

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NATIONAL REVIVALS AND VIOLENCE

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Nationalist* movements seeking to make commensurate the boundaries of state and nation have in many cases employed or induced violence. Nazi Germany, Somalia, Serbia, Ireland, Algeria, Vietnam, and Basque Country are gruesome examples. Yet comparable movements, similar in goals and apparently similar in context, have been solved by relatively peaceful means. Quebec, Andhra Pradesh, Ghana, Flanders, Italy and Catalonia are shining exemplars. This paper will employ the tools of game theory and the comparative method in political science (Lijphart, 1971; Skocpol and Somers, 1980; Collier, 1991) to address the question: why are some nationalist movements peaceful in strategy and outcome while others create carnage? The answer is not to be found in the great forces of history, having to do with capitalism, state formation and inequality. Rather, the conditions that lead to violence require a micro foundation based upon social organization in rural and small-town life, tipping phenomena in political recruitment, and spiraling effects of fortuitous events.

Predominant approaches to the study of nationalism and violence have relied upon the identification of broad social processes that help to place nationalism in deep historical context (Kohn, 1944). These approaches have pointed to the fact that nationalism is a modern social formation that emerged in the wake of industrial capitalism and concomitant modernization (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990). Capitalism in seventeenth century Europe unleashed productive energies in a number of core zones, and these zones drew migrants from relatively depressed localities. This process, called "social mobilization" (Deutsch, 1954) unhooked people from loyalties to tribe, village, and region. While before capitalism, each locality had a distinct dialect and other cultural forms, with modernization the cultures of the people who inhabited the core capitalist zones began to dominate, and set common standards across wide regions.

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States in this period were multinational, and boundaries were set by dynastic marriages, wars, and geographic convenience. The cultures of the populations inside those boundaries were of little relevance to leaders or subjects. But Capitalism, the Enlightenment, and the Protestant Reformation all brought notions of individual citizenship to the consciousness of the newly powerful social classes (Bendix, 1978). Kings were pressured to justify their domination by acting in the interest of their "people". Symbols that pointed to the common culture of the people, associated with the cultures of core economic zones, became powerful tools of legitimation, in large part because they connected the modern (a powerful state) with the neo-traditional (symbols of a national language, ancestry, and territory). In this way "nations" were "invented" (Hobsbawm, 1990: 10) or "imagined" (Anderson, 1983).

English, French and Spanish kings all sought to emphasize a common "national" culture to help bring coherence and efficiency to state rule. The full power of nationalist ideas, brilliantly demonstrated by Napoleon's ability to conscript soldiers who were committed to the "national" cause, led rulers elsewhere in the world to replicate French success by emphasizing national symbols to legitimate state domination. Groups of people who shared a common culture but lacked a state were similarly impressed, and sought states for their nations. The enormous success of the early nationalist projects and the universally-available symbolic material (a mythic history, a common language, an attachment to a territory) made for easy replication of the project all over the world. This is what Anderson (1983) means when he writes of the "modular" quality of nationalism. Due to this quality and to the deeply felt needs of people for a sense of community in the anomic modern world, nationalist ideologies have remained dominant ideological forces up through the current century (Smith, 1979).

These broad outlines of nationalism have been astutely drawn in macro sociology. But the tale of violence is a more difficult one to relate. Historical sociologists are well aware that nationalism grew in England in a relatively benign fashion, but in Germany it was associated with hatred of minorities, genocide and imperialist war. Many attempts have been made to

stipulate the connections between types of nationalism and likelihood of violence, for example by distinguishing the examples of states creating nations (France, England) from nations creating states (Italy, Germany). Other typologies (e.g. Gellner, 1983) identified additional patterns of nationalist development, but in none of these works is there a clear empirical or theoretical line drawn between nationalism on the one hand, and violent outcomes on the other.

The most compelling work differentiating types of nationalism (Hayes, 1931; Haas, 1986) does indeed point to special conditions that turn nationalism into an "integral" or exclusionary form, and one prone to violence. Integral nationalism is attributed to a number of factors, generally summed up by the term "modernization breakdowns". Under conditions of capitalist development, if a cultural minority gets extremely rich as compared to the majority group, leaders of the majority group can use the symbols of nationalism to punish or to extort from the successful group, and this has a violent element to it. Or if a national state finds itself economically weak compared to a neighboring state, its leaders could use symbols of nationalism to mobilize the population toward extraordinary efforts at "catch-up". This may ultimately lead to military action in which the backward state seeks to get control over valuable resources through imperialist means; alternatively it could lead to the persecution of minorities within the state's boundaries who are held responsible for the failure to develop. Nationalist violence (in the form of internal "ethnic wars") in the postcolonial states of Africa and Asia is often attributed to the fact that these colonial peoples suffered the uprooting that went with capitalism but little of the economic benefits. This was the ultimate breakdown in modernization.

In general, macro social theorists argue that capitalism induces vast social change and a powerful ideology of legitimation (i.e. nationalism). Those who are losers in the processes of change will employ the powerful ideology in a violent way to confront the winners. Psychological theories are often employed here (Gurr, 1970; Azziz, in this volume) to elucidate the reasons why people who are "relatively deprived" or who face "status inferiority" can be induced to violent action.

The Comparative Method

The comparative method employed in this paper helps to undermine the cogency of formulations that find the taproots of nationalist violence in capitalism, modernization breakdowns, postcolonialism, poverty, relative deprivation or status inferiority. It does so by systematically seeking variation in outcomes (what we call "the dependent variable") when the putative cause (which we call "the independent variable") is present in all cases. If colonialism is associated with violence in Algeria but peace in Tunisia, the comparative method instructs us to look elsewhere for causes of Algerian violence. Looking at only one case (e.g. Algeria) may lead an historian or anthropologist to draw links between the colonial experience and the violent war for national liberation. The comparative method suggests that those links are tenuous.

Or consider the cases of Catalonia and Basque Country when national revival movements re-emerged in both of these Spanish regions since the 1960s. The variation on the dependent variable - high levels of violence in the Basque movement; low levels of violence in Catalonia - is sharp. Yet the macrosociological conditions can be controlled for: the international context, the experience of the civil war and Franco's authoritarian rule, and relative economic prosperity in comparison with the rest of Spain are for both regions the same. We can therefore discount these variables as explanatory for Basque violence or Catalan peace. The Basque/Catalan comparison serves as this paper's first step in employing the comparative method.

The next step requires an identification of crucial differences between the cases, as plausible explanations for their different outcomes. These differences need to be formulated as variables, and therefore some degree of abstraction is necessary. The reason for this is that the goal of the comparative method is not simply to explain the set of cases under consideration, but to identify general social and political processes. The putative causes must therefore be formulated so that other scholars will be able to determine whether that factor was present in other cases.

I then move to game theory to complement the comparative method. I do so because the identification of plausible connections between independent and dependent variables only suggests association, but not cause. The empirical relationships become powerful if they are part of a deductively driven "story" which provides a rationale as to how and why the situation on the independent variable leads to specified outcomes on the dependent variable. This story should suggest mechanisms that drive the variations in the predicted directions. The stronger the theory (its assumptions are reasonable; the number of independent variables is few; its applications to other cases are wide; its account of the cases at hand are plausible), the more confident one is that the empirical association has causal properties. Game theory is surely not the only approach to the telling of a deductively driven story, but it is a compelling one.

The comparative method, like Citibank, never sleeps. It requires us to refine our stories in light of new cases that are themselves carefully controlled. In this paper I apply the lessons from the Spanish cases and game theory to the rise of nationalist movements in the former Soviet Union. I therefore construct another controlled comparison, between Ukraine and Georgia. In Ukraine, the establishment of national sovereignty from 1989-92 has been peaceful. In Georgia, facing similar constraints and opportunities, there has been intra-national and inter-national violence. Can the variables identified in the Spanish cases and illuminated by theory apply to post-Soviet nationalism? To the extent they can, the theory is said to be more "robust", able to explain cases with a wide range of parameter conditions. This paper will demonstrate that the variables identified in the Spanish cases do indeed help illuminate differences in the post-Soviet cases, although information on the latter two cases remains quite limited. To the extent to which the paired comparisons yield patterns of association that are deductively plausible, we can say that a satisfactory theory of nationalism and violence is emerging. Let us now move on to the cases.

The Search for Theory: Catalonia and Basque Country

Catalonia and Basque Country are two regions of Spain whose linguistically distinct cultures have survived in popular memory and practice despite centuries of rationalization strategies by the leaders of the Spanish state.[1] Both regions were early to industrialize compared to the political center in Castile. Nineteenth century regional revivals in both regions are related to their industrial advance, although in Catalonia the vanguard nationalists were the bourgeoisie seeking autonomy from mercantilist Spain while in Basque Country the vanguard were the rural notables fearing the consequences of the high Basque bourgeoisie becoming Spaniards (Shafir, forthcoming). Both regions, due to industrial vibrancy throughout the twentieth century, became magnets for migrants from rural Spain, and these migrants were considered to be "foreigners". The immigrant communities posed a demographic threat to the indigenous populations, making the regional nationalists fear the loss of their distinctive cultures. This threat became all the more real, for after the civil war (1936-39), General Francisco Franco imposed coercive rationalization policies in Basque Country and Catalonia, and suppressed all manifestations of regional distinctiveness. Under these conditions, migrants had no need or opportunity to assimilate into the regional culture, and the non-coopted autochthonous populations, of virtually all political persuasions, associated dictatorship with Castilian hegemony. It became an article of faith amongst the democratic opposition to Franco that regional autonomy was a prerequisite for Spanish democracy.

Anti-Franco nationalist movements consolidated in Catalonia and Basque Country in the 1960s. Their programs were similar, as radicals in both regions called for "independence" from Spain. Both sought the creation of newly constituted political units from a set of separate provinces. In fact, the radicals wanted more, and that was to unify the largest conceivable territory under the regional flag: Basque nationalists sought to incorporate Navarre, which is the historical center of medieval Basque power, but whose residents today mostly see

[1] Weber (1968: 71, 1108, 655, 809-38) discusses rationalization as the process by which a state establishes efficient and orderly rule: a professional civil service, clear territorial boundaries, issuance of a common currency, and establishment of an official language are aspects of rationalization.

themselves as Navarrese, but not primarily Basques; Catalan nationalists sought to include Valencia, one of what they call “the Catalan countries”, and a place where many of Catalonia’s leading language revivalists come from, but whose people mostly see themselves as having a separate language and culture from Catalonia. Once the movements got under way, and many activists were arrested by Francoist police, both movements made amnesty a leading element of their political platforms. In the period of the democratic transition, the leading regional parties, PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) in Basque Country and CDC (Democratic Convergence of Catalonia) in Catalonia, were both led by bourgeois moderates, who had support among autochthonous professionals and managers as well as a strong rural base. The leaders of both parties were quite willing to give up the goal of independence in order to achieve the transfer of most state functions to the regional level. These leaders had economic and social ties to “Spain” and were ambivalent about their own nationalism. Both movements, then, earned the scorn of more radical elements in their own region that would not have compromised on the goal of independence.

Despite these similarities in historical experience, the nationalist revival movement in Catalonia has been relatively peaceful, with terrorist groups effectively marginalized by the Catalans themselves, while the nationalist revival movement in Basque Country has been bloody. The Basque terrorist organization, ETA (Euskadi and Freedom) has up till 1990 been responsible for about 780 deaths, an endless string of kidnappings, and bombings of electrical stations, tourist centers, and state property. Targets for murder have been Spanish military and police forces as well as Basques themselves who cooperated with the Spanish state or joined all-Spanish parties, or who refused to pay a "revolutionary tax." In one bloody attack, ETA terrorists murdered a Basque politician who was associated with the all-Spain UCD (Central Democratic Union) party. They dragged his dead body and left it in front of UCD party headquarters in Vitoria. No wonder the terrorism made ordinary Basques fear to make any public statement in favor of accommodation with Spain (Elorriaga, 1983).

The Catalans have not been immune to nationalist violence. In the 1960s, radical separatist organizations formed, and a small breakaway group of the Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional (Socialist Party of National Liberation) even advocated military insurrection. In the late 1960s the Front d'Alliberament Cátala (Catalan Liberation Front) engaged in violent, but not murderous, acts (Díez, 1992: 370-71; Reinares, 1990: 355). The organizations Crida de la Solidaridat (Cry for Solidarity) and Terra Lliure (Free Land) formed later still, and recruited among young Catalans who were appalled by the willingness of CDC officials to compromise away the cherished goal of full independence. Violence as a tactic was always debated in radical Catalanist circles, and never completely rejected (Esprai, 1988; Catalunya, 1988). In 1981 Terra Lliure activists engaged in kidnapping and bombings which were reminiscent of ETA's tactics. But these activities were quickly contained from within the Catalan nationalist movement, and terrorism did not become normalized.

With such similarities in regional history and nationalist goals, why should one nationalist movement be marked by terrorism, and the other by political negotiation? This question has indeed captured the imagination of the leading social scientists who study Spain, but they have not been able to provide a coherent answer. Carr and Fusi (1979: 159) emphasize that there is "no simple explanation" and Gunther *et al.* (1986: 313) warn that the answer is "complex". The reason for the complex (and often convoluted) explanations is this "paradox" (Payne, 1975: 250): Catalonia has been an historical thorn in the side of the Spanish state while Basque nationalism was only a local irritant; this should have us "predicting" (Carr, in Shafir, forthcoming: 159) Catalan terrorism and Basque negotiation! Certainly a study of early twentieth century working-class movements (such as in Romero, 1968) would suggest the hypothesis that it is the Catalans who have an elective affinity for violence. Despite the confusions in the literature, it is nonetheless instructive to examine the efforts by historical sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists to explain Basque terrorism and Catalan negotiation, because my micro viewpoint will build upon their insights.

Historical Sociology of Catalonia and Basque Country

Historical sociologists (Linz, 1973; Díez, 1992; Shafir, forthcoming) differentiate nineteenth century Basque and Catalan nationalism by focusing on the social classes that played vanguard political roles. Basque nationalism was the program of the rural notables who lost status in the face of rapid industrial development in the steel producing cities. The leading industrialists required capital investment from a wide network, and Basque bankers set up networks throughout Spain to raise capital. The industrial and financial bourgeoisie saw Basque nationalism as provincial and backward; they had a cosmopolitan outlook, and saw themselves as Spaniards. In opposition to them, Basque nationalists in the nineteenth century linked themselves with neo-traditional Carlism. In the twentieth century, with the high bourgeoisie closely linked with Franco, a nationalist alliance formed between the left-wing nationalist forces in the cities with the traditional nationalists in the rural areas. Deep divisions within Basque society, and the odd marriage of the anticlerical left and the lower clergy, it is argued, brought a moralistic fervor to modern Basque nationalism.

In Catalonia, the industrial and financial bourgeoisies never lost control over the nationalist movement, even if many of them were ambivalent about a full nationalist program. In the late nineteenth century, Catalan industrialists unsuccessfully lobbied for legislation in Madrid that would facilitate the development of joint stock companies and set up trade barriers to limit textile imports from England. These failures plus the loss in the 1898 "Spanish-American" war of Cuba and the Philippines, where Catalan industrialists had near monopoly rights, impelled the Catalan bourgeoisie to lead a cross-class alliance in support of Catalan regional autonomy. The hegemonic bloc that formed in Catalonia was able to bargain successfully with the Spanish state both in the 1930s and again in the late 1970s, and this decreased the space for an alliance of disaffected rural folk and urban radicals to challenge the bourgeoisie in the name of nationalism.

The patterns *adduced* through historical *sociological inquiry* are *compelling images* of the two nationalist movements; yet the links between the independent variable (the leading social groups in the nationalist movement) and the dependent variable (the level of

violence in the strategic plan to fulfill their programs) are obscure. The explanations have a *post-hoc* quality: if Catalonia had the terrorism, it would be plausible to link the achievement of cross-class hegemony with the ability to organize a war of maneuver against the forces of the Spanish state; and then one could link the failure of hegemony in Basque nationalism with the need to make the best bargain possible short of going to war. The broad macro historical patterns can account for virtually any level of violence in the nationalist movements under study.

Survey Research Approaches to Catalan and Basque Nationalism

Survey research, in collecting public opinion data throughout Spain, has sought to get a grasp on the differences between the levels of violence in the two nationalist movements by studying the structure of popular beliefs and opinions. Political outcomes, in this view, are the result of underlying values and feelings. The survey data, for example those compiled by Gunther *et al.* (1986), unfortunately, can support an argument going either way. Perhaps their greatest virtue, however, is in their power to discredit standard "political science" explanations, three of which will be outlined here.

(l)Racialist Ideology: It is often argued, based on a study of the nationalist writings of Sabino de Arana, that Basque nationalism is more "racialist" and exclusionary than Catalan nationalism, and thus more intolerant. Catalan nationalism has often emphasized the mixed nature of the Catalan people, as the country is seen as a trading crossroads. Catalans promote themselves as more inclusive and open than other Spaniards. Survey data show that more Basques than Catalans define membership based on "willingness to defend the nation." While not racialist, this attitude reflects a rather intolerant view, counting as Basques only those willing to fight for a national cause (Shabad, personal communication). But other data show that Basques are more likely than Catalans to include as fellow nationals anyone who lives and works in their region, and they thus may thus be more tolerant about membership (Gunther *et al.*, 1986: 318-30; see also Linz, study quoted in Shafir, forthcoming: 221ff). On the basis of

these data, it would be possible to find an elective affinity for both intolerance (violence) and pluralism (bargaining) in both regions.

(2)Cross-cutting Cleavages: Going back to the work of Simmel, social scientists have noted that where people are linked to different sets of others in different social arenas (e.g., work, family, and church) they are more likely to hold moderate political views and to seek democratic compromises. This is because your opponent on one issue might well become your ally on the next. Gunther's data (1986: 376-77) show that the Basques have higher levels of cross-cuttingness in their pattern of cleavages (class, religion, region and left-right) than do the Catalans. Because of the high *salience* and stark polarization of one of those cleavages - region - in Basque country, Gunther *et al.* argue that it is the salience of the relevant cleavage rather than the degree of cross-cuttingness that explains the level of violence. Whether they are correct or not, their data send a blow to standard cleavage theory.

(3)Symbolic power of Cultural Institutions: A high percentage of Catalans, through the use of the Catalan language, are militantly regionalist. The percentage of Basques who are monolingual Spanish speakers is far higher. If the omnipresence of a cultural institution such as language facilitates collective action, we should expect Catalan nationalism to be far more militant than that of the Basques. To be sure, it could be argued, as a UCD official did (reported in Gunther *et al.* 1986: 331) that "There is a greater anguish in the [Basque] demands, because there are greater threats to the survival of their culture," but if the power of cultural symbols and their imminent disappearance can *both* predict militant political action, we are stuck with a theory that cannot be disconfirmed.

Still other survey data show that Basque identification with an exclusive autonomous community and in support of a revolutionary nationalist party are at much higher levels than the Catalans'. But when analyzed over time, Díez concludes (1992: 429-30) that these attitudes are more the product of the events engendered by ETA than an explanation for ETA's activities.

Survey research has performed a service in helping us to eliminate well-regarded theories from consideration in the explanation for the differences in the Basque and Catalan strategic repertoires. But the concentration on attitudes and values as an explanation for violent action has been less fruitful. The attitudes themselves give ambiguous signals, and the attitudes themselves are more likely a response to events rather than an explanation of them.

Anthropological Explanations for Basque and Catalan nationalism

Anthropologists have made important inroads in understanding the reproduction of Basque culture and the sources of the culture of violence that has marked the Basque country since the mid 1960s (Pérez-Agote, 1984; Ramírez, 1991; Zulaika 1988) In an evocative treatise, Zulaika describes local Basque culture. In this setting young men find emotional appeal in joining a movement that asks them to murder people whom they have known all their lives but who have become informers for the Spanish police. If American boys in the 1950s invariably rooted for the "cowboys" in their genocidal forays against "Indians", young Basque boys saw in ETA an organization that would help realize them as men and citizens. Going beyond the dictates of participant observation, Zulaika himself felt pulled by those same forces to seek admission into ETA. While Zulaika spurns the task of providing a social "cause" for this appeal to join ETA in rural Basque country, he provides a cultural context. For example, he analyzes the symbolic meanings of the words "yes" and "no" in the Basque language and in Basque literature and finds that they have sharp and uncrossable boundaries. This cultural feature *inter alia* sustains a politics in which unyielding opposition seems normal and moral. Basque culture, Zulaika points out, refused to yield to the attractions of modern urban "Spain"; it refused to compromise with the authoritarian Franco state; and in the 1960s ETA asked members of this culture to stand firm in its opposition to Spanish centralism.

However enlightening and subtle the analysis, the epistemological problem with Zulaika's story is that it cannot explain the centuries of assimilation by Basques into Spanish

cultural and political life. Basques became multi-cultural, and said both "yes" and "no" to Castilian culture. Finding a deep cultural basis to explain ETA terrorism invariably runs into the problem of not being able to explain the more long lasting phenomenon: Basque participation in the construction and imagining of the Spanish nation.

Perhaps more troubling for the use of Zulaika's work as an explanatory model for Basque violence is the complementary exercise of probing into the symbolic bases of Catalan self-understandings. While Catalanist anthropologists (DiGiacomo, 1985) have emphasized the importance of the Catalan notion of *seny,* a feet-on-the-ground practical spirit that rewards calculation and compromise, it is important to point out that within the Catalan symbolic repertoire is the concept of *rauxa* (impulsiveness) which anthropologists would have appealed to if Catalans had centered their politics in rebellious activities in the late Franco years (Laitin and Rodríguez, 1992). Indeed, it has been pointed out (Freedman, 1988) that Catalan legends have an important genre of heroic battles that their ancestors supposedly fought to the credit of the nation. Catalans have a cultural repertoire that can give support to cowardly accommodation or heroic rebellion. So do the Basques.

The Micro Foundations of Nationalist Violence

While previous research in Catalonia and Basque Country has not adequately explained the differential outcome in regard to violence, and while no theory has been put to a "robustness" test in other countries, many of the ideas are worth developing for wider testing. In this section I shall develop three propositions about violence in the course of regionally-based nationalist movements, and in subsequent sections I will see how well those propositions hold up in the Catalan-Basque Country comparison and, for a check on robustness, see how well they hold up in explaining the high levels of communal violence in Georgia and low such levels in Ukraine, both in the course of the collapse of the Soviet Union. To the extent that propositions developed from one paired comparison hold up in a second paired comparison, a strong case can be made for their plausibility.

My focus on micro foundations is justified by the perplexity that macro theorists have faced in regard to violence. If similar macro structures are associated with divergent outcomes in regard to violence, perhaps the variables that explain the violence have to do with micro social processes that translate broad social goals into everyday tactics. In order to develop a micro theory of nationalist violence, it is incumbent on the theorist to provide a plausible and compelling "story" as to why many individuals would themselves take the risks of armed combat to achieve uncertain results that will be shared equally by those who have engaged in the combat and those who have not. The micro approach is one necessarily oriented to an explanation of the successful recruitment of armed combatants in a nationalist struggle (Petersen, 1993). Let us now turn to the crucial micro conditions that engender nationalist violence.

(1) A necessary condition: dense rural social structure. Consider three ideal-typical rural societies: one where there is a strong presence of a nationalist party in virtually every village; a second where the principal form of village solidarity is based upon irrigation societies and other work-sharing groups; the third where there is a strong presence of local social groups, from outing clubs to boy scouts. (This section relies entirely on Petersen, 1991 and 1993, whose work makes more differentiations than are possible here). An initial proposition is that a necessary condition for nationalist guerilla action against state authority is a rural society that is rich in social membership groups. Here is why.

In the first type, nationalist parties are easily penetrated by the leading centralist parties of the state, since the leaders of the nationalist parties find themselves in more regular negotiation with centralist than with local forces. An incentive for leaders of nationalist parties is to present to the localities hard-won compromises as packages that are the best available. Because war against the state, if it is to be led by nationalist party leaders, would require a coherent army, and because this army will have a low probability of beating an already established state army, the likelihood of leaders of nationalist parties supporting a violent war against the state is very low.

In the second type, with dense agricultural groups, the likelihood of guerilla action (in localized combat, conventional armies are impossible to form) is low, in large part because any member of a rural work group who seeks to commit himself to a life of political/military action is necessarily shirking his economic duties. There will therefore be a strong incentive for leaders of rural work groups to deter such defections from work team duties. Furthermore, *since* work groups are publicly visible, any guerilla action that is supported by such groups can be easily identified by state police, and the principle of collective guilt might well be followed. It is therefore imprudent for guerilla action to take place based on rural work group solidarity.

Localized social groups, however, are the ideal nesting ground for guerilla action. While economic groups have norms of fairness, social groups have norms of honor. If a leading individual of a scouting group commits himself to the nationalist cause, other members would be dishonored if they betrayed him, and in fact would feel social pressure to join in with that leader. Furthermore, since most local social groups have membership lists that are as private as those of masons, group members will not fear reprisal if they remain members of groups many of whose members are active in guerilla or terrorist movements. The greater the number of such groups, the higher the likelihood that a critical mass of leaders will commit themselves to an underground terrorist campaign to fulfill the national dream.

(2) Explaining the incentives to violence: a tipping game phenomenon. The tipping game, first developed by Schelling (1978) to explain phenomena such as neighborhood stability, can be applied to the dynamics of recruitment to national causes. Although the model can be applied in general to the choice of whether to "join the national movement", my work (Laitin, 1989) has been on a small component of that choice - of whether to accept the regional language as the language of official business and education - and it is that model which will be presented here.

Consider a region in a country in which over the centuries a significant percentage of people have begun to use the language of the political center as the language of education,

work, and even everyday life at home. Many in the rural areas are bi-lingual but only few are monolingual in the language of the region, a language which no longer has the institutional support (in schools, or in administration) to survive in the long term. There will inevitably be a corps of national historians, poets and philologists who keep the national language "alive"; they will be the seeds for any counter-hegemonic nationalist movement if and when leading sectors of the regional society organize a national movement.

The national revival will require, *inter alia,* that people who rely principally on the state language for getting information, watching TV, and writing letters begin to equip themselves (and more importantly, their children) to operate in the regional language. This will be a costly investment, especially if for lack of a critical mass of speakers of the regional language, the movement fails. Each person in the region needs to calculate the costs and benefits of re-aligning him or herself with the regional language, based on subjective assessments of the probability of others making a similar choice.

The calculation for making such an investment in the regional language is based on (a) the economic pay-offs for learning the regional language; (b) the status gain or loss from the regional society for learning or not learning the regional language; and (c) the changes in a and b based upon the percentage of citizens in the region who have already invested in the regional language as the language of the future "nation".

Suppose that the average pay-offs for individuals to switch to the local language are considerably lower than the average pay-offs for individuals to continue relying principally on the language of the center. And suppose that the initial movers into the regional language (who will have higher individual pay-offs than the societal average) get great honor from the community for their bravery and good jobs as regional leaders and teachers, but that these early successes only reward a small percentage of movers. Suppose further that economic returns in the form of professional employment for learning the regional language only begin to kick in after more than half the people of the region are operating fully in this language. Suppose finally that negative sanctions (loss of local honor)

for using the language of the center do not become strong (especially in the cities) until forty percent of the population switches primary language allegiance. If these suppositions are formalized, the tipping game might look like Figure A.

Figure A

A Tipping Game Model



Percent of People in the Region who switch from the language of the Center as their primary medium of instruction in their education to the regional language.

CC= payoffs for people who receive instruction through the medium of the central language; RR= payoffs for people who receive instruction through the medium of the regional language.

*= Status quo before beginning the nationalist movement

**= Tipping point

Two aspects of Figure A are noteworthy here. First, it is individually irrational for those with average or below-average pay-offs to switch to do so at the early stages of a national movement. Second, after initial successes into the regional language camp, the national movement will have a harder time (given the increasing divergence in average pay-offs) in recruiting people to make a personal investment in the future of the regional

language. My hypothesis about violence follows from this second point. The hypothesis is that the wider the gap in pay-offs at "25% switch" the more likely the early movers (whom I call "language vigilantes") will see terrorism as a useful tactic in raising the costs for accepting the linguistic status quo. By terrorizing prominent regional actors who haven't switched, the vigilantes raise the status costs of not-switching. By terrorizing the police forces of the political center, the vigilantes seek to create greater regional solidarity and thereby raise the benefits for switching. Terrorism, then, is a viable tactic in the national revival tipping game for language vigilantes when the average costs of regional identification for those people who have not switched remain far higher than their costs of maintaining the linguistic status-quo.

(3) Sustaining Mechanisms: a Random Event, the Value of Stunning but Small Victories, the Tyranny of Sunk Costs, and the Culture of Violence. The basic proposition here is that violence gets going in only a small subset of cases for which the necessary conditions exist, and for which there are strong incentives to use it. Fortune chooses a small subset for a cycle of violence to get going. Once it does, it will be sustained by three factors: (a) if the regional population perceives the tactical victories but is blind to the strategic losses, (b) if the costs of leaving the terrorist organization are high, and (c) if a "culture" of violence becomes institutionalized.

Nationalist movements active in regions of established states invariably face police forces and state militia that are far more institutionalized and have far greater access to firepower than do the challengers. Under such conditions, it would be irrational for anyone to join an army that is likely to be crushed. Suppose, however, a small commando group stages a revolutionary event, such as an assassination of a leading politician from the center. In most cases, these efforts will fail; but when they succeed - I shall call this a "random" event that cannot be explained by social structural factors - these events have the power to galvanize support from potential recruits who now see the group as "successful". If the focus is on tactics, terrorist organizations can point to incredible strings of victories, and such pointing can have

the effect of framing perceptions in the region that the balance of power is on their side.

A stunning random "victory", and the concomitant re-evaluation of the chances for independence by people from the region, will lead to a new tyranny - the tyranny of sunk costs (Petersen, 1991). After new recruits join an illegal military organization, and after they commit a criminal act, it is extremely difficult, psychologically and for security reasons, for them to change their minds and return to political quiescence (Fanon, 1968). This tyranny of sunk costs acts to sustain a movement long after its original goals, or even its original characterization of the "center", are lost in the fog of commando actions and state reprisals.

This action-reprisal-action cycle that escalates between nationalist movement and state authority (or other enemies of the regional movement) creates what can be called a "culture of violence" (Shabad and Llera, forthcoming: 73) in which ordinary people become callous to violence and begin to see it as part of "ordinary" life. The cultural expectation of violence helps perpetuate it, as it joins the set of plausible actions that anyone in society might use to fulfill one's political agenda.

Retelling the Stories of Basque and Catalan Nationalist Revival

The micromechanisms discussed in the previous section were developed with an eye on differentiating the Basque and Catalan regionalist movements. It will be no surprise that I find key differences in the two regions on each of these mechanisms. The real "test" will be to see the level of their robustness, once we move to another context, in the defunct Soviet Union. But even if there will be no surprises, it is worthwhile to lay out the key differences in the two regions of Spain.

(l) Social Structure: Virtually all anthropological accounts of Basque *society* point to the importance of low-membership village-based social groups. Each village has its own mountain-climbing clubs, called *mendigoitzale,* and the regular outings have always proven

to be occasions for male bonding and political intrigue. Furthermore, characteristic of Basque society, boys join into gangs, or *cuadrillas,* of about six to ten in a group. As youngsters, pranks and petty vandalism make up the repertoire of group activity. As members age, the group becomes a drinking society as well. In the words of Gurrutxaga (quoted in Díez, 1992: 449), "It seems that development in Guipúzcoa facilitates the diffusion of nationalism, because it is founded on small towns, where mechanisms of social control become more significant and where there is a very dense network of interpersonal relationships."

While the foundation of ETA membership was among middle class and well-educated urban intellectuals, by the mid 1970s ETA's recruitment base went to the small and medium sized cities, where recruits were among semi-qualified workers in small factories (Reinares, 1990: 364). These became the commandos in ETA's terrorist program. In Clark's (1984) study of ETA, he finds that it was the climbing clubs and the cuadrillas that were the source of ETA recruitment. In his data base of eighty-one ETA militants, not one (and this is consistent with Petersen's theory) was from a farming village. The great majority came from small towns where young men commuted to work in small nearby factories. They were workers during the day, but embedded themselves in Basque culture at night. Unlike farmers, they were not members of local economic, but only social groups. The solidarity of these groups allowed for clandestine recruitment and a culture of group honor that made it nearly intolerable for group members to become police informers.

If Basque Country was strong in local social groups, it was weak on the level of local party organizations linked to Spanish-wide political institutions. The leaders of such parties, as Petersen's theory indicates, would have an interest in developing bargains with political power at the center. To be sure, PNV has built a strong centralized (for the region) party with excellent local links. This could help explain why PNV has been able in the late 1980s to cooperate with the Spanish state in marginalizing ETA from the Basque region (Maravall, personal communication). But ETA was able, in an important way, to immunize itself from this sort of bargaining. ETA's political wing, Herri Batasuna, entered parliamentary competition,

but forbade the winners from occupying their seats. HB parliamentarians could not enrich their careers by trying to sell a peaceful compromise to their mass base (Reinares, 1990: 378).

If the anthropological work on Basque Country emphasizes locally based social groups, Catalanist research emphasizes the importance of economic based groups (unions) and their links to national political parties. Díez (1992: 432) mentions that in the late Franco period, it was Catalonia that had far more political party activity than Basque Country, and points out that "While ETA faced little competition in becoming the symbolic center of Basque opposition to Franco, revolutionary nationalist groups in Catalonia... faced strong competition from other more moderate political groups..." Political parties are more likely to bargain than to fight; this helps explain the lower level of violent nationalism in Catalonia.

If Catalonia was strong in party development, it was weaker in the development of small-town autonomous social groups. In one study of the rural Alto Panedés (Hansen, 1977: 115), the author reported that prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the only voluntary groups were run by Catholic brothers. And when secular social organizations began to form, all the clubs were led by men who were "the *caciques* of one or another of the national parties. The prominence of the national party in part determined the prominence of the *cacique* on the local level...The local *cacique* was far more than a vote deliverer for the national party and a patronage dispenser at the local level...[He] was a man who took care of things for people..." According to the logic of the group bases for terrorist organization, the Catalan type of rural group is too easily coopted through extra-local accommodations between leaders of the social groups and state-level authorities. Another anthropological study that focused upon the "culture of opposition" in Franco-ist Catalonia, saw labor unions and the church as the major organizations in village life. Some emphasis was put on the scouting clubs (which were supported by the church) and mountain groups; so it would be fair to say that Catalan village life had some potential for triggering a violent opposition group (Johnston, 1991: ch. 4).

The anthropological evidence suggests that the social conditions for a commando-like structure were more supportive in Basque Country than in Catalonia; but this doesn't necessarily mean that it would have been impossible in Catalonia (we don't know the thresholds); nor does it mean that violence was a logical outcome of the Basque social structure. We have seen only that a necessary condition has been more fully met in the Basque than in the Catalan case.

(2) Tipping Phenomena: The historical sociological approach identified a hegemonic Catalan and a divided Basque nationalist elite. Politically, this manifested itself clearly amid the collapse of the Second Republic. Unlike Basque Country, Catalonia had a successfully operating regional government in the Second Republic. Its legitimate president, Josep Tarradellas, spent the Franco years in exile in France. He became a symbol of Catalan aspirations, even though the younger generation of leaders, such as Jordi Pujol, felt that it was their turn to rule. Because of Tarradellas's legitimacy, however, radical Catalans could not easily renounce his leadership publicly, or undermine Tarradellas's negotiations with Adolfo Suárez, the Prime Minister of Spain who managed the transition. Meanwhile in the Basque Country, the republican leadership broke up into separate groups amid the civil war. One faction went into exile while another remained to fight the war. The governments in exile did not have the same symbolic weight for Basques as it did for Catalans. The intra-Basque political competition remains more salient than intra-Catalan. Shabad (forthcoming: 39) writes that within Basque Country, the greatest hostility is between the HB (Herri Batasuna), popularly believed to be the political arm of ETA, and PNV (which was willing to compromise with Madrid), rather than between a united set of Basque nationalist parties against the ruling and non-regionalist PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers Party).

What, however, are the mechanisms which translate elite division into violence and elite unity into negotiation? Here is where the tipping game might provide an answer, by examining more closely the recruitment dynamics within the autochthonous society, starting from a period of optimism in Basque Country when opposition to Franco began to be expressed

in a nationalist frame. The radical nationalists in the early years won a small but significant percentage of the Basque population over to the *abertzale* (national liberation point of view) side. But the great majority, although sympathetic to the *abertzale* position, were unwilling to cut their ties with Spain. Leaders experienced the difficult problem of convincing fellow-Basques to change vastly their everyday behaviors for uncertain gains. One way to change the calculations of those who remained Spaniards in their way of thinking and living was to raise the costs for doing so, at first by harassment and perhaps later by terror.

Although ETA was not directly involved in battles *over* cultural revitalization, one way to think about ETA's recruitment dilemma, at least in a metaphorical way, is to analyze the dilemmas facing those who sought to promote the Basque language as the principal language for Basque everyday life, education, and administration. Learning the Basque language for many urban Basques, and especially for those in Alava or Navarra, would be a great burden, with only uncertain rewards. For immigrants, learning a language that shared no roots with Indo-European languages would be especially burdensome. It would be hard for anyone to rationally assume that Basque would replace Castilian within one's lifetime.

Meanwhile the Catalan nationalists had an easier task. The Catalan language had been a language of science and written literature for centuries. From the cultural renaissance in the mid-nineteenth century to the second republic (1931-36), there was an outpouring of publications in Catalan. The language *is* of the Romance family, and unlike Euskera, can be learned easily by Castilian-speaking immigrants. Passive understanding takes months; active participation perhaps a few years. When the Catalan nationalists passed the Law of Linguistic Normalization (1979) in Catalonia, many people reasonably expected that if their children did not learn Catalan, their future (e.g., in university admissions) would be imperiled.

Basque radicals faced a more difficult situation as they sought to "tip" their region in the direction of a Basque-centered culture. Their strongest supporters had a difficult time

in learning the Basque language. These radical leaders had a more daunting task than did the Catalans in altering subjective pay-offs. When it becomes irrational for any more Basques to adopt the Basque language, radicals can raise the costs of maintaining the status quo by intimidating those who refuse to shift. The sources of harassment and perhaps even terror can be found in a rational calculus of radicals that the movement would stagnate without adding the cost of fear to those who find comfort in the status quo.

ETA was not playing a language tipping game, but the logic may well be the same. My hypothesis is that the violence aimed at Spanish police authorities, and the kidnappings and "revolutionary taxation" of Basque industrialists were instrumental actions designed at reconfiguring the pay-off function of fellow Basques in their assessments about the value of maintaining a "Spanish" life style. The difficulty of the tip, rather than the probability of it, provides an incentive for violent tactics. This micro explanation, linked to the macrosociological situation of a divided Basque elite and a united Catalan elite, provides a coherent story of why violence in Basque country became a viable, even rational, nationalist strategy.

(3) Sustaining Mechanisms: ETA emerged in 1959 when a coalition of youth groups, frustrated with the passivity of the older generation in the PNV, merged ideas of ethnolinguistic nationality, anti-colonial guerilla warfare, and marxism. The groups that formed were subject to schisms of every sort, and were only a marginal element in the underground anti-Franco movement in Basque Country. In 1965, members agreed on a theory of revolutionary change: to involve the state in an "action-repression-action spiral" that would serve nationalist purposes, as this spiral would draw ever larger numbers of Basques into the revolutionary camp. Nine years after formation, with membership no larger than in the one hundreds, a pair of ET As were stopped at a roadblock after a bank robbery. One was hauled from the car and shot; the other imprisoned and tortured. True to its ideology, ETA targeted an especially fierce police commissioner, and murdered him. The results played into ETA's theoretical hand. Franco declared a "state of exception" over the entire country, engaging in just the kind of repressive actions ETA leaders had counted on, and ETA attracted new recruits. Extensive

repression by Spanish police was effective, however, and by 1970 membership declined from 600 to about 100. In December of that year, the infamous trial of ETA militants held at Burgos, in which two Basque priests were charged, outraged public opinion internationally, and helped ETA recoup its forces. And three years later, in what was then perhaps the most stunning terrorist victory in modern European history, ETA commandos assassinated Luis Carrero Blanco, the Spanish Prime Minister and *heir apparent* to Franco. ETA membership quickly doubled. Finally the execution of two ETA prisoners in 1975 yielded a general strike and turned the victims into martyrs (Reinares, 1990: 366). Through these events, ETA became the frame for many small-town Basque youths who desperately wanted to be in the nationalist picture. ETA became as well so mythic in its identification with Basque values that it was able to expand its recruitment into rural society (Reinares, personal communication).

This vignette of ETA history (see Clark, 1984, Payne, 1975, and Zulaika, 1988 for richer accounts) illustrates two points. First, identifying the social conditions that led to the emergence of ETA does not help to explain why violence, terror, murder and kidnapping became defining characteristics of the contemporary Basque nationalist revival. Groups like ETA form in many different kinds of societies, and are probably not different in outlook from the Catalan organization Terra Lliure. But a random event - like being caught in a roadblock - blown up into an affair of state, catalyzed the group into a major representative force that delineated Basque aspirations. The assassination of Carrero Blanco, which succeeded because he followed the same route to church every morning for a period of years, was equally random and invigorating. Without this type of fortune for ETA, PNV could well have become the hegemonic voice of Basque aspirations, and social scientists would be looking into Basque history and social structure to find the roots of peaceful nationalism.

Second, the early assassinations, the successful kidnapping of a Basque industrialist who had bullied unions, the collection of a “revolutionary tax” from a wide segment of nervous Basque businessmen, and the ease in stealing arms and ammunition from Spanish armories all

gave ETA operatives (as well as potential recruits) a clear sense of endless tactical triumphs. The value of regular small victories was more powerful in ETA calculations than the degree of progress toward the ultimate goal. The cloud of tactical victories certainly overshadowed any calculations concerning the probability of a life of freedom in newly-democratic Spain.

Once the Basque culture of violence had been established through the overvaluing of stunning tactical victories, anti-ETA Basque nationalists found themselves in a political bind. One high PNV operative responded in an interview that it was unrealistic to work towards ETA goals, but quickly added that "If I were to say today that I am Spanish, that I renounce Basque independence, I would be immediately kicked out of my party." A PNV Senator Joseba Elósegui said in 1984 that "the fathers of ETA members belong to the PNV, and they propose that the *peneuvista* [member of PNV] father denounce his *etarra* [terrorist] son to the Guardia Civil..." (Shabad and Llera, forthcoming: 62-3). ETA's élan prevented responsible Basque politicians from denouncing its use of violence.

ETA not only influenced the political agenda by policing *peneuvistas,* but was able to police defectors from within their ranks. To be sure, ETA policing of the Basque population was limited to only a few zones in the wider country, and it was relatively easy for commando members to return to normal civilian life (Clark, 1984: 152). Furthermore, the Spanish Minister of Interior in 1980 developed an amnesty program that eventually reintegrated 200 former terrorists into civil society. Yet those who considered amnesty found themselves subject to terrorist death threats (Reinares, 1990: 389-93). Violence is sustained when those already implicated in terrorist acts fear reprisals if they defect from their organizational roles.

A cycle of violence never got underway in Catalonia, even though the generational tensions that led to ETA doubtlessly existed in Catalonia, and radical groups in Catalonia debated terrorism with similar vocabulary as did the ETA organizers. Terre Lliure (Esprai, 1988) and the "marxist social current" (Johnston, 1991: 68) certainly had elements that were hard to distinguish from ETA's.

Cultures of violence are not eternal; nor can they be ascribed to any national group. The Catalans, it is to be remembered, were the violent anarchists of the early twentieth century and the peaceful regionalists of the late twentieth century. The Basques were known for their centuries-long peaceful incorporation into the Castile-León crown. A combination of social organization and random events can enculturate a people anew into a life style that turns terrorists into heroes, and in which ordinary citizens become callous to violence. Cultures, once institutionalized, are resistant to change; but they are not eternal.

A Critical Test: Georgia and Ukraine

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Union Republics as new nation-states provides a "nice" robustness test. As with the Catalan/Basque case, leaders in Georgia and Ukraine both had similar problems in regard to the establishment of a nationalist program. However, the results differed immensely. In Georgia, democratic elections did not lead to peaceful rule but rather to a violent intra-Georgian anti-government insurgency and a set of small-fire wars between Georgians and minority ethnic groups. In Ukraine, democratic elections were bitterly fought, but the winner was able to establish himself in authority without internecine war. Furthermore, despite a host of cultural minorities in Ukraine, the first years of independence went by without inter-ethnic guerilla warfare.

Virtually all the Union Republics in the Soviet Union were multiethnic in composition but had a single group (called in the Soviet Union the "titular" nationality) after which the republic was named and to which most central largesse went. In the context of the Union, minority groups in Union Republics were assured protection from the Center, and ambitious people from those groups could orient themselves to the status hierarchy of the Union. Meanwhile, members of the "titular" nationality could orient their future either to the republic or to the union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnic minorities in the newly

independent republics were subject to the will of the titulars, and this situation was an invitation to conflict.

In Georgia, with the rapid outmigration of Armenians, Jews and Russians since 1959, Georgians make up nearly 70 percent of the population, with Armenians at 9 percent and Russians at 7.4 percent (Suny, 1988: 299). Most of the other minority populations live on the border with Turkey and in the mountainous regions of the Caucasus bordering on the Russian republic. The Ossetians cross the border between Georgia and Russia. In the latter, North Ossetia is an Autonomous Republic; in the former, South Ossetia (with only 60,000 Ossetians and 30,000 Georgians) is only an Autonomous Oblast, somewhat less in status than an Autonomous Republic. The south Ossetians feared the break up of the Union, and sought unity with their northern brothers. The Georgians held that Ossetians only came to south Ossetia in recent centuries (!), and that they should rightfully return to Russia. The Ossetian problem had the greatest potential for violence in post-Soviet Georgia.

But there were other minorities with their special problems in Georgia. On the Turkey-Georgian border live the Adzharis, who are ethnically Georgian but Muslim in religion, and many of them identify with the Turks. In the northwest, on a crucial rail link to Russia (crucial not only to Georgia but to Armenia) is the mountainous Abkhaz Autonomous Republic, where the Abkhazis form only a small minority of 17 percent of the population (with Georgians comprising 45 percent). Abkhazis have called for separation from Georgia, and Tbilisi authorities fear for the security of the Georgians living there. Also in Abkhasia are Adigei (sometimes referred to as Cherkess), Abaza, Ingush, Kabardians, and Chechens.- They are predominantly Muslim, and conflict among these groups has been a common feature of recent political history. These conflicts center, however, within the Russian Republic, where the majority of these small groups live.

The national scene in Ukraine is even more complex, and perhaps even more “loaded” with historic antipathies. Ukraine has 52 million people and 110 nationality groups: 37 million Ukrainians; 11.35 million Russians; 486,000 Jews; and 440,000 Belorussians. The Kuzbass

(originally from Siberia) miners, many of whom migrated to the Donbass mining areas, hardly were aware that they lived outside of “Russia”. In Crimea, which Khrushchev ceded to Ukraine in 1954, is a vibrant Russian tourist area as well as the home of a key “Soviet” naval base. Russians in Crimea have pressed for the creation of “Novorus”, an independent republic as part of the Confederation of Independent States. In the Transcarpathian region Slovaks, Czechs, Hungarians, Rumanians, Gypsies and Germans live together with Russians and Ukrainians. Transcarpathians have pressed for a special oblast, but issues of incorporation into neighboring republics have also been raised, especially by Moldova and Romania in regard to the strip of land in Bessarabia and northern Bukovina that were given to Ukraine as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Elsewhere in Ukraine Tatars, who were inhumanly uprooted from their native soil in the Crimea, began migrating back to their homeland in the 1970s, and now claim that the Ukrainians and Russians who live there are doing so illegally. Religious divisions between the Uniate Church (largely Ukrainian in membership) and the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church (largely Russian), with battles over property rights current on the agenda, cloud the political scene. Less manifest up till now is the conflict between the Uniates and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (largely Ukrainian). A recent monograph examined the "legacy of intolerance" among religious groups in Ukraine (Little, 1991: 5), and the author notes that as the Soviet state “relaxed its oppressive policies toward religion and permitted the legalization of hitherto suppressed churches, members of these churches suddenly find themselves required to confront old antagonisms [which] of late erupted into hostile acts among some of the groups, along with mutual accusations of discrimination and violence.”

The remarkable fact in the post-Soviet period *is* that while both republics were rife with national, cultural, and religious antipathies, potential pogroms were successfully marginalized in the Ukraine, whereas in Georgia, national antipathies were the basis for terrorism and war.

In Ukraine, despite a concerted attempt by Russian mass media to stir up national hatreds - virtually all stories reporting incidents come from Russian newspapers and TV -- the Ukrainian nationalists have been assiduous in policing themselves against their own worst instincts. In the words of Mihaylo Horin, the Vice President of the Rukh, Ukraine's coalitional nationalist party, "The Ukrainian movement Rukh and other organizations, such as the Republican Democratic Party...have always advocated the view that the Ukraine is the fatherland of various nationalities [who] are not unequal under the law...We know what happened in Germany in the past: Hitler acted against the Jews...This also happened in the Soviet Union: Lenin started to act against the landowners...Whoever uses an apparatus of repression should know: It starts with the suppression of the others-and in the end oneself is suppressed or even eliminated. Thus if we defend the rights of the Jews, Russians, Armenians, and Greeks, we simultaneously defend the rights of the Ukrainian people" (FBIS, 911031). Meanwhile, the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR, President Leonid Kravchuk of independent Ukraine, and virtually all candidates for Ukrainian-wide elections have emphasized that the stirring up of ethnic hostility was "inadmissible" (FBIS 910104). But this is more than talk. In March, 1991, Russian cadets were counter-demonstrating against a Ukrainian rally for separatism in western Ukraine. A fight quickly broke out. But Rukh "stewards" came to the immediate defense of the Russians, to prevent the creation of martyrs (RFE, 910315). A radical deputy from Lviv in the Ukrainian parliament, Stepan Kmara, has tried to stir up all sorts of inter-ethnic violence in order to portray Ukrainians as an embattled people. Despite his wide recognition throughout the Ukraine and his impeccable nationalist credentials, Ukrainian political authorities have done everything to marginalize him and restrict his range of potential damage. Finally, with Ukrainian nationals suffering in Moldova, Ukraine's government looks aside. It fears that if it stirs up trouble by speaking for Ukrainians there, then the Russian, Romanian, and Hungarian governments might well begin to stir up minorities within the borders of the present Ukraine. President Kravchuk frequently raises the specter of Nagorno-Karabakh (RFE: 910201). Policing his own people to avoid fanning the flames of historical conflicts has been so far a successful strategy. Finally, despite fears of violent religious clashes,

the author of "Ukraine: the legacy of intolerance" wrote an afterword which reported as of late 1990, most conflicts had been settled peacefully, even if traditional animosities between churches remain (Little, 1991: 73-4).

In regard to electoral violence, it might be noted that Ukraine has a party system quite similar to what Gunther *et al.* (1986) describe as the source of polarized politics in Basque Country. Over 100 candidates ran for president (FBIS: 911101), with at least four serious contenders. The presidential election was successfully held where the nationalist coalition, Rukh, lost, and a former communist won, and in which there has been intra-elite accommodation and bargaining since the election. President Kravchuk might well fail due to the economic and social catastrophe that followed in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, but he hasn't fallen due to open warfare between the multitude of party factions in Ukraine.

In Georgia, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, peace has been elusive, among nationality groups and among Georgian political factions. Electoral politics were played out in an atmosphere of contending armed camps. In 1990, the radical nationalist candidate for the presidency Gia Chanturia was nearly killed in an assassination attempt, and at least two people were killed in armed clashes during that campaign. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who was then considered a moderate yet had impeccable nationalist credentials, won the election with his "Round Table/Free Georgia" coalition.

Gamsakhurdia quickly lost support among other leading Georgian figures. He had organized the election so that Dzhaba Ioseliani, an art history professor who was leader of the Sakartvelos Mkhedrioni (Knights of Georgia), was not permitted to run. Ioseliani's band of 7,000 recruits, relying on weapons bought from demobilized soldiers who had fought in Afghanistan, established national credibility by fighting Soviet MVD (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) troops. But after being marginalized by Gamsakhurdia, Ioseliani mobilized the Knights to overthrow the Georgian president. Even Gamsakhurdia's former allies, disgusted by his erratic rule, soon joined the armed opposition, and a rump group of the National Guard joined as well. In early 1992 the cycle of armed combat led to a siege of Gamsakhurdia's

official residence. He finally escaped, but the six-week battle cost of lives of 110 people, and Tbilisi remains an armed camp with daily reports of explosions and armed attacks (FBIS, 920316).

With regard to nationality groups in Georgia, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was the scene of the early bloodshed. Georgian titular authorities denied electoral standing to candidates who preached any form of secession, and this act alone took nationalist Ossetians outside of the democratic game. Ossetians appealed to Moscow, not only for the right to field candidates, but to protect them from threats that Georgian would be the sole official language of the republic. Ossetian nationalists began to terrorize Georgian villagers, and Georgians in Ossetia fought back by cutting off all electrical power, in the middle of Winter, 1991, to Tskhinvali, and by surrounding the city with 15,000 Georgian troops. Meanwhile, Georgians living in surrounding farming villages began to shoot missiles into Ossetian cities while Ossetians assail Georgians travelling in between farming villages. The Russian (now the CIS) army has played an arbitrating role, but the death toll was over 250 in 1991, and there were tens of thousands of refugees.

The Ossetian war is not isolated, and enemies of the Ossetians became friends of the Georgians. This is why Gamsakhurdia, an enemy of Ossetia, was able to find sanctuary in the Chechen area, since the Chechens and Ossetians had been in conflict with each other in Russia. Abkhazia, demanding independence from Georgia, also became a sanctuary for Gamsakhurdia, and there have been armed clashes between the Georgian army and Abkhazi commandos seeking to destroy the railroad lines. By early 1993 the war in Abkhazia, where Russian troops are giving support to anti-Georgian rebels, has created yet a new generation of refugees. To the south, in Adzharia, a nationalist leader was assassinated in April, 1991, during a demonstration in support of political autonomy. There is a spiral of violence in the making; the old Adzharian elite has been bribing the officers in the army garrisons in order to procure weapons.

Even the return to Georgia of Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgia's only hope to secure international recognition, could not douse the flames of violence. Although he was a key

figure in the Gorbachev attempt to resuscitate the Soviet Union, he served a long period as chief of the Georgian Communist Party. In 1978, when demonstrations took place on the streets of Tbilisi to protest restrictions on the Georgian language's official status, Shevardnadze gave in to the demands and avoided a possible round of violence. His heroic return amid the civil war sparked optimism. Indeed, he was able to negotiate an accommodation with Russia over Ossetia. But violence in Abkhazia (where Shevardnadze could not contain the bloody initiatives of his own Minister of Defense) and attacks by Gamsakhurdia's forces throughout Georgia continue into 1993. A culture of violence is emerging in post Soviet Georgia.

Explaining Ukrainian accommodation and Georgian violence

As was the case with the Catalonia/Basque Country comparison, it would be possible but not fruitful to find the roots of violence and accommodation in the present period in patterns of behavior or social structure from previous periods. In fact, as with the Spanish cases, a powerful story can be told to predict the *opposite* results. The standard national history of Georgia (Suny, 1988) points to that country's role, like Catalonia's, as an historic passageway, one in which ethnic and religious minorities could pass through, could integrate socially and culturally, and could operate commercially, without threat to their personal security. And as a passageway between the Ottoman and Russian empires, Georgian elites learned the importance of accommodating to the realities of power rather than fighting for autonomy. The late 18th and early 19th century incorporation into the Russian empire was accomplished without resistance, as the Georgian aristocracy well understood the realities of Russian power. During the Russian revolution, the Mensheviks were the most powerful force in Georgia. But when the Bolsheviks closed in on Tbilisi in 1921, the Mensheviks fled the capital city without a fight.

One can tell a mirror story of the militarization of Ukrainian society with the arrival of the Cossacks in the 15th century. Religious pogroms and inter-national wars mark Ukrainian history through World War II. These are not the only stories one could tell of the Georgian and

Ukrainian pasts, but they are plausible stories to explain a tradition of Georgian peaceful accommodation and Ukrainian violence. The problem is that in the post Soviet period, the outcomes have been different from what these stories would predict.

To be sure, in the post-Stalin period, Georgians were far more discriminatory toward minorities than were the Ukrainians. In Georgia, where Georgians make up 67 percent of the republic's population, in the 1969-70 school year accounted for 82.6 percent of the students in higher education. “National autonomy in Georgia had come to mean,” concludes Suny (1988: 304-05), “the exercise of local power against the unrepresented local minorities.” Meanwhile, Ukrainians constitute 74 percent of the population in the republic, yet make up only 60 percent of the students in the institutions of higher learning (Subtleny, 1988, 531). It might be argued that Georgian discrimination against minorities was a powder keg ignited by the freedoms associated with glasnost. But I don’t think this is a significant factor in explaining levels of post-Soviet violence. For one, violence in Georgia was as much intra-Georgian as it was between Georgians and minorities. Second, inter-national rancor was present, even prevalent, perhaps even more so than in Georgia, in post-Soviet Ukraine; but it was politically contained.

Contemporary observers of the post-Soviet ethnic scene are more likely to explain the diverse outcomes in Georgia and Ukraine by focussing on Karachi’s political skill in building coalitions and his *sangfroid* in handling crisis in comparison with Gamsakhurdia’s exclusionary rhetoric and megalomaniacal ambitions. Other explanations focus upon the Georgian fear of demographic and regional threat that mobilized them against outsiders in comparison with a more secure Ukrainian environment. While surely not wrong, these explanations have an *ex post* quality to them, and need to be interwoven into a theoretic fabric, as I shall try to do in re-examining the micro factors in light of the Georgian and Ukrainian experience.

Microfoundations of Post-Soviet Nationalist Violence and Accommodation

Anthropological research of the type reported in the Spanish cases need to be conducted in order to put the micromechanisms to close empirical scrutiny, and therefore to see if those mechanisms could account for Georgian violence and Ukrainian accommodation in the course of their national revivals. But it is nonetheless possible to give the outlines of a story, relying on those micromechanisms, to make sense of the post-Soviet national scene in Georgia and Ukraine.

(l) Rural Social Structure – Georgia's rural social structure appears to have maintained the organizational basis for terrorist organization while Ukraine, in the past half century, has become a highly urbanized republic whose small towns and villages could not contain their young men, thus making it far more difficult to create and sustain militant commando groups.

Georgia had a vibrant underground economy in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union. It is estimated to have reached 25 percent of the Georgian GNP, among the highest in the Union. A quasi-anthropological study (Mars and Altman, 1983) to explain the success of this economy, in the face of strict punishments by communist authorities, pointed to the importance of "network cores" that were constructed from family and business ties by those people who were most successful in this economy. These cores could be successfully and surreptitiously constructed because, in Mars and Altman's view (p. 548) Georgian village life is still based upon a culture of "honour" and "shame". This culture of honour pushes men to achieve personal economic successes that were not possible in the context of Soviet communism; but it also prevents members of the network from informing on illegal practices to central authorities. The tightness of village networks, it is concluded, helps explain both the motivation and the security of the Georgian underground economy. It is this same village organization that allows for the construction of commando organizations to fight intra-Georgian as well as anti-minority battles in the course of a nationalist revival.

In contrast, the rural social structure of the Ukraine changed immensely in the past generation. Massive rural-urban migration in the 1920s and 1930s were a function of Soviet policies to promote mining and industrial production in Ukraine (Liber, 1992: 49-52). Later, Khrushchev's Virgin Lands project induced 80,000 farmers from Ukraine to settle in eastern republics. But the rural-urban migration continued, and trends suggest that nearly 70 percent of Ukrainians will be living in large urban environments by the year 2000. As a consequence, the rural labor force in 1965 was 7.2 million; by 1980 it was down to 5.8 million. Subtleny (1988: 528) wryly notes that "on many collective farms it is the weathered old women who provide the main source of manual labor." And this, he argues, has broad cultural consequences (p. 527): "As the role of the peasant in Ukrainian society has diminished, the populism that was the hallmark of Ukrainian ideologies in the 19th and early 20th centuries has also faded. One can even argue that today the concept of the *narod* - in the traditional sense of the poor, oppressed peasant masses - no longer occupies a central place in the political thinking of Ukrainians." The point here is that the number of Ukrainian villages that can produce a nationalist vigilante like Stepan Khmara is small, and the local structures that would enable him to recruit a network of support organizations for commando operations are declining as well.

While rural social organizations have declined in Ukraine over the past generation, the Ukrainian Communist Party grew as fast as any republican party in the post-Stalin period. Khrushchev Ukrainized the party. Oleksiii Kyrychenko was the first ethnic Ukrainian to hold the post of first secretary, and since the Khrushchev period only Ukrainians have held that post (Subtleny, 1988: 497). While it remains to be seen whether the UkCP network survived intact through the 1980s, Kravchuk, a leading *apparatchik,* was able to reconstruct elements of that network and soundly defeated candidates with better nationalist credentials but without the rich organizational ties from the Soviet period. Perhaps being a west Ukrainian with political connections in the east, Kravchuk was able to unify support groups from both regions? In any event, a strong coherent and bureaucratically organized party is less likely to promote an untested and unstable figure like Gamsakhurdia into a position of highest office. The general

point is that commando action is less likely when nation-wide party organization has greater organizational presence than locally based social groups. In Ukraine, this was the case, and local commando actions were successfully policed.

(2) The Tipping Game - The normalization of the Catalan language, given that the costs for Spanish-dominant Catalans or immigrants to learn it successfully have been low, has not faced significant levels of private subversion, where people vote for normalization but privately undermine it, for example by sending their children to schools where Catalan is not taught. Meanwhile, learning Euskera for Spanish speaking Basques and immigrants requires substantial effort. The tipping model would account for Basque violence as a tactic to reduce the benefits of subversion of the nationalist project, to make the pay-offs for learning Basque comparable to the pay-offs for subversion. Violence was less necessary to move the Catalan tipping game toward a "100% R" equilibrium.

While a precise cost accounting of the Ukrainian and Georgian nationalist tipping games is not possible given available data, the pattern is similar to what we have seen in Spain. In the Ukraine, the *korenizatsia* campaign of the 1920s was a great success. While in 1922 only 20 percent of government business was conducted in the regional language, by 1927, 70 percent was conducted in Ukrainian. Schools, media, and cultural institutions followed suit. For example, in 1927 more than half the books published in the Ukraine were in the Ukrainian language and 55 percent of republican newspapers were in Ukrainian (Subtleny, 1988: 387-90). These changes laid a basis for Ukrainization of culture in the post-Stalin thaw, where the Ukraine language became established in cultural life, even in the heavily Russified east (Subtleny, 1988: 501). And so, the costs of Ukrainizing the society in the post-Soviet period are not so daunting. Even for immigrants, who are largely Slavic, learning Ukrainian, a language closely related to Russian, has relatively low costs. With the national project not-so-threatening to individuals, the need for violence to raise the costs of subversion is not so obvious.

To be sure, Georgian prospered in the Soviet period as a language of administration, education and culture (and thus it cannot be compared with the literary and administrative

desuetude into which Basque fell in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). None the less, the costs of accommodating to Georgian cultural hegemony are somewhat higher for a variety of groups than would be costs for comparable groups accommodating to Ukrainian. Georgian is a Caucasian language, which is a separate family from Indo-European (of which Slavonic, Baltic, Romance, Itanian and Armenian are members). Russians will therefore have a harder time learning it (but only two and a half percent fewer Russians in Georgia claim to know Georgian than Russians in Ukraine claiming to know Ukrainian) (Laitin, 1991: 172). Ossetian and Armenian are both in the Indo-European family; their speakers have been adamantly opposed to Georgian language hegemony. Even Abkhazians, whose language is in the Caucasian family, have higher costs adjusting to Georgian. Their language since the 1950s has relied upon a modified Cyrillic script, while the Georgian script is quite distinct. With Georgian being a non-Indo-European language with a non-Cyrillic and non-Latin alphabet, non Georgians pay a high cost to assimilate. And Georgians who became Russified have similar problems (Hewitt, in Kirkwood, 1990). There isn't sufficient evidence suggesting that any of the violence is related to this sort of accounting; but it has been reported that the Ossetian Popular Front appealed to Moscow rejecting the language measures reported in the Georgian press that would make Georgian the sole, official language of the new republic. With only 14 percent of Ossetians knowing Georgian, the proposed Georgian language law presented a daunting challenge. Inasmuch as north Ossetians have done very well in securing higher education in Russia, south Ossetians felt highly discriminated against in Georgia (RFE, 910215). Perhaps the combination of low Georgian birth rates and low incentives for minorities to assimilate gave radical Georgian nationalists a sense that the tip toward Georgianization would not occur unless minority groups and anti-nationalist Georegians were intimidated and even terrorized?

(3) Sustaining Mechanisms - Georgia has experienced in its recent history a few riveting episodes that have served as a triggering force in the establishment of a culture of violence. In 1956, for example, there was a quiet vigil at a monument to Stalin, a vigil that symbolized disgust with Khrushchev’s exposé of Stalin’s crimes. The Soviet army came in quickly, killing dozens of young people and wounding hundreds (Suny, 1988: 303). Perhaps

more relevant, a peaceful prodemocratic demonstration in Tbilisi in April, 1989 again brought in Soviet troops, and nineteen were killed, mostly elderly women and young girls. After that event, Soviet troops were routinely called the "army of occupation" in Georgian political discourse (RFE, 910215). The organization of the Knights of Georgia, which of course required a local social structure conducive to this type of recruiting, grew out of these bloody events.

The war in Ossetia, like the war between Gamsakhurdia and his former supporters, was not determined by history. Georgian authorities saw the Ossetian contacts with Russian authorities in regard to the language issue in 1989 as undermining Georgian sovereignty, and terrorist activities began. A spiral of events followed: the denial in 1990 to Ossetians to run candidates in Georgian elections; and the declaration of the South Ossetian Oblast Soviet as an "independent Soviet democratic republic" later that year. Very soon came a tyranny of sunk costs in perpetuating this guerilla war. When negotiations were proposed by the immediate successors to Gamsakhurdia, a south Ossetian leader found the status quo ante unacceptable, as "too much blood has been shed...For what? For us to return to the past?"

While it is too soon to say that the mechanisms leading to guerilla war in Georgia have created a self-sustaining culture of violence, and while Shevardnadze's leadership may undermine those mechanisms, the micro theory presented herein helps account for that violence. In the late Soviet period a few historically riveting events normalized violence in Georgia. The Georgian social structure, which maintains a strong local base for social groups, allowed for the recruitment of irregular militarized bands in the name of the nationalist cause. Fear of Georgianization of the entire society, costly for minorities, induced them to defy the Georgian nationalist project. And the realization by vigilantes that it would be irrational for many people who live in Georgia to become "Georgians" in a cultural sense, gave a motivation for nationalist groups to use violence. These mechanisms all point toward an explanation of how and why the Georgian national project became saddled with violence and terror.

Conclusion

In the introduction the reader was offered a panegyric on the comparative method that is spiced with the deductive logic of game theory. A careful reading of this paper, however, should lead one to worry somewhat about its methodological weaknesses. Here in the conclusion - after I have put my best foot forward, and where readers have already seen the bunions and bruises - is the proper place to address these weaknesses.

Surely I have propagated a myth of "controlled" variables! Any area specialist can point to scores of stunning historical, cultural, economic, and social differences between Basque Country and Catalonia, or between Georgia and Ukraine. Why did I just focus on the few that my predilections led me to identify? Why do I gloss over the unique and peculiar aspects of each nationalist movement while emphasizing the common? Perhaps causes can be found only in the unique concatenation of factors that are systematically undervalued by the comparative method? In a related concern, why do I assume that the causes of violence in Basque Country are the same as those in Georgia? Perhaps each experienced violence for different reasons, a point that is lost when one accepts the myth of control.

The comparative method has, however, a response to these compelling concerns. The world does not throw up perfectly controlled cases in order to allow political scientists to do better work. Comparativists must continue, Sisyphus like, to reconfigure their work to better isolate variables they think are important.[2] If the controls are inadequate, the comparativist should design an experiment that has better controls, say between a violent and peaceful Basque village with the same social structure. We should always be looking for "hard" cases that force us to re-examine our theories. For example, the notion that a indelible memory of violence in the course of a political movement normalizes violence for future interactions may have clear limits, as might be seen from the relatively peaceful Chinese student responses to the horrors of Tiananmen Square. The sanguinery hatreds of

[2] I mean Sisyphus: even if there are no general patterns, we should continue in our search for them.

the Spanish civil war, to use another example, gave communists, conservatives and liberals alike in Spain a sense that their movement for democracy ought to abjure violence. The comparative method should be used, then, to seek out the conditions when sudden and unexpected violence leads to cycles of further violence and when it leads to the coordinated acceptance by all conflicting parties to negotiate peacefully.

Critics should also recognize that the nature of the violence was different in the Basque and Georgian cases. In the former, the violence was directed at people who were associated with the policies and preferences of the center, and this phenomenon was the basis for the tipping game which explained the Basque case theoretically. In the latter, the intra-Georgian violence was not associated at all with disagreements about cooptation by the Soviet Union or Russia. Thus, the theoretic model is not directly applicable to the Georgian case. Another major difference between the two cases is that the Basque movement was never at war with national minorities within Basque country. Georgians, however, have fought intensely against Ossetians and Abkhazians.

Perhaps, however, we should celebrate the incommensurability of the Spanish and Soviet examples, as long as each of the paired comparisons is properly controlled. The fact that research shows similar mechanisms in the two cases of violence and the apparent absence of those mechanisms in the two cases of peaceful accommodation suggests the robustness of the relationship rather than the inadequacy of the design. To be sure, future theoretical work should reconfigure the theoretical model in an abstract way so that it identifies the players, the rationale for violence, and the mechanisms that produce violence equally for a wider range of cases. But a common story that helps illuminate apparently incommensurate cases is evidence of scientific success, not failure.

A critical reading of the game model will also lead one to worry about the methods by which actor preferences have been coded. I have claimed here that someone who speaks Basque fluently has a greater interest in the promotion of Basque identity, and will therefore receive a higher pay-off if Basque Country achieves independence. But what about the immigrants to Basque Country who have joined ETA? They get socially accepted by

the Basques if they become radical nationalists, and therefore get a high score for joining a violent brigade. These two cases suggest that with an eye on the ultimate choice, I can find a high pay-off for anyone who becomes an ETA. These codings therefore have a tautological element to them, as observations on the dependent variable become sources of information for coding on the independent variable.

Indeed, there is an element of tautology in the theoretical presentation herein. One way that network theorists address this problem is to assume a random distribution of preferences (Granovetter, 1978; Kuran, 1991). Then they can show rapid changes in recruitment into violent movements once a critical threshold is reached. No information on any particular person is necessary. They will say that they can't tell you why Sun Yat-sen, or anyone like that would become the first mover in a nationalist movement. We have no theory as to what is in the minds of social actors. All we can say is that there will be some people a few standard deviations off the mean, that they will be the first movers, and the question is the mechanisms for getting others who are only one standard deviation from the mean to follow.

The problem with this approach is that it gives one little sense of social structure, which is a key to understanding micro processes. I want to know why it was Sun Yat-sen in China who was the first to form a nationalist movement. I am willing to risk tautology, by trying to figure out what the distinctive pay-off matrices for the early movers are. The key to this research strategy is to develop coding mechanisms for pay-offs that rely on information distinct from observations of subsequent outcomes. This has not been done in the context of the present paper, but it is an area where future research in theoretically-attuned comparative politics needs to go. Some network theories (e.g. Petersen, 1991; Marwell and Oliver, forthcoming) are already making inroads into this problem.

For all its flaws and unsolved problems, the comparative method as used in this paper has been able to shed fresh light on the problem of violence and nationalism, and a summary of the results follows.

Violence, terrorism, commando action, and guerilla war are a related set of tactics that have been employed by groups involved in different sides of national revival movements. These tactics have been prevalent in Basque Country from the 1960s through the 1980s, and in Georgia since 1989. In similar national revival projects taking place in Catalonia since the 1960s and Ukraine since 1989, these tactics have played a much more restricted role. Political scientists and historical sociologists who have sought to explain these different outcomes have relied upon variables such as modernization breakdowns, attitudes of the populations, and ideologies. These macro factors have been shown to be insufficient for an explanation of the different outcomes.

Nothing inherent in nationalism leads to violence; but since national revivals compel people to make important changes in how they live their lives, violence and terror become an available tool for those supporting or those suppressing the national project. The tool of violence is not historically or culturally determined; it is triggered by factors incidental to macrosociological factors and to the prevailing nationalist ideology.

In light of the gaps in macrohistorical analysis, this paper has taken a different tack. It has relied upon the comparative method to highlight a variety of micro factors that help explain why certain nationalist movements become arenas for terror and others for peaceful bargaining. To be sure, national revival movements challenging relatively weak but tenacious central states give a rationale for violence. But there is a wide gulf between rationale and execution.

The gap between the rationale for and execution of violence is bridged when nationalist leaders can recruit in small villages and towns in which there are many social groups whose members are bound by codes of honor. The nationalist group needs also to go through a period of early euphoria, followed by a point in which it becomes irrational for most of those uninvolved in the national movement to join in. This is the point at which terrorist activities come to be seen as a possible way to reinvigorate recruitment. My theory cannot determine whether leaders will actually choose a violent path in order to get past the tipping point. But it does suggest that a stunning success by a rump group of

activists, or a bloody attack by forces from the center, may be required before the nationalist organization commits itself to a terrorist course of action. Once such a course of action is chosen, the tyranny of sunk costs and the strategic difficulties for states to make credible commitments to terrorists help perpetuate a culture of violence. That I can tell the stories of violence in Basque Country and Georgia highlighting these factors, while juxtaposing the stories of peaceful bargaining in Catalonia and Ukraine where these factors are less prominent, lends credence to the approach.

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