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LANGUAGE AND STATES

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State construction has always involved attempts by rulers to define or redefine the identity (or identities) of the people living within the boundaries that those rulers hope to consolidate or expand. In reaction to these regime-favored definitions, cultural groups have sought both to influence the perceptions of their rulers about those definitions and to adjust their cultural repertoires either to defy or give support to those definitions. The program of cultural engineering by rulers on the one hand and strategies of mixed defiance and complicity by society on the other hand lead to outcomes that are in one sense open-for-challenge and in another sense, not-forever-open. At certain points in the state building process, the issue of the cultural identity of the people is a crucial component of political debate; at other points, their identity is obvious, resting on a solid (but symbolic) biological foundation (i.e. the "nation"). The purpose of this paper is to examine the processes of state building under which one aspect of cultural identity -- the "language(s) spoken by the people -- is contested or becomes institutionalized.

My examination of the politics of language in the process of state building will emphasize three central themes. First, the politics of identity manipulation in state formation follows diverse patterns. Processes by which rulers deal with the facts of societal multilingualism differ depending on the historical context of state building. The language material herein will therefore be used to develop a differentiated typology of state-building.¹ Second, the

¹ Many of the models of state building elucidate its universal qualities, e.g. Tilly (1985), North (1981) and Levi (1981). Other work, e.g. that of Mann (1986) and Rokkan (1981) delineate so many paths that it is difficult to isolate key differences. Studies by Anderson (1974) and Doyle (1986) make interesting dichotomies, but fail to account for the consequences of different means and contexts of state expansion and consolidation. We remain without a clear typology of state-building paths.

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institutionalization of a (set of) language(s) in a state is the result not of a single political battle but rather of a series of conflicts or games. Because of these dynamics of language conflict (in which, for example, the domination of one language may be "settled" but the retention of subordinate languages may remain contested), models of state building based on the metaphor of "punctuated equilibria" are more useful than those models that see states built upon a single contract. (Krasner, 1984) Third, institutionalization and/or hegemony can only mean that a language conflict is "settled" in inverted commas. Language defeat will often mean the establishment of a core of linguists within the subordinate group who preserve the dying language, a language which could serve as the symbolic resource for a counter-hegemony.

STATE RATIONALIZATION

My research on language and state building initially focused on the relationship between any central ruler and a lord in an (linguistically distinct) incorporated region. The ruler, I assumed, would want to reduce transactions costs by stipulating a common language of commerce and control. (Laitin, 1988) I noted that decrees in France (16th c.) and Spain (18th c), demanding that official documents from the regions be written in the language specified by the ruler, met little opposition and easy compliance. This was in contrast to decrees seeking to rationalize the administration of taxation and the recruitment of soldiers.

To explain this outcome, I modeled a game between a ruler seeking language rationalization and a lord seeking to maintain the cultural integrity of his region as a possible resource for future mobilization by the lord to make his region the center of an autonomous state. In this game, the ruler has the choice of administering the region in his, or the region's, language. The lord has the choice as to whether to learn (or have his children and encourage members of his status group to learn) the ruler's language or to refuse to learn it. As Matrix A shows, four different outcomes are possible.

Let us assume that the ruler, once he decides to reduce transactions costs, holds the rationalization of language to be of primary concern. Efficient communication in the short term with any regional lord is of secondary concern. In terms of the four outcomes, administering in his language, and the lord choosing to learn the ruler's language is the first choice (a "4"); administering in his language without the lord learning it is his second choice (a "3"); administering in the regional language while the lord learns the language of the center is third (a "2"); and capitulation to the

fail to account for the consequences of different means and contexts of state expansion and consolidation. We remain without a clear typology of state-building paths.

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language of the region is the worst outcome (a "1").

For the lord, there are three concerns. First, he would prefer that his language be the language of regional administration. Second, he would want to be able to communicate with central authority, to seek monopolies, state offices for relatives, and licenses.² Finally, all other things being equal, he would prefer not learning another language. Administration in the regional language without the lord learning the language of the center meets all three criteria, and it is therefore the lord's first choice. Administration in the regional language while the lord learns the ruler's language meets the first two goals, and is the second choice. The remaining alternatives meet only one preference. I assume that ability to communicate with the center has benefits for lords outweighing the opportunity costs of learning another language, and therefore the third choice is administration in the ruler's language while the lord learns that language. Worst is administration in the ruler's language without facility in that language by the lord.

Matrix A models this game. The ruler has a dominant strategy to administer in the language of the center. The lord, assuming that he is a rational player, will avoid his worst pay-off by learning the language of the center. The equilibrium outcome is "2,4", with the state having rationalized the language of administration with the lord (and, since this game is played in each region, all lords) learning that language.

STATE RATIONALIZATION GAME

Central Ruler Administers in Language of

| | | Region | Center |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|--------|--------|
| Lord in regard to Ruler's language | Learn | 3, 2 | 2, 4 |
| | Don't Learn | 4, 1 | 1, 3 |

MATRIX A

From this model, I postulated a universal characteristic of state-building, viz. that the rationalization of language gave

2. Braudel (1966), v. II, pp. 681-7 has a fine discussion of why regional lords should want to be conversant in the language of the ruler.

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strategic advantage to a ruler over lords in the periphery. I quickly realized, however, the historic limits to the argument, especially in light of the experience of those states that received their independence in the period after the Second World War. (Laitin, 1987) I was therefore pressed by the differential outcomes between European and 20th century state building processes to model separate paths of how the cultural product within the boundaries of a consolidating state gets altered. In this paper, I shall focus on the variety of paths traversed as states, in the course of expansion and consolidation, seek to manipulate the cultural definition of their population.

STATE-BUILDING DIFFERENTIATED

I begin my investigation of paths by differentiating three types of state expansion. First, there is bargained incorporation, in which two ruling groups make a deal. The dominant ruler agrees to provide protection to the weaker ruler (who may be threatened by his own society or by external hordes) if the weaker ruler agrees to accept the sovereign authority of the dominant ruler.

Second, there is predatory expansion, where irrespective of the desires of local rulers, a dominant state coercively occupies and rules a peripheral territory.³ Predatory expansion has three sub-types. The first involves replacement, when one foreign conquering group replaces another one, without directly involving the residents of the area. In terms of state building this is no different from state capture in which a powerful state coercively expands its rule over a formerly autonomous region. In these cases, the elite in the captured territory is divided among itself in regard to cultural assimilation or rejection. The third sub-type involves nomadic capture, in which an army that is only loosely connected with a dominant state asserts itself in a foreign territory. In this case, the descendants of the nomadic aristocracy eventually learn the language of the captured region, and form a new state-building

3. A great flaw in North (1981) is that he assumes all forms of state formation have motives similar to those in bargained expansion. But predatory expansion may be motivated not merely for added tax revenue, but to stave off a potentially hostile neighbor, i.e. another predator. Or a losing faction in one society may have a supply of coercive control but no effective demand for it. The faction can become predators through the physical elimination of the leaders of a foreign territory. In what sense can we say that they are offering a better bargain to the population, as North's theory would lead us to think? Margaret Levi (1981), who focuses on predation, doesn't make distinctions between different modes of establishing control, and the different political dynamics that would result. For North, everything is a "bargain"?; for Levi, it is all "predation". Can we usefully distinguish state building that is more bargain-like from that which is more predatory?

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aristocracy.⁴

Third, there is the imperialism of free trade, in which there is control without any effort at state incorporation. The dynamic of language change in this case is quite different from the other forms of state building. Here, the center makes no effort to give "most favored lord" status to the elites of these peripheries, and they therefore have little incentive to learn the language of the dominant state. Meanwhile, the social marginals or outcasts of the peripheral society can gain new status and wealth by working for the imperial power. With a different social class being the first assimilators, the dynamics of challenge to the dominant state is quite different from challenges under conditions of predatory expansion. And, for that reason, this form of imperial control is short-lived and sets the stage for new forms of state building in the periphery.

From the point of view of those people dominated by these processes, the distinctions just made may well be irrelevant. After all, in every case we have the establishment of new forms of political control by people considered as foreigners to the area. Nonetheless, these distinctions allow us to map separate processes of social and political control and defiance.

LANGUAGE DYNAMICS IN STATE BUILDING

1. Bargained Incorporation

I have in mind here the incorporation of Scotland into Britain, of Languedoc into France, and Aragon into Spain. In none of these cases was there a peaceful contract completely devoid of coercion. In Languedoc the French massacres of the Albigensians in the twelfth century were especially gruesome, and Louis' predatory threat to Count Raymond of Toulouse in 1229 compelled him to sign a treaty with the French king that effectively yielded sovereignty. In Aragon, the marriage of Ferdinand to Isabella indeed was a contract that united the Castile-Leon crown with Aragon. Yet as the seventeenth century rebellion of the Catalans and the Catalan role in the war of the Spanish succession shows, the contract was coercively enforced. And the Union of Scotland and England in 1707 was equally ambiguous, and followed a long period of predatory threats by England on Scots' sovereignty.

Yet what distinguishes these cases is the fact that there were elites in the periphery who had the authority to bargain with the

⁴ I will not model nomadic capture in this paper. But the experience of the Normans in England, the Moghuls in China, the Abbasids in Persia, and the Oduduwas in Yorubaland all suggest that a small conquering army will have, in a few generations, assimilated the language of those whom they conquered. Meanwhile, they will differentiate themselves as a status group marked by other criteria,

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putative central ruler, and struck a deal that furthered their interests. The peripheral elites gave up sovereignty for rights to markets, protection on the seas, and protection from their own people. I shall call state expansion built on these agreements "bargained incorporation".

In situations of bargained incorporation, there is an elite compact that not only ignores the interests but often seeks to subvert the goals of the lower strata in their society. The lords of the periphery primarily want to be accepted as "most favored lords" by the elites in the center. Second, they wish to have a monopoly of communicative competence with the lower strata in their region. They can thus play a crucial intermediary role for the ruler in having access to his means of coercion while administering rules and collecting taxes in the manner (and in the language) of the period before the compact. Given these preferences, we see that the peripheral elites will learn the language of the ruler to achieve their primary purpose; and that they will seek the preservation of the peripheral language to fulfill their secondary purpose.

But these lords are in strategic interaction with the ruler. The ruler, let us assume, seeks to rationalize rule by reducing transactions costs. First, he will want to pass on the transactions costs to the lords of the periphery, by having them learn his language. (This will also be a test of their loyalty). Second, he wants to be able to communicate with the regional elites for purposes of extraction and control. He would therefore be willing to pay for translation services in the short term, as long as the lords were making investments in his language. (Later, the ruler will want the lower strata to convert to his language, to monitor compliance in localities without having to rely on the lord's administrative staff).

The conjunction of these two preference orderings is pictured on Matrix B. The strategic ruler, who does not have a dominant strategy, will note that indeed the lords do have one, and that is to learn the language of the ruler, no matter what the ruler decides to do in regard to legal administration. It is therefore rational for the ruler to declare that all administration will be in his language, and to expect compliance by the regional lords. By having the dominant strategy, the lords are in a strategically weaker position than the ruler. (This game has the same result as the state rationalization game, but with a different dynamic, given the different preferences).

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The Bargained Incorporation Game

Center Administers in Language of

| | | Center | Periphery |
|--|-------------|--------|-----------|
| Lords, in regard to the language of the Center | Learn | 3, 4 | 4, 3 |
| | Don't Learn | 1, 1 | 2, 2 |

MATRIX B

Under situations of bargained incorporation, we can assume further that given the reduced transactions costs of governance and the increased market availability, that there will be increasing marginal returns for language assimilators. Furthermore, middle strata in the periphery will perceive an interest in learning the language of the center to circumvent the lords' monopoly on communicative competence with the center. We can therefore predict that there will be a linear trend from the top to the middle strata of the population to acquire linguistic capital in the language of the center. As long as the elite compact holds, upwardly mobile individuals in the periphery will have little alternative but to learn the language of the center. And if assimilators can migrate into the center and have none other than linguistic barriers to achieve opportunities equal to those of their social strata in the center, then we can predict not only mass learning of the language of the center, but steady loss of the language of the region. I have elsewhere described this phenomenon as a competitive assimilation game (Laitin, 1988) in which greater rewards come to first assimilators, giving each person an incentive to learn the dominant language before his neighbor does. This dynamic, from a macro perspective, makes language shift appear painless and rapid. The outcome of a competitive assimilation game is the realization of a myth that the people of the region are part of the same nation as the people of the center.

To be sure, as we will explain in the section on predatory expansion, there will be memories of any of the regional languages institutionalized in sagas and literature, and models of its beauty exhibited by those linguistically defunct intellectuals intent on preserving the old culture. Should social conditions change (for example, mobility barriers erected to limit mobility for those who come from a particular region; economic dynamism in the region that begins to surpass growth in the center), those memories and those defunct intellectuals can form the basis for a regional revival movement that uses language as a symbol of their difference.

2. Predatory Expansion

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There is a continuum between bargained incorporation and predatory expansion. Predators will of course seek to lower the costs of control through the creation of treaties between themselves and those whom they have conquered. The Scramble for Africa was littered with these treaties in which African rulers received "protection" in exchange for loss of sovereignty. In Wales, after three centuries of military conquests, the Tudor kings made efforts to contract with Welsh gentry. Although the "Act of Union" was promulgated without the formal approval of Welsh authorities in 1536, there was an implicit bargain: the Welsh got seats in the House of Commons and some public goods in exchange for political submission. Other cases of predatory expansion had varying degrees of contractualism. Examples of this form of expansion include Brittany, Algeria, and Ireland.

The political process of predatory expansion has a number of stages, and its path reaches a historically important fork. Each of these stages has a particular dynamic. It is useful to think of these stages not as continuous, but as overlapping. As a new stage becomes the dominant arena of social conflict, it begins to replace the former conflict. This is an example of what Krasner has identified as the "punctuated equilibrium" model of state building.

The first stage of language incorporation involves a predatory tipping game.⁵ The question for people in the captured territory is whether to invest in the language of their conquerors, or whether to defy their conquerors by maintaining group solidarity. Let us assume that the language of the captured territory is not spoken in other dynamic centers. Furthermore, let us assume that the language of the center is in an area of relative economic dynamism in compared with the captured territory. Finally, let us assume that there is sufficient solidarity among social groups in the captured territory for there to be a consensus that the center is illegitimately dominating their community.

Any individual in the captured territory with sufficient resources to decide, must calculate the economic returns and the in-group respect that will follow from a decision to learn the language of the center (or more realistically, to have his children study the language of the center). The calculation will be different if nearly 100% refuse to assimilate than if 50% begin to assimilate. Let us make some basic assessments of the pay-offs involved at different levels of assimilation. (I will arbitrarily score a "4" for high returns and a "1" for low returns on each of the two dimensions. Without any justification, I will add the two figures for a score on both pay-offs).

⁵ This game is based on Schelling (1978). Roger Peterson of the University of Chicago helped me develop this analysis for purposes of future empirical applications.

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Economic Pay-offs for Assimilating

| Percent who assimilate | Score | Reason |
|------------------------|-------|---|
| 0 | 3 | Defecting from the community gives an individual valuable opportunities for translation services for the new authorities. |
| 25 | 1 | Declining marginal returns for defection, as jobs for administration by the center are limited. |
| 50 | 2 | As the community integrates more with the center, new possibilities open for central enterprises locating in the periphery and for peripheral members to migrate into the center's economy. |
| 75 | 3 | Increasing marginal returns for integration into dynamic center. |
| 100 | 4 | Same as above. |

Economic Pay-offs for Refusal to Assimilate

| Percent refuse to assimilate | Score | Reason |
|------------------------------|-------|--|
| 0 | 2 | Assumption that local economy brings moderate rewards. |
| 25 | 2 | Same as above. |
| 50 | 1 | Backwash effect as local economy becomes dominated by central economy. Local industry meets loss of local markets. |
| 75 | 1 | Same as above. |
| 100 | 2 | New market in "traditional" services. |

Pay-offs for In-group Respect for Assimilating

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Percent
who
assimil-
ate

| | | |
|-----|---|--|
| 0 | 1 | Scorn for first assimilators. |
| 25 | 1 | Same as above |
| 50 | 2 | Critical mass has assimilated, and social norms against assimilation begin to erode. |
| 75 | 3 | Assimilation now associated with modernity. |
| 100 | 3 | Same as above; lingering memories of tradition make full acceptance of assimilators difficult from within community perspective. |

Pay-offs for In-Group Respect for Refusal to Assimilate


Percent
refusers

| | | |
|-----|---|--|
| 100 | 3 | Refusal expected of all community members. No special rewards. |
| 75 | 4 | Greater respect for those who hold out when traitors are beginning to gain economically from defection. |
| 50 | 3 | As critical mass of assimilators develops, redefinition of the tradition begins to occur, and high status is not assured for refusing to assimilate. |
| 25 | 2 | Declining significance of tradition. |
| 0 | 3 | Those who keep the memories alive in the face of total assimilation are given special social roles and respect. |

Chart A maps the total scores for assimilators (AA) and rejectionists (RR) at the different levels of assimilation. In this chart there are two (stable) equilibria, at 0 and 100. The tipping point is at about 50%. But we see at 100%R (the status quo ante) that the average loss to an individual who defects is not great; so that side-payments by the center can bring recruits rather easily. The key political point on this chart is at 75%R, where the average loss to defection rises. My preliminary argument is that the strategies by

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the center and the periphery in regard to movements at the point of 75%R are crucial for setting up the dynamics of the games that will follow. Should the movement toward the tipping point slow at 75%R, the stage is being set for separatist politics. Should the tipping point be reached, the stage is being set for national incorporation.



National Incorporation or National Separation

Consequently, during the predatory tipping game, development reaches a fork in its road. Will there be a movement toward "national incorporation" of the periphery into the center, or will there be the emergence of "national separation", in which a political movement within the periphery sees control by the center as illegitimate and therefore seeks to consolidate a state inside the boundaries of the conquered territory? One way to model this situation is to consider the basic decision for members of the periphery whether to abandon the language of their homeland, or (for those who have learned the language of the ruler) to remain bilingual.

There are two incentives for assimilated peripheral elites to maintain fluency in the language of their homeland. First, they will retain their mother tongues if there are non-market hurdles (i.e. prejudice) for them to jump in order to become high status members of society at the center. For example, if they are racially distinguishable or religiously contemptible, they might find barriers to assimilation even if they learn the language of the center. Relatedly, the migrants may feel that although assimilation is going well, there is a risk of future persecution. In that case, it would be prudent to maintain the linguistic skills to make for a successful return. Second, there may be high in-group costs for giving up the home language. Loss of facility in the language of the region may threaten a person's rights to ancient burial grounds, or leadership of an extended family, or social security back home after retirement.

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State policies in regard to the predatory leadership group will have significant impact on the decisions of individuals to assimilate or refuse to do so. Michael Mann (1986, ch. 8) distinguishes two different elite strategies: the "Assyrian option" and the "Persian option". In the former, the ruling elites pride themselves in their unique culture, and seek to prevent mass assimilation in the periphery. In the metaphor of this paper, these central elites sought to maintain monopoly rights in the language of rule. Lustick's research (1985) on the political role of settlers in conquered territories demonstrates that a medium-sized settler class will have an interest in this "Assyrian" option, giving them special links to the center. In the "Persian option," the market for languages was an open one. In fact, the official language of rule was Aramaic, which was not the language of the ruling elites but rather a lingua franca of the region. The "option" will create incentives or disincentives for individuals to maintain use of their mother tongues in their family life.

The question of whether to learn the language of the center is best portrayed in game theoretic terms. This is because the decision of any individual is contingent on the decisions of others. The subsequent issue, which concerns me now, whether to retain one's mother tongue, involves questions of risk and opportunity that face all members of a language community equally, *viv-a-vis* the wider society. The choice of any individual is not noticeably affected by the choice of his/her neighbor. Thus, this calculus is best portrayed in standard econometric models.

A conjunction of a weak incentive to maintain bilingualism with an empire ruling through the Persian option will bring to a quick conclusion the successful tip toward assimilation in the predatory tipping game. There will be local areas of resistance and the process will take time, but once the tipping point is reached, there will be a new focus on the question of national incorporation, i.e. whether to invest in mother-tongue retention. Here is an example of a punctuated equilibrium model. As an equilibrium solution is being worked out in the predatory tipping game, a related calculus, with new rules and a different equilibrium, comes into play. The focus of choice begins to change. As we shall see, in cases of successful national incorporation, politics about language do not disappear. This is because of the possibility of a cultural resurgence in the periphery, and this I have called a "regional reactivation game".

Regional Reactivation Game

Let us assume that the central state seeks to reduce compliance costs by mobilizing popular support for its domination. At some point in state building, this support began to be built on a notion of welfare gains. In the European experience, welfare was at first conceived of as unemployment insurance, social security and health care. Later, regional leaders who saw themselves as less able to

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attract resources (for economic development; for recreational facilities; for educational establishments) than regions close to the center, began to appeal for resource redirection to enhance the welfare of their people. These claims have often been intertwined with the appeal for support for the regional language as a form of welfare payment.⁶

In the post World War II period in Europe, the centers have changed their preferences in regard to the promotion / loss of the regional languages. Going back to the "state rationalization" game (Matrix A), we might want to reverse the "2" and "3" scores for the ruler. The state now prefers people in the region to learn the language of the center, even if it means administering affairs in some social, educational and political domains in the language of the region. Despite this change, the equilibrium outcome: central administration in the language of the center and members of the region learning that language -- remains. Regionalists have tried to make threats that unless the center gave in to some regional rights, the region would abjure the language of the center. But this threat is not credible, because it would be irrational for the people of the region to follow through on that threat, something central elites would surely know.

This is why the real politics of regional reactivation involves a tipping dynamic among citizens of the region. If, through regional mobilization, the great majority of the population shifts its language use from that of the language of the center to the language of the region for a large number of language domains, then the threat by regional elites to abjure the language of the center will become credible. How might this occur?

The model of the regional reactivation game is the same as that of the predatory tipping game, but with the status quo ante at the equilibrium point on the side of 100%A. It assumes that much of the population of the region relies solely on the language of the center for most language domains (dealing with the bureaucracy, at work, reading, watching TV). The question here is whether to remain at this status quo, or to "defect" by seeking to replace the language of the region as the preferred medium in an increasing number of domains.

This new game is not a natural outgrowth of the success of national incorporation. Rather, its emergence is contingent. Under conditions in which the economic dynamism of the center deteriorates relative to the dynamism of the formerly conquered periphery, there will develop an incentive for the economic entrepreneurs in the region to make an alliance with those cultural nationalists (lonely philologists and unread poets) who had institutionalized the memory

⁶ See Status of Migrants' Mother Tongues, ed. Louise Dabène et al. (1983), in which the European debate about education in regional languages is portrayed in terms of welfare pay-outs.

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of the greatness of the past. Under these conditions, both indicators of AA and RR begin to change. Economic elites see economic interest in a political project that emphasizes cultural nationalism. Freed from tariffs, or monetary policies, or corporate regulations that work against the interests of the region, these elites will see advantage in decentralization or separation. That claim, they may feel, can be best justified in terms of "cultural difference" exemplified by language. (Gourevitch, 1979) Meanwhile, the cultural renaissance that emerges under conditions of political and economic tension with the center can revive feelings of in-group belonging, a feeling often lost amongst urban masses during industrialization. The value of in-group solidarity, through re-identification with a dying language, may therefore go up for those who enroll in popularly organized instruction in the language of the region.

Regional reactivation movements have an easy time making initial recruits. This is because there are a number of inexpensive victories in battles with the central state. Road signs and street names can be made bilingual; the regional language can be assigned specified hours for state television and radio; courses in the language can be made available in public schools and degrees given in that language's literary heritage in regional universities. Each of these battles requires ethnic mobilization by cultural elites. Victories are tangible, and those who participate in these politics are given enormous rewards in terms of in-group solidarity.

But after the period of initial euphoria, the marginal pay-offs for defection (from assimilation) decline. Also, the economic costs of defection rise. Once the initial victories have been secured, the cultural revivalist movement, in order to keep the process alive, must seek an ever-expanding role for their language. This expanding role has opportunity costs. Educational curricula that require the use of the regional language as the medium of instruction for specific subjects (say, science and math) mean that parents must calculate the educational opportunities for their children. Is it worth the risk, they will ask themselves, to have my children educated in a language of great sentimental (but little scientific) value? Some of these parents, while supporting the revivalist movement on the ballot, will subvert it by sending their children to private schools where the language policy is less "regionalist".⁷

At the point of the greatest gap between "defect" (Assimilate on Chart A) and "align with revivalist movement" (Refuse to assimilate on Chart A), the way that nationalists can push the region past the tipping point is through coercion. In Basque country, Catalonia, Flemish Belgium and Quebec, cultural nationalists have formed vigilante groups to monitor compliance, and to raise the costs for

⁷ This and the last paragraph reflect my field notes from language revival movements in Somalia (Laitin, 1977) and Catalonia (Laitin and Sole, 1987).

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those "hypocrites" who vote for nationalism but subvert it in their private choices. Public humiliation of these hypocrites is one form of coercion often used; another form is through the law, to make, for example, all private schools provide the same language repertoire as do public schools. They will try to get control over the public service in the region to demand that all applicants have facility in the regional language. To the extent that these vigilante groups succeed, the potential costs of defection rise.

If the revivalist movement successfully passes the tipping point, the regional leaders can portray to the center that the preference ordering of the region (the lord in Matrix A) has been changed, and that the people will not learn the language of the center if administration remains solely in the language of the center (i.e. "1" and "2" are switched in the state rationalization game). Once that is done (under conditions in which the state has already changed its preferences, as indicated earlier), the equilibrium outcome is the deficient "2,2". However, an agreement for a Pareto superior equilibrium of "3,3" in which there is substantial language decentralization while the regional elites are committed to requiring education in the language of the center, can be reached. If so, regional reactivation does not lead to separation, but rather to decentralization.

National Separation

The second fork from predatory expansion leads to national separation. This results essentially from the situation in which the imperial elite plays the Assyrian option. Under these conditions, when elites from the region receive declining marginal returns for assimilation and when emigration to the center does not provide an outlet for economic mobility, they have an incentive to ally with the masses in the region for a movement that will grant them political autonomy. The elites will promise the masses rule by a nationalist front (rather than foreigners), as exemplified by their common language and culture. With independence, the national elites will have access to jobs (say, in the civil service that might be dominated by colonial or settler bureaucrats) that reverse the trends of declining returns on the modern job market that their class had been facing.

While the game of assimilation toward the language of the center continues, a new game of resistance to assimilation in the name of national independence goes on simultaneously. This is another example of the punctuated equilibrium model of state building. As equilibrium conditions of the predatory tipping game are emerging, an offshoot game provides a different set of opportunities and constraints.

If the national separation game involves the promise of linguistic rectification, once independence is achieved, yet a new

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language game is inaugurated, a "post-colonial" language game.⁸ In it, the regional elites who had manned the lower positions in the modern bureaucracy, and led the nationalist movement in order to assure themselves unblocked promotion to the higher levels, recognize the implications of the fulfillment of a national language project. The one skill that they enjoy, that distinguishes them from the masses whom they have led, is fluency and literacy in the language of the former center. They have a strong incentive to emphasize the rich scientific capabilities of the colonial and the backwards semantic range of the national language. They will offer resistance to the populist groups that seek fulfillment of the national project.

Let us assume that the bureaucratic elites would prefer to operate in the colonial language no matter what language is used in other domains (say, in the parliament, or for entertainment on TV). While they would prefer that other political forces (in parliamentary politics) would rely on the colonial language as well, this is not crucial in their decision. Meanwhile, populist leaders of political parties would prefer a radical change to fulfill the nationalist program (i.e. everyone using the national language as the normal language of use). But since they seek national "unity", they would prefer operating in the same language as the bureaucrats than having two elites split by language. These preferences are ordinally described on Matrix C. The equilibrium outcome is the maintenance of the colonial language as the dominant language of politics. The national language becomes a symbolic memory, with a decreasing social, educational, and political role.

⁸ The best monograph exemplifying the conflict of interest between bureaucrats and populists in regard to language in a postcolonial situation is that of Haugen (1966) in his study of the role of high German in Norway. The continued use of Swedish in postcolonial Finland, of English in postcolonial Ireland, and of French in postcolonial Algeria are related cases.

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Postcolonial Language Game

Language use by Populist Parties

| | | Indigenous | Colonial |
|-----------------------------|------------|------------|----------|
| Language Use by Bureaucrats | Colonial | 3,2 | 4,3 |
| | Indigenous | 2,4 | 1,1 |

MATRIX C

This outcome is stable over the medium term. I believe that it will be stable in the long term only to the extent that the costs of language learning by the masses to the language of the elite are relatively low. To the extent that there are severe linguistic blockages to social mobility, then the political opportunity for populist elites to mobilize the masses in the name of a real nationalist politics will not be long ignored.

Predatory expansion unleashes an historically contingent set of language conflicts. Its initial impetus is different from bargained incorporation, in that regional elites have to calculate the pay-offs for language assimilation after the conquest. If, in the predatory tipping game, assimilation advances beyond the point of 75%R, then the process will look much like bargained expansion. The dominant game will no longer be towards language assimilation, but rather towards national incorporation. Ultimately, the center can face challenges based on regional reactivation. But decentralization and cultural pluralism rather than separation will likely be the result. If in the predatory tipping game, movement becomes slowed at about 75%, empire building gives way to its antithesis: national separation. And national separation has its own set of language games involving conflict between bureaucrats and populist forces.

3. Imperialism of Free Trade

From the language perspective of this paper, the key difference between predatory expansion and the imperialism of free trade is that in the latter, the conquered elites are not given "most favored lord" status for accepting the suzerainty of the imperial power. They receive very small economic or social rewards for assimilating. Often, they receive a small salary from the imperial power to provide

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order while colonial merchants continue their trading without internal resistance.

From the point of view of the predatory tipping game, the first movers in the colony are the social marginals near the coast who become middlemen for the foreign traders. They can reap some economic rewards, and, as marginals, give up no status for doing so. With no formal education system, the coast usually develops a pidgin, in which the semantics of the colonial language infuses the syntax of the coastal language(s). As long as the trade system remains stable, there will be declining marginal returns for learning the language of the traders.

As the colonial state develops, it will need an army of clerks to man the customs house, the railroad stations, and the police units. Again, new job opportunities will open, and they will again be filled by social marginals, but the children of the elite will see these jobs (as opposed to factotums on the coast) as attractive. Yet again, since the colonial state will rarely entrust citizens of a country whose elites do not have "most favored" status with positions of real responsibility, and there will thus be declining marginal returns in this job sector as well.

Let us model this development for purposes of contrast with the predatory tipping game. In predatory expansion in Europe, due to universally respected rules of feudalism, knighthood and laws of inheritance, the lords of conquered territories received without question "most favored lord" status - they had rights equal to all other people of similar social rank within the state. No such status was granted the elites of captured territories in Africa, south Asia and the Americas. They therefore had little incentive to adjust their identity to make it congruent with elites in the political center. African chiefs, for example, were reluctant to send their children to schools in which they would be educated in a European language.

Meanwhile, social marginals were delighted to act as middlemen between European merchants and African traders. These marginals developed facility in the languages of the outsiders, and were easily attracted to missionary establishments with the promise of becoming literate in the new language of power.

Let us look at the predatory tipping game from this perspective. For this rendition of it, I add one indicator: the opportunity for and value of a new identity for those who are making an identity readjustment. (This captures the variability on the "most favored lord" dimension). I will multiply the value of the new social group relative to the old (4 is high; 1 is low) by the probability of someone learning the language (or refusing to do so) of attaining assimilation in the new group (or in a position of respect in the dominated society).

Free Trade Imperialism Tipping Game

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| For assimilators at: | Economic Returns | In-Group Respect | Chance and value of new assimilation |
|----------------------|---|---|--|
| 100%R | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| 75%R | 2.5 | 2 | .7(1) |
| 50%R | 2 | 3 | .8(3) |
| 25%R | 1.5 | 3 | .6(3) |
| 100%A | 2 | 3 | 1(2) |
| Justification | Declining marginal returns for entering colonial economy; begins to rise as society integrates fully in external economy. | Decreasing costs to assimilation as percent of assimilators rises | As status of assimilated community goes up, entry boundaries also rise. When everyone can be a member in nationalist politics, the value lowers. |
| For refusers at: | Economic Returns | In-Group Respect | Chance and Value of community membership for those refusing new Assimilation |
| 100%R | 2 | 3 | .7(4) |
| 75%R | 1 | 4 | .8(3) |
| 50%R | 1 | 1 | .9(2) |
| 25%R | 1 | 2 | 1(1) |
| 100%A | 2 | 3 | .7(3) |

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| | | | |
|---------------|--|--|--|
| Justification | Backwash effect of imperialism makes non-assimilators pay a cost. As the percent of assimilators approaches 100, some rents to be accrued by preserving tradition. | Respect goes up by standing firm. But that makes you look backward when half the society has adapted to outside power. Some added respect when people remember tradition fondly. | When threatened, society opens boundaries to marginals, but its status goes down. Eventually the status will rise, but it will be given only to those with exemplary skills. |
|---------------|--|--|--|

These figures are compiled on Chart B. From it, we see that there are considerable incentives to assimilate after 30 per cent have assimilated. But after 50 per cent, the new assimilators do not reap the same rewards as their immediate predecessors did. This is the point that opens opportunities for assimilators who have not reaped the relative benefits that they expected to ally with those who haven't had the opportunity to assimilate. These assimilators have available the symbols of the declining culture to create a bond between them at the non-assimilators (rural masses, unemployed urban migrants, and traditional aristocrats). It is their task to raise the value of the "tradition" and to recruit cadres to fight in its name.

LANGUAGE AND FREE TRADE IMPERIALISM




CHART B

The second point of difference between imperialism of free trade and predatory expansion is that the boundaries of the new colonies rarely coincided with political boundaries that preexisted the

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imperial expansion. With social marginals having the linguistic capital to challenge imperial rule, and without a language of social control that spanned the territory in the period before imperial conquest, there is no obvious choice for a new official language when and if independence is reached. (If there were, the postcolonial game would make that choice hard to implement).


Given the logic of continuing use of the colonial language and its association with foreign control, the dynamics of language politics in the postcolonial period take on a new dimension. In a number of postcolonial states in the post World War II period, there has been a conjunction of (a) continued use of colonial languages for official domains; (b) no significance of emerging indigenous lingua franca in official domains, but the rise of these languages in large urban centers; and (c) official promotion and success of sub-regional vernaculars. This outcome appears irrational at first, but my research has shown its rationale in both Kenya and India. (Laitin and Eastman, 1989; Laitin, "India" 1987) I shall describe its dynamic forthwith.

To comprehend language policy in many postcolonial states, it is useful to isolate three players: the nationalist elites ("P" for politicians), who formed the political movement seeking independence; the bureaucratic elites ("B" for bureaucrats) who had medium level positions in the colonial civil service and remained on salary, often in enhanced positions, after independence; and regional politicians ("V", for those supporting regional vernaculars), those leaders who connected their future with the support of a language group that remained at the periphery in the new state.

The game to establish an official language is best represented in extensive form. The interaction between "P" and "B" has already been described on Matrix C. But "V"'s are attentive to the outcome of the game between P and B, and do not have to choose until that outcome has been established. I reckon that if P chooses the language of colonial control and that is accepted by B, then the Vs will face potentially grave relative (to other regions) losses if they promote V beyond the symbolic level. If P promotes an indigenous lingua franca and B rejects it, then the language situation is ambiguous. The implementation programs of the national language will be weak; yet the pay-offs for excellence in the colonial language will have high returns only to those able to capture jobs in the upper reaches of the bureaucracy or managerial positions in international corporations. This affords an opportunity for Vs to provide moderate rewards for the full promotion of the regional vernaculars. A regional civil service, a V-medium educational system, and a newly financed media industry (radio, TV, literature) in V will all provide considerable opportunities for jobs for ambitious people in the region. (See Tree A) Of the three choices V's face (support the colonial language, the lingua franca, or the local vernacular), the latter choice yields the higher pay-off under conditions when the national bureaucracy is subverting the goals of the national

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politicians.

THREE PLAYER POST-COLONIAL GAME



*=outcome in India and Kenya; #=outcome yielding highest utility, at least to P, which has the first move.

TREE A

I surmise that the outcome on Tree A brings low returns to P. P would prefer unity in the language of the colonial state rather than a language policy that asks citizens in the regions, schools, and government offices to equip themselves in at least three languages. Therefore, from the logic of "backward reasoning", P in Kenya and in India have been irrational. Perhaps so. But it would be more reasonable to suggest that in the thick of politics in the early independence years, calculations of the sort that are required in backward reasoning should not be expected. The three language formulae in these states are a stable equilibrium outcome, but they do not represent the outcome of rational calculi. This means that the regional vernaculars will continue to be promoted by regional elites, that a lingua franca will continue to be promoted by national elites, and that the former colonial language will remain a vital force in key sectors of society.

This 3-person game on the question of official languages is played simultaneously with another game that is played unofficially. This is the game that seeks efficient communication in the major cities of multilingual postcolonial states.

Transactions and Language Change in Multilingual Environments

The fundamental purpose of a trader in a market is to make a sale. If the potential buyers represent a congeries of language groups, and if sellers are numerous with indistinguishable products, these sellers will use a variety of language strategies to attract

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potential customers. Surmising the language of the passer-by, and making an offer to that buyer in his or her language often yields a new customer. The net result of countless market transactions of this sort is a slow development of a market koine.⁹

Micro-transactions in urban markets and in other public domains (housing estates, sports clubs, neighborhood political organizations, urban theatre groups) under conditions of multi-lingualism will inevitably result in language shift. (Weinreich, 1953) In the case of north India, including Bombay, a heavily Urdu-ized Hindi (often called Hindustani) has become the koine of everyday transactions. Migrants into the large cities use it for inter-ethnic communication; and speakers of dialects that are often portrayed politically as a distinct language (e.g. Maithili), are slowly assimilating into a larger Hindustani speech community. (Brass, 1974) In the case of Kenya, a form of Swahili, informed semantically by a number of Kenyan languages, is emerging as the dominant urban koine.¹⁰

Independent states that were subject to free trade imperialism are therefore experiencing two simultaneous language games. First there is the game among national politicians, bureaucrats, regional politicians. This game has led in some cases to complex language formulae that often require citizens to be educated in three languages. Second, there is the result of transactions in urban centers among migrants and autochthonous populations. The sum of these transactions games is often the development of a common language of public life. In Kenya and India, that common language is not one that is getting much official support.

These states will eventually face a fork in their development paths. If these states can achieve a modicum of stability and social control, then the complex language formulae will become institutionalized. After all, states set examinations, subsidize dictionaries, control the media, and hire literate personnel. Despite Deutsch's models that have emphasized communications over control, people will adjust their language competencies to take into account the market signals sent by state organizations. For post-colonial states in the present era, state rationalization as in France and Spain will not occur; states will incur higher long term transactions costs to administer a complex multilingual society. Yet, language diversity may well provide benefits for the society, in terms of creativity and added freedom, (Laitin, in Ruggie, 1983) However, if government control weakens, the market forces in society could become

⁹ This paragraph is a generalization of a model developed in D. Parkin, in Whiteley.

¹⁰ For the Kenyan example, see Laitin and Eastman (1989). These language developments can be captured by Deutsch's (1954) "relative acceptance" models. Deutsch's communications theory, as I shall explain, comprehends only part of the reality of language shift.

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formative. Populist leaders (those whom Weinstein (1979) calls "language strategists") can promote the koine as the true language of the nation. Educated bureaucrats will protest that the koine is not capable of expressing scientific and technical reality. But under conditions of quasi-anarchic populism, linguistic nationalism, in which koines will be called "national languages", becomes possible. These leaders, if they achieve central authority, could bring about successful state rationalization measures in newly named languages.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

My theoretical exposition concerning the role of language conflict in state building suggests four related general points of some concern to the issue of hegemony and the institutionalization of the state.

1. The same sorts of language conflicts occur in different paths of state consolidation, but in different forms. I have isolated a limited number of "games": state rationalization, tipping, and reactivation. In an earlier paper, I constructed a single development path for these games. (Laitin, 1988) Here, I show that these games have different roles and outcomes depending on the context of state expansion. Thus this paper is a contribution to the literature on "crises and sequences" (Binder et al., 1971) of development, with some hypotheses about sequences of language conflict and shift. Chart C summarizes the types of language conflict associated with three state-building paths.

LANGUAGE AND STATE BUILDING

| Bargained Incorporation | Predatory Expansion | Free Trade Imperialism |
|-------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| 1. Bargained Incorporation Game | 1. Predatory Tipping Game | 1. Imperial Tipping Game |
| 2. Competitive Assimilation Game | 2a. National Incorporation OR 2b. National Separation | 2. Post-Colonial (3- player) |
| 3. Regional Reactivation Game | 3a. Regional Reactivation OR 3b. Post-Colonial (2- player) | 3. Urban Transactions |

CHART C

2. The metaphor of "punctuated equilibrium" is useful in

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modeling state consolidation in regard to language. I have shown that a game begun at one stage of development may not have reached an equilibrium point when the conditions for a related game are created. The focus of conflict may move toward the second game, and the strategies pursued in that game may have secondary consequences for iterated outcomes of the first game. To model language shift as a continuously iterated game would be to miss the changes in game structure (players, rules, pay-offs) that occur exogenous to the game itself.

3. The achievement of an equilibrium outcome represents something different from iterated plays of an ongoing game where the outcome is not an equilibrium or in which a Pareto inferior equilibrium has been reached under conditions of multiple equilibria. When an equilibrium outcome has been achieved, we can usefully say there has been an institutionalization of language. Under conditions in which elite players reach an equilibrium and the dynamic among the lower strata moves steadily toward the same language, we can say that language hegemony has been achieved.

4. Language hegemony does not mean the establishment of a final victory for a language within set boundaries over a wide range of linguistic domains. The battle over the cultural definition of a state will never be over. In this sense, theories of hegemony or institutionalization must incorporate hypotheses about the seeding and cultivation of "contradictory consciousness".

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Abstract

The paper analyzes the politics of language in the processes of state building in multilingual societies and ascertains the conditions under which linguistic diversity gets institutionalized or becomes a source of rivalry between center and periphery. Modelling language conflicts in terms of game theory, a limited number of games (“state rationalization”, “tipping”, and “reactivation”) are distinguished and related to three different paths of state expansion (Bargained Incorporation, Predatory Expansion, and Free Trade Imperialism). The paper argues that the institutionalization of a language -or a set of languages- in a state is the result of a series of games (language conflicts), but these vary and have different outcomes in each of the three paths of state expansion. Institutionalization or language hegemony is achieved when the series of games in a path of state expansion yields an equilibrium outcome, implying that the center and the periphery elites have reached a compromise regarding the dominant language, and the more dynamic of the lower strata moves steadily towards that same language.

Resumen

El paper analiza la política relativa a la lengua en sociedades caracterizadas por el pluralismo lingüístico en los procesos históricos de construcción del estado, y pone de manifiesto las condiciones bajo las cuales la diversidad lingüística bien se institucionaliza o bien deviene una fuente de confrontación y desafío entre la periferia y el centro. Modelando los conflictos lingüísticos en términos de la teoría de juegos, el paper distingue algunos juegos (conflictos) lingüísticos básicos (“racionalización del estado”, “inclinación” y “reactivación”) que son analizados en el contexto de tres trayectorias históricas de expansión del estado (Incorporación Pactada, Expansión Depredadora e Imperialismo de Libre Mercado). La institucionalización de una lengua o una pluralidad de lenguas en un estado es el resultado de una serie de juegos (conflictos lingüísticos), pero dichos juegos varían y producen diferentes resultados en cada una de las tres trayectorias históricas de expansión del estado. Cuando una serie de juegos lingüísticos produce un resultado de equilibrio se puede afirmar que se ha llegado a la institucionalización de la(s) lengua(s) de un estado. En esta situación las élites del centro y de la periferia han forjado un compromiso acerca de una lengua dominante y las capas más dinámicas de los estratos inferiores se desplazan hacia la misma lengua.