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INTERNATIONAL FACTORS IN DEMOCRATIZATION

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What were the major causes of the democratic "tsunami" from 1974 to 1990? In much of the literature ("transitology") on these transitions to democracy, analysts have concluded that outside forces had a marginal impact. By contrast, this essay will argue that international causes must be given high priority. Herein their role will receive greater emphasis, focusing mainly on Latin America and particularly Chile, complemented by some cursory glances at Europe and other regions engulfed in the recent democratic tidal wave.¹

In the Chilean and many other cases, investigators have concluded that external factors played a very limited role. They arrived at this conclusion because they were searching mainly for the results of direct, concrete, intentional, and official policies of foreign governments and agencies. However, a different conclusion can be reached by asking a different question: what was the impact of general tendencies in the global context?²

In other words, what international factors created an international democratic conjuncture? Why in this time period did democratic regimes become the norm in many parts of the world? To answer this question, it will be necessary to concentrate on broad currents more than precise actions. The emphasis will be on international or multinational causes rather than on national processes, without forgetting that the impact of trends varied enormously from country to country. Three types of international factors will have to be taken into account: (1)

¹ For suggestions for this paper, I am indebted to Ellen Comisso, Peter Evans, Peter Gourevitch, Miles Kahler, David Lake, Sanford Lakoff, Robin Linsenmeyer, Brian Loveman, Victor Magagna, David Mares, Eduardo Silva, Peter Smith, Barbara Stallings, and Laurence Whitehead. Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore, 1986), 3-46. Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America: U.S. and Other External Influences," Mimeo, Stanford, 1988. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America* (Boulder, 1988). Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America* (Baltimore, 1991), especially the articles by Laurence Whitehead, "The Imposition of Democracy," 356-382; John Sheahan, "Economic Forces and U.S. Policies," 331-355; and Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The United States and Latin American Democracy: Learning from History," 383-406. Daniel H. Levine, "Paradigm Lost; Dependence to Democracy," *World Politics* 40:3 (April, 1988), 377-394. Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23:1 (October, 1990), 1-22. Karen L. Remmer, "New Wine or Old Bottlenecks? The Study of Latin American Democracy," *Comparative Politics* 23:4 (July, 1991), 479-496. Robert A. Pastor, *Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989).

² Heraldo Muñoz, "Chile: The Limits of 'Success,'" in Lowenthal, *Exporting*, 161-174. Carlos Portales, "External Factors and the Authoritarian Regime," in Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksic, *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982-90* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 251-275. Heraldo Muñoz and Carlos Portales, *Una amistad esquiwa: Las relaciones de Estados Unidos y Chile* (Santiago: Pehuén Editores, 1987). Paul E. Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

those that damaged or destroyed governments; (2) those that influenced the character of the subsequent regimes; and (3) those that helped consolidate the new political systems.

To obtain an historical perspective on the deluge of democratization from the 1970s to the 1990s, this essay will be written by an historian in the year 2040. After half a century (1990-2040), this scholar is trying to explain the transition to democracy of over thirty countries in sixteen years. It is untenable to argue that a cycle of change in regimes so vast, rapid, and uniform was a coincidence. It could not have been merely the fortuitous result of myriad national, local, individual, and idiosyncratic decisions. Very few social scientists could believe that so many countries changed their political system in the same direction at the same time by chance. Profound causes must be found, without being deterministic.³

Our historian knows that external and internal causes interact. Many times, international currents have the greatest impact when a transnational coalition--explicit or implicit--of external and internal groups converges around a common political objective. During a worldwide trend, domestic factors can determine the reception, the transmission, the translation, the character, the form, the pace, the timing, the mechanisms, the actors, the direction, and the outcome of political change in a particular country. In an individual nation in a period of regime transitions, crucial factors may include the actions of a social group, the rules for an election, the ideology of a political party, or the decisions of a leader. Moreover, the correlation of forces in some countries will produce resistance and rejection of the global trend, which is not an unavoidable whirlpool but rather a probable tendency in a specific historical epoch.

Principally because of the occidental culture of its elites and its peripheral, vulnerable position in the international arena, Latin America has frequently reflected tendencies in Europe

³ Peter H. Smith, "Crisis and Democracy in Latin America," *World Politics* 43:4 (July, 1991), 608-634. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992). Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, 1991). Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), especially their "Introduction," ix-xxvi. Enrique Baloyra, *Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). Geoffrey Pridham, *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991). Laurence Whitehead, "The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies," in Pastor; "Democracy by Convergence and Southern Europe: A Comparative Politics Perspective," in Pridham, *Encouraging*, 45-61. Alfred Stepan, "Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 64-84. Alicia Frohmann, "Chile: External Actors and the Transition to Democracy," Mimeo, Santiago, 1993.

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and the United States, albeit within its own framework. These external forces have been strategic, political, economic, social, intellectual, and cultural. Near the end of the twentieth century, international factors had an extraordinary impact because of the globalization of capitalism and communications, eroding nationalistic barriers to penetration.

Our historian points out that years of perspective on an event often lead scholars to deemphasize local factors and to highlight broader, shared, multicausal elements. The passage of time makes it easier to see the "big picture," the forest instead of the trees. To underscore this point, it is worthwhile to look briefly at the causes of four monumental changes in Latin American political regimes. In large part, all occurred as reactions to huge transformations in the international system: (1) the rebellion against monarchical domination from the 1770s to the 1830s; (2) the destruction of free trade and many democracies in the 1930s; (3) the transition from the Second World War to the Cold War in the 1940s; and (4) the economic crisis and the end of the Cold War in the 1980s.⁴

THE WARS FOR INDEPENDENCE

Why did almost all the Latin American colonies struggle for independence from the crown from 1808 to 1824? In each individual case, historians have examined decisions made in municipal councils, manifestoes written by creole revolutionaries, battles won by liberators, and so forth. At the same time, it has been impossible to explain the fundamental causes of this continental change in political regimes without spotlighting international factors.

⁴ In this article, all of the discussions about regimes in the Western Hemisphere apply only to the Latin American countries. All the statements about democracy refer only to a narrow definition of the political processes, rules, and institutions normally associated with elected, representative, civilian governments. This definition says nothing about social or economic justice. Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is...And Is Not," in Diamond and Plattner, 39-52. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale

In all probability, the Latin American movements for independence would not have caught fire in the early years of the nineteenth century without the winds of change from overseas. A basic list of these external events and influences would include: (1) the Bourbon reforms; (2) the expansion of commerce between Europe and Latin America; (3) the spread of new liberal beliefs; (4) the French revolution; (5) the U.S. revolution; (6) the foreign policies of Great Britain and the United States in favor of free trade and democracy (or at least republicanism); and, above all, (7) the wars in Europe, especially the invasion of Iberia by the French, who deposed the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs, eventually driving many Latin Americans to declare their independence.⁵

THE GREAT DEPRESSION

Why did nearly all the political regimes in Latin America fall between 1930 and 1934? In the 1920s, Latin America hosted fourteen democratic governments (albeit quite elitist) and six blatant dictatorships. It was an era of global prosperity and of official U.S. support for constitutional rule. After the devastation of the Great Depression, Latin Americans in the 1930s were governed by fifteen dictatorships and five democracies.⁶

To explain the demolition and replacement of a particular government in the early thirties, historians have studied the attitudes and actions of numerous players, including social classes, interest groups, political thinkers, political parties, and the armed forces. Thus they have analyzed the relation between the international economic crisis and the national political change. Notwithstanding crucial individual nuances and deviations, the fundamental cause of upheaval was the global Great Depression and the accompanying debt crisis. Also influential

University Press, 1971).

⁵ John Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808-1826* (New York: Norton, 1973).

⁶ Rosemary Thorp, *Latin America in the 1930s: The Role of the Periphery in World Crisis* (London, 1984). Paul W. Drake, "Debt and Democracy in Latin America, 1920s-1980s," in Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman, *Debt and Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 39-58; "From Good Men to Good Neighbors: 1912-1932," in Lowenthal, *Exporting*, pp. 3-40.

were anti-democratic ideologies and examples, especially from Europe.⁷

In the era after the Great Depression, the United States and England took a neutral position toward democracy in Latin America. As the war in Europe loomed larger, the U.S. priority in the Western Hemisphere was anti-fascist policies, regardless of the type of government in power in a particular country. Only after the victory in World War II did the United States briefly support the installation of democratic regimes.

FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR TO THE COLD WAR

Why did most Latin American countries experience an opening to democracy and the left during 1944-46? The basic causes were the victory in World War II of the democratic and leftist countries, the cooperation between capitalist and communist powers, the propaganda from their governments, and the widespread hope for a postwar bonanza. The dominant superpower, the United States, imposed democracy in Italy, Germany, and Japan, and fomented it in many other nations, including Greece, Turkey, and most of Latin America. At the same time, the phasing out of colonialism in Asia and Africa generated more democratic countries.

Between the hot and cold wars, the majority of the Latin American countries swerved left and then right. During the heyday of democracy and reform, there were especially notable political openings in the revolution in Guatemala, in the exit of the authoritarian government of Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, in the laborite components of the Peronists in Argentina, in the populist campaigns of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in Colombia, in the taking of power by Acción Democrática in Venezuela, in the Aprista-dominated government in Peru, in the presidency of José María Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador, in the election of Gabriel González Videla in Chile, in the civil war in Costa Rica, and in the growth of the National Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia.

⁷ Paul W. Drake, *Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-52* (Urbana, 1978), 60-181; "El renacimiento de la democracia en Chile: perspectivas históricas y comparativas," *Revista de Ciencia Política* 7:2 (1985), 117-128. Peter H. Smith, *Argentina and the Failure of Democracy: Conflict among Political Elites, 1904-1955* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974).

After this democratic spring, why did most Latin Americans switch abruptly to more autocratic and rightist political systems--in several cases military dictatorships--from 1946 to 1956? Why did so many countries suddenly exclude communists, populists, and other leftists? Why did government after government crack down on labor unions? Why did most of the nations quickly establish a strategic, political, and economic alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union? Without a doubt, the intensified global struggle between capitalists and communists had an enormous impact. The United States changed its relations with Latin America to align with almost any type of government--in many cases authoritarian regimes--in order to combat communism.

During the reactionary phase, reformist and leftist groups were beaten back. The United States intervened covertly to crush the Guatemalan revolution. In many other cases, the national armed forces smashed democratic and "popular" movements without significant external assistance: Bolivia, Paraguay, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, Panama, Cuba, Haiti, Colombia, and Argentina. And in Brazil and Chile, the civilian government veered in a conservative and anti-communist direction without suffering a coup d'etat.⁸

THE DEMOCRATIC TSUNAMI

The tremendous new democratic surge between 1974 and 1990 followed another authoritarian cycle in the Western Hemisphere. In the twentieth century, Latin America has been drenched by three great waves of "golpes del estado:" (1) fourteen between 1930 and 1933 (including two times in Chile, Cuba, and Ecuador); (2) twenty two between 1946 and 1956 (excluding two violent changes by civilian forces in Costa Rica and Bolivia, but including more than one coup in Bolivia, El Salvador, Haiti, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela); and (3) eleven during 1964-76 (including two times in Argentina and Bolivia).

⁸ Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, *Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). David Rock, *Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Huntington, 18-19. Whitehead, "International," 34-35.

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Between 1964 and 1976, fifteen of the twenty Latin American countries endured tyrannical rule, the majority by coups and many more than once: Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, Guatemala, Cuba, Panama, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Chile. In the international sphere, it was a period of general economic growth, although the jump in petroleum prices in 1973 damaged some Latin American countries, notably Uruguay and Chile. After the brief emphasis in favor of democratic regimes under John Kennedy (1961-63), U.S. presidents Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford (1963-77) promoted military solutions to the problem of communism in the Third World, in Latin America as well as Asia.⁹

The democratic deluge between 1974 and 1990 was the biggest in history. The flood started in Southern Europe, continued in Latin America, and reached high tide in Russia and Eastern Europe:

The Establishment of New Democratic Governments, 1974-1990

1974: Portugal, Greece
1976: Spain
1979: Ecuador
1980: Peru
1982: Honduras, Bolivia
1983: Argentina, Turkey, Grenada
1984: El Salvador, Uruguay, Nicaragua
1985: Brazil, Guatemala
1986: Philippines
1987: South Korea
1988: Pakistan
1989: Paraguay, Taiwan, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Panama, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,

⁹ Huntington, 19-21. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). Juan J. Linz, *Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism* (Berkeley, 1973). Alain Rouquié, *The Military and the State in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). Brian Loveman and Thomas m. Davies, Jr., *The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America*, 2nd ed (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989).

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Romania, Albania

1990: Yugoslavia, Russia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Chile, Nicaragua, Haiti

In sixteen years, more than thirty countries became democratic. Without a doubt, Latin America displayed in 1990 the highest number of formal democracies in its history. At the same time, some countries which did not establish fully democratic systems nonetheless became more democratic, for example Mexico and South Africa. In 1991 and 1993, the worst possible cases of Haiti and Peru underwent reversion to authoritarianism, denounced by the United States and the interamerican community.¹⁰

Before the general economic crisis of the early eighties, the authoritarian governments in Ecuador and Peru experienced grave problems with sluggish economies and burgeoning foreign debts. Partly for that reason, they turned over power to elected successors at the end of the 1970s. The ability of those rickety civilian administrations to survive during the economic disaster of the 1980s testified to the strength of the international democratic trend. In Ecuador and Peru after democratization, discontent with the struggling economy was expressed through electoral changes of governments rather than through unconstitutional changes of regimes. During the economic downturn, citizens also used ballots to overturn unpopular governments in the continuing democracies of Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic.

After the economic collapse of Latin America in 1981-82, some despotic governments quickly turned over the reigns to democratic leaders during 1982-86 (Honduras, Bolivia, Argentina, El Salvador, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Brazil, Guatemala). Other dictatorships waited longer, clashing with protests against economic and political hardships and then leaving office

¹⁰ Although no one doubts that a democratic impulse circled the globe, this is not a perfect list. Some of these so-called "democracies" are flimsy at best and riddled with authoritarian remnants. Particularly dubious regimes can be found in Central America, Mexico, and the remains of the Soviet empire. The roster here emphasizes cases in Europe and Latin America, but some experts argue that other countries in Africa and Asia should be added. Our historian lacks the expertise or information to judge many Asian or African cases. Scholars can also disagree with the dates when the new democratic regime began (for example in Chile, a case could be made for 1988, 1989, or 1990). There still exists a controversy over the definition of the political system in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas, so its democratization is listed both in 1984 and 1990. Huntington. Pastor. Diamond and Plattner, especially the chapter by Richard Joseph, "Africa: The Rebirth of Political Freedom," 307-320.

during 1987-90 (Panama, Paraguay, Chile, Nicaragua, Haiti). In Latin America, only two authoritarian regimes survived the stampede of democratization during the "lost decade" of economic misery. Both survivors had governments with revolutionary and nationalistic legitimacy, with a powerful official party, with a tradition of resistance against U.S. political demands, and with leaders who retained a significant, if shrinking, social base. Mexico introduced some timid democratic reforms but sustained the essence of its system of domination by the revolutionary party. Cuba maintained its regime of authoritarian socialism with very few alterations.¹¹

Looking back at the "decade of democratization" in the 1980s, our future historian identifies four central international causes to explain that phenomenon: (1) the economic impact; (2) the imperial impact; (3) the ideological impact; and (4) the dominos impact.¹²

A. The Economic Impact

1. Prior Economic Growth

Without reverting to "modernization" theory, it remains true historically that a certain minimal level of socioeconomic modernization has been useful for democratization, although it has not been a necessary or a sufficient condition. In a lengthy, slow, conflictual, and asynchronous process, the worldwide dissemination of capitalism has nurtured the growth of urbanization, education, industrialization, specialization, and social heterogeneity. The spread of capitalism has spawned new social classes, particularly the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat. When those groups have demanded greater political participation, the result

¹¹ Drake, "Debt." Paul W. Drake and Eduardo Silva, *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1982-85* (La Jolla: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, 1986).

¹² Dankart A. Rustow, "Democracy: A Global Revolution?" *Foreign Affairs*, 69:4 (Fall, 1990), 75-91.

has been either severe repression, social revolution, or gradual democratization.¹³

Pressures from emerging social strata to be taken into account were very notable in the first half of the twentieth century in many South American countries and in the 1970s in the Central American republics. In nearly all of Latin America, economic growth in the 1970s augmented desires for Western-style consumption, for an improved standard of living, and for democracy in the 1980s. Eventually, economic successes stimulated parallel desires for economic and political liberalism.¹⁴

2. *International Depression and Debt Crisis*

Often in the past, fundamental changes in political systems have occurred as reactions to crises in the international economy. Although economic factors have provoked transformations of political regimes, they have rarely determined the new political direction. For example, during the Great Depression at the start of the 1930s, many strong leaders with new coalitions and programs took power. But these politicians and their projects were very diverse, including Adolf Hitler and National Socialism in Germany, Getúlio Vargas and the New State in Brazil, and Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal in the United States. In such dramatic changes, usually the new government has been the opposite of the previous administration, whether it was democratic or authoritarian, leftist or rightist. The debt crisis of 1930 toppled many

¹³ John J. Johnson, *Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958). Peter F. Klarén and Thomas J. Bossert, *Promise of Development: Theories of Change in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986).

¹⁴ Diamond, Linz, and Lipset. Mitchell A. Seligson, "Democratization in Latin America: the Current Cycle," en James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 3-14. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development and Democratic Theory," in Alfred Stepan, *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 299-326. Evelyne Huber Stephens, "Capitalist Development and Democracy in South America," *Politics and Society* 17:3 (1989), 281-352. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Zehra F. Arat, "Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited," *Comparative Politics* (October, 1988), 21-36. Miguel Urrutia, *Long-Term Trends in Latin American Economic Development* (Washington, D.C.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

democracies, while the debt crisis of 1982 mainly damaged dictatorships.¹⁵

As in the past, the recent inundation of regime changes was accompanied by economic crises. The petroleum shock and the world recession during 1973-74 undercut several political regimes, especially those in oil-importing countries. Particularly shaken were the governments in Portugal, Greece, Spain, the Philippines, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile. The second petroleum shock in 1979 also stunned several governments. At the same time, difficulties with foreign debts began to appear, notably in Peru.¹⁶

In the tsunami, the first more general economic jolt was the international recession in 1981, partly caused by anti-inflationary policies in the United States. As U.S. interest rates rose, the foreign debt crisis took hold in 1982. Battered by that financial disaster, Latin America became weaker and more vulnerable to foreign pressure to convert to economic and political liberalism. Discontent with existing governments rose. A similar chain of economic difficulties, social protests, and political reforms erupted in Eastern Europe in the 1980s.¹⁷

The debt crisis facilitated democratization in four ways. First, it destroyed the image of

¹⁵ Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca, 1986); "The Second Image Reversed," *International Organization*, 32 (Autumn, 1978), 881-912. James Rosenau, *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems* (New York: Free Press, 1969). Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). Geoffrey Pridham, "International Influences and Domestic Transition: Problems of Theory and Practice in Linkage Politics," in Pridham, *Encouraging*, 1-30.

¹⁶ Barbara Stallings, "Peru and the U.S. Banks: Privatization of Financial Relations," in Richard R. Fagen, *Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979), 217-253. Geoffrey Pridham, *The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece, and Portugal* (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1984), especially the chapters by Geoffrey Pridham, "Comparative Perspectives on the New Mediterranean Democracies: A Model of Regime Transition?", 1-29, and by Alfred Tovias, "The International Context of Democratic Transition," 158-171. Huntington, 51.

¹⁷ Albert Fishlow, "A Tale of Two Presidents: The Political Economy of Crisis Management," in Stepan, *Democratizing*, 83-119. Edmar L. Bacha y Pedro S. Malan, "Brazil's Debt: From the Miracle to the Fund," in Stepan, *Democratizing*, 120-142. Grzegorz Ekiert, "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration," *British Journal of Political Science* 21:3 (July, 1991), 285-313. Barbara Stallings, *Banker to the Third World: U.S. Portfolio Investment in Latin America, 1900-1986* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, *Latin American Debt* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988). Miles Kahler, *The Politics of International Debt* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). Riordan Roett, "The Debt Crisis and Economic Development in Latin America," in Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Varas, *The United States and Latin America in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 131-151. Smith, "Crisis," 615, 632.

economic efficiency cultivated by authoritarian governments, leaving them with little legitimacy. Second, the financial debacle provoked massive protests against autocratic rule, by many in the middle and upper classes as well as workers. Third, such difficult circumstances reduced the desire of some dictators to continue governing. Fourth, the sudden scarcity of resources diminished the possibility of a large, activist, progressive state aligned with an aggressive working class, thus dispelling the longstanding fears of democracy harbored by rightwing groups.¹⁸

3. *Globalization and Neoliberalism*

With the globalization of competitive capitalism and of neoliberal, free-market models in the 1980s, working-class organizations lost strength in most of the world. The internationalization of investment and production left trade unions with few economic or political allies. Consequently, the likelihood of populist or leftist governments shrank, as did efforts to redistribute income and power. Since business executives and military officers now had less to fear from workers and leftists, they became more willing to accept formal democracies.¹⁹

Although debilitated, U.S. unions pressed harder than ever for democratic rights for their counterparts in Latin America. North American unionists promoted their cause principally through the American Institute for Free Labor Development. Their campaign had more impact than in the past for three reasons: (1) the rightwing dictatorships and neoliberalism sapped Latin American unions and increased their need for external assistance; (2) the winding down of the Cold War doomed communist alternatives; and (3) U.S. trade unionists had a greater stake in improving conditions for Latin American workers so that U.S. capitalists would not be lured

¹⁸ Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). Huntington, 45.

¹⁹ Ian Roxborough, "Organized Labor: A Major Victim of the Debt Crisis," in Stallings and Kaufman, 91-108. Paul W. Drake, "Los movimientos urbanos de trabajadores bajo el capitalismo autoritario en el Cono Sur y Brasil, 1964-1983," en Marcelo Cavarozzi y Manuel Antonio Garretón, *Muerte y resurrección: los partidos políticos en el autoritarismo y las transiciones del Cono Sur* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1989), 79-138. Frieden, 152-153. Gourevitch, *Politics*, 224, 227.

abroad by weak unions and low wages south of the Rio Grande. U.S. labor leaders denounced the repression of unions and wages in underdeveloped countries as illegal unfair trade practices. North American unions inserted their demands for Latin American labor rights within some international trade agreements.²⁰

In Latin America, neoliberalism and privatization--while exacting cruel social costs--multiplied the number of participants in private property. Thus support for capitalism grew, while support for populism or socialism shriveled. A central objective of nationalistic socialism and populism had been to use the state to control capital, but that was no longer a very viable strategy in the face of the globalization of economic competition. More limited, constrained democracies became more acceptable to capitalists. According to partisans of neoliberalism, the reduction of the state, the invigoration of the private sector, the expansion of property ownership, and the reliance on market mechanisms comported with classic theories of the economic prerequisites for a liberal political system. Allegedly, now individualism would dominate both the economic and political marketplaces.²¹

After the 1982-83 recession fortified the democratic opposition in most of Latin America, worldwide economic recuperation from 1984 onward generated an international consensus in favor of combining liberal economics and politics. By 1990-93, Latin America was growing, some countries quite rapidly, thus facilitating democratic consolidation.

International economic agents--such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank--reinforced the neoliberal bandwagon. They even strayed beyond economics to make some gestures in favor of democracy. The same pitch was made by U.S. economic institutions, such as the Agency for International Development. Whereas the principal source of foreign loans in the 1970s was private banks, that role in the 1980s was taken over by public agencies, adding more weight to their pronouncements.

²⁰ Paul G. Buchanan, "The Impact of U.S. Labor," in Lowenthal, *Exporting*, 296-328. Serafino Romualdi, *Presidents and Peons; Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967). Hobart A. Spalding, Jr., *Organized Labor in Latin America* (New York: New York University Press, 1977). Dag MacLeod, "Worker Rights in a Global Economy," Masters Thesis, University of California, San Diego, 1993.

²¹ Domingo Hachette and Rolf Luders, *Privatization in Chile: An Economic Appraisal* (San Francisco: ICEG, 1992).

For Latin Americans, the possibilities of entering into free trade agreements, especially with the United States, solidified the propensity to wed economic and political liberalism. Washington preferred to negotiate such accords with democratic governments. However, for special geopolitical reasons, it signed the first agreement in Latin America with Mexico, whose mixed political system contained significant authoritarian elements.²²

4. *New Technologies*

At the same time, the development of new technologies facilitated the expansion of capitalism, the private sector, individualism, and democratic possibilities. By the same token, the state lost power. Modern means of communication almost instantaneously brought information about successful economic models and democratization to consumers around the globe. This lightning learning was aided by the proliferation of cable television, especially the Cable News Network (CNN). Another new technology was the personal computer, which delivered more power to individuals and less to the state. Fax machines also permitted more rapid and individual communication. In addition, the democratic opposition was helped by new campaign techniques, such as polls and focus groups.²³

5. *Economic Changes in Eastern Europe*

²² Barbara Stallings, "The New International Context of Development," *Items*, 47:1 (marzo, 1993), 1-6; "International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and Structural Reform," in Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 41-88. Joan M. Nelson, *Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid?* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1992).

²³ Huntington, 45, 61-72, 101-102. Thomas E. Skidmore, *Television, Politics, and the Transition to Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

As in Latin America, so in much of Eastern Europe, economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s gave way to deterioration in the 1980s. At the same time, a crisis of foreign debts took hold, especially in Poland and Hungary. Many Eastern Europeans sought help from the West with technology, commerce, and finances. In the midst of the globalization of capital and markets, some large state apparatuses and enterprises became obstacles to agile, efficient, and successful participation in the world economy. Economic and political liberalism conquered economic and political authoritarianism. When Gorbachev eliminated the special relationship between the USSR and its allies in Eastern Europe, those governments perished.²⁴

B. The Imperial Impact

Besides economics, other forces (strategic, geopolitical, diplomatic, etc.) emanating from the great powers also encouraged democratization. During the second half of the 1980s, four of the most powerful entities in the world were supporting democratization: the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Vatican. With the influence of Washington on capitalists and the armed forces and that of the papacy on the Roman Catholic Church, the three Latin American groups historically most favorable to authoritarianism were being pushed toward democracy.

Without being ethnocentric, it is worth noting that the democratic tsunami principally influenced countries close to the West--close in their geographic and strategic location, their history, their culture, their language, their religion, their society, and their economy. These countries were more susceptible to currents flowing from the United States and Western Europe. Partly for that reason, democratization had more success in Southern Europe, Latin

²⁴ Ellen Comisso, "Crisis in Socialism or Crisis of Socialism?" *World Politics* 42:4 (July, 1990), 563-606. András Köves, *Central and East European Economies in Transition: The International Dimension* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1989).

America, and Eastern Europe, not in Africa, the Middle East, or Asia.²⁵

1. *The Impact of the United States and Western Europe*

In the long run, perhaps the most important influence of the United States and Western Europe was their role as successful economic, political, and cultural models. Naturally, the United States carried more weight in Latin America, and Western Europe in the rest of Europe. The North Americans had the most clout with the two Latin American groups traditionally most powerful, conservative, and authoritarian: the military and the capitalists. For example, the Pentagon sent officers to convince their Latin American counterparts to take seriously the new U.S. policy in favor of democracy. In similar fashion, Washington reversed an attempted "self-coup" by President Jorge Serrano of Guatemala in 1993 mainly by communicating its displeasure to the armed forces and the business elites.²⁶

In Latin America, direct pressure from the United States and, to a lesser degree, from Western Europe had a positive, although discrete, impact on democratization. These concrete actions intensified the general dissemination of international signals and incentives favorable to democracy. Although any one nudge rarely evoked much response, the cumulative effect of many forms of prodding helped the democratizers. Instruments used by the United States to foment democracy included: (1) pronouncements by officials in Washington and in U.S. embassies; (2) annual reports by the State Department on human rights in every country in the world; (3) international media outlets; (4) interchanges among universities and intellectuals; (5) programs of economic and social assistance--often to new social movements and to democratic activists--from the Agency for International Development and the Inter American Foundation; (6) technical and publicity aid from the National Foundation for Democracy, established in

²⁵ Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), especially 183-200. Huntington, 85-87.

²⁶ Whitehead, "Democracy." Alfred Tovias, "U.S. Policy towards Democratic Transition in Southern Europe," in Pridham, *Encouraging*, 175-194. Dusan Sidjanski, "Transition to Democracy and European Integration: The Role of Interest Groups in Southern Europe," in Pridham, *Encouraging*, 195-211. Geoffrey Pridham, "The Politics of the European Community, Transnational Networks and Democratic Transition in Southern Europe," in Pridham, *Encouraging*, 212-245.

1984; (7) financing for the Center for Electoral Promotion and Assistance, operating out of Costa Rica and helping many countries improve voting procedures, for example registering voters for the 1988 Chilean plebiscite; (8) committees to observe elections; (9) suspension of military aid; (10) economic pressures; and (11) military action.²⁷

Official U.S. promotion of democracy began with the Democrats in Congress and the election of President Jimmy Carter in 1976. The State Department inaugurated its annual publication on the status of human rights in foreign countries in 1977; the U.S. government was supposed to take those conditions into account in its allocation of military assistance abroad. Although exhortations for democracy did not produce major successes immediately, they did help democratization stay on track in Ecuador and Peru, and they contributed to the preservation of democracy in the Dominican Republic. At the same time, Carter's initiatives created space for human rights movements under authoritarian regimes. Some future leaders of democratization escaped from jail, torture, and death, partly because of U.S. pressure. By diffusing the concept of human rights around the globe, Carter undermined the legitimacy of dictators. In the final analysis, his policies had their maximum impact in the long run, sowing seeds for transitions which came later.²⁸

In his first government (1981-85), President Ronald Reagan privileged the crusade against communism over the campaign for democracy. Consequently his administration warmed up to previously scorned rightwing dictators. Then his initial policy changed for three key reasons: (1) the need to criticize rightist as well as leftist dictators in order to justify his intervention in Central America and his conflict with the USSR; (2) the desire to respond to idealism in U.S. public opinion; and (3) the necessity to recognize the international torrent of democratization. In

²⁷ Thomas Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years* (Berkeley, 1991), 203-210, 226-236. Gregory A. Fossadel, *The Democratic Imperative: Exporting the American Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 71-77. Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny* (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1991), 182-183, 204. Huntington, 93-94.

²⁸ Lars Schoultz, *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982). Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights* (Lanham: Hamilton Press, 1986). Nelson. Lowenthal, Partners. Fossadel, 60-64. Huntington, 91-100.

his second administration (1985-89), Reagan gave more support to democratic transitions.²⁹

Since the human rights policy had become a consensus between Democrats and Republicans, Presidents George Bush (1989-93) and Bill Clinton (1993-97) continued promoting democracy, especially in Europe, Russia, and Latin America. Now the United States could support democracy in the hemisphere without worrying about communism. However, that was not a universal policy, as Washington maintained fairly normal relations with autocratic regimes in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

Historically, there has been a superficial correlation between political systems in Latin America and foreign policies of the United States. The table below shows this relationship since the United States became the hegemonic power in most of the hemisphere after the First World War:

Period	Dominant Regime Type in Latin America	Dominant U.S. Foreign Policy toward Democracy
1920s	Democracy	Positive
1930s	Dictatorship	Neutral
1945-48	Democracy	Positive
1948-54	Dictatorship	Neutral/Negative
1958-63	Democracy	Positive
1964-76	Dictatorship	Neutral/Negative
1984-93	Democracy	Positive

²⁹ Carothers. Muravchik, *Exporting*, 4. Arthur MacEwan, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule," *Latin American Perspectives* 15:3 (Summer, 1988), 115-130. Cole Blasier, "The United States and Democracy in Latin America," in Malloy and Seligson, 219-234. James M. Malloy, "The Politics of Transition in Latin America," in Malloy and Seligson, 235-258.

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The connection between cause and effect in this table is unclear. It could be that the foreign policy of the United States in favor of democracy promoted democratization in Latin America, or it could be that the arrival of democracy in Latin America promoted democratization in the foreign policy of the United States. Normally, it seems that there has been reciprocal action between changes in Latin America and in U.S. policy. For example in the 1980s, the first democratizations helped convince the White House to stop coddling dictators; thereafter the new U.S. policy in favor of democracy facilitated the ouster of other tyrants.³⁰

In this century, Western Europe has had much less influence in Latin America, although its shadow has been growing in the last fifteen years. At the same time, Western Europe has increasingly been emphasizing its preference for democracy. Its main impact has been in Southern and Eastern Europe, where democratic credentials became necessary to join the European Community. The moderation of the democratic left in Western Europe also impressed its neighbors and its counterparts in Latin America. In 1982, the defeat of Argentina in the Malvinas/Falklands War by Great Britain, with support from the United States, shattered an authoritarian regime and began the return to democracy in the Southern Cone.³¹

2. *Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*

The beginning of the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and the subsequent termination of the Cold War dampened ideological conflicts in Latin America and most of the world. The communist model and its Cuban version lost credibility. This left Latin America's orthodox communist parties with no program and authoritarian rightwingers without that enemy to justify military rule. Since, however, the majority of the Latin American transitions occurred before the complete disintegration of the Soviet empire, this factor helped mainly with the

³⁰ This table should be taken with care. One problem is the debatable designations of certain regimes as democratic or dictatorial, especially in the Caribbean Basin. Another problem is the dicey definition of U.S. policy as favoring democrats or dictators. For example, the State Department has usually justified all U.S. policies in Latin America with the motive of fomenting democracy, even in interventions in Guatemala under Jacobo Arbenz, in Chile under Salvador Allende, and in Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega.

³¹ Pridham, "The Politics." Huntington, 87-89.

consolidation of democratic systems.³²

No doubt international factors played a bigger role in Eastern Europe than in Latin America. The Soviet model and Marxist-Leninist ideology had been losing international appeal well before Gorbachev. The planned economies of Russia and its client states had also entered into crisis. Under Reagan, the expansion of the U.S. armed forces and particularly the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative threatened the Soviet Union with bankruptcy and ruin. It was losing both the economic and military contests. One of the few alternatives left was to conclude the Cold War.

At the same time, Eastern Europe shared the decay of the Soviet Union and, in some cases, suffered its own debt crisis. Meanwhile, Eastern Europeans envied the successes of the United States and Western Europe, especially in the years leading up to the integration of Western Europe in 1992. After taking power in Russia in 1985, Gorbachev gave up control over his Warsaw Pact allies in 1989. Suddenly the dominos fell. The newly independent countries convened elections in 1990 to launch democratic systems, or at least systems with democratic aspirations.³³

3. *Noneconomic International Organizations*

Many noneconomic groups joined the great powers in advocating democracy. Multinational public institutions--such as the Organization of American States and the United

³² Heraldo Muñoz V., *El fin del fantasma: las relaciones interamericanas después de la guerra fría* (Santiago: Hachette, 1992). Alan Angell, "The Left in Latin America since 1930: From Leninism to Pluralism," en Leslie Bethell, *The Cambridge History of Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Marcelo Cavarozzi, "The Left in Latin America: The Decline in Socialism and the Rise of Political Democracy," in Hartlyn, Schoultz, and Varas, 101-127. Barry Carr and Steve Ellner, *The Latin American Left: From the Fall of Allende to Perestroika* (Boulder: Westview, 1993). Jorge G. Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).

³³ Ken Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 255-263. Gyorgy Szoboszlai, *Flying Blind: Emerging Democracies in East-Central Europe* (Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association, 1992). Marc F. Plattner, "The Democratic Moment," in Diamond and Plattner, 26-38. Giuseppe Di Palma, "Why Democracy Can Work in Eastern Europe," in Diamond and Plattner, 257-267. Ekiert, 285-289.

Nations--placed more emphasis on fostering and preserving human rights and democracy. At the same time, many private, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)--like Amnesty International--joined the democratic chorus. Examples of such actors included defenders of human rights, churches, academic associations, professional organizations, and trade unions. Calls for change also came from international coalitions of political parties, especially Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Communists.³⁴

C. The Ideological Impact

1. Liberalism

Among many international elites and intellectuals, a consensus developed around representative democracy and neoliberal economics. For all their defects, Reaganism and Thatcherism helped resurrect and spread the gospels of political and economic liberalism. This ideological offensive--especially the arguments favoring democracy--was propelled by visits of foreign intellectuals to countries with authoritarian regimes, trips by intellectuals from the democratic opposition to the United States and Europe, foreign financial and moral support for democratic intellectuals under dictatorships, and participation of opposition intellectuals in struggles for democratization. The North American and British campaigns in favor of liberalism had an exceptional impact in the Western Hemisphere. Although Latin America contained many partisans of authoritarianism, it also maintained an authentic and significant liberal tradition.³⁵

The neoliberal crusade nurtured the creation of a Latin American rightwing somewhat

³⁴ Pridham, "The Politics," 239-242. Muravchik, *Exporting*, 218-219.

³⁵ Muravchik, *Exporting*, 195-197. Jeffrey M. Puryear, "Building Democracy: Foreign Donors and Chile," *Conference Papers*, 57 (Columbia University, 1992). Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s*, revised edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).

more democratic. Rightist politicians espousing liberty in politics as well as economics included León Febres Cordero in Ecuador, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, Alfredo Cristiani in El Salvador, Mario Vargas Llosa in Peru, and the Party of National Action in Mexico. Some of these movements had strong ties to the business sector.³⁶

2. *Human Rights*

Beginning in the 1970s, the universalization of the concept of human rights in the 1980s delegitimized many authoritarian regimes. Dictators lost the capacity to avoid foreign investigations and accusations by hiding behind national sovereignty. Former domestic issues of repression became international issues. In parts of the world, the gross violation of human and democratic rights became unacceptable, almost like the repudiation of slavery in the nineteenth century. The pronouncements of Carter, the accords of Helsinki, the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the democratic conversion of the second Reagan administration accelerated this process. The blossoming of an international network of human rights activists helped the champions of democracy.³⁷

Linked to the crusade for human rights was the international campaign in favor of women's liberation. Feminism had an impact in the participation of Latin American women in human rights organizations, in committees seeking an accounting for torture and murder by the dictatorships (for example, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina), in new social movements, and in associations calling for women's rights. For example, many Chilean women demanded "democracy in the nation and in the household," and surprised Pinochet by supplying

³⁶ Rosario Espinal, "The Right and the New Right in Latin America," in Hartlyn, Schoultz, and Varas, 86-100. Hernando de Soto, *El otro sendero* (Lima: ILD, 1986).

³⁷ More research is needed on the causes of the transnationalization of human rights expectations. For some of the arguments, see Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," en Marvin E. Gettleman, et. al., *El Salvador: Central America and the New Cold War* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1981), 15-38. Schoultz, *Human Carothers*. Frohmann. Huntington, 89-91.

a majority of their votes to his opponents in the 1988 plebiscite. Thus females played an important role in the restoration of democracies that promised to pay more attention to their needs.³⁸

3. *Religious Changes*

It may be significant that democratization has been rare in countries dominated by non-Christian religions. The majority of the democratizations in the tsunami took place in the heavily Catholic countries of Latin America and Europe. In the history of the Americas, the Roman Catholic Church had been one of the bastions of conservative and authoritarian governments. It switched to more reformist and democratic positions through Vatican Two in 1963-65 and the Second Congress of Latin American Bishops in Medellín, Colombia, in 1968. Some of the Latin American dictators in the 1970s tried to invoke traditional Catholicism to consecrate their regimes, but they experienced little success. Although never monolithic, the Church became a transnational ally of democracy and social reform.³⁹

Standing on the shoulders of Max Weber, some observers have argued that the democratic

³⁸ Jane S. Jaquette, *The Women's Movement in Latin America: Feminism and the Transition to Democracy* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). María Elena Valenzuela, "The Evolving Roles of Women under Military Rule," in Drake and Jaksic, 161-187.

³⁹ Penny Lernoux, *People of God: The Struggle for World Catholicism* (New York: Viking, 1989). Brian Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). Miguel Carter, *El papel de la iglesia en la caída de Stroessner* (Asunción: RP Ediciones, 1991). Ralph Della Cava, "The 'People's Church,' the Vatican, and Abertura," in Stepan, *Democratizing*, 143-167. Thomas C. Bruneau, *The Church in Brazil* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982). Scott Mainwaring, *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986). Scott Mainwaring and Alexander Wilde, *The Progressive Church in Latin America* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989). Paul E. Sigmund, *Liberation Theology at the Crossroads: Democracy or Revolution?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Daniel H. Levine, *Churches and Politics in Latin America* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979); *Popular Voices in Latin American Catholicism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Introduction," in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame, 1992), 1-16. Huntington, 45, 72-85. Ekiert, 306-307.

tsunami was due, in part, to the propagation of Protestantism. This faith grew rapidly in Latin America from the 1960s to the 1990s. In several countries, it proved especially attractive to members of the military and the urban poor. Some converts exhibited an increased commitment to individualism, capitalism, and democracy. Others, however, evidenced political apathy, opposed leftist reformers, and accepted authoritarian governments. Therefore, it will require much more research to establish a coherent, compelling connection between Protestantism and democracy in Latin America.⁴⁰

D. The Dominos Impact

From 1964 to 1976 in Latin America, many democratic "dominos" fell. An opposite domino effect occurred from the late 1970s to the beginning of the 1990s. After the tumble of each dictatorship, the collapse of the next authoritarian regime became more likely. Although there was no doubt that an international cycle of political contagion was taking place, there were few satisfactory explanations for this contamination.

Why did democratization spread like wildfire? One answer is that most of the dominos were buffeted at the same time by the international forces already discussed in this paper. A second factor behind the ripple effect is that the new democracies supported similar transformations in their neighbors, partly because democracies are less likely to attack other democracies. They even started engaging in collective action to promote and prop up democracies in their region, so that each new democracy had more international allies. Meanwhile dictatorships became increasingly isolated and illegitimate. Another key is that modern means of international communication rapidly delivered news and lessons around the globe.

⁴⁰ Huntington, 72-76. Diamond and Plattner, "Introduction," x, xv. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Centrality of Political Culture," in Diamond and Plattner, 134-137. David Martin, *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990). David Stoll, *Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). Emile Willems, *Followers of the New Faith: Future, Change, and the Rise of Protestantism in Brazil and Chile* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967).

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An additional response to the domino question is that both democratic and undemocratic actors underwent political learning from other countries in transition. Their education made replication of the process in their own nation more probable. In the experiences of their neighbors, they saw the political possibilities, the effective strategies and tactics, the costs and benefits of changes, and the international reactions. Proponents of democracy observed the virtues of that political system in and of itself. In Latin America, the authoritarian forces learned from each toppling domino that a transition to an elected government did not necessarily usher in communism, populism, economic disaster, social chaos, destruction of the military, or the reduction of national security.⁴¹

THE CHILEAN CASE

To show how this global interpretation might be applied to a particular case, our future historian will impose this scheme on the Chilean experience. International factors will be highlighted, maybe even exaggerated.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the authoritarian regime of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte looked invincible. He enjoyed: a stable and growing economy; a new authoritarian constitution supposedly approved by two-thirds of the voters in the 1980 plebiscite; new institutions and regulations to continue his domination until 1990 and perhaps on to 1997 and beyond; social tranquility maintained by repression and terror for the working class and satisfaction for the middle and upper strata; solid support from the armed forces, the business class, and many segments of the middle sectors; an oppressed, divided, demoralized, and impotent opposition; neighbors with very similar dictatorships; and rightwing governments in Washington and London who sympathized with authoritarian regimes which opposed communism and embraced neoliberal capitalism. In 1981, hardly anyone would have predicted

⁴¹ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 3-4. Larry Diamond and Juan J. Linz, "Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 47-48. Huntington, 100-106. Di Palma, *To Craft*, 14-26.

a takeover by his opponents by the end of the decade. What changed to bring about the defeat of Pinochet?

Imported from the United States, the neoliberal economic model strengthened the capitalists and weakened the working class and unions. Market-oriented reforms undercut the classic base of the left. Therefore, the entrepreneurs and the armed forces became less fearful of democracy by the late eighties.⁴²

Although the formal transition to democracy began in 1988, the informal and invisible transition started six years earlier. Pinochet's domination was shaken first by the economic crisis of 1981-82, largely caused by the U.S. recession. This disaster of the Chicago model ignited social protests from 1983 to 1985. In turn, those street demonstrations motivated the democratic political parties to reemerge with new leaders, ideologies, and strategies.⁴³

Gaining traction in 1985, the resurgence of the Chilean economy was fueled by three international factors: falling prices for petroleum, rising prices for copper, and declining interest rates. Following the catastrophe during 1981-84, economic recuperation gradually stimulated a consensus on the neoliberal economic model in Chile, and in most of the countries of the hemisphere. The international popularity of economic and political liberalism fostered a similar understanding between the right-wing government and the center-left opposition in Chile, although the government was more dedicated to the liberal model of economics and the opposition to the liberal model of politics. This confluence paved the way for a transition to democracy without severe conflicts over the economic system. Although the opposition's Concertation for Democracy lambasted the inequitable distribution of income, it wanted to avoid populism after the calamitous experiments in Peru, Argentina, and Brazil.⁴⁴

In part, the opposition parties changed their programs and practices as a result of lessons

⁴² Guillermo Campero, "Entrepreneurs under the Military Regime," in Drake and Jaksic, 128-160. Alan Angell, "Unions and Workers in Chile during the 1980s," in Drake and Jaksic, 188-210.

⁴³ Manuel Antonio Garretón, "The Political Evolution of the Chilean Military Regime," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 95-122. Barbara Stallings, "Political Economy of Democratic Transition: Chile in the 1980s," in Stallings and Kaufman, 181-200. Drake and Jaksic.

⁴⁴ Eduardo Silva, "The Political Economy of Chile's Regime Transition: From Radical to 'Pragmatic' Neoliberal Policies," in Drake and Jaksic, 98-127.

learned overseas, especially by exiles. From other transitions, they perceived the necessity of multiparty cooperation. From the examples of the Philippines, Uruguay, and Brazil, they adopted the approach of defeating the dictator through his own system.

With the support of foreign foundations, Chilean intellectuals survived and developed fresh ideas and concepts, partly through interchange with foreign scholars. Exceptionally important was the conversion of Socialist intellectuals and politicians to create a party less revolutionary and more democratic; this transformation derived from their bitter experience of failure and exile, from dialogue with political thinkers in other countries, from the example of moderate socialist parties in Europe, from the reforms of Gorbachev, and from their own redefinition of socialism and democracy. The participation of Chilean intellectuals in the country's democratic parties, in the campaign against Pinochet, and in the government of Patricio Aylwin contributed mightily to redemocratization.⁴⁵

At the same time, many of these changes in Chile's political parties were supported by the United States, Europe, foreign foundations, the Catholic Church, international party organizations, and democratic neighbors. Under Pinochet, domestic questions acquired international dimensions, especially issues concerning human rights, democracy, and the economic model. The Chilean democratic forces tapped into a global network of activists in favor of democracy and human rights. Meanwhile, almost no foreign group expressed its solidarity with the authoritarian camp.⁴⁶

From 1984 on, the U.S. campaign in favor of democracy in Chile formed part of Washington's revived pro-democratic foreign policy, its desire to avert a Nicaraguan-style revolution in Chile, and its response to the resurrection of the democratic movement in Chile. Although never intense, U.S. pressure grew steadily as the 1988 plebiscite approached. North American unions backed the anti-Pinochet efforts of Chilean unions. From the United States, the National Foundation for Democracy and the National Democratic Institute encouraged the unity of the Concertation parties, the mobilization of the electorate, and the "No" campaign

⁴⁵ Manuel Antonio Garretón, "The Political Opposition and the Party System under the Military Regime," in Drake and Jaksic, 211-250. Puryear.

⁴⁶ Portales. Heraldó Muñoz, *Las relaciones exteriores del gobierno militar chileno* (Santiago: Las Ediciones del Ornitorrinco, 1986).

against Pinochet's continuation in the plebiscite. Particularly notable was U.S. action on the eve of the voting, when the State Department denounced any intention by the dictatorship to cancel or annul the election. The arrival of international delegations to observe the referendum also helped the democratic coalition.⁴⁷

The crumbling of the Soviet and Eastern European regimes had an important impact in Chile because of the strength of its Marxist parties and of the anticommunism of the Pinochet regime. As a result, the Communist Party of Chile lost significance, Pinochet's attempt to resuscitate the electorate's fear of Marxism did not bear fruit, the United States lost its dread of the Chilean left, and a firm alliance was forged between the Socialists and the Christian Democrats. Following the transition from Pinochet, the enormous changes in Russia and Eastern Europe contributed even more to the consolidation of Chilean democracy.

The climax of redemocratization in Chile was the 1988 plebiscite to prolong or terminate Pinochet's rule. The expansion of the concept that human rights and democracy were transnational questions could be seen in the evolution of Pinochet's plebiscites. In the controlled elections of 1978 and 1980, Pinochet could denounce and exclude foreign critics as an insulting intrusion in domestic affairs. In 1988, it was futile to invoke nationalism to prohibit the arrival of foreign observers to verify the cleanliness of the plebiscite.

The honesty of the plebiscite was also protected by the Roman Catholic Church and the Concertation. The leaders of the opposition deployed fax machines, computers, and other tactics practiced abroad to monitor crucial elections. Aided by a publicity and polling campaign planned partly with a U.S. firm, the democrats won the battle of public opinion, even among women voters, on whose traditional conservatism Pinochet had counted. The "No" triumphed by 55% to 43%. After an equal Concertation victory in the 1989 presidential and congressional elections, President Patricio Aylwin installed the revived democracy in 1990.⁴⁸

Was this victory by the Chilean opposition possible without the international changes

⁴⁷ Paul W. Drake and Arturo Valenzuela, "The Chilean Plebiscite: A First Step Toward Redemocratization," *LASA Forum* 19:4 (Winter, 1989), 18-36. Buchanan, 306-307. Fossedal, 72-77. Muravchik, *Exporting*, 209-210. Portales.

⁴⁸ Sigmund, *The United States*.

from 1982 to 1990? Of course, but it might have been more difficult and less probable. It is impossible to know, but a different combination of international ingredients might have produced or facilitated a different outcome.

To imagine a counterfactual history, it is necessary to begin by eliminating the economic collapse and debt crisis of 1982. Instead of crashing, foreign financing and prosperity continued until 1990. Therefore, social protests never exploded, and the political parties remained dormant and divided. There was no international proliferation of cable television, personal computers, or fax machines.

Meanwhile, suppose there was no global wave of democratization. The Catholic Church never veered in a reformist direction, never criticized dictatorships, and never sheltered the democratic opposition. Protestantism did not flourish in Latin America. Imagine that the government of Carter did not promote human rights. In turn, the Reagan administration maintained cordial relations with authoritarian regimes. Western Europe continued its traditional indifference to domestic political squabbles in Latin America. International organizations softpedaled human rights and democracy. No worldwide campaign for women's rights took off. Foreign foundations and scholars withdrew from the inhospitable atmosphere in Latin America. U.S. unions remained captives of the Cold War and opposed leftist organizations south of the border. No free trade movement developed to integrate Latin America more completely with the hegemonic United States. Neither the Cold War nor the Soviet Union's grip of Eastern Europe came to an end.⁴⁹

In this alternative history, Pinochet reached the 1988 plebiscite with a decade of prosperity, with his neoliberal and anticommunist doctrines intact, and with the support of the United States, England, and Chile's dictatorial neighbors. With these advantages, he retained enthusiastic backing from the capitalists, the middle sectors, the rural population, the women, and the military. He tightly controlled the entire electoral process and prohibited foreign interference. Against an anachronistic, fragmented, brutalized, and depressed opposition, he easily won 7% more of the votes to obtain a majority in the plebiscite. As a result, Pinochet continued in power for at least eight more years.

⁴⁹ Sheahan "Economic," 346-347.

CONCLUSION

It may well be that this essay exaggerates the importance of international factors. Many times the key to political changes is the interaction between external and internal forces. The international conjuncture can offer opportunities, such as loans, market niches, or support for democracy, but there is no guarantee that a country will be able to take advantage of these openings. Every nation has to construct its own history, in relation with some structures, conditions, and tendencies beyond its control. Whatever the global currents in an historical epoch, democratization in a particular country will still depend ultimately on the intelligence and courage of its own political actors.⁵⁰

It is difficult to write an accurate history now from the perspective of the year 2040 because no one knows the conclusion of this democratic story. Although some of the factors presented in this article may facilitate democratic consolidation, it is very difficult to predict the duration of these regimes. Even in a favorable international framework, some democracies may be destroyed by domestic forces.⁵¹

If the central argument of this paper about the importance of the global or regional context has some validity, then the international climate in the future may do extensive damage to democratic regimes. The external environment can contain not only opportunities but also threats, risks, and perils, such as economic depressions, wars, and antidemocratic ideologies. In the past, some authoritarian governments have been able to resist democratic tides. The challenge now is to construct and consolidate democratic systems which can survive hostile international storms in the future.

⁵⁰ Whitehead, "Democracy."

⁵¹ Peter Hakim and Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Latin America's Fragile Democracies," in Diamond and Plattner, 293-306.