Instituto Juan March
Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (CEACS)
Juan March Institute
Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (CEACS)

Democratization, mass political culture and political legitimacy in Brazil

Author(s): Moisés, José Alvaro
Date 1993
Type Working Paper
Series Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 44 (1993)
City: Madrid
Publisher: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales

Your use of the CEACS Repository indicates your acceptance of individual author and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any document(s) only for academic research and teaching purposes.

DEMOCRATIZATION, MASS POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IN BRAZIL

José Alvaro Moisés

Estudio/Working Paper 1993/44
February 1993

José Alvaro Moisés is Director of the Research Center on International Relations and Comparative Politics and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of São Paulo. He presented this paper at a seminar held at the *Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences* of the Juan March Institute in Madrid, on December 9, 1992.

INTRODUCTION

Recent processes of democratization in different parts of the world in the 1980s and 1990s illustrate a paradox. Previous discussion by the specialized literature suggests that the legitimacy of a democratic regime depends basically on its effectiveness in producing material goods, and thus on recognition by members of the political community that it is doing a good job (1). However, recent cases of democratic transition in such different countries as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, East Germany and (to a certain extent) Spain and South Korea show that while the degree of popular dissatisfaction with the performance of new democratic governments has become intense - and sometimes bound up with similar degrees of dissatisfaction among citizens about the way political institutions work -, the new democratic regime in these countries still enjoys a reasonable level of support among the mass public (2).

This raises a challenge to traditional explanations which tend to see the relationship between political legitimacy and the degree of approval about government performance in a very instrumental way. Brazil is a case in point here; although it has been argued in recent years that - compared with neighbouring Argentina, Peru or Uruguay - the economic achievements of authoritarian government in Brazil were considerable (3), it is a fact that the advent of democracy coincided in this country with one of the worst social and economic crises of this century. But neither the military regime maintained the popularity it had at the outset, nor the effects of the recent crisis have blocked the aspiration that democracy should become generalised in all sectors of Brazilian society. How and why, then, does popular support for democracy grow - or fail to grow - after a transition from a non-democratic to a democratic form of regime ?

The available literature in political science and political sociology refers to at least three main models to explain the relationship between political regime and political legitimacy:

1) In the first place, a substantial part of the literature after World War II assumed that the development of political institutions - particularly of democratic

institutions - largely reflected the existence, among the mass public, of pre-existing political values. In fact, many works on political culture and/or on political development were based on the assumption that, as an independent variable, political values were largely responsible for both the stabilization and the continuity of political regimes over time;

2) Secondly, as a critical reaction against the kind of value and cultural determinism implied in the previous approach, writings in the 70's and the 80's argued, on the contrary, that political institutions (and therefore, political regimes) were both an outcome of the quality of the performance of governments and governmental structures and/or a consequence of a strategic choice made by relevant political actors. Clearly, in both cases the choice favouring the adoption of the democratic alternative would be essentially produced by some kind of instrumental rationality, one that, by all means, would not need the intervention of the pre-existence of any political values;

3) A third but more recent alternative is represented by the suggestion that political institutions and political values, as essential factors for the development of political regimes, strongly and reciprocally influence each other. The assumption now is that it is very important both to have well-functioning political structures (for instance, the party system and the structure of representative institutions) and political values that by themselves support and reinforce the optimal functioning of those institutions.

This paper discusses the paradox mentioned in the first paragraph and its implications for democratic consolidation in countries like Brazil. The argument follows two courses. On the one hand, it posits that exclusively deterministic and/or instrumental explanations are insufficient to understand the acceptance of democracy in Brazil and other democratizing countries apart from all their growing economic and social problems. On the other hand, even if the above mentioned fresh alternative (model 3) is not yet entirely developed, an analytical distinction arises between (a) acceptance of democracy as a clear indication of the

legitimacy of the new regimes; and (b) day-to-day disenchantment among the mass public about both the poor performance of governments and the way political institutions are working; in this respect, it is argued that a strong authoritarian tradition and a poorly working political structure inherited by the new regimes from the recent past are also crucial factors to explain both the above mentioned paradox and levels of popular adherence to democratic values.

PART I - PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

In order to properly address the relevant issues of this discussion, two preliminary considerations must be tackled here:

1. POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE.

In much of the recent literature on political transition, democratization is seen basically as the result of a strategic choice by the elites involved. This tends to discount the importance of creating a democratic culture (Di Palma, 1990; Przeworski, 1986 and 1989a; Morlino, 1980). The premise explaining this choice follows the well-known axiom of Robert Dahl (Dahl, 1971) in his deservedly famous *Polyarchy*. The central idea is that democracy becomes a preferential option among elites when the costs of suppressing opposition (or the suppression of basic social conflicts) exceed those of tolerance. The assumption is that changes of political regime take place *if* and *when* the elites concerned become conscious of the negative effects of the "war of every man against every man". At that point, some sort of combination of repression and representation becomes a preferable option (Przeworski, 1986 and 1989a).

Not all who follow this view reject, however, the importance of the conversion of the elites concerned to democratic values, but the nature of the argument over transition and democratic consolidation is clearly 'minimalist'. This means that democracy flourishes and becomes stable even if favourable structural and cultural conditions do not exist, but if (a) democratic structures geared towards institutionalising political competition have been established by

those elites, and (b) when the political loyalties and passive consent of those elites shift from the old to the new regime as the advantages of the new regime outweigh those of the old. The problem then, it is said, is

one of a choice which - institutionalising the uncertainties arising from conflict - provide at least minimal conditions for the elites to achieve their aims. It is clearly a calculation at once rational and instrumental (5).

To my view, there is no reason to cast doubt on the crucial importance of the decision of elites to opt for a democratic regime as a key factor for the transition from authoritarianism or totalitarianism to begin. A mere review of recent examples shows that when this was possible, democratization got under way and advanced with greater impetus than where this was not the case, or where - as shown by events in the old Soviet Union in 1990 and 1991 - it was insufficient. Whether in prompting the crisis of authoritarianism or guiding it towards new alternatives, the role played by elites in the emergence of democracy is certainly crucial.

But it is a different matter whether or not this is sufficient to ensure that democracy is taken to heart by other relevant or emerging groups in society, or indeed that a new regime is capable of consolidating under such particular conditions. Then, one of the central issues addressed in this paper is the lack of a theoretical or practical basis to the 'minimalist' argument in relation to the role played by mass political conditions in situations where a democratic government has replaced authoritarian rule, but a democratic regime is still not entirely established. In much of the literature on democratic transition there is an almost total absence of analytical treatment of the importance of non-elite groups' commitment to basic democratic values (6). The fact that this has been overlooked stems possibly from the way in which research has tended to apply itself to a 'genetic' approach to transition rather than to addressing vicissitudes in the development of democracy once it has been established. But this can no longer be justified. Most of the original cases of transition analysed previously are now

countries where democratic regimes are in the process of consolidation; the issue of whether or not the population has become accustomed to, and indeed support democratic practices is now a matter of concern (7). The important consequence of not giving sufficient consideration to the spreading of mass values when looking at key issues such as the equality before the law, its importance in dealing with social conflict, tolerance towards those who think or act differently, the right to dissent, the need for public controls over what governing groups do, etc, is shown by the lack of attention given in many instances to the creation of mechanisms to separate public life from private interests. In societies that have gone through democratic transition, the survival of archaic ways of practising politics, where the public dimension is dealt with as if it were a private matter, shows up these problems, and greatly increase the strategic difficulties that face democratic elites and other relevant actors that support the consolidation of democracy (8).

One example alone highlights the practical importance of this matter. It refers to some of the *new democracies* which are emerging from what Guillermo O'Donnell termed the 'second transition'. With representative systems of government insufficiently established, these are leading to what has been called 'delegative democracies' (O'Donnell, 1990; Weffort, 1991). On the one hand, these are popularly-elected governments, but on the other, the results of their electoral victories have tended to weaken the already fragile party systems in countries such as Argentine, Brazil and Peru. They combine popular support with a strong plebiscitarian component; charismatic leaders like Collor, Menem, and Fujimori feel they are (or were) authorised to interpret their democratic mandate so as to follow their own particular political designs. Similarities with populism in the 1950s and the 1960s are more than just coincidental. Because of the frustration arising from overly ambitious electoral promises - which have had enormous repercussions for the expectations of those who believed in the functioning of the democratic system - it is difficult to know how to set up mechanisms in such conditions as to make these regimes attractive to all competing interest groups.

The presidential system of government in Brazil is a case in point here, as the recent political crisis that ended with Collor's impeachment has shown. It concentrates enormous power in the hands of the executive, irrespective of the rules which give the legislature and political parties the ability/right to oversee its activities, and the president has a powerful armoury at his disposal when it comes to political bargaining. In such circumstances, it is virtually impossible to stop or correct abuses, whether through the legislature, the judiciary or private institutions of civil society.

But if it is clear that in these 'delegative democracies' the usual instruments of representative democracy do not disappear, they tend to work in a very precarious way. They are steam-rollered by charismatic leaders who are continually looking for greater freedom of manoeuvre in decision-making; they have to face high expectations from an electorate usually dissatisfied with the methods with which politics is conducted and with the lack of efficiency in everything relating to state institutions (9). In this context, it is not difficult to see how and why the mass public tend to give support even to anti-democratic and charismatic attempts of Presidents like Fujimori in their supposed efforts to tackle deep social and economic crises. Complementing the way in which the presidential system works, political parties in this setting become virtually redundant, losing their sense of representativity and, in the words of one of those analysts "the idea of accountability to those institutions or to other private or semi-private organisations appears as an unnecessary impediment to the full authority that the President has been delegated to exercise" (10).

This shows quite clearly that to look exclusively at the internal dynamics of the disintegration of authoritarianism does not exhaust the question that relates to the transformation of political regimes. Neither does the analysis of the way in which 'moderates' or 'hardliners', 'minimalists' or 'maximalists', 'progressives' or 'traditionalists' (both in power or in opposition) provoked or deepened the crisis and chose democracy as the 'second-best alternative' on offer (11). The specific way

in which the mass public influences this process - as it becomes 'accustomed' to democracy, begins to put pressure on democratic institutions or eventually supports those who threaten it - has to be considered also as a relevant factor in itself, which can shift the elites' allegiances towards a change of regime (12). This should not be underestimated, and still less ignored, in the analysis of democratization processes.

In fact, an examination of well-known cases of democratic consolidation shows that as well as involving a complex interaction between behaviour/attitudes and the ways in which political structures function (13), these factors are reinforced by the degree of autonomy of values and attitudes that characterise the political culture. This implies both processes of political socialisation and resocialisation of adult members of the political community and the 'passing of time': citizens tend not to entirely support democracy until they have seen it in operation for some time. However, it would be hard to argue that the creation of democratic institutions in Britain or the United States, for instance, did not go hand in hand with or benefit from the spreading of basic democratic values among the citizens of these countries (14). It is not a case of a simplistic dialectic between political structure and democratic values; these examples show that when democratic institutions are lacking, it is very difficult to develop democratic practices and customs such as tolerance towards those who think and act differently. At the same time, if political tolerance or the rule of law to resolve conflict are taken as contingent instruments and not things of permanent value, certain political institutions might lose their *raison d'etre*, go into decline and ultimately either disappear or become disfunctional (15).

Recent examples of democratization also confirm the importance for regime changes of the interaction between political culture and structure. The first is that of West Germany after World War II, which Almond and Verba's analysis in *The Civic Culture* (Almond & Verba, 1963) described as having a political culture that was parochial and insufficiently participatory or democratic. There the

convergence between values and political structure have been demonstrated by the very experience of Nazi-fascism and helps to explain the way in which mass political attitudes were congruent with the authoritarian structure of that regime. However, two decades later, research on public opinion orientations showed that the defence of democracy by the political parties and the exemplary way in which democratic institutions have worked, have resulted in basic democratic values becoming generalised throughout the German public. Part of the literature also underlines the deliberate effort made by both the occupation forces in the immediate post-war period and German national parties and governments to use education and persuasion to teach the superiority of basic democratic values (16). Similarly, post-Franco Spain also seems to show that it is not indispensable to have a pre-existing majority for democratic consensus (if this ever existed in the real world) for a democratic regime to be established. But as well as the need for the transition process (involving the behaviour and the choices of the relevant political actors) to promote the diffusion of these values, the existence of some initial basis of pro-democratic feelings and attitudes also seems to be very important (17).

Even so, on the basis of the available empirical evidence, it is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion as to the direction of the causality of this phenomenon: i.e., whether democratic institutions produce a political culture that is favourable to democracy, or vice-versa. As Lijphart (Lijphart, 1980) and Kavanagh (Kavanagh, 1980, 1983) have recalled, even conceding that the political structure has a big influence in the creation of a democratic culture, it is impossible completely to separate the action of building institutions from the overall values held by the relevant actors involved. It is not necessary to resort to psychological explanations to see that (a) decisions taken by those actors in relation to political structure are coloured by contextual circumstances, i.e. the nature of political conflict, the way in which the actors interpret it and current and inherited patterns of political behaviour; (b) self-interest explanations are

insuficient to interpret actor's preferences in such circumstances because different actors - in similar objective situations - can respond in very different ways. Perhaps it would be most appropriate to talk, of the "reciprocal influence between action and political beliefs" as Rustow does (18). At this point, it would be necessary also to take into account the processes by which political identities are formed. These identifies lead the actors concerned to take decisions on the best strategies to adopt in order to attain their objectives, but do not stop them reacting to impulses from either objective conditions (including the strategies of others) or subjective factors such as the stimulus of beliefs, aspirations, desires and values. In other words, actor's preferences are determined by a set of alternatives and objective conditions, but also by subjective conditions, such as their understanding of the nature of the political regime in which they live, in other words, its legitimacy (19). Even though it is true that in this process the "internalised norms" can be reaffirmed, reformed or rejected through different processes of socialisation, it would be hard to argue that this takes place outside the context of social interaction (20). To speak, for instance, of a rationality that is defined outside (or prior to) the context of objective influences that blend with traditions and values, would imply a rationality outside real social life - or of social actors which were formed prior to them actually forming society.

If it is correct that political culture is insufficient to generate a democratic regime on its own - and if the process of constructing this regime involves in addition what some writers recently have correctly termed the 'crafting' of institutions (Di Palma, 1990) - this is not to say that political values -that is, the dimension that refers to expressive and symbolic politics, -are not a necessary condition. For instance, just as this 'crafting' ultimately depends on how the democratic institutional 'package' is presented to those elites who participated in the authoritarian regime and who shift to supporting the democratic regime, it becomes impossible to distinguish completely between strictly rational intentions and specific choices which affect political structure but arise also from a context of

social, cultural and political values (21).

2. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND POLITICAL STABILITY.

A second central consideration refers directly to the question of political legitimacy. Most of the dominant paradigms in political science over the last 20 years which deal with the relationship between legitimacy and political stability are rooted - directly or indirectly - in Joseph A. Schumpeter's critique of classical democratic theory. In his influential work, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (first published in 1942), Schumpeter sought to develop a 'realistic' model for the way democracy works, counterposed to what he considered the excessively speculative and normative foundations of classical democratic theory (22).

Schumpeter's theory of 'competing elites' was based on what he identified as the real empirical foundations of current political reality in the majority of consolidated democracies: that the formation of governments is a function of free competition between political leaders, via political parties, for the preferences of voters. This simple 'method', Schumpeter argued, gave the governed the power to select political leaders who in seeking power, look for public authorisation. They therefore provide a 'supply' in the 'political market' through the electoral promises they make. These promises shape 'demand'; in other words, the electorate can select those leaders who come closest to meeting their own views on how the political system should work. Accordingly, during the phase of electoral competition political leaders who wish to be elected should only make promises they will be able to keep.

It is worth discussing some of the implications of this theoretical model for the analysis of democratic legitimacy. Firstly, for the Schumpeterian 'school', democracy is essentially a mechanism through which the overall aspirations of the 'common people' (the electorate) are registered in the political system through electoral competition. However, once their choice is cast about who should govern them, they no longer have a function, and - until the next election - they delegate

the task of producing satisfactory public policy to those supposedly trained and/or with the experience to do so. Secondly, stemming from this specific conception of the relationship between the governed and those who govern, the optimal working of the political system derives from an 'equilibrium' - a function of the stability of the political system - which all systems aspire to reach. Its basic aim is to balance citizens' demands with the capacity of the government to meet them (23). Phenomena such as the deterioration in the authority of those governing and/or withdrawal of support by those governed, can only take place when a government has to confront demands whose number and complexity require responses that are beyond its capacity to provide. Put another way, these phenomena arise when the government is unable (for whatever reason) to reaffirm its capacity to govern, i.e. when it fails to persuade the citizens to reduce the demands they made.

Schumpeter's conception of political legitimacy has been very influential in contemporary political science, but it is clear that some points should be critically assessed in relation to the issues examined here. Firstly, it now seems clear that the theory of 'equilibrium' is not supported, as was once believed, by the empirical evidence. Different authors from a variety of theoretical schools have argued that the effects of 'overloading' of demands on the state and/or a 'crisis of legitimacy' have produced in the past few decades a sharp fall in citizens' trust in governments and political parties in countries with consolidated democracies (United States, United Kingdom), without this in any way eroding support for the political system itself (24). In fact, in these countries there seems to be a 'reservoir' of political legitimacy based on a minimun mormative consensus about the workings of the democratic system, which is greater and more effective than the theoreticians of 'equilibrium' wished to believe, irrespective of the approval ratings of those in government (25).

Secondly, it is not yet possible to come to the definitive conclusion that the incapacity of the state to satisfy the 'overloading' of demands by citizens is the only, or even the most important source of political dissatisfaction - even if it is

related to support for specific governments. Indeed, as the extensive literature shows, essentially political factors such as the inadequacy of institutions (poorly structured party systems, lack of genuine representativity or coalitions which fail to articulate voter preferences) can become potential sources of disruption as the members of a political system no longer feel that their interests are properly represented or that they are able to oppose the predominant policy orientations if they wish to. This almost always leads to their trust in the system being undermined (26).

Furthermore, research that has tested the key hypotheses of the theories of 'overloading' of the state and 'crises of legitimacy' suggests that the analytical refinement needed for looking at the notions of 'political support', 'trust in government' and 'political legitimacy' requires a clear distinction to be drawn between two basic dimensions of the phenomenon. While some research came across a strong statistical correlation between indicators measuring political support and trust in government, it is also clear that indicators measuring the degree of satisfaction with democracy *per se* (legitimacy, political cynicism) interact independently with the above, even when citizens' political behaviour reveals a high degree of protest and hostility towards those in government (27).

Thus, on the basis of these empirical studies, as well as those reporting the recovery in the 1980s in political support for governments and political parties in countries like the United States and Great Britain (where the problem had originally emerged), it has been possible to underline these findings. Indeed, changes in government arising from electoral competition have proved capable of producing important shifts in the way citizens perceive the workings of political institutions, as well as in their capacity to mediate in the distribution of resources. Their trust in the political regime *per se* has become more stable and less prone to being rocked by temporary phenomena such as the poor performance of those in government, even though there may have been high levels of dissatisfaction with political institutions. For this reason, Citrin and Gabriel, among others, recently

suggested the readoption of the analytical distinction made years ago by David Easton and Seymour Lipset between the 'diffuse' nature of citizens' support for the system itself (its legitimacy) and 'specific' support for governments, incumbents and their specific policies (effectiveness) (28). Inasmuch as legitimacy or diffuse political support refer to attitudes towards the way the political system works - ie. those mechanisms which guarantee competition to choose and to control governments - effectiveness of specific support is related to satisfaction with the performances of those in government or by the perceived results of government. Both Easton and Lipset stressed, in the case of the former, the symbolic and expressive nature of the basic attitudes involved; and for the latter, the mainly instrumental nature of citizens' judgments on governments and those that form them (29).

The conclusion seems fundamental. Even if in consolidated democracies, loss of trust in politicians, criticism of their actions and dissatisfaction with those in power can all generate serious political disturbances, they do not necessarily create the conditions for a change in the system. The reason for this is clear. Members of a political system may have strong motives, in certain circumstances, for complaining about their living conditions and blame their political leaders for them; they may complain about their shortcomings or the way they go about public business; they may even want to punish those in government by withdrawing their support for them at the next elections. This does not exclude, however, their accepting (a) the existence of a public sphere (state, governments, etc.) as something separate from civil society, (b) the procedures through which authority in the public sphere is sanctioned, and (c) the feelings of being a part of a national community of which the state and governments are expressions. In other words, when adequately structured to represent the citizens, the political system offers alternatives through which its members can compete for the resources to which they aspire, by which the discontented can get rid of the source of their discontent (i.e., governments insensitive to their demands); and in which

contingent crises of support for governments (and those in them) and for political parties, do not necessarily become fundamental crises of the legitimacy of the political system (30).

Analytically, the attempt to draw a clear theoretical distinction between 'diffuse' and 'specific' support turns on the long-term effects of loss of political support by governments and those who form them, when the tendency does not correct itself and thus becomes chronic. The basic idea is that when the political system provides its members with the feeling that there are real or potential institutional alternatives that might channel their aspirations better, or - more importantly - that allow for things to be changed if necessary, long-term political support is ensured and a 'reservoir' of legitimacy is created. This suggests that even though the 'passage of time' factor is important for the stabilisation of democracy, it is vital that these specific institutional conditions exist. When they do not exist, destabilisation might occur. Indeed, the example of European countries in the 1930s, which not only suffered the hard consequences of economic and social crisis but also underwent lengthy periods of ineffective government owing to lack of trust in the political system, suggests that the long drawn-out crisis of support leads almost invariably to the destruction of democracy and the establishment of totalitarian regimes (31).

But if the analytical distinction between political legitimacy and governmental effectiveness holds good for cases where a democratic regime has been well established for many decades, it becomes less certain in situations where a new democratic regime emerges from a transition that was long, faltering and ambiguous, as was the case in Brazil. In this sort of situation the 'passage of time' is by definition unable to generate all the expected results, and the democratic regime is far from being consolidated. Even if support for democracy is widespread, less than a decade does not seem to be long enough to generate the necessary 'reservoir' of legitimacy which, in consolidated democracies, is an intrinsic part of regime continuity over time (32).

However recent analyses of political attitudes among the mass public in countries like Spain, East Germany and South Korea after the demise of authoritarianism/totalitarianism, suggest that even during a 'honeymoon' period in relations between citizens and a new government, there is a tendency for people to judge the new regime by contrast with the old. Whether by valuing democracy or expressing dissatisfaction with its practical deficiencies, so long as they do not express a desire to return to the former regime, most citizens weigh one up against the other, balancing the advantages of the present over the past. The deciding factor is certainly a practical or instrumental matter, but the comparison between the present and the past does not limit itself simply to the distribution of material resources; it also involves an appreciation of the distribution of symbolic resources brought by the advent of democracy. In almost all recent cases of democratization, these have also played a key role in the recovery of public life, as mobilizations for the defence of human rights have sometimes suggested (33).

Moreover, cases like that of Brazil require additional matters to be considered. By definition, they are political systems lacking institutional strength. Political representation, electoral competition, the functioning of the party system and public control over political life are all affected by the deficiencies of the recent authoritarian past. The degree to which the mass public perceives the comparisons between regimes might be necessarily limited. Although a more refined analytical model on the relationship between legitimacy and regime consolidation should include both the instrumental and symbolic dimensions of political life - as well as the ways in which citizens internalise their recent experience with democracy and authoritarianism and, therefore, compare them - cases such as that of Brazil stand out because of other characteristics too. Actually in fact, some of the 'new democracies' that have arisen as a result of the latest wave of democratization in different parts of the world can be defined as hybrid political regimes. This arises from the survival of leaderships and state structures belonging to the authoritarian past which combine with new democratic institutions. Indeed, as is

shown by the Brazilian case in particular, the preservation of the overriding control exercised by the armed forces over political life, the survival of union corporatism, the strength of the executive branch vis-a-vis the legislature and even the judiciary, all justify the conclusion that while "democracy is new, the state is old" (34). In this country, the *modus operandi* of the new democratic regime fuses with the dynamic which activated parliamentary institutions, political parties, the courts and government at the local, state and national level during the previous regime. Indeed, although the changes brought in with the 1988' Constitution (which supposedly was the crowning glory of the political transition) produced some minor institutional changes, in terms of representing the citizens in the political system, they failed to correct the main distortions which predominated in the authoritarian phase or even before it.

All this survivals helped to confuse the image of what the new democratic regime means. There were few changes in the political parties, in electoral legislation, in parliamentary procedures and in the different levels of government activity. It is clear that the electorate's opinions towards the new democratic regime were shaped by this reality (35).

PART II - DATA ANALYSIS

1. COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL

The democratic transition in Brazil took more than a decade, generating a broad and complex movement opposed to authoritarianism which helped to redefine both the elites' commitment to the political regime as well as to propagate the virtues of democracy among the masses. Various factors contributed to this. Firstly, the experience of State terror prompted a profound shift in political attitudes among different social sectors towards what was usually called 'formal' democratic rights. Secondly, the beginning of the democratic 'opening' coincided with moments of crisis in the international and the national economy (1972-73)

and helped to 'socialise' dissatisfaction - which had been limited up to that point to popular sectors - among the business elite which became progressively more disenchanted with the authoritarian regime. Thirdly, two decades of economic and social modernisation not only changed the societal morphology but caused a large degree of socio-political mobilisation, triggering in turn new and more complex patterns of social expectations and greater demands on the state. Last, but not least, the authoritarian regime in Brazil coexisted with the survival of a semi-competitive political system which provoked not only splits and political mobilisation among the elites but which also led to a permanent de-legitimisation of authoritarianism. Even in a system of only semi-autonomous political parties, periodic elections inevitably would lead to widespread public discussion about the problems of the regime and possible alternatives to it. The consequences are well known: the deepening of divisions among the elite; plebiscitary elections which take on clear anti-regime characteristics; and widespread social mobilisation which frequently turns into pro-movements democracy. This is the context in which changes took place in Brazilians' political beliefs and values. (see Table 1 - all Tables appear in Appendix 2).

Indeed, at the beginning of the 1980s, it became clear that the country was on the way to becoming a democratic regime. The reintroduction of direct elections for State governors in 1982 was a kind of turning point which prompted some analysts to begin talking about the existence of a 'diarchy' in Brazil (Linz, 1978). Although restricted to limited areas of the country, opinion surveys provided some evidence confirming that mass opinion in Brazil was growing increasingly critical of the regime (Rochon and Mitchell, 1987). But it would still take nearly a decade for democratic values to actually generalize among all sectors of society and reach the level of 1989, when the first direct presidential elections were held. By that time, the population had already experienced almost two four-year periods of elected state governments, and these in many cases led to a dashing of in the sort of popular expectations of political, economic and social change formed in the

transition period. At the same time, the country had witnessed a spectacular and unprecedented mass mobilisation in defence of direct elections for the presidency, although the electoral calendar was nevertheless postponed until the end of the decade (36). As for the influence that the new political structure could have had in the political culture of the mass public, it would be tempting to conclude that such experiences did not provide a good starting-point for democratic convictions to take root among the Brazilian masses. However, the evidence derived from the available data suggests the contrary that the interaction between the process of institution-building and the formation of democratic values at that stage of the Brazilian political transition might have had some margin of autonomy in its development. Indeed, although it is necessary to be careful about making comparisons - since the figures for 1989 and 1990 are nationwide, while those for 1972 and 1982 are only for the South-east and some state capitals - some aspects of Table 1 are striking. Firstly, we see that between 1972 and 1990, the percentage who saw the military as an option for resolving the country's problems fell notably, even though six years after the authoritarian regime ended if still accounted for more than one-third of the electorate. Secondly, although there is not a significant change in the course of the 20-year period, the oscillation in public opinion towards the role of political parties is remarkable, especially in the middle of the period, which in turn made it more difficult to stabilise mass convictions about such important institutions for a democratic regime. Even so, about a half of those interviewed in most of the years saw them as having some importance. Finally, the data also shows that the beginning of democratic consolidation - in the late 1980s - coincided with more widespread acceptance of basic democratic rights such as participation in elections, right to vote for illiterates and the idea that 'the people' are able to intervene in public life. So the data shows that the political outlook of the mass of the Brazilian population has changed over these 20 years.

Table 2 turns to the important question of democratic legitimacy. Making use of a question already included in previous survey research in Chile, Argentina

and Spain, the interviewers asked the Brazilian electors whether they preferred a democracy, a dictatorship or whether they did not have any preference at all concerning the political regime. Clearly, the question was designed to function as a test for democratic legitimacy and corresponds to two aspects of the above discussion on the relationship between political legitimacy and political regime: (a) on the one hand, it was meant to be used as a direct indicator of the public adherence to the symbolic dimension of politics; (b) on the other hand, the question referred to the actual existing political alternatives at that time in societies like Brazil and sought to capture the actual tendencies of the mass public with regard to these alternatives. (But, phrased as it was, the question implie a clear conceptualization of democracy as a categorical or qualitative variable with all its implications; I shall return to this point later.)

The data correspond to a series of six surveys taken between 1989 and 1992 and table 2 shows that Brazilians prefer a democratic government to a dictatorship or to an attitude of indifference about the political regime; in fact, the indices vary from a little more than 40% in September 1989 to nearly 50% three years later. If it is taken into consideration that 20 years ago some opinion surveys showed a strong majority (actually, more than 80%) supporting the military regime in the country (37), these results suggest a remarkable change in the orientations of the Brazilian mass public; but it is not at all irrelevant that at the beginning of the 1990s a quarter of Brazilian electors still prefer an authoritarian regime, while one fifth simply do not have a clear preference. This seems to show that while nearly a half of the Brazilian society is now explicitly commited to the building of a democratic regime, the other half is divided among those who clearly prefer the alternative represented by a dictatorship, do not have a preference or are unable to choose any alternative.

Even so, one might say that up to 1989 and 1990 a second step towards the consolidation of mass democratic values may have occurred in Brazil, as the data also show that the tendency is slightly growing. This conclusion is also backed up

by the dramatic developments of the final phase of the transition period. On the one hand, the 1989 presidential elections came to represent the end of the transition. The conquest of direct elections had a strong significance, as the majority took them as signifying the end of the authoritarian regime. On the other hand, the elections marked the end of a very ambiguous period - the first civilian government of the post-authoritarian government (1985-89). Indeed, while under Sarney the main party in government, the PMDB, was also the main opposition force against the preceding regime, the president and many other key figures of his government were themselves examples of the continuity between the past and the nascent democratic regime. The problems this government had in demonstrating its capacity to govern in part stemmed from its ambiguous nature. This frequently immobilised a divided government with only precarious legitimacy. At times, it also led it to adopt a strategy of framing policy decisions around expected electoral outcomes (Moises, 1990). Its problems were also related to the institutional crisis itself when it came to revising the constitution, as there was paralysis every time the Constituent Congress, in fulfilling its mandate, sought autonomy from and clashed with the preferences of the executive (Albuquerque, 1990). The results are well-known. Once again popular expectations about solving economic and social problems were not fulfilled. Frustration grew with the way institutions worked and signs of disenchantment with the new political institutions became increasingly evident. As the 1989 electoral campaign showed, the demise of the authoritarian regime became a time of disillusionment (Moises, 1991).

2. ADHERENCE TO DEMOCRACY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Analysis of opinion changes during regime transformation can be insufficient if only based on data of one national case alone. In order to view more adequately the significance of these developments in the political convictions of the Brazilian electorate, the analyses tried to look at the patterns observed in a broader context by comparing them with available results from other countries

which are experiencing (or have experienced) a similar process of democratization.

Table 3 sets out preference for political regimes in a comparative perspective. Two things are immediately apparent: firstly, adherence to democracy is clearly lower in Brazil than in Chile, Argentina or Spain; secondly, data for almost all countries suggest that the 'time sequence' might be a variable to be taken into consideration, a point which the German experience also suggests. On the other hand, taking into account that any comparison has to be seen in terms of different historical conditions it refers to and in relation to the different connotations of the indicators used, it is important to consider two other points: (a) Firstly, there is a longer and more deep-rooted democratic tradition at least in Chile and Argentina than in Brazil. To mention just one factor, while Brazil is still trying to consolidate a party system, parties that had already appeared in Chile and Argentina (and in this respect, also in Spain) at the end of the last century played a key role in democratization of these latter countries; (b) Secondly, contrary to the experience at least of Argentina, Uruguay and Peru, authoritarianism in Brazil brought relative success in the economic sphere and with it significant social and economic modernisation; this might have influenced different sectors of the public opinion when comparing the two different political regimes, but this is also disputable, as Spain would be a complete exception since modernisation in this country was also very important. Clearly, this might be due to the fact that although modernisation has had an important impact in Brazil, inequalities are so great and so deeply rooted in this country that it was still not enough, for instance, to substantially change patterns of distribuition of educational resources among different sectors of Brazilian society (c) Thirdly, another key factor for understanding such differences in the level of adherence to democracy seems to be the fact that Brazil involved less brutal forms of repression when compared with the other cases, particularly with Argentina and Chile; in fact, if the symbolic dimension of politics is effectively taken into consideration for comparison among political regimes, the deeper the experience with State terror

during the authoritarian experience, the broader the adherence to democracy tend to be. All these circumstances, also called by some authors the 'paradox of success', made the experience of dictatorship in Brazil less traumatic and the memories of it less durable in this country. But the data presented above clearly suggest that, with the 'passage of time', a majority of Brazilians is forming with a preference for democracy.

3. THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION IN BRASIL

Why do Brazilians uphold such low levels of adherence to democracy? Are there inner factors - other than the historical ones - that could explain those results? In order to explore these questions, the analysis focused on the extent to which the Brazilian mass public is cognitively mobilized to the world of politics. As it has been also suggested by Shin (Shin, 1992), "in an information society (...), cognitive skills are increasingly required for individual citizens to deal with the complexities of politics and make their own political decisions".

In view of this, a scale was constructed to measure degrees of political sophistication among the mass public. The original hypothesis stems from what Neuman (Neuman, 1985) and others termed the 'theory of the three publics'; that is, the notion that mass publics in unequal and complex societies divide up on the basis of economic, social and political differentiation into three basic segments: an elite of around 5% composed of the most active, best informed and most articulate members of society; an intermediate public of 75%, moderately articulate and politically informed, but which shares a reasonably homogeneous pattern of opinion and behaviour; and lastly, the remaining 20% which remain apathetic, uninformed and disinterested both about political participation and public life in general. The theory is backed up by extensive empirical evidence encountered in societies with consolidated democratic systems of government, but in which there is greater economic and social homogeneity and much less inequality than in Latin America. For this reason, as this is to offer a useful point of departure for

examining the way in which opinion is formed in mass societies, it is necessary to take into account the large differences in socio-economic structure; it is worth recalling the differences in educational standards - one of the main variables of sophistication - between the United States and Brazil. For this reason, the hypothesis has to take into account the proportion of the 'uninformed, uninterested and least active' in Brazil being at least double that for developed countries. The 'intermediate' public would represent around 50%. Given some global characteristics of the way it is formed, the elite - those who live from politics, are involved in it and form opinions about it - would probably vary less, perhaps between 5-10% - a similar sort of proportion as in developed countries. Two aspects of this theory, however, make it interesting for analysing the Brazilian case. On the one hand, it is analogous to the concept of politicisation, as it relates to the basic conditions for political participation. Those social sectors lacking intellectual or information resources are similar to those classified as 'apathetic' or 'inactive'; their inconsistent behaviour stems from this apathy, alienation and inaction. At the same time the theory holds that those in the 'middle' segment, though much better equipped intellectually to develop their perception of reality than those in the 'inactive' segment, are still very far from being comparable to those mobilised by the activists who by definition, tend to manipulate basic political concepts to 'undertake, debate or diffuse' politics. Indeed, although able to follow politics and define themselves politically, these intermediate groups are not sufficiently equipped to make logical relationships between their points of view, nor do they necessarily do so in a homogeneous way. Even though politics may be something important for them, this does not stop their outlooks and views reflecting the unequal distribution of intellectual resources, information etc (Milbrath, 1965).

Three criteria were used to construct the scale: the degree of mobilisation of information, the salience of politics for the interviewees and the capacity and precision of those interviewed in conceptualising certain concepts about political life. Starting with this conceptual framework, it was possible to elaborate a scale

that was not only additive but cumulative. In other words, those who were able to respond positively to a more exacting question are also able to do so for a less complicated one which, for instance, only tests his stock of information on the world of politics. Inversely, it is most unlikely that an interviewee who fails to get beyond the elementary stage will reach the levels required for a more sophisticated response, ie., being able to conceptualise what is 'democracy', 'the left' and 'the right' in politics. The advantage of this sort of measure over that used, for instance by Converse (Converse, 1980), is that the more sophisticated concept will bring in not only the segments of the elite or groups close to it (because of the inequalities in access to education), but also different segments among the mass public which, despite their lack of resources, do feel the impact of politics in their lives in different ways, do become more or less interested in politics and do experience the effects of political resocialisation.

The data in Table 4 come from the survey of September 1989. Initially, one observation can be made. The profound changes prompted by economic and social modernisation that occurred in Brazil in the last 20 years have to be taken into account. Although it is impossible to deal extensively with this matter here, it is necessary to take into consideration the two types of effect which result from the changes that have been taking place since the mid-1950s in Brazil, and which were at their strongest during the military governments. On the one hand, these cause profound alterations in social morphology, giving new dimensions to the size and importance of different social groups, expanding wage labour, incorporating new sectors (like female labour and youth) and deepening capitalist relations. On the other, they redefined the relationship both among these social groups and between them and the state. They gave rise to large-scale mobilisation in defence of their interests, and to greater economic and social demands on the state. Thus they helped to break down the corporatist structures through which workers, business groups and governments had previously related to one another. Important consequences of this process of modernisation have been: (a) the fact

that today Brazil is essentially an urban society, with more than three-quarters of the population living in cities; (b) although a pattern of highly unequal income distribution persists, the educational system has expanded a great deal, and has oriented itself to the needs of the poorer and unprivileged masses; and (c) the media and cultural industries effectively integrated the whole of the population in an enormous information market. Whatever may be said about the political orientation of this market, it cannot be denied that it has had an effect in increasing the availability of information about political life. Among the most significant of these changes are the emergence of social movements and the formation of new political parties (38).

Tables 4 and 5 show, meanwhile, that even if modernisation helped to educate the population as a whole to deal with social and political realities, it did not annul the effects of economic, social and regional inequality; in some cases it even accentuated them. Indeed, confirming the evidence presented in the massive literature on this topic, the tables show that the mass public's political sophistication is that much greater when the population is concentrated in middle-ranking or large cities. This level of sophistication is connected with the variables that form the 'tripod' of political participation - income, education and occupation. It would be fanciful to think that the 'conservative modernisation' put into practice by the military governments in Brazil would have profoundly altered the pattern of inequality which lies at the root of the paradigm in which those with higher incomes are those with better education and with non-manual jobs, and who at the same time are those who participate most in public life. But, inasmuch as they influence the general conditions in which these changes take place for the whole mass public, the contradictory effects of modernisation confirm the relevance of the theory of the three publics.

4. DISTRIBUTION OF THE MASS PUBLIC IN THE SCALE OF DEMOCRATIC/AUTHORITARIAN ATTITUDES

Sophistication, however, is but a prerequisite for the formation of political convictions. On its own it does not resolve the problem of the consistency of opinions about democracy. This is also due to the fact that the mass public - in its complexity - does not experience choosing between different regime alternatives as a sharp well-defined choice; the existing evidence suggests that whereas a major sector of the mass public might turn towards a specific alternative at a certain point in time, this does not mean that the public will 'buy' a single package of beliefs and democratic values, and that it will extend its convictions into all spheres of social life in a uniform way. Even if the beliefs and attitudes which legitimate democracy are formed within certain margins of autonomy, they cannot be ascertained by the categorical conception of democracy or democratic transition. As argued by Shin, "such a static conception of a regime as either a democracy or a nondemocracy makes it difficult to accurately comprehend the rapidly changing process of democratic transformation" (39). Adherence to democracy can be better understood if the concept refers to a continuous variable and set free to take on different values.

To verify the relevance of this hypothesis, the study turns to the specific role played by democratic beliefs, conceptualising them as part of a continuum rather than as the components of an homogeneous 'package'. This involved taking data on the the political regime, attitudes towards democracy and the repression of political rights. As they grouped together when factorial analysis was done, the data was construed according to Guttman's scale.

Table 6 refers to results of certain correlations conducted from the scale. In the first place, it is clear that more than two thirds of those interviewed who, classified on the democratic-authoritarian continuum favoured the less authoritarian level of the scale, corresponded to those who clearly for a democratic regime. Secondly, it becomes evident that, depending on the indicators used, the intensity of the association varies. Since the formation of democratic convictions is multi-dimensional, it does not imply homogeneity of responses. This suggests, for

instance, the advantage of working on the hypothesis of the formation of various political sub-cultures in Brazil using the data for occupation and level of education to explain differences in convictions and the diversity of certain responses.

Is there any statistical association between levels of sophistication and positions on the democratic-authoritarian continuum? Is the position of individuals on this continuum and on the scale of sophistication correlated to any extent with commitment to political values? In order to test this second question the explicit response of those interviewed about their preference as to political regime, was taken as an indicator and then they were divided between the responses on the one hand of those who prefered democracy or dictatorship, and on the other of those who declared themselves to be indifferent or unable to answer the question. The results are set out in Tables 7 and 8.

The most sophisticated tend to classify themselves preponderantly on the democratic end of the continuum; the least sophisticated at the authoritarian end. But what is most striking is - as the original hypothesis suggests - that the public situated in the intermediate strata are divided almost equally among the three positions on the continuum. Although not a phenomenon of causation, this shows that starting from the supposition that sophistication precedes commitment to values, we can reach the conclusion that the degree of heterogeneity in relation to the levels of sophistication encountered in middle groups is closely associated with their differentiation in terms of commitment to political values. At the same time, commitment to values (measured by the question about political regime preferences) is more positive among those who classify themselves as 'democrats' and as 'authoritarians' than among those who take an 'intermediate' position. Moreover, the lack of sophistication is associated more closely with those who are not committed to values than those who are. But, more importantly, the correlation between sophistication and the position on the democratic-authoritarian continuum, when controlled by the variable of commitment to values shows that the intensity of the association between sophistication and the position

on the continuum is greater when those interviewed are committed to political values.

5. INSTRUMENTAL AND SYMBOLIC DIMENSIONS IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

The next step was to look at the relationship between the instrumental and symbolic dimensions of politics. It implied constructing a more complex set of attitudinal indicators, using Likert and Guttman's scales. These lend themselves to measuring three key issues in question with greater precision: 'political cynicism', 'trust in institutions' and 'satisfaction with the government'. On the basis of factor analysis of data from the 1989 survey, the cynicism scale (geared towards identifying trends of acceptance or rejection of political life among the mass public) was constructed on the basis of the following questions: (1) 'The good thing about elections is that you can swap the vote for something material'; (2) 'Politics is so complicated that people don't understand what is going on'; (3) 'No matter how much you may wish to change things, there will always be poor people and rich people in Brazil'; (4) 'It's nonsense to change the laws in Brazil, because they are not obeyed'. For its part the scale of judgments on the input mechanisms in the political system was constructed on the basis of these questions: (1) 'Do you have confidence or not in the courts?'; (2) 'Do you have confidence or not in the National Congress?'; (3) 'Do you have confidence or not in the federal government - ie. in the president and the ministers?'; (4) In your opinion, do city councillors fulfill their job in making regulations and controlling the use of public money?'; (5) 'In your opinion, do your state deputies fulfil their function in making regulations and controlling the use of public money?'; and (6) 'In your opinion, do deputies and senators from the National Congress fulfil their functions in passing laws and controlling the use of public money?'. Finally, the scale for judging the performance of governments, geared towards testing public opinions on the 'output' mechanisms, are based on replies to the following questions: (1) 'In a

general sense, do you think the housing finance system is very good, good, regular, bad or disastrous?'; (2) 'the state school system?' (3) 'the health centre system?'; (4) 'the police?'; and (5) INAMPS and/or INPS?' (ie., the social security system) (40).

The correlation of those different scales with certain socio-economic variables (set out in Table 9) confirm the general pattern pointed to by analysis of other dimensions of Brazilian political culture. In other words, those that have the most critical attitudes about the workings of the political system, and at the same time those that show greatest subjective integration in the structures of the new political regime, are those who are concentrated among electors with the greatest family income, those with most schooling, those with non-manual occupations and - last but not least - those who live in large or medium-sized cities. Just as in other things, the economic and social modernisation of the last 30 years has its effects here. Thus those who live in rural areas and in small towns tend to be those who are proportionately much more 'cynical', but at the same time more positive in terms of trust in political institutions and more satisfied with government performance. The same can be said of the lower strata in terms of family income, those who have had less schooling and who carry out manual occupations. It is in these groups that we find a greater concentration of those who feel more distant from the system, and less critical of what it does. This combination suggests that we are dealing here with those who are most 'deferential' in their attitudes towards governments and public authorities.

In terms of general significance, the statistical coefficients resulting from the correlations suggest that the pattern is stronger in the relationship between 'satisfaction with the government' and the structural variables than when the same correlation is examined for 'trust in institutions' and 'political cynicism', even if the pattern turns out to be similar in all three cases. This suggests that there is a tendency among the Brazilian mass public towards what Peter McDonough et al., (who looked at public attitudes in 1980s Spain), highlight as being the basis of *pragmatism* towards post-Franco governments, ie. a tendency to judge how the

political system functions more by concrete results than by abstract considerations (41). At the same time, as in other cases, the statistical association becomes stronger when any of the criteria that measure political support (diffuse or specific) are correlated with the indicator that measures years of schooling. Even if the association between political support and the other structural variables is somewhat similar, this means that education features as an absolutely crucial element for assessing Brazilian attitudes and opinions. In other words, synthesising the less striking differences revealed by other structural variables, education represents the dividing line between those who feel themselves to have the motive to participate in public life (those who have finished second grade or more) and those who feel alienated from it (those without formal education or who have up to the end of second grade). At the same time, education is an important prerequisite for those able to judge the workings of institutions critically, and the capacity of governments to satisfy citizens' demands. Included here are those who have completed one of the three levels of the educational system as opposed to the 'uncritical', those who have no formal education or have completed only first grade.

To get a better understanding of the impact of education, this variable was correlated with indicators of political support, this time controlled by the occupation of those interviewed. The results are set out in Table 10. They are extremely interesting, and show among other things that those with higher levels of education (those who completed higher education or even some post-graduate study) were all more critical both in terms of what they say about the workings of institutions and about the performance of government. But education is even more important particularly for manual workers: the more educated they are, the more critical, even when compared with non-manual workers. They are also less 'deferential' than the average in the survey. This suggests, therefore, that the effect of education is even more important when it is considered in conjunction with the differentiation in the social status of those interviewed; in other words, it is important for all segments in the survey, but more important in the case of

manual workers than non-manual workers. It shows that education is more important as a requisite for political integration for workers than for the middle-class which already has access to information and has greater political sophistication. It also shows that attitudes of 'deference' towards those in authority persists in Brazil, but particularly strongly among those who, because they are poor, are *excluded* from the educational system.

Finally, in order to test the hypotheses that involve the relationship between 'political trust', 'satisfaction with government' and the indicators reflecting the nascent legitimacy of the democratic regime in Brazil, other correlations were conducted including in the test the index classifying the democratic or authoritarian attitudes of those interviewed. Tables 11 and 12 show the results.

The data in Table 11 can be looked at from two different angles. In the first place, it includes the results obtained from correlating the 'political cynicism' index and the 'political trust' index with the 'satisfaction with the government' index. The statistics confirm very clearly the hypothesis which posited the lack of a significant association between the indicators of diffuse political support and the two criteria of specific political support. The values of the Tau-b coefficient in both cases are virtually nil and the relation between each pair of variables (measured by the Eta coefficient) is extremely weak. In striking contrast with these results, when the analysis turns to the association between 'political trust' and 'satisfaction with the government' alone, all the coefficients used yield fairly high values. Indeed they oscillate between .40 and .55, satisfactory for measuring social and political phenomena. The test set out in the upper part of Table 4 reveals, as expected in the original hypothesis, autonomy between the legitimacy indicator and those that relate to political efficacy. The second test in the lower position of the table shows that between the two criteria of political support - 'political trust' and 'satisfaction with the government' - there is a very close correlation as the hypothesis also presupposed. This means that, in general, those who tend to judge

political institutions negatively also have a negative judgment about government performance. At the same time, those who are satisfied with the government tend to have more trust in the institutions which channel citizens' demands to it. The data show, moreover, consistency in the attitude of interviewees.

Turning to Table 12, and grouping the data into two main categories, these confirm the findings above. At the same time, however, they draw attention to the need for a key analytical qualification. Firstly, these are the results of correlating the scale of 'political cynicism' with the index of democracy-authoritarianism. As might be expected, the statistical correlation between these two indicators of political legitimacy is stronger than in the correlation between the indicator of diffuse political support and of specific support. Even though the coefficients are not very high (with the exception of Gamma), at least in the correlation between cynicism and democracy-authoritarianism the correlation is practically twice as strong as between legitimacy and effectiveness. As well as this, the correlation between legitimacy and cynicism fits with what might be expected: those who are classified as 'more democratic' in their leanings are also those who tend to be less 'cynical', ie. those most willing to become involved in political life. The most 'authoritarian' correspond to those who feel most alienated. At the same time, the statistical variation is smaller for those who occupy intermediate positions on both scales. So, it can be concluded that at an aggregate level Brazilians show a tendency to combine democratic attitudes with a propensity to involve themselves in political life.

The second group of results relate to the correlation between the democratic-authoritarian scale and each of the various indicators of specific political support. Now, taking the Tau-B coefficient as the basis for analysing the strength of the correlation, it becomes clear that in both cases, even though the variables show some correlation, it is weak. This confirms what we have already seen in correlating 'cynicism' with 'effectiveness'. But more importantly, the correlation does not affect the nascent reservoir of legitimacy that exists. Indeed,

the correlations that are strongest are on the one hand the relationship between the most 'democratic' and those who are most 'critical' about government and institutions, and on the other between those who are most 'authoritarian' and those who could describe as being most 'deferential'. The meaning of this would be different if, contrary to what the data show, those who are most 'critical' were at the same time classifiable as 'authoritarian' or 'anti-democratic'. In this case, as some of the theories criticised above presuppose, it could be shown that the motives of the mass public in supporting political regimes hinge basically on the material satisfaction they provide.

All in all, as we saw above, a qualification is needed. If, as the original hypothesis foresaw, the correlation between the indicators of legitimacy and effectiveness is weak, even irrelevant, its presence prevents us from speaking of complete independence between these two dimensions in the Brazilian case. Even if the original hypothesis is not in question, in the Brazilian situation diffuse support and specific support maintain some points of contact. The reason for this, as we have suggested, is connected with the ambiguities that arise from the lack of a clear break between the old and the new political regime. This makes it more difficult for 'democrats' to distinguish clearly between their pro-democracy sentiments from those which (as a result of the distortions in the workings of institutions and the inefficacy of recent governments) foster lack of trust, dissatisfaction, and in many cases anger towards politics and politicians.

A different way to research this problem is to examine the patterns of correlation between the two variables used in this study to measure political legitimacy, when they are controlled by the indicators of diffuse political support: 'political trust' and 'trust in the government'. Given the structural ambiguities connected with the new democratic regime it might be expected that the correlation between 'cynicism' and 'democratic legitimacy' could become stronger when controlled by negative judgments about institutions and government performance. It stands to reason that the citizens' more critical perceptions about

the poorly institutionalised public domain and the pattern of government ineffectiveness which makes change so difficult even within a democratic framework, would lead the mass public to adopt a less favourable view of the democratic regime.

The data in Table 13 show the relevance of this hypothesis. Firstly, in general terms, it can be seen that the correlation between the 'democracy-authoritarianism' scale and that of cynicism is always stronger when interviewees' replies are controlled by the negative judgment of 'input' or 'output' mechanisms, whatever their preferred options. Secondly, for the similarly general correlation between 'cynicism' and 'democracy-authoritarianism' produced by the negative judgment of these indicators above, the correlation is stronger among those interviewees classified as being more 'cynical' and 'authoritarian'. Indeed, compared to the coefficients produced by the two extreme cases (ie. very negative and very positive judgments about 'political trust' and 'satisfaction with the government') it becomes clear when controlled by the former, the strength of the correlation is almost twice that when controlled by the latter. In other words, what affects the correlation between the indicators of diffuse support in an anti-democratic direction is precisely the fact that Brazilian citizens are dissatisfied with the way in which the current government works. In present conditions of corruption, political clientelism, and extreme inefficiency in parties and government, there is a growing risk that those least interested in public life could become potentially a source of support for authoritarianism. This is what the first column of figures in the table suggests.

PART III - PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

The above discussion suggests some preliminary conclusions. As the general public opts for democracy, it is tempting simply to conclude that in post-authoritarian Brazil a political culture sufficient to consolidate a democratic

regime has already been formed. But one needs to be careful and distinguish at least two aspects of the problem. On the one hand, the data leaves no doubt that, in comparison with orientations and attitudes of the mass public over 20 years, there have been effective and important changes towards what could be described generically as a democratic view of politics. There is also a 'secular' sphere of decision making in public life, recognised as such, with fairly large margins of autonomy, in relation to which the public believes it has powers of influence; on the other hand, however, it is necessary to ask whether the reality which the data measures for a specific moment, ie., that half of the citizens opting for these democratic values in 1989-90, can be considered both necessary and sufficient for the consolidation of democracy in Brazil in the longer run.

On this point, there is no agreement in the literature on democratization. The positions authors adopt vary between, on the one hand, those who tend to stress a consensual view of democracy, ie., those who believe that for democracy to be consolidated there has to be near unanimity among members of the community about the basic rules of the game (Chalmers, 1966) and on the other hand, those who adopt a more conflictual definition of democracy (i.e. although the majority should agree on the rules of the game, not everyone has to do so, and there is always a minority which - for a variety of reasons - would like to try out other alternatives or, even not take part at all in the workings of democracy (Bobbio, 1986). The virtue of democracy, it is said, lies in the fact that a diversity of conceptions can coexist without threatening its existence. Leaving the first alternative aside since it can be easily answered on account of its non-democratic nature, the second - with its rider about the need for a majority democratic consensus albeit not an unanimous one, is more plausible.

So therefore empirical evidence confirms the existence in Brazil of a preliminary 'reservoir' of democratic legitimacy. Despite a growing and intense malaise among citizens about the day-to-day workings of politics, adhesion to the normative principles of democracy persists among different segments of public

opinion. However, by definition, this preliminary 'reservoir' of legitimacy is still not large enough to ensure the continuity of the new democratic regime. In the conditions of political ambiguity inherited from the previous regime, there is nothing to prevent this 'reservoir' - interpreted by some as a 'honeymoon' or 'period of grace' - from diminishing rapidly or vanishing if the current distortions persist, ie. the lack of a real connection between politicians, political activity and the workings of institutions and governments and the democratic aspirations created by the experience of authoritarianism and the mobilisation against it among the mass public. In the long run, trends of this sort can be fatal in societies which are persistently unable to resolve key economic and social problems. The problem is not exclusively instrumental: when symbolic resources are lacking it can produce a rapid political deterioration. Symbolic resources are perceived by citizens as providing them with the means to get involved and produce political change when it is necessary.

The paradox of democracy in Brazil in the 1990s is that the perversions of the past distort the virtues of the present. The risk remains that the latter may be unable to resist the forces of disruption and disaggregation produced by the former. The paradox therefore acts as a warning to political leaders committed to the democratic regime. If politicians, governments and political institutions fail to get rid of the distortions which characterise Brazilian political life, and fail to meet the expectations created by the process of democratization, it is unlikely that the 'honeymoon period' between the citizens and the new democratic regime will last. Such conditions will most likely lead to open rupture and discord. The result may be the death of democracy.

NOTES

1. On the question of legitimacy, see the literature revision in Montero, J. R., 'Sobre la democracia en Espana: legitimidad, apoyos institucionales y significados', Working-paper, 39, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales del Instituto Juan March, Madrid, 1992; Shin, D. C. Shin, 'The mass culture of democratization in Korea: public perception of democratic legitimacy', paper presented to the APSA's meeting, Chicago, 1992; and Weil, F. D., 'The development of democratic attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany in a comparative perspective' (forthcoming 1992). Also McDonough et al. provided evidence for the Spanish case and focused on revising the concept of legitimacy based on an historical comparison undertaken by citizens between democracy and the regime which preceded it. McDonough, P. et al 'The Nature of Political Support and Legitimacy in Spain' (mimeo), paper presented at the 8th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, 1992.

2. It is quite remarkable that evidence for a number of cases show higher levels of democratic legitimacy even in situations that the literature has recomended lower expectations concerning changing patterns in the public opinion beliefs. See Weil (1992) for East Germany, Moises (1992) for Brazil, Shin (1992) for South Korea and Montero (1992) and Maravall (1989) for Spain. Also Bano (1986) for Chile and Catterberg for Argentina. On the other hand, Rimmer analysed the data from 21 competitive elections in Latin America between 1982 and 1990 and showed that even though the social and economic crisis reduced support for governments and brought about a high degree of electoral volatility, it did not compromise the existing consensus in favour of democratic regimes. See Rimmer, K.L., 'The political impact of economic crises in Latin America in the 1980s', *APSR* Vol 85, No 3, September 1991.

3. O'Donnell, G 'Transicoes, Continuidades e alguns pardoxos' in Reis, F.W. and O'Donnell, G (eds) *A democracia no Brasil - Dilemas e Perspectivas*. Ed Vertice, Sao Paulo, 1988.

4. I discussed this paradox in Moises, J.A., 'Political distrust, dissatisfaction with government and democratic legitimacy: the implications of the Brazilian paradox', paper presented to the APSA's meeting, Chicago, 1992; I also provided the evidence on the spread of democratic adhesion between the end of the last decade and the beginning of this in Brazil in Moises, J.A., 'Democratization and Mass Political Culture in Brazil' in a forthcoming book by Kinzo, M.A. and edited by the Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, and to be published by Taurus Publishers, 1992.

5. "The entire problem of legitimacy is in my view incorrectly posed. What matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives". See A. Przeworski, *Some problems in the study of the transition to democracy* in O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, '*Transitions from Authoritarian Rule/Prospects for Democracy*'. Johns Hopkins University Press, London and Baltimore, 1986, p52. Przeworski believes that since preferable alternatives analogous to the democratic one exist, they are chosen as a rational decision by relevant actors without the interference of norms, values or political beliefs.

6. To the authors already mentioned, we should add D. Rustow whose seminal article 'Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model', *Comparative Politics* Vol. 2 No. 2

(1970), pp. 337-363, has been a permanent source of inspiration for part of the literature on transition. There are, however, exceptions to the lack of attention to the importance of political culture for democratic consolidation: L. Diamond, J.J. Linz and S.M. Lipset *Democracy in Developing Cultures* (4 Volumes), Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London, 1989; N. Lechner et al. *Cultura Politica y democratization*, Flacso/Clacso/ICI Santiago, 1987; and in the case of Brazil, F.C. Weffort, '*Por que democracia*?', Brasiliense, SP, 1984, and B. Lamounier et. al. *De Geisel a Collor: O balanço da transição*, Ed. Sumare, SP 1990. The prestigious study organised by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, in my opinion is a case apart. Although the main authors do not deal specifically with the political culture approach, they do not reject the problem out of hand. This can be seen in the chapter written by O'Donnell and Schmitter 'Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies'.

7. Di Palma, for instance, does not think political culture is indispensable for democratic consolidation, but he admits that it can be useful and also that it develops when the population manages to become 'accustomed' to democratic procedures. But he does not explain how or why this could or should happen. Op. cit..

8. In recent writings, O'Donnell has given fresh importance to this problem which he says derives from the survival of archaic styles of conducting politics.

9. Opinion polls during the last five years show this is the case in some countries. See, for instance, Data-Folha Bank, S. Paulo, for the Brazilian case.

10. O'Donnell '*Delegative Democracy?*' Mimeo, CEBRAP, 1990, p.9.

11. What is called the 'minimalist theory' of democracy sees it as being the 'second-best' available choice, as some authors would say that the first alternative for relevant actors to face fundamental societal conflicts is 'to win' See Di Palma, op. cit, and also Weil, op. cit..

12. Both Rustow and Przeworski deal with this choice as a necessity, but in my view they do not give sufficient discussion to the extent to which this stems from the processes of delegitimisation of authoritarianism, which as I suggest below could be a crucial factor in the crisis of this regime.

13. See Weil, op. cit..

14. T.H. Marshall's book *Cidadania, Classe Social e Status*, Zahar Ed. SP 1979 is still the best treatment of this interaction, taking social pressures in the sense of extending citizenship in the case of England.

15. An interesting approach on this is the work of E. Zimmerman 'Economic and Political Reactions to the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s in Six European Countries' Mimeo. Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1986.

16. See D.P. Conrad 'Changing German Political Culture' in Almond and Verba op. cit., 1980. Also, O.W. Gabriel *Cambio social y Cultura Politica/el Caso de la Republica Federal de Alemania*, Gedisa Ed., Barcelona, 1990.

17. Authors like J. M. Maravall and L. Paramio show how this consensus was progressively created during the transition period, but Lopez Pintor suggests that, even

without becoming a majority among the Spaniards, the level of commitment for democracy that existed under Franco played an important role in creating this consensus. See Maravall, *La Política de Transición*, Taurus Ed., Madrid, 1980; L. Paramio 'Del Radicalismo Reivindicativo al Pluralismo Radical' in Lechner op. cit.; R.L. Pintor 'El impacto del autoritarismo en la cultura política la experiencia espanola en una perspectiva comparada' in C. Huneeus et. al. *Para Vivir de la democracia*, Ed. Andante, Santiago, 1987 pp. 135-152.

18. See Rustow, op. cit.

19. See in this respect, A. Pizzorno, 'Sulla Razionalitá della Scelta Democratica', *Stato e Mercato*, 7, (April 1983) pp. 3-46; also, Mainwaring, S., 'Transitions to democracy and democratic consolidation: theoretical and comparative perspectives', in Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G. and Valenzuela, J.S. (eds.), *Issues in Democratic Consolidation/The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1992.

20. It is rather surprising to see the enormous importance given now by an author like Elster to social norms, as set out in his essay J. Elster, 'Racionalidade e Normas Sociais' *Revista Brasileira de Ciencias Sociais*, 12, Vol 5, (February 1990), pp. 55-69.

21. Even Downs is now saying so. See in this respect, A. Downs 'Social values and democracy' in K.R. Monroe, *The Economics Approach to Politics*, Harper Collins Publishers, 1991.

22. Schumpeter, J. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Harper and Row, New York, 1975.

23. Weil, among others, also suggested to interpret this tradition in terms of a theory of 'equilibrium'. Weil F.D., 'The Sources and Structure of Legitimation in Western Democracies: A Considered Model Tested with Time Series Data in Six Countries since World War II' *APSR* Vol. 54, October 1989, pp 682-706.

24. Citrin J., and Green D.P., 'Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of Trust in Government' *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol 16, pp 431-53, 1986; Harmel R., and Robertson J.D., 'Government Stability and Regime Support: A cross-national analysis', *Journal of Politics*, Vol 48, pp 1029-40, 1986; Lane *op. cit.*; Dahrendorf R., *op. cit.*. Compare with Held *op. cit.* and Weil, *op. cit.*.

25. Gabriel, O., *Cambio Social in Cultura Politica*, Gedisa, Barcelona, 1980, especially Chapter 2; Weil, F.D., 'Cohorts, Regimes and the Legitimation of Democracy: West Germany since 1945, *American Sociological Review*, Vol 52, pp 308-24, 1987.

26. Gabriel *op. cit.* p 56 and passim.

27. Miller, A.H., 'Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-70, *APSR*, Vol 68, pp 951-72, 1974, Citrin J., 'Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government', *APSR* Vol 68 pp 973-88, 1974; Barnes, S., and Kaase, M. (eds) *Political Action, Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1979, Kaase, M., 'Political Alienation and Protest' in Dogan M., *Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on*

Legitimacy, Westnew Boulder, 1988, pp 114-42.

28. Citrin, *op. cit.*, 1974; Gabriel, *op. cit.*; Easton, D., 'A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol 5, pp 435-57, 1975; Easton, D., *A Systems analysis of Political Life*, Willey, New York, 1965; Lipset, S.M., *Political Man*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1981.

29. Compare McDonough, *op. cit.*, Weil, *op. cit.*; and Edelman, M., *the Symbolic Uses of Politics*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1967.

30. Easton, *op. cit.*, 1965; Lipset *op. cit.*, 1981; Lipset, S. M. and Schneider, W., *The Confidence Gap*, Free Press, NY, 1987; Huntingdon, S.P., Forensic and EDUSP, Sao Paulo, 1975.

31. Compare Easton *op. cit.*, 1975; Lipset, *op. cit.*, 1981; and Zimmerman, E., 'Government Stability in Six European Countries during the World Economic Crisis of the 30s: Some Preliminary Considerations', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol 15, pp 23-52; Zimmerman, E., 'The Puzzle of Government Duration: Evidence from Six European Countries during the Interwar Period', *Comparative Politics*, Vol 20, pp 341-57.

32. Compare Whitehead, L., 'The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies: A Discussion with Illustrations' in Pastor, R.A., *Democracy in the Americas*, Holmes and Meier, NY, 1989; and Rimmer, *op. cit.*.

33. Compare Moises J.A., 'Dilemas da Consolidação Democratica no Brasil' in Moises, J.A. and Albuquerque, J.A.G. (eds) *Dilemas da Consolidação da Democracia*, Ed Paz E Terra, SP, 1985; McDonough, P., Barnes, S.H., and Pina, A.L., 'The Spanish Public in Political Transition', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol 11, pp 49-79; and Diamond, L., Linz, J.J. and Lipset S.M., *Democracy in Developing Countries* (3 vols) Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1990.

34. Weffort, F.C., 'New Democracies, Which Democracies?' (mimeo) Paper presented to the East-South System Transformations Seminar, 1991.

35. Lamounier, B., 'Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Brazil' Annual Meeting of APSA, Washington, 1987; Lamournier, B., 'Representação, Representividade e Sistemas Eleitorais' *Revista da Universidade de Sao Paulo*, No 6, SP, 1987; Moises, J.A., *Cidadania e Participação-Eusaio Sobre o Plebiscito, O Referendo e a Iniciativa Popular na Nova Constitução*. Ed Marco Zero, SP, 1990, especially Chapter 3. Kinzo, M. D. G., 'Consolidation of Democracy: Governability, Institution-Building and Political Parties in Brazil' Paper presented to the Conference 'Brazil: The Challenges of the 1990s', ILAS, University of London, October 1991.

36. See J.A. Moises (in collaboration with J.A.G. Albuquerque) '1974, a avalanche de votos de protesto' in J.A. Moises *Cenas de Politica Explicita*, Marco Zero, SP, 1986. Also B. Lamounier and F.H. Cardoso *Os partidos e as eleicoes no Brazil*, Ed Paz e Terra Rio, 1978.

37. See Y. Cohen, 'Popular support for authoritarian governments: Brazil under Medici', Doctoral thesis, University of Michigan, 1979.

38. The literature on the political significance of social movements in Brazil is vast, similarly on the formation of political parties between the mid-1970s and the end of the 1980s. See J.A. Moises et. al. *Cidade, povo e poder*, CEDEC/Paz e Terra, Rio, 1982; R.C.L. Cardoso, 'Os movimentos populares no contexto da consolidação democratica' in Reis and O'Donnell op. cit. pp. 368-382; B. Lamounier, *Partidos e Utopias*, Ed Loyola, SP, 1989.

39. See Chin, op. cit.

40. Statistics obtained for the scale on the democratic-authoritarian continuum are as follows: Reproductability = 0, 90; Minimum marginal reproductability = 0.76; Percentage of improvement = 0.14;Scaleability = 0.61.

41. McDonough et al., op. cit.

OTHER BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

ALBUQUERQUE, J.A.G., "Da crise do governo a crise do presidencialismo", in MOISES, J.A., e ALBUQUERQUE, J.A.G., *Dilemas da consolidação da democracia*, Paz e Terra, Rio, 1989.

ALMOND, G. e VERBA, S., *The Civic Culture*, Litle, Brown and Company, Boston, 1963.

BOBBIO, N., *O Futuro da democracia - Uma defesa das regras do jogo*, Paz e Terra, Rio, 1986.

CHALMERS, J., *Revolutionary change*, Litle, Brown and Company, Boston, 1966.

COHEN, Y., "Popular support for authoritarian governments: Brazil under Medici", Doctoral thesis, University of Michigan, 1979.

DAHL, R., *Poliarchy: participation and oppositio*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971.

DI PALMA, G., *To craft democracies*, University of California Press, New Haven, 1991.

FLISFISCH, A., "Consenso democratico en el Chile autoritario", in LECHNER, N. et.al., *Cultura politica y democratizacion*. FLACSO/CLACSO/ICI, Santiago, 1987.

GERMANI, G., *Politica y sociedad en una epoca de transicon*, Paidos, Buenos Aires, 1974.

KAVANAGH, D., "Political Culture in Great Britain: the Decline of the Civic Culture" in ALMOND, G. e VERBA, S., *The Civic Culture revisited*, Litle, Brown and Company, Boston, 1980.

---------, *Political science and political behaviour*, Lenwin Hyman, Boston, 1990.

LIJPHART, A., "The structure of inference", in ALMOND e VERBA, op. cit., 1980.

MANN, M., "The Social cohesion of Liberal Democracy", *American Sociological Review*, 3, Vol. 35 (June 1970).

MARAVALL, J.M., 'Valores democraticos y practica politica', in LEVIATAN, nro. 37, II Epoca, 1989, pp. 5-24.

MILBRATH, L.W., *Political Participation*, Rand McNally College Publishing Company, Chicago, 1965.

MOISES, J.A., "Dilemas da consolidação democratica no Brasil", in MOISES e ALBUQUERQUE op. cit..

MORLINO, L., "Crisis autoritaria y cambio de regimen en el sur de Europa", in HUNEEUS, c., *Para vivir la democracia*, Ed. Andante, Santiago, 1987.

MUSZINSKI, J. e MENDES, A., "Democratizaçao e opiniao publica no Brasil", in LAMOUNIER, b. ET ALLII, *De Geisel a Collor: o balanço da transição*, Ed. Sumare, SP, 1990.

NEUMAN, R.W., *The Paradox of Mass Politics*, Harvard University Press, Mass., 1986.

O'DONNELL, G., "Delegative Democracy?", mimeo, CEBRAP/Notre Dame, 1990.

PRZEWORSKI, A., "Como e onde se bloqueiam as transições para a democracia?", in MOISES e ALBUQUERQUE, op. cit..

---------, "Marxismo e escolha racional", *Revista Brasileira de Ciencias Sociais*, 6, Vol. 3 (February 1988)

ROCHON, T.R. e MITCHELL, M.J., "The Withering away of the Authoritarian State/Social Bases of the Transition to Democracy in Brazil", mimeo., Western Political Sciences Association, 1987.

SANTOS, W.G., "A pos-revolução brasileria", in JAGUARIBE, H. et. al., *Brasil, sociedade democratica*, J. Olympio, Rio, 1985.

SCHMITTER, P., "The 'Portucalization' of Brazil?", mimeo. s/d.

WEFFORT, F.C., *O populismo na politica brasileria*, Paz e Terra, Rio, 1978.

---------, "New democracies. Which democracies?", mimeo., 1991.

APPENDIX 1: CONSTRUCTION OF SCALES

The research project 'Cultura Politica e consolidaçao da Democracia no Brasil' was carried out through an agreement between CEDEC (Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies), Institute Data-Folha and the Department of Political Science at USP; the author acted as its director. It involved three national surveys (urban and rural) done by stratified sampling and aleatory sampling. The total electorate of Brazil was considered as the universe, divided according to regions: south, south-east, north-east, centre-north-west. For the purposes of the sample, municipalities were grouped together according to their regional weight, geographical location, socio-economic level, and stratified by population size. Through successive processes of selection, the neighbourhood was identified, the street down to the individual. In September of 1.989, 2.083 electors were interviewed; in December, 2.506 and in March of 1.990, 2.480.

The scales were constructed from factor analysis undertaken for the whole gamut of political and attitudinal questions. For the political sophistication scale, the following questions were used:

1."Whom should the political parties represent?"
2. "In your opinion, do the President of the Republic and his ministers take important decisions on their own, or are they influenced by other political forces in the country?"
3. "Do you agree or do you disagree that only an alliance of all political parties could solve the country's problems ?"
4. "Are you interested by national, state and municipal politics, or are you not interested in politics at all?"
5. "Does politics influence your life ?"
6. "Are you in the habit to read or watch political news items?"
7. "What do you understand to be the Right in politics?"
8. "What do you understand to be the Left in politics?"
9. "For you, what is democracy ?"

The first three of these questions were included in order to test whether the interviewee was able to make use of his stock of information about the political system. The three following systems were related with how important politics was for the interviewee. The three last questions sought to test his capacity to conceptualise objects in politics. The points were given cumulatively.

For the democratic-authoritarian scale, the following questions were used:

1. "Would the country be much better if only one political party existed?"
2. "So as to maintain order, should the laws always be obeyed even when unjust?"
3. "Is democracy dangerous because it can provoke disorder?"
4. "Would the country work much better if the military returned to power?"
5. "Should the government be allowed to ban political parties?"
6. "Should the government be allowed to close down Congress?"

Even though these questions were typical of a single addition scale, the way in which they were presented to the interviewees suggested that they were approached as dichotomies. Given the intensity of the stimuli, for the purposes of reading only a total rejection was considered an indication of non-acceptance of an authoritarian standpoint.

¡Error!Marcador no definido.

APPENDIX 2: TABLES

¡Error!Marcador no definido.

¡Error!Marcador no definido.

¡Error!Marcador no definido.

¡Error!Marcador no definido.

¡Error!Marcador no definido.

¡Error!Marcador no definido.

¡Error!Marcador no definido.

¡Error!Marcador no definido.

¡Error!Marcador no definido.

¡Error!Marcador no definido.

¡Error!Marcador no definido.

¡Error!Marcador no definido.

¡Error!Marcador no definido.