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A POLITICAL THEORY OF NATIONALISM AND ITS EXCESSES

Michael Mann

Michael Mann is Professor of Sociology and Associate Director at the Center for European and Russian Studies of the University of California, Los Angeles. He was Visiting Professor (1992-1993) at the *Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences* of the Juan March Institute in Madrid. This paper is a revised version of a seminar given at the Institute on March 22, 1994.

I here present a politically-driven history of nationalism and of its excesses, concentrating on its emergence and development in Europe. I argue that nations and nationalism have primarily developed in response to the development of the modern state. Though I will sometimes concede that this or that aspect of the nation had either economic or ideological causes, on the whole I shall reject the materialist and culturalist theories of nations and nationalism which tend to be dominant today, and revert to a more old-fashioned theory based primarily on political institutions. It is sometimes said such a theory cannot account for the passions nations have aroused (Calhoun 1993: 219). This is probably because most earlier political accounts tended to focus on the gradual "top-down" extension of state sovereignty

among the people. I will, on the contrary, stress the role of turbulent, passionate, popular political movements -- which later forced some "top-down" regimes themselves to become far more passionate and aggressive nationalists. We will see that moderate nationalism is a product of the drive toward democracy. Aggressive nationalism is a perverted form of that drive.

A nation is a community affirming a distinct ethnic identity, history and destiny, and claiming its own state. Nationalism is an ideology whereby a nation believes it possesses distinct claims to virtue -- claims which may be used to legitimate aggressive action against other nations. Like most writers, I adhere more to a "modernist" than to a "perennialist" or "primordialist" view of nations. They are not old. They arose only from the 18th century (one or two writers prefer the 17th century), first in Europe and America, then elsewhere (Kohn 1944, Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, Hroch 1985, Chatterjee 1986, Hobsbawm 1990, Calhoun 1993; the main "perennialist" dissidents are Armstrong 1982, and Smith 1986). Since in pre-modern times the culture and organization of dominant classes were largely insulated from the life of the masses, political units could rarely be defined by a common culture, as occurs in a nation (Mann 1986: 527-30; Gellner 1983: Chapter 1; Hall 1986; Crone 1989: Chapter 5). And everyone concurs that the ideology of nationalism is distinctively modern. So I concentrate on modern Europe, where nations first surfaced and dominated.

However, we must start a little earlier in time, with two "proto-national" phases before the full emergence of nations and nationalism: the *religious* and the *commercial\ statist* phases. The expansion of literacy was key to both, since this provided the necessary infrastructure through which culture might be more broadly shared. In the religious phase, beginning in the 16th century, Protestantism and the Counter-Reformation expanded literacy across the spread of each vernacular language and downward across middling classes. A single written vernacular spread out from the "home counties" at the expense of other dialects and languages, increasing a sense of shared cultural community. The Protestant Reformation involved a degree of popular religious mobilization against ruling classes and church hierarchies. The Counter-Reformation and the Protestant princes then sought to control this mobilization from above. Where different Churches organized different states or regions, their conflicts might then generate "proto-national" sentiments reaching the lower classes, as in the Wars of Religion. Yet these tendencies were limited since the Catholic and some Protestant Churches were transnational, and since

state, linguistic and Church boundaries only sometimes coincided. The state was not yet relevant enough to social life to stably form the focus of many persons' identities or ideologies.

In the second "commercial\statist" phase, begun in the late 17th century, commercial capitalism and military state modernization took over much of the expansion of literacy. In Britain and Holland commercial capitalism predominated, in Austria and Prussia the military state -- while France mixed both fairly equally. Business contracts, government records, army drill manuals, coffee house discussions and academies of notables and officials secularized and spread slightly downward literacy and culture. Social identities could be standarized across larger social spaces and to a limited extent across the classes. Since all states were now ruled by law, rudimentary notions of "civil citizenship" diffused across state territories. Yet since capitalism, upper class literacy and Churches all remained somewhat transnational, national identity remained limited. Anderson's (1983) much-touted "print capitalism" could as easily generate a transnational or a federal West as a community of nations. The nation still did not mobilize society though it was now technically possible for it to do so.

This centuries-long process could also slowly and steadily solidify local and regional communities. Interaction networks expanded as agriculture commercialized; local religious practices became more shared across the classes; customs, marriage patterns and cultural practices stabilized. Local-regional mobilization across the classes became more technically possible. By the late 17th century the local-regional community often seemed to mobilize entire "ways of life". Thus it might seem strong, deeply-rooted, honoured by time, a seemingly "ethnic" identity. Yet the outer limits of such communities remained imprecise, since the scope of the interaction networks generated by emerging standardized languages, economic markets, marriage markets, churches and cultural practices might all differ. Pre-modern ethnicity was also inherently local and concrete, rarely capable of uniting complete strangers -- the hallmark of the "imagined community" that is the modern nation (Anderson 1983).

The merging of these two "proto-national" elements -- the bounded but weakly-rooted state, and the vibrant but poorly demarcated local-regional ethnic community -- into fully-fledged and sometimes aggressive nations took place in the three phases I label *militarist*, *industrial* and *modernist*, lasting from the late 18th into the late 20th century. But different types of nation emerged. Firstly, nations differed in their sizes vis-a-vis existing states. British

and French nations were coterminous with existing states -- and so the nation proved *state-reinforcing*. Yet in the Austrian, Ottoman and Russian Empires nations proved smaller than state boundaries and they became *state-subverting*. There was also a temporary third size since across Germany and Italy the nation was at first bigger than any existing state. It developed a *state-creating* (or "pan-state") role -- though as one state (Prussia, Piedmont) succeeded in swallowing up the others, the nation then became state-reinforcing. Secondly, nations differed in their forms of popular mobilization, being mobilized "bottom-up", popularly and democratically, or "top-down", controlled from above by authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. Why did nations develop, but in these varied forms?.

Only a small part of the answer can be found in capitalism. True, the emergence of industrial capitalism expanded the interaction networks and the literacy of civil society, enabling identities to stabilize over larger social spaces. But there was little in the capitalism of this period to encourage a distinctively *national* civil society. Capitalist markets remained fairly transnational across the 18th and 19th centuries: smuggling exceeded the trade regulated by 18th century mercantilism; capital and labour moved increasingly freely across frontiers up to the 1870s; and industrialization spread faster across peripheral and frontier regions (the Low Countries, Bohemia, Catalonia, etc.) than in state cores. Early industrialization reduced state regulation of labour relations: increasingly labourers, artisans and merchant capitalists settled their relations with little recourse to national politics. It is true that from the 1870s state protectionism, subsidization and regulation began to grow, but industrial capitalism remained largely transnational in its organization and effects. We shall see that in the second, "industrial" phase economic development did have an impact on the nation, but largely indirectly, by bolstering up the state. The nation is not so intimately related to capitalism or industrialism as is often argued.

The key lies rather in the state. Pre- 18th century states had done little beside fighting and preparing for wars. Only where entwined with Churches did they penetrate much of social life. Yet under the pressure of the Military Revolution (from the 16th century), reinforced by persistent 18th century wars, their military activities began to significantly affect social life. Around 1700 European states still absorbed only around 5% of GNP in peacetime, 10% in

wartime.[1] By 1760 this had risen to the range 15-25%; by 1810, 25-35%. Virtually all the increases went on financing wars. By 1810 the armies were calling up about 5% of total population. These extraction rates are identical to those of World Wars I and II and to the highest rates in the world today, those of Israel and Iraq. No modern state (outside of the Soviet and Fascist blocs) has loomed larger than the states of the Napoleonic War period.

Such figures enable us to appreciate the scale of the 18th century transformation. From being fairly insignificant, states now loomed over the lives of their subjects, taxing and conscripting them, attempting to mobilize their enthusiasm for its goals. As state extraction increased, it became more regressive -- since the dominant classes were the money-lenders and could better resist increased taxes. This was class exploitation, made transparent at the level of the state. Thus subjects became aroused out of their historic political indifference into anger and violence against naked exploitation. They petitioned, demonstrated, rioted and sometimes rebelled -- showing as much emotion as any critic of political explanations could ask for -- in their demand for political citizenship for "the people" and "the nation[2]". After prolonged social struggles, such labels were usually restricted for much of the 19th century to bourgeois and petty bourgeois males drawn from dominant religious and ethnic groups, but later the peasantry, the working class, minorities -- and eventually women -- joined people and nation.

However, let me draw back from a single-factor explanation of the entire process. Local-regional ethnic communities also played their role in generating capacities for political mobilization: family and neighbourhood organization was prominent in many popular movements of the time. While in countries like Britain and France a more-or-less shared language and religion helped protest focus on the broader nation. But the clarity of focus on the nation as coterminous with the state cries out for a predominantly political explanation. Self-conscious nations emerged from the struggle for representative government, initially born of the pressures of state militarism. Whatever atrocities were later committed in the name of the

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[1] All figures on state finances and manpower, and all generalizations about state activities prior to 1914, are drawn from the research I have conducted on the history of five states -- Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Prussia/Germany and the United States -- reported in Mann 1993: Chapters 11-14.

[2] Some would argue that this process occurred rather earlier in England. Kohn (1944) and Greenfeld (1992) believe English conceptions of nation and nationalism arose in the 17th century, struggle against monarchical taxation (reinforced by a religious populism).

nation, its emergence lay with those democratic ideals of this period that we most value today.

The militarist phase also produced our two main nation sizes -- state-reinforcing and state-subverting -- as well as the third, temporary, state-creating nation. Britain (apart from Ireland) and France were examples of state-reinforcement, since the linguistic community was securely located in the state's territorial and class core and since the emerging political nation was virtually coterminous with state boundaries. Reformers and revolutionaries alike focussed on transforming the central state, to make it more representative. Their activities only served to strengthen the salience and centralization of that state. When they succeeded in making it more representative, it became a more unitary nation-state, its activities (principal among which remained warmaking) increasingly mobilizing national sentiments.

But Empires like the Austrian, the Ottoman and the Russian were essentially confederal, blending many languages, religions and provinces, most with autonomous political histories and organization. Fiscal and conscription pressures here produced very different outcomes. When Austrian taxes and borrowing arrangements proved insufficient for modern warfare (and the Habsburgs declared bankruptcy in 1811), higher exactions had to be negotiated with regional notables represented in provincial Diets and staffing provincial administrations. Thus reformers within the Habsburg domains sought less to transform the central state than to strengthen regional political autonomies against the central state. The drive here was toward what we would call federalism. "Patriotism" became associated more with the single province than with the whole Empire. Indeed in the 1780s Joseph II's administrative and fiscal rationalization had provoked the first self-styled "patriot" movements in Europe -- one in the most advanced province, the Austrian Netherlands, the other in a backward one, Hungary. Thus these "national" revolts cannot be traced to a certain level of industry or capitalism. Instead what the two shared was powerful provincial political organization, in the Netherlands among all propertied classes, in Hungary confined to the nobility. The Habsburgs -- or the Romanovs or the Ottomans -- *could* have dealt with dissent by establishing a federal form of representation -- the United States and Switzerland had pioneered such constitutions. But these dynasties were absolutist, opposed to representation. Thus, right up to the 20th century, only mixtures of two political alternatives were available to most ethnic minorities: centralized authoritarianism and

limited, centrally controlled regional autonomy -- a kind of pseudo-federalism.[3] Since regionalists deeply opposed the former, they increasingly sought to expand the latter, first into genuine federalism involving regional autonomies, then (when the Empires would not concede this) into state-subverting nationalism.

Again, this is not intended as a single-factor explanation. The core of these "province-nations" was usually reinforced by more than one among a distinctive language, a religion and a distinct economic market, all tending to cement and expand ethnic solidarities. Yet virtually everywhere nationalist movements focussed on existing political units, provinces with distinct assemblies or administrations centred on old political units. Gellner (1983: 45) has observed that there were vastly more languages and ethnic or cultural groups than there were nationalist movements. We cannot predict which few nations successfully emerged on the basis merely of "ethnicity". The presence or absence of regional administrations offers a much better predictor. This suggests a predominantly political explanation.

In Germany and Italy states were much smaller than proto-national identities. "Germany" existed as the mutually-intelligible dialects of educated people, as a paper-thin political federation (in which Austria was actually the leading player) and as a vague sense of the past. But it had over three hundred states plus 1500 minor principalities in 1789; 39 still survived in 1815. By a historical quirk most (including Prussia) had a quite secure fiscal basis: their dynasties owned larger private estates and\or had institutionalized stabler tax-collecting systems than had most other European states. Thus Germans were not goaded on as much by the military-fiscal-representation cycle to transform and so increase the salience of their states. The expansion of German literacy was thus more "apolitical", producing a Romantic Movement exploring language, emotions and the soul more than reason and politics. Schiller defined German "greatness" as "delving into the spiritual world." Schiller and Goethe wrote: "Forget, O Germans, your hopes of becoming a *nation*. Educate yourselves instead ... to be human beings." (Segeberg 1988: 152).

German attempts to grammaticize and codify their own language were also imitated across central Europe by Poles, Magyars, Czechs and other Slavs. But this had more political

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[3] Only the Magyars forcibly, and the Finns peacefully, obtained more from the dynasties.

consequences, encouraging state-subversion. For example, most Czechs spoke dialects of a mutually-intelligible language, giving them some sense of shared community. Yet few yet thought of this as a singular "national" identity: Czech was the language of the private household and local community, German of Habsburg capitalism and state. Those involved in the latter often classified themselves as "Germans", despite having Czech surnames (Cohen 1981). But to standardize Czech was to make it potentially available for the public realm as well, increasing its significance as a source of social identity. Philologists did not attack states, yet they encouraged community identities subtly subverting state boundaries.

The French Revolution and the ensuing wars escalated some of these tendencies. Fiscal and manpower needs forced limited reforms, inching states toward more universal "national" principles of administration, military service and representation. The scale of war mobilization - - 5% of total populations conscripted, perhaps half agricultural and manufacturing surpluses fed into the war machines - meant whole "peoples" were organized to fight each other. Negative national stereotypes of the enemy became more widely shared in Britain and France (Newman 1987; Colley 1986). And as initial French "liberation" turned into French imperialism, widespread revolts became legitimated by national stereotypes: Germans characterized themselves as open, upright and God-fearing, Spaniards described themselves as dignified, honourable and devout, and both styled the French as sly, frivolous and unreliable.

But who could the new patriots turn to? Local notables -- nobles and clerics mobilizing peasants -- could lead guerilla warfare in backward Spain and mountainous Switzerland and the Tyrol. Elsewhere big armies mobilized by large states were required to kick out the French. That meant submission to the Prussian or Austrian monarchies. The Prussian regime had been shocked by defeat at the hands of Bonaparte toward stuttering reforms, harnessing proto-national sentiments to absolutism. There developed the first significant "top-down" national identity, that of Prussia-Germany, harnessing national (and also Evangelical religious) sentiments to loyalty to a strong semi-authoritarian state. Between 1815 and the 1870s, as Prussia absorbed Germany, this top-down nationalism became more unitary (despite an ostensibly federal *Reich* constitution) and state-reinforcing.

The Habsburgs could not choose such a national solution, however top-down: they were dynasts ruling a confederal Empire. When somebody was recommended to the Emperor Francis

as a patriot for Austria, Francis replied "He may be a patriot for Austria, but the question is whether he is a patriot for me" (Kohn 1967: 162). Russian and Ottoman rulers confronted the same problem. Habsburg dynastic power was fully restored in 1815. But war-induced fiscal pressure continued to evoke regional-national autonomy movements. Through the next (and last) century of their rule the Habsburgs were assailed by nationalists asserting that a people, defined by ethnic-linguistic culture, but ruled by foreigners, should have its own state. These state-subverting nations triumphed, the Magyars in 1867, the rest in 1918. The triumphs of Ottoman provinces in Europe occurred through the same period; those of most Russian provinces had to occur twice, in 1918 and 1991.

Their emergence and triumph were not directly caused by the development of capitalism or industrialism (as Marxists and Gellner 1983 argue). Hroch (1985) gives the most careful account of nationalism in terms of economies and classes. He studied nationalist societies in eight state-subverting small nations across Europe. He found commercial and manufacturing groups under-represented in nationalist societies, urban professionals over-represented -- especially where markets were most developed. Yet if we look right across Europe we find greater variability. The Austrian Netherlands and northern Italy (not studied by him) were commercialized and urbanized at the time of their first patriotic ferment (so were the Czechs by the time ferment reached them). But Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Balkans hosted nationalist movements while they were still far more agrarian and backward. There was probably a threshold level of market-aided literacy and communication below which patriots could not credibly organize -- as Hroch concludes. But above that threshold there was diversity. Indeed Hroch's "bourgeois" nationalist societies were not always the most significant actors. In the 1848 revolution most leaders of provincial "national" movements were nobles seeking representation only for themselves (Sked 1989: 41-88). State-subverting nationalism later also acquired a peasant base. What common class motivation could lead such disparate movements to proclaim themselves nationalists (asks Sugar 1969)? Nationalists said little about classes or capitalism or industrialism. Why, then, should we believe them reducible to these forces?

My explanation centres rather on the political economy of the state: its growing fiscal and manpower costs and its office-holding benefits. As elsewhere, discontent concerned taxation, conscription and rights to hold public office. But here it was expressed territorially, by

region. British discontent might produce class riots which local gentry and yeomanry could handle. But territorially-based discontent (which the British experienced only in Ireland) led to revolts by provincial notables, wielding militias, sometimes regular troops, with initial sympathy from lower-level clerics, mobilizing intense local-regional ethnic sentiments. Linguistic issues increasingly arose: what should be the language of the public sphere, especially of government, and what languages should be taught in schools? As Gellner (1983) argues, literacy was cultural capital, bringing rewards through employment in army, civil administration, law courts and capitalist economy. In the Austrian lands, as capitalism and states expanded, non-German speakers were blocked from administration and law courts -- or so the revolutionaries of 1848 claimed (Sked 1989:41-88). Yet linguistic nationalism was not just an instrumental demand. As clerics and philologists standardized local vernaculars, these became the cement of public as well as private interaction networks, reproduced in elementary schools, churches and market exchanges. Language gradually became coterminous with the sense of a regional cross-class ethnicity. Politics concerned identities as well as interests, deepening the emotions they could mobilize.

I have argued so far that nations essentially originated as movements for democracy. Reformers were confronted by a choice: to democratize a central state, or to reduce the powers of a central state and seek federal government based on more democratic regional governments. Since none of the three major Empires would accept genuine federalism, Europe saw the development only of state-reinforcing and state-subverting nationalism. Across the whole of Europe federal representative government, democratically regulating the relations between regions, could not be established. We still live with the consequences of that non-event.

As is often observed (for example by Mommsen 1990), nationalism was not yet very aggressive. Nonetheless, harbingers had already appeared. It was those most concerned to establish "rule by the people" who most severely repressed their domestic foes once in power. They legitimated this in a particular way. French Revolutionaries had legitimated the Terror by denying the royal family, aristocrats and (non-juring) clerics membership in the nation, which they said was "one and indivisible". Thus there was no place in the nation for particularism or conflict: political disputes were to be resolved not by compromise, but by exclusion and force. Terror was purity, compromise was corruption, proclaimed Saint Just. His American

counterparts killed "Loyalists" (to the British) precisely because they were not "Patriots". Excluding certain groups from the nation later proved to be one of nationalism's two killing-fields. Yet the numbers killed here were small, and the goals were ostensibly liberal. The French Revolutionaries also invaded the rest of Europe in the name of *la grande nation*. Inter-*national* wars later proved nationalism's second killing-field. Yet the French believed they were liberating, not subordinating, nations. When Bonaparte turned this into imperialism, he played down the nationalism. Moreover, during this period few reformers were democrats. By the "people" or "nation" they usually meant only male property-owners. Though citizenship was extended, most reformers could rely broadly on traditional methods of controlling the masses, without resorting to terror or to chiliastic ideologies. Most nations comprised respectable men, using fairly moderate methods.

From the mid-19th century to World War I, in the *industrial* phase, states shifted gear in two ways, largely under the pressures of industrial capitalism. First, the notion of popular sovereignty took fire among subordinate classes mobilized by the spread of industry, commerce and commercialized agriculture. By 1914, west of Russia, the suffrage was widely diffused among middle class males and it was widely accepted that full male (and probably female) suffrage would eventually come. The more reactionary ruling classes had adapted democratic arguments: the energies of the masses could be mobilized by themselves in a "top-down", semi-authoritarian national state, of which the German *Kaiserreich* was the prototype. This also increased their attachment to centralization, denying genuinely federal forms of representation. Nationalism -- having arisen "on the left" -- moved rightward.

Second, state functions rapidly expanded. Though military functions remained important, there were few wars before 1914 and states were for the first time performing major civilian functions. These centred on communications systems needed by an industrial society -- canals, roads, post offices, railways, telegraph, and, most significantly, schools. By the 1880s expenditures on these were rivalling military expenses; by the 1900s they exceeded them. These infrastructures enhanced the density of social interaction -- but being largely confined within the state's territories they subtly "naturalized" social life. During the 20th century, welfare and fiscal policies redistributed resources between regions, age-groups and classes, reducing inequalities and further solidifying the nation. Perhaps the most impressive evidence comes from Watkins'

(1991) analysis of fertility, illegitimacy and marriage age rates. She shows that from the 1870s right through to the 1960s regional variations in these rates declined, as each nation-state acquired a distinctive, homogenous, national demographic profile. Without anyone intending it, and even in the intimate sexual sphere, social behaviour had been "naturalized". Both popular sovereignty and state activities had furthered the nation as an experienced community, linking the intensive and emotional organizations of family, neighbourhood and ethnicity with more extensive and instrumental power organizations.

Yet the expanding scope of state activities still left around 40% of budgets going on war and preparation for war. Military virtues were still a valued part of masculine culture; women were valued as the bearers and nurturers of future warriors. Now that these states were becoming more representative and more national, it is often asserted that in the industrial phase the whole population began to identify their interests and their sense of honour with those of their state against other nation-states, endorsing aggressive nationalism. A rival class theory looks to see exactly who was represented in these states. It concludes that full political citizens -- primarily the middle class -- were the bearers of aggressive nationalism in alliance with old regimes.

Yet to conceive of oneself as a member of a national community does not necessarily mean supporting aggression against other nations. Even though nation began to be associated in this period with "race", racism was predominantly used to justify *European*, not national, imperialism (against "non-whites" elsewhere in the globe). Only some versions of nationalism showed aggression toward other Europeans. In Britain the old radical "Protestant" conception of the popular nation, now more secular and still quite pacific, contested against conservative imperialist conceptions, while some Liberals advocated a softer imperialism. French Republicans, Monarchists and Bonapartists offered rival conceptions of the meaning of "France", some aggressive, others quite pacific. Classes and minorities who experienced the sharp end of domestic militarism tended to oppose aggressive nationalism. But then so did much of the enfranchised middle class -- and the much-maligned petty bourgeoisie -- since few wanted war or higher taxes or had reason to hate foreigners. True, aggressive nationalism had broadened its appeal, but this was predominantly in a rather specific and "statist" way. Hundreds of thousands of administrators, teachers and public sector workers now depended for

their livelihood on the state; hundreds of thousands of young middle class men passed through its institutions of higher education; while millions of young men of all classes were disciplined by a military cadre into the peculiar morale, coercive yet emotionally attached, that is the hallmark of the modern mass army. These three bodies of men, and their families -- not broader classes or communities -- provided most of the fervent nationalists -- as studies of pre-war pressure groups reveal (summarized in Mann 1993: Chapter 16). They were "super-loyalists" or "nation-statists", with an exaggerated loyalty to what they conceived to be the ideals of their nation-state. These state ideals varied. British officials might be attached to liberal ideals, French to Republican ones, Spanish and Italian ones to rather varied ideals (since their regimes were rather mixed ones). German pressure groups, centred on state officials, proclaimed an authoritarian and increasingly racist nationalism whose violent rhetoric and agitational style was moving beyond control by the old regime (Eley 1980). But since all states were militarist, their servants were generally mobilizable at least to an ostensibly "defensive" militarism. This fervent "statist" form of nationalism was to become highly significant in the 20th century.

Nationalism came to possess a further feature in the more reactionary states west of Russia, especially in the German Empire, in Spain and in the Germanic and Magyar cores of the Habsburg domains. As confrontation between their ruling classes and the Marxian (or anarchist) proletariat grew, it took on "national" hues. Since the proletariat organized by socialists and anarchists came to see itself as transnational, the ruling class associated itself more with the nation -- as mobilized in "top-down" fashion by an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian state. Thus the dominant classes began to define the proletariat as disloyal to the nation. The German term, *Reichsfeinde*, "enemies of the Reich", serves to convey the rather statist flavour of this condemnation. The *Reichsfeinde* were not just the socialists, but also Poles, Danes and other nationalities inside the Reich, as well as more occasionally Catholics and Jews. In contrast, the nationalists began to think of themselves -- as in the title of Chickering's excellent (1984) book -- as "We Men Who Feel Most German". "Integral" nationalists in Spain, Portugal and France also began to claim that leftists and regional-nationalists (like Catalan or Basque autonomists) were traitors to the nation-state. Only they themselves represented the true, integral nation. It was a disturbing revival of the earlier revolutionary tendency to exclude whole categories of person from full membership in the nation. After World War I it began to legitimate terror.

Though the rise in nationalism was a cause of World War I, it was not one of the most important ones. Elsewhere I have argued that more decisive were traditional geopolitics, the almost casual militarism of some old regimes and the chaotic decision-making structures of the states -- to which nationalist agitation, however, did make a contribution (Mann 1993: Chapter 21). The War produced an immediate explosion in voiced nationalist sentiments. But it is easy to exaggerate this. A shallow "spectator sport militarism" was here baptized as many millions of men and women cheered on "their boys", sang patriotic songs and handed out white feathers -- at no real cost to themselves. A few million young men were sufficiently caught up by an early patriotic frenzy to sign on in moods varying from enthusiasm to resigned duty to fear of social ostracism. But this produced insufficient recruits. Conscription became necessary.

Frontline moods also differed considerably. By 1917 there remained a small core of enthusiastic "nation-statist" soldiers for whom the later myth of *Fronterlebnis* may have been reality, a smaller core of dissidents-becoming-revolutionaries (their proportions were reversed in the Russian armies) and a vast majority desperately tired of war, fearful of death but obeying orders as the safest way of keeping their heads down. World War I also saw relatively few excesses in the name of the nation. Its horror derived more from weaponry and tactics than from atrocities; while the atrocities committed were mostly the traditional ones of rape, pillage and murder of civilians. Enemy combatants were treated quite well. Up to 1918 nationalism remained surprisingly mild.

My third, *modernist* phase begins with the peace settlements of 1917-19. They redrew the map fairly authoritatively. Though there were discontented "revisionist" states -- the Soviet Union (at first), Germany and Hungary, and to a lesser extent Italy and Bulgaria -- boundaries were clear and internationally guaranteed. There were border clashes between government forces and/or fervent minority nationalist paramilitaries around German frontiers, between Poland and the Soviet Union and around Trieste, but these died away (though they left important influences on domestic politics). German and Italian nationalist aggression was to revive in the 1930s, but the 1920s saw war-weariness and low profile diplomacy.

Yet domestically it was a different story. The war and the peace settlements destroyed most of the authoritarian and semi-authoritarian old regimes of Europe, and with them went the centrepiece of institutionalized control over the masses. Churches, armies, lesser monarchies

and notable conservative parties remained, but all were under pressure to compromise with the lower classes through parliamentarianism, institutionalized labour relations and land reform. The dislocations even to nominally victorious regimes like those of Italy or Romania were also severe, since lower class expectations had been aroused by wartime promises of a better society. Neutral Iberian regimes were weakened by other forces (though Spanish military disasters also played a role).

Across the whole of central, eastern and southern Europe, not a single parliamentary regime was already stably institutionalized -- unlike almost the whole of northwest Europe. Either parliamentary regimes had not previously existed, or they had relied upon state executive interventions at the top and patron-client party corruption at the bottom. This political system was now in crisis since postwar constitutions reduced state executive powers and as socialist and populist Christian parties threatened patron-client parties from below. Under the strain conservatism split, into parliamentarianism and an authoritarian radical right. In their different ways each represented a coming to terms with popular sovereignty. Conservative parliamentarians accepted party democracy; the radical right far surpassed the old regimes in "top-down" political mobilization, building up mass street-fighting parties, often founded upon the immediate postwar paramilitaries. The radical right stood for a kind of perverted democracy, its legitimacy and mobilization based essentially on "the nation", yet advocating anti-democratic constitutions. Throughout the entire centre, south and east (except for Czechoslovakia), the competition between the two rightisms had a single result: authoritarianism triumphed, either as parliamentary conservatives themselves launched coups, or as they were swept aside by quasi-fascist radical rightists. By 1938 modern authoritarianism was entrenched across two-thirds of the continent.

The victorious authoritarian rightists had two main bases of support. One was class. Since they promised to suppress working class movements, in most countries the higher the social class, the more support they got. Yet the relationship was not strong and contemporary research stresses the extent to which fascists in particular managed to recruit among *all* social classes, if with two exceptions: though they recruited many workers, they could rarely penetrate the organized working class core (though they did in Hungary and Romania) and certain religions or minorities were highly resistant (there were not many Catholics who were Nazis,

nor Basques or Catalans who were Nationalists or Francoites). Authoritarian rightists claimed indeed to be *national* movements, and this was substantially true.

But, second, this nation had a more limited core: extreme "nation-statists" with a close relationship with the state. Over-represented were adherents (and sometimes priests) of state religions,[4] soldiers or veterans, state civilian employees (including public sector manual workers), and students, professors and graduates of state higher educational establishments.[5] Adding these together normally gives us a majority of leaders and militants and a sizeable minority of all members. There were also complex regional patterns of support often revolving around a "national" axis: if a region might claim to embody the "core" of the nation-state, or if it felt the need for strong defence by the state, then it provided more support for authoritarian rightism -- like Old Castille, certain rural regions of Romania or German border regions.

Thus authoritarian rightism, including fascism, was essentially an aggressive, statist and class-biased form of nationalism. Authoritarian rightist movements in *every* country now argued that socialists and anarchists were traitors to the nation since they favoured internationalism and fomented class conflict, thus weakening the nation. They generally charged liberals and ethnic and regional minorities less strongly with the same treason. Such traitors made democracy unworkable, they claimed. The people must rule, but as a "purer nation", and by more "organic", "integral" means than a corrupt, chaotic democracy of competing parties. Only the Nazis went as far as mass slaughter of those they claimed could not be assimilated to the nation -- Jews, Slavs, gypsies and the mentally defective (though their wartime collaborators in several countries became equal partners in the slaughter).[6] But apart from its racism Germany was not unusual. With a few exceptions (Pilsudki in Poland, Primo de Rivera in Spain, Pats in Estonia,

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[4] Though Catholic Churches usually resisted fascism, they were usually supportive of other forms of authoritarian rightism.

[5] I am at present assembling all the available data on who supported authoritarian rightism in the countries of interwar Europe. There is no up-to-date published survey of all the evidence, though Linz (1976) commented very shrewdly on data then available to him, and various articles in Mühlberger (1987) and Larsen et al (1980) are good on individual countries.

[6] I here include only the relatively few collaborators and allies who were also fervent racists -- a very large number of Austrians, minority factions among Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, Croatians, Ukrainians and in the Baltic states, and very small numbers elsewhere. The peculiarity of Nazi racism was that it killed Europeans. The reasons for this lie outside my scope here (in any case it is not easy to explain).

Metaxas in Greece) authoritarian rightist regimes legitimized the suppression and selective killing of their domestic opponents by denying them membership in the nation. The left had their own popular exclusionary slogans. These were more varied, since leftists also mobilized class exclusions -- Stalin, for example, proclaimed his enemies to be class traitors. Yet several leftist movements, especially in southern Europe, claimed to mobilize "the people" against the rightist "nationalists". In the Spanish Civil War the Republicans deployed three main discourses -- Republican constitutionality, the transnational proletariat and revolution, and "the people" or "the popular forces". Their enemies, especially landowners and priests, might be shot because they were either rebels or not in the working class or not of the people. But the other side not only claimed to mobilize "the nation" -- they actually defined themselves, and were usually described by others, as "the Nationalists"; and their various factions were labelled as "Nationalcatholic", "Nationalsyndicalist" etc. They killed large numbers of Republicans, both during and after the war, in the name of "Spain" against "anti-Spain" (Aguilar 1993; Juliá 1990). In this period nationalism found its main domestic killers -- mostly authoritarian rightists. Apart from Nazi racists, they rarely argued that "ethnicity" defined the nation. Opposed class and political movements, religious deviants and troublesome regionalists were "foreign", outside the nation. But anyone could repent and join the nation -- even the Nazis believed socialists and liberals could repent. Voluntary actions, not birth, defined membership for these highly aggressive nationalists. Politics, not ethnicity, generated most of the extraordinary emotional intensity, the barbarity conducted in the name of morality, of the modernist period -- while the great exception, the Holocaust, embodied more racial than national ethnicity.

In foreign fields rightist regimes behaved more variably. Almost all developed ideologies of national superiority over foreigners -- from Aryan supremacy to "Hungarism" to *Hispanidad*. But most showed geopolitical caution. Not Germany or Italy, of course. But most Eastern European regimes went into World War II for what they believed was pragmatism (Hitler and Mussolini would win, so join the winning side). Franco and Salazar stayed out altogether, though Franco almost went in. And when they went in, most nations' soldiers did not commit all that many atrocities.

There were two main types of exception. First, Germans and Japanese, both with a highly racial notion of the nation, committed massive atrocities. The Germans did not only

perpetrate the Holocaust against Jews. The German army on the Eastern Front let die 47% of its Russian POWS, whom it considered *Untermenschen*. But only 3% of its Anglo-American prisoners perished, since its racism accorded them membership in the Aryan race, if not in its national core (Bartov 1985). Again, the worst slaughter must be explained more in terms of racism than nationalism. But the second exception returns us to politically-driven nationalism. Across Eastern Europe there were atrocities between the remaining imperial states and their minorities denied political representation -- Russians versus Poles and Ukrainians, Serbs versus Croats, some Baltic peoples versus Jews (as supposed agents of Russian Bolshevism). In contrast nationalist sentiments were far milder further west. In the democracies, neither state-reinforcing nor state-subverting nationalism committed more than a handful of atrocities across the period of World War II. Popular sovereignty was here achieved. Thus nationalism and ethnicity (outside of racism used against persons of non-European origin) were fairly harmless.

The victors took more care over the peace settlement than their predecessors had in 1918 (Maier 1981). The Soviet Union and the Western allies not only settled borders and ringed them with armies, they also institutionalized state socialist and democratic regimes. Democracy returned later to Greece, Portugal and Spain. All the new democracies worked well enough to defuse aggressive nationalism, whether state-reinforcing or state-subverting. In Spain especial care was taken over the regional question. Only those treated the worst under the Franco regime, the Basques, have retained much terrorism, and even that has steadily diminished as democratic federalism has advanced.

The Soviet bloc was not democratic. Its regional-nations, dispossessed by a mixture of authoritarianism and pseudo-federalism, had little immediate hope of rising up again. For forty years they merely kept their heads down. This also happened under the somewhat more liberal Tito regime in Yugoslavia. But, as before, state-subverting nationalisms became violent where imperial regimes began to grow vulnerable yet still would not grant representation. When those regimes collapsed (from within in the Soviet case -- not from the efforts of regional nationalists), a region clearly belonging with another established nation-state -- like East Germany -- could simply join it. Similarly, an oppressed historical nation-state -- like Poland -- could simply declare independence. Greater problems arose where an ethnic group, usually with past regional administrative institutions but without clear ethnic boundaries or an actual historic

state, was inserted amid others, perhaps similarly placed.

A genuinely "federal" association of ethnicities was clearly the best solution. Yet this was largely discredited by virtue of the pseudo-federalism of the exploiting imperial predecessor. Federalism had not been considered a feasible solution in 1918 for this reason (except, highly imperfectly, in Yugoslavia), and it has also collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s. On both occasions groups retreated down to the ethnic level where they believed the normative solidarities of ethnicity -- language, religion and customs -- might generate the political trust necessary for democracy. Each locally dominant "people" thus sought to found its own representative state. Yet it was also expected to respect minorities, who might be the "people" of the neighbouring state. Emergent peoples have had no prior democratic institutions, centralized or inter-regional, available for either task. They are proving brittle, tempted into grounding their representative institutions "organically" (and so often non-democratically) on the core ethnic people, excluding minorities from full membership of the nation. This inflames neighbouring states representing those minorities. Territorial incursions, mass migrations and "ethnic cleansing" may result. The downward spiral may only be halted not by contractual federalism among the peoples but by inter-governmental agreements. These will probably produce mutual guarantees of minority rights -- less ideal than genuine inter-regional federal democracy. But this may stem the slaughter.

In contrast Western states which successfully institutionalized democracy, especially inter-regional, federal democracy, have experienced little nationalist violence even when beset by deeply-rooted inter-ethnic disputes. Switzerland is quite stable. Belgium, Canada and even Spain may indeed break-up -- but if so, with very few fatalities. Northern Ireland may represent the worst scenario in the democratic world: a struggle between rival ethnic communities in a democracy which is yet highly centralized, with no effective federal institutions. The unitary Westminster and local government system has not been able to adequately represent the minority Catholic community, in an environment where the intimate lives of both communities remained highly segregated. Thus, in the worst years, just after the British resolve to hold onto the province clearly wavered, hundreds have died. But this is far fewer than where centralization has been buttressed by authoritarianism. Neither Yugoslavia nor the Soviet Union institutionalized either democracy or genuine federalism, yet they contained rival ethnic

communities, many with their own historical political institutions. Massive state-subverting ethnic violence is thus resulting: a product of centralized authoritarian regimes in decline. This was so in the 19th century. It remains true today.

My politically-driven account of nations and nationalism has argued that both their milder and their aggressive aspects originated and developed in response to the drive for democracy. An ability to gradually institutionalize representative institutions over a period of time developed rather mild nationalism, able to rally citizens behind their regimes at times of war, but rarely to commit nationalist atrocities. Failure to institutionalize democracy generated exclusionist nationalism, able to commit atrocities against persons defined as being outside the nation who might live inside or outside the national boundaries. These definitions of the nation were fundamentally political rather than ethnic, except where racism (with rather different and more particular sources) was invoked. State-subverting nationalism seems to have had a more ethnic base, yet it developed in drives for regional representation and was defused toward mildness by inter-regional, federal democracy. Yet complete repression of such drives by an authoritarian regime which then fails may lead to a downward spiral of nationalist aggression, involving territorial displacement and ethnic cleansing. Mild nationalism -- whether state reinforcing or state-subverting -- is democracy achieved, aggressive nationalism is democracy perverted. The solution is, therefore, to achieve democracy -- especially federal, inter-regional democracy. Unfortunately, this is easier said than achieved.

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