	interm.	interm.	long	long	interlocking	Yes (?)	Yes (?)	corporate/segmental fragmentation
Belgium	party first	interm.	early	long	long	interlocking	No	No	segmental fragmentation
Denmark	party first	interm.	early	long	short	interlocking	Yes	Yes	corporate
Finland	parallel	interm.	late	short	short	dependency/ interlocking	Yes	No	ideological fragmentation
France	parallel	late	late	long	long	contingent/ demand group	No	No	ideological fragmentation
Germany	parallel	early	early	short	med.	dependency/ interlocking	No	No	ideological & segmental fragmentation
Ireland	corp. first	interm.	late	med.	long	dependency	No	No	ideological fragmentation
Italy	party first	late	late	long	med.	contingent	Yes (?)	No	ideological fragmentation
Netherlands	party first	late	late	med.	med.	interlocking	No	No	segmental fragmentation
Norway	party first	interm.	interm.	long	short	interlocking	Yes	Yes	corporate
Sweden	party first	interm.	interm.	med.	short	interlocking	Yes	Yes	corporate
Switzerland	corp. first	early	interm.	short	short/med.	contingent	No	No	ideological, segmental and territorial fragmentation
United Kingdom	corp. first	early	late	short	long	dependency/ interlocking	Yes	Yes	corporate

Membership Mobilisation

In this section attention turns from patterns of organisational consolidation to levels of membership mobilisation. The *first* and general goal is to describe cross-country differences in the rates and levels of corporate, partisan and electoral mobilisation. The *second* more specific goal is to investigate to what extent differences in early central organisational consolidation (sequence, timing, length, cross-linkage, representation-mode) influenced later membership mobilisation capacity. The *third* goal is to check whether agencies in the economic sphere were more ready to mobilise than political agencies or the other way round. This latter question can be reformulated in terms of the extent to which citizens mobilised into electoral politics were already organised in extra-electoral interest and cultural organisation in the corporate-groups channel. *Finally*, I will discuss how levels of organisational density in the corporate, partisan and electoral sector relate to each other, and whether they define different styles or types of Socialist mobilisation.

Data concerning Trade Unions' membership, party membership and socialist votes have been collected from a variety of sources.[47] The indicators which

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[47] Electoral sources are documented in the Appendix 1 of Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability*. Party membership sources are documented in S. Bartolini, "The Membership of Mass Parties: The Social Democratic Experience, 1889-1978", in H. Daalder and P. Mair (eds), *Western European Party Systems. Continuity and Change*, London, Sage, 1983, pp. 204 and 216-219. They are updated to 1990 through the research project on party organisation directed by Richard Katz and Peter Mair who reported such data in "The Membership of Political Parties in European Democracies, 1960-1990", *European Journal of Political Research*, 22 (1992),n. 3, pp. 329-345. In addition to these sources, for a number of small Communist parties, additional information is drawn from W. S. Sworatowski (ed.), *World Communism: A Handbook*, Washington, Hoover Institution Press, 1973. Trade Unions Confederation membership figures come from two main sources: J. Visser, *In Search of Inclusive Unionism. A Comparative Analysis*, PhD Dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 1987; and G. S. Bain and R. Price, *Profiles of Union Growth. A Comparative Statistical Portrait of Eight Countries*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1976. Neither of them covers all countries included in this paper. Jelle Visser made available to me his *Trade Union Membership Database*, Amsterdam, Department of Sociology, March 1992, where additional data covering Ireland, Finland and Belgium are available. Other supplementary information has been drawn from various sources. For Finland, *Työel m n Suhteet - Aikasarjola 1907-1988*, Helsinki,

have been retained are: (1) the total number of Trade Unions members and the total number of left wing Trade Unions members; (2) the total number of Socialist and Communist party members; (3) the total number of votes gained by the class left parties in elections.[48] Trade Unions memberships figures (all Trade Unions as well as left Trade Unions) have then been computed *(a)* as a percentage of the total dependant labour force in order to obtain a comparative measure of trade-unionisation levels across countries; *(b)* as a percentage of the enfranchised electorate in order to directly compare corporate and electorate mobilisation levels; *(c)* as a percentage of the total left vote in each country and election in order to obtain information about the density of the class cleavage organisational network. Party membership figures have also been computed as a percentage of the electorate and of the left votes for similar reasons. This yields the following list of mobilisation indicators:

Corporate mobilisation

TUD: All Trade Unions members as a percentage of the total dependent labour force;

LTUD: Left oriented Trade Unions members as a percentage of the total dependent Labour force;

Työministeriö, 1990 (made available by Jelle Visser); and A. J. Suviranta, "Finland" in Blainpain (ed.), *International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations*, *cit.*, para 275. For Ireland: Rare Roberts, "Appendix", *Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland*, 20 (1958-59), p. 95; and Charles MacCarthy, *Trade Unions in Ireland 1894-1960*, Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1977, p. 622; W. K. Roche, *A Model Working Class? The Liberal Theory of Industrialism and the Maturation of the Irish Labour Movement*, Oxford, Conference on the Development of Industrial Society, December 1990; W. R. Roche, *Modelling Trade Union Growth and Decline in the Republic of Ireland*, IBAR, Irish Business and Administrative Research, 13 (1992), pp. 86-102. For Switzerland, 1881-1813,: A. Balthasar, E. Gruner and H. Hirter, *Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeber auf dem Arbeitsmarkt; Streks, Kampf ums Recht und Verhältnis zu anderen Interessengruppen*, Band II/1 *Arbeiterschaft und Wirtschaft in der Schweiz 1880-1914*, Bern, Chronos, 1988, pp. 66-68; 155; 158.

[48] A list of the parties regarded in each country as belonging to the historical class left is in Bartolini and Mair, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

LTUE: Left oriented Trade Unions members as a percentage of the Electorate;

LTUV: Left oriented Trade Unions members as a percentage of the class left number of votes.

Partisan mobilisation

PD1:   Total members of Socialist and Communist parties as a percentage of the electorate (partisan density one);

PD2:   Total members of Socialist and Communist parties as a percentage of the total left number of votes (partisan density two);

Electoral mobilisation

TLV: Combined votes of all class left parties as a percentage of the electorate.

These indicators have been computed on a year to year basis. In this paper they will be analysed by decade averages and by election year.

Before one can turn to the analysis a clarification is necessary. The levels and rates of corporate, partisan and electoral mobilisation may depend on aspects which are in the environment of the national socialist movements, and as such outside the restricted scope of this paper. The capacity of parties and groups to mobilise is influenced by the more or less closed nature of the channel in which they operate. Electoral mobilisation requires legitimating and incorporation thresholds being overcome. Corporate mobilisation requires association and collective action rights being granted. Electoral enfranchisement and associational freedoms are therefore decisive intervening variables between organisational consolidation and political mobilisation.[49] In the following discussion these

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[49] In a recent article Ebbinghaus has drawn an interesting parallel between barriers in the

variables are incorporated only in a partial and unsystematic way. They constitute the specific object of other parts of a broader project concerning the class left mobilisation in Europe.

Table 4. *Patterns of Organizational Consolidation and Levels of Political Mobilisation**

	corporate	partisan	electoral
Sequence			
T.U.-first	15.0 (29)	3.1 (16)	20.3 (29)
Parallel	14.1 (41)	4.2 (36)	35.0 (45)
Party-first	16.7 (65)	6.0 (58)	29.5 (67)
Trade Unions timing			
Early	16.0 (35)	3.2 (24)	27.2 (34)
Medium	17.4 (78)	7.0 (64)	32.6 (80)
Late	8.0 (21)	1.4 (24)	22.1 (25)
Party timing			
Early	22.1 (26)	6.7 (24)	34.3 (37)
Medium	16.1 (44)	6.8 (45)	29.3 (46)

political channel and barriers in the corporate one. To mobilise support in the corporate channel, Unions needed to bypass thresholds of (1) association, (2) collective action (strike), (3) bargaining (recognition as collective bargaining partners), (4) participation (involvement in the economic policy formation and management) He perceptively suggests that the relationship which prevailed between parties and Trade Unions - what is here labelled cross-linkage and representation mode - depended on factors related to the timing of thresholds being bypassed. He advances the following hypotheses: (i) the more and the earlier "the two paths were separated the more we would expect party and Unions to be differentiated and less dependent; (ii) if the political channel remains closer longer one would expect a politicisation of the organisations in the corporate channel. In the reverse case, unions would go for political alliances". B. Ebbinghaus, *The Transformation of Cleavage Structures in Western European Trade Union Systems. Can we draw Union Diversity in Rokkan's Conceptual Map?*, ECPR Joint Sessions, Limerick, April 1992, p.5-6.

Late	10.9 (54)	2.0 (43)	26.2 (58)
Trade Unions length			
Short	13.1 (52)	3.2 (49)	31.3 (53)
Medium	14.6 (27)	6.2 (23)	24.3 (28)
Long	18.5 (55)	5.8 (40)	30.0 (60)
Party length			
Short	15.4 (59)	6.5 (58)	34.0 (59)
Medium	12.8 (37)	2.6 (37)	26.3 (41)
Long	18.7 (38)	4.8 (17)	25.8 (41)
Linkage			
Contingent	8.9 (25)	2.3 (27)	23.2 (28)
Interlocking	17.1 (109)	5.8 (85)	30.9 (113)
Mode			
Fragmented	12.1 (76)	2.6 (61)	28.6 (81)
Corporate	15.4 (58)	7.8 (51)	30.3 (60)
Mean	15.6 (134)	4.9 (112)	29.3 (114)

*Number of cases in parentheses.

Organisational Consolidation and Membership Mobilisation

To investigate whether different modalities of central organisational consolidation do influence the levels of the three forms of socialist mobilisation, it is necessary to relate the latter to the classification of Table 3. Table 4 reports mean levels of the three types of mobilisation (LTUD; PD1; TLV) by the modalities of organisational consolidation. Cases are national elections in the period 1900-1940, when all countries had elections and the franchise tended to converge toward universality (maximum N= 141 elections).

Corporate mobilisation is favoured by early timing in organisational consolidation. It is more than twice as high in cases of early or intermediate than in cases of late consolidation. It is also influenced by the length of the consolidation process, even if in an unexpected direction: higher levels of corporate mobilisation for cases of longer centralisation processes than for shorter ones. What is more interesting is the strong impact on corporate mobilisation of factors relating to political centralisation and representation: corporate mobilisation is roughly double (1) in cases of early party centralisation; (2) in cases of interlocking party-Trade Union cross-linkage, and (3) (to a lesser extent) in cases of corporate representation versus fragmented ones. It is striking that political and representational factors have such a strong association with the levels of membership mobilisation of the Trade Unions. even if one considers corporate mobilisation exclusively or predominantly as an answer to economic alienation and interests. The role of political party and activists in fostering Trade Unions development is well known. However, such role is regarded as important for the "political consciousness" of the Trade Unions movement, for its co-ordination, centralisation, and recognition of the importance of political action, more than for sheer levels of membership mobilisation. These data suggest that the role of pure political factors is important also for the latter.

This result should be read in the light of the factors which influence *electoral mobilisation*. The most significant finding is that the variables pertaining to the process of organisational consolidation do not have a strong impact on the levels of electoral mobilisation: the differences in mean electoral mobilisation by organisational variables are minimal, and lower by far than means in the other forms of mobilisation. This minor role of organisational consolidation factors is surprising when compared with the remarkable variance in left electoral mobilisation across the cases and across time between 1900 and 1940. Averaging cases reduces this variance pointing to the rather minor role of organisational consolidation factors. That said, among the factors which do have an impact one finds only factors relating to the party (party-first sequence; early party formation, and the length of the process of party centralisation), or to the party-union linkage. An interlocking party-Trade Union linkage favours both corporate and electoral mobilisation. In contrast, none of the factors relating to Trade Union consolidation present significant association with electoral mobilisation. Note that while a fragmented mode of representation is associated with substantially lower levels of corporate mobilisation, it shows no impact whatsoever over electoral mobilisation. The electoral success of the left parties appears to be quite independent from the modalities of organisational development in the corporate channel. *Party organisational and representation factors influence corporate mobilisation much more than corporate organisational factors do for electoral mobilisation.*

Partisan mobilisation is more influenced than the other forms by organisational consolidation aspects. Almost all organisational characteristics do have a significant impact on partisan mobilisation (the weak one is the length of party consolidation). Unsurprisingly, the aspects which play the greatest role are the sequence (favourable to the party-led one), the timing of party consolidation and, in particular, the linkage and the mode of representation. Interlocking cross-linkages are associated with levels of partisan mobilisation two and a half

times higher; cases of corporate monopolistic Trade Union and political representation foster a partisan mobilisation three times higher than cases of fragmented representation. Parties which grew in close organisational interpenetration with unified Trade Union movements drew advantage from the dense network of organisational cross-linkages.

Table 5. *Relative Weight of Organizational Consolidation Factors*

A. Corporate mobilisation

Best conditions for corporate mobilisation				All organizational variables			
Variables	R^2	Beta	Partial correlations	Variables	R^2	Beta	Partial correlations
Mode	.155	.069	.058	Party timing	.172	.351	.381
Cross-linkage	.174	.283	.250	Mode	.261	.318	.325
TU-timing	.189	.387	.275	Party length	.322	-.284	-.312
TU-length	.277	-.539	-.341	Cross-linkage	.341	.156	.167
TU-sequence	.285	.152	.106				

B. Partisan mobilisation

Best conditions for corporate mobilisation				All organizational variables			
Variables	R^2	Beta	Partial correlations	Variables	R^2	Beta	Partial correlations
Mode	.441	.557	.621	Mode	.441	.862	.594
Party timing	.562	.349	.454	Party timing	.562	.993	.518
Party length	.567	.072	103	Party length	.567	.087	.092
				TU-timing	.570	-	-.395
				TU-length	.595	1.037	.269

Party-sequence	.635	.519	-.321
	.637	-.622	.080
Cross-linkage		.066	

C. Electoral mobilisation

Best conditions for corporate mobilisation				All organizational variables			
Variables	R^2	Beta	Partial correlations	Variables	R^2	Beta	Partial correlations
Party length	.100	.259	.259	Party length	.100	.196	.192
Party timing	.147	.206	.211	Party timing	.147	.343	.229
Cross-linkage	.167	.193	.185	Cross-linkage	.167	.147	.151
Mode	.178	-.119	-.113	Mode	.178	-	-
				TU-length	.181	.255	.150
				TU-timing	.186	-.203	-.115
				Mode	(removed)		

The organisational dimensions listed in Table 4 may be arranged in descending order going from a presumed most -favourable set of conditions to a presumed least favourable one on the basis of expectations which are independent from the actual result in the Table. Thus for Trade Unions' mobilisation one can hypothesise that the most favourable conditions are met when Trade Unions organise before the party, early, within a short period, with an interlocking (or party -dependency) cross-link with the party and in a corporate mode of representation. Similarly, for electoral and partisan mobilisation one can hypothesise that the most favourable organisational combination is constituted by a party-led sequence, an early and short process of centralisation, and again interlocking linkage with Unions and corporate mode of representation. The opposite combinations should be regarded as the least favourable. Following this logic the organisational categories can be rank-ordered for the purpose of a regression analysis meant to identify, for each specific form of mobilisation, the

most discriminating factor (controlling for the combined effect of all), and the global weight of the whole set.[50] This is reported in Table 5. For each type of mobilisation, in the first column one finds the result of a regression undertaken with only those organisational variables concerning that specific form of mobilisation (i.e. Trade Unions variables for corporate mobilisation and party variables for partisan and electoral). In the second column all organisational variables are used for each form of mobilisation.

This exercise confirms and clarifies what we guessed looking at Table 4. First of all, the process of organisational consolidation appears to be of far greater importance for partisan and corporate mobilisation than for electoral mobilisation, for which it has little significance. Let us now compare the result of this regression with the regression including all variables. Adding party consolidation variables to the regression concerning corporate mobilisation increases the association. It also shows that they are more important than those concerning Unions' consolidation, which tend to disappear. In contrast, when we add to the regression of electoral mobilisation the variables concerning Unions' consolidation, nothing changes in the overall association, and very little in the order or relative weight of the variables. *This indicates that Socialist electoral mobilisation did not depend on the forms of corporate-channel organisational consolidation, while corporate mobilisation did indeed depend to a considerable extent on the pattern of party consolidation.*

Note that the nature of the representation mode - whether fragmented of corporate - appears to be a strong factor in determining levels of corporate and partisan membership but of no importance whatsoever for electoral mobilisation.

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[50] I have ordered the categories attributing 1,2 or 3 points as follows. **Unions Sequence**: 3= Unions-first; 2= Parallel; 1= Party-first. **Party Sequence**: 3 = Party-first; 2= Parallel; 1=Unions-first. **Unions Timing**: 3 = early; 2= mid; 1 = late. **Party Timing**: 3 = early; 2= mid; 1 = late. **Unions Length**: 3= short; 2= mid; 1= long. **Party Length**: 3= short; 2= mid; 1= long. **Cross-linkage**= 3= interlocking; 1= contingent. **Mode**: 3= corporate; 1=fragmented.

The data indicate that political and organisational divisions have the greatest impact on partisan membership participation. For its part, the latter is an intermediate form of participation. It combines the character of voluntary and active adhesion far more "expensive" than voting (like corporate mobilisation, in this sense), and the character of remoteness from functional specific interests and actions, far more "abstract" in terms of motivation and incentives than union membership (like electoral mobilisation, in this sense). "Costing" more than voting and being more "removed" from interests than the Unions' membership, it is logically more affected by organisational and ideological incentives.

It seems that the link between forms of Socialist corporate and electoral mobilisation is far less direct and important than often thought. I will return to this issue in the conclusion.

The Relationship Between Different Forms of Mobilisation

Let us now look at the relationship between different forms of mobilisation. A first approach is to check the measure of association between them in the 1900-1940 period (Table 6) which, as far as I know, has never been looked at in broad comparative perspective. The highest correlation is between the two forms of voluntary membership mobilisation (corporate and partisan), and the lowest between electoral and partisan mobilisation. In the set of 135 elections between 1900 and 1940, the correlation of .479 between corporate and electoral mobilisation is not especially high, particularly if one considers that it refers to an early phase of class mobilisation. This phase is often regarded by historical and sociological accounts as the "golden age" of class alignments and of clear social homogeneity of Socialist support. In later times - so goes the standard argument - the pattern has been complicated by the blurring of class boundaries, by the

influence of "embourgeoisement", by the counter-mobilisation of religious or nationalist movements, and so on and so forth, in a long list of explanations as to why class is less associated with political behaviour today than it used to be. This weak association casts some doubts on this picture.

Table 6. *Association Between Electoral, Partisan and Corporate Mobilisation, 1900-1940**

	Partisan	Corporate
Electoral	.237 (113)	.479 (135)
Partisan	--	.532 (109)

*Cases are election years

A possible explanation of the relatively weak association between corporate and electoral socialism is that in the early days of socialist mobilisation workers already mobilised in the corporate channel were not *yet* transferring this membership into voting practices for class parties due to lack of experience and/or class consciousness, to abstentionist habits, to anarcho-syndicalist and a/anti-political stands. It is only through time and a long process of apprenticeship and political education that they came to develop the habit and realise the importance of electoral politics. If this were to be true, one would expect an increase over time in the association between these forms of political engagement. More precisely, one would expect that the early phase was not characterised by strong association between corporate and electoral mobilisation; that this association would grow over time to a maximum, and that in more recent times should decline again due to the number of class-dealignment factors mentioned

before. For the purposes of this test, Figure 1 reports the values of the correlation between corporate and electoral mobilisation by decade over almost a century of electoral politics. The distribution of the correlations by decade may be read as confirming this thesis, with highest associations located in the 30's and 40's, intermediate ones in the 1910-20's and 1950-70's, and with almost no association at the beginning and at the end of the century.

At the same time, these data suggest another conclusion. The correlation of .479 between 1900 and 1940 (Table 6) (or of .491 over the 314 elections between 1880 and 1990) pertains to the developmental question of whether the growth over time of corporate socialism is associated with the growth over time of electoral socialism. As both processes are historical trends (toward growth), this can be due in part to historical multicollinearity. Taking correlations by decade, the developmental question is transformed into a synchronic one. Within each decade the influence of developmental association is reduced (time is "parametrised") and the question becomes whether, at any point in time, electoral socialism was stronger *where* corporate socialism was stronger. The answer is clearly "no" until the 1930's (and since the 1960's). *Between 1900 and 1930 it was not in cases of higher corporate mobilisation that the electoral left was stronger.*

Figure 1. *Correlation Between Total Left Vote and Left Trade Unions'*
Membership Density by Decade

Table 7. *Corporate, Partisan and Electoral Levels of Mobilisation by Decade*

Country		1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	Mean 1880-1940	Mean 1900-1940
Austria	corporate	-	-	19.8	39.7	26.1	28.5	28.5
	partisan	-	-	7.7	12.0	16.9	12.2	12.2
	electoral	-	21.0	33.1	40.0	41.7	34.0	34.0
Belgium	corporate	-	2.8	13.1	23.6	22.0	15.4	15.3
	partisan	-	-	n.a.	-	-	-	ab.2.0
	electoral	8.8	22.5	29.3	37.9	37.9	27.3	31.9
Denmark	corporate	11.6	10.4	22.8	27.6	36.9	21.9	24.4
	partisan	5.2	6.9	8.7	8.4	9.9	7.8	8.4
	electoral	10.5	23.9	28.9	34.9	45.6	24.7	33.3
Finland	corporate	-	4.0	9.1	9.2	4.7	6.8	6.8
	partisan	-	5.5	4.2	2.1	1.6	3.4	3.4
	electoral	-	38.4	42.2	40.2	37.7	39.6	39.6
France	corporate	-	1.8	4.5	7.0	13.7	6.8	6.8
	partisan	-	0.3	0.8	1.3	2.9	1.3	1.3
	electoral	9.9	11.4	18.6	29.8	36.2	21.2	24.0
Germany	corporate	2.4	7.7	20.4	27.2	21.1	15.8	19.1
	partisan	-	4.0	5.0	3.0	2.9	3.7	3.7
	electoral	23.4	30.4	40.2	37.8	35.4	29.3	36.0
Ireland	corporate	-	-	-	22.0	19.5	-	20.8
	partisan	-	-	n.a.	-	-	-	<1.0
	electoral	-	-	-	9.1	8.4	8.8	8.8
Italy	corporate	-	2.6	7.1	9.9	-	6.5	6.5
	partisan	1.1	1.2	0.6	1.9	-	1.2	1.2
	electoral	7.9	17.8	28.6	29.9	-	21.1	25.4
Netherlands	corporate	-	1.9	9.6	11.5	14.0	9.3	9.3
	partisan	0.3	0.9	2.3	1.2	2.2	1.4	1.7
	electoral	1.4	11.5	21.8	24.2	25.7	14.3	20.8
Norway	corporate	-	3.7	13.0	13.3	24.7	13.7	13.7
	partisan	2.8	3.6	6.2	4.5	6.7	4.8	5.3
	electoral	0.5	12.6	30.0	34.9	39.3	23.5	29.2
Sweden	corporate	3.1	11.3	7.7	19.1	34.7	15.1	18.2
	partisan	5.7	17.0	7.7	7.2	9.3	9.3	10.3
	electoral	-	9.2	33.5	42.4	51.8	34.2	34.2
Switzerland	corporate	1.1	3.5	10.9	12.9	15.7	8.8	10.8
	partisan	-	2.1	3.9	3.6	4.6	3.6	3.6
	electoral	8.3	15.1	21.2	27.4	29.3	20.3	23.2
U.Kingdom	corporate	8.7	10.2	19.9	23.0	18.6	16.1	17.9
	partisan	-	-	-	0.8	1.2	1.0	1.0
	electoral	-	3.1	11.6	32.9	36.4	21.0	21.0

Mean	corporate	5.4	5.4	13.2	18.9	21.0	-	14.9
	partisan	3.0	4.6	4.7	4.2	5.8	-	4.8
	electoral	8.8	18.1	28.3	32.4	35.4	-	28.6

n.a.= data are not available.

If these data were to be confirmed by further control, they would imply some historiographic revision. If a "golden age" of class alignment and of social homogeneity in socialist support ever existed, this was certainly not the early phase, but rather the intermediate period of the 1930's-1950's. This in turn forces historians and social scientists to raise a somehow unconventional question; namely, *who voted for the Socialists in early days?* As far as the class composition of the socialist vote is concerned, the first formative phase should be as problematic as the last and most recent one, since the mid-1960s.

General association measures hide cross country differences and a more historical and country-specific look at the data can be obtained through close inspection of Table 7. Here, data have been averaged by decade to facilitate cross-country as well as cross-time and cross-channel comparisons of political mobilisation processes within the Socialist movement. Due to differences in electoral enfranchisement and associational barriers, the most reliable mean for cross country comparison is that taking the whole 1900-1940 period.

The first point to note is that globally, and contrary to a certain common wisdom, in the experience of European Socialism electoral mobilisation did not lag behind corporate mobilisation: quite the contrary. In the decade at the beginning of the century, facing an European-wide average of electoral mobilisation of around 8.8%, was an average corporate mobilisation of about 5.4%. Through time, this lag in corporate mobilisation maintained itself until World War II. Only in the second half of the century did left Trade Unions' density parallel or bypass left electoral "density". Between 1900 and the 1930's, left Trade Union density multiplies by 4, while electoral mobilisation just more than doubles; and still at the end of the period the latter was leading over the former. This difference would be accentuated if instead of using Trade Union Density (that is, Left Trade Unions members as a percentage of the dependent labour force) one were to use the same membership as a percentage of the electorates. This would offer a better common

point of reference for comparison with percentages of votes. However, with the electorate being bigger than the dependent labour force since the 1890's, the rate of Left Trade Unions members over the electorate is by then considerably lower than the same rate over dependent labour, making the lag of left Trade Unions mobilisation even more striking. Finally, we note that partisan mobilisation is the most stable of all. Between the first decade of the century and the 1930's it did not change very much, while both corporate and electoral mobilisation were growing fast.

Considering national differences, Finland stands out as the case of early electoral Socialism totally unmatched by corporate mobilisation: the Finnish Trade Unions never approached the early enormous success of the Finnish Socialist (and later Communist) party. Germany follows an early similar pattern. Only in the 1910's did it experience a sudden strong Trade Union mobilisation. The Danish Socialist movement is the only case of a perfectly parallel consolidation in the three channels: the Danish movement, which was consolidated organisationally very early on, grew stronger and stronger in all its dimension, in a sort of "harmonic growth". The contrary are the British and Irish cases; these two most-different systems in terms of strength of the industrialisation - and therefore of the size of the dependent labour constituency - are similar in their unbalanced growth: much stronger in the corporate channel than in the electoral one, and always painfully underdeveloped in the partisan one. France and Italy stand out as similar cases of predominantly "electoral" Socialism. The weakness of the Socialist movement in both corporate and partisan channels is astonishing if compared with its electoral development. This was a Socialism whose source of strength certainly did not lie in organisational infrastructure. In conclusion, *independently from the level of association between the two, electoral mobilisation was generally earlier and higher than corporate mobilisation.*

Over time the experiences of the different countries tend to become more

similar in electoral terms; although converging, they remain more differentiated in corporate mobilisation; their profound differences in the partisan mobilisation channel endure. There is no single instance of a reversal or a recovery in this field. Socialist movements which were weak in partisan mobilisation remained in the same class throughout the period. On average, in this crucial phase Austrian Socialism provides an impressive image of partisan mobilisation capacity: there was a Socialist party member for every 8 electors. The figure was one for every ten in Denmark and Sweden, and one for every 16-18 for Norway.[51] No other Socialist movement even by far approached these levels of partisan mobilisation within the electorate. Intermediate cases like Germany and Switzerland already had a party member for every 30 enfranchised electors. Compare these figures with the situation of structural and protracted weakness of French, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, British and Irish Socialist movements: by and large, in these cases there was a left-party member for every 60 to 100 electors - a situation in which partisan activities of recruitment, propaganda, social work and the like must have been concentrated territorially in particular regions or urban areas.

If the cross-country comparison is undertaken in reference to the overall

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[51] Britain, Sweden and Norway are the three European countries in which socialist membership includes individual card-carrying members as well as collective affiliation through Trade Unions. For Britain separate figures for individual members are available since the 1920's, and these are the data used in our computations. In contrast, for the Swedish and Norwegian Labour parties no separate figures for individual card-carrying members are available. Estimates state that in Sweden the collectively affiliated members account for about 70 per cent of the total post-war membership. In Norway this figure would be 40 per cent. See N. Elvander, *Scandinavian Social Democracy: Present Trends and Future Prospects*, Berlin, ECPR Workshop, March 1977. In the computations, the membership figures of these two Labour parties are considered together with those of parties without collective affiliation, even though this weakens the meaningfulness of the comparison. Nevertheless this problem is less conclusive than it would seem from a British perspective. Actually, particularly in Norway, indirect membership is not channelled through nation-wide federations. Each local union makes a decision on affiliation by majority vote. Individual members can thus _contract out_ rather easily. In financial terms this often does not mean very much, as Trade Unions financially support the party from a common fund without specifying the names of contributors (See Rokkan and Valen, *op. cit.*), but, for counting purposes, this kind of affiliation indicates a more conscious political involvement in the party than is the case in Britain.

means in mobilisation in the three channels, one can distinguish four groups of Socialist movement mobilisation patterns. In Austria, Denmark and Sweden, mobilisation was high in all three channels, giving to the Socialist movement a strong electoral support directly mirroring the strong organisational encapsulation of the Socialist voter. Norway assimilates to these cases in the sense that it shows medium levels of mobilisation in all three sectors. At the other extreme lie those countries in which Socialist mobilisation remained clearly below overall European mean levels in corporate, partisan as well as electoral mobilisation: first the Netherlands, then Switzerland, France and Italy following in order of growing electoral mobilisation. What characterises these countries comparatively is simply class cleavage under-mobilisation in all dimensions.

Belgium and Finland are cases where, with different intensity, the level of electoral success overcomes by far that of organisational membership mobilisation. Germany is an interesting cases which reproduces, at higher levels of electoral success, the typical British and Irish pattern: strong mobilisation in corporate channel versus weak mobilisation in the partisan channel. This is at odds with the common image of German Social Democracy as the strongly organised, solid Socialist example.[52] This image was true in the very early phase of Socialist development, between 1860 and 1890, but faded soon at the turn of the century. Perhaps much of this image was based more on strong centralisation than on actual levels of partisan mobilisation. Finally, the United Kingdom and Ireland represent clear-cut cases of retarded electoral mobilisation, extremely weak partisan mobilisation in the context of early and high corporate mobilisation. Figures 2 and 3 synthesise the previous discussion, charting mean values of corporate and partisan mobilisation levels for each country in the 1900-1940 period against the corresponding levels of electoral mobilisation.

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[52] ".. with a membership of more than one million in 1914, the SPD was the largest and best organised Socialist party in Europe." R. Breitmen, *German Socialism and Weimar Democracy*, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1981, p. 6.

Who Mobilised First?

The question of the extent to which Socialist voters were already mobilised in other channels can be more directly appreciated considering left party members and left Trade Union members as a percentage of the votes collected by the same left parties. Tables 8 and 9 report these data by country and by decade. The figures indicate how many left Trade Unions members and how many party members existed at each moment for 100 left parties' voters. Figures greater than 100 point to situations in which the former outnumbered the latter. To refer corporate and partisan mobilisation to the votes of left parties make them strongly dependent on the variation overtime in the latter. Therefore, these figures are not ideal for comparison over time, as they depend on concomitant variation in two dimensions, but are indicative for synchronic cross country comparisons.

Figure 2. *Electoral and Corporate Mobilisation (1900-1940 Means)*

Figure 3. *Electoral and Partisan Mobilisation (1900-1940 Means)*

Table 8.   *Left Trade Unions Members as a Percentage of Left Voters (Decade means)*

Country	1900	1910	1930	Mean 1900-40
Austria	-	42	40	49
Belgium	11	50	63	49
Denmark	132	105	53	86
Finland	7	13	8	11
France	23	34	52	36
Germany	43	50	35	44
Ireland	-	-	126	126
Italy	88	44	-	61
Netherlands	30	69	34	41
Norway	52	47	36	41
Sweden	671	57	50	209
Switzerland	67	126	96	93
United Kingdom	1238	306	48	418
Mean	214	78	53	98

Table 9.   *Party Members as a Percentage of Left Voters (Decade means)**

Country	1900	1910	1920	1930	Mean 1900-40
Austria	-	39	48	46	44
Belgium	-	n.a.	-	-	(13)
Denmark	51	40	47	44	46
Finland	22	17	14	21	19
France	5	7	11	20	11
Germany	16	15	20	16	17
Ireland	-	n.a.	-	-	(6)
Italy	11	4	13	-	10
Netherlands	10	14	10	15	12
Norway	75	36	46	40	49
Sweden	342	34	51	47	119
Switzerland	27	42	19	71	39

United Kingdom	-	-	12	20	16
Mean	62	25	26	34	36

*Figures in parenthesis are estimates.

Three countries stand out as clear-cut cases of Socialist mobilisation in corporate channels preceding temporally electoral mobilisation: Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Switzerland shows an almost one-to-one relation between Unions members on socialist voters. In all other cases, at the turn of the century, electoral Socialism *was already supported by large sections of previously not otherwise mobilised voters*. There was a member of left Trade Unions for roughly every second left voter in Italy, Austria, Belgium, Germany; one for every second and a half in Norway and the Netherlands; one for every third to fourth left voter in France.

Differences are more pronounced in terms of voters/party members ratios. Sweden, Norway and Denmark are cases where partisan mobilisation can be said to have preceded electoral mobilisation (unfortunately figures concerning the Austrian Socialist party membership are not available before 1913). In the first decade of the century there were 3.5 party members for each vote in Sweden; two thirds of a party member for each vote in Norway and a party member for every two votes in Denmark.

These early differences tended to decline over time, but they will never disappear. In the 1900-1940 period, Norway, Denmark, Austria and Sweden had a Socialist member for every two voters. In contrast, Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Belgium and Ireland should be added on the basis of period estimates) had only one member for every 6 to 10 voters.

These data can be read in two different ways. In those cases in which the ratio of members to voters is low, one could argue that electoral mobilisation did not demand strong organisational infrastructure; that electoral Socialism had

different sources of appeal; that votes were indeed, in this perspective, organisationally "cheap". Alternatively, one could read the data as indicating the strength of the electoral *enracinement* of Socialism on the basis of the organisational "bondedness" of its electoral constituency. It is a fact that in the long run solidly encapsulated Socialism proved more electorally stable, more socially "hegemonic" than weakly encapsulated Socialism. But it did not necessarily prove stronger in electoral terms.

Some Concluding Remarks

The paper has documented the extent of national variation in the patterns of both early central consolidation and successive corporate, partisan and electoral mobilisation. Several times, I have underlined the different "logic" of corporate versus political socialism development, the lack of strong association between the two and the prominence of the latter over the former. The findings point to "qualitatively" different types of early socialist movements characterised by different "mixes" of organisational mobilisation. I venture the following distinction of four basic types of early Socialist movements:

	Electorally under-mobilised	**Electorally over-mobilised**
	Unions' socialism	*Encapsulated socialism*
Organisationally over-mobilised	Britain Ireland Switzerland	Austria Denmark Sweden

	Undermobilized socialism	*Electoral socialism*
Organisationally under-mobilised	Italy Netherlands France	Germany Belgium Finland

Unions' Socialism was more mobilised in the corporate channel than in the electoral one. *Encapsulated Socialism* was densely organised and strongly interlinked in all channels. *Ideological Socialism* was far more electorally successful than organisationally strong. Finally, *under-mobilised Socialism* was simply lagging behind, homogeneously, in all mobilisation spheres. Such broad typological characterisations normally offer more questions than answers; yet they are useful in pointing to the questions which need to be answered. Let us therefore venture into a number of broader conclusions and hypotheses for further research.

First, this research underlines the need to separate interpretations of corporate versus partisan versus electoral mobilisation. The form in which the early consolidation of specific organisation in both channels of interest representation and in that of voting and political direct action took place, was important for successive waves of mass political mobilisation. The impact of such an initial pattern was more influential on corporate and partisan mobilisation than on electoral mobilisation. In most cases, since its beginning, electoral Socialism extended far beyond the politically mobilised sectors of the labour movement. The few exceptions to this general picture are important; it is exactly where early corporate and partisan mobilisation preceded or paralleled electoral mobilisation that in the long run Socialism proved more successful, more electorally stable and, in a word, more "hegemonic". Yet this should not conceal the fact that electorally large Socialist movements could develop without building on other forms of pre-electoral mobilisation; they managed to maintain their strength

even if resting on thinner organisational bonds and bases. Electoral Socialism was, from the beginning, "entrapped" with large electoral allies - more or less wanted or unwanted - which surely were linked to Socialism by politico-ideological motivation, but deprived of solid encapsulation into its organisational network.[53] In a nutshell, the explanation of corporate and electoral socialism need not be the same and a clear distinction between these two channels helps to reconcile the often widely diverging general explanations of socialist development *sub specie* of "economic" response and "political response". These two dimensions have often been seen as two faces of the same process, but the analysis conducted in this paper suggests that they would need different explanatory models.

Second: as far as electoral over-mobilisation is concerned - and more generally electoral mobilisation greater than corporate ones - this seems to have been particularly true (1) where protracted authoritarian rule forced Socialist movements to give priority to *political* goals of democratisation and liberalisation; and, to a lesser extent, (2) where religious political mobilisation oriented toward Socialism sections of the electorate motivated by rationalistic and anti-clerical attitudes. In both instances electoral Socialism could more easily attract sections of the middle-classes while at the same time being obliged to relinquish the monopoly representation of organised labour. It is important to underline that

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[53] This point, and others made in the paper, cast doubts on the thesis that early socialism was mobilising mainly workers because it appealed to them as a "class" and later started to lose their support once it decided - for electoral maximising purposes - to appeal to the middle class and to address workers as "citizens". For such a thesis see A. Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985; and A. Przeworski and J. Sprague, *Paper Stones. A History of Electoral Socialism*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1986. Without questioning the "rationalistic" assumptions of this line of reasoning - and the rather uni-dimensional kind of worker it postulates - an approach to electoral socialism centred on elites strategic choice and workers' rational answer to them is historically unconvincing. As suggested by the disparity among different forms of mobilisation, "alliances" and social dishomogeneity were a feature of early electoral socialism. It is even likely that in many cases it was very (old)middle-class at its beginning and became less so over time. Circumstances outside the range of organised workers' socialism seem to have played an important role in electoral development running faster than party or Trade Unions developments.

these aspects have been traditionally considered liabilities for Socialism, as they hampered its chances of fully mobilising the working class. But they were liabilities for *corporate* Socialism, not necessarily for *electoral* Socialism. What they subtracted from it in terms of organised labour support could be compensated in terms of middle-class ideological support. Of course this resulted in different kinds of Socialist movements: different exactly in the nature of the relationship between electoral, partisan and corporate support.

This confirms the need to clearly distinguish the state-bureaucratic environment response from the economy-class environment response in the history of Socialism.[54] Patterns of economic and industrial development - the "maturity of socio-economic conditions" - could be more closely associated with levels of corporate class mobilisation than with levels of political class mobilisation. In the latter case the relationship appears some what inverse. Electoral Socialism could profit from the strength of the state/political opposition which it encountered, and grow earlier and easier where in such a sphere it was forced to fight for goals unattained by infirm or ineffectual liberal-democratic political movements (suffrage extension, parliamentarisation, state-church separation, bureaucratic powers restriction, anti-militarism, abolition of late feudal remnants, etc.). In contrast, the earlier and easier attainment of these goals, while making mobilisation in the interest channel easier and faster, generated at the same time a lag behind partisan and electoral, mobilisation. In this case, neither the corporate movement needed rapidly to develop a specific political tool - it could lend its growing organisational support to other sympathetic candidates or political organisations - nor could electoral Socialism appeal through themes and issues liable to raise support outside the corporatively already mobilised groups.

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[54] On this theme see the stimulating reflections of E. Szabo, *Socialism and Social Science. Selected Writings of Ervin Szabo (1877-1918)*, edited by G. Lituàn and J. Back, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982.

Third - reading this time the scheme along the row of organisational under-mobilisation - it is worth underlining that political fragmentation of the labour movement clearly hampered corporate, but not electoral mobilisation. More specifically, in all those cases in which the Communist split proved successful in organisational terms - in particular France, Germany, Finland and Italy - the Socialist movement rested on a relatively thin organisational encapsulation on *both* partisan and corporate dimensions, which was by far inferior to its electoral mobilisation. Can this support the thesis that the prospects for success of the "international revolution" cleavage were boosted by the weakness of the socialist organisational encapsulation of the working class in the aftermath of World War I? In these cases, the socialist electorate was composed by relatively large sectors *not organisationally linked to the Socialist party and Unions*, and delayed massive trade-unionisation occurred exactly during the period of maximum appeal of the Russian revolution. Organisational competition between socialists and communists was not taking place *within* established and large corporate movements, but within weak organisations, subject to the fast growing recruitment of previously non-mobilised (and mostly non-specialised) sectors of the working-class.

Finally, a number of more specific questions are left open: what were the extra-organisational sources of the exceptional electoral success of Finnish Socialism? Conversely, what explains the exceptional electoral under-mobilisation of Irish Socialism? Why were the Dutch, Italian and French movements so organisationally under-mobilised? Were there extra- or pre-political networks which made it easier for Scandinavian and Austrian Socialism to build impressively dense organisational "*lager*"? National literatures are not short of specific answers. The problem is to make them compatible in a comparative framework.

In this article I concentrated on organisational development, as I think this

is the least developed field of the comparative history of Socialism. However, for further investigation and more accurate control, organisational data need to be complemented with data concerning three other dimensions, here deliberately omitted. The first dimension concerns *the* "constituency size"; that is the size, type and composition of the working class - the "classic" starting point for discussions about Socialist mobilisation. The second dimension concerns the timing in the development of fundamental participation rights and of electoral and associational incorporation. More generally one should look at the *timing, ease and modalities of entry* of the Socialist movement into the political system. Finally, the third forgotten dimension is the ideological one. Political mobilisation is not only a development of instrumental capacities, but also the formation of identity and "*management of emotions*". No reference was made here to the original ideological orientation of early Socialist agitators and ideologues, to the penetration of their ideas in the Socialist movement, and in general to the degree and nature of internal ideological strife. These aspects had a strong impact on decisions of engaging or not in specific political action; on the arena in which to concentrate in terms of confrontation of mobilised resources; on the issue-bargainability of early Socialist movements and the responses they were likely to meet.

To test macro-hypotheses about the historical development of the European class left requires a model which links organisational mobilisation instrumentality, socio-structural conditions, ideological characterisations and structure of political opportunities.