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THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION: PEASANT POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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1. *Local and national politics: historical and comparative remarks*

When peasants have become involved in local and national politics, they have concerned themselves with matters of a public interest, the use of public resources and the functioning of public institutions, and the dealings with public authorities and political organizations, the state in particular. The forms and the contents of these concerns and these involvements have changed considerably in the course of the centuries-old experience of Castilian peasants, but the general pattern has been neither one of peasant rebellion, nor of peasant submission, but rather one of protracted accommodation.

Castilian peasants' involvement in state or national politics started with the very beginning of their settlement on the land. This was the result of military conquest, in which the peasants participated. The land was to be conquered against the Moors, and then defended against the Moors' attacks almost without interruption in Old Castile and Leon until the end of the XIth century. Peasants were very much part of the people who did the actual fighting, conquered, and defended the land. This is why most of them were, or became, free men, and this is why their villages or *pueblos* were granted *fueros, cartas pueblas* or privileges, which allowed most villages and towns of Old Castile to govern themselves, to be free from seigneurial jurisdiction for a long period of time and subject only to royal authority, or able to appeal to the king's justice. This situation, however, changed for many villages by the late XIVth century, and through the XVth century, when the nobility took advantage of a period of domestic disturbances to extract concessions the Crown was, only too eager to concede.

Travellers going through Castile today (and the same applies to travellers of the last few centuries) may feel they are traversing a ghost, melancholic country, populated by immense ruins, castles, churches in decay, in almost every corner of the landscape: monuments to memories of a past grandeur. Such a past is made of battles, meetings and settlements of all kinds whose protagonists were the kings, the church, the nobility, and the cities. Church councils and church foundations; confrontations between bands of noblemen, dynastic wars, and wars, again, between the kingdoms of Castile, Leon and Portugal once the Moors were confined to southern Spain by the XIIth and XIIIth century; all this, and the development of commercial and industrial towns like Segovia and Burgos, Medina del Campo and Valladolid, are what most of these monuments are about. They are witnesses for

the fact that for a few centuries Castile was the scenario for one of the most precocious (and for a long time one the most successful) state building and nation building processes in European history. Later, Castile was to stand at the heart of the Spanish kingdom and the Spanish empire for most of the XVIth century.

Castilian peasants were both witnesses and part of this scenario. They submitted to, or had to deal with kings, noblemen, church clerics and townmen in all sorts of endeavours, economic, social, cultural and political. The "little tradition" of the peasant community was intertwined with the "great tradition"[1] of state, seigneurs, church and towns, and it was inseparable from it. Sometimes peasants were reluctant and marginal participants in the great events, as happened in the War of *Comunidades,* in early XVIth century; but at other occasions they could be their main protagonists (or coprotagonists), as it happened in the War of Independence against the French at the beginning of the XIXth century.

The War of *Comunidades* of Castile (1520/1521) was a turning point in Castilian and Spanish history. The urban nobility of the most important Castilian cities that had a vote in the *Cortes,* the Castilian Parliament, challenged the unlimited authority of the king, and reminded him of his obligations to upheld the old law, and to obtain the consent of the Parliament to impose taxes. They also asked the king to select his ministers among Castilians, and not among foreigners.[2] They put into question what they already saw as a danger that the traditional "royal supremacy" of the king would become "royal sovereignty," i.e. that the king would turn into absolute ruler. They asked for the power of Parliament to be expanded, and their meetings to be more frequent. They initiated a political movement for a reformulation of the constitutional settlement of the kingdom with an appeal to the "proto-nationalist"[3] sentiments of their fellow countrymen, therefore combining modern traits with a reference to the old ways and Castilian traditions. They did in fact put the matter to a war, confronted the royal army, made up mainly by the retenues of the rural nobility, and were finally defeated near the village of Villalar, in Tierra de Campos, in 1521.

Echoes of these events reverberated through the entire country, and remained in the collective memory of the villages for a long time. But the fact is that villages and peasants played a rather

secondary role in this drama.[4] Possibly because they knew that both urban towns and local seigneurs were intent on extending their influence and their domination on the countryside anyway, and because they realized that one way or another most taxes should be coming and put to bear on the peasants while the nobility and the church would be exempted from them. They probably looked at the central government and the king as a counterweight to the powers of the nobility, and saw the king's justice (to which they could appeal) as a potential protector against seigneurial justice. And they did not, and could not possibly perceive the link between the plight of the *Comuneros* and the potential for urban development in Castile, from which the countryside could have benefitted (neither were they prepared to understand and take sides in the rather complex conflict between the textile industries of some towns and the wool trade, in which some commercial towns and part of the nobility and the high church were greatly involved, that underlied most of the urban politics of the time).

The limited involvement of Castilian peasants in the War of *Comunidades* may serve as a model for peasant political behavior, for it shows where the focus of interest for the peasants in their dealings with the different layers of the state authority lies, and it sheds light on the necessary conditions for peasant full involvement in national politics is to be expected. In that war peasants stuck as close as possible to their local concerns. They behaved as if they had adopted a policy of wait-and-see, on the assumption that, whoever the victor, they would be back to their local traditions of working out an accommodation among the villages, the seigneurial system, and the royal authority. This in fact has been the pattern for peasant involvement in state and national politics ever since. Peasants have shown a remarkable resilience in sticking to this tradition of having as much control as possible over their own local affairs, and making an accommodation with the state, either directly, or more often through an intermediate layer of seigneurs, *caciques,* political parties, or interest associations.

Now, concerning local politics, the question is to understand how the village has traditionally managed the problem of controlling its own affairs. To begin with, it is important to notice that the frontier between private and public matters within the community has always existed, and certainly exists today, even though it is fuzzy, and it has gone through many changes in the

course of time. Local politics, which has to do with such public matters, does not affect today the almost entire life of the community, as it did in the past, when collective practices were extremely important in the economy of the village, and the *concejo,* or local council, the local priest, and the seigneurial officers could intervene, and did intervene routinely, in what they considered rather extensively matters of morality, with the application of fines and other punishments.

Today, a good deal of economic and social life in the community is just a private matter, where public institutions such as the village council (the *concejo* of the past, the *ayuntamiento* today) and others, are involved very little. This does not mean that people may act in any way they want in these matters. They can but only do so at their own risk. They know that there are unwritten rules, and failing to abide by them, villagers know, can set in motion quite an effective system of subtle punishments. They may range from open criticism to various forms of social ostracism. Their reputation or fund of prestige *(honra)* may suffer to various degrees. A girl who has an illegitimate child may also be subject not only to family sanctions, but to village sanctions, to the point where it may be impossible for her to marry in the village. The boy or girl who marries against his/her family's wishes may be subject to family reprisals, and to harsh comments from the more extended family network. Peasants who are troublesome, difficult to deal with, and do not live up to the norms of good neighborhood, may be avoided, called names, and referred to in a derogatory way. Thus, they lose the capital of prestige which may be important one day when they need to activate help or cooperation. The point remains, however, that all these are, or have became, social yet private matters, and therefore they are not subject to explicit public regulations, backed by specific public sanctions, or enforced by public authorities. By contrast, the regulations of economic activity known as "agrarian collectivism" could be considered public business in the past, wherein the collective could make decisions concerning what, where, when and even how the individual peasant should conduct his agrarian activities (though public regulations are also issued today by the village council about the funding and the use of public resources such as streets, roads, public laundry, schools, halls and others).

The range of such local politics (that is, the scope of the competence of local authorities and the amount of resources they may gather) depends on the extent to which outside powers such as the king or government, church, seigneur, bureaucrats, etc., on the one hand, and the family units of the village, on the other, are willing and able to extend their own area of influence. The king or the seigneur, for instance, may be interested either in strengthening or in weakening local autonomy, depending on various circumstances. Rich peasants may be interested in curtailing collective rights of the village at some critical points while extending the sphere of their private business; or they may try to extend their rights and make use of them by taking advantage of their economic and political superiority.

In the following pages I will discuss the extent, the contents, and the structure of peasant politics at the local level. My approach is both historical and relational: I shall look at the variations of this type of politics over time, as well as to its relations with changes in the nature of the peasants involvement in national politics and in the very structure of the national polity. Despite the changes we may observe in the course of time, peasant politics shows some invariant traits all along. First, at least in small and middle villages (peasant villages), peasants have fought for, and have usually got, a significant degree of control over the local resources and institutions, at the expense of both outsiders and landless workers, and, to a minor degree, of the local notables who might be interested in using the local political apparatus to their own benefit. Second, peasants have usually had an understanding or tacit covenant with the government, by which they have exchanged support for protection against perceived threats such as seigneurial abuses, capitalist development, or social revolution. These threats have changed in name or contents, but they all show a similar character in that they challenge the peasants' will and ability to control their environment. In trying to come up against these challenges, peasants have tended to avoid open rebellion, and have tried to work out an accommodation with the central power, usually in the larger context of a three-level system. This system has included (a) the central ruler, (b) a network of intermediaries, and (c) the peasants themselves. By contrast with the relative autonomy they had in their local politics, they only recently (and rather reluctantly) engaged in national politics through autonomous or peasant-controlled organizations.

Two additional comments may be in order now, concerning both the local and the national dimensions of peasant politics, the relations between peasants and workers, and between peasants and the central government. First, many discussions on peasant communities refer to their ability and willingness to act (and occasionally to engage in that peculiar modality, peasant movements) as if they were basically homogeneous communities (even allowing for some hierarchical order within them). But one of the main points of my argument is the need to make a categoric distinction between peasants and landless rural workers. From this perspective, it seems that most peasant communities, and certainly the Castilian ones, should be understood as being built around a structure of domination, with a basic cleavage between peasants and workers. This is crucial for explaining the peasants' eagerness to control local politics as well as the peculiarities of their involvement in national politics. This is why it has been in times of acute class conflicts that peasants have mobilised their resources and have intervened in politics most forcefully. Otherwise they may have tended to be apolitical and apathetic both at the national level and, less so, at the local level, letting a small group of notables and rich peasants run the show.

It is also crucial to understand the terms of the pact the peasants have made with the governments, and particularly with the liberal regimes that were in place most of the time between the 1840's and the 1920's, and during the 1930's up to the Civil War. Some historical accounts and explanations of peasant political behaviour point to the conflicts between liberal regimes and peasants' demands and aspirations. But whether or not this opposition develops into a crucial one depends on the nature of the peasants' interests in their broadest sense, and on their understanding of their specific situation, this including the nature of the challenges they meet, the contents of the government' policies, and the alternatives open to them. So, for instance, it is necessary not only to point out to the conflicts between peasants and workers, but also to make a distinction between situations in which the peasant/worker conflict is perceived as the crucial one, and situations in which the main line of cleavage opposes workers and latifundists, with peasants in between but possibly leaning toward workers' positions (as it seems demonstrated in Díaz del Moral's account of Andalusian social mobilizations in the late 1910's and early 1920's).[5]

The transition from the Old Regime to the liberal order (and the capitalist economy) was not antagonistic to Castilian peasants' interests. That is why they did not react against such a transition, as the Basque and the Andalusian peasants did. Basque and Andalusian peasants reacted against liberalism, however, for quite different reasons. So out of the transition from the Old Regime to the bourgeois or liberal order in Spain came quite different peasant political traditions, according to different local circumstances.

The Basque peasantry did not have a sentiment of antagonism towards the nobility and the church. To begin with there was no clear distinction between noblemen and commoners, Basques having the privilege from immemorial times to be considered all *hidalgos* (or nobles of low rank). Besides, peasants were engaged mostly in subsistence farming, had long term leases, and they did not feel threatened by the landowners. The church did not have extensive land properties that peasants could dream taking hold of; and it had played a respected role for very long time in village life. By contrast, there was a wide cultural distance between rural *caseros* and the urban bourgeoisie of Bilbao and other cities, as well as economic and political differences, for peasants resented both the growth of the urban economy and the centralist state. If we add to all this the religious divide between anticlerical urban intelligentsia and the church, it is easy to explain the end result of these tensions: the Basque peasants, encouraged by the local priests, sided with the Carlist pretender against the central government in the 1830's and again in the 1870's; as later they were to transfer this Carlist loyalty to the Basque nationalists in the XXth century.[6]

The Andalusian peasantry faced an altogether different situation. Their expectations regarding the liberal order were much higher. They had already traditional grievances against the way local power was managed under the Old Regime, and against the use *labradores ricos* and local notables made of the common lands. These groups had usurped *defacto* these lands, either by using them as pasture for their own cattle, or by renting them for low prices in order to sub-let them to poor peasants for a large profit (as shown in the complaints of the *pegujaleros* of Osuna in 1767).[7] The halfhearted efforts of the enlightened reformers of the XVIIIth century to put these practices to an end were unsuccessful, since their correction was left in the hands of the culprits themselves.

The liberal order reinforced the position of such local oligarchies offering them new opportunities to profit from the sale of church's lands and common lands, while pushing small peasants into becoming landless rural workers, and making them more and more dependent on labor markets controlled by these local oligarchies (who engaged themselves in a rather extensive type of agriculture, thus reducing their needs for manpower). Moreover, the redistribution of land and the new system of property was protected by new laws (put together in the Civil Code of 1889), by the increased control of local power by that oligarchy, and by new institutions and government agencies specifically designed for the protection of the new order, the new rural police or *guardia civil* in the first place (which was put, however, under the control of the central state and not of the local oligarchies). The new system of property, together with the new laws, the new government agencies and the very state that backed it all, were hardly seen by the peasants as legitimate. It was all too obvious that they had been the result of a process of usurpation of land, of the unscrupulous use of local power, and of institutional changes backed by means of violence.

Once significant sectors of the Andalusian rural population (peasants, rural workers and nonfarming population of the lower orders) came to this conclusion, as happened by the 1860's, it was just a matter of time and opportunity for them to find and gather the organizational and cultural resources needed to articulate their grievances around a strategy and a political discourse. They found their organizational resources right in their own experience: in the solidarity facilitated by the type of traditional community they lived in (with big concentrations of people of similar conditions in clustered villages and close-tight neigbourhoods), and by the traditional practices of their work (which was done by teams in *cortijos* or big farms).

Later, several external factors contributed to changing the way they understood their situation, and the way they formulated that understanding. They moved away from a church-inspired discourse towards an Anarchist-inspired one, as the Anarchist ideology spread through large parts of Andalusia in the final decades of the XIXth century, and early XXth century. First, the ground for this had been prepared by the fact that the church sided with the propertied classes, while the professional middle classes (lawyers and politicians) of cities like Málaga and Cádiz (which had

some influence on the countryside) took a more and more critical stand vis à vis the church and the political establishment, and were able to establish some linkage between their "progressive" policies and the rural masses at the time of the revolution of 1868 (that ousted Elisabeth II), and the years immediately preceding and following it.[8] Anarchist artisans and middle-men started spreading the new gospel around almost at the same time. Then, peasants and rural dwellers found that there was a fit between that ideology and their own predicament, for the Anarchist ideology provided them with a language and a moral impulse they needed to express their resentment at the state, the church and the propertied classes, and more particularly their local oligarchies; to assert themselves, their own internal solidarity and their sense of belonging to a moral community; and finally, to articulate their goals of local government and control over the land.[9]

The Castilian peasants, on the other hand, did not rebel against the liberal order. They were freed from the payment of tithes to the church, received a share of church and common lands, and retained a voice, however limited, in local government (particularly in small and middle villages). Whatever we may find of a Castilian peasant movement, it took place during the 1920's and 1930's, up to the civil war, and came only at a certain point in the development of the liberal order, and in the framework of repeated (but failed) attempts at an accommodation with that order. Castilian peasants fought back against the liberal order only when it appeared unable to check the threat of a social revolution and, to a lesser degree, of capitalist development. But the Castilians did not aim at a radical transformation of the peasant situation during the liberal regime (as the Andalusians did), and much less so at a restoration of the Old Regime (as the Basques tried to).

2. *From the old regime to present times: concejos and seigneurs*

As was the case in much of Europe, Castilian communities combined, from the Middle Ages to the end of the XVIIIth century, self-government and submission to seigneurial and royal jurisdictions.[10] This combination varied widely from region to region; but in Castile, as a rule, it included a formal recognition of the corporate character of the village. The reason for this lies in the way in which the colonization of the territory took place during the middle ages. The land

of the Cuenca del Duero, and in between that region and the Cuenca del Tajo, making up most of Old Castile (and León) and a large part of New Castile, was settled between the IXth and the beginning of the XIIIth centuries. During the first centuries, a tradition of local self-government was relatively consolidated, at least in Old Castile, around the institution of *concejo* or local council. This tradition would be challenged by the nobility in the following centuries, and royal authority occupied the middle ground. At some point, around the XIVth century, the Crown started a rather consistent trend to side more and more with the aristocracy, and allowed it to place more and more villages under seigneurial jurisdiction. However, most peasants remained free. Many villages came under direct royal jurisdiction, and had the right of appeal to the king's justice (to be firmly established by the Catholic Kings by late XVth century).[11] Originally the kings *gave fueros* or *cartas pueblas* (constitutional charters) to peasants willing to populate the new territories as they were being conquered. As a way of attracting people, the kings included in these *Jueros* a variety of personal and political liberties (similar to the ones granted for the colonization of East Prussia in the XIVth century),[12] which were to be maintained even when the villages fell under the control of the nobility in the Old Castile, and even in New Castile where entire districts were given to Military Orders (and even more so in Extremadura and Andalusia, where the nobility received the lion's share of the *repartimiento* of lands and domains in the XIIIth century and thereafter). But this did not mean the end of local self-government, for the seigneur had an interest in the corporate organization of the village, since the village could thus be held collectively responsible for seigneurial tributes, law and order, and the maintenance of seigneurial land.

As a rule, the seigneurs could exercise power in a limited manner in their own villages. They held a monopoly on legitimate violence in most of the countryside as a *de facto* privilege given to them by the kings, who after some attempts renounced the idea of a nation-wide centralized standing army. The seigneurs' justice, however, was subject to appeal to the king's tribunals. Also, seigneurs were unable to impose heavy economic tributes on their peasants. In any case these tributes were of minor importance by the middle of the XVIth century.

Most villages had councils or *concejos* which were elected by the neighbors, and had considerable authority over the use of common lands, crop rotation, and grazing rights. The seigneur could appoint some of the *alcaldes* or local judges, or confirm the officials who had been already elected by the villages. Usually, he did not interfere in small villages, but he watched the more important villages closely.[13] Eventually, he had to reckon with the corporate identity of the village and its council. In Valdemora, for instance, the duke of Medinaceli obtained rights over the produce of woodland and pastures only after complicated negotiations with the villagers which lasted from 1504 to 1539, and with the condition that three-quarters of the tribute was returned to the village.[14]

In general, relationships between *concejos* and seigneurs were rather uneasy. The ceremony of the seigneur or his representatives taking possession of his village[15] emphasized his supreme authority, by means of a ritual of submission of the local officers, and of assertion of seigneurial preeminence, the seigneur or his representative administering justice, putting some neighbour in jail and entering the villagers' houses. But in fact, in the everyday life of the village, the seigneur had to share power with the *concejo.* The seigneur designed officers such as the *corregidor* and *alcaldes mayores;* but it was customary for him to accept the candidates presented to him by the village for the positions of *alcaldes ordinarios* and *regidores.*[16] The seigneur could try to control the nomination of candidates, and to make sure the new appointed officers would be in fear of his control ex post facto by means of the *juicio de residencia* once their time in office expired (the expenses for this proceeding having to be shouldered by the village itself).[17] But on the other hand the seigneur had to consider the possibility that the villages would be willing to engage in endless litigations against him before the royal courts, the *Cnancillerías* (by means of which the kings tried to check the abuses of seigneurial justice). In case the seigneur decided to ignore custom, and even to suppress the very offices of *alcaldes ordinarios,* he could end up occasionally having to face the villagers' violence (as in Curiel in 1658).[18] Therefore, an accommodation of sorts was normally searched for, and found, between seigneurs and *concejos,* as proven by the paucity of antiseigneurial movements in the Castilian countryside trough the entire Old Regime.[19]

The power of the *concejos* was varied and extensive. They applied the local ordinances referring to economic activities of many kinds, such as local markets, weights and measures, public works, and use of common lands, as well as to regulation of feasts; and they administered justice, in the spheres of the upkeeping of public peace and public morality, and the respect for private property. They concerned themselves also with the distribution of taxes to be paid to the king and the seigneur, with the storage of grain in *pósitos* and *alhóndigas*, and with some provisions on local social welfare (the care of widows and orphans, provisions in case of food scarcity and, in some cases, responsibility for primary education and the local poor).[20]

Though peasants tended to prefer the king's direct rule, since in this case there were no seigneurial dues to pay, and the king allowed more freedom for local government, the fact is that villages changed hands from the kings to nobles and vice-versa several times. In the late Middle Ages, the nobles, profiting from a weak, and rather obliging royal authority, extended their jurisdictions; a trend that was checked and reversed to a point by Ferdinand and Isabella. The Hapsburg kings, always on the verge of bankruptcy, alienated many royal villages, particularly in the XVIIth century. However, on the whole, the distribution of villages under royal and seigneurial jurisdiction in the kingdom of Castile between late XVIth century and the end of the Old Regime remained fairly stable. (See table n.1).

Table n. 1

Year	percentages of villages under	
	royal jurisdiction	seigneurial rule
by 1570[21]	48	52
by 1600[22]	47	53
by 1797[23]	49	51

3. *The War of Independence and the crisis of the old regime.*

The strategic orientation of the Bourbon monarchy of the XVIIIth century, and of the enlightened reformers which designed and implemented that strategy, aimed at a gradual

expansion and intensification of royal authority at the expense of both seigneurial jurisdiction and the *concejos*.[24] The full realization of this strategy, however, required time and resources that were lacking, and the support of a king able to understand the strategy and willing to play his role. By the end of the century none of these conditions applied. The combination of a dramatic fiscal crisis (largely due to Spain's intervention in foreign wars such as the American War of Independence), and inconsistent political leadership, with the momentous consequences of the French revolution, created considerable strain in the political system (and an emerging public opinion).[25] This was followed by the French occupation of Spain and the War of Spanish Independence between 1808 and 1814, with the result that the state collapsed almost entirely. A period of prolonged uncertainty, dramatic alternation in policies and institutions, political discord and civil war then set in until the 1840's, when a new order (the so-called "moderate order" named after the moderate party which was in power most of the time in the decades to follow) was put in place, the main lines of which remained well into the first third of the next century.

As Miguel Artola has shown, the War of Independence was a turning point in Spanish history, where several deep rooted tensions and weaknesses of the institutional system of the Old Regime exploded in the open.[26] Almost every institutional layer of the Spanish state failed at the moment of truth of the French invasion. Both Charles IV and his son Ferdinand renounced to the throne and their rights to the crown of Spain in favour of Napoleon (who then appointed his brother Joseph as king of Spain) outpacing each other in gestures of debasement and submission to the Bonaparte family.[27] In the absence of the king, the *Junta de Gobierno* decided to accept the very high commander of the invader army as its president. The *Consejo de Castilla* (which was the maximum legislative, administrative and judiciary agency of the kingdom) accepted the new Bonaparte king, trying to placate the populace into getting along with the *fait accompli*.[28] The regional authorities and the whole state apparatus, both civil and military, followed suit in a show of indecisiveness and cautious opportunism. In other words, the higher orders of the state and society, including the nobility and the high church, demonstrated their lack of vision, will, and ability to stand up to the circumstances, otherwise than by submitting to the invaders. The country was left, so to speak, to itself.

What happened, then, was that the country, by this meaning, people of a middle station and the populace, took matters in its own hands, and decided to fight the French on its own. In so doing, that people invented de facto a new political system and a new political culture, without knowing how to name them for the time being (and this initial perplexity was going to reverberate through the entire XIXth century Spanish politics). The closer thing they found for articulating the new political system was a constitutional monarchy (and some territorial rearrangements), a safe formula for those who wanted to keep the prerogatives the last absolute Bourbon kings had. Regarding the new political culture, they managed with a blend of nationalism and liberalism (the word "liberals" was supposedly invented by these Spaniards at the time), not without strong reservations on the part of those who labeled themselves *serviles*. That people also believed in an idealised characterization of Ferdinand, so as to fight the French and engage in their own political experimentation of new political creeds and new political institutions, all in the name of Ferdinand VII.

At that time the country was made out of two basic ingredients: a heterogeneous combination of local priests, provincial lawyers, low level nobility, functionnaires and army officers which could provide some leadership at the provincial and local level, on the one hand; and the low orders, chiefly the urban populace and peasants, on the other. Most of the actual fighting and the administration of public business was done on the field, at the local level, under the direction of leaders with little experience but able to mobilize support from the communities surrounding them. War consisted in operations of *guerrillas,* carried out by fighters, or *guerrilleros,* who, in many cases, were of rural extraction. Public business was conducted by *Juntas provinciales* which called themselves *soberanas,* that is, sovereign in their own territories. This experience lasted in many parts for six years, and it was largely successful insofar chaos was averted, the French were expelled, and the guerrillas managed to fix an army of 250,000 to 350,000 French soldiers on the Spanish scene of operations, thus making a crucial contribution to Napoleon's final defeat.[29] Such experience was to remain as an symbol for the capacity of Spanish people to face up extraordinary challenges, and it shaped the rhetoric and the imagination of the generations to come. *The francesada,* as it was called (that is, both the French invasion and the Spanish reaction to it), was to become a crucial element of the collective memory of the peasantry.

The key for understanding the importance of that event lies in that the War of Independence made possible the convergence of the "great tradition" of state building and the "little tradition" of local politics into a cluster most peasants could understand and find meaningful.

First, the presence of the French invaders exacerbated a feeling of belonging to a Spanish nation (a call to which was already made by the urban nobility at the time of the War of Comunidades in the XVIth century). The fact that the invaders had every intention to live off the field and lost no time in taking grain, mules and sheep for their our consumption, contributed to this feeling. Second, the French army carried with it a foreign language, foreign institutions and a foreign mentality, alien to well established traditions of Spanish monarchy and Spanish Catholicism the peasants had accepted and lived with for centuries.[30] Third, the vacuum of power caused by the collapse of the traditional institutions and the rejection of the foreign ones opened new opportunities for local initiative and social mobility of all kinds: it allowed a reassertion of a tradition of localism and the authority of the *concejos* (thus reversing a trend towards centralism that had accelerated in the last century); it enabled people of the low orders literally to fight their way up, by becoming officers and even generals in the irregular army (and later incorporated into the regular one), breaking in that, way, once and for all, the monopoly the nobility had in the past of military offices; and it permitted the peasants to forego their scruples of consciousness for evading the payment of tithes (which never recovered from the de facto moratorium of the war years), to reinforce their reluctance to pay seigneurial charges, and to fuel their ambition to get hold of the church lands and the common lands.

Fourth, it may be even speculated that a link could have been forged between the *hazañas* or great deeds of the present and those of the past, thus adding up to the impulse for the people to take matters in their own hands once the war was over. Memories of grandeur were not totally alien to the Spanish populace, and certainly not to the rural classes, as they were surrounded by remainders of a glorious past (be they castles or churches), and they were participants in an oral tradition of recounting *hazañas.* This could find, partly at least, an echo in the moral ethos of Castilian peasants, the ethos of *labrador honrado.*

Finally, the key feeling underlying all the rest, was the feeling that it was the people (by this meaning, again, the middle and low classes of society) who had "reconquered" the country from the hand of foreigners. It was a new Reconquista, but this one was accomplished with almost no help either from the state or from the privileged orders (both the nobility and the high church). From this followed that no political system could be seen as legitimate any more unless it received the explicit consent of the middle and low classes of society. Things could never be the same again, even if the old institutions were restored. Working out the complexities and ambiguities of the situation created by this critical experience of the war took most of the energies of the next generation, who still had to go through a period of intermittent civil war in the 1820's and 1830's before landing on the so called "moderate compromise" and the bourgeois order of the 1840's.

At the end of this period of 1800/1840, the crown had to renounce to the historical project of the absolute monarchy, the church lost not only tithes and lands but also most of its ability to influence the policies and institutions of the state, and the seigneurial jurisdiction disappeared. A new bourgeois or liberal order was put into place. Agrarian issues very much close to the peasants' hearts and interests were at the center of the new politics. The definition of the state as a secular entity implied the notion of a distance between *trono y altar,* between the state (as symbolised by the Crown) and the church. The church responded by looking for new ways to get access to the state and influence on society; and the peasantry, particularly the Castilian one, was one of the main tactical targets the church aimed at. On the other hand, any attempt on the part of the church to get close to the Castilian peasants had to wait until after the issue of the church's lands the peasants wanted to get hold of, was settled.

Finally, peasants were asked to support the new design of a liberal and centralist state, against a variety of challenges. On the one hand, traditionalists and left-wing movements challenged the liberal state, while Castilian peasants tended to side with the establishment through the networks of liberal and conservative politicians.[31] On the other peripheral nationalisms challenged the central state, which in turn received ample support from the Castilian peasants. At the same time however the most important interest groups of those same peripheral regions, the Basque and Catalan

industrialists, managed to build up a coalition of sorts with the Castilian (and Andalusian) cereal-growing agriculturalists around the common interest of protectionist tariffs. Finally, at the local level, the liberal state kept on the traditional strategy of the state of the Old Regime (particularly of the XVIIIth century) by pushing forwards a policy of administrative centralisation, trying to put the local councils, the new *ayuntamientos,* under the control of the provincial governor, and lastly of the Minister of the Interior.

4. *The liberal order*

4.1. *Centralism, Political Parties, and Caciquismo*

A series of new economic institutions and economic development transformed the peasant economy in the XIXth century. This transformation was closely related to a similar change in the political system. A series of liberal governments committed themselves to a large-scale redistribution of land away from the church and the corporate villages, and in favor of the urban middle classes and well-to-do peasants. They also constructed a new legal definition of the land rights in favor of the owner and at the expense of the traditional tenants, installed a new judiciary system, and put in place a far more efficient rural police (the *guardia civil).* Finally they defeated the Carlist movements, which were supported by the Basque (and to some extent the Catalan) peasantry.

The new political system was characterised, first, by centralist policies that stepped up the degree of state intervention in village life. The government took over the seigneurial jurisdictional powers, following a trend already at work in the absolute monarchies of the Old Regime.[32] Local judges and mayors were to be appointed and closely supervised by the government. At the same time, the new *alcaldes* (now the mayors) were to have more powers, at the expense of the councils. The seigneurs lost their political power, though in fact they retained their economic one. Sometimes they even improved their economic situation, since their jurisdictional rights were often transformed into private property.[33] As villages lost most, if not all, of their common lands, they became even more dependent on government aid. Many villages in fact tried to hold on, or buy

back, these lands. But their efforts were not very successful against the government, urban middle classes, and the middle peasants interested in buying some of those lands. The centralized state succeeded in monopolising the means of legitimate violence in the countryside, as it defeated attempts at setting local militia under control by ayuntamientos, and it managed to put down the danger that local banditry would spread over the countryside in the second half of the XIXth century (this being one of the main features accounting for the differences in the historical path to follow by Southern Italy and Southern Spain).

There was a tension within the liberal camp between the two political parties of *Moderados* ("Moderates") and *Progresistas* ("Progressives") concerning the configuration of local power in villages and towns. After some alternations in policy, the Moderates won, and imposed an institutional design whose main traits would last (with some dramatic interruptions and some qualifications) for most of the century. This liberal order put local power in the hands of a limited segment of the propertied classes, while subordinating that power to the central government. The village mayor dominated the village council, and he was under the provincial governor' control (who received his orders from the Minister of Interior). The system was hierarchical and largely immune to judiciary and parliamentary control, since the Moderate party followed the French model, according to which a special branch of the judiciary was to control the administration (as against the Progressives' Anglo-saxon model of administrative control by ordinary judges and Parliament).[34] The reason for this lay in the close connection between the mayor's two roles: that of presiding over local business as a representative of the government, and that of overseer of the electoral process.[35] The mayor was charged with the control of electoral lists, the drawing of the boundaries of the electoral districts, the acceptance of candidate lists, the supervision of the actual voting proceedings and the handling of grievances related to the electoral process.[36] Every effort was made to insure the electoral results would fit with the central government's expectations. To this end, and in addition to the mayor's resources of influence and manipulation, all sorts of administrative pressures by government agencies were exercised on the voters: looking into the tax situation of those reluctant to follow the mayor's advise, disputing their claims for a share in the use of the common lands,

questioning the borders of their property, and engaging in all manners of petty harassment. Villages not flexible enough to accommodate the wishes of their corresponding provincial despots, were threatened with the loss of the opportunity to have a new road or a railroad station, etc.[37]

But most often the key figure who established a link between the central government and the local community was not the mayor but rather the *cacique* or local political boss, who held the real power in the countryside as a result of his local or provincial power and his connections with the state. The fact is that the centralism of the liberal state came to the countryside together with that particular institution known as *caciquismo,* a variant of clientelism. This refers to the rule of caciques or local political bosses, whose basis was the stable and diffuse relationship they established with their clients. These clients provided the cacique, or patron, with political support (and other resources if needed) in exchange for various degrees of protection.[38] As it developed in rural Spain, *caciquismo* or clientelism cannot be characterized as a one-to-one relationship between the *cacique* and his clients:[39] it was rather a *system* of relations between (a) a superior power such as the government and by extension the provincial representative of government, (b) the *cacique,* and (c) the *mass* of clients themselves. Relations between the *cacique* and each of his clients might be such that any particular balance of services could sometimes be in the client's favor. But taking into consideration the over-all and long-term balance between the *cacique* and the mass of his clients, then it is clear that the *cacique* usually got the best of it.

The rural *caciques,* particularly the Castilian ones studied by Varela Ortega[40] played a much more important part in the towns and larger villages, especially in the capitals of the judiciary and administrative districts, than in the smaller ones. Mostly, they were legal professionals (lawyers, notaries, judges), and landowners. The economic changes of the century made it easy for them to buy land from the church and the villages. Their legal advice became more and more necessary. Many farmers, sharecroppers and landless workers became dependent on them for work and land. In a situation where payments in cash became more and more generalized, they were also moneylenders; and, in the absence of any form of rural banking, they abused their position in order to extend their landholdings, or expand their influence.

Moreover, the caciques were in close connection with the government and its provincial representatives. In point of fact, a stable working relationship developed between them. The *caciques* provided the government with the votes it needed, particularly after universal suffrage was established in the 1880's. In turn, the *cacique* had some influence on government affairs which he could turn to his advantage and use to get clients' support: recommendations for jobs and small favors in the cities, some help in dealings with judges and the rural police, or, on a larger scale, roads or schools for the villages.

Besides centralism and *caciquismo,* the third element of the liberal order was a two-party system, the two main parties being known by the end of the century as Conservatives (the heir to the Moderates) and Liberals (the heir to the Progressives). In fact, these two parties were intertwined with networks of *caciques* and government officials. On paper there was open competition for political power through free elections. In fact, the patron-client system pervaded both competing parties and the administration. This is not to say that there were no important differences between the two parties, and that political conflict between them was devoid of real meaning. This would be a misrepresentation of the situation. Universal (male) suffrage (in 1891) and freedom for all sorts of associations (in 1887) were brought by the Liberals; and these reforms were of an enormous importance for the development of radical movements. By contrast, foreign and economic policies were closer, but far from identical. What was practically identical was their agrarian policy. The intertwining of the networks of caciques, bureaucracies and party leaders was made possible precisely by the broad consensus among both parties as to what this agrarian policy should be. But here we find an important difference between the Castilian and the Southern, for instance, Andalusian, situation. In the South, the agreement was oriented toward promoting the latifundists' interests and keeping in line a more and more restless agricultural proletariat, even, when it became necessary, by violent means. In Castile, the consensus implied a degree of protection for the middle and small peasants. The agrarian policies of the government included protectionism against foreign competition, and various ways for discouraging the landless workers from forming unions.

Castilian peasants were, of course, pressing for these policies. Their demands for government protection had been made for centuries. Their anti-workers strategy was in turn a sign of the new times. Tensions between peasants and workers had always existed of course in one way or another. But when, by the end of the century, workers in villages like Villalpando or Union de Campos decided to form a union, the peasants were surprised and outraged. Their reaction was caused less by the contents of the workers' grievances (better food, restrictions against hiring outside workers) than by the idea of a workers' union. They could not accept the split of the community that such a union risked making fully explicit. In turn, the workers made their revolutionary move from quite a traditional viewpoint: they accused the peasants of being non-Christian and of not carrying out their traditional duties.[41]

4.2. *The Crisis of the Liberal Order: From the 1900's to the Civil War*

Castilian peasants entered the XXth century, however, with much more concern about the state than about the rural workers. They could not quite take for granted that the state would stick to a policy of high tariffs in order to protect them from corn imports, though the coalition between coal and metal industries, and textile ones with extensive agriculture was fairly stable, and for some it constituted the very foundation of the liberal state. Then, counting on the state protection but faced with a somehow unstable domestic agrarian market, peasants started looking for ways to improve their access to rural credit and to get the state to regulate the market.

Their socioeconomic interests coincided with a revival of the Spanish church, and the result was the appearance of social movements and new political parties that made for an institutional alternative to *caciquismo* in Castile. The church had taken a long time to make its peace with the descendants of those Castilian peasants who, in the old days, decided not to pay tithes, to buy the church's lands arid refuse support for antiliberal politics. But by the last quarter of the century the church seemed intent in coming back to this Castilian peasantry and reinvent it as a traditional one, and one of its most solid social basis. The convergence of the peasants' socioeconomic interests and the church' readiness to reach out to these peasants resulted in a gradual rapprochement between the two,

and in the gradual establishment of a wide network of Catholic professional associations, Catholic rural cooperatives, and Catholic saving banks that sprung up the Castilian countryside between 1900 and 1920. These organizations were to provide the training ground for the leadership, organizational schémas, and ideological discourse of the Catholic political parties of the 1930's.[42]

The 1920's, however, witnessed changes in the economic and in the political culture that provided the basis for a transformation of the nature of politics in the 1930's. Economic development was remarkable; it brought a massive migration to the cities and a transfer of active population from agriculture to industry (the participation of agricultural labor in the total active population fell from 57% in 1920, to 45% in 1930).[43] Communications between cities and villages improved thanks to the expansion of a network of highways, of motorization (with the diffusion of the rural bus or *coche de línea),* and the generalization of the radio.[44] The political culture of the Left underwent a process of relative radicalization (with the Socialists and the Republicans becoming a significant factor in Castilian politics). The result was that, at the fall of the Monarchy and the instauration of the IInd Republic in 1931, the Castilian peasants found themselves in a more complicated and somehow disquieting world than the one they were used to.

They sensed a threat coming from various sides. They became more and more critical of the lack of government regulation of cereal prices, particularly as they hid their own crops and thus misled the government, which in turn had to import cereal on two occasions, in 1932 and 1934, which worsened the ongoing crisis. The government, moreover, was generally perceived by them as favoring consumers in the cities and in the outlying provinces, at the peasants' expense.[45]

Above all, they became more and more irritated by the mounting pressure of the agricultural workers, who were finally getting some degree of support from the Republican government. First, protection was given to workers' unions, at least the Socialist ones (since the Anarchist influence in Castile was minimal). As a result, there was one of their offices, the *casa del pueblo,* in almost every village, particularly in the big villages, where there was a large number of workers. The Socialist

union (Federación de Trabajadores de la Tierra, FTT) was attempting by 1934 a general strike in the countryside, taking position against the introduction of machinery, and asking for thorough government intervention in the labor market and for a program of land expropriation.[46] By 1936, it called for the immediate occupation of the land, the doubling of agrarian wages and the guarantee of permanent employment to rural workers.[47]

Second, the government interfered in the labor market. It introduced, for instance, a sort of Speenhamland system, so that in times of unemployment all the workers of a village were assigned to the local peasants, who in turn had to provide them with a minimal wage for some work. It also tried to make sure that the workers of each village had priority over outside workers, while making it impossible for the peasants to oppose their workers' strikes by bringing in scab labor from other villages.[48] Third, the regime made a general commitment to an "agrarian reform." In fact, this commitment was put into effect with utmost timidity, except for some months immediately before the outbreak of the Civil War. By contrast, it was announced with great acclaim and abundant rhetoric. It was not powerful enough to transform the agrarian structure, but it was more than enough to frighten not only landlords and big agriculturalists, but also middle and important sectors of small peasantry (in principle, property of more than 22 hectares could be considered for expropriation).[49] So, in spite of the fact that the government did not undertake an agrarian reform, and that it did check the attempts by the workers to occupy the lands in some districts, the Republican regime was generally perceived as protecting the agricultural workers, to the point of threatening peasants' property. If something else was needed, the government was also perceived as either a protagonist or an accomplice in a general anti-Catholic and anti-church strategy. At some point, in the cities, churches were sacked and desecrated, with the government playing what seemed to be a passive, amorphous role. Crosses were removed from the schools, including village schools, and some religious orders were expelled from the country.

Castilian peasants strongly reacted against this situation. They did so by becoming involved in national politics. First, they went the traditional way: they voted for and supported a party of regional notables and *caciques,* the Agrarian Party. It got just enough votes to be a very small

though very vocal minority in the Cortes of 1931. Later, a mass party developed on the lines of the German Zentrum, and the Italian Popular Democrats of Dom Sturzo, that is, a Christian Democratic Party: *Acción Popular.* It learned from the church's efforts since the 1920's to build up influence in Castile with a network of rural banks, the *Cajas Católicas de Ahorro.* It had a modern apparatus of propaganda and an energetic leadership. Its success was impressive throughout the whole country, and particularly in Old Castile, which became its stronghold.

Still, *Acción Popular* remained committed to legality, that is, to political action within the existing constitutional framework, and to some sort of democratic order. Because of this, at the time of the military revolt of July, 1936, the party as such and its most prominent national leaders left the scene. Their followers, however, and particularly its youth[51] joined in, and so did most of the local and regional leaders. They could not do it as Christian Democrats. So they became Nationalists without any specific political colour, or Falangistas. As is known, the Falange was made up of three Fascist groups led by Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, and Onésimo Redondo. Both Ledesma and Onésimo came from Old Castile, and their organizations were based on the Castilian cities and towns. Through only a tiny minority of the middle classes, *(señoritos,* students, clerical workers) joined the Falange until 1936, its leaders had looked from the very beginning at the Castilian peasants as one of their main potential supporters and followers. Its program seemed well suited to the peasants' interests: it included the regulation of the wheat market, and the control of the workers' movement. It was also well suited to their view of political order, with its emphasis on a strong authority which was to be used to check cities and the surrounding areas, and its acceptance of a margin for local self-government, so that the peasants would keep the control of their own peasant villages. Its Catholicism, with its doses of anti-clericalism, would not be suited to the church itself, but fitted quite well with the attitude of the Castilian peasant.

To all this, the Falange added a certain amount of anticapitalist ideology and rhetoric, with reference to the state's control of the banking system, and to a modest antilatifundist agrarian reform, as well as what came out, quite unequivocally, as aggressive, violent, illegal tactics. So

that, when the war broke out, Castilian peasants found themselves, together with the middle classes of the provincial cities, as the main popular supporters of the army/church/falange bloc.

The probability of the peasants' voting for rightist parties such as *Acción Popular* during the 1930's was, of course, greater where the church's influence, or at least Catholicism, was more important, and where the main cleavage pitted peasants against workers rather than against latifundists (or big agriculturalists). This was the case in Old Castile. Also, the probability of the peasants' joining the nationalist army depended, of course, on the fate of the cities where most troops were concentrated, and on the proximity of the villages to these cities. It also depended, to a minor extent, on the relationship of forces within the villages, between (leftist) workers and (rightist) peasants, and this again led the peasants of Old Castile to become one of the main elements of Franco's armies.

Transition from the republican regime to the nationalist one in the Old Castilian villages was violent, though much less so than in Andalusia, partly because of the lack of organized resistance by the Left. Repression was, however, particularly important during the first six months of the war,[52] and it was probably greater in the big villages which had a large working class population. At any rate, during the 1960's people tended to avoid discussing the subject and to minimize the violence, partly because, at least in the middle and small sized villages, the social and ideological conflict which opposed peasants and workers during the 1930's did not totally eradicate some of the ethics of neighborhood which could not be reconciled with such violence.

As a matter of fact, memories of violent repression were mixed up with memories of compromise and understanding. In June of 1936, in a small village of the Old Castile like Tamara de Campos, the village council was controlled by center-to-the-left councillors. At the moment of the insurrection one of the councillors managed to shift his allegiance to the other side. Thus, he could use his own credentials to commute the death sentence of an agricultural worker who had been a leader of the *casa del pueblo* into a prison sentence. Another village councillor went into hiding. Another went to jail for some years. The *casa del pueblo* was closed. The crosses came back to the school. The streets got new names: those of the nationalist generals. After the war, one of the local officials

was instrumental in arresting three agricultural workers from a neighboring village who were accused of having leftist ideas and sentenced to death; two of them were shot.

Most of New Castile, on the other hand, remained on the Republican side during most of the war. In a small village like Camino Viejo, only a liny sector of the population voted left during the 1930's. It was led by nonpeasants: the chief of the railroad station, and the schoolteacher. Too close to Madrid to be otherwise, the whole valley of Tajuña followed Madrid's fate in July, 1936, and it went Republican. There was some resistance in a big village like Valdesomio. A few latifundists and military men were shot, and the church was burned by Socialist workers from Madrid's industrial belt. Camino Viejo did not resist. Its church was burned anyway, while the statue of the saint patron was saved and hidden by its new Anarchist mayor. In this particular region, while Socialist and Communist unions developed, most peasants went to rival Anarchist organizations. In other parts of the countryside, in Aragón, for instance, it was just the opposite: the peasants asked the Communists for protection against the agrarian reform attempted by the Anarchists. After the war, there was a small number of executions in Valdesomio, this time of leftist workers; and, again, in Camino Viejo, some people went to prison.

5. *Castillan peasantry and francoism: national politics and local politics*

5.1. *An Excursus on Bonapartism*

Castilian peasants were, like their French counterparts at the time of Louis Bonaparte, attracted to an authoritarian regime. They both look like variants of a tendency that peasants may have to support bureaucratic authoritarian regimes at a certain stage in the development of a capitalist society in response to the double threat posed by a social revolution and the development of a capitalist economy. According to Marx's suggestive discussion of the French peasants' support of Bonapartism in his *18 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*,[53] peasants were instrumental in defeating the insurrection of the Parisian workers in June, 1848, and in bringing about the IInd Republic. In these circumstances, the peasants started by supporting both the party of order and Bonaparte, but in

the final confrontation most of them chose Bonaparte, and with it what we may now call a bureaucratic authoritarian regime. Marx's explanation for it emphasized economic determinism as well as the relative isolation and powerlessness of the peasants, which pushed them to trust on the state for solving the problems they had in dealing with capitalist development. The traditional technology, the small size of the farms, and very limited involvement in the market made for an atomistic social structure (in Marx's famous metaphor peasants and peasant villages being considered as "a sack of potatoes"), and an extremely localist parochial culture. As a consequence, the peasants were unable to get an objective view of the general situation and of their own interests, and unable to engage in a nation-wide, or even a region-wide, peasant movement. They were not even able to form a social class proper, the similarity of their interests stopping short of allowing them to act in a self-organised way (in the Hegelian like language Marx often used, peasants would be considered as "a class in itself" not as "a class for itself").

This, of course, did not prevent the peasants from being able to deal with day-to-day situations, with the help of their families and other local resources. The trouble came when they had to face problems which had originated in the outside world and had, for them, an extraordinarily unusual character, in this case, the threat of a social revolution and the threat of a capitalist development. In such circumstances, the peasants tended to ask for solutions from a supreme, powerful figure, as they could ask for rain from a heavenly God. Here Marx suggested a peasant variant of a theory of the fetichism of the state in terms which were strongly reminiscent of those of his early discussion on alienation,[54] where a collective subject (in the occasion, the peasant class) projects or transfers its essence, in other words, its sociopolitical power or resources, onto an alien object, the state (or one state institution such as the President of the Republic). By so doing, this subject becomes powerless, not only because it loses actual control of the state, but also because it loses the consciousness of having endowed the state with the powers it has.

Certainly, Marx's argument distorts and oversimplifies the predicament of peasants under conditions of economic capitalist development, and in any case it overstates the economic

causation of their political behaviour. Peasants may engage and have engaged in many different types of political action on the basis of economic conditions such as those faced by the French peasants of the XIXth century, depending on the political institutions they are dealing with and their interpretation of the situation (according to the kind of cultural resources they may dispose of), which in turn is contingent on their local traditions and the collective memory they have. At the same time, Marx's picture of the isolation and powerlessness of French peasants seems greatly exaggerated, for this kind of extreme isolation and powerlessness was rather exceptional in the history of European peasantry. As a matter of fact as Bois, and Tilly, have shown regarding the peasantry of the West, in late XVIIIth century, and Agulhon for the Midi, in early XIXth century,[55] French peasants were quite able to tap on those resources of internal solidarity, and their cultural or ideological resources, for engaging in political activity in times relatively close to the one Marx was referring to. (And the fact that they could rely on leaders or intermediaries not belonging to the peasant classes should not made the peasants all that different from the industrial workers, so close to Marx's heart, who were also seemingly in need of non workers for articulating their thoughts and guiding their strategies).

The fact is that peasants had more social and cultural resources on their own, and a much larger margin for manoeuver, than Marx's argument would recognise them to have. Peasants such as the French ones of that period had a range of choices, and they were able to engage in political action that permitted a middle ground between total autonomy (to be supposedly expressed through participation in social revolution), and total alienation (as shown in their total submission to the state). In other words, they could work some deal or accommodation with the state, either directly with the central ruler, or, more likely, through a system of intermediaries (which would fit in more easily with the social and cultural experiences peasants might have).

The general point is that peasants such as these, when faced with extraordinary problems, may tend to resort to some supreme, powerful figure, and/or to a network of intermediate notables and bureaucrats. This qualification is important as it sheds new light on the parallelism between politics and religion. The authoritarian politics and the Catholic culture French peasants had

adhered to for centuries reinforced each other and belonged to the same basic mode of life. The three level political system of (a) king, (b) ministers and functionaries, and (c) subjects, mirrored the three-level religious system of (a) God, (b) intermediaries such as Virgin Mary, saints and priests, and (c) laymen. And we have to remember that this traditional peasant (1) had only a limited involvement in religion as long as he was not passing through critical situations (the same applying to his involvement in politics), and (2) did not necessarily invest more energy in the cult of the all-powerful but distant God rather than in the cult of the closer (and maybe more reliable, because more reachable and controlled) intermediary figures (and the same would apply to politics too).

In terms of our present discussion, this brings us to the following argument. For the peasants to transform their authoritarian and conservative general orientation into an active force in politics and to support Bonaparte versus the party of order, several conditions would have to apply. First, extraordinary problems would have to push the peasants out of their usual political inhibition and localism (these problems possibly being those of the threat of a social revolution, or a gradual but seemingly inexorable absortion of the family farm by capitalist development). Second, at a given moment, protection by an authoritarian ruler like Bonaparte would have to look more attractive than the protection by the party of order (or its equivalent).

Now, what Bonaparte and the party of order had to offer to the peasants was in many respects very similar. Both offered an emphatic defense of property but only a qualified defense of the peasant property, a hardline stand against social revolution and a great reluctance to ease the financial and the fiscal burden of the peasants; and, by the way, neither promised to give back any political power to the peasants. As a matter of fact, centralization was to follow its course, and political participation should restrict itself to the rituals of national elections or plebiscitary celebrations. Even so, Bonaparte's protection seemed more believable because he was thought to be more willing to defend peasant property and because he was supposed to be more able to do so. This certainly had to do with the greater visibility of the links between the party of order and the capitalist interests and also with Bonaparte's success in dealing with the Assembly. But this mainly had to

do, as Marx pointed out, with the fact that the president was a Bonaparte, and this tapped the collective memory, imagination, and political culture of the peasants. That is what persuaded the peasants of his willingness and his ability to defend them. That is to say, he benefitted from a capital of prestige and trust, a charisma, in Weber's terms, which had been accumulated in the past, because of the association in the peasant memory of the rule of the first Bonaparte and the prosperity of the peasant economy. But this being so, from this follows that peasants' attachment to Bonaparte was conditional on his capacity to deliver, and was always contingent on the peasants having no better alternative at hand. Defeat in war destroyed that capacity; and the leadership of the IIIrd Republic was to propose the alternative deal.

This explains why, when the charismatic leader was defeated in the Franco-Prussian war, the IIIrd Republic was able to inherit peasant support, and the bourgeoisie managed to establish a network of relations between the capital and the country and town notables, and was able to put together industrial and agricultural interests around a demand for state protection against the more and more aggressive foreign competition.[56] And from this also follows that at no moment could the peasants be portrayed as being subject to a process of complete alienation of their political power, and even less could such alienation be understood as a mere result of their living in conditions of economic backwardness and social isolation. The isolation and the backwardness were real, but they should not be overstated, since the market, cultural influences, and state intervention had provided an uninterrupted flow of communications between the rural communities and the urban centers from immemorial times. Their powerlessness was also a matter of degree. Despite a persistent policy that traditional as well as modern French rulers had tried for centuries to subdue them, peasants had shown in the past as they did in the present, that they could keep collective arrangements, formal and informal family networks and other forms of community organization, that is, a considerable degree of organization at the local level, plus a certain capacity to resist and/or to influence the national authorities, this allowing them in due time to develop their own associations. Also, peasants' ability to find out organizational and ideological resources in and around their own experience (for instance among artisans and professionals) so as to articulate and press their demands, should not be underestimated (and Maurice Agulhon's analysis of the French Midi between 1815 and

1851 provides an eloquent contrasting view of such ability as against the picture of "rural idiocy" Marx was all too inclined to attribute to the French peasants).[57]

5.2. *Francoist Peasants in the 1960's*

Now we may come back to Castilian peasants' adhesion to the nationalist cause in the Civil War of the 1930's. Castilian peasants exchanged political support (military recruits, then loyalty) for protection against acute threats posed by a social revolution (including a challenge to their worldview), and instability in the grain and labor markets. Their bargains with the political authorities took place in the framework of a three-level system of exchanges between Franco, the political and social intermediaries, and the peasants, and against a background of internal enemies (agrarian unionists, for instance) and external ones (last but not least, foreign agriculturalists). The intermediary level was a composite one made of the Fascist party and other Francoist political families, the official agrarian association and a variety of clientelistic networks (many of them related with the church). At this intermediary level, peasants made use of the organizational experience they had accumulated in the first third of the century, when Catholic organizations had spread all over the Castilian countryside. Old Catholic leaders occupied crucial positions in the clientelistic networks mentioned above, and in the official agrarian association of Francoism. At the same time, peasants hold on to the notion that the Francoist state had been the result of a war they themselves, or their sons, had fought, and was therefore indebted to them.

The new deal peasants made with the Francoist state seemed another variant in a long tradition of peasant involvement in national politics. From the Old Regime, to the liberal order, to Francoism, the three levels of the supreme ruler, the intermediary forces and the peasants, had remained. What Francoism did was to reinforce considerably the relationship between the state and the peasants, and to strengthen the covenant or tacit understanding between them, by changing the nature of the intermediary level. As we know, through the XIXth century and the first third of the XXth century, a system of patron-client relationships had been put in place, caciques and politicians having replaced seigneurs and royal functionnaires, while mass political parties and interest

associations became prominent later on in the 1920's and 1930's. The Francoist state took away parties and associations. Instead, an ubiquitous state bureaucracy took over, looking into the grain market and the implementation of agrarian policies such as those referring to the concentration of plots and technical training. This created a situation where peasants would still feel ambivalent to the state and to national politics, but in a new and different way.

When asked about politics, Castilian peasants in villages such as Camino Viejo, Támara or Carrión, in the 1960's, usually exhibited a sort of indifference. References to politics and politicians almost invariably had a negative connotation. Politicians were ambitious people who achieved their particular goals under cover of seeking the public good. Their public spirit was simply pretense. Their promises were suspect: too good to be true. They could make on occasions an impression on the peasants, but they were certainly not to be relied upon, their deeds never matching their words. But then, when pushed to be a more specific, peasants' rejection of politics turned out to be a rejection of a certain type of politics. When they said that "politics" was bad, they meant: "party politics" was bad. When they said they liked "no politics," they meant they liked a government not run by party politicians. "Party Politics" of course was banned from the Francoist experience. Therefore peasant statements in this respect could only refer to the pre-Franco period, particularly to the Second Republic. Feelings of antagonism against that experience were still alive among these Castilian peasants. Partly this was due to systematic indoctrination, by the newspapers, radio, television, church and school. But more or less this indoctrination covered the whole country with very different results. Here the indoctrination effort found a receptive audience, because of the reasons that have already been discussed.

Even so, the government in Madrid looked very far away. There was no way to control or influence government decisions. There had been, true, a pattern of over-all protection. But industrial prices had tended to rise and agricultural prices to fall behind. The price of the tractors were, for instance, very high as a result of a protectionist policy whose first priority was the domestic industry, not the peasants. At the same time, the peasants' trust in the government was unevenly distributed between Franco and his ministers. Franco was trustworthy though distant. The ministers were seen as running the daily life of government but could not be trusted. Franco was visible, the

the ministers were somehow less visible and more anonymous. Two thirds of the peasant men in Camino Viejo, for instance, did not know the name of the Minister of Agriculture (despite the fact that their entire economy strongly depended, as they knew very well, on decisions made in the last instance by such a minister). People in positions in government, like more in general people living in the capital, were assumed neither to know the peasants' problems not to care much about them. It was not so much that they felt alienated from the state, in the sense of having no feeling of identification with or support for it, since they did support the regime. Nor was it that they felt alienated from the state in the sense of feeling powerless before, and fully dependent on, the state (irrespective of whether or not they did identify with it), for there was always a measure of self-reliance in the peasant attitude, which was provided by the experience of their local institutions as well as by the experience of their decisive intervention in the Civil War. Rather we are dealing here with something more complicated in peasants' attitudes: with degrees in their feelings of alienation from the state, and their sense of control (or lack of it) over government, and to their ambivalence toward authority.

What the peasants basically expected in exchange for their military, and then their political, support of the regime was a stable social and economic rural order, and certain relative standing for the peasantry in the social order of the whole country. They expected this not as a result of the impersonal play of economic and social forces, such as economic development, the market, tendencies in social mobility, and the like. They expected this rather as a result of deliberate policies in the face of a somehow threatening if only half-understood fate. By the same token, they made someone, the government, responsible for the fulfillment (or frustration) of these expectations.

One of the troubles with the current circumstances was that, in this respect, things had been changing for the worse in the course of the 1960's. First, the agrarian order was no longer stable: the slow eroding process of the 1950's had been replaced by an acute economic crisis. Second, the whole country had changed in a very dramatic way, and this was perceived by the peasants as a great opportunity for the industrial workers and the city dwellers, while they were left behind. Under these conditions the state was held responsible. Peasants resented what they called the

ingratitude of the government. As a peasant of Camino Viejo put it: "The government doesn't care for us, the middle people, the reliable people. It simply favors those at the top, and those at the bottom."

5.3. *Local Politics by the early 1960's in a Small Village*

After a brief moment of totalitarian fervor in early 1940's, the Francoist regime adopted the configuration of an authoritarian regime as described by Juan Linz,[58] and the state discouraged people's participation in politics, even on the part of classes or groups sympathetic to it. This of course applied also to Castilian peasants. In principle this was compatible with people focusing their attention on local politics. But the conditions for a revival of the strong corporate identity of the villages had disappeared long ago, leaving behind only traces or remnants. At the same time, resources for taking care of local problems were limited. As a consequence the potential for cooperation and association among Castilian peasants remained underdeveloped, and their experience in local politics in that period was rather tenuous. (It would be only in the late sixties and early seventies that economic cooperation would stimulate some interest in local politics; and only in the late seventies, with the disappearance of Francoism, that independent professional associations and political parties would come back to life, this in turn making for a renewed interest in local politics.)

Local politics in a small peasant village like Camino Viejo in the early 1960's evolved around the use of a very reduced amount of common resources. Yearly income was barely enough to pay a local official, and little more. The public patrimony consisted of roads and streets of dust, a few ill-conserved buildings, and a few plots of land in the hills. There was no regulation of common activities such as the repair of roads (the *cenderas* of some Old Castilian Villages). The coordination of rotation of crops and *derrota de mieses* was still in use, but it was done on a customary basis, without intervention on the part of the local public institutions. Still, there was a degree of concern for some services, such as the school, and for dealing with some common problems of the village. Most of these public resources (patrimony, regulations, activities, etc.) were decided upon by the *ayuntamiento* or village council, whose competences and composition were regulated by national laws

such as the *Ley de Régimen Local,* which had been enacted and were interpreted by the central administration.

The *ayuntamiento* was composed of the mayor or *alcalde* and (in this case) three councillors or *concejales,* plus the secretary or local official. The law provided at least in theory for a strong mayor who had considerable authority over the council, while being rigidly subordinated to provincial and lastly central functionaries. He was not elected by the village, but appointed by the provincial governor, and was responsible to him. The local official was also appointed. The councillors were elected, at least on paper. A vote for one-third of the councillors (here just on person) was regularly held each three or four years. Only heads of family participated in this election. There might be also some form of an election for the councillor who represented the professions or syndicates, in this case the farmers' official syndicate. Finally, the third councillor was chosen by the other two. The posts of councillors were therefore open to public vote. For the election of family councillor, participation of voters was relatively high: about 70 to 80 per cent in a twenty-year period in Camino Viejo (from early 1940's to early 1960's).

In fact, most of these positions were held by middle and to a lesser extent small peasants. In small villages like Camino Viejo and Tamara there had been a sort of rotation of most, though not all, public positions among five or six families. In Tamara, between 1930 and 1964, except for a short period of four years when the local official also became the *alcalde,* the mayor had always been a member of one of the three most important peasant families. The councillors were all but one middle peasants. In Camino Viejo, the situation had been very similar, with three families having a disproportionate share of public positions, and the secretary and the schoolteacher playing dominant roles, since they belonged also to middle peasant families, and had some land themselves. Landless workers were as a rule excluded from village power (from the village council, positions in the farmers' syndicate or the local office of the Fascist party, and local justice).

Despite his prominence in the council and the capital of prestige or *honra* ascribed to the position, the *alcalde* had limited power. As he received no salary or other form of remuneration for his job, and he was also a full-time agriculturalist, he did not have much time (and often the

the will) to spend in his office. Nor did he have any particular competence or love for the paperwork that made for most of the day-to-day business of the local administration, keeping registers and statistics, issuing certificates to people, and above all dealing with requests made by provincial and central functionaries. In big villages and towns, where the local political apparatus was somewhat more developed, the peasants had a marginal role, the central and provincial government became more visible, and as a result the *alcalde* could more easily play a role approaching that of the local boss or *cacique* of old times. But in small villages the *alcalde* operated and made decisions on the basis of a tacit consensus among middle and small peasants about what was to be done; this meant, as a rule, as we will see later on, doing as little as possible.

Under these circumstances the secretary might become much more than a mere official to execute others' decisions. He knew and took care of the public business, and kept the *alcalde* and councillors informed. In some cases, he might accumulate considerable power, particularly if he got hold of other administrative positions. In Camino Viejo, for instance, the secretary of the village council was also the secretary of the farmers' syndicate, the secretary of the local judge, the secretary of the social security office, as well as the church keeper or *sacristan.* All kinds of information, both public and private (budgets, records of meetings, statistics, official transcripts, birth certificates, technical information on agricultural matters, etc.), in circulation within the village and particularly between the village and the outside world passed through his hands. At the same time, he belonged to a middle peasant family, and was a member of an informal group or network of local notables, together with the schoolteacher and three other families, all linked by kinship ties and belonging to the same stratum of middle peasants. The case of Camino Viejo's secretary was not exceptional, nor was it the rule either. In many other villages the secretary could be just a clerk who was poorly paid and not very highly thought of, who confined himself to paper work and had little say in any significant decisions to be made by the peasant authorities. In these circumstances he might be, as the schoolteacher himself usually was, a relatively marginal character on the village scene.

By 1962, the annual income of the *ayuntamiento* of Camino Viejo was about 80,000 *pesetas* (about $1,400 at the time). This was typical of the small sized villages of the region. Most of this income went into the secretary's salary. The rest was used for keeping a minimum amount of services going: some repair work in the public buildings, lights in the streets and little more. The boys' school was in poor condition, and the girls' school was nearby in ruins; the graveyard was in a state of decay; the church was threatening to collapse. The streets had no sidewalks, and they were made of dirt and mud. There was no running water in the houses. The most basic medical services were absent, nor did any doctor or other medical personnel live in the village. This picture was not exceptional. In Tierra de Campos, for instance, water was a very rare resource. Only one third of the villages had brought water within the village, and none of the small and middle villages had brought it within the houses. In all these villages, women had to walk about one to one-and-a-half miles in order to get the water they needed for cooking, drinking, and washing.[59] These villages could not afford big investments such as the construction of new buildings, or the repair of the old ones, waterworks, the paving of the streets or the construction of a public laundry. They could not increase their local taxes and had little inclination to do communal work. In order to better their collective condition, they tended either to sell or rent some of the common lands if they still had any or, and this was their favorite policy, to ask for money from the central and provincial governments.

As a rule, the village authorities were not oriented towards an interventionist local administration. They lacked the funds for such intervention, but also the will for it, as the villagers tended to mind their own business and distrust leaders of any kind who might be using the already scarce common resources for their own benefit. People in positions of authority were surrounded by people who held such opinions, and they even shared the same views. They also knew that any attempt on their part to do too many things would meet with distrust and disguised or open criticism. So, they tended to occupy the positions of power rather than to exercise this power: enjoying the prestige of these positions and seeing that things run the usual way.

Some issues, however, caught the attention of both local authorities and the communities by early sixties, as they became more and more sensitive to the school situation; but only gradually and against an original background of quite ambivalent feelings towards the village school. Primary schools became widespread in the countryside only during the second half of the XIXth century; but they played a rather marginal role in the everyday life of the village. Learning the roles of housewife, agricultural worker or farmer, head of a family, etc., was a process that was carried out at home, in the streets and in the fields, not in the classroom. None of them required much formal training, not even writing and reading. Liberal as well as conservative governments did press for the diffusion of elementary schools in the countryside. They acted, however, very differently according to the regions. Their efforts were much more intense and successful in the northern part of the country than in the South. By 1877, the percentage of men able to read and to write was of more than 45% in most Castilian provinces (and more than 60% in several of them), while it was less than 30% in most provinces East and South of Castile.[60] It all happened as if the government had wanted to provide reading and writing abilities to a rural population mostly composed of conservative peasants rather than to a population where there was a majority of restless landless workers. As a Minister of Public Instruction of the XlXth century, Bravo Murillo, put it rather nicely: "Are you asking me to authorize a school for 600 workers? Certainly I will not. We don't need men who think, but cows who work."[61] Castilian peasants, who presumably belonged to the first species, benefitted from some government aid, but also from the church's, two-thirds of Castilian children going to primary school by the early 1930's. With quite opposite ideological overtones, the Republic and the Francoist state increased the numbers and the funding of primary schools. The result was a high rate of schooling for Old Castile, and slightly less so for New Castile. In Camino Viejo, for instance, illiteracy decreased from 45% in 1940 to 6% in 1962.

The point, however, is that schooling remained largely divorced from village life, and it was confined to communications with the outside world. Most people sent, and received, very few, if any, letters, and read from newspapers, not to speak of books. The schoolteacher held little prestige. He (and more often she) received a small salary, and was supposed to live in rather precarious conditions, so much so than people in great need was described, in a popular saying,

as "being more hungry than a schoolteacher" *(tienen más hambre que un maestro de escuela).* Schoolteachers were perceived as standing at the end of a bureaucratic ladder, being ill-paid and poorly thought of by the central government that employed him. Their business was to deal with children, not with adult men. They knew things, but these were of small relevance in everyday village life. Reading, writing and arithmetic had some but not much use. Schoolteachers also taught a little geography, and above all history of Spain. This was, and has always been, a highly ideological matter. The schoolteachers of the Republican period in the 1930's tried to spread democratic and liberal values, much in the way their counterparts of the French Third Republic had done a couple of generations before.[62] With that short-lived exception, schoolteachers usually conveyed the conservative interpretation of the history of Spain. In the Francoist period, this meant to link the Civil War, the War of Independence against Napoleon, the *hazañas* of the Golden Age (the *Conquista de Indias* and the European Wars) and the *Reconquista* in a linear sequence. The argument was simple: (a) Spain was a sort of eternal entity defined by its commitment to Catholicism and national independence (against outsiders or enemies such as Moors, Protestants, French invaders, Masons and Communists), as well as to values of glory or honor among all nations, and consequently, it was characterized by an ethos of strenuous efforts or *hazañas;* and (b) peasants were portrayed as having been faithful to those basic values and having participated rather successfully in the national destiny (for instance, in the Reconquista and the War of Independence), though they would share the ethos of *hazañas* only in an approximate way.

The fact was that, whatever the success of the schoolteacher's indoctrination in shaping some stereotypes of the peasants' world view, these stereotypes had only secondary importance in their daily life. They did little to motivate the peasants into giving money or much esteem to the schoolteacher and the school itself. This was to change, however, in later years due to economic and social transformations that made professional training, reading, writing and arithmetic a more and more urgent and valuable asset in an increasingly uncertain world. As a matter of fact, more generally, conditions for the peasants' involvement in local as well as in national politics did change through the 1960's, and even more so through the 1970's and 1980's.

Notes

1. R. Redfield, *Peasant society and culture* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960): 19.

2. José Antonio Maravall, *Las comunidades de Castilla* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1970); Joseph Pérez, *La Revolución de las Comunidades de Castilla (1520-1521)* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1985).

3. Maravall, *Las comunidades*, 57.

4. Ibid., 48; Pérez, *La Revolución*, 452.

5. Juan Díaz del Moral, *Historia de las agitaciones campesinas andaluzas* (Madrid: Alianza, 1971) (1st. ed. 1929); Pérez-Díaz, Víctor: *Pueblos y clases sociales en el campo español* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1974): 7-35; and Temma Kaplan, *Anarchists of Andalusia (1868-1903)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

6. R. Oyarzun, *Historia del carlismo* (Madrid: Alianza, 1970). For useful comparisons with reactions of the French peasantry against the French revolution see Paul Bois, *Paysans de l'Owest* (Paris: Flammarion, 1971); and C. Tilly, *The Vendée* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1964).

7. J. Costa, *El Colectivismo Agrario en España* (Madrid: Biblioteca Costa, 1915): 124; C. de Castro, *La revolución liberal y los municipios españoles* (Madrid: Alianza, 1979).

8. C. Lida; I. Zavala (eds.), *La Revolución de 1868* (New York: Las Américas Publ., 1970).

9. J. Díaz del Moral; *Historia de las agitaciones campesinas*; V. Pérez-Díaz, *Pueblos y clases*.

10. J. Blum, "The European village as community: Origins and functions," in *Agricultural History*, vol. 45, no. 3, 1971.

11. S. Payne, *La España medieval* (Madrid: Playor, 1985): 14; and B. García Sanz, *Los campesinos de la España tradicional* (Valladolid: Diputación Provincial de Valladolid, 1989): 57.

12. F. Carsten, *The origins of Prussia* (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1954).

13. As Salomon points out a propos of the duke of Infantado: Noel Salomon, *La campagne de Nouvelle Castille á la fin du XVIeme siécle d'aprés les Relaciones Topográficas* (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964): 201.

14. Suzanne Tax Freeman, *Neighbors. The social contract in a Castillian Hamlet* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970): 14.

15. B. García Sanz, *Los campesinos en la sociedad tradicional*, 35.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 106.

18. Ibid., 124.

19. Antiseigneurial revolts (as different from anti-tax revolts) were also rare in France according to Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *The French Peasantry (1450-1660)* (Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1987): 372.

20. García Sanz, *Los campesinos*, 100.

21. Salomon, *La campagne*, 204.

22. A. Domínguez Ortiz, *El antiguo régimen: los Austrias* (Madrid: Alianza, 1973): 205.

23. A. Domínguez Ortiz, "El ocaso del régimen señorial en la España del siglo XVIII" in *Revista Internacional de Sociología*, nº39 (1952).

24. See M. Artola, "El Estado y la política económica de los Borbones ilustrados" in M. Artola (ed.) *La economía española al final del antiguo régimen. IV Las instituciones* (Madrid: Alianza, 1982: XI-XLIII); and E. Garrigós, "Organización territorial a fines del antiguo régimen" in Artola (ed.) *La economía española*, 1-105. See also C. de Castro, *La revolución liberal*, 16, 23.

25. M. Artola, *Los orígenes de la España Contemporánea* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1975): 357.

26. Ibid., 10.

27. Ibid., 103.

28. Ibid." 113.

29. M. Artola, *La burguesía revolucionaria 1808-1874* (Madrid: Alianza, 1977): 28.

30. Artola, *Los orígenes de la España Contemporánea*, 123.

31. J. Varela Ortega, *Los amigos políticos*, Madrid: Alianza, 1977.

32. S. de Moxó, *La disolución del regimen señorial en España* (Madrid: CSIC, 1965).

33. Gonzalo Anes, "La agricultura española desde comienzos del siglo XIX hasta 1868", in Pedro Schwartz (ed.), *Ensayos sobre la economía española a finales del siglo XIX* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1970): 245.

34. Castro, *La Revolución liberal*, 127.

35. Ibid., 130.

36. Ibid., 177.

37. Ibid., 233.

38. Another, and quite different, variant of patron-client relationship may refer to the relationship between an artisan, or shop-keeper, and his clients, wherein it is the client who patronizes the artisan, as in the Jajmany system. O. Lewis and W. Barnouw, "Caste and the Jajmani system in a North Indian village" in J. Potter; M. Díaz; G. Foster (eds.) *Peasant society* (Boston: Little Ground Co., 1967): 110-134.

39. For a different view see J. Varela Ortega, "El funcionamiento del sistema *caciquista*," in *Revista Storica Italiana*, LXXXV, 4, 1973: 944.

40. J. Varela Ortega, *Los amigos políticos* (Madrid: Alianza, 1977). Ibid.

41. Varela Ortega, "El funcionamiento," 950.

42. J.J. Castillo, *Propietarios muy pobres* (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 1979); J. R. Montero, *La CEDA: el catolicismo social y político en la Segunda República*, Madrid: Revista de Trabajo, 1977. Manuel Ramírez, *Los grupos de presión en la Segunda República española* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1969).

43. M. Martínez Cuadrado, *La burguesía conservadora 1874-1931* (Madrid: Alianza, 1973): 112.

44. R. Herr, *An historical essay on Modern Spain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971): 145.

45. For some of the evidence see E. Malefakis, *Reforma agraria y revolución campesina en la España del siglo XX* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1970): 306, 331, 379, 405, 421, 427, 429.

46. E. Malefakis, *Reforma agraria*, 388.

47. Ibid., 423.

48. Ibid., 425.

49. Ramírez Jiménez, *Los grupos de presión*, 174.

50. See for instance, the discourse of Estevanez, representative of Burgos in the Spanish Cortes, July 29, 1931, *Diario de sesiones de las Cortes constituyentes de la República española*, 192-196.

51. Montero, "La fascistización de la derecha española en la Segunda República: el caso de la CEDA" in *Estudios en homenaje a Francisco Murillo Ferrol*, Política y Sociedad, vol.II (Madrid: CIS-CEC, 1987): 619-644.

52. G. Jackson, *The Spanish republic and the civil war 1931-1939* (Princeton, 1965): 526-540.

53. K. Marx, *The 18 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York, 1963): 123-131. And V. Pérez-Díaz, *State, bureaucracy and civil society* (London: McMillan, 1978): 34-53.

54. K. Marx, *Economie et philosophie* in *Oeuvres. Economie II* (ed. Rubel), (Paris: Gallimard, 1968): 3-143. This analysis anticipates Marx's discussion of Oriental Despotism that he was to develop in his articles on India, in 1853. Pérez-Díaz, *State, bureaucracy*, 46, 53-4, 79-83.

55. Bois, *Paysans de l'Ovest*; Tilly, *The Vendée*; Maurice Agulhon, *La République an village* (Paris: Plon, 1970).

56. P. Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986).

57. Agulhon, *La Republique au village*.

58. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: the Case of Spain" in E. Allardt, S. Rokkan (eds.) *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology* (New York: Free Press, 1970).

59. G. Brenan, *El laberinto español* (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1950): 259.

60. V. Pérez-Díaz, "La escuela y el maestro rural" in *Cambio Tecnológico y procesos educativos en España* (Madrid, 1972): 127-155.

61. M. Artola, *La burguesía revolucionaria*, 277.

62. For a comparison see E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976): 303-338.