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Changing the world : Explaining successes and failures of international campaigns by NGOs in the field of human security

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Abstract: La tesis examina las respuestas institucionales a nivel global que han recibido las demandas del movimiento pacifista desde el fin de la Guerra Fría. En concreto, las campañas internacionales llevadas a cabo por coaliciones de ONG en el campo de la seguridad humana. La tesis analiza sus distintas estrategias y formas organizativas, así como el impacto que han tenido en los diversos contextos de negociación. Cada uno de los capítulos empíricos examina el proceso que llevó a la firma de un tratado internacional desde la perspectiva de los activistas, recogiendo también las impresiones de diplomáticos: desde la creación de la coalición y la puesta en marcha de la campaña, pasando por la negociación y firma del tratado, hasta su posterior ratificación e implementación. La parte central del material empírico fue recogida por el autor mediante participación observante en estos procesos, así como durante más de cien entrevistas semi-estructuradas con los principales actores. La tesis sugiere que las organizaciones de la sociedad civil pueden tener influencia política bajo un conjunto de condiciones, las cuales incluyen ciertas reglas del juego, así como un liderazgo sólido y creíble por parte de países con voluntad de dedicar recursos y organización a temas que tengan consecuencias humanitarias. Además, las coaliciones más efectivas utilizan los distintos contextos favorables a la acción colectiva, combinando recursos, estrategias (de protesta y de grupo de presión, pero también procesos comunicativos en los que se enmarca el tema y se pone en evidencia a los gobiernos irresponsables), una organización flexible y las capacidades de sus aliados internacionales.

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Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones

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**CHANGING THE WORLD.
EXPLAINING SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGNS BY NGOS IN THE
FIELD OF HUMAN SECURITY**

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Abbreviations

AI	Amnesty International
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
CCW	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
BASIC	British American Security Information Council
CICC	Coalition of NGOs for an International Criminal Court
CITES	Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species
CMC	Cluster Munitions Coalition
COARM	Council Working Group on Conventional Arms
CSC	Coalition to Stop the use and recruitment of Child soldiers
DCI	Defence of Children International
EAR method	Ego-perception + Alter-perception + Researcher analysis
ECS	European Civil Society
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
ESM	European Social Movement
ENGO	European Non-Governmental Organisation
EPOS	European Political Opportunities Structure
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
EU	European Union
EU-ACP	Group of the European Union, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FC	First Committee of the UN General Assembly
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GCS	Global Civil Society
GF	Global Framing
GOA	Gun Owners of America
GSM	Global Social Movement
GJM	Global Justice Movement
HI	Handicap International
HHRR	Human Rights
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IANSAs	International Action Network on Small Arms
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGO	International Organisation
INAGH	Informal NGO Ad Hoc Group on the Drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPOS	International Political Opportunities Structure
LPOS	Local Political Opportunities Structure
MBT	Mine Ban Treaty
MPOS	Multilevel Political Opportunities Structure
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSMO	National Social Movement
NSMO	National Social Movement Organisation
NPOS	National Political Opportunities Structure
NRA	National Rifle Association
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OP	Optional Protocol (to the Convention of the Rights on the Child)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
POS	Political Opportunities Structure
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SM	Social Movement
SMO	Social Movement Organisation
SNA	Social Network Analysis
TAN	Transnational Advocacy Network
TC	Transnational Coalition
TCA	Transnational Collective Action
TCS	Transnational Civil Society
TSM	Transnational Social Movement
TSMO	Transnational Social Movement Organization
UN	United Nations
UNCHR	United Nations Commission of Human Rights
UNCLOS III	1982 Law of the Sea Convention
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
US/USA	United States of America
WG	Working Group (of the UN Commission of Human Rights)

ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the global institutional responses to the peace movement demands after the Cold War. The primary analysis revolves around several international campaigns carried out by coalitions of NGOs and other civil society organizations in the field of human security. Each empirical chapter examines the process towards the signature of a treaty largely from the activists' perspective intertwined with diplomats and UN officials' views. The identification of pathways and determinants of successes and failures in these processes forms the central part of the analysis. The cases of study are the Coalition to Stop the Use and Recruitment of Child Soldiers, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the International Action Network against the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the Coalition to stop Cluster Munitions. The strategic and organizational levels of these networks are examined through their roles in each international negotiation context, such as the Conference of Disarmament, the Convention of Certain Weapons of the UN Program of Action of Small Arms or the Oslo Process on Cluster Munitions.

From this perspective, different successes can take place in terms of the access to the institutions and the procedures of the bargaining processes, in the setting of the (political and media) agenda and in the legal and policy-making dimension. In the long term, the model also considers the existence of cultural effects. The assessment of these effects is carried out mainly from a qualitative point of view. In the thesis, there are three cases that are successful (that result in a treaty) and one unsuccessful case (small arms), although each of them has a different degree of success in different dimensions, ensuring therefore the variability of the dependent(s) variable(s). This analysis in turn raises many

more themes and inevitably a great host of questions. Among these is an investigation of a common pattern of evolution of a transnational coalition through three phases: the creation of the coalition, the negotiation of the treaty and its implementation.

The lessons of these campaigns suggest that civil society organizations can be politically influent under a set of conditions, including flexible rules of the game (e.g. voting by majority and participatory channels) and a solid and credible leadership by allied countries willing to spend resources and organization in an issue that has humanitarian effects. Moreover, the most effective coalitions know how to better use the different contexts favourable to collective action, and also how to combine their resources (research, experience, grass-roots membership and the media), strategies (protest and political pressure, but also communicative processes, such as framing the problem and shaming the irresponsible governments), a flexible organization and the capacities of their international allies. Sometimes also, external events, such as changes in a government, terrorist attacks or economic crisis can play a role in these processes.

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In London, Tina & Frank. In Brussels, Priscilla and Miguel. In New York, Jenny, Chad, Dan, Eleni. In the UN, but also in Dublin, Eugeni and Jordi. In Stockholm Idriz and Sofía. In Berkeley, Nahuel and Aileen. In Los Angeles, Luke & Nuria, Rika, Eri, Miguel, Nguyen and Ann Kerr. In Berlin, Toshiaki, Emir, Mara, Tina & Frank. And Antje.

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A lovely mention goes to Eva, who shared some of these and many other moments in a crucial period for this dissertation. She and her passionate vocation for life are definitely included here.

Finally, Barcelona is my home. And there I have my oldest friends and family. They know who they are. My brother Alberto and my parents, Pilar & Agustín, deserve to be named the last for all the patience and love they have provided for the last 31 years. This thesis is dedicated to them.

INTRODUCTION

The thesis examines the global institutional responses to the peace movement demands after the Cold War. The part played by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the negotiations towards disarmament treaties is one that has received little critical attention by scholars dealing with the evolution of the peace movement at the global level. Each empirical chapter examines the process towards the signature of a treaty largely from the activists' perspective intertwined with diplomats and UN officials' views. It therefore moves beyond the more traditional focus of social movement scholarly research that has to date been almost exclusively based around national accounts of how a particular movement achieved to shape the position of its country in such processes.

Several themes are explored in the manuscript. The primary examination revolves around several international campaigns carried out by coalitions of NGOs and other civil society organisations in the field of human security. The identification of pathways and determinants of successes and failures in these processes forms the central part of the analysis. The cases of study are the Coalition to Stop the Use and Recruitment of Child Soldiers, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the International Action Network against the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the Coalition to stop Cluster Munitions.

There are a number of ways NGOs through transnational coalitions shape the content and scope of human security regulations. The strategic and organisational levels of these networks are examined through their roles in each international negotiation context, such as the Conference of Disarmament, the

Convention of Certain Weapons of the UN Program of Action of Small Arms or the Oslo Process on Cluster Munitions.

From a theoretical point of view, and based on works from different academic literatures, a tentative model on transnational coalitions' outcomes is presented. It considers two different groups of independent variables: (a) those elements that are controlled by the actors that form the coalition: their organisational features, including their resources and their strategic choices; and (b) the factors grouped in the structure of political opportunities for collective action, which act at different levels, mainly national and international. From this perspective, different successes can take place in terms of the access to the institutions and the procedures of the bargaining processes, in the setting of the (political and media) agenda and in the legal and policy-making dimension. In the long term, the model also considers the existence of cultural effects. The assessment of these effects is carried out mainly from a qualitative point of view. In the thesis, there are three cases that are successful (that result in a treaty) and one unsuccessful case (small arms), although each of them has a different degree of success in different dimensions, ensuring therefore the variability of the dependent(s) variable(s).

This analysis in turn raises many more themes and inevitably a great host of questions. Among these is an investigation of a common pattern of evolution of a transnational coalition through three phases. First, several organisations based in different countries decide to campaign for a future international treaty about a global problem absent from the international political agenda. This includes the first attempts to negotiate the issue, normally in the framework of an official formal process. Afterwards, the concrete and real negotiation of the treaty may imply a new process where the main actors are states, particularly in UN-based contexts, whereas NGOs may gain a status of partnership. Moreover, activists need the support of like-minded states to take the lead among diplomats. The thesis argues that this is a necessary condition for the success of such campaigns. Once the treaty is achieved, the objectives of the coalition expand

in a third phase. The treaty needs to be effectively implemented. Yet, activists keep on campaigning for the issues that were not included in the text. In addition, they have a long-term aim, which is the cultural stigmatisation of the use of the weapon.

The thesis explores the dynamics at play in these processes and addresses the key concerns that lie behind the signing of the treaties. It attempts to answer questions such as to what extent are these coalitions effective in modifying international regimes. Which are the pathways towards success? Which are the main determinants of success and failure?

The interplay between activists and diplomats is also examined throughout the seven chapters. In a field where the vast majority of studies are written by practitioners or by activists, the research is conducted by an external observer who does not belong to this 'community of practice'.¹ While the thesis does not analyse in detail the positions of each country during the negotiations of each process, it does assess some of them that are considered relevant for different reasons. Therefore, the particular case of the United States is often studied with detail, as it is the only super-power of this era.

The dissertation exploits a wide range of primary and secondary sources. The research is conducted for the most part qualitatively. The main primary data is thus collected from elite interviews from the social movement sector and also with governmental and United Nations representatives, including eighty-seven interviews with some of the key decision-makers in these processes. Moreover, participant observation is conducted in several negotiation processes taking place in Geneva and New York, but also in the Oslo Process on cluster munitions. This is

¹ Despite these are networks made up by hundreds of organisations, their activities are mostly the consequence of transnational relationships of a few group of activists and diplomats. This 'community of practice' (Borrie 2005) interacts together, sharing spaces and practices, experiences and common understandings of global problems and disarmament processes, working together to develop effective and concrete proposals to deal with them.

crucial to understand the way each of the different bargaining processes works and develops over time. Such contexts are also used to contact and interview key participants with the aim of contrasting previous information, gain first-hand insights of the developments of the processes, and also expose them to tentative conclusions of the research, assessing therefore their reaction.

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One presents the theoretical framework, based on the intersection of different literatures that deal with different aspects relevant for the research, including empirical research on NGOs, social movements sociology, transnational activism, norms in international relations, international humanitarian law, new diplomacy and human security. Indeed, human security provides a coherent intellectual framework for framing issues and negotiating on substance in these contexts, enabling a brokering role to bridge the gap between separate actors, such as diplomats and activists, or between donor and affected countries. The chapter, therefore, introduces the theoretical model that will be applied throughout the empirical chapters and makes explicit the main objectives and questions that the thesis addresses.

The second chapter presents the different data and methods used to assess the explanatory power of each set of independent variables that accounts for the success of the campaigns; namely, (i) the organisational form that each coalition takes, (ii) the different strategies that it employs, and (iii) the multilevel opportunity structure it deals with. The chapter introduces the comparative historical method and presents the process-tracing approach that is employed to detect pathways towards success and the main analytical challenges concerning the identification of the impact of transnational activism. The campaigns studied in the research are briefly presented, together with the criteria for case selection. The chapter ends by detailing the fieldwork process and the main strategies for data gathering and data analysis.

The empirical sections of the thesis are found in chapters three, four, five and six. These are equipped with a short introduction that presents the topic. Afterwards, a narrative of the

evolution of the international process is offered, divided by phases. In each one, an assessment of the transnational coalition' outcomes in each of the dimensions are shown: agenda, access, policy and culture. Each empirical chapter examines the role of each of the independent variables, first those of the multilevel political opportunity structure and the specific alliances and opponents. Then it examines those resources controlled by the social movement organisations. The chapter concludes by reflecting on possible contingent factors or transforming events that could have an effect on the processes analyzed. A concluding section aims at generalising beyond the specificities of each case study.

The most significant example of “new diplomacy” can be found in the negotiations surrounding the treaty banning the use of anti-personnel landmines in the late 1990s. Therefore, chapter three examines the role of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in this process. It shows how a group of like-minded countries led by Canada avoided the consensus-based forum of the UN and opted for an alternative negotiating process in defiance of the great powers' preferences. The undertaking of this more activist leadership role by Canada was made possible by two factors: the role of particular individuals and the strong cooperation with NGOs. The lessons of the landmines campaign suggest that it was successful because it was able to adequately combine resources (research, expertise, advocacy and use of the media), a flexible organisational form and the capabilities of allies, benefiting as well from certain contingent factors beyond its control. To know to what extent these findings would survive a careful and systematic research is one of the major aims of the dissertation, which sheds new light the extent to which they hold true for the main campaigns on the field of human security.

The international processes around the problems posed by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the arms trade are the focus on Chapter Four. The two most important ones are the UN Program of Action (PoA) agreed in 2001, which is not legally binding and the future arms trade treaty (ATT), which will

include all conventional weapons (small and heavy). The thesis argues in this chapter that in the two developments that took place in 2006 in this process the ATT was mainly successful and the PoA mainly unsuccessful from the point of view of the binding nature of the texts. It suggests that the primary explanatory factor could be the change in the rules of the game from one setting to the next. That is, the institutional setting affects how well civil society can affect the outcome. The chapter also shows the improvement of the activists from one setting to the other one regarding different dimension, such as their coordination and their communicative strategies.

Chapter Five examines the process on the banning of cluster munitions, known as the Oslo Process. This case tries to replicate the Ottawa Process, which is considered as the model for new diplomacy that one decade ago finished with the mine ban treaty. In particular, it focuses on the set of rules and procedures of the whole international process. The thesis argues that this is one of the determinants of the success of the NGO campaigns. In brief, processes characterised by flexible rules allowing decision-making by majority rules (instead of the search for consensus and the “tyranny” of unanimity rule) and participatory procedures that include other actors beyond the states, such as the activists as partners, will be more permeable to the NGO influence, strengthening thus the partnership with the group of like-minded states. This analysis sheds new light on the relationship between the diplomats and the activists through ‘communities of practice’.

Chapter Six addresses the role of the coalition to stop the use and recruitment of child soldiers. This is one of the cases that have received less attention by the community of scholars working on international relations and by those working on transnational mobilisations. Moreover, this is a paradoxical case where, different from what happened in other cases, such as the landmine process, the fast success in the policy and legal phase has not been followed by a similar success in the implementation phase. If the coalition was created in a situation where it had to explain to the public opinion the fact that under-18 were recruited in many

parts of the world, then the treaty helped to stigmatise this problem, but only to a certain point and therefore, much remains to be done in the current third phase of the campaign.

Chapter Seven summarises the main findings of the dissertation and reflects on what it adds to the knowledge in the field. It compares systematically the results of the empirical cases and concludes by reflecting on theoretical, methodological and related issues, suggesting as well some fruitful avenues for further research. The lessons of these campaigns suggest that civil society organisations can be politically influent under a set of conditions, including flexible rules of the game (e.g. voting by majority and participatory channels) and a solid and credible leadership by allied countries willing to spend resources and organisation in an issue that has humanitarian effects. Moreover, the most effective coalitions know how to better use the different contexts favourable to collective action, and also how to combine their resources (research, experience, grass-roots membership and the media), strategies (protest and political pressure, but also communicative processes, such as framing the problem and shaming the irresponsible governments), a flexible organisation and the capacities of their international allies. Sometimes also, external events, such as changes in a government, terrorist attacks or economic crisis can play a role in these processes.

Two annexes are also included in this manuscript: a methodological and a normative one. The first one detail each step of the fieldwork process and specifies the way participant observation and in-depth interviews are conducted in this research. The second one proposes practical ways for improving the political influence of transnational coalitions, such as increasing the communication and coordination between them.

CHAPTER 1. SETTING THE SCENE. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Introduction

1.1.1. The context of the research

As opposed to previous decades, social movements in the fields of peace and human rights do not now focus on elaborating abstract theoretical discourses against the use of violence or nuclear power and weapons. Instead, activists concerned about peace and human rights today center all their effort on contingent and concrete action.

After 50 years of international politics divided along communist and capitalist lines, states have finally been able to take unilateral actions. For instance, the loss of the nuclear and chemical weapons' primacy on the international agenda has allowed the emergence of new issues related to the consequences of some types of conventional weapons. In addition, the humanitarian discourse has been able to overcome ideological distances.

This post-Cold War context has facilitated the creation of single-issue (although interconnected) advocacy networks that have been partially successful at both the national and global level. However, transnational collective action faces an important limit that is not present in the national arena: there is no coherent,

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attentive, and informed international public opinion comparable to the national one.¹

The repertoire of action of the recent transnational networks seems to be less and less oriented towards big protest events (with remarkable exceptions, such as 15 February 2003, the global day of action against the war in Iraq), and more on putting more efforts on lobbying the negotiating processes. These trends suggest that the recent (and current) peace movement might have a lower profile, but at the same time be more effective than in the past.

The dissertation analyses four recent international campaigns in the field of human security, namely landmines, child soldiers, small arms and cluster bombs, with the aim of identifying paths towards success. In doing so, a methodology based on triangulation (including a large number of interviews with key players, extensive document analyses and participant observation in several negotiation processes) has been used.

1.1.2. Power and the international policy cycle

Political scientists that look at the distribution of power in society as the key issue to understand collective outcomes tend to assume that institutional arrangements, such as international regimes, reflect the configuration of power in society. Overall, the main actors within the creation and modification of international regimes are States, corporations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The focus of this research is on the role that the latter play in the international policy cycle.

¹ A similar concern has been expressed by Dieter Rucht (1997) regarding the environmental collective action mobilised around European issues. Rucht's research (1997) shows that efforts to influence environmental decisions in the EU are relatively unattractive and unspectacular, and they therefore attract little attention from the average group member and the wider public, many of whom are preoccupied with local or national issues.

The cycle is divided into three main phases: (i) agenda-setting, (ii) international norm creation and (iii) norm implementation.² The influence of transnational non-governmental actors on the first and third phases of the cycle has arguably been remarkable.

Concerning the first phase, one can probably go so far as to argue that there has rarely been a new normative issue on the international agenda, which has not been advocated by transnational advocacy coalitions, international NGOs or epistemic communities (Risse 2002). For example, in the international political economy, an epistemic community put Keynesian ideas of 'embedded liberalism' on the international agenda during the negotiations establishing the Bretton Woods monetary system and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Ikenberry 1993). In the environmental area, examples include the protection of the ozone layer, global warming, deforestation, wildlife conservation and climate change (Haas 1992, Hurrell 1992, Litfin 1994, Raustiala 1997, Ringius 1997). On the issue of human rights, the origins of almost every single post-Second World War international human rights agreement can be located in the activities of transnational social movement organisations (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Korey 1998, Schmitz and Sikkink 2002). Finally, examples from international security conventions include the Geneva Conventions and the nuclear test ban debate (Finnemore 1996).

With respect to the third phase, there are two reasons that account for the NGOs' influence. First, the legalisation process of international norms increases the legitimacy of those actors who demand compliance with them. Second, states must rely on the monitoring and information capacities of transnational advocacy networks and international NGOs, because the former are bound

² Later in section 2 of this chapter, this idea is further developed into a 5-phase model (see figure 1.3 in page 48).

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by rules of sovereignty and of non-interference in internal affairs, while the latter can move more freely.³

However, when it comes to the second phase, international rule-creation and international treaty-making, national governments assume centre-stage. It is in this phase where transnational activists are less influential and so, any success will imply puzzling issues for the thesis.

The research deals with the effectiveness of NGOs when creating or modifying international regimes and it asks: what are the paths to success of coalitions of NGOs and other transnational non-governmental actors during international regime changes?⁴ Given that rational actors consider the three phases when negotiating a new treaty, the study of agenda-setting (first phase) and norm implementation (third phase) becomes also necessary for the purpose of this research.

The concept of success is operationalised in terms of political influence when signing an international treaty. The campaigns studied are part of what could be described as the global peace movement. All of them are to some extent related to the broad topics of disarmament and arms control. Moreover, all of them were highlighted in the Hague Appeal for Peace (UN Ref.

³ Concerning this stage of the process, Keck and Sikkink have developed the so-called 'boomerang effect' model to explain how domestic and transnational non-profit actors join together to bring pressure 'from above' and 'from below' on authoritarian governments to accomplish changes in human rights protection (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Brisk 1993, Klotz 1995; a more complex model is Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999. See also Schmitz and Sikkink 2002). Section 1.2 of this chapter will present the advantages and disadvantages of this model.

⁴ As it will be explained extensively later, the dissertation does not try to identify all the possible determinants of success, but it focuses on the role of a) organisational form and b) strategies, both within a certain context or opportunity structure. Similarly, changes in international regimes have been understood in a broad way, including cultural and relational dimensions.

A/54/98),⁵ among the thirteen crucial initiatives by civil society that peace and human rights activists considered as the necessary steps in order to achieve the final objective, namely the abolition of war, the thesis examines four: (i) the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), (ii) the International Action Network against the use and proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (IANSA), (iii) the Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC), (iv) the Coalition to Stop the Use and recruitment of Child Soldiers (Child Soldiers Coalition, CSC).⁶

Accordingly, the treaties studied here are situated in the same political framework as United Nations conferences, that is, not the national or regional level but the global. To sum up, the choice is to focus on one issue (the intersection between human rights and disarmament) and one type of institution (United Nations). The case selection is based on a diffuse typology of these campaigns. Therefore, only those explicitly aiming at a feasible concrete UN treaty are considered. For this reason, the Global Campaign for Peace Education, the campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, the Global Action to Prevent War and the Campaign to End Genocide have been excluded from the research. Similarly, other initiatives have been considered too broad to be analysed within the framework of the research, such as Women in Peace Building, the International Network on Disarmament and

⁵ In May 1999, a hundred years after the conference that laid the foundations for today's international humanitarian law and UN systems, 10.000 peace activists of all ages met in The Hague in the Netherlands, in pursuit of new strategies for a peaceful 21 Century.

⁶ The 13 initiatives emphasised in the Call of the Hague were: International Action Network on Small Arms; Global Campaign for Peace Education; Global Ratification Campaign for the International Criminal Court; International Campaign to Ban Landmines; Abolition of Nuclear Weapons; Stop the Use of Child Soldiers; Global Action to Prevent War; Women in Peace Building; Campaign to End Genocide; Global Ban on Depleted Uranium Weapons; The International Network on Disarmament and Globalisation; Call for an International Poor Peoples Campaign For Economic Justice.

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Globalisation and the Call for an International Poor Peoples Campaign For Economic Justice. Moreover, the coalition aiming at a Global Ban on Depleted Uranium Weapons was created in 1999, but its low level of activity since then would have made difficult to assess its success within the temporal scope of the research. Finally, the Coalition of NGOs for an International Criminal Court was also excluded because of its lack of links with the disarmament field.

Thus, the research covers the other three cases on the list. Key methodological and substantive reasons support this choice.⁷ On the one hand, the choice of these cases is motivated by the existence of variability in both sets of independent variables: those controlled by the coalitions and those beyond their control. On the other hand, the research design also ensures enough variability of the dependent variable: It includes several cases of success, such as the prohibition of landmines in 1997, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the rights of the child banning the use of child soldiers in 2001; a case of failure, which is the non-signature of a binding treaty in the UN Conference on Small Arms in 2001 and the achievement of no outcome document in the Review Conference in 2006. Moreover, a fourth case with an uncertain future was also included, namely the Cluster Munitions Coalition, created in 2003 and with a certain number of possibilities of achieving a treaty by 2008. In addition, each case has a different degree of success in different dimensions.⁸

The main aim of the thesis is to identify factors that contribute to the success and failure of those actors when exercising their political influence and to present pathways towards the signature of the treaty. The secondary aims of the research concerns the descriptive aspect. Thus, the study provides additional quantitative and qualitative evidence of the growth of transnational non-governmental actors and their influence in world politics, as well as an accurate depiction of their different organisational forms and

⁷ See also chapter 2 of the dissertation.

⁸ See section 1.4 of this chapter.

the strategies used in their campaigns. In doing so, the dissertation explains the negotiation process taking place mainly at the international level, following the methodological strategy of process-tracing (George and Bennet 2004).⁹

1.1.3. Relevance of the research question

“The consensus among most social scientists is that the ostensibly pluralist democracy of Western democracies is so dominated by powerful economic interests that others only infrequently prevail. [...] But if the game is so heavily biased in favour of those with the fattest wallet, how is it possible that impecunious campaigns have so often defeated the well-funded, highly orchestrated efforts of powerful countries and corporation interests?” (Rootes 2002: 213).

This research is important for a number of reasons. First, the rise of social movement organisations is itself of scientific importance, as the rise of their numbers, membership and influence has constituted one of the most substantial shifts in post-war international politics (e.g. Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001). Moreover, their activities and their interaction with international organisations have had an unprecedented and increasing relevance at the transnational level.

Second, when dealing with the creation or modification of an international regime, non-governmental actors, by definition, do not have as much negotiation power as those states pushing for the status quo have. Also, corporations have more resources and influence than NGOs and are able to establish institutions that are relatively independent from states because they can constrain state behaviour through their market power, as noted in much of the

⁹ By process tracing, I understand the “procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context” (George and Bennet 2004: 176).

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literature on business-government relations.¹⁰ In contrast, by any material standard transnational civil society is weak.¹¹ There is no no army composed by anti-torture activists and no wealthy human rights multinational corporation. Despite this lack of economic power, NGOs may influence state preferences by creating transnational coalitions. Although less likely to establish or modify independent international regimes, NGOs do exert influence in more subtle ways. The thesis aims to capture the complexity of these indirect processes of achieving an international impact.

Finally, the results of the research will add a significant contribution to the current theoretical debates taking place in the field, creating a mutual understanding between different literatures. It will shed new light on the role that non-governmental actors play in international politics. It is not unthinkable that in the near future new coalitions will emerge that will – in contrast with most contemporary non-governmental actors – not only shape international bargaining, but also the international political system itself. In this respect, our understanding of the key factors and pathways that account for the current success and failure of their campaigns may prove crucial for the development of new tools in order to deal with a new political configuration of the international system.

1.1.4. The idea of an international campaign

A campaign is a “thematically, socially, and temporally interconnected series of interactions that, from the viewpoint of the carriers of the campaign, are geared to a specific goal” (Della Porta and Rucht 2002: 3). Different from a social movement, a

¹⁰ The classic analysis of the power of business is Lindale’s *Politics and Markets* (1977).

¹¹ This term is understood here concerning all transnational actors which are not inter-governmental neither transnational corporations.

campaign implies mobilising *ad hoc* for a concrete issue. At least *a priori*, it starts with a clear sense of its beginning and its end. The level of formal structure is variable. Sometimes, it only implies coordination among several entities concerned with a common problem. Others, a new organisation is created with its own headquarters and juridical personality, which serves as a coalition of all the individual organisations. Between these two extremes, we often find different types of flexible networks that facilitate the communication and the management of the members' resources.¹²

These are initiatives that emerge from the civil society, even though they can also have official or governmental support. At the international level, this can include the support of a department or ministry of a Northern European country. They often participate in such networks, partially because of their tradition and peace vocation and partially due to a rational calculation of the prestige that implies being recognised as humanitarian powers.

Even though these campaigns use different repertoires of action, today and especially at the international level, in the group of entities that somehow are part of the global movement for peace and human rights, their activities seem to be less and less visible. Such a lower profile does not mean that protest events, such as demonstrations or boycotts have been abandoned, but it seems to be an evolution towards the lobbying and political pressure as a preferred strategy. Ideally, the best solution is the combination of both. Most of the coalitions analysed in this research have been able to create a plural group of organisations specialised in different profiles, including those prioritising strategies of

¹² Lahusen (2002) has observed that within international campaigns political mobilization is mostly differentiated along two components: (a) membership recruitment, public information and resource allocation are decentralized and carried out locally in order to adapt better to local conditions; (b) the definition of policies and the coordination of collective action are 'centralised' internationally in order to structure and finalize local and national activities into a well-integrated international venture and better adapt to global conditions.

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lobbying, and those prioritising strategies of protest. That depends on the capacities and the disposition of each organisation, and also on the goals the coalition has with respect to the campaign they promote. Some NGOs have achieved high levels of access to certain institutions, whereas others, such as Amnesty International, explicitly refuse to participate in governmental delegations in forums like international UN Conferences so as to be able to maintain a certain distance and critical capacity in their discourse.

As we shall see in each of the empirical chapters, a fundamental element of any campaign is the mobilisation of the public. This is linked to the legitimacy of the democratic values promoted by the NGOs. Social movement organisations sometimes carry out spectacular events, which are amplified through the media in order to reach the average citizen and beyond. Thus, even if by definition it is more difficult to find an international public opinion informed and mobilisable on a concrete issue (compared with the national level) all the diplomats interviewed coincide on affirming that they have felt influenced by the way the media has dealt with a concrete issue.

The cases studied in the dissertation are not unique. Other precedents of successful mobilisations of the international civil society include for example the campaign for the International Criminal Court¹³. If we trace backwards a similar path in history, it could be argued that even the movement for the abolition of slavery is part of such transnational networks that have been effective in changing the political status quo by globalising their protest.¹⁴

¹³ For exhaustive research on the participation of the civil society in the creation of the International Criminal Court, see the study by Marlies Glasius (2005).

¹⁴ A good recent study about the anti-slavery movement in the British empire is Hochschild (2006).

1.1.5. Globalisation of protest

When activists challenge the UN, they have a double structure of political demands. First, they challenge specific nation-states that violate international rules and try to force them to conform to standard behaviors (Tolley 1989). Second, they influence the elaboration of international norms by drafting international conventions. This second strategy leads to the globalisation of protest because the NGOs overstep national parameters by elaborating global rules in their areas of competences that have to apply in every case. According to Passy (2005), globalisation of protests results from two processes, namely consensus formation among challengers and transnational networking among organisations.

Regarding consensus formation, the globalisation of protest takes place on the discursive level through the elaboration of collective frames (Melucci 1996, Snow *et al.* 1992). Social movements must overstep national particularities in order to be able to draft international norms and universal conventions in collaboration with the UN administration which will be ratified by states.

Starting from particular cases, about which they spread data and knowledge through oral and written statements, organisations elaborate a common framework for their demands. Together, activists build a collective frame of attribution, interpretation and action that allows them to contribute to the elaboration of international norms. They frame their protest in global terms through a series of discursive acts with the aim of finding compromises that allow them to speak with a common voice. Thus, specific interventions by social movement organisations are transformed into 'universal' rules applicable to everybody. In addition, in the single-issue campaigns studied in this research, the 'human security' frame will help to form such consensus and theorised issues within transnational activists.

The theorisation of issues by social movements requires organisation arrangements between them. The elaboration of

consensus needs exchange practices. Both inside and outside the UN arena, before, during and after UN events, and both formally and informally, social movements that challenge international norms work together and develop a strong international exchange network. Therefore, transnational linkages between organisations form a second mechanism of the globalisation of protest. As we will see in section 1.4 of this chapter, the UN administration facilitates the creation of these transnational linkages between organisations by offering spaces where they can meet, exchange information and experiences, and organise protest events.


Transnational activists often meet for organisation purposes prior to UN events, to elaborate common action frames and to intensify the development of transnational mobilisation. As Haas (1989,1992) points out, only organisations that share similar views on the origins of the conflict common ideological frameworks and common goals can have a significant impact on the elaboration of international norm (Haas 1989, 1992). 'Epistemic communities' (Haas 1989) must display consensual knowledge to be influential. When every single organisation tries to influence the elaboration of norms with its framing and its own propositions, the UN administration tends to exclude them. Indeed, this has happened often in the small arms case.

In all of the campaigns under examination, regional and global meetings of transnational coalitions will enable national and local activists to familiarise with international political processes and the debates on key issues.¹⁵ They also help them to make strategic connections between national and transnational political contexts from a multilevel perspective.

The result of the bargaining process taking place within the UN supranational political structure is the formation of international norms. Thus, the creation of international normative frameworks, their implementation in each country and the diffusion of information about these normative frameworks

¹⁵ See Smith (2002) for an example of this idea in the case of Greenpeace and the international campaign on toxic waste.

represent the output side of the globalisation of the protest (see figure 1.1 below, based on Passy 2005).



This figure is useful to present other necessary elements that account for the processes examined in the dissertation. In the campaigns under study, the issues brought to the agenda by the activists are based on (violations to) international humanitarian law. The use of human security frames (a) reduces particularisms among the different NGOs, forming transnational consensus around their moral concerns, and (b) helps to bridge the gap between diplomats and activists within the negotiations of international norms. In addition, international negotiations provide a multilevel political opportunity structure for transnational coalitions and their allies. These allies are mostly middle powers that lead processes of new diplomacy, usually opposed by bigger powers. Later in section 1.4 of this chapter this ‘negotiations’ box will be further developed by taking into consideration the different resources and strategies of transnational activists. Before that, section 1.2 offers the theoretical background for each of the elements mentioned in this paragraph, whereas section 1.3

presents the typology of actors that will be used in the research and also some reflections around the outcomes/impact vs. success/failure terminology and the way this has been applied in the research.

1.2. State of the art: Literature review on transnational collective action

1.2.1. Mainstream approaches

Social science in different disciplines focus on international campaigns and their interactions with international organisations. The common pattern of this literature is the stress on the increasing relevance of non-governmental actors and the blurring of distinctions between domestic and global levels of politics, particularly active in the so-called transnational level.¹⁶ However, beyond this consensus there is a serious lack of discourse between the various literatures.

First, one of the most influential fields of research is composed of the empirical literature about NGOs. For example, Lipschutz (1992) identified Greenpeace as a participant in the networks of global civil society, while Wapner (1995) emphasised that their impact on government policies was only a minor facet of their

¹⁶ For the purposes of this research, collective action may be said to be transnational when they involve “conscious efforts to build transnational cooperation around shared goals that include social change” (Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield 1997: 60). In contrast to social movement organisations within nation-states, transnational social movement organisations incorporate “members from more than two countries, have some formal structure, and coordinate strategy through an international secretariat” (Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield, 1997: 61). Also according to Dieter Rucht (2002), to qualify a social movement as transnational, it is best to rely on the criterion of organisational structure, i.e. when it is essentially composed of closely interrelated groups and organisations that belong to more than one country.

overall political and ideological impact on global policies. The work of Raustiala (1997) asserted that (i) states remain in control of the political process, and that the specific forms of NGO participation are systematically linked to the specialised resources that NGOs possess and that (ii) states gain an advantage from NGO participation. Princen and Finger (1994) see NGOs as agents of change who play a critical role in social learning and in connecting world politics and regime changes. These authors assume that regime change processes will not be led by states; instead, they predict that the key players in regime development will be epistemic communities, individuals and NGOs, but they do not identify more precisely the roles these actors will perform. Finally, Smith (1997b) shows that Earth Action, another environmental group, helped sustain the pressure on governments to adhere to declarations they had made during the 1992 global conference UNCED. By doing so, public and governmental awareness of global environmental issues also increased.

These and others case studies argue that NGOs have been successful in influencing the negotiation and decision-making processes as well as the content and elaboration of several international agreements, particularly in the environmental field.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the weight and impact of these efforts to influence international policies should not be overestimated (see Rucht 1997 for the case of EU environmental policy). In this sense, the research on the transnational mobilisation around the UN special sessions on disarmament held in 1978, 1982 and 1988 concluded that the activists were unable to exert much direct influence on the

¹⁷ Amongst others the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES), the Antarctic Environmental Protocol, the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UNEP Convention on Biological Diversity, Agenda 21, the Convention to Combat Desertification, the NAFTA Supplemental Environmental Agreement, legislation concerning the protection of dolphins in tuna fishing and the bio-safety protocol and a protocol linked to the UNEP Convention on Biological Diversity. See a useful review in Arts and Mack, 2003.

negotiations (see Atwood 1997).¹⁸ However, direct influence has been acknowledged regarding the role of transnational social movement organisations –especially the Quakers– at the UN Committee on Human Rights to advance the right to be a conscientious objector (see Hovey 1997).

To sum up, evidence exists that NGOs have joined states as participants in international conferences, although the principal participants in the decision-making and implementation processes within the UN context remain government representatives (see e.g. Gordenker and Weiss 1995). Even if NGOs are a strong presence at every contact point for transnational governance, their presence differs in specific areas. It seems that international conferences, like in the cases of AIDS, the environment, human rights, women and humanitarian assistance, offer an opportunity for deeper contacts between NGOs and the UN organisations. However, there are no concluding findings on the concrete effects of such NGOs organised within transnational coalitions. Moreover, most of these findings are based on case studies which make difficult their generalisation. The thesis builds from such findings and will contribute to this literature especially on the transnational level by studying single-issue campaigns carried out by coalition of activists and social movement organisations.

Second, the international relations literature has historically developed focusing on states as the main actors in the international system. Realist analysts primarily study military power and to a lesser extent international political economy. For those authors, regimes are created by powerful states protecting their national interests. In the realist view, states cooperate within the new regime only to the extent that they improve, or at least maintain,

¹⁸ However, the same research acknowledged that transnational activists' participation in the sessions had important indirect consequences, both in terms of the influence on the national and intergovernmental debate about those issues and in terms of the political learning by transnational social movement organisations which fostered transnational cooperation among peace and disarmament organisations (Atwood 1997).

their relative position to other states. Realists assert that cooperation occurs only at the wish of strong states. Furthermore, they argue that changes in the underlying relative power capabilities result in regime change. In the case of treaties regulating arms trade, for example, due to the fact that security concerns are intimately associated with arms regulation, realists predict that arms producing nations will strongly resist other states' interference in these matters. In sum, in the realist view, transnational activists will play an insignificant role in changing international regimes.

Incorporating scholarship from the transnationalist school (Keohane and Nye 1972) that have also stressed the role of non-governmental actors in international politics, the thesis argues that approaches based on states as the only actors have been overestimated both by realists and liberalists.¹⁹ Therefore, lacking the analysis of other actors in the negotiation processes, there are several features that cannot be appropriately explained. To sum up, this research will take into account the role of the main powers in each negotiation. And it will also the analysis on the non-governmental actors to fully account for the processes under study.

Third, the normative perspective, exemplified in the debates on global governance and civil society, has obtained an increasing

¹⁹ There are three other classical schools in International Relations when explaining the creation and modification of international regimes. First, the *idealists* or liberals focus on values and interests of players, even the interests created by the organisations themselves (who need to act to continue existing). For example, the “republican liberalism” of Moravcsik (1999) suggests that the creation of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms lies in self-interested efforts by newly (re)established democracies to employ international commitments to consolidate democracy. Second, the *neo-marxists* emphasise classes constructed at the international level (if that is possible; I do not address this issue here). Third, the *knowledge-based theories* underline the importance of scientific convergence or epistemic communities (e.g. Haas, 1989 and 1990).

influence in recent years (for example, Held 1995, Held et al. 1999). For these authors, the key motivating force of global civil society is its moral concern to create a better world by advocating a fairer, freer, and more just global order –whether it be with regard to economic, political or social issues. Despite recognising its merit in refocusing the attention to the transnational sphere and the dynamics of civil society, this approach has received many critical responses for the use of the concept of ‘global civil society’, mainly for its normative bias.²⁰ In some of the versions of this approach, it has instead been considered as too descriptive (for example, Salamon *et al.* 2000).²¹ The thesis shares with this literature the acknowledgment of the moral concern that drives transnational activism, but tries to control its normative perspective. In other words, the dissertation does not assume that the concept of a global civil society is desirable *per se*. The evidence from the different (and even opposed) civil society groups in the case of the small arms campaign will shed new light on this idea.


One of the most sophisticated analyses in the field of transnational collective action is Keck and Sikkink’s (1998), *Activist Beyond Borders*. In this work and in other more recent works such as Risse and Sikkink (1999) and Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002), the authors argue that the success of transnational advocacy networks derives from the ‘boomerang effect’ of issue networking. Thus, international norms are advanced through national NGOs and international media networking with international NGOs, which exercise more effective persuasion within the former host country, at times inducing Western

²⁰ “The ethic or big idea of a global civil society is said to be warranted and plausible and desirable” (Keane 2003: 4). See also Wapner (1995), Waterman (1998) or Munk (2002). A defence of the term can be found in M. Shaw (2001) and in the first Global Civil Society Yearbook (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor, 2001).

²¹ Similarly, Taylor argues: “to present the sum of discrete country-by-country descriptions of civil society around the world is not homologous to global civil society” (2002: 342).

governments to take punitive action (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12-13).²² In some cases, international criticism set in motion a “spiral effect” in which norm-violating states were induced to make democratic concessions from which they could not easily extricate themselves (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 18-32). For example, because of the closeness of the domestic opportunity structure of Argentina, local NGOs and local social movements worked with international NGOs, international and transnational social movements in order to pressure the UN and also other state, such as Italy, to force the Argentinean government to improve the human rights situation in that country. Based on Keck and Sikkink (1998), figure 1.2 represents these patterns and effects.

Figure 1.2 The Boomerang Effect



As the thesis will show the idea of the boomerang effect is useful to understand some patterns within the campaigns and

²² Putnam (1988) partially accounted for this dynamic with his notion of multilateral politics as a “two-level game”, in which international and national policy-making contexts are affected by interdependent national and multilateral decision-making processes. However, some authors have already stressed that Putnam’s model exaggerates the independence of multilateral decision-making processes from non-governmental pressures (see for ex. Risse-Kappen 1995:16 and Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield 1997: 76).

processes under examination, but it also shows its limitations. Among its critics, it has been argued that this approach is too restrictive because it only covers specific issue areas and forms of international NGO political action (Nelson 2002) and it is also biased toward middle-class activism (Waterman 1998). The influence of transnational advocacy networks also varies across region (Risse-Kappen 1995: 4, 30-1). Thus, scholars have found that transnational democracy and human rights movements were more influential in Central Europe and Latin America during the 1990s than in other regions of the world (Sikkink 1993: 435-6; Sikkink 1996: 166; Risse and Ropp 1999: 240). At the same time, Middle Eastern and Sub-Saharan African organisations are “severely underrepresented” in transnational networks (Florini and Simmons 2000: 7).

For the purpose of this research, the most relevant stream for the study of the impact of transnational collective action comes from the sociology of social movements. Authors that have tried to synthesise both traditions (international relations and social movements) have underlined the relevance of the latter particularly with respect to concepts like political opportunity structure (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and framing (Olesen 2005). Other classical approaches include the study of identities (Melucci 1982), repertoire of contention (Tilly 1984) and the different resources of the transnational social movement organisations that can be mobilised for collective action (McAdam 1983).²³

Here, four weaknesses arise. First, relatively little research has been done on social movements operating beyond the nation-state; in other words, social movement scholars have been ‘myopically domestic’ (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2004).²⁴ Second, such

²³ For an extensive review of the literature on the outcomes and consequences of social movements, see chapter 2 in Giugni (2004), which is entirely devoted to it.

²⁴ McCarthy (1997), for example, in an article originally titled “The globalisation of social movement theory”, which comes after a series of case studies of transnational mobilisation, suggest that transnational social movement studies should basically adapt six core concepts of the

research is largely descriptive and does little to address theoretical concerns (for example, Cohen and Rai 2000). Third, the field suffers from problems of specification and the misuse of terms, which frequently lead to misunderstandings. In this sense, the term ‘social movement’ is paradigmatic, with different and even opposed uses.²⁵ Fourth, where a comparative analysis has been pursued, it has primarily sought to explore more cross-national differences than global content (Kriesi 1996). Generally, these pieces of research are attempts to analyse organisations and movements operating beyond the nation-state through descriptive case studies of individual organisations, usually concluding that the cases were specially embedded in national-level civil society and politics (for example, Florini 2000, Edwards and Gaventa 2001). Consequently, the dissertation aims to contribute to this literature by studying activism operating beyond the nation-state, by carrying out a research that is theoretically driven (including a clear specification of the terms and their accurate and rigorous use)²⁶ and by conducting a comparative analysis focused not on cross-national differences, but on the global content of a set of international campaigns in the field of human security.

In a recent work, leading scholars in the field of transnational collective action try to map the state of the art of this field (Della Porta and Tarrow 2004). These authors present their approach as an alternative to macro-level structural change theories (i.e. globalisation) and to micro-level perspectives that emphasise technological innovations, such as the internet, as the main agent

SM tradition: strategic framing processes, activist identities, mobilising structures, resource mobilisation, POS and repertoires of contention.

²⁵ One of the most common mistakes consists of dealing with a single organisation, as if it was a whole social movement, without specifying that it is just a social movement organisation that takes part in a broader social movement. For example, Greenpeace is a social movement organisation that takes part in the environmental movement, but not the whole movement. From this perspective, NGOs would be equivalent to SMOs.

²⁶ See section 1.3 of this chapter.

of social change. They propose a middle-range theoretical approach to the study of transnational collective action. Della Porta and Tarrow acknowledge that the expansion of international institutions, international regimes, and the transfer of the resources of local and national actors to the international stage have produced threats and opportunities for transnational activists, which develop different strategies to challenge but also to collaborate with insiders. Activists have overlapping memberships linked within loosely structured, polycentric networks (Della Porta and Tarrow 2004: 237).

In one of the chapters of Della Porta and Tarrow (2004), a typology of the dynamics of multilevel governance is proposed (Sikkink 2004). The basic idea is that in order to understand adequately transnational collective action, the researcher has to distinguish different levels of political opportunities, showing the existence of (at least) a domestic and an international structure, and so a multilevel political opportunity structure (POS). Moreover, both can be divided into different sub-levels, such as the local and the regional (for the domestic) and the European and the global (for the international). The use of a multilevel POS is an improvement in the literature on transnational collective action and it will be central in the development of the theoretical model of the thesis.²⁷

Strategies and multilevel POS are important but are not the sole ingredients. As research on national movements has shown, social movement organisations can take a number of organisational forms, and these forms can affect what the organisations are able to do (for example, Gamson 1990; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996 and Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield

²⁷ This idea was already implicit in other works, such as in Smith (2002). This scholar shows that in the case of Greenpeace and the international campaign on toxic waste, there was division of labour between national and transnational segments of the organisation, which allowed a synergetic situation in which both the transnational and the national dimensions reinforced.

1997).²⁸ The same holds true for international campaigns. Previous research on the landmines campaign (Price 1998), on environmental campaigns (Ringius 1997) and on the Zapatista solidarity network (Olesen 2005) show that organisational form is key for the kind and level of success that different social movement organisations can achieve. In the thesis, it is particularly crucial given that the coalition model is the most typical of the whole universe of transnational organisations (see Smith 1997).

It has already been suggested that coalitions with different organisational forms vary in the extent to which they attract broad networks of organisations, and in how geographically dispersed their membership is, two measures of interconnectivity closely related with the degree of success of the organisation (Smith 1997). But definitive data about these issues is still missing in the literature. For example, whether and how differences in organisational membership shape policy activities remains unclear. The same applies for the subjects of finances and leadership.²⁹

Finally, one of the most discussed development in recent years in the field of social movements studies has been the “mechanism-and-process” approach advocated by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (McAdam et al. 2001, Tarrow and Tilly 2006). It developed as a critique of the “classic model” of social

²⁸ These fundamental infrastructures those support and condition citizen mobilizations are sometimes called *mobilizing structures*. See McCarthy 1997 for the variety of different mobilising structures than can contribute to transnational activism.

²⁹ Regarding leadership features, Young argued that their emergence is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for success in efforts to reach agreement on constitutional contracts at the international level. In his multidimensional conception of leadership, he distinguishes among structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership concluding: “the real work of regime formation in international society generally occurs in the interplay among those representing the different forms of leadership” (1991: 307).

movement activism, perceived to be too static and overly structural. These authors have tried to replace the checklist of variables with a search for explanatory mechanisms and processes, which through causal narratives, could connect such variables to each other and collective action.

The agenda of the mechanism-and-process approach is much wider than that of more classical social movement research, trying to bring together various forms and types of contention under the heading of “contentious politics”. As it will be shown in chapter 2, the thesis also proposes a challenge to the distinction between institutionalised and non-institutionalised politics. The argument here is that for too long politics as official and prescribed means, and politics as alternative “collective action”, have been treated separately. Instead the advocates of the mechanism-and-process approach aim at studying the parallels and interactions between “contained” and “transgressive” contention.

It is argued by critics of traditional sociology of social movements’ that the classical model (combining social movement schools, such as political process and resource mobilisation) still represents a far more coherent, comprehensive and parsimonious account of collective action than the proposed alternative. The dissertation’s approach will combine elements of both methodological approaches, but it will also integrate other approaches which are substantially relevant for this research and will help to explain the ‘negotiations’ box in figure 1.1 (see section 1.5 of this chapter). First, the historical background of most of transnational activists’ claims is rooted in International Humanitarian Law. Second, the literature on ‘new diplomacy’ provides with insights on the decision of certain states to create new coalitions with other actors. Third, the human security frame has been used by activists and like-minded diplomats to bridge gaps and build consensus. Forth, the literature of norms in international relations disentangles the role of several actors as norm entrepreneurs in the different phases of norm creation.

1.2.2. Integrating other approaches

If these are the mainstream approaches for the study of transnational collective action, the integration of other approaches in the research proves essential to capture part of the complexities in this field and to further develop figure 1.1. The historical perspective provided by international humanitarian law is useful to understand the role of contingent factors as catalysts of collective action, but also to identify precedents of the current use of human security frames. Based on such frames, middle powers and other norms, entrepreneurs lead processes of new diplomacy to negotiate the creation of international norms. The thesis argues that transnational coalitions of NGOs have an impact in such negotiation processes through different strategies and organisational forms in different contexts of multilevel POS.

1.2.2.1. International Humanitarian Law

Transnational coalitions under study, when translating their human security frames into concrete messages, attempt to resonate with previous bodies of law. Among them, one of the most relevant is the international humanitarian law, also known as Laws of War. Many states consider that topics related with the laws of war are internal questions that affect their national sovereignty and security. Such questions include the campaigns analysed in the thesis, such as the participation of children in armed conflicts and a number of attempts to regulate the use of certain types of conventional weapons. It should be noted that this body of law is not about laws to avoid war, but to regulate it.

The principles that regulate the behaviour during war were first coded as legal rules and agreed upon by the states in the first Geneva Convention signed in 1864 "for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field"

(see Petrova 2007: 62-77).³⁰ The Geneva Conventions consist of four treaties formulated in Switzerland that set the standards for international law for humanitarian concerns. They focus on the treatment of non-combatants and prisoners of war. Thus, they do not affect the use of weapons in war, which are covered by The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Protocol (1925) on the use of gas and biological weapons. In 1977 and 2005, three separate amendments were included in the Geneva Conventions. The adoption of the First Convention followed the foundation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863.

Part of this legal corpus regulates or bans the use of some weapons that cause harm and unnecessary suffering. Thus, with the Declaration of Saint Petersburg signed in 1868, following the proposal of Russian tsar Alexander II, diplomats agreed to prohibit the use of less deadly explosives that caused severe and fatal wounds merely injure the combatants and thereby create prolonged suffering of such combatants. The Declaration banned the use of such a bullet motivated by the invention of these bullets by the Russian army (Petrova 2007: 63). The bullet exploded and spreaded when it entered in touch with a soft substance. In 1899 and following the initiative of another Russian tsar, Nicolas II, the Call for Peace of The Hague was launched. Among other things, two declarations were adopted in The Hague in 1899. They banned the use of several types of explosive munitions, such as those that dispersed suffocating gases.

It is necessary to highlight that these regulations were adopted by majority voting and not by consensus. The US did not sign these two declarations and Britain, which was the most powerful country during that period only accepted the declaration on suffocating gases eight years after it was adopted (Petrova 2007: 64). Even so, the agreement by the majority allowed a series of

³⁰ For an extensive and more detailed descriptions of the evolution of International Humanitarian Law, see McCoubrey (1999), Carey and William (2003), Petrova (2007: chapter 2) and Fleck (2008).

principles, that had existed for a long time as a customary law - as a repeated juridical rule that had not been explicitly coded as such yet - to be transformed into a legal text.

From a historical perspective, many of the attempts to humanise war came as a consequence of contingent factors, such as important conflicts that, challenging the humanitarian principles with new methods of war and technological innovations, revealed the flaws in the existing laws. The Conventions of Geneva of 1949 were a product of the experience of the Second World War. Also, the Vietnam War fostered the Additional Protocols of 1977 and the Convention of Certain Weapons (CCW) of 1980 (see McCoubrey 1999, Carey and William 2003, Petrova 2007 or Fleck 2008).

Within a Cold War context, a series of neutral countries led by Sweden attempted to achieve international restrictions in the use of certain conventional weapons that produced severe humanitarian effects, using the UN General Assembly as a platform to express their ideas (Petrova 2007: 66). In order to overcome the opposition of the countries belonging to the two blocs (Eastern and Western), the ICRC put forward a compromise by offering them practical solutions that would improve the protection of civilians, while taking also into account the military utility of the weapons. Retrospectively, the establishment of the CCW is assessed positively. According to Petrova, it is an institution, which despite its weaknesses, could serve as a forum where discussions about weapons that have severe humanitarian consequences can be reopened and where the interested parties can focus their efforts on continuing to develop the IHL (Petrova 2007: 105).

More recently, international campaigners and their allies - mainly middle powers - have engaged in processes of new diplomacy facilitated by certain armed conflicts and other contingent factors. Thus, the campaign against the landmines took place before the effects of the conflicts of the Cold War theoretically finished. The process of negotiation of the optional protocol on children in conflict armed, discussed in chapter 6,

coincided with situations of armed conflict or post-conflict situations in countries such as the Congo or Sierra Leona, where there was a large number of child soldiers. Finally, international pressure against the cluster bombs have only taken place after the war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 that had shown the humanitarian effects of using these weapons. At a national level, measures to control the possession and the trafficking of small arms have frequently been the natural reaction to massacres with a huge resonance in the media, in such countries as Britain, Australia or in several states in the US.

1.2.2.2. New diplomacy, middle powers and public opinion³¹

The literature on “new diplomacy” offers insight into the reasons why states decide to form coalitions with other states, but also with non-governmental organisations. Broadly speaking, ‘new diplomacy’ refers to flexible and faster ways of dealing with international negotiations than traditional diplomacy. These processes have taken place particularly in negotiations about human security topics in during the 1990s and early 2000s and have been mainly led by countries characterised as “middle powers”. The end of the Cold War allowed these middle powers to play a larger role on security issues and form new alliances with other countries, as well as with NGOs, that share their ideas and objectives. Indeed, confronted with “hesitancy or opposition to a more comprehensive solution of the humanitarian problems... middle and even small states stepped forward and took the opportunity to lead [...] international processes [...] in areas of traditional middle power expertise (...) such as peacekeeping and peace building, human rights and environmental protection”.³²

³¹ A previous version of this section was presented as part of a paper at the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference. Montreal, Canada, 17-19 May 2007. See Bouchard and Alcalde (2007).

³² See Petrova (2007: 30, 32).

The most significant example of “new diplomacy” can be found in the negotiations surrounding the treaty banning the use of anti-personnel landmines in the late 1990s. During these negotiations, Canada, supported by a group of like-minded middle and small states, played a leading role. These like-minded countries avoided the consensus-based forum of the UN and opted for an alternative negotiating process in defiance of the preferences of the great powers. This Canadian initiative was made possible by two factors: the role of particular individuals and the strong cooperation with NGOs (see Petrova 2007). These two factors are significant to explain the ability of middle powers to play prominent international roles and engage in this “new diplomacy”. For example, in the landmines case, the role played by Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian Foreign Minister, was seen as crucial. Axworthy used the partnership with NGOs to enhance Canada’s position internationally, to gain recognition and renew prestige for his country and to reassert the identity of Canadians as ‘good world citizens’.³³ In the case of negotiations on SALW at the United Nations in the late 1990s, the European Union seemed inclined to follow a similar path to Canada in the landmines case. In the cluster munitions case Norway will be such a leader.

Regarding the concept of ‘middle power’, “its definition remains vague and ranges from indicators of economic power such as Gross National Product (GNP) and GNP per capita to behavioural patterns such as the states’ tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide their behaviour”.³⁴ Other countries such as France and Britain “ha[ve] not based their international image on performing

³³ See Petrova (2007: 321-22; 34).

³⁴ Cooper *et al.* (1993). Quoted in Petrova (2007: 31).

'middle power' roles, but rather on their great power status enshrined in their UN Security Council permanent membership".³⁵

An important number of EU countries are considered as middle powers (including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden) and may influence the EU to act as "middle powers" in international negotiations. The EU as an international actor does seem to display some characteristics generally associated with middle powers. According to Cooper, during the Cold War "middle powers" engaged in routine (quiet, low-key, consensus-oriented) diplomacy (Cooper 1997). "These roles were dictated by both self-interests and a desire to gain international prestige and distinguish themselves from the great powers" (Petrova 2007: 31).

As middle powers, "those states were affluent but militarily weak and thus had a vested interest in preserving a stable and peaceful world order" (Petrova 2007: 32). These states also started to embrace stronger humanitarian values. With the end of the Cold War, authorities in most European countries increasingly tended to adopt humanitarian values instead of military values. Following Petrova, the thesis argues that most military authorities in EU Member States would have embraced these humanitarian values, which included the renunciation of weapons that caused severe humanitarian harm to civilians, such as anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions and the regulation of the illicit trade of small arms.

Whereas in great powers, such as the United States, military values and institutions might be supported by public opinion, in middle power countries societal attitudes may also influence the military authorities in a different way; military authorities would potentially find it difficult to defend the continued use of weapons stigmatised by public opinion.³⁶ Public opinion could therefore directly affect negotiations at the domestic level (the third level in

³⁵ Petrova (2007: 18). See also Danilovic (2002) and Kennedy (1987).

³⁶ See Cooper (1993) and Petrova (2007).

a multilevel game). Furthermore, in the second-tier states, some have argued that the promotion of these humanitarian norms restricting the use of conventional weapons such as SALW has also been facilitated by governments on the left of the political spectrum.³⁷

Petrova argues that middle powers expect short-term, medium term, and long-term dividends from taking up the risks and costs of creating coalition and leading negotiations.³⁸ “The short-term benefits consist mainly in the ability of the leading states to steer the negotiations in their preferred direction and have greater influence of their final outcome. The midterm dividends include the ability to translate the newly gained political capital and prestige into leverage in other issue areas. Finally, the long-term dividends (...) come from their enhanced international status.”³⁹

They can also increase their ability to redraw further the international agenda towards including “issues in which middle power states have a comparative advantage and on which they have already asserted their leadership ambitions”.⁴⁰ In contrast, middle powers have to face the financial costs and expending resources associated with organising international conferences, lobbying other states or contributing to funding field operations in order to match their rhetorical and financial supports. “The leading states also take the risk of loss of prestige if their initiative fails, and the risk of punishment by the great power for going against its interests.”⁴¹

³⁷ See Hubert (2000) for the importance of the Left governments in France and Britain when negotiating the landmines treaty. Also Petrova (2007) mentions this issue (see for example, p. 29).

³⁸ See Petrova (2007: 26-37).

³⁹ Petrova (2007: 34).

⁴⁰ Petrova (2007: 34). The thesis agrees with Petrova, in that the promotion of the “human security” agenda internationally by Canada and a number of other middle powers (particularly European) could be seen as “an attempt to solidify their authority and legitimize their greater role in international politics.” Petrova (2007: 35). See also Chapnik (2000).

⁴¹ Petrova (2007: 34: fn. 37).

These potential costs often remain hidden by the perception that NGO pressure and the possibility of building a coalition with NGOs and with other countries would create higher benefits than costs. Indeed, as NGO advocacy grows and spurs more national support for their causes, the risks of assuming leadership are lowered. On the one hand, the states acquire allies, which somehow represent (international) public opinion and hold 'moral authority'. On the other hand, their chances of success increase by the constitution of a stronger coalition.

Finally, in an "ideal new diplomacy processes", there is a facilitating condition that reduces transaction costs: "the shared background of [some] key individuals in policy-making positions and NGO activists facilitates communication between the two sides of the like-minded coalition. Importantly, this commonality in interests and ideas among policy-makers and NGOs is made possible by opening of government positions to former NGO members."⁴² That has happened mostly in Scandinavian countries, but also in other countries such as Belgium and Britain.⁴³

For the purposes of this research and according to the literature on norms in international relations, one of the most important roles that middle powers might play in processes of new diplomacy is that of norm entrepreneurs.

1.2.2.3. Norms

Figure 1.1 shows the creation of international norms as the result of the bargaining process taking place within the UN supranational political structure. The literature on norms in international relations highlights the centrality of entrepreneurs in norm-building processes (Florini 1996: 375). Thus, within the

⁴² Petrova (2007: 9).

⁴³ As chapter 5 will show, the case of Norway illustrates nicely this idea, as the number of people in the different departments of the Norwegian government coming from the associative terrain is the highest in Western Europe (Petrova 2007: 295). See also Leonard and Small (2003).

norm life cycle, the first stage of norm emergence is usually associated with the prominence and influence of the entrepreneur. In the words of Ethan Nadelmann, “norm entrepreneurs mobilise popular opinion and political support both within their host country and abroad, they stimulate and assist in the creation of like-minded organisations in other countries; and they play a significant role in elevating their objective beyond its identification with the national interests of their government” (Nadelmann 1990: 482). Indeed, they focus their efforts on foreign audiences and more specifically on foreign elites to convince them that a specific prohibition regime does not only reflect the moral code of one particular society but is rather universally shared.

For example, looking at the case of the small arms and light weapons (SALW), García has shown how the role of two main norm entrepreneurs was decisive during the phase of agenda setting and raising awareness in the first half of the 1990s (García 2005). The norm entrepreneurs were both university professors and very active in the previously existing epistemic community of the conventional arms trade, which 'transformed' itself into a community looking at small arms. At the beginning of the 1990s, information and knowledge regarding many aspects of the small-arms availability started to be generated and disseminated. Normative change slowly started to occur, from a total absence of debate and policy action about the problems associated with small-arms diffusion during the early 1990s, to active debate and the contours of norm-building processes that started to take place by 1998. Concretely, Michael Klare was the key author in the dissemination of the idea that research and action should focus on a new arms management framework paradigm that would include small arms. Second, Edward Laurance effectively argued the need to engage NGOs in an international networking process involving coalition building with like-minded states. In doing so, the elevation of the issue on to the international security agenda was facilitated.

However, less clear is the role of norm entrepreneurs in the second phase of the norm creation, after 1999. In her study of

norm emergence in several issue areas within the small arms field, García was only able to find one norm entrepreneur. Thus, on the issue of brokering, the lobby work of the representatives of the Dutch government would have allowed a success in the legislation process (see Garcia 2005).

But the literature on norms still puts the emphasis on the role of the norm entrepreneurs in the norm emergence phase. Following Finnemore and Sikkink, there are two different stages in the process of persuasion by norm entrepreneurs. In the first place, norm entrepreneurs “attempt to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms”. A second stage “is characterized by a dynamic of imitation as the norm leaders attempt to socialise other states to become norm followers” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895). The transition between the first and the second phase is mediated by the reach of a ‘tipping point’, generally understood as one third of the states in favour of the new norm.

However, chapter 4 will show that in the Review Conference that assessed the implementation of the Program of Action, no individuals acted as effective norm entrepreneurs. That is consistent with the literature that affirms that norm entrepreneurs are influential mainly during the phase of agenda setting and awareness rising. Thus, the lack of success in the UN Review Conference on small arms in July 2006 may be partially explained by the lack of effective norm entrepreneurs. At this point, a more interesting question arises: How can we explain this absence of effective norm entrepreneurs? Was it predictable? Was the negotiation setting favourable for their action? The thesis suggests that the ‘rules of the game’ made the presence of effective norm entrepreneurs impossible in the Review Conference.

The experience of other cases in the field of human security negotiations have shown that even in other stages of norm emergence, norm entrepreneurs can be still influential beyond the agenda setting phase. In this sense, the example of the landmines convention and the role played by Axworthy, at that time, need to be taken into account.

In the small arms case, however, the characteristics of the negotiation environment were very different from the so-called Ottawa process and, in particular, they were not favourable for the emergence of effective norm entrepreneurs. Even if more than one third of the states were committed to many of the articles of the different 'final documents' (which is the condition generally suggested by the norms literature in international relations), the consensus rule in place did not allow to reach the *tipping point* (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) necessary for the *norm cascade* and the socialisation of a norm. NGOs were the "norms entrepreneurs", active in the first stage of the norm life cycle and the EU was seen by some as "norms entrepreneurs" but also, and more importantly, as "norm leaders". However, at the RevCon, the EU member states were not effective "norm leaders", partially because they spent too much time talking to each other and probably not enough time convincing other states such as the US or most of Middle East countries (see Alcalde and Bouchard 2008).

That suggests that the literature on norms in international relations should be further developed in order to identify under what conditions norms entrepreneurs matter when explaining norm emergence. The dissertation presents some suggestions that come out of complicating pervasive assumptions in the literature, such as the equation "one third of states in favour = tipping point reached". The thesis argues that even if this logic can explain some cases of successful human security negotiations, such as landmines or cluster bombs, there might be other factors at play, including the 'rules of the game'.

Thus, in cases where the negotiation setting is not favourable for the effective work of norm entrepreneurs, the *tipping point* is not a useful tool to understand the evolution of the negotiations. Nevertheless, research that is more systematic is needed in order to fully explain this issue, particularly studies of the reasons for the decision of states to make coalitions with other states and with NGOs. One of the reasons may have to do with the fact that they see a momentum for international norm creation. And in the cases

under examination, the human security perspective can provide such momentum by and also bridge the gaps between different multilateral actors, such as diplomats and activists.

1.2.2.4. The human security perspective

The human security perspective can be useful in conceiving how security benefits for the individual and for the community can be met, particularly if grounded in reality by the involvement of the field-based humanitarian community alongside governments. The research argues that transnational activists have realised that and are trying to develop these ideas within a coalition of like-minded diplomats to move forward issues in the field of disarmament and arms control.

There is no agreed definition of what human security is, other than ‘security from the point of view of the individual’. It somehow tries to go beyond the classical conception of security as military security involving external threats to states, with the inclusion of issues such as human rights, development or environment.⁴⁴ A recent survey of twenty-one scholars in the humanitarian security field revealed a wide range of definitions.⁴⁵ Human security has been described as a rallying cry, a political campaign, a set of beliefs about the sources of violent conflict, a new conceptualisation of security, and a guide for policymakers and academic researchers (Paris 2001: 102).

Using it “as an effective slogan”, the members of certain NGO coalitions have been able to minimise their individual differences, thereby accommodating as wide a variety of members and interest

⁴⁴ In fact, Amnesty International, Oxfam and Greenpeace, which are the most important NGOs in these fields, usually engage on campaigns against the effects of certain weapons, framing them in terms of ‘human security’. For in-depth analysis about the relationship between environment and security, see Levy (1995) and Græger (1996).

⁴⁵ Some examples include ‘bridge between the interconnected challenges confronting the world’, ‘psycho-social well being over time’ and ‘a concept in search of relevance’. See Several Authors (2004).

in their network as possible. From this point of view, the use of human security in the discourse is more widely used. For example, Jody Williams won a Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for her work in the coordination of the landmines campaign. In her speech to the governments during the Oslo Conference against Cluster Munitions in February 2007, she repeated several times: “human security should be our focus and not the cluster munitions security”. And even some of its critics end up with a conclusion that invites to use the term.⁴⁶

Analytically, one of the main divergences is between so-called ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ conceptions of human security. The original definition by UNDP was a broad concept with seven components of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (see Human Development Report 1994). This kind of definitions is not useful for analysis and decision-making purposes. Proponents of more pragmatic ‘narrow’ conceptions focus on evaluating the effects of violent threats as a basis for policy response, arguing that human security parameters have resulted in successful initiatives, such as the campaigns I analyze in this research.⁴⁷

However, even if these campaigns have achieved some results, it does not automatically follow that the human security perspective actually *did* guide negotiators at the time, they probably had concerns that are more prosaic. A governmental participant in the subsequent Mine Ban Convention process, as well as in the drafting of the 2001 Program of Action on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, states that human security ideas only “informed the views of those negotiators already openly

⁴⁶ For example, Roland Paris concludes his article by saying that “human security could provide a handy label for a broad category of research – a distinct branch of security studies that explores the particular conditions that affect the survival of individuals, groups, and societies - that may also help to establish this brand of research as a central component of the security studies field”. See Paris (2001).

⁴⁷ See Owen (2004).

disposed towards them in the turmoil of drafting and deal-making".⁴⁸

However, human security could somehow provide a more coherent intellectual framework for framing issues and negotiating on substance in these contexts. The same governmental participant (which actually headed the delegation of New Zealand) affirms: "it enabled a shared analysis between donor and mine-affected countries to develop and consequently generate money and resources for mine action" (Borrie 2005: 24).

Also, the contribution by field-based perspectives and by the humanitarian community in multilateral disarmament and arms control processes should be considered. In fact, those working on post-conflict contexts usually express concerns about the effects of certain weapons, which may motivate other actors to collect data on the injuries caused by these weapons. If this is empirically confirmed, a negotiating process to regulate or abolish these weapons could follow. That could explain why civil society initiatives are actually taking place to collect empirical data in issues such as small arms, child soldiers, landmines or explosive remnants of war.

As it will be shown, this perspective has been successfully applied in the case of anti-personnel landmines, and there have been a number of attempts to replicate such campaign in related issues. The argument has been summarised as follows: The presence and use of these weapons causes insecurity and acts as an impediment to development and the protection of human rights. Moreover, that could be confirmed by dynamic contacts between practitioners from the field with multilateral negotiators.

In any case, the human security frame takes the perspective of the individual and of the community, rather than the nation state. Applied to this field of study, the idea is that concepts originating in the humanitarian sector may provide these types of useful frameworks for tackling disarmament and arms control challenges. They could act as well as a broker, forming a bridge between

⁴⁸ See John Borrie (2005: 24).

different political grouping - particularly between Northern and Southern countries, but also concerning weapons of mass destruction and the divide between humanitarian and 'hard' national security viewpoints -. Section 1.2.3 will illustrate these ideas with the campaign pioneer on the use of the human security frame.

1.2.3. Lessons of the landmines campaign and the Ottawa Process

Of the campaigns included in the thesis, the landmines campaign has been so far the most studied (Price 1998, Cameron *et al.* 1998, Anderson 2000 and Hubert 2000). These scholars agree that the negotiation of the treaty less than five years after the founding of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) represents a remarkably successful example of humanitarian advocacy. Even other coalitions, such as the Cluster Munitions Coalition, have taken the landmines campaign explicitly as a model and have tried to reproduce it when carrying out their own campaigns, producing important consequences at an organisational and strategic level.⁴⁹

Works focused on the landmines campaign, although lacking a systematic empirical approach and a strong and consistent theoretical one, have been very inspiring for getting some insights about the factors that made the ICBL successful. First, and consistent with the findings of the literature on the political influence of NGOs and transnational coalitions, is the fact that the geopolitical environment, within which the campaign developed, the Post-Cold War Context, acted as a facilitating factor for the success of the campaign. Second, among the resources controlled by the ICBL, expertise and effective use of media are widely

⁴⁹ Neo-institutional theorists of organisations have noted that aspiring organisations seek social legitimacy by structuring themselves along the lines of their most highly legitimate predecessors (Powell and di Maggio 1991).

stressed. Third, from an organisational point of view, a distinction is made between the steering committee that provided global strategic direction and the broad-based coalition that provided the foundation for national level campaigns and links to grass-roots activism. Fourth, fundamental to the success of the landmines campaign was the effective working relationship between the ICBL and other crucial non-governmental actors, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and UN agencies.

Once the emphasis of the campaign shifted from raising public awareness to negotiating a comprehensive treaty banning mines, a group of states became a central player. They managed to take the negotiations outside traditional disarmament forums, avoiding the entrenched logic of arms control measures such as the need for agreement from all major military powers. Throughout the negotiation process known as Ottawa Process, favourable negotiating environments included the full participation of the ICBL. The NGOs also benefited from contingent factors beyond their control, including the fact that landmines were not a highly profitable industry.

To sum up, the lessons of the landmines campaign seem to suggest that the ICBL was successful because it was able to adequately combine resources (particularly research, expertise, advocacy and use of the media), a flexible organisational form and the capabilities of allies, benefiting as well from certain contingent factors beyond its control. To know to what extent these findings would survive a careful and systematic research campaigns on the topic of disarmament and human rights has been one of the major aims of the dissertation.

Section 1.3 will present the typology of actors that will be used in the research and also some reflections around the effects/impact versus success/failure terminology and its application in the research.

1.3. International actors and the concept of success

1.3.1. International actors

Among the different typologies of actors proposed by the literature, the dissertation roughly follows the typology of forms of transnational collective action developed by Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2004).⁵⁰ In their view, the main categories of actors are the following:

Transnational advocacy networks: Sets of actors linked across country boundaries, bound together by shared values, dense exchanges of information and services, and common discourses.⁵¹ They are the most informal configuration of non-governmental actors. Evidence of these kinds of actors is provided extensively by Keck and Sikkink, 1998. Transnational advocacy networks are more likely to appear when the national POS is closed (Smith 1997).⁵²

⁵⁰ Another interesting typology was proposed by Sidney Tarrow referring to contentious transnational politics and the new work in this field, dividing it into five groups, with some overlap between them (Tarrow, 2001): (a) Development of a wide spectrum of non-state actors who organised transnationally (Keck and Sikkink 1998); (b) Particular movement families, such as the peace movement (Rochon 1988), the environment (Young 1997), immigrant rights (Soysal 1994); (c) Organisations – either in particular ones (Finnemore 1996), organisations in the aggregate (Boli and Thomas 1999), or transnational networks of organisations (Keck and Sikkink 1998); (d) International treaties in which non-state actors were legitimised and supported or in which activists played a constitutive role (Ringius 1992 and 2000); (e) Particular bi-national or regional contention in the context of international agreements or institutions (Imig and Tarrow 1999 and 2001).

⁵¹ Until the publication of Keck and Sikkink (1998), these kinds of actors were also known in the literature as *issue networks*. See for example, Sikkink (1993) or Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield (1997).

⁵² In fact, this is the first hypothesis suggested by Smith (1997): “transnational SMOs will form around issues for which national POS are

Transnational coalitions: Sets of actors linked across country boundaries that coordinate shared strategies or sets of tactics (transnational campaigns) to publicly influence social change. The cluster munitions coalition or the child soldiers coalition illustrate this form of transnational collective action.

Transnational social movements: Sets of actors with common purposes and solidarities linked across country boundaries that have the capacity to generate coordinated and sustained social mobilisation in more than one country to publicly influence social (and political) change. With the strongest collective identity, this concept refers, for instance, to the environmental movement that, in a sustained way, has been campaigning against radioactive wastes, for the defence of the resources of the Amazonian area, the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, and so on.

All of these concepts have to be differentiated from international NGOs. Concerning the distinction between international NGOs and transnational social movements, Tarrow argues that it is mainly behavioural: although both may have social change goals, transnational social movements engage in sustained contentious interaction with states, multinational actors, or international institutions, whereas international NGOs engage in routine transactions with the same kinds of actors and provide services to citizens of other states (Tarrow, 2001). In a similar way, Diani claims that a transnational advocacy network differs from a transnational social movement in that the former lack the embeddedness in dense networks of face-to-face and daily interaction (Diani, 2000). For instance, Amnesty International is an international NGO that is part of the transnational movement for the promotion of human rights and so, a transnational social movement organisation; it has participated in the transnational advocacy network that helped to denounce human right abuses in Argentina during the dictatorship; finally, it has taken part in different campaigns carried out by transnational coalitions, such as

relatively closed or for which purely national solutions are inappropriate” (1997: 57).

the one aiming at banning landmines or the one trying to stop the use and recruitment of child soldiers.⁵³

If states and intergovernmental institutions are or are not included in these terms is not always clear. In this sense, the literature offers two alternate visions (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2004). Some authors use an *expansive* definition, meaning that, although NGOs and social movements are the primary actors of transnational collective action, (parts of) states and intergovernmental organisations, as well as other non-governmental actors such as foundations, research institutes, epistemic communities, corporations, domestic interest groups, and social movements could also be included (see for example, Thomas 2003).

Yet, transnational coalitions, transnational advocacy networks and transnational social movements can be defined more *restrictively* to include only domestic and international NGOs and social movement organisations. The idea is that only with a narrower conceptualisation the researcher can focus on the conscious linkages made to other actors as factors shaping the emergence and/or effectiveness of transnational collective action rather than as a part of the network by definition. Moreover, this more restrictive definition to preserve the character or autonomy of the movement or network. For this reason, this second interpretation has been the one adopted in the dissertation.

As Khagram, Riker and Sikkink argue, transnational social movements are the most difficult and rare form of transnational

⁵³ Kriesberg, following McCarthy and Zald (1977), adopts a similar perspective when he states that whereas any international NGOs reflect and reinforce the status quo, “Transnational SMOs are international NGOs, such as Greenpeace or AI, that seek to bring about a change in the status quo. [...] Social movement organisations are that subset of NGOs working to change some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of society. [...] International NGOs are those NGOs whose memberships transcend national boundaries” (1997: 12). However, in this approach is not clear why in some cases the adjective used is ‘international’ whereas in others it is ‘transnational’.

collective action. Indeed, in order to speak of a truly transnational social movement, groups in at least three countries must engage in joint and sustained mobilisation. Transnational social movements are also expected to have the highest level of collective identity among the transnational organisations.

In any case, all of these actors are forms of transnational collective action involving non-governmental organisations interacting with international norms to restructure world politics. However, the authors believe that the form that transnational collective action takes may influence its goals and effectiveness. The main difference for them is the different degrees of connection and mobilisation.

Therefore, arguably the most interesting insight of this typology of actors is that these three forms can be viewed as a gradation of ascending levels of transnational collective action.⁵⁴ Often, a transnational coalition only emerges after a network of communication has first developed, and a transnational movement adds the mobilisation element to an existing transnational coalition. Conversely, a sustained transnational social movement may be initiated from a short-term campaign of a transnational coalition, which is the unit of analysis of the research.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ From a historical point of view, Chatfield (1997: 28-31) has suggested a typical process of transnational SMO creation. Thus, beginning as informal national networks of people who shared common concerns, they gave rise to congresses –large international meetings to exchange information and opinion, succeeded by conferences that had some jurisdictional authority which were followed by committees formed on various subjects that served as a first formal structure of the transnational social movement organisations.

⁵⁵ Chatfield (1969), for instance, described such coalitional efforts in his analysis of US peace organisations in the interwar period. Following the work of this author, now we know that coalitions typically form around campaigns, which are “deliberate efforts to coordinate movement actions around a particular policy or event and thereby to extend the movement’s message beyond its elite and informed publics to a more general audience” (Chatfield 1992).

As an attempt to clarify the main kind of actors included in a transnational coalition, the thesis builds up from another typology of actors, developed by Thomas Olesen (2005), regarding different forms of domestic and transnational social movements. Without major changes, it can be modified to include other different transnational actors and, specifically, coalitions. The dissertation deals with coalitions that, broadly speaking, are concerned with transnational problems and issues.

Table 1.1 Forms of social movement organisations

		LOCATION	
		NATIONAL	TRANSNATIONAL
ISSUE	NATIONAL	Domestic SMOs concerned with problems and issues in their own countries	Transnational SMOs concerned with problems and issues in their own countries
	TRANSNATIONAL	Domestic SMOs concerned with transnational problems and issues	Transnational SMOs concerned with transnational problems and issues

But, as is shown by the table 1.1 above, these coalitions can include both domestic and transnational social movement organisations. Concerning definitions, it can be easily argued that the label SMOs is quite similar to what others call NGO. From this perspective, domestic NGOs are equivalent to SMOs and transnational NGOs to transnational SMOs. Thus, a transnational coalition is composed of several transnational SMOs (and other regional, national and local SMOs) that may evolve in order to constitute a sustained transnational social movement. As stated before, transnational social movements are the most difficult and rare form of transnational collective action. Consequently, empirical research in the field of transnational collective action tends to focus on transnational coalitions, such as those under study in the thesis.

1.3.2. *The concept of success*

Social movements have a number of effects on their societies, some of them intended and others quite unintended. Broadly speaking, there are two ways of approaching the topic of outcomes in the field of transnational collective action. On the one hand, there is what we could name as the 'objectivist approach'. The authors that follow this approach (Shumaker, 1975) prefer to call these outcomes in a 'neutral way' as consequences, effects or impacts. They believe that by doing so, they are avoiding subjectivity. However, the notion of subjectivity is implicit in all scientific research. This means that when these authors define what they understand by social movement consequences, effects or impacts, they are implicitly taking decisions that affect the object of research. On the contrary, authors that frame this topic in terms of success or failure (such as Gamson 1990, Giugni 1999), are assuming from the beginning the subjective dimension of the term. It is clear that the idea of success could vary easily across sectors of collective actors, types of organisations, actions and strategies. An advantage of a broad conception of success is that it entertains the possibility that the major effects of collective action can have little to do with the public claims their members make. It is possible, then, to identify non-intentional successes.

The thesis favours the success/failure terminology because (i) it implies an honest recognition of subjectivity (it is the researcher who defines what a success is) and (ii), it makes the definition of the object of research richer than the more 'objectivist approach'. With the aim of being precise in the use of vocabulary while acknowledging the subjectivity of the terms and the fact that one approach can complement the other, both success/failure and outcomes/consequences/results have been used. In this research, there are three largely successful cases and one largely unsuccessful case to date, although each case has a different degree of success in different dimensions, ensuring therefore the variability of the dependent variable.

1.4. The model: Transnational coalitions' outcomes in a context of multilevel governance

The dependent variable of the thesis is the success of the transnational coalition, understood in terms of changes in the international regimes. In order to parameterise the impact of the international regime, the research focuses on cases that belong to the same regime (holding thus the regime constant).

Figure 1.3, inspired by Shumaker 1975, Hovey 1997 and Risse 2002, presents the different stages of the international political cycles. It runs parallel to the globalisation of protest (see figure 1.1). Thus, the creation of a transnational coalition implies the formation of consensus and transnational linkages among the activists. They try to modify the international agenda and the procedures of international institutions in order to shape the negotiations of international norms. In a subsequent stage, the new legal framework is translated into concrete policies and implemented in the different countries. In each of these phases, a different kind of success can be identified. It is worth to note that the approach chosen, which focuses on the legal/policy-making phase has been underestimated by the literature until recently.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ In this sense, Laura Kriesberg did not include political influence on treaty-making in the five main *methods of shaping global policy* identified in the introduction of Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco (1997), which in our terminology would be named as different kinds of successes: mobilising support for particular policies (i.e. coalition-building); widening public participation in international policy processes (i.e. access); sustaining attention on critical global problems, framing issues and setting the policy agenda (i.e. agenda-setting); carrying out transnational policies (i.e. compliance and implementation).

Figure 1.3 Stages of the political cycle



As an illustration of the figure, let us take again the case of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Mine Ban Treaty. In the course of 1991, several non-governmental organisations and individuals began simultaneously to discuss the necessity of coordinating initiatives and calls for a ban on antipersonnel landmines, creating a transnational coalition. After having achieved the setting of the topic onto the agenda of international public opinion, the ICBL was able to participate directly in a negotiation based on participatory procedures. The signing of the Ottawa Treaty meant the banning of the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines. Currently, the main goal of the ICBL is the monitoring of the implementation policies of the treaty. This network succeeded even though it was pitched against the fierce opposition of several great powers, including the United States and Russia (Price 1998).⁵⁷


In Figure 1.3, more than one of the stages can take place at the same time, in part, because some stages like the “agenda-setting” one has a broader temporal scope than others. Using again the case of the ICBL, the network has continued growing even after the treaty was adopted. The phase of agenda-setting was also important in 1997, when the topic gained important public attention after the awarding of the Nobel Prize to the ICBL and its coordinator, Jody Williams.

The next step needs to define mechanisms in order to connect different independent variables to the different kind of successes. Figure 1.4, based on Shumaker (1975), Sikkink (2004) and

⁵⁷ Some of them, like the US or China, have not signed the treaty yet.

Gamson (1990) presents a tentative model on transnational coalitions' outcomes.

Figure 1.4 Model on transnational coalition outcomes



The basic idea of the model considers two different groups of independent variables. There are those (internal) elements that are (to a greater or lesser extent) controlled by the organisations that form the transnational coalition, and those (external) factors grouped in the structure of political opportunities for collective action. From this perspective, different kinds of successes can take place in terms of impact on access, agenda-setting, legal/policy-making, and in the long-term, the model also captures the existence of cultural effects, such as the stigmatisation of the weapon.

The specification of the variables of the model, based on Shumaker (1975), Gordenker and Weiss (1995) and Silva (2008) is presented in figure 1.5 below. From this figure, it is important to note the different levels of political opportunities structures that interact with the independent variables, as well as the different

kinds of outcomes that determine the success of the campaigns carried out by the transnational coalitions.

However, before discussing the specification and operationalisation of the variables, a previous consideration has to be taken into account. The inexhaustible complexity the model tries to capture with its variables makes it necessary to focus the study on the most interesting and methodologically feasible concepts and relationships.

Figure 1.5 Specification of the model variables

Independent variables		Dependent variables
TRANSNATIONAL	IDEOLOGICAL PARADIGM	
ORGANISATION DIMENSIONS	Local POS	AGENDA EFFECTS
A. Formulation and professionalization		
B. Research and expertise		
C. Resource-financing	National POS	ACCESS EFFECTS
T. Territorial distribution		
F. Decision-making (structure/classification)		
STRATEGY DIMENSIONS	International POS	POLICY EFFECTS
A. Professionalism		
B. Use of mass media		
C. Institutionalisation, lobbying, advocacy		
T. Policy proposals/Coalition formation		
E. Learning processes		CULTURAL EFFECTS

First, and given the original definition of success, namely political influence when signing an international treaty, the thesis focuses on policy outcomes (and particularly on the negotiation process until the treaty is or is not signed, excluding therefore the implementation stage). Consequently, structural and cultural outcomes are not fully considered in the research. Finally, both agenda and procedural outcomes have a secondary role in this research. To sum up, the theoretical perspective recognises the different kinds of possible outcomes of the transnational coalitions at different levels, but it deliberately focuses on their influence when signing an international treaty.

Concerning the context or opportunity structure and its variables, although the thesis recognises the importance of considering it as a multilevel concept and while taking in mind all of them theoretically and given the international and transnational nature of the issues at stake, the local level has a secondary role in the research. The thesis examines both the strategic and the organisational dimensions of the transnational coalitions within national and international opportunities structures.

1.4.1. Independent variables controlled by the transnational coalitions

This section of the chapter specifies the independent variables, trying to connect them with the concrete aspects of the research question that they try to answer, as well as to the data and methods used to deal with them. First, the focus is on those connected with the ‘organisational form’ of the transnational coalition. Second, the chapter deals with the ‘strategies’ issued in their campaigns.

1.4.1.1. Organisational form

In organisation and management theory, ‘organisational form’ is a somewhat technocratic term for those characteristics of an organisation that identifies it as a distinct entity and, at the same time, classifies it as a member of a group of similar organisations (Romanelli 1991, Anheier and Themudo 2002). Following the theoretical perspective outlined in chapter 1, different combinations of the dimensions of the multilevel political opportunity structure are connected with the adoption of different organisational forms of the coalitions. Therefore, this research aims to discover which kind of organisational form is best suited for being successful in the complex task environments studied.

Forms that are appropriate for specific purposes in certain environments can be disabling for different purposes and phases as well as environments (for example, European based versus

transnational/global). As an illustration of this, Anheier (2003) sums up the implications of the organisational form adopted by the coalition Jubilee 2000. This coalition initially adopted, what the author calls, 'a social movement form' - little central coordination, dispersed resources with information management decentralised. This organisational form was good for the period of growth, but with 24 million members, organisational problems set in. In the end, the lack of controls reduced its legitimacy and its final effectiveness.

This example shows that each case has to be studied with attention paid to its specific context and so, its specific multilevel opportunity structure. The thesis argues, with Anheier and Themudo, that the organisational form that a transnational non-governmental actor adopts, are closely related to its capacity for effecting change (2002: 193). But what are the implications of organisational forms in terms of effectiveness and success? The answer to this question is far from being clear in the literature. In fact, there are bi-directional hypotheses with arguments (for and against) different factors. For example, it is still not clear when short-term cost-efficiency (i.e. imitating successful organisation forms) is more valued over long-term effectiveness and innovation such as searching for differentiation, which may imply more risks. This research is perfectly suited for in-depth study of this issue, because it analyses a coalition that deliberately has tried to avoid the ICBL organisational form (the IANSA on small arms) and another one who replicates it to a great extent (the CMC on cluster munitions).

Organisational theorists have found that forms that offer competitive advantages over others are more likely to be selected by new organisations for maximising their sustainability, while other forms become less frequently used (Aldrich 1999). If that holds true for the global civil society space (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001: 17), the relevance of researching to what extent an organisational form of a network of transnational non-governmental actors is more successful than others would be that

the most successful ones would tend to be adopted by others, for example by processes of diffusion or learning.

A major aspect regarding the organisational form of these actors is their evolution. It has been argued that organisations can also experience fundamental changes and major redesigns over time (Aldrich 1999). Other scholars have suggested that this may be related to the environment in which they operate (Anheier and Themudo 2002). In the theoretical framework of this dissertation, this environment is understood as the different dimensions that form the multilevel political opportunity structure. The thesis develops this aspect in the next section of the chapter.

Anheier and Themudo (2002) have developed a quite simple, but useful, evolution of the main organisational forms. They state that NGOs have been evolving from unitary, centralised and stable organisations towards more flexible, autonomous and multi-unit ones (see figure 1.6 below, based on Anheier and Themudo 2002).

Figure 1.6 Different organisational forms



The dynamic analysis of the coalitions under study will shed new light on this uni-directional relationship, highlighting the complexities and particularities of a multilevel political opportunity structure. Moreover, looking at the evolution of the coalition from the moment of its creation until a treaty is signed, it is possible to identify which organisations are the most stable, and so which ones give continuity to the coalition, and finally to what extent is this fact linked to the activists' success.

Schumaker's model on social movement impact (1975) takes into account two dimensions of the organisational form, namely (i) stability and (ii) the number of active members within the organisation but, as he admits, more work has to be done on it to do justice to the organisational dimension. Silva (2008) integrates

Schumaker's ideas in the light of the works of Kriesi (1996), Rucht (1996), the Janda's empirical research on political parties (1980) and some pioneering work on organisation theory (Pugh *et al.* 1963, 1968), ending up with five cluster variables: (i) formalisation (formal membership, legal status, institutionalised formal functions, differentiated basic functions), (ii) professionalisation (number of paid staff), (iii) resources (membership size, amount of financial resources), (iv) geographical distribution) and (v) decision-making structure (centralisation of power). This was created for the study of single organisations. As the main unit of analysis in the dissertation is the whole coalition, some of these variables have to be adapted to the research, and others have to be added.

This part of the research looks for connections between different compositions of the network and different final outcomes, following particularly the resources mobilisation theory. Overall, this perspective considers that material resources matter and that organisational characteristics have an influence on the network structure.⁵⁸ Therefore, "the more resources the organisation is provided with, the more possibilities it has to develop political skills and ways of action and therefore this may result in (transnational) social movement organisations being better equipped at promoting successful campaigns on which other actors may converge" (Diani 2003: 108).

Material resources refers to (a) the number of members; (b) the amount of financial resources; and (c) the number of paid staff. These variables have been adapted to a research where the main unit of analysis is the whole coalition. The expected outcome is that more successful coalitions have a higher number of members, greater financial resources and a higher number of paid staff.

Similarly, the level of formalisation is analysed regarding each coalition as a unit of analysis, considering it as a cluster variable

⁵⁸ Variables such as degree of *professionalisation* and resources might be expected to influence the structure and centrality of the organisations within the network (Diani 2003).

and accounting for several indicators (Silva 2008) such as (i) formal membership (criteria for being a member); legal status (in the international law), (ii) institutionalised formal functions, and (iii) differentiated basic functions. However, Silva operationalises it taking a scale with a maximum value of four and treating each indicator in a yes/no fashion, which would seem appropriate for dealing with a big number of organisations in a purely quantitative way. Yet, in a research based on four different coalitions, a more qualitative procedure of evaluating those indicators seems reasonably more fruitful. It will shed light both on the evolution of the coalitions (to what extent are they transforming unidirectionally towards a fully formalised organisation), as well as on the differing consequences associated to different levels of formalisation (when a specific level of formalisation is necessary in order to achieve a specific goal). Following organisational theory, the expected outcome is that more successful coalitions have a higher level of formalisation.⁵⁹

It is also possible, on the subject of decision-making structures, to re-adapt Janda's cluster concept for political parties (1980) that Silva (2008) adapted first for single organisations to the level of transnational coalitions, including the following indicators: (a) allocation of funds, (b) formulating strategies, actions and policy proposals, (c) communication control, and (d) leadership concentration. But again, it makes more sense to deal with these four indicators from a qualitative point of view. Therefore, for each indicator the range of possibilities goes from a situation in which the responsibility is diffused throughout the coalition to another one where all decisions are determined by a single person, or by a very small elite and no need for further approval is required. The analysis of these features allows one to assess whether the most successful coalitions always have

⁵⁹ Similarly, Smith (1997) affirms that "where significant numbers of formal movement organisations are present, more attempts to influence the decisions of intergovernmental institutions are likely, and these attempts are probably more coordinated transnationally" (1997:44).

centralised decision-making structures. Moreover, the thesis examines the evolution of the coalitions with respect to this cluster variable, to understand how every coalition adapts to the new context they have to face when they change from one stage to the next.

Smith (1997) has suggested that transnational social movement organisations are becoming more decentralised as their memberships become increasingly localised and as new technologies facilitate greater scope of participation in organisational decisions. Overall, coalitions will opt for a more decentralised decision-making structure when (a) their aims and targets are more decentralised - the targets are countries that have to change their preferences with reference to the signing of a treaty - and (b) they have the necessary material resources to support a decentralised decision-making structure. Moreover, the advancement of communication and transportation technologies has made more decentralised organisational forms viable and so, the more transnational coalitions are engaged with the new technologies, the more decentralised they become.

Given that the theoretical perspective of the thesis takes into account a multilevel political opportunity structure, it has to investigate how the coalitions deal with this complex context and so, to what extent is the different scope of the organisations relevant. In other words, despite being transnational (some authors label them even as global) actors, what is the relevance of the local and national organisations that are part of them? Does it have some relationship with the amount and characteristics of the final impact of the coalition? In dealing with this question, it makes sense to first study the extent to which the coalition is distributed geographically. Therefore, the thesis assesses the extent to which more effective organisations have more extensive links with governmental and non-governmental organisations and with a broader geographic diversity.

However, the more geographically distributed the coalition, the more diversified their aims and results might be, and the more it has to face problems of coordination. Consequently, a

geographically decentralised coalition is not always successful, because it also depends on the different environments it has to interact with. In order to operationalise this territorial perspective, the thesis compares the number of local, national and regional organisations the coalition is constituted by. As it occurs with other variables, given an average main item of analysis, data gathered can be easily organised in a set of discrete and qualitative categories, for example low, medium and high.

With regard to the way power is distributed between headquarters and national affiliates, the literature has identified two basic ideal types of organisational forms: the 'global democracy' and the 'global federation' model. The 'global democracy' form gives equal voice to individual members, usually over representing the Northern countries at the global level; Amnesty International is a good example of this. By contrast, the 'global federation' form gives representation on a 'one country section, one vote' basis, usually giving greater power to individual members from the Southern countries (Anheier and Themudo (2002: 211-212). The dissertation explores which one is more frequent in successful coalitions.⁶⁰

Concerning collective identity that connects different individuals and organisations vastly dispersed over the world, the thesis is interested in sub-research questions: Is it the case that all the coalitions are basically 'dominated' by peace and disarmament organisations or are there other actors inside the coalition, such as human rights groups or epistemic communities, whose importance for the network is greater? To what extent is this associated to the success of the coalition? The empirical chapters of the thesis will show that there is a tension between a homogeneous coalition that

⁶⁰ A proxy variable that captures this dimension regards the official (and working) languages in each Coalition. Its operationalisation could have three values, ranging from the totally Western-based to the global one: 1 if there are only so-called European languages (e.g. English, French, and Spanish), 2 if there is another widely spoken language (e.g. Arabic, Chinese), and 3 if there are at least two other widely spoken languages.

manages to develop a higher sense of collective identity, whereas for certain issues it is precisely the diversity of the actors that give the coalition more strength and so, more chances of final success.

With regards to correlations between the independent variables presented above, there is some evidence coming from related fields, such as social movement studies and organisation theory,⁶¹ but for the specific case of transnational coalitions, they still need to be identified. To what extent it is the case that the greater the degree of material resources, the more likely it is to show territorial distribution and (de)centralisation of power?

To sum up, a relevant aspect for this research is to assess the impact of transnational coalitions active on human security through internal variables - such as those coming from the resource mobilisation tradition. Gamson (1990), Shumaker (1975) and some of the contributions of Giugni *et al.* (1999) have suggested that the organisational form can directly affect the strategic capacity of the social movement, which in turn affects its result. Hence, organisational form would be an indirect cause of the impact of social movements. This research assesses to what extent this holds true for transnational coalitions active on human security and disarmament issues.

1.4.1.2. Strategies in transnational coalitions

Some authors have identified pre-1945 international NGOs and transnational social movement organisations in terms of the issues, or areas, of their primary concern (Willems 1982; Chatfield 1997), categorising groups in terms of their purposes - what they mobilise to do. And the result is that the aims of many international NGOs are mixed, contributing to complex interactions along a broad range of issues. Similarly, they

⁶¹ Knocke (1989) has found some correlation between amount of resources and formalisation, being this relationship less clear with the decision-making structure. Also, Kriesi (1996) have found a correlation between amount of resources, formalisation and professionalization.

concluded that rarely were strategic alternatives clear. “Often mobilisation was an *ad hoc* matter of reaching anyone who would listen” (Chatfield 1997:32). An analysis of current transnational social movement organisations and coalitions will show an evolution of their way of understanding strategy. In fact, the thesis maintains that each choice of strategy consciously reflects an associated purpose, and the practical consequences of that choice define their international role, and thus, the way of carrying out the international campaign by each transnational coalition.

Also, the international literature on the political influence of NGOs and transnational coalitions (including the existing literature about the landmines campaign (Price 1998, Cameron *et al.* 1998, Anderson 2000 and Hubert 2000) and the ICC (for example, Glasius 2005) shows that they generally employ a broad range of strategies. Whereas some of them point to lobbying as the most effective one (for example, Arts *et al.* 2001), a combination of strategies has been usually seen as the most effective.

In carrying out their political goals, coalitions must employ two distinct strategic programs, namely, a mobilising strategy and an action strategy (Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield, 1997: 71). Whereas mobilising strategies attempt to attract new activists and resources for the cause, as well as to energise existing adherents and resources, action strategies are the activities that social movements employ in order to influence policy. In this section, chapter one focus on this second kind of strategic programme, which is critically related to what Tilly (1984) has labelled ‘repertoires of contention’, or standard collection of tactics that a given population recognises as possible means of influencing political or other authorities. McCarthy has added the transnational dimension to this concept (see McCarthy 1997).

Without being an exhaustive summary of the transnational tactical repertoire, the list of activities of table 1.2, based on Smith 1997, shows some of the variation in transnational SMOs activities.

Table 1.2 Examples of transnational SMO tactics 1983 – 1993, by target⁶²

<i>Individuals</i>	<i>National Governments</i>	<i>Intergovernmental Institutions</i>
Education	Letter-writing campaign	Draft international conventions
Citizen exchanges	Fact-finding missions	Document violations of international law
Work camps	Protest demonstrations	Early warning activities
Speakers bureau	Direct actions	Promote 'international' days
Legal aid	Lobby national policymakers	Advise IGO officials
Alternative marketing	Petitions	Lobby delegates
Networking	Observer missions	Monitor transnational corporations
Non-violence training	Advise national governments	Monitor international agencies
Technical training	Draft national legislation	Political socialisation

Many transnational social movement organisations mirror those used by national and local SMOs, but others are carried out within a global or regional strategic framework and so, they ultimately aim at shaping intergovernmental and trans-governmental political process. This list should be modified to the information age. In this sense, Cohen and Rai (2000) also include the following: signing petitions, band-aid concert/telethons and (new) media events. Moreover, Hassan (2004) writes about the use

⁶² In this table, categories are illustrative, not necessarily mutually exclusive.

of tactical media, such as culture-jamming, warchalking and digital direct action.

When analysing the tactical mode in coalitions' strategy with regard to the UN, Gordenker and Weiss (1995) conclude that showy mass demonstrations might only rarely be possible in international meetings;⁶³ they could be easier to mount for local and national authorities. Similarly, we will expect that successful coalitions use advocacy and lobbying as the primary mode of action where the multilevel POS is more favourable, whereas they use mass protest in arenas where the multilevel POS is less favourable (when their access to the institutions is closed).⁶⁴

In fact, the tension between NGO professionalism and mass protest is far from new. Transnational SMOs benefit from mass support in advancing their international policy agenda. But it is also true that their credibility with international authorities depends as well on their ability to participate in substantive policy debates with these agencies. This implies that when lobbying transnational SMOs fail to forge successful coalitions with the street protest ones, they are also "the targets of attacks from the populist left, and have been increasingly identified as an elite, professional wing of the NGO movement, with limited claim to mass political support and legitimacy (Nelson 2002: 388)". Some scholarly accounts have provided evidence of the increasing levels

⁶³ In fact, they just gave the example of a few single-issue NGOs concentrating on AIDS that had used mass demonstrations to attempt to affect international conferences. In order to look for more examples the authors included the (large) presence of NGOs at the UN Conference on Environment and Development and at the women's conference as cases of mild mass demonstrations (Gordenker and Weiss 1995: 549). Moreover, the events after Seattle and Genoa with the movement for a global justice seem to confirm that probably this pattern is changing nowadays.

⁶⁴ Also Smith 1997 has found that transnational SMOs rarely employed (from 1983 until 1993) unruly or disruptive tactics, and the use of even the most routine protest tactic of public demonstrations seems extremely low among transnational SMOs, in contrast to national SMOs.

of professionalism of personnel serving transnational SMOs, especially those that have close relationships with the headquarters activities of IGOs. There are even cases where professional standards in some transnational SMOs and IGOs are equivalent (Donini 1995). However, the extent to which high quality advanced preparation for participation by NGOs in UN system meetings gains a payoff, as Gaer (1995) and Conca (1995) suggest, remains hard to estimate.

Moreover, the literature has emphasised the importance of producing new information and disseminating scientific research and knowledge about the issues at stake (Chen 1995, Arts 1998, Price 1998). This is a basic tool of political feedback and a specialised use of international legal and political expertise allows transnational activists to carry out high-quality interventions in public forums (Smith 2002). Thus, we would expect that successful coalitions conduct rigorous scientific research and produce scientific knowledge.

Regarding policy proposals (the definition of goals), previous research on the environmental field has suggested that the more activists' claims are resonant to legislation already existing the more likely they are accepted, because this fact increases their legitimacy (Arts 1998). Also, Van Rooy (1997) has shown that in a suitable multilevel POS, such as the UN-NGO forums, activists aim at (a) directing the attention of public policy makers, public opinion and mass media in order to shape the agenda-setting, and (b) framing issues in the sense of interpreting them as problematic and highly salient.

One of the most successful transnational framing efforts in recent times has been the creation of a common transnational conception of human rights (Coy 1997, McCarthy 1997, Pagnucco 1997, Keck and Sikkink 1998 and Sikkink and Schmitz 2002).⁶⁵ In

⁶⁵ Some authors (for example, Olesen 2004) also consider this fact as one of the most important facilitating conditions that allows transnational mobilisation around human rights issues. Even if this holds true, the campaigns have to face counter-framing efforts in order to label the issue as different from the human rights area. And this has been the case for all

this sense, public reporting of human rights violations can reach a wide audience and could be part of a mass propaganda audience (see Gaer 1995). We find a similar pattern in environmentalism and in women's organisations (Gordenker and Weiss 1995). In all these cases, mass communications media constitute an intervening organisational factor that should be analysed in order to be able to understand the whole political process.

However, not in every campaign (even when considering those of the same field, such as human security), the strategic framing through the media achieves a similar degree of success. Moreover, transnational activists have to face counter-framing efforts in order to label the issue as different from the human security area. And this has been the case for the campaigns studied in the thesis that move into a blurred territory between human rights and security issues. For example, the basis of the landmines campaign was that the human costs exacted by antipersonnel mines far outweighed their military utility.

If the work of strategic framing is difficult at the national level, it is far more complex at the transnational level. Social movements and transnational coalitions attempting to construct frames that resonate in diverse cultural settings and to promote frame bridging, or the linking of new mobilising frames with existing cultural materials, confront great obstacles.⁶⁶ Creating widely embraced transnational frames is likely to be a far more lengthy, extensive, and multifaceted process than it is at the national level.

In addition, transnational collective action faces an important limit that is not present in the national arena: there is no coherent, attentive and informed international public opinion. A similar concern has been expressed by Rucht (1997) regarding the

of the campaigns studied in this research, which move in a blurred territory between human rights and security issues. The essence of the landmines campaign, from start to finish, was that the human costs exacted by antipersonnel mines far outweighed their military utility.

⁶⁶ For the concept and applications of frame analysis, see Snow and Benford (1998) and (2000).

environmental collective action mobilised around European issues. His research shows that efforts to influence environmental decisions in the EU are relatively unattractive and unspectacular, and therefore attract little attention from the average group member and the wider public, many of whom are preoccupied with local or national issues. Environmental groups in Brussels lack ‘power in numbers’ (De Nardo 1985) as well as the opportunity to generate a “radical flank effect” (McAdam *et al.* 1988: 718-19), and they pose little or no threat to the major players in the EU. The human rights situation seems to be quite different (Sikkink 1993, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Schmitz and Sikkink 2002). However, systematic research on the use of media by transnational coalitions aiming to influence international decision-making processes on human security issues is still lacking in the literature, which has already expressed the need for comparative strategies in this field.⁶⁷ To empirically assess framing campaigns, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) have fruitfully deployed the concept of *issue culture* (mass public discourse around a social issue) and they have shown that it can be systematically estimated in media coverage over time (see for example, Gamson 1990 about nuclear power in the US). Finally, those frames that are considered more newsworthy by journalists have a higher likelihood of receiving media coverage. The thesis assesses the extent to which the more a frame is clearly defined and culturally resonant, the more activists will be successful in shaping the political and media agenda-setting.

⁶⁷ “To better assess the conditions under which effective transnational mobilising frames emerge, hypotheses drawn from cases-study must be tested through systematic comparisons among two or more cases” (McCarthy 1997: 251).

1.4.2. Independent variables not controlled by the activists: MPOS

The concept of political opportunity structure is one of the most popular in social movement studies, but also one of the most controversial ones.⁶⁸ However, it can still be useful for research purposes, as implicitly recognise Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield when they say that “movements promoting different goals not only vary with respect to the actors they mobilise and in their degree of formal coordination, but also face different political opportunities in national, intergovernmental, and trans-governmental decision-making arenas, and these factors influence the strategic choices they make” (Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield 1997). In any case, it was originally created for a national context and, for this reason, when adapting it to a multilevel POS its dimensions need to be adapted. As already seen in section 1.2 of this chapter, the idea of a multilevel POS refers to the different contexts at different levels that can be favorable to collective action.

Regarding its supranational element, the world is changing in ways that promotes the growth of transnational social movement organisations and increases their significance (Kriesberg 1997). Furthermore, we are in a period of turbulence and transition (Rosenau 1990). In such periods of flux, the little shifts in direction that transnational activism help bring about can have large, long-term effects.

Kriesberg (1997) has identified four major trends providing the context for transnational activism: (i) growing democratisation (the end of the Cold War), (ii) increasing global integration, (iii) converging and diffusing values and (iv) proliferating transnational institutions. Similarly, Olesen (2005) suggests four facilitating factors for the success of transnational networks in the 1990s and first decade of the new millennium, through the construction of a successful global frame: (a) the invocation of a global consciousness and common belief system, (b) the

⁶⁸ For some critical assessment of the utility of this concept, see Tarrow (1996), Koopmans (1999) and Della Porta and Diani (1999).

establishment of an injustice frame centered around the concept of neo-liberalism (c) the use of a democratic master frame and (d) the mediation of everyday experiences via the Internet. Added to this, Smith (1997) has predicted that favorable international political opportunity structures, including new institutional opportunities within international organisations, contribute to the emergence of transnational collective action.

These authors underline that this emergence is fostered by the presence of political authorities on the international level. In this sense, Passy (2005) argues that the existence of quasi-supranational power centers, such as the European Union and the United Nations, offers new political opportunities to social movements. Following the way paved by Tilly (1986, 1995), who pointed to the shift from local to national collective action, Passy affirms that the creation of supranational political structures leads to an analogous transformation of protest from the national to the international level: social movements find new targets to defend their interests. One of the institutions that illustrates this process of trans-nationalisation of the protest is the United Nations.

1.4.2.1. The POS at the United Nations

The UN was created after the Second World War. It encompasses almost all the countries of the world in order to manage common problems, especially those related to international security. It is one of the political forums where international regimes are elaborated (Passy 2005: 151). Thus, the UN offers a deliberative space where states can build international regimes, that is, governing arrangements that affect every participant in the negotiation by creating norms and procedures that regularise their behavior on specific arenas (Keohane and Nye 1977).

The UN has incorporated organised sectors of civil society in international negotiations. Since the early 1990s, the number of organisations allowed to participate in UN activities has grown and their role in such activities has gained in importance (Willetts

1982, Smith 1997, Rucht 2005). Nevertheless, because of the limitations of the UN as a power centre,⁶⁹ the national level remains a crucial target of social movements. In a two-level strategy, activists address their demands to their national authorities, but they also use supranational arenas to articulate their political conflict in order to develop international normative frameworks.

However, UN institutions are not monolithic (Willets 1982 and 1996). At one end of the scale, there is the World Bank and its limited and minimal relationships with social movement organisations. On the other hand, the UNHCR and UNICEF not only contact NGOs, but also endeavor to involve them more intimately in research formulation and policy consultations. As Gordenker and Weiss suggest (1995: 554), this might reflect the fact that these institutions have a relatively high number of staff members who themselves have previously worked in NGOs or are at least sympathetic to many of transnational coalitions' values.

Passy uses the theoretical framework elaborated by Kriesi *et al.* (1995) to stress the three main dimensions of the UN political opportunity structures: (i) formal access, (ii) informal possibilities and (iii) the activist's configuration of allies and opponents.

First, the UN gives formal access to several NGOs by granting them consultative status to take advantage of their resources.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ The UN has a very limited coercive power (Willets 1990). Moreover, nation-states remain sovereign and are autonomous with regard to the implementation of international norms (Donnelly 1986).

⁷⁰ Formal access to the UN is somewhat limited. Some organisations have consultative status in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). They have to be transnational (i.e. they have to be present in more than one country) and they are required to work in the economic and social field (education, health, human rights, culture and related matters). Access to the ECOSOC allows to directly participation in the elaboration of norms and international regimes and also to all the conferences organized by ECOSOC and to all the special agencies of the UN, such as UNICEF, GATT and the IMF. However, security matters are not discussed in the ECOSOC.

Social movement organisations are important pools of resources, especially in terms of knowledge (Haas 1990; Haas 1989, 1992; Rosenau 1993), such as grassroots knowledge from the field that is important practical information. Moreover, transnational social movement organisations are effective in disseminating information about the existence of UN declarations and resolutions in nation-states (especially at the local level) and help within the implementation of UN norms. Transnational coalitions cultivate activists' familiarity with the institutions and develop their skills for working effectively in such contexts, as shown by Smith (2002) for the case of Greenpeace and the international campaign on toxic waste.

Second, the UN administration adopts an inclusive strategy towards social movements, which expands the opportunities for their action.⁷¹ The UN administration has autonomy because the representatives of states are not always present in the UN. Therefore, the functioning of this supranational political structure is the responsibility of its administration. It drafts resolutions, sets the agenda of conferences, working groups and commissions, and so on. In their preparatory work, the UN administration usually provides NGOs with a broad action space.⁷² The combination of

⁷¹ Informal strategies broaden considerably the political opportunities provided by the UN to social movements, e.g. by offering financial support to organisations that cannot attend UN commissions or working groups for practical reasons, by publishing newsletters of UN-related organisations in order to spread their work and improve the communication between the, by creating special offices giving administrative support (translations, typing reports) to the organisations, by offering spaces where they can work, meet, and prepare common strategies (see Passy 2005: 154-155).

⁷² The organisations are also very active in informally take advantage of their political opportunities within the UN. Since they began to challenge the UN political structure regularly in the late 1970s, activists have gained experience. They know better the functioning of this complex structure and they have created a new space for their lobbying activities. They draft resolution proposals and other types of UN norms. They also give a political meaning to UN world conferences, for instance

the willingness of the UN administration to incorporate the organisations into the negotiation processes and the willingness of many organisations to be incorporated has produced a considerable increase in the informal role of social movements (Finger 1994, Willets 1990). Thus, the informal strategies of the UN administration have expanded the supranational political opportunities for social movements.

Third, the configuration of allies may expand or narrow the opportunities for the action and lobbying of activists. The configuration of activists' allies and opponents can be operationalised as: international NGOs, transnational social movement organisations, associations, movements, parties and government bodies expressing either support or non-support with transnational coalitions' political goals, as observed in policy and key-representative statements by such actors.⁷³

This operational definition allows us to include only actors that are either explicitly supportive or in opposition to transnational coalitions' political goals, leaving aside the many political actors who have no outspoken opinion on such matters. This decision has also disadvantages. Theoretically, it may not take into account relevant positions by actors who have not publicly declared their support. However and given the quantity of documents on these issues, this difficulty should not be so significant for the thesis. Moreover, the practical advantage of such a definition is that it enables one to clearly construct the configuration of allies and opponents, without methodological doubts.

Among the allies, we should normally expect organisations whose existence reflect the willingness to show solidarity with victims, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross;

by helping to set their agenda or by influencing the work during the preparatory sessions (Passy 2002: 155-156).

⁷³ The last part of the definition tells us to look for the empirical referent within collective "policy-statements" of such actors, differentiating representatives' statements when they act as individuals or as real representatives.

organisations that can be part of one coalition but not of the others; elements of the global justice movement, leftist parties (and others not always necessarily leftist); newspapers and unions; and government bodies traditionally sensitive to these issues, like the Scandinavian countries or Canada. Human rights, peace, development and disarmament associations form part of the coalitions under study, often within the core group of founders. All coalitions have been partially successful in establishing relationship with institutional organisations and all coalitions have some governments that support them and governments that oppose them. Finally, the case of IANSA is unique in this sense, because it has to deal with the gun lobby.

Regarding institutional support, some states are more open to social movements than others depending on the problems at stake (Kriesi *et al.* 1995). For certain questions, states become social movements' allies by facilitating their lobbying, by signing resolutions drafted by organisations, by disseminating their reports, by orienting political debates so as to favor the organisations and by exerting pressure on other states. But when certain issues are concerned, some states may try to do their best to exclude the activists by reducing their speaking time, by excluding them from international conferences or by asking for the right of censorship on their statements.

This 'configuration of allies and opponents' form a 'relational opportunity structure' of the totality of actors in the field of international human security politics. The distribution of ties is relatively flexible and changes over time. Contingent factors or transforming events (such as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, and the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001) can change this distribution, by reconfiguring the alliances. In social movements' terms, they are sometimes known as 'suddenly imposed grievances' (Walsh 1981).

From a perspective based on a multilevel POS, this research explores if more successful coalitions have higher levels of both formal and informal access to the institutions and especially more favorable configurations of allies and opponents.

1.4.3. Dependent variables: Transnational coalitions' success

As explained above, the thesis deals with the determinants and paths to success of transnational coalitions. The main dependent variable is explicitly clear from the very beginning of the research: Transnational coalitions' success, in all its four different dimensions. The thesis has already reflected on this concept, which is understood as political influence, in section 1.3.2 of the chapter. This section presents the different dimensions of the concept.

In this research, there are three largely successful cases and one that is largely unsuccessful. However, each case has a different degree of success in different dimensions, which needs to be accurately assessed. This implies, then, a substantial variability in the dependent variable. Let us take, as an example, the case of the child soldiers campaign and the policy dimension of its success/failure variable. It can be affirmed that the signature of the Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child was mainly a success. However, this does not imply that it was a total success. On the contrary, in some articles of the treaty, such as the one that allows the voluntary recruitment of children below eighteen years old, the final text is quite less ambitious than the original proposal of the transnational coalition of NGOs and other non-governmental actors against the use and recruitment of child soldiers. This example shows, therefore, that a more substantiated evaluation of the different dimensions of transnational coalitions' effects can provide very detailed and fruitful results. Below, the chapter elaborates further on this issue.

Agenda outcomes: Success in the agenda-setting phase is measured by the inclusion of issues (i) on the public opinion and (ii) on the agenda of the UN institutions, or (iii) by a switch in the degree of primacy of the issues at stake within the agenda. A priori and given that the phase of agenda-setting is usually before the others, it is expected to find a substantial (although with a variable) degree of success in all the campaigns under study, at

least in the phases leading to the negotiation of the treaty, its signature and ratification.

Access outcomes: Given that transnational coalitions and social movements are, in general, based upon participatory practices, it sometimes translates into claims for reforming the procedural arrangements of global public bodies for increasing their accountability, transparency and legitimacy. As it will be shown in the empirical chapters, this is one of the most important (and most underrated, both by activists and by scholars) dimensions of success, which correlates strongly with the policy one. In other words, if activists gain access to the institutions, they will have better chances to impact the legal and policy dimensions.

Policy outcomes: Official and provisional outcomes of the decision-making of the UN agencies. This refers to the promulgation of international laws, international treaties, conventions and rules. Here, it means (a) the signing of a treaty in a UN General Conference and (b) transnational coalitions' political influence in each article of the treaty. Other (national or regional) agreements will be assessed in the thesis as moderate successes. In the third phase of the campaigns, this dimension deals with the implementation of the treaties in the different countries on the terrain.

Cultural outcomes: It is beyond the scope of the thesis to consider these in greater detail. Yet, the theoretical framework also allows for the existence of a long-term success in cultural terms. Therefore, even if a full assessment of this dimension would require a longer period to do the research, it is also true that in some cases, the distance between the facts studied and the actual research is long enough to allow at least an informed estimation, for example about the stigmatisation of a weapon.

The dependent variables of this research also account for (a) those cases in which the transnational coalitions were expected to produce an outcome in policy/procedure-making, but this did not happen or they produced an unintended different outcome; and (b) those cases in which a certain policy or a certain procedure was

not implemented because of the action of the transnational coalition.

In each campaign in every phase, the outcome is assessed qualitatively with four values, ranging from low and moderate to high and very high. For every assessment, the thesis gives a reasoned explanation. For example, if the treaty is approved in one phase, the effects in the policy dimension in that phase will be very high. Sometimes, the dissertation uses proxies to estimate the effect. For instance, the coverage of the mass media is sometimes an indicator of the stigmatisation of a weapon in the society, which in turn is assessed as an outcome in the cultural dimension. Exceptionally, for different reasons two values instead of one are provided (for example, in the case of the arms trade / small arms, as these two processes have different results in the different phases). In the occasions where the researcher was not sure about how to assess the impact of a transnational coalition in a concrete phase, several experts who had been previously interviewed and agreed to provide such academic support were consulted to decide the final value. In any case, the author is the only responsible of any mistakes these pages might contain.

CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the different data and methods used in this research to identify the pathways for the success of the campaigns and to assess the explanatory power of each set of independent variables that account for such success; namely, (a) the organisational form that each coalition takes, (b) the different strategies that it employs, and (c) the multilevel opportunity structure it deals with. At this point, it must be emphasised that the research tries to triangulate as much as possible, both in the phases of data collection and data analysis.

The chapter starts by introducing the comparative historical method, explaining why this is the methodological approach chosen in the research and showing how the main limitations of this perspective were faced. The cases studied in the research are briefly presented. The chapter continues by presenting the process-tracing approach and the main analytical challenge concerning the identification of the impact of transnational activism.

It devotes special attention to the process of data gathering, as well as to the main strategies of analysis, detailing the fieldwork process and the characteristics of the interviews and the participant observation in the research. The chapter ends by summarising the methodological framework used in the dissertation.

2.2. The comparative historical method revisited

One of the main methodological decisions underlying this research is how the success of transnational coalitions should be studied. In order to respond adequately to the research question, the comparative historical method seemed the most suitable possibility. Other approaches, such as those based on statistical tools would have implied a very different research question.

Moreover, in his 2004 book, *Social Protest and Policy Change*, Marco Giugni expresses his hopes that future research on social movement consequences will include qualitative instruments since they can fill a 'substance gap' of knowledge and 'move the analysis toward the processes and mechanisms that account for the translation of protest activity into policy change' (Giugni 2004: 231). Since 2004 some researchers have contributed to fill this gap (see for example, Silva 2008 or Parks 2009). Yet, the present research has a similar aim.

Two methods commonly used in the field of social movements are protest event analysis and social network analysis. Despite both of them were considered in the first versions of the research design of the present work, in the end for different reasons they have not been used through the research.

First, protest event analysis has traditionally dealt with "hard events", that is, protest manifested in the streets as demonstrations, rallies, strikes, occupations, and so on. Even if this approach maximizes a quantitative rigor, its major disadvantage is that it leaves out many forms of more indirect or institutionalised protest, which in the cases studied in the dissertation seem to be particularly frequent. For this reason, the protest event analysis was excluded from the research design.

Second, social network analysis would have had interesting potential gains, by mapping the organisational form of each coalition in a concrete moment. However, that does not help the study across time as aimed in the thesis. Moreover, taking into consideration the complexity of networks made up by more than one thousand actors, data collection seemed a titanic enterprise,

apart from the usual difficulties of this method (such as decisions concerning boundaries, nodes, links). Social network analysis did not seem the most appropriate method to effectively answer the main research questions of the present work in a reasonable period of time. Nevertheless, the researcher is aware of its potential and so the expansion of the thesis to include some sort of social network analysis remains a real possibility in the post-doctoral future. Indeed, the dissertation has used from a theoretical perspective concepts frequently developed in the context of this technique, such as brokerage.

Therefore, the research design of the present work is a historical comparison of four case studies. There is a natural trade-off between number of cases and the depth in which they can be studied. Yet, the benefit of having different cases compensates for the complexity of such a research, as “they talk to each other”. Chapter 7 will reflect on this issue.

A case study explores in depth an event, activity, process or the action of one or more actors. Each case is bounded by its time and space (Yin 1993), and the researcher collects detailed information using a variety of data sources over a sustained period of time (Stake 1995).

This research aims to draw some generalisations, both statistical (statements on the whole population on the ground of a sample) and analytical (empirical findings are held and discussed against existing theories).¹

The comparative historical method has received criticism and it has some limitations the researcher needs to deal with from the beginning. For the purposes of this dissertation the main analytical challenges are (a) the problem of having few cases and many variables (see e.g. King et al. 1994); and (b) the so-called “selection bias” problem. The first one is addressed in the following section. The second one will be dealt with in the presentation of the cases (see section 2.3.1 of this chapter).

¹ See Yin (1989).

2.2.1. *The “small N, many variables” problem*

In qualitative studies, there is frequently a situation in which there are few cases, but many variables. If the researcher cannot hold constant some of them, it is not possible to identify the independent variables that explain the dependent ones. In order to parameterize the impact of the international regime, the research focuses on cases that belong to the same regime, holding thus the regime constant. Moreover, the four cases belong to the current post-Cold War period. This fact allows controlling for macro variables related to the period of time.²

A related problem concerns the limit of not having enough information and the risk of indeterminacy of a research design, something that encompasses all sciences, including comparative social science. In the case of Mill's methods³, more than one independent variable happening at the same time (or all of them) could produce the outcome (Ragin 1987, King et al. 1994, George and Bennet 2004).

A way to deal with such complex causality is by starting to admit it. Easy forms of Boolean algebra are enough to express forms of conjectural causation on which systematic comparison can be applied in accordance with Mill's logic (see Ragin 1987). Moreover, despite the fact that a comparison could point to more than one specific causal path, one should always take alternative explanations seriously into account.

The thesis uses systematic comparison along Mill's lines across the cases: to assess the presence and absence of different

² The study of previous examples of transnational collective action, such as the anti-slavery movement would have implied a totally different research.

³ The most well-known of Mill's methods are the method of agreement and the method of difference. With the method of agreement, the researcher aims to identify a common causal factor across cases that share the same outcome, but vary in many other ways. With the method of difference, the scholar aims to identify a causal factor across cases that are similar in many ways, but differ in the outcome.

factors in each case of success or failure of the protest coalition. It does so for four reasons. The method allows, once evidences are gathered, to generalize over the population of cases in the way George and Bennet define as 'typological theory in terms of sufficient and necessary causes'. The method seems also especially appropriate in ruling out those causes that are neither necessary nor sufficient (Goertz and Mahoney 2004, George and Bennet 2004). Moreover, the comparative method has formed the foundation of much social movements' research and has been revealed to be a powerful and useful instrument in scrutinising commonalities and differences among movements (Della Porta 2002). Indeed, Giugni and Tilly (1999) recommend it as a methodological prescription in the study of social movement consequences.

Another tool to address the problem of indeterminacy in the research design is the use of counterfactuals. In other words, a law will have a causal effect if in a counterfactual hypothesis (*ceteris paribus* conditions) policy 'x' was not promulgated and thus had effect 'c'. As we will see throughout the dissertation, the counterfactual reasoning has been used to increase the leverage of the estimated effect, allowing thus the relationship to move beyond correlation. For example, many interviewees were asked this question "do you think that in absence of the work by the coalition, *ceteris paribus*, the result of the negotiation would have been the same?" with different follow-ups that detailed and made more specific each answer.

The dissertation accommodates some of the problems of having few cases and many variables by analytically 'creating' more cases. For example, the analysis engages in cross-time comparisons by comparing different phases of the processes and the campaigns, cross-space, cross-issue, cross-actor, etc. Thus, even though each campaign of the present study can be characterised as a single case study, it tries to make use of a more sophisticated comparative logic.

Concerning process tracing, and as it will be explained in section 2.2.2, once it is set out that the main interest is causal

mechanisms rather than highlighting correlations, the ‘small-N and many variables’ problem assumes a different meaning. First, observations for case studies are not only a measure for each independent variable as defined by Eckstein (1975: 85) and King et al. (1994: 210-211). By investigating the ‘unobservable’ links between independent variables and outcomes new pieces of information are discovered, on which a theory can be continuously tested and revised (Campbell 1975, King et al. 1994, George and Bennet 2004). Therefore, comparativists usually go for ‘empirical desegregation’ in order to generate new observations needed to model complex interactions of variables.

In the reconstruction of a causal mechanism, not all observations stand on an equal footing. Unlike when dealing with data sets, some pieces of information are considered ‘smoking guns’ in the reconstruction of a causal process (see e.g. Goertz and Mahoney 2006). They allow the researcher to increase the analytical force of the causal inference since they carry much more knowledge than others. This dissertation is full of such examples.

In extreme cases, a case study could be sufficient by itself in falsifying or validating a certain theory. Thus, a case study based on causal mechanisms can carry not only multiple observations with which a theory can be tested, but pieces of information that can, by their force, validate a theory regardless of their statistical significance.

To sum up, being aware of the limits of a ‘within case study’ analysis (Yin 1984) the research is built around such analysis from a comparative perspective and in the form of tracing the causal mechanisms. This will allow the dissertation to move beyond causation-as-correlation,⁴ which has been often identified as one of the central weaknesses of Mill’s methods.

⁴ Causation-as-correlation is a frequent critique to comparative studies that assume that a correlation between variation in an independent variable and variation in a dependent variable means that the independent variable cause the dependent variable.

2.2.2. Doing process tracing

Process tracing is uniquely well positioned to combine a positivist and an interpretivist outlook in (comparative) case study research (Vennesson 2008). It implies a specification of the different independent variables at work. Through a series of mechanisms (steps and interactions) a narrative links these independent variables with their effects. Mechanisms can be defined in different ways: as sequentially ordered events (George and Bennet 2004); as transforming events that change the course of an action, linking thus causes and consequences (McAdam et al. 2001 and 2008); and as cognitive processes whereby an individual filters opportunities of action and selects a given option (see Coleman 1990; Elster 1989).

Using elements of these different definitions, mechanisms will be understood in the dissertation as sequentially ordered transforming events. ‘Transforming events’ constitute a turning point in a movement’s history and are also characterised by producing additional events and forcing actors to take sides in a controversy (Della Porta 2008).

Process tracing relies on the introduction of time and arranges variables along a diachronic sequence. This approach does not mean giving up on contextual variables such as “political opportunity structures”, but to qualify which mechanisms transform such opportunities into successful mobilisation.

The thesis combines this approach with a historical perspective (see Giugni 2004 and Tilly 1999; see also figure 2.1). A historical approach seems appropriate due to the nature of the events treated in this research and in relation to its scope: an assessment to the effects of the transnational coalitions and an exploration of their causes. The impact of transnational coalitions on events such as the signature of a treaty is often the result of contextual action carried out in the years (or even decades) before the actual event. But it is during the period prior to an international event that policy-makers form negotiations starting positions and

alliances; divisions are consolidated; transnational campaigns set up, and coalitions' lobbying and advocacy efforts are displayed.

Confining the attention to the short term of an international conference and not taking up a broader historical perspective would only provide a partial account of the nature of political processes that appear as intrinsically dynamic. In this partial account, some of the possible determinants of the political outcome could be neglected. Therefore, all four case studies in the thesis, despite being labelled after the final major international event in which a treaty is negotiated (for example, the UN Review Conference on Small Arms in New York in 2006), comprise a diachronic treatment of the whole process that generally refers to several years preceding the main event and is thus divided into different phases. For each of the four case studies, the effort is to show how an effect was brought about by a series of variables through a series of diachronically ordered causal mechanisms in each of the phases.

For the purpose of generalisation, which is addressed in chapter 7, the dissertation develops what George and Bennet have defined a 'typological theory' (2004). Variables are grouped in theoretical types and listed in a typology, based on the creation of 'ideal types'. The cells of the typology are filled by the information of the within-case analysis. A general theory in the form of a diagram is developed, which highlights the relationships between the different variables. This research applies this theory in the construction of an ideal of "evolution of a transnational campaign". As explained in chapter 7, a transnational campaign will not always follow exactly that evolution, but the idea of an ideal campaign is useful to analyze the real ones.

Adopting a historical perspective means analysing factors that are constantly developing and that are specific and relative to each case. Limited to the four case studies, and on the basis and within the limits of the evidence available, the research model and the narration of the process attached to constitute the most reasonable explanation of the causal chain of the of the transnational activists'

impact. Moreover, the model can potentially prove valuable also in the future if applied to other case studies.


2.2.3. The challenge of studying the impact of transnational activism

It is not a coincidence that the studies of the impact of social movements constitute one of the less studied sub-fields of the discipline. Overall, two are the main problems the researcher has to face. The first problem is identifying and assessing impact. When has a transnational coalition (TC) achieved impact? To what extent is the impact important? This also includes the added challenge of identifying cases when impact is defined as preventing the occurrence of an event. This research design has specified impact as the signature of the treaty and the other dimensions specified above.

The second problem deals with the fact of making sure that the impact is due to the role played by the transnational coalition. The main analytical problem is posed by the following question: How can one know that an outcome has occurred as a consequence of the international campaign? Is it possible that other factors have intervened? Is it possible to hold them constant? Can a combination of different factors, including the actions of the campaigners account for such impact?

In order to make the analyst's logical problem clearer, the chapter uses a diagram (see figure 2.1 below), based on Tilly (1999). Thus, and despite the research should focus mainly on space A, the fact is that spaces B, C, and D also exist and it would be very interesting to investigate them. But how could they be differentiated?

Figure 2.1. The problem of identifying transnational coalitions' outcomes



A = Effects of TC actions (but not of outside influences) that bear directly on TC claims
B = Joint effects of TC actions and outside influences that bear directly on TC claims
C = Effects of outside influences (but not of TC actions) that bear directly on TC claims
D = Joint effects of TC actions and outside influences that *don't* bear directly on TC claims

An advantage of this approach is that it entertains the possibility that the major effects of TC can have little or nothing to do with the public claims their members made. The major disadvantage is that it is almost impossible to follow systematically and rigorously all six steps. Yet, they will be considered as guiding lines for this research.

As Tilly argues, no inductive methodology –no multivariate statistical analysis, no yes/no comparison checklist, no narrowing of the outcomes considered- can solve the problem completely.

However, and with the purpose of overcoming this problem, I will try to follow a six steps approach proposed by Tilly in the same work:

- 1) To formulate clear theories of the causal processes by which TC produce their effects.
- 2) To limit investigations to the effects made plausible by those theories.
- 3) To work upstream by identifying instances of the effects, then seeing whether the hypothesized causal chain was actually operating.
- 4) To work downstream by identifying instances of the causal chain in operation, then seeing whether and how its hypothesized effects occurred.
- 5) To work midstream by examining whether the internal links of the causal chain operated as the theory requires.
- 6) To rule out, to the extent possible, competing explanations of the effects.

2.3. Presentation of the cases

2.3.1. Introduction: The “selection bias” problem

The so-called ‘selection bias’ is one of the most common critiques raised against small-n comparative studies, normally from the perspective of statistical approaches. Comparative studies are vulnerable to this critique since they often purposely select extreme cases on the dependent variable (e.g. revolutions, impact of social movement and so on).

Following Giugni and Tilly (1999), the thesis allows variation both in the independent and in the dependent variable. One among the four case studies is purposely selected as a case of no impact, that is, a case where the TC did expect to produce an outcome in the dimensions considered in this research, but where it had failed to accomplish this goal; in concrete, to have a signed treaty (small arms). Moreover, another case was uncertain by the time this research was starting, namely cluster munitions.

The fact that some of the cases studied are current cases, cases that are still in movement, changing, developing, evolving, has

posed additional analytical challenges. The case of the cluster munitions coalition is paradigmatic as it was considered as a case of failure by the time the first research design of this work was presented, then it became one of the most relevant and effective cases, as a new international process of negotiation started when the empirical work was theoretically finishing (that obviously postponed the end of the fieldwork) and which will be most likely a very successful case by the time this Ph.D. will be defended.

As will be discussed extensively below, having both cases of impact and no impact adds a wider spectrum of causal paths and counterexamples with which to use Mills methods.

Apart from these crucial heuristic and methodological considerations, the choice of these case studies also rests on a series of practical reasons. Firstly, there was the need to choose cases of events and issues from the issue-area in order to provide the research with a cohesive picture. Secondly, there was a need to select events and issues that were considered crucial in international affairs in order to make the research relevant and up to date. Finally, there was the need to select cases of events and issues in which transnational activists' could expect influence in order to provide the research with coherence as regard its scope: the assessment of transnational coalitions' outcomes.

2.3.2. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines is a global network of organisations working to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It has adapted and expanded since it was founded in 1991. In that year, several NGOs and individuals began simultaneously to discuss the necessity of coordinating initiatives and calls for a ban on antipersonnel landmines. The ICBL's founding organisations: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation came together in October 1992 to formalise the ICBL.

From the beginning, the ICBL defined itself as a flexible network of organisations that share common objectives. The ICBL calls for an international ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines, and for increased international resources for humanitarian mine clearance and mine victim assistance programs. In recognition of its achievements, the campaign was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997, together with its then coordinator, Jody Williams. The Norwegian Nobel Committee applauded the campaign for changing a ban from "a vision to a feasible reality" and recognised that it offers a model for disarmament and peace campaigns. Since the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty, the ICBL has remained committed to capitalising on the global political momentum that it helped to create.

The ICBL's internal structure has undergone several transformations over the years, adapting to the changing needs of the global coalition. In 1993, the Campaign Steering Committee, consisting of the original six organisations, was formalised and the coordinator was recognised. As dozens of national campaigns formed and hundreds of organisations joined the campaign, the Steering Committee was expanded in 1996, 1997 and 1998. Since 2005, 13 organisations are represented on the Coordination Committee. Today, this network represents over 1,100 human rights, demining, humanitarian, children's, veterans', medical, development, arms control, religious, environmental, and women's groups in over 60 countries, who work locally, nationally, regionally, and internationally to ban antipersonnel landmines. The ICBL currently has six staff members who are based in six different countries in North America and Europe.

2.3.3. The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)

The International Action Network on Small Arms is the global network of civil society organisations working to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons

(SALW). World attention is increasingly focused on the humanitarian impact of these weapons, and IANSA brings together the voices and activities of NGOs and concerned individuals across the world to prevent their deadly effects. Founded in 1998, IANSA has grown rapidly to more than 500 participant groups in nearly 100 countries, with representation from many gun-affected regions. IANSA is composed of a wide range of organisations concerned with small arms, including policy development organisations, national gun control groups, research institutes, aid agencies, faith groups, victims, human rights and community action organisations.

IANSA works by raising awareness among policymakers, the public and the media about the global threat to human security caused by small arms; promoting the work of NGOs to prevent small arms proliferation through national and local legislation, regional agreements, public education and research; fostering collaborative advocacy efforts, and providing a forum for NGOs to share experiences and build skills establishing regional and subject-specific small arms networks; promoting the voices of victims in regional and global policy discussions.

Operations are guided by the Facilitation Committee, composed by representatives from different regions and thematic areas and coordinated by an International Secretariat in London.

In July 2001, IANSA was instrumental in raising and unifying the voices of NGOs at the United Nations Small Arms Conference in New York, the first global gathering on small arms and light weapons. It brought governments into serious, meaningful dialogue with the NGO sector over small arms, ensuring that those involved in the preparation of the UN Programme of Action felt the pressure of civil society organisations committed to bringing about real and lasting change. Even then, a binding treaty was not finally adopted.

However, IANSA helped bring 46 participant organisations from gun-affected countries to the preparatory meetings and Conference, as well as coordinating NGO activities and their presentations to the Conference. IANSA is now recognised by the

UN as an important global NGO network with valuable expertise to contribute to discussions at all levels. In 2006, there was a revision conference of the 2001 UN Conference and IANSA was aiming at improving the PoA.

2.3.4. The Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC)

The cluster munitions coalition is the most recent case. It was officially created in 2003 and aimed at concluding a legally binding treaty in 2008. As it happens with the arms control network, it is difficult to assess its final successes and failures at this moment.

The Cluster Munitions Coalition was founded in November 2003. At that moment, the perception was that the CMC should be an international campaign against all explosive remnants of war, not only against cluster munitions. The argument was that the CMC had to replace the vacuum left by the ICBL and the mine ban treaty, which did not include sub-munitions in its mandate. Moreover, the experience of other campaigns of public pressure suggested that a clear and concrete message, such as “stop cluster munitions” was essential.

The issue reached effectively the public agenda in the end of 2006, gaining momentum and initiating an alternative political process. NGOs in this process are considered as full partners, participating in all the meetings and working closely to the group of like-minded states that lead the negotiations, thus enjoying a similar level of access as the landmine campaign did a decade ago.

2.3.5. The Coalition to Stop the Use and Recruitment of Child Soldiers (CSC)

The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers was formed in May 1998 by leading international human rights and humanitarian organisations. The International Coalition has its headquarters in

London. Its International Steering Committee member organisations are: Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Federation Terre des Hommes, International Save the Children Alliance, Jesuit Refugee Service, the Quaker United Nations Office-Geneva and World Vision International. It maintains active links with UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Over the last seven years, the CSC has worked in collaboration with partner organisations to establish national coalitions in many regions of the world. The national coalitions are composed of local and national NGOs working with or on behalf of child soldiers. There are national coalitions in over 35 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and North America. Regional Coalitions, which unite national coalitions to campaign on child soldier issues specific to their regions, have been formed in the Great Lakes region of Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.

The CSC has been at the forefront of efforts to ban the recruitment and use of child soldiers. As chapter 6 will show, its achievements include playing an instrumental role in the negotiation, adoption and entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. It has an active engagement with influential inter-governmental agencies, such as the UN Security Council, the Human Security Network, the EU, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child and the ILO.

The CSC has published three Child Soldiers Global Reports, providing comprehensive country-by-country information on child recruitment and use worldwide, as well as numerous reports and briefings on the use of children in armed conflict by government forces and armed political groups. Moreover, it has published research on issues relevant to child soldiers, including gender and sexual exploitation, displacement, juvenile justice and the reintegration of former child soldiers into their communities. The CSC is involved in a range of researches and activities aimed at

strengthening regional and national networks, facilitating the exchange of information and experience and stimulating debate.

2.4. Data gathering and strategies of analysis

Data has been collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include interviews, participant observation and documents. In-depth interviews have taken place with selected key representatives of NGOs, governments and other key individuals such as key representatives of the UN bodies, who are mainly concentrated in Brussels, Geneva, London and New York. The criteria for selection was that they participated in the events analysed (mostly the negotiations of the treaty), either as part of a delegation or by lobbying in the corridors.

Participation as an observer has taken place in several occasions, including the 2006 UN Conference on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions. Official documents (and statements) such as the text of the final treaties are also used and compared to previous versions of these documents, as well as to the proposals by non-governmental actors.

Finally, web archives and newspapers have also been used. The four coalitions and their campaigns have their own web pages, updated with detailed information and with archives containing their own texts and also links to the main official documents related to each issue. Eventually newspaper archives have been used in order to collect *objective* information about the activities and relations of the main member organisations of each coalition, particularly regarding past events to which no other information was available in order to trace the negotiation process and also to collect declarations and statements. Some of these declarations were collected from the major media broadcasting networks (BBC, CNN, etc.), major newspaper (*New York Times*, *Guardian*, etc.), but more particularly from bulletins and newsletters. This information is used and quoted in different parts of the research.

However, some of the international events analysed are often low-profile events (especially in their run-up) taking place outside mainstream media coverage.

Regarding secondary sources and given the existence of increasing research in this topic in recent years, there are already many works about other campaigns, especially in the fields of the environment and human rights. Also, some of the cases of the dissertation have already been partially studied, such as the landmines case.

Knowing the perceptions by the coalitions' representatives about whether they accomplished their political goals or not cannot be assumed to be an objective evaluation, although it is worth remarking that a high level of transparency and honesty seemed to prevail among the interviewees. In this regard, an important crosscheck was provided by the official declaration of political and informed agents' opinions.

Relevant documentation was gathered through personal relations of trust build during participant observation. Some of the interviewees have provided the researcher with their personal archives, which include the coalitions' official and semi-official documentation and, in some cases that included even personal emails.

The thesis uses different techniques of data analysis. The *analysis of the attributes* or variables of the coalition has been used to compare the different organizational forms. *Discourse analysis* has been used for comparing the official documents such as the text of the final treaty with the proposals by non-governmental actors. *Frame analysis* has been carried out with the aim of identifying strategies by the activists. Finally, elite interviews have been carried out following the so-called *EAR method* (see section 2.4.2 of this chapter). The main idea behind the whole methodology is to identify the transforming events that turned into the different steps in the causal process leading to the successes and failures of each coalition in each of the phases studied. Next section will detail the use of each of these methods

and techniques with reference to the fieldwork process developed through the research.

2.4.1. The fieldwork process

The dissertation considers triangulation as a way of improving social science research and ensuring reliable information about the cases. With this aim and as explained in the previous section, different methods have been used to collect information, expand the scope of the data available and test (and compensate for) possible biases of some of the sources.

Although the research was first thought to be conducted mainly through web archives, the reality was that the web pages of the coalitions of NGOs analyzed are not as rich as one might think. For this reason, the thesis relies more than expected on semi-structured interviews and participant observation in order to grasp the process of negotiation, of creation and of evolution of the networks, something complementary to the data and documents. The most important pieces of empirical evidence for the research are constituted by 87 semi-structured face-to-face interviews, about 15 by e-mail or by phone, and about 15 informal interviews. The interviews were conducted in different places and languages, including Barcelona, Madrid, Florence, Brussels, Dublin, Geneva, New York, London, Oxford, Oslo and Stockholm. In at least 20 cases, interviewees were contacted more than once. Not all of the interviews were recorded, as some interviewees asked the researcher not to do so. Some interviews were taken place more informally, such as in a cafeteria. In these ones, notes were taken just after the interview was finished. Regarding the ones that have been recorded, all of them have been transcribed. Those carried out in the context of international conferences were shorter than those done at the offices of the interviewed.

Participant observation was carried out in international events, including the following: *Focus Group 'Peace and Human Security*

Aspects of the U.N. Reform, organized by the International Peace Bureau (Florence September 2004); *1st Revision Conference of the United Nations Program of Action on the Illegal Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All of Its Aspects*, including four days of governmental speeches, one day NGO speeches, two diary IANSA meetings, the EU-NGOs coordination meeting, the IANSA/Control Arms deliberation meeting and a number of side events (New York June - July 2006); *Conference of Disarmament*, (Geneva February 2007); *Seminar for a free-mine world: analysis, action and commitment*. Organized by Moviment per la Pau (Barcelona April 2007); *Week Action against Cluster Munitions*, including the Civil Society Forum, the governmental meeting and the NGO training workshops (Oslo February 2007); and the Dublin Conference on Cluster Munitions (Dublin May 2008), including four days governmental speeches, two diary CMC meetings and a number of side events.

Some methods of gathering information were particularly useful for specific cases. Thus, for the two cases still in the second phase (negotiation of the treaty) by the time of the development of the research (small arms/arms trade treaty and cluster bombs) the presence and participation in the international meetings was crucial to understand the dynamics of these bargaining processes, the differences and relationships between them and the roles of the different actors. For the two cases where the second phase was already finished and so the treaty had already been signed, participant observation was not possible (or where it was it had less sense and it did not compensate the amount of time and resources needed) and so in-depth semi-structured interviews with selected individuals and intensive use of secondary literature and other sources were the preferred methods to collect and update the information. The methodological appendix explains all the details concerning the fieldwork process, the participant observation and the interviews as they have been done in this research.⁵

⁵ The methodological appendix lists the date and place of each interview, detailing as well the fieldwork process, by making explicit the

The next section of the chapter presents a specific strategy of analysis which is used in some parts of the dissertation: the EAR method.

2.4.2. The EAR method

“One of the most serious problems in the study of influence arises from the fact that, no matter how precisely one defines influence and no matter how elegant the measures and methods one proposes, the data within reach even of the most assiduous researcher require the use of operational measures that are at best somewhat unsatisfactory” (Robert A. Dahl (1961: 330))

In some parts of the dissertation and particularly in chapter 6, the thesis adapts the so-called EAR method (see table 2.1), which consists in the combination of three elements: Ego-perception, Alter-perception and the Researcher’s analysis (see Arts 1998 and 2001; Arts and Verschuren 1999). The first and the second are based on the perceptions of the participant actors: a) key NGO representatives (ego-perception) and b) key representative of the States (alter-perception). In the third one, the researcher tries to reconstruct bargaining and decision-making processes. This triangulation uses deliberately different (and even opposed) information sources with the aim of neutralising the positive bias of these perceptions, usually overestimating political influence of NGO, and the confirmation bias of process tracing research (see George and Bennet 2004: 217).

aim and role of each step within the whole process. It also details how participant observation was done in this research as it presents certain particularities that a researcher does not always need to face in other works, such as its international nature. Finally, it addresses the in-depths interviews, presenting as well some reflections and suggestions on how to interview elites.

Table 2.1 The EAR Method

<p><i>Ego-perception:</i> Views of transnational coalitions representatives with regard to their own political influence (claims)</p> <p><i>Alter-perception:</i> Views of government representatives with regard to the political influence of transnational coalitions (first control of activists' claims)</p> <p><i>Researcher's analysis:</i> Researcher's assessment of transnational coalitions' claims on the basis of policy documents and additional interviews (second control).</p>

Following Arts (1998 and 2001) and Arts and Verschuren (1999), the researcher analysis is constructed as follows. First, it has been assessed whether the TC coalition involved has achieved their goal – fully or partially – with regard to a policy topic under investigation. Such a goal may refer to the enhancement of a desired ‘good’ or to the prevention of an undesired ‘bad’. The assessment itself has been done on the basis of a comparison of the coalitions’ initial policy goal – deduced from documents and interviews – and the parallel policy outcome. In cases where activists have not achieved their goal, it has been assumed that they have not been influential at all. In cases where they had (at least partially) achieved their goal, the researcher’s analysis continued. Secondly, it has been assessed that this goal-achievement is caused by the coalition’s own interventions and not by those of governments or other actors. In other words, it has been examined whether the outcome was more in line with the coalition’s goals than if the latter had not intervened (counterfactual). To assess this, the policy/decision-making processes of the topic concerned have been reconstructed as accurately as possible.

The application of three methodological tools raises the question of how to construct a final judgement on the coalitions’

political influence. It is obvious that a conclusion has been positive where ego-perception, alter-perception and the researcher's analysis are all affirmative with regard to a specific policy topic. Then the coalition was definitely influential. The same goes for the opposite: where both alter-perception and the researcher's analysis are negative, the coalition was not influential, despite their claims (note that the indicator of ego-perception is always positive as the activists' perceptions of their own political influence form the basis of this study's assessments).

The situation changes in cases where alter-perception and the researcher's analysis differ. Then one should decide which tool should prevail. In general, the researcher's analysis is considered dominant *vis-à-vis* the indicator of alter-perception, as the former is mainly based on 'fixed' policy documents, whereas the latter builds on 'temporally distorted' views of respondents. But this relationship of dominance also depends on the quality of the data, as this is going to differ case by case. As respondents have different experiences, access to different information and different interests to defend, the quality of their views on the actors' political influence varies.

If this method has been adapted for the child soldiers campaign (chapter 6) the ideas behind it are present throughout the research in the sense of triangulating between the opinions and information provided by the activists and the one provided by the diplomats. Therefore, the analysis by the researcher aims at counter-balance all possible biases by adding other sources whenever it was possible. The next section of the chapter explains the different ways the data is used and presented in this research.

2.4.3. Presenting the data

"The greater problem for first-time qualitative researchers is not how to get data but how to figure out what to do with the data they get (...) The problem of transforming unruly experience into an "authoritative written account" never totally disappears." (Wolcott 1994: 9-10)

Harry F. Wolcott (1992) has identified three major modes through which qualitative researchers gather their data: participant observation (experiencing), interviewing (enquiring) and studying materials prepared by others (examining). The same author identified three ways to present data: (i) treat descriptive data as fact, letting the data “speak for themselves”; (ii) an analysis that proceeds in some careful, systematic way to identify key factors and relationships among them; (iii) interpreting the data, the goal is to make sense of what goes on (Wolcott 1994).

Even if the three categories (description, analysis, and interpretation) are not mutually exclusive, this distinction may serve a useful purpose, especially if they are considered as varying emphases to organize and present data. The idea is to follow a (to some extent) consistent pattern in employing them and not use other more confusing terms such as descriptive analysis or interpretative data.

The descriptive strategy, passing on “raw” rather than “cooked” data, presupposes a reader capable of overcoming all the problems that the researcher tried to avoid. This has been the main approach followed through the writing of the research. However, this implies a risk, as readers might think that the researcher has been unable to sort out data and has simply passed the task along (Wolcott 1994: 13). The added value of providing the reader with a sample of the same material used by the researcher was considered big enough to take the risk.

The analytic part of the thesis tries to follow and report systematic fieldwork procedures, fleshing out the analytical framework that guided the data collection (contextualizing it as well in the literature review) and trying to identify pattern regularities in the data.

A question that has guided all the research in this thesis was “what can be learned from this experience”. The idea is that whether or not a research provides results, something will most likely be learned about research approaches.

As this research has an ethnographic component, the research drew in some cases on the researcher’s personal experience (see

methodological appendix, section A.I). In the self-reflexive mood dominant in the 1980s, in the sister discipline of anthropology, the distance an observer was expected to maintain to assure objectivity disappeared altogether in some camps (see e.g. Geertz, 1988: 73-100). Following this trend, personal reflection has become in some areas not only tolerated, but even accepted. The thesis will therefore include personal reflection in the final part of the dissertation, such as in some parts of chapter 7 and in the appendixes.

2.5. Summary

To sum up, the methodological ambition of the project is to provide causal inferences built on both co-variance and evidence of causal mechanisms found through process tracing. The evidence of the presence/absence of specific hypothesised causal mechanisms will be provided through direct measurements when possible and otherwise through indirect measurements using different kinds of indicators from a perspective based on triangulation of different methods.

This chapter has presented the different data and methods used in this research to identify the pathways for the success of the international campaigns and to assess the explanatory power of each set of independent variables that account for such success; namely, (a) the organisational form that each coalition takes, (b) the different strategies that it employs and (c) the multilevel opportunity structure based on the configuration of friend and foes for each case.

All the cases studied in the research have been presented. In addition, the comparative historical method used in the thesis will be mainly based on information gathered through interviewing elites, participant observation and other sources. An important part of the analysis will follow the EAR method while the writing process, which will be as explicit as possible when describing, analysing or interpreting the data. The next chapter will tackle the

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first empirical case study around the international process that successfully banned landmines a decade ago.

CHAPTER 3. THE LANDMINES CAMPAIGN AND THE LESSONS OF THE OTTAWA PROCESS

3.1. Landmines. An introduction

Of the four cases, the landmines campaign has been so far the most studied. With a few exceptions, all authors agree that the negotiation of the treaty less than five years after the creation of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) represents a remarkably successful example of humanitarian advocacy.¹ Even other coalitions, such as the IANSA (small arms) and the CMC (cluster munitions),² have taken it explicitly as a model and have tried to reproduce it when carrying out their own campaigns, which imply important consequences, both at the organisational

¹ On the one hand, it has been argued that the negotiations were situated in a favourable politico-economic context for protagonist states, limiting then the role of NGOs. On the other hand, critical visions reduce the importance of the humanitarian aspect of the Ottawa Treaty, stating that the traditional conception of security is maintained versus the new concept of human security (see for example, Marshall Beier and Denholm Crosbyall 1998, and Dauphinée 2001). For the purposes of this chapter, the Ottawa Treaty and the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) will be used as synonyms.

² See <http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/> See also chapter 4 and chapter 5 of this research.

and at the strategic level.³ For this reason, the re-examination of this campaign with new sources and the theoretical grounding provided by the model outlined in chapter 1 is particularly useful. It will allow to set the foundations on which the other campaigns will be examined.

The ICBL will be successful for a number of reasons: first, because it will be able to adequately combine resources such as research, expertise and use of the media; second, because of effective strategies of lobbying and protest, as well as communicative processes such as framing and shaming; and third, because of a flexible organizational form and the capabilities of allies, benefiting as well from contingent factors beyond its control. Moreover, activists' efforts will be facilitated by favourable 'rules of the game' in the negotiations, effective coalition building and clear campaigning messaging on a concrete and feasible issue: ban landmines.

3.2. Evolution of the international process

In order to understand the successes and failures of the campaign, it becomes necessary to divide it into different phases. From this chronological perspective, a first phase will begin the moment of the creation of the coalition, the ICBL. Despite some action against the use of the weapon had already been taken, the coordination of such efforts at an international scale will mean the beginning of a true social movement with specific aims, targets, strategies and resources.

This first phase will end with the failure of the traditional forum to deal with such weapons. Consequently, both the NGOs and the countries that supported them will have to create a

³ In this sense, neo-institutional theorists of organisations have noted that aspiring organisations seek social legitimacy by structuring themselves along the lines of their most highly legitimate predecessors (Powell and di Maggio 1991).

completely new process of diplomacy with new rules and an ambitious scope. That is objectively a new stage for the landmines fight and arguably, it will signal the beginning of a new era of international diplomacy on disarmament issues. The second phase is then situated from the beginning of the so-called Ottawa Process to the signature of the treaty. In fact, in every campaign such as those under study, the signature of the pursued treaty means a turning point or even *the* turning point. Afterwards, the coalition changes its structure and aims, beginning a third phase that ideally lasts until the implementation of the treaty is complete. Completion is defined as when the last landmine is removed from a contaminated area and destroyed from every arsenal of every army of the world.

3.2.1. From the creation of the ICBL to the 1st review of the CCW

It is widely accepted that major changes took place in the early 1990s regarding the landmines issue. Consistent with the findings of the literature on the political influence of NGOs and transnational coalitions (see e.g. Arts 1998 and Olesen 2005) is the fact that the geopolitical environment, within which the campaign developed, the Post-Cold War Context, acted as a facilitating factor for the success of the campaign⁴. For the first time in fifty years, unilateral actions in international politics could be taken by states, beyond superpower blocs. Regarding international efforts at arms control and disarmament, once the nuclear weapons lost its

⁴ Among the authors who emphasize the importance of the Post-Cold War Context for the success of the ICBL, see Axworthy (1998), De Larrinaga and Sjolander (1998), Peters (1996), Williams and Goose (1998), Williams (1997, 1999a, 1999b and 2000) and Huberts (2000). However, Rutherford (2000a) criticises *the end of the cold war* as a realist explanation for the placement of the landmine issue on the international agenda because it would not explain why other worthwhile issues such as environmental degradation remain low-priority items for governments.

primacy, the effects produced by landmines and other small arms would begin to be fully appreciated.⁵ Finally, the humanitarian discourse would be able to overcome ideologies.

The first in raising the problem were the ICRC and NGOs working on the specific regions heavily affected, who published some terrible accounts of the indiscriminate and perdurable effects of landmines and their consequences in particular countries (see e.g. Cahill 1995, Hampson 1995, HRW and Physicians for Human Rights 1994, ICRC 1992, 1993 and 1995, McGrath 1994, Roberts and Williams 1995, US Department of State 1994).⁶

These publications had something in common: they acknowledged the existence of a landmine crisis (see Boutros Ghali 1994, Cahill 1995, US State Department 1994).⁷ At the same time, NGOs were coordinating efforts to face such a crisis. In November 1991, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAFA) from the US and Medico International (MI) from Germany agree to jointly launch a campaign of advocacy to bring together NGOs in a coordinated effort to ban landmines. In May 1992, Handicap International (HI) launched its campaign along with Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Physicians for Human Rights (PHR). Those organisations and Human Rights Watch (HRW) created the ICBL in October 1992; Jody Williams, from VVAFA, was its first coordinator.⁸

⁵ Nevertheless, from the 70s, the ICRC and a handful of NGOs had starting to press governments against indiscriminate weapons that produced unnecessary suffering. See for example, Petrova (2007).

⁶ See for Somalia African Rights & Mines Advisory Group (1993); for Cambodia, Davies (1994) and HRW (1991); for Iraq, HI (1993); for Afghanistan, MAG (1991); for Angola, HRW (1993) and for Mozambique, HRW (1994). For an account of the earlier efforts to restrict the use of mines, see Huberts (2000: 3-7).

⁷ In fact, in 1994, Senator Leahy organized the first US congressional hearing on landmines, "The Global Landmines crisis". See also Vines (1998).

⁸ The first Steering Committee of the ICBL was made up by: Handicap International (France), Human Rights Watch (USA), Medico

While its main long-term aim was stated from the beginning as pursuing a treaty to ban landmines, being this the unique possible solution to the landmines crisis, a short-term and parallel aim was to put the issue on the agenda of the media, the governments and the international organizations.⁹

Since its creation, the evolution of the ICBL shows a constant increase of international coordination. In the first NGO International Conference on landmines hosted by the ICBL in London, May 1993, there were 50 representatives from 40 NGOs. The second one in May 1994 in Geneva had 110 representatives from 75 NGOs. The third one, in June 1995 in Phnom Penh (Cambodia): 400 representatives of 42 countries from NGOs, governments, the UN, demining organisations and landmine victims. The fourth one, in February 1997, in Maputo (Mozambique) hosted more than 450 participants from 60 countries. At the same time, national campaigns were being created in many countries.¹⁰ Thus, in the first few years, much of the work was concentrated on expanding the network throughout

International (Germany), Mines Advisory Group (UK), Physicians for Human Rights (USA) and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (USA).

⁹ Moreover, the London Conference in May 1993 set out two other central objectives: a) the establishment of an international fund, administered by the UN, to promote and enhance mine victim aid programs and landmine awareness, clearance, and eradication programs worldwide; and b) the effort to ensure that countries producing and disseminating antipersonnel mines contributed to the fund. However, some have criticised that in reality these other objectives remained secondary until the Ottawa Process phase (see for example, White and Rutherford 1998).

¹⁰ For example, in 1992 the German and the Swedish campaign were launched. In 1993, the British, the Australian, the Italian ones and also in New Zealand. In 1994, the Belgian, the Irish, the Cambodian and the Canadian. In 1995, the Kenyan, the Spanish, the South-African and the Afghan. In 1996, new campaigns were formed in Zambia and in Zimbabwe. In 1997, in Japan, in Greece and in Thailand. In 1998, in Georgia.

North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand (Williams and Goose 1998: 24). Third World mostly mine-affected countries were targeted in a second stage, starting in 1995 with the Cambodian Conference in June.

The first attempt to seriously restrict the use and transfer of landmines took place in 1995, in the CCW Review conference¹¹. To prepare that conference, there were four experts' groups meetings beginning in February 1994. They were conducted based on consensus and with China totally opposing NGO access, which finally lacked official status in the conference.

Negotiations focused almost exclusively on the military utility of mines, and their legitimate use in the preservation of national sovereignty and security. In fact, NGOs were excluded from full participation because conference members considered the discussions to be matters of disarmament and therefore of national security (Price 2000b: 624). However, there were some countries in favour of a total ban, particularly Sweden, who helped NGOs who were monitoring negotiations and lobbying in the corridors to introduce the discourse of the *humanitarian costs* of landmines, performing the framing vs. counter-framing battle.

The conference was scheduled to last for three weeks beginning in September 1995. Detailed negotiations soon revealed a deadlock between some governments wanting and others opposing credible restrictions. Work was not resumed until January through a technical session, followed by a concluding session in April 1996.

A technological solution to the crisis was suggested by a joint US-British proposal, offering to ban *dumb* or conventional antipersonnel mines and replace stocks with *smart* self-destruct mines. This idea was effectively contested by less-industrialized countries who complained about the economic costs of this

¹¹ Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

‘solution’ and by proponents of a total ban, who finally ensured that this control regime was rejected.

The new protocol adopted in April 1996 was denounced by the ICBL and others as a humanitarian failure.¹² However, examining it from a broader perspective and keeping in mind the later events, such as the signing of the Ottawa treaty, it can also be understood as a milestone to the Landmines treaty.¹³ In other words, an early failure can become a future strength, because it will help to strengthen the network and to create the necessary *momentum* for the negotiations (Atwood 1999b).

Following the theoretical model outlined in chapter 1, table 3.1 summarises the effects found in this stage of the ICBL. First, results in access remained low. Even if we take into account the CCW Review Conference as belonging to this phase, the NGOs from the ICBL were present at the first two Expert Group Conferences, but they boycotted the final two in protest over their lack of access. In addition, very few countries included representatives of the social movement sector among the members of their delegations.¹⁴

Concerning agenda effects, it has to be noted that the ICBL in this phase shows that the NGOs can shape the agenda-setting

¹² Among them, see e.g. Price (1998b), Williams and Goose (1998), Rutherford (2000a) and Huberts (2000). Apart from the fact that a total ban was not achieved, “most provisions would not come into effect for at least a decade, no restrictions were made on anti-handling devices, and implicit encouragement was given to self-neutralizing and self-destructing mines” (Huberts 2000: 16). Moreover, the definition of antipersonnel mine was weakened to include only those devices “*primarily* designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person”.

¹³ Even after the Ottawa Treaty, some researchers have argued about the fruitful possibility of complementing the two different negotiation settings (see for example, Atwood 1999b, Mathews 2001 or Kaye and Solomon 2002).

¹⁴ However, more than 100 representatives from 70 NGOs attended the conference to monitor negotiations and lobby in the corridors.

through norm diffusion (Keck and Sikkink 1998), being able to re-legitimize landmine use by relocating authority away from states (Price 1998). As we will see in section 3.3.4 of this chapter, the activists will attempt to change the debate from a political to a humanitarian issue. In order to do this, they will frequently and prominently feature personal testimony and graphic images of landmine victims and survivors, helping generate international attention (for example a front-page article summarising the conference in the *International Herald Tribune*. See also James 1996 and Rutherford 2000a).¹⁵ Victims were also a prominent presence at international mines conferences already in this period.

Table 3.1 Assessment of the different effects of the ICBL in its first phase

<i>Type of effect</i>	<i>Estimation</i>
Access	Low
Agenda	Moderate
Policy	Moderate
Cultural	Moderate

The moderate policy results of the actions carried out by the ICBL in this stage are the growing number of governments taking unilateral action to put moratoria on export or end their own their own production, transfer, stockpiling and/or use of landmines and to support a global ban, fifteen countries in late 1995 (see Huberts 2000: 12). Six months later, after the CCW Review, more than forty countries had endorsed a comprehensive ban or were

¹⁵ The importance of public opinion in this case is summarised in the broad (and arguably too simple and too linear) argument “the greater the governmental and public attention created by the NGOs toward a particular issue, the quicker an issue gets on the international political agenda and, most importantly, addressed by states” (Rutherford 2000a: 79).

observing some kind of export moratorium and others were beginning to destroy their stockpiles. However, the total ban had not still been achieved in the CCW Review and its perspectives at a short-run were more utopian than real.

In terms of cultural effects, security issues are generally deemed particularly resistant to pressures exerted by nongovernmental actors. Nevertheless, after the CCW review, the ICBL had managed to draw attention to the humanitarian consequences of landmines to public opinion. Landmines were framed as a humanitarian issue, with outrageous landmine statistics of horrible effects, disproportionate consequences and priming victims stories (Rutherford 2000a), showing a shocking carnage that could explain to a some extent why the landmines campaign has been more successful than other weapons (Price 1998b: 622). In the spring of 1996, the support for a ban was overwhelming in national public opinions around the world.¹⁶

3.2.2. The Ottawa Process

There is no consensus to situate the beginning of the so-called Ottawa Process. Formally, it started when Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian foreign minister, stated in September 1996 that Canada was ready to hold a treaty-signing conference in fourteen months (Axworthy 1996). However, most scholars agree that it had already started before, in parallel with the (predicted) failure of the negotiations in the CCW review (see for example Atwood 1999b).

¹⁶ “Would you personally be in favor of or against your country signing the landmine ban treaty?” *Ban of use land mines in favour of against*, Gallup International Opinion Research. Quoted in Rutherford (2000a: 106). The author explains that there were 21 states surveyed, Japan (58 per cent) and the US (60 per cent) scoring the lowest in approval and Spain (91 per cent) and Denmark (92 per cent) the highest. The poll included the citizens of other major regional power states, such as Russia (83 per cent), key for its influence over the other ex Soviet republics (Vigeant 2001) and India (82 per cent).

This chapter argues that the CCW review was a decisive moment for the ICBL evolution, a turning point that ends one stage and starts another one. Thus, the non-signing of a treaty in the first Review of the CCW is considered in this research both as a failure and a milestone to the Landmine treaty (see Huberts 2000: 13-17).¹⁷

The conference was a clear failure, even for those people who state that a comprehensive ban was not expected even if called for.¹⁸ Yet, the results of the CCW Review made proponents of the ban stronger and more coordinated than before. They decided to seek an alternative process, while continuing to press governments for unilateral measures and working as well in regional contexts to secure mine-free zones. So there is a transition period between the first meeting of the *CCW Review* (September 1995) and the Axworthy statement in the end of the first Ottawa meeting (October 1996) that could be called as 'pre-Ottawa process'.¹⁹ Pro-ban states and ICBL meet in January, April and May 1996 before the first Ottawa meeting in October 1996. Each meeting had increasing assistance of states and of NGO involvement.

In November 1995, a new source of legitimacy, moral authority, and access to international media was added to the cause of landmines.²⁰ The ICRC, an organisation that had carefully

¹⁷ Given that on the second phase a very high effects will be found concerning the policy categories (signing of the Ottawa Treaty), it could be argued ex-post that the moderate effects in this phase are a necessary condition for the later ones.

¹⁸ "Even the narrow expectations of an improved treaty were dashed for NGOs, international organizations and a growing number of governments" (Peters 2000: 9).

¹⁹ 'Towards a Global Ban on Antipersonnel Mines', Ottawa, October 3-5, 1996.

²⁰ Moral authority is directly related to the claim by these actors that they somehow represent the "public interest" or the "common good" rather than private interests (see Risse 2002). They can quickly lose their credibility if they become identified with some special economic or political interests.

cultivated a reputation as a neutral humanitarian organization, launched a widespread international call for a total, immediate, and definitive ban on landmines. It also commissioned a report to assess the (lack of) military utility of landmines, written by Patrick Blagden, former British Army combat engineer and later UN demining specialist (ICRC 1996).²¹

After this series of meetings between the ICBL and the core groups of like-minded states created during the CCW Review Conference, a major meeting took place in Ottawa (Canada), in October 1996. Fifty states attended as full participants, including the US, France and Britain, twenty-four as observers, along with representatives from the ICRC and the UN, and dozens of NGOs. In the end, the discussions led by the Canadian delegation came to the agreement of pursuing a fast-track negotiation process, without excluding the Conference of Disarmament (CD) as an appropriate arena for the multilateral negotiations.²²

²¹ This was a debate taking place not only in Europe. In April 1996, the US Commander in the Gulf War, General N. Schwarzkopf, and other 14 senior retired military personnel signed an open letter to President Clinton challenging the presumed military utility of landmines, which was published in the *New York Times*. While they (and the ICBL) did not question the military utility of landmines, they questioned whether their “limited” utility proportionally outweighed the humanitarian costs. See also Gard (1998).

²² Supporters of CD approach (US, France, UK, Australia, Germany, Spain, Finland, among others) argued that: a) a landmines ban should be taken up by a ‘single multilateral disarmament negotiation body’; b) it allowed the presence of major producers and users of landmines; c) working through established channels added legitimacy to the whole process, and d) recent successes on chemical weapons and nuclear testing confirmed its effectiveness. On the contrary, supporters of the Ottawa Process argued that: a) the basis of consensus (operating both in CD and CCW allows resistant states to block serious efforts to ban the weapon; b) CD excluded most severely mine-affected states; c) In a pessimistic path-dependence way, the fact that CD and CCW had been negotiating for decades did not seem very favourable as a fast-track procedure, and

However, as soon as the issue started to be discussed in a forum where consensus is the usual form to take decisions, the Conference on Disarmament, supporters of the fast-track understood that the only real possibility for a serious ban in the short term was the Ottawa Process,²³ characterised by *a*) a close partnership between states and NGOs; *b*) like-minded coalition comprising a core group of small and medium-sized states,²⁴ with a functional and geographical division of labour²⁵ and *c*) a set of negotiations undertaken outside normal multilateral channels for creating favourable negotiating environments including the participation through the process of self-selection,²⁶ and

most importantly *d*) landmines was a *humanitarian* problem, and not a security issue.

²³ A Canadian diplomat, Ralph Lysyshyn, “surveyed his counterparts around the table whereas listening to the statements, international security bureaucrats like himself from the 50 countries formally attending the meeting to realize that of the 50, probably 25-30 were simply there to ensure that their governments were represented in the meeting; they neither knew nor cared a great deal about the antipersonnel mines issue, nor did they particularly believe in the need for a ban. As a result, they could be expected to follow the lead of the major powers and direct the issue to the Conference of Disarmament, where it be buried” (Tomlin 1998: 202).

²⁴ Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark Mexico, Norway and Switzerland were the pro-ban states meeting already in January 1996. In February South Africa, Germany, Philippines and the Netherlands were also included, increasing the geographical diversity of the group.

²⁵ Austria had to produce the first draft of the treaty, Belgium, Germany and Norway to hold major conferences. The others had to work regionally in Africa, South America, Asia and the European Union to ensure widespread support or a comprehensive ban. For example, in February 1997 (on the eve of the ICBL conference in Maputo, Mozambique), South Africa (the major producer and user of landmines in Africa, partially responsible the southern African region to become the most mined-infested region in the world) announced a unilateral ban, leading many other African states to support the Ottawa Process.

²⁶ The self-selection process means that participants had to commit to “the earliest possible conclusion of a legally binding international

particularly the two-thirds majority vote for decisions, the selection of Selebi as president (strong chairperson and very appreciated by the NGOs), and the full participation of the ICBL. See table 3.2, based on Axworthy (1998), Brinkert (2003b), Cameron (1998), De Larrinaga and Sjolander (1998) and Rutherford (1999).²⁷

It also has to be noted that, different from the traditional disarmament forums, such as the CCW, the initiative did not come from an international organization, but it was Canadian minister Axworthy who called publicly for the treaty-signing conference. Also, the fact that verification measures in the treaty are weak would have facilitated the debates. Finally, the clear, simple and consistent ban was very different in this new multilateralism from the usual complex regulation matters of the traditional disarmament forums.

In this extremely intensive period, the group of small and medium powers which were leading the process managed to take the negotiations outside traditional disarmament forums (the CCW and the Conference of Disarmament), avoiding thus certain logics of arms control measures such as the need for agreement from all major military powers and the emphasis on intrusive verification period of meetings and conferences.

agreement to ban antipersonnel mines". Other countries were also welcome to attend the formal meetings, but as *observers*.

²⁷ Some researchers have identified similar patterns in the Hague Conventions of 1899 (Rutherford 1999).

Table 3.2 New multilateralism (e.g. Ottawa Process) versus old multilateralism

	<i>Traditional disarmament fora (CCW)</i>	<i>Ottawa Process</i>
<i>Initiative</i>	International Organisation	An international political leader
<i>Relationship between states and civil society</i>	Participation in regime creation is limited to states	Partnership: NGOs and IGOs participate (almost) as full members
<i>Leadership</i>	Major powers	Group of like-minded middle powers
<i>Duration of the process</i>	Long and slow	Short, fast-track
<i>Negotiating environment</i>	Only official channels	Multilateral channels and rules facilitating like-minded participation
<i>Voting procedures</i>	Consensus	Majority
<i>Verification measures</i>	Strong	Weak
<i>Objective</i>	Complex and ambiguous regulation that allows flexible interpretation	Clear, simple and consistent prohibition

Table 3.3 Major meetings of the pre-Ottawa Process and the Ottawa Process (1996-1997)²⁸

<i>When</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Participants</i>		<i>Reason of the meeting and significant results</i>	
September 1995	Vienna (Austria)	States	without	CCW	Review Conferences starts
January 1996	Geneva (Switzerland)	States	without	CCW	Review Conference continues
January 1996	Geneva (Switzerland)	ICBL + 8	pro-ban states		Core group of states is created
April-May 1996	Geneva (Switzerland)	States	without	CCW	Review Conference ends
September 1996	Ottawa (Canada)	75 states + ICBL + ICRC		Axworthy's statement: Ottawa Process starts	
February 1997	Vienna (Austria)	111 states		Expert meeting.	Austrian draft is discussed
February 1997	Maputo (Mozambique)	450 participants from 60 countries		4 th NGO International Landmines Conference.	New national campaigns launched in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Somalia
March 1997	Tokyo (Japan)			Meeting on mine clearance and victim assistance	
April 1997	Bonn (Germany)			Meeting of experts on verification issues	

²⁸ Others included a Regional Seminar on Landmines in Sana'a, Republic of Yemen, the 3-4 November 1997, organized by Swedish Save the Children Fund (Rädda Barnen), a Meeting on the Australian Position in Sydney, Australia, the 14-17 July 1997, organized by the ICBL, and other one at the end of the year in New Delhi (India).

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<i>When</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Participants</i>	<i>Reason of the meeting and significant results</i>
May 1997	Kempton Park (S. Africa)	Organization of African Unity	25 African countries commit to signing the MBT
May 1997	Stockholm (Sweden)	Swedish NGOs + 20 Eastern European NGOs + Eastern states	Seminar on AP Mines and Strategy Workshop for Baltic and Eastern European states
June 1997	Harare (Zimbabwe)	41 OAU states + ICRC	10 new African countries are pro-ban
June 1997	Brussels (Belgium)	155 states + 130 NGOs reps	106 states sign the Brussels Declaration. ²⁹ Czech Republic, France, UK, Italy, Spain, Hungary and Bosnia support Ottawa Process for the 1 st time

²⁹ Angola, Antigua And Barbuda (Caricom), Austria, Bahamas (Caricom), Barbados, Belgium, Belize (Caricom), Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Colombia, Republic Of Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica (Caricom), El Salvador, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Grenada (Caricom), Great Britain, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana (Caricom), Haiti, The Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica (Caricom), Jordan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, The Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia, Malaysia, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, The Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, New Zealand, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, The Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts And Nevis (Caricom), Saint Lucia (Caricom), San Marino, Saint Vincent And The Grenadines (Caricom), Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Surinam (Caricom), Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad And Tobago (Caricom), Turkmenistan, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. See Belgium *et al.* (1997).

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<i>When</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Participants</i>	<i>Reason of the meeting and significant results</i>
June 1997	Ashgabat (Turkmenistan)	Caucasus and Central Asian states	Central Asian Regional Conference
July 1997	Manila (Philippines)	43 analysts from 17 countries	ICRC Regional Seminar for Military Experts
September 1997	Oslo (Norway)	121 states	Negotiators agree on the final text
October 1997	Oslo (Norway)		1997 Nobel Prize awarded to the ICBL and JW
December 1997	Ottawa (Canada)	157 states (2400 representatives)	122 states sign the Mine Ban Treaty

They also ensured that the issue of landmines was not raised in inhospitable multilateral environments such as NATO and, at times, even at the EU. In the end and as the table 3.3 above shows, there was an extremely intensive period. Moreover, there were the UN Declarations that urged legislative action on landmines (UN 96). The core group raised the issue in every possible meeting or event to build further support (for example, G-8 in Denver, the Commonwealth Heads of Government in Edinburgh, *la Francophonie* in Vietnam) with the result that the number of countries committed to the Ottawa Process raised from thirty in January 1997 to more than seventy in late May.

The final negotiations took place in Oslo in September 1997. With the presence of the US, most of the debates were around its non-negotiable demands. In the end, they were too rigid, the ICBL lobbied effectively for no-exceptions in the treaty and the result was the agreement of a text that marked the isolation of the US.

The draft was improved and the word “primarily” was removed.³⁰ After that and after the award of Nobel Prize in October 1997, important states also declared their support to the ban (e.g. Australia, Greece and Japan).

The assessment of the access effects in this phase is high, but ambiguous. Indeed, the number of states including NGO members on their official delegations dropped from over a dozen at Ottawa in 1996 to only six at Brussels and Oslo.³¹ However, there is an evolution in the status of the ICBL; whereas they were not allowed to attend the working sessions until the Bonn Conference, Afterwards, the transnational coalition was treated as a full participant in the meeting, being thus able to attend and make interventions at all sessions.

In terms of impact in the agenda setting and so in the international public opinion, there is an important peak, partially due to the huge coverage that Princess Diana’s trips to Angola and Bosnia received in the international press. As section 3.3.2 of this chapter will show, this did not have a direct effect in every country, but it definitely helped to reach a broad audience in crucial countries, such as Britain.

At the policy level, the aims are fulfilled. The Mine Ban Treaty is signed in a record time by 122 countries. One important feature of the treaty is its length. It is a very short treaty. The first Austrian draft had thirteen articles; then after Bonn and Brussels, it had eighteen, which increased to twenty articles in the final version agreed in Oslo (see Austrian officials 1997, Hajnoczi *et al.* 1998 and UN 1997). As shown in other chapters of the thesis, the length of the texts correlate in many occasions with the final result of the negotiations. In other words, agreement on shorter texts seems, *ceteris paribus*, easier to reach than in longer texts.

³⁰ “Perhaps for the first time, negotiations ended with a treaty stronger than the draft on which the negotiations were based!” (Williams 1999: 5). See also Dolan and Hunt (1998).

³¹ Canada, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Australia and Germany, with a varying degree of inclusion from significant in the case of Canada to negligible in the case of Germany (Price 2000b: 637).

Finally, the cultural change reached as well a peak fostered after the award of the Peace Nobel prize.³² Even those still opposed to a ban have been extremely reticent in making a public case and contesting the legitimacy of the idea of eventually banning mines.³³ Through a process of mobilisation of the shame, the leaders of some reluctant states, such as Greece and Poland, felt intolerable to be left outside the club of responsible international citizens and ended up joining the treaty.

Table 3.4 Assessment of the different effects of the ICBL in its second phase

<i>Type of effect</i>	<i>Estimation</i>
Access	High
Agenda	Very high
Policy	Very high
Cultural	High

3.2.3. A new phase for the ICBL: After the Mine Ban Treaty

After the Mine Ban Treaty, the ICBL enlarged and decentralised its structure, created a web page, fixed new objectives, and made a great effort to annually produce a unique

³² Some researchers have provocatively dissociated the cultural change from the action of the ICBL, attributing the success in Ottawa the first and arguing that the ICBL had only a minor role (Latham 2000). Following this perspective, the global prohibition regime for landmines should be understood primarily because of changes in the culture of the world polity that took place in the early 1990s.

³³ Richard Price who has extensively studied the case of the chemical weapons, remind us that there is a striking contrast in the two cases. Thus, “during efforts to outlaw chemical weapons in the 320, opponents of the Geneva Protocol (including members of the US military and US Senate) ridiculed the idea of a ban as preposterous” (Price 1998b: 636).

instrument for the verification of the Convention (see Atwood 1999 and Findlay 1999). Thus, the 'Landmine Monitor Reports' reminds the world every year that much has already been achieved, but also that much has still to be done.³⁴

Each of the issues of 'Landmine Monitor Report' has more than a 1000 pages and among 60 and 100 people work together to ensure its publication. Published in the six official languages of the UN (English, Arabic, Russian, Portuguese, Spanish, French), it is presented in the 'Meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty', one year in Geneva and the next one in a country heavily affected by landmines. The first one was held in Maputo, Mozambique, and included the launch of the Landmine Monitor 1999. The second was in Geneva, the third in Managua (Nicaragua), the fourth in Geneva, the fifth in Bangkok (Thailand), and the sixth in Croatia.

Beyond these meetings, a major event took place in Nairobi, 29 November – 3 December 2004, the first Review Conference of the states parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. One hundred and thirty-five states participated, along with the ICBL, the ICRC, international organizations such as the IMF and the WB, the European Parliament and the African Union, ten UN agencies and some dozens of NGOs (see UN 2005: Part 1, C).

The Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World is considered a landmark because States Parties agreed to adopt the Nairobi

³⁴ Among the successes in the implementation terrain, six facts should be highlighted, as reported by the Landmine Monitor during 1999-2006: a) Production of antipersonnel mines has dropped considerably and trade has almost come to a halt; b) there has been widespread and extensive destruction of stockpiles; c) vast tracks of land have been cleared and put back into productive use; d) most importantly, there are now fewer new mine victims each year; e) mine use has halted in several countries where it had been widespread (particularly in Angola and Sri Lanka); the Mine Ban Treaty is gathering strength more and more states are joining the treaty, whereas more non-member states and non-state actors are responding to international pressure and abiding by the spirit of the agreement. See ICBL (1999-2006).

Action Plan, which will guide efforts for the next five years (2005-2009). Thus, a set of concrete actions were stated to renew the political and financial commitment with the landmines crisis, promising to achieve four objectives:³⁵ Universalizing the convention, destroying stockpiled antipersonnel mines, clearing mined areas and assisting the victims.³⁶

So far, the work to pursue these aims has not been fulfilled with the same results, according to the major findings of each report of the Landmine Monitor. After the signing of the treaty, the major progress in preventing antipersonnel mines from being

³⁵ It should be noted that the participants in the Ottawa Conference in December 1997 were more likely to indicate that NGOs should, to a great extent, give priority to maintaining public awareness of the mine issue and to victim assistance than to maintaining partnerships with governments, maintaining compliance with the convention and demining assistance, although all the issues had more than 66 per cent positive answers in a survey. As a technical note, the survey was completed by 201 individuals attending the landmine ban conference. It was carried out in Ottawa by an independent institution, Ekos Research Associates Inc. the following days of the Conference. About the characteristics of respondents, 45 per cent represented governments, 41 per cent NGOs and 9 per cent IGOs; 77 per cent were male, 81 per cent English speaking. Of all the government representatives, 31 per cent came from Africa, 19 per cent from Europe and 9 per cent from North-America, whereas 41 per cent came from Asia and South-America. 51 per cent of the NGO representatives were from North America, 28 per cent from Europe, 8 per cent from Africa and 12 per cent from Asia and South-America. I thank Bob Lawson, who very kindly sent me the survey made by EKOS in 1997 to the participants of the landmines conference in Ottawa.

³⁶ However, even if this conference is a landmark for the ICBL, it is not as significant as the Review Conference to the CCW or the signing of the Ottawa Treaty were. In other words, after the Nairobi Summit, this is still the same third phase, with a similar coalition's structure and with the same aims, even if the priorities can be different in one moment or in another one (for example, victim assistance). This idea is supported by the fact that the conclusions or 'major findings' of the different editions of the Landmine Monitor Report (see e.g. ICBL 2004, who assess the period 1999-2004 and ICBL 2005) are pretty similar.

laid and in clearing existing minefields has not been matched in the area of assistance. Landmine Monitor reports that while global mine action funding has increased greatly since 1999, identifiable resources for 'mine victim assistance' have declined. Resources for victim assistance as a percentage of total mine action funding have decreased significantly from 14.9 per cent in 1999 to 8.3 per cent in 2003 (ICBL 2005).³⁷

Specific attention is devoted in this phase to non-state armed actors. As with other international treaties and conventions, acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty is a process that is exclusively for States. Non-state actors cannot participate in the negotiation or drafting of treaties, nor can they sign them, despite it is estimated that today landmines are a weapon predominantly used by non-state armed groups (Geneva Call 2004: 9). For this reason, a specific document, a Deed of Commitment was created for them, whose support appears frequently under the umbrella of objective universalisation of the treaty or the inclusive approach to the mine ban. In March 2000, the organisation 'Geneva Call', closely related to the ICBL, obtained the first signature of the 'Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Co-operation in Mine Action'. Some days before taking place the Nairobi summit, Geneva Call convened a parallel meeting for non-State actors in Geneva, the First meeting of Signatories to Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment, reaffirming that the work with non-state actors is one of the major challenges for the NGOs dealing with on landmines issues in this phase.

To sum up, the effects in access remain high in the third phase. The NGOs continue to be allowed to assist to major meetings, working closely with some like-minded governments. In the public agenda, there is still moderate presence, but definitely

³⁷ In the Ekos survey, the areas upon which respondents were most likely to feel that the convention would have a positive impact were increased resources for mine clearances, increased assistance to mine victims and increased research and development into mine clearance technologies (97 per cent, 96 per cent and 90 per cent, respectively). See also footnote 35 in this chapter.

lesser than in the previous phase. Being aware of it, the ICBL has explicitly stated that one of its main objectives in this phase is to keep public attention (see Mines Action Canada 2003: Questions pour l'avenir, 35).

The results in policy terms are high, given the high number of countries that have ratified the Ottawa Treaty.³⁸ Most of them are equally submitting national reports to help the verification efforts undertaken by the Landmine Monitor.

Culturally, the use of landmines is still seen as something against human rights. Even in the countries that have not signed yet the treaty, such as the US, opinion polls show that public opinion does not consider this weapon legitimate.

Table 3.5 Assessment of the different effects of the ICBL in its third phase

<i>Type of effect</i>	<i>Estimation</i>
Access	High
Agenda	Moderate
Policy	High
Cultural	High

3.3. Independent variables: Analysis of the political influence of the ICBL

3.3.1. Introduction

As outlined in the theoretical chapter, this section analyses the different independent variables controlled and uncontrolled by the

³⁸ Moreover, researchers have observed that some non-signatory states could have improved the situation of human rights and democracy in their countries as a consequence of the Ottawa Treaty, the public attention given to these issues and the perspective of a strong national civil society (see Vigeant 2001).

coalition of NGOs. First, it examines the different levels of the political opportunity structure, including the main allies of the IBCL. Afterwards, several resources of the activists are presented, including the financial ones, and also their strategies, such as the framing of the campaign. Finally, several contingent factors beyond the activists' control are also taken into account to explain the political influence of the transnational coalition.

3.3.2. *Multilevel Political Opportunity Structure (MPOS)*

The idea of MPOS refers to the different contexts at different levels that can be favourable to collective action. From the beginning, the ICBL decided to work at all the levels: global (such as in international conferences), regional (for example, proposing mine-free zones) and national (national campaigns), using as well the local to gather public attention showing the magnitude and the consequences of the problem. The transnational coalition also benefited from powerful allies, particularly at the global level.

In the end, this strategy of working at every possible level showed to be necessary because each of the levels was particularly effective in different phases and in different countries. Thus, national campaigns were sometimes able to ensure a favourable position regarding the ban (for example, Italy), whereas the final decision of others was more regionally based (for example, South-African countries) and some others were persuaded to sign as a consequence of the international pressure (for example, Poland). To clarify this idea, the next pages study in detail the evolution of different *critical* cases: Canada as the main protagonist of the latter process; Britain and France as cases initially reluctant, but subsequently converted; the European Union because it allows to see internal variability; South-Africa as a regional power in the most heavily mined region in the world; and the US in a role that fluctuated between leader and holdout.

First, in a complex multilevel political environment, Canadian landmine's policy fluctuated between foreign affairs minister

André Ouellet's advocacy for the ban and defense minister David Collenette, who supported the military utility of the weapon. Whereas senior policy advisers were focused on issues related to the NATO and Yugoslavia, the landmines issue remained in the agenda because of the work of middle-level civil servants, such as Jill Sinclair of the IDA (Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division) and her team.

The Canadian NGOs were lobbying intensively already in the first phase of the process (see Warmington and Turtle 1998) and in November 1995 Ouellet announced an export moratorium; in January 1996 the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) stated Canadian support for a global ban. A former political science professor close to the NGO sector, Lloyd Axworthy, replaced Ouellet as foreign affairs minister. Interested in policy innovation, he and some key political entrepreneurs in his office are mainly responsible for the design of the Ottawa Process,³⁹ in a close partnership with top representatives of ICBL, such as Jody Williams and Steve Goose. National NGOs, particularly Physicians for Global Survival, then members of Mine Action Canada, were also relevant, as they would be part of the Canadian delegation in the negotiations (see e.g. Cameron 1998).

As designed by Axworthy and his collaborators, the Ottawa Process formally launched in Ottawa 1996 aimed at preventing that the issue of landmines was dealt with in a traditional forum such as the Conference of Disarmament, where consensus rules would not allow improvements. Moreover and from a national perspective, Canadian leadership in the issue had to be secured, given that other countries such as Belgium were pushing for it. In

³⁹ Among them, Ralph Lysyshyn saw the possibility of an alternative policy forum to the traditional disarmament ones, whereas Mark Gwozdecky had the idea of self-selection. For a more detailed account of the Canadian process from the governmental side, see Tomlin 1998. From NGO side, see (Warmington and Tuttle 1998). About the partnership between both, see Lawson, Gwozdecky, Sinclair and Lysyshyn (1998).

the end, as we have seen in section 3.2 of this chapter, this risky procedure (major powers were totally against it) was lucky and a year later crystallized in the Ottawa Treaty.

Second, until mid-second phase of the landmine process, Britain was among the treaty's strongest opponents. Only after January's 1997 trip to Angola by *Lady Diana* as a guest of the British Red Cross, the landmine issue gathered attention in the country (interviews 28 and 29). Similar to what was already happening in the negotiation process, it helped transfer the issue from a political to a humanitarian problem in Britain.⁴⁰ The rise to power of Tony Blair's Labour Party, which had made banning landmines one of its election-campaign-platform goals, facilitated the work of the British campaign, especially the Mines Advisory Group. The reservations of Blair's governments, including "the right to use mines in exceptional circumstances" were finally left aside, in an effort to gain public-opinion credibility.

Thirdly, France was one of the few countries active in landmines in the first phase of the process. Thus, after initial pressure by Handicap International (including the support of Danielle Mitterrand, prime minister's wife), the French government formally requested a review of the 1980 CCW Convention, partially due to the fact that Senator Leahy's action had created fear in the French authorities of an American leadership on the landmines issue (Chabasse 1998). Privileged contacts with high officials inside the government (Xavier Emmanuelli, secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs) and the

⁴⁰ "I'm not a political figure. I would like to reiterate now, my interests are humanitarian. That is why I felt drawn to this human tragedy. That is why I wanted to play my part in working towards a worldwide ban on these weapons". Quoted in Rutherford (2000a: 100). Several days after her death on August 31, 1997, the prime minister of Norway stated at the Oslo Conference's opening that the treaty should be titled *the Diana, Princess of Wales Treaty*, highlighting the fact that she helped the NGO movement to bring attention to the landmine issue, promote assistance to landmine victims and focus on the landmine ban (Rutherford 2000:101-102).

parliament (Madame Taubira-Delanon, a member of Parliament for French Guiana), and spectacular street actions by the French Coalition ensured the continuity of the issue in the agenda. However, with a strong pressure by the arms industry (one of the top five in the world, see www.sipri.es), the French position was not clearly in favour of the ban until the new and supportive political environment after the change of government in the spring 1997.⁴¹

In the fourth place, South Africa had always been a “bad guy”. In fact, until the mid-nineties, it was a major exporter and producer of mines in Africa. When explaining the change of position of its government between 1993 and 1997, it has been emphasized the role played by the international post-Cold War context, as well as the overarching transformation process under way after the first democratic election in South Africa (Stott 1998). Thus, the formation of the South African Campaign in 1995 coincided with the return of the country to the international community, fact that enhanced its ability to influence national (and regional) policy process. In this sense, the broad national coalition (over 100 NGOs) attracted support by a well-known international figure, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, while focusing their advocacy work on the tensions between the different actors and levels of government. In sum, interrelations between the national and international political opportunity structure fostered civil society influence in this case.

Regarding the European Union, and although it undertook early action to address the proliferation of landmines by passing a resolution in the European Parliament in 1992 requesting a five-years moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines, the European Union did not show a united political view on the landmines issue.⁴² That happened in the first phase of the process,

⁴¹ “Your policy is contradictory: you are saying that you want to ban landmines, except when you want to use them” Jody Williams to the French representative in Ottawa 1996. Quoted in Tomlin (1998: 201).

⁴² For more detailed accounts on the influence of the European states within the Ottawa Process, see Long and Hindle (1998) and Long (2002).

but even in the second, there was no clear common European position. Partially, this was because, differently from the US case, most European campaigns put a higher priority on directly engaging the public than in working with legislators or other governmental officials. Thus, whereas Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium passed early legislation in favour of the ban, other countries like Britain were more reluctant. In Italy, the government made a dramatic shift in its position in the summer of 1994, as a result of the Italian campaign's creative work in diverse fields, but particularly getting the most popular Italian national talk show to devote time every day to the issue of landmines.⁴³ Other countries, such as Spain and Portugal came to the treaty in the later phases (in Brussels and Oslo conferences).

The US shows a set of complexities and ambiguities, partially related to the fact of being the super-power. Why did the US not sign the Mine Ban Treaty? What consequences follow that decision? From a realist perspective in international relations, the US position on this issue is important because it is still the superpower of this era. In the phases before the signing of the treaty, many representatives of the countries did not have strong preferences regarding landmines. In these cases, one of the easiest and more frequent options is to follow the superpower, the US position. As shown in section 3.2 of this chapter, that was also the case until the Brussels and Oslo conferences (late 1997), when the combination of campaigning efforts of the ICBL, lobbying work of the core group of supportive countries and some favourable contingent events ensured the US isolation regarding this treaty.

Nevertheless, many supporters of the ban may think that a treaty without the US cannot be legitimate or effective.⁴⁴ It is

⁴³ In one of the *Maurizio Constanzo* shows, the Italian Minister of Defense made the surprising declaration that Italy should ban the use of landmines and end their production. For a more detailed analysis on the work of the Italian campaign, see Williams and Goose (1998: 27-28).

⁴⁴ However, in the Ekos survey, only 16 per cent of the respondents felt that the failure of some countries to sign the ban convention would have a large negative effect on the convention's full implementation. In

likely that the Mine Ban Treaty will not be as strong as it would if the US had signed it from the beginning. If this is true, one should also consider that, as it has already been shown that in terms of effectiveness, it is likely to be the most effective arms-control treaty in history, and even almost all states that are not members have restricted (to a different extent) their policy regarding landmines.⁴⁵

The US was an active country against landmines already in the first phase of the process. The complex and ambiguous role of US concerning landmines began in October 1992, with the successful effort of Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman Lane Evans to impose a one-year moratorium on the sale, transfer, and export of landmines.⁴⁶ With the support and campaigning efforts of the Vietnam Veterans American Foundation, the same senator introduced two resolutions in the UN General Assembly in 1993

fact, only 4 per cent of the respondents felt little confident that other countries would abide by the rules of the mine convention. Finally, fully 81 per cent of respondents felt that the Ottawa Process had been very effective in dealing with the landmines issue.

⁴⁵ The power of the mine ban movement and the MBT is reflected in the fact that “a de facto global ban on the trade of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s, with only a very low level of illicit trafficking and unacknowledged trade taking place. Moreover, of the more than 50 countries known to have produced AP mines, all but 15 have formally renounced production (Landmine Monitor 1999-2005: section on Major Findings). However, some articles of the Convention has been interpreted in different ways by some States Parties, diverging from the predominant legal interpretation and practice on some matters. As a result, “compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty by States Parties has been very impressive, but not absolute or uniform” (Steve Goose, Chief Editor of the Landmine Monitor initiative, in ICBL 2005).

⁴⁶ This early statement relatively uncontroversial at the time ended up to be key for the evolution of the ICBL, specially because the French Campaign could use it strategically to urge action to the French Government, who decided to contest the early US leadership on the issue, formally calling for the first CCW Review Conference to be held in 1995.

and 1994 appealing for a moratorium on export and called for the 'eventual elimination of landmines'. The publication of US Department of State (1994) was very influential to increase funds for victim assistance, a domain in which the US has always taken the lead.⁴⁷

Table 3.6 Position of the main US actors regarding the ban⁴⁸

White House and National Security Council: Basically in favour (e.g. NSC's Senior Director for Defence Policy and Arms Control, Robert Bell and Sandy Berger, the President's National Security Advisor during Bill Clinton's second term).

Department of State: Largely in favour (e.g. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright).

*Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:*⁴⁹ Totally against.

Department of Defence: Initially ambivalent. But constant pressure from US commanders in Korea achieved to convince the whole military and the Secretary of Defence against it.⁵⁰

Congress: The majority was in favour, but people in key places (e.g. Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees) were against it.

Military Retirees: Ambivalent, some in favour and some against it. However, those in favour received bigger press coverage, (in part, due to the generally favourable approach of the press).

⁴⁷ See US Department of State (1994 and 1998) to see the major donors in the issue.

⁴⁸ Based on Keegan (2003), Snyder (2004), Teague (2002), Troxell (2000) and Wareham (1998). For accounts of the policy of Bush's Administration, see Keegan (2003) and Snyder (2004). Wareham (1998), Teague (2002) and Snyder (2004) also offer a US landmine policy chronology.

⁴⁹ At that time, the ACDA was being integrated into the State Department.

⁵⁰ For a quite recent defense of the Korean exception from a high representative of the US military, see Troxell (2000).

Non-Governmental Organizations: Totally in favour, although some could have accepted the Korean exception.

Press: More in favour than against (e.g. editorials and articles in 1996 in *The Economist*, *Newsweek*, the *New York Times*, *Scientific American* or *The Wall Street Journal*).⁵¹

There was an extremely intensive period of meetings and conferences among the different actors who had different positions on this issue (see table 3.6 above). In the end, the opposition of the Department of Defence, with the help of key representatives in the Congress and the military united were enough to convince Clinton to write the PDD 64, a complex and dynamic compromise between humanitarian, military and arms control agendas.

Therefore, in the domain of the ban, the final position of the US was negative. Following Snyder (2004), “Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 64 was the result of a long and tortuous process whereby the Clinton administration attempted to reach a compromise among a number of influential actors within the White House and National Security Council, the State Department, the Defence Department, Congress, powerful interest groups and foreign governments”.⁵²

With President George Bush Jr., the US policy was oriented to protect its national interests, opposing any possible international agreement concerning landmines and reversing previous US restrictions. Between 2000 and 2006, the *New York Times*, the *International Herald Tribune*, and other mainstream US

⁵¹ See Strada (1996), Hackworth (1996), *The Wall Street Journal* (1996), Masland and Barry (1996), Mydans (1996) and *The Economist* (1996).

⁵² Presidential Decision Directive 64 (spring 1998) is the third and final PDD to address the Clinton’s administration’s policy on landmines. The PDD committed the US to sign, by 2006 or sooner, the 1997 Ottawa Convention banning landmines if suitable alternatives to anti-personnel landmines and ‘mixed munitions’ could be developed.

newspapers published more than 20 editorials/Op-Eds critical with the 'New Bush Landmine Policy', showing that the US public opinion is in favour of a ban.⁵³ The recent election of Barack Obama could mean a closer work of the US diplomats with multilateral institutions on certain global problems. If landmines will be one of them remains unknown.

3.3.2.1. Allies and opponents⁵⁴

Fundamental to the success of the landmines campaign was the effective working relationship between the ICBL and other crucial non-state actors.⁵⁵ First, many researchers have underlined that the governments and governmental officials of the core group of states were even more important than the ICBL during the Ottawa Process (see for example, Long and Hindle 1998 or Peters 2000). But also, mine affected-countries played a significant role, particularly the ones of the southern African region. Both sides (NGOs and governments) have repetitively affirmed that there was "constant contact between particular participants driving the Ottawa Process via email, telephone and fax when they were not meeting face-to-face" (Peters 2000: 22).

⁵³ See the news archive of the US Campaign to Ban LM: http://www.banminesusa.org/news/965_news.htm and http://www.banminesusa.org/news/921_times.htm. Other related news are *New Poll Shows 80 per cent of Americans Want US to Join Mine Ban Treaty* (http://www.banminesusa.org/news/895_poll.htm) and *Mine Ban Advocates Denounce White House Decision to Retain Landmines and Abandon Mine Ban Treaty* (http://www.banminesusa.org/news/928_bush.htm).

⁵⁴ Among the authors who emphasize the importance of the strong alliances, particularly with IGOs such as the ICRC and UN agencies for the success of the ICBL, see Biggs (2000), Huberts (2000), Kongstad (1999) and Rutherford (2000). For a comprehensive compilation of the ICRC work, see Maslen and Maresca (2000).

⁵⁵ Among the authors who emphasize the importance of the work of ICRC and UN the success of the ICBL, see Biggs (2000), Huberts (2000), Kongstad (1999), Maslen (1998) and Peters (2000).

The ICRC added credibility to the campaign through direct information, and also crucial research on the utility of the weapon. The ICRC also worked closely with military personnel who would have been unwilling to be associated with the ICBL (see Maslen 1998).

The involvement of the UN in the process was slower, with more comprehensive approaches in the latter phases of the process. Once they did it, UN agencies filled important gaps in ICBL capabilities, such as geographical presence in regions where the NGO campaign was weak (e.g. Asia and the Middle East).⁵⁶ In 1997, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was established within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to be the UN's focal point on landmine-related matters, to ensure that there is UN assistance in the creation of sustainable national capacities and in the implementation of overall programs. As chapter 5 will show, in the cluster munitions case, this new UN agency will also have a relevant role in moving the process forward.

3.3.3. Resources controlled by the ICBL

From an organisational point of view, a distinction has to be made between the steering committee that gave global strategic direction and the broad-based coalition that provided the foundation for national level campaigns and links to grass-roots activism. Formal committee membership included the six founding members, expanding in the Ottawa Process phase to include some campaigns of Third World countries and the Swedish section of Save the Children.⁵⁷ Moreover, significant

⁵⁶ For the first time in its history, the ICRC launched a public advertising campaign promoting a comprehensive ban in November 1995.

⁵⁷ The members included in 1996 and 1997 were the Afghan, Cambodian, Kenyan and South African Campaigns and the Swedish NGO Rädde Barnen.

individuals from other organisations were regularly included in the committee meetings (Huberts 2000: 32).

In the broader coalition, dozens of NGOs were sufficiently engaged to send more than 100 activists to participate in the major conferences and negotiations, increasing in the Ottawa Process. They created national campaigns, coordinated by umbrella groups linking existing organisations and networks. National campaigns began with two objectives of raising public awareness of the problems caused by the use of mines and lobbying government officials to commit to a comprehensive ban. As explained in section 3.2.2 of the chapter, in some countries shifts in government policy led to close working relationships between NGOs and government officials.

High profile transnational moral entrepreneurs, who had had first-hand experiences of the human tragedy generated by landmines, gave credibility working closely with the national campaigns and facilitating contacts with their government:⁵⁸ Leahy in the US, Princess Diana in the UK, Axworthy and the DFAIT in Canada or Mandela and Tutu in South Africa (see Stott 1998 and Markram 2004).⁵⁹ The ICBL and particularly national campaigns provided information, public-opinion support, and resources to these individuals to highlight the landmine issue and

⁵⁸ Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that norms are more likely to arise against practices that harm the bodily integrity of innocents. Price (1998: 623) applies this argument to the ICBL, which would have successfully achieved to mobilise transnational political action through prominent decision makers and celebrities who visited mine-devastated areas, met with victims, becoming then committed allies of the ICBL

⁵⁹ Authors that have theorised and studied the role of key individuals who are the moving forces behind normative change and important decision makers who may be persuaded by activists to elevate the position of an issue on the domestic or international political agenda or even to decide in favor of an issue out of moral conviction are Nadelmann (1990), Lumsdaine (1993) and McElroy (1992).

pressure states into changing their landmine policies.⁶⁰ That happened in the first phase of the process, but it was intensified in the second; in the Ottawa Process. And even most importantly, the frequent and close relationships between them, other officials of different governments and a number of activists committed to the ICBL (led by its coordinator Jody Williams) created the famous partnership among the two different sectors (NGOs and governments) that has so often been highlighted as one of the main characteristics of a new mode of international negotiation. Some of them have even talked of the development of global 'transnational elites' (Anderson 1999). As explained in chapter 1, this thesis uses instead the concept of a community of practice.

It is difficult to systematically assess the organisational form of this period (until the signature of the treaty and the reception of the Nobel Peace Prize) because the committee was loosely organised with no formal structure, budget or secretariat. Some estimations calculate a total expenditure of \$1 million to \$2 million per year after 1995, with two dozen full-time activists (see Goose 1998 and Huberts 2000: 32).

A largely unexplored issue regarding this kind of campaigns is gender. In the landmines campaign, a large majority of those who were campaigning against landmines were women, whereas most of government representatives were men (Williams 1999: 5).⁶¹

⁶⁰ Other prominent single individuals that added their voice to the call for a ban include the UN secretary-general Boutros Ghali, Pope John-Paul II, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the Dalai Lama. The importance of these people is explicitly recognised by the ICBL in one of the *questions per l'avenir*: "The *magic* and the prestige related to certain individuals, such as Jody Williams, princess Diana and Lloyd Axworthy have helped to gain public attention on the mines issue. How could we reproduce this *magic*?" (see Mine Action Canada 2003: 35).

⁶¹ The ICBL in its web page is aware of this, advising journalists interested in write about the ICBL to take the angle of *women peace makers* in a section that begins as follows: "The story of landmine movement is a story of some inspiring women". See www.icbl.org.

Results from the rest of the cases will untangle to what extent this is a generalised trend in current transnational contentious action.

Regarding the media, despite that there was not an overarching ICBL strategy, some of the members of the ICBL had strong media contacts and experience in making their voice heard. This was focused on the tragic, personal stories of landmines victims, creating the impression that ICBL's was a 'David vs. Goliath' struggle (Williams and Goose 1998).⁶²

However, the media as an autonomous and independent actor also played a role. It documented the impact of the weapons around the world, provided the vivid images of maimed victims and acted as a platform in which to raise the issue and to disseminate the information that became the rallying cries for the ban advocates (see Peters 2000).

The mailing of information among campaigners, like the quarterly newsletter *Landmine Update*, and specially the telephone and the fax were the main communicative tools for the ICBL before the arrival of the electronic mail (late 1995 and early 1996). Yet, face-to-face meetings were always necessary among campaigners and also with government and military representatives.

3.3.3.1. Material resources: Mine action funding and the ICBL finances

Given the absence of official data, since the states do not always report fully on aspects such as their mine action funding, some of the data presented is typically estimated by the ICBL. Accurate, complete and comparable figures for major mine action recipients are even more difficult to obtain than those for mine-action donors. Moreover, it is likely that some programs that assist mine survivors are not reported in the context of mine action funding. And the same happens with the activities of mine-

⁶² *Goliath* in this case was the US and its allies, whereas *David* was the pro-ban coalition (see Rutherford 2000a: 97-105).

affected states in providing resources for facilities and services within the public health system to address the needs of landmines victims; information of expenditure by many of these countries is not readily available. In addition, many victim assistance programs are carried out by NGOs who receive funding from various sources including governments, private donors and charitable foundations. Therefore, the information obtained for the 'Landmine Monitor Report' cannot be taken as fully representative of the total resources available to provide assistance to mine victims and other persons with disabilities.

Regarding the financial situation of the ICBL, though the digital summaries available in the internet it is possible to find audited statement of recorded cash receipts and disbursements for three years of the third phase of the landmine process (2001, 2003 and 2004). Analyzing the numbers from these years is sufficient to draw some conclusions regarding organisational and strategic features. First, there is no much change across time in the order of the categories. For example, in all three the first four categories of 'cash disbursements' are the following:⁶³

Grants	\$950,000 - \$1,050,000
Meetings/travel	\$450,000 - \$650,000
Salary/benefits/payroll expenses	\$280,000 - \$320,000
Printing	\$110,000 - \$170,000

The rest of categories (professional fees, rent, telephone, postage/delivery, website, translations, regional advances, supplies, equipment/maintenance, meeting room rental, rent, others) never reach \$100,000. The total of recorded *cash receipts*, made up by grants, sponsorships and other is constantly growing, in this period (2001-2005) between \$2 and \$3 million.

Direct activities, what the auditors name as 'grants' reach among 30 per cent and 50 per cent of the total money spent. The rest is spent on maintenance, organisational costs, and so on.

⁶³ In these figures \$ are US \$.

Website spending is constantly growing, from 5,000 \$ in 2001 to more than \$ 40,000 in 2004. On the contrary, spending in CD Roms is constantly decreasing, from \$ 46,000 in 2001 to just \$ 1,500 in 2004. Disbursements on telephone, delivery and printing are quite constant. And the same applies for the equipment/maintenance and supplies. Regarding 'meeting room rental' it is worthy to note a decrease from almost \$ 25,000 in 2001 to less than \$ 2,500 in 2003 and 2004. With an estimation of the rest of the years, it could be possible to extract a conclusion regarding the different importance of different means of communication in different periods. Thus, it seems that in the first phases (until 1996), fax, telephone and personal meetings were the most used means by the ICBL. After a period of coexistence with the internet, digital communication has increased regularly its relevance, as shown by the constantly growing amount of resources spent in the webpage.

Indeed, in some interviews, ICBL's first coordinator Jody Williams has declared that one of the main consequences of generalised use of e-mail was that her spending on telephone decreased heavily. Yet, the traditional means of communication have lost relevance, but they are still important. In the last years its use (comparatively inferior to the previous decade) has been maintained quite constant, confirming the statement many times declared by Jody Williams and other staff of the ICBL: "While email is a fabulous tool for communication, nothing replaces personal relationships, however, in building a social movement" (see "Much has been said about the ICBL and its pioneering use of email. How critical has email been to your work?" in Williams 2005a). The meetings/travel/catering category is always the second in the order of relevance, reaching levels close to the first one (grants). However, the disbursements regarding the meeting room rental have reduced heavily. These two data (increase in spending in travels, decrease in meeting room rental) suggest that nowadays meetings take place more and more outside the ICBL decentralised headquarters and so, that networking tends to be more and more with people geographically distant.

3.3.3.2. The ICBL and the new technologies

The importance of email to the success of the campaign remains unclear. While there is no doubt that it facilitated the inexpensive dissemination of information, a careful assessment of this factor could conclude that it has been consistently overstated. In fact, e-mail was not widely used until late 1995, when the campaign was already well underway. In the first phase of the landmine process, the use of e-mail had no effect. The ICBL website was first setup in May 1998 and later revised with the current format in August 2004. However, the lower cost and increased reliability of email versus telephone and fax has been particularly relevant in facilitating communication with campaigners in developing nations, being crucial to joint planning of major activities and conferences, such as those held in Cambodia in 1995 and Mozambique 1997 (Williams and Goose: 1998: 24).

In the third phase of the landmine process, the use of internet has been widespread, efficient and most likely, necessary. For instance, the ICBL campaign kit was created to allow activists the possibility of easily campaigning, offering them a complete set of tools. Whereas it was first presented in May 1999 in format paper, it is now available online (www.icbl.org). This possibility will definitely save costs to the ICBL, showing that in a long run, investing resources in the new technologies (for example, the web page) can be worth spending on. As a clear sign of the increasing relevance of resources in a phase where the issue of landmines is losing prominence on agenda setting, is that the last section added so far to the web site is the 'Fundraising' one.

3.3.4. *Strategies*

In the first phase of the landmine campaign, the main pragmatic and strategic decision was to focus on one single issue, isolating landmines as a discrete problem amenable to the

identifiable solution of a comprehensive ban. In this sense, some authors have stressed the necessity of focusing on one single-issue for the success of the ICBL, especially during its first stages (for example, Peters 2000). It means to choose only landmines among small arms, but even to choose the treaty among all the related aspects. For example, the issue of victim assistance was secondary until 1996 (White and Rutherford 1998). Besides the inclusion of other weapons as targets for the campaign, some researchers have also argued that it is necessary to broaden the ICBL framework in order to consider other issues, such as environmental degradation as a principal aftermath of the global landmine crisis (Berhe 2005).

About the evolution of the ICBL goals and strategies, it is worth noting that in all cases, national campaigns began with the two separate, but complementary objectives of raising public awareness and lobbying government officials to commit to a comprehensive ban. In some countries (for example, the U.S., Australia, and Japan), these objectives remained unchanged throughout the different phases of the campaign. In others countries, such as Canada, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, shifts in government policy led to close working relationships between NGOs and government officials. It seems that the transnational coalition tends to be the key player in countries and geographic regions with hesitant or intransigent governments. Finally, the signing of the Ottawa Treaty is a turning point that will modify the strategies of the ICBL.⁶⁴

The theoretical chapter of the dissertation examined to what extent the more successful coalitions use advocacy and lobbying as the primary mode when the multilevel POS is more favourable, whereas they use mass protest in arenas where the multilevel POS is less favourable. The dual role of the ICBL in the landmines case (mobilising public opinion and working closely with the core

⁶⁴ Jody Williams and Steve Goose, the leadership of the ICBL, divide their often quoted chapter into Pre and Post-Ottawa political strategies of the ICBL (see Williams and Goose 1998: 25-40).

group of like-minded governments) shows that there is not necessarily an incompatibility of choosing lobby versus protest action. Instead, this case reveals that a combination of both, while taking into account the different multilevel POS is the most efficient strategy for such an international campaign. Therefore, when lacking access to the CCW Review Conference, the ICBL focused on some coordinated spectacular actions to get media attention.⁶⁵ Yet, most of efforts in the negotiations during the Ottawa Process were spent in lobbying to make the Austrian draft as similar as they own proposal as possible.

By using expertise and scientific research, the ICBL promoted statistics as systematic indicators in a schema to get states to recognize the landmine problem (Rutherford 2000a: 87-90). Some examples are summarised in table 3.7. Today, we know that some of these estimations are inflated.⁶⁶ In fact, most of the original sources and methodological data-collection techniques are unknown.

This data was promoted via Internet in the second phase of the landmine process and through conference mechanisms such as speeches and prepared reports, gaining huge coverage in the media and so reaching an increasingly large audience, without being seriously questioned until the second half of 1997 (Rutherford 2000a). Therefore, the suggested argument in chapter 1 of the dissertation, coalitions that are more successful carry out better scientific research (and therefore, produce better scientific knowledge), is not clearly confirmed here.

⁶⁵ Williams and Goose (1998) present a detailed summary of these mass-oriented activities.

⁶⁶ Particularly, the first statistics published of mines deployed in Afghanistan, Angola and Iraq would have been heavily inflated (Rutherford 2000a: 88-89). However, some of the studies were extremely rigorous such as the one that Graça Machel presented on the impact of armed conflict (including landmines) on children to the UN General Assembly.

Table 3.7 Statistics generated by NGOs and reproduced in the media

Landmines kill and maim more than 26,000 people per year (500 per week) of whom 80% are civilian

There may be 200 million landmines scattered in at least 64 countries

LM are more likely to kill or injure a civilian after a conflict than a combatant after hostilities

More children die from LM after a war for which those LM were deployed than do soldiers during that war

Those countries infested by landmines have the largest amputee populations in the world⁶⁷

Demining efforts have removed 100,000 LM annually by the mid-1990s. At this rate, it would take 1,100 years to clear those already in place if no more mines were deployed

However, for every mine removed, another 20 are being planted⁶⁸

To “stabilize” the current situation would require training 200,000 new mine clearers world wide costing \$ 1,1 billion per year and accidents would cause a death and injury toll to 2,000 mine clearers per year⁶⁹

More people have been killed and maimed by LM than by biological, chemical and nuclear weapons combined.

The works produced by NGOs that were in the field, and so those perceived to be moral authority and having legitimate knowledge (see Risse 2002) were key to start the process of agenda-setting. Moreover, information and media technologies were used to get the public to pay attention to the landmine issue

⁶⁷ For example, over 30,000 of the 8.5 million of Cambodians (HRW 1991).

⁶⁸ Most of these data are from US State Department (1994) and ICRC (1994 and 1996). The NGOs widely circulated the figures from the US State Department study, which had been in part supplied by humanitarian groups working in the field, being typically very rough estimates (Price 1998b: 622).

⁶⁹ Data from 1995, calculated by UN demining expert Patrick Blagden (ICRC 1996: 114-115).

by highlighting dramatic statistics, perceived as truthful (see Peters 2000).⁷⁰ Even if no one could pinpoint the precise number and location of landmines in the world in the ground, the figure of 100 (or even 200) million landmines in over 60 countries gained widespread acceptance, creating a sense of humanitarian crisis, and so, the problem of the weapon was frequently labelled as landmine crisis.⁷¹ Perhaps then, the “better scientific research” should be reformulated to account for outrageous stories, without stressing their systematic or rigorous approach.

The next section deals with the framing strategies of the ICBL and its opponents. Chapter I had previously stated that successful coalitions define clear frames that resonate culturally, being therefore able to gain coverage in national and international media. The analysis of the landmines campaign will add new elements to the understanding of the construction of effective frames, including the focus on a concrete and feasible goal.

3.3.4.1. The framing of the ICBL

The joint call made by the six already mentioned organisations in 1992, the beginning of the first phase of the landmine process, illustrates how the ICBL effectively used a particular communicative process: framing. The call is a public document

⁷⁰ This credibility or legitimate knowledge has historically been established in the human rights domain through very strict information-gathering rules that have been accepted by all actors in the international arena. For example, currently Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch *define* what constitutes a human rights violation. Other groups and even states might provide the information and disseminate it. But only if those actors “approve” of this information as being correct does this constitute a human rights violation in the eyes of the international community. In fact, many Western governments, including the United States and Germany, often use information provided by them almost verbatim when they write their own human rights reports (Risse 2000).

⁷¹ For example, Boutros Ghali (1994), US Dept. of State (1994) Cahill (1995), and ICBL (1999-2006).

that aimed at a wide audience with clear framing of the issue in humanitarian terms. The text of this joint call is organised into two different parts, each of them composed by three different paragraphs. The two parts of the joint call are reproduced below.⁷²

The first one:

a) Landmines are indiscriminate and long term effect weapons:⁷³

“Whereas antipersonnel mines that detonate on contact are indiscriminate weapons that remain hidden and lethal long after the end of the conflict; and

b) Landmines produce great human and socio-economic consequences:

Whereas antipersonnel mines have killed or mutilated tens of thousands of civilians and rendered large tracts of agricultural and pastoral land unusable, preventing the subsistence and economic development of rural populations; and

c) Existing legislation does not work:

Whereas the 1981 United Nations Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions the Use of Mines, booby Traps and Other Devices has failed to prevent the indiscriminate use of antipersonnel mines;”

Building from these three causes of the problem, the document calls then for a solution, which is framed in three different and interrelated prognostic elements in a separated second part:

a) A ban on all aspects concerning landmines

“An international ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and sale, transfer or export of antipersonnel mines, and

b) A United Nations (UN) fund to ensure the implementation of the ban

⁷² The idea expressed in each paragraph is presented before the paragraph. Then the paragraph is shown in italics as it was published in the original joint call.

⁷³ To the indiscriminate effects of landmines, it was soon added the ‘disproportion’ of the damage (see De Larrinaga and Sjolander 1998).


The establishment of an international fund, administered by the United Nations, to promote and finance landmine awareness, clearance and eradication Programmes worldwide; and

c) Responsibility of producer countries, who should contribute to the fund

Countries responsible for the production and dissemination of antipersonnel mines to contribute to the international fund”

In this joint call, a diagnosis of the problem is first identified and described through three different elements, each one addressed in a different paragraph. Second, a solution or *prognosis* is proposed, symmetrically divided as well into three different paragraphs dealing with three different and interrelated elements of the suggested solution. This symmetrical structure informed a clear and strong message that effectively penetrated into the public discourse. Figure 3.1 below sums up this section.

Figure 3.1 Framing of the ICBL: diagnosis + prognosis



3.3.4.2. The evolution of the landmines frame: Identity vs. opposition

“The military frame of reference should be changed. Militaries must deal with the life cycle effects and costs of mines, including responsibility for clearance. Governments must be encouraged not only to undertake serious studies of the military utility of mines, but also of the relative military benefits versus humanitarian costs.” (ICBL 1994:82-86)

Whereas the first International NGO Conference on landmines held in London 1993 was useful in order to broaden the network, the second one held in Geneva in 1994 focused on strategic choices. Particularly relevant for this research, the aim of the third working group in that Conference was *promoting the ban – countering the opposition*. In that group, numerous debates were around how to frame the issue, particularly taking into account how the adversaries were doing it. In the end:

“After much discussion, the general consensus was that the campaign should make a serious effort to question the military usefulness of landmines, but that ultimately our strength would be to focus on the fact that the long-term, human and socio-economic costs far outweigh any short-term military utility.” (ICBL 1994:82-86).

In the Review Conference of the CCW (1995-1996), considered in the dissertation as still in the first phase of the landmine process, negotiations focused almost exclusively on the military utility of mines, and their legitimate use in the preservation of sovereignty and security. Indeed, NGOs were excluded from full participation because conference members considered the discussions to be matters of disarmament and therefore of national security (Price 2000b: 624). However, there were some countries in favour of a total ban, such as Sweden, who helped NGOs that were monitoring negotiations and lobbying in the corridors to introduce the discourse of the *humanitarian costs*

of landmines, performing the identity vs. oppositional frame battle (see De Larrinaga and Sjolander 1998, and Snow and Benford 2000). In other words, actors in favour of a ban on landmines partially created their collective identity as an opposition to the arguments to the adversary. In addition, the use of human rights arguments for banning landmines follows the recent expansion of international NGO human-rights activities from the early 1990s to include economic and social rights (Korey 1998), an approach which resonates strongly with the international humanitarian law.

When addressed to governments and armies, “the fundamental challenge is to reshape the interest calculations of political actors in a direction that opens space and releases resources for impartial and effective humanitarian action” (Huberts: 2000: x). The ICBL framing was focused on the horrible effects and disproportionate consequences on civilians of the weapon.⁷⁴ These were, largely, indisputable arguments and anti-ban states had to make military and political arguments to why landmines should not be banned while at the same time expressing humanitarian concern for the landmine victims. No government could question, in a coherent way, norms and principles already established in the international humanitarian law, such as the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention. Among them, the proportion of civilian casualties (even if exaggerated in some statistics) was unquestionable evidence, and used by the pro-ban actors it became a very difficult argument to refute.⁷⁵ As chapter 5 will explain, this argument is

⁷⁴ Jody Williams put it in this way “we must continue to educate the public, our governments and our military to our view: the social costs of the landmines so greatly outweighs their military utility that they must be banned” (Williams 1995: 11).

⁷⁵ Robert Sherman, from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, responded to such arguments in this way: “I frequently hear it said that landmines are indiscriminate; they can’t tell the difference between a child and a soldier. That’s true, but it’s also true of other weapons or war. The shell, bomb, missile that can tell the difference between a child and a soldier has yet to be invented. The military would

also used by the cluster munitions coalition, which shows a successful learning process within different transnational coalitions.

The framing strategy of the ICBL included landmines in the category of weapons of mass destruction through an emphasis on their indiscriminate effects and on the fact that they continue to kill and maim long after the fighting has stopped.⁷⁶ For these reasons, it has been often argued that: “landmines can be considered a weapon of mass destruction in slow motion. As a result, they should be perceived as being just as indiscriminate and inhumane as chemical weapons” (e.g. Williams 2005a). The strategy then was to establish new international norms that place landmines in the same category than chemical and biological weapons, a category of weapons labelled as unacceptable by the international public opinion.⁷⁷

The ICBL had to face a second oppositional frame (see figure 3.2 below). Adversaries to the ban used to say that it was a utopian objective. In order to create an identity frame able to effectively compete with that one, the ICBL produced a list of arguments from different perspectives.⁷⁸ First, from the first joint document, it had been stated that the existing legislation was not effective. Now they will use exactly the same word than their adversaries:

love it if it were but it doesn't exist and won't in the foreseeable future”. Quoted in Rutherford (2000a: 93).


⁷⁶ Jody Williams, for example, put it in this way: “The military must consider the entire life-cycle of the weapon. It is not enough to look at a landmine during the engagement; the soldier must understand the long-term impact of the weapon long after the engagement has ended” (Williams 1995: 11).

⁷⁷ Those comparing landmines to chemical weapons and/or biological weapons, include the Belgian foreign minister Derycke as he opened the Brussels conference on 23 June 1997 (Price 1998b: 629).

⁷⁸ All the quotes of this paragraph were originally transcribed in the Acts of the third Working group of the Second NGO Conference on Landmines (see ICBL 1994: 82-86).

“it is more utopian relying on that legislation to solve the landmines problems”.

Figure 3.2 Framing of the ICBL: identity vs. oppositional frames



From a practical point of view, “a total ban on landmines would be much easier to verify and enforce than anything less than a total ban”, as it happens with other “legal precedents for outright bans on weapons (for example, biological and chemical)”.⁷⁹ This is arguably one of the major advantages of this campaign as compared with broader ones aiming at better regulation of other weapons, such as small arms or nuclear weapons. It has also been argued that the fact that the ICBL remained focused on the ban as a main goal was an essential factor that prevented them to be co-opted by the governments (see Jackson 2000). In addition, those preferring an incremental approach should ask for a ban, given

⁷⁹ That was precisely the ICBL argument against those (such as the US) suggesting the introduction of self-destructing or ‘smart’ mines as a solution to the landmines crisis. E.g. “it was felt that it would be more difficult to get agreement on prohibitions on ‘safe’ mines than on a comprehensive ban on all mines” (ICBL 1994:82-86).

that “without the articulation of a ban as a goal, agreement on interim steps is unlikely”.⁸⁰

The legal claim is quite persuasive too, “a ban on landmine use is already required by customary international law”. A similar argument will be effectively employed in December 2005 by the coalition against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (IANSA) when negotiating a legal instrument for the marking and tracing of small arms. However, the motivational frame remains probably the most powerful contra-argument to overcome the label of *utopian goal*. Therefore, “even if it is difficult, the magnitude and horror of the problem compels society to achieve a ban”.⁸¹

The set of statistical indicators was complemented by dramatic landmine victim stories, providing a kind of news that fits in the way current mass media work, offering them to the Western society of reality shows and filmed wars. The ICBL and the ICRC continually featured these stories, which were picked up by the media and pro-ban governments, such as the Canadian one. This ‘priming’ strategy has also been recognised as one of the main factors of the fast success of the ICBL, particularly from the NGOs side (see Rutherford 2000a).⁸² The problem is that the

⁸⁰ The Acts of the working group focusing on strategic issues reflects the debate between those preferring calling for ban versus those suggesting going gradually: “some people – a minority - argued that the focus should be not on a ban, but on improvements to the Landmine protocol” (ICBL 1994:82-86). See also Lawson, Gwozdecky, Sinclair and Lysyshyn (1998).

⁸¹ That was, indeed, the factor most frequently rated in the Ekos survey as having had a positive influence on a country’s decision to sign the convention. Thus, 80 per cent of the respondents included *merits of the issue* among the factors having a positive influence.

⁸² Indeed, in the Ekos survey, national NGOs and the national media were more likely to be rated as having had a positive influence on a country’s decision to sign the convention by representatives of NGOs and international organizations than by government representatives (80 per cent, 84 per cent and 65 per cent respectively). However, in the same survey, representatives of government and international organizations

surprise and impact in people's minds has a limit and once it has reached a saturation point, it no longer makes the same effect, as it frequently happens with hunger in Africa. The decrease of landmine's relevance in the public agenda after the Ottawa Process phase could be an example of this saturation point. Chapter 6 will expand on this idea, by showing that a number of pieces of news are depicting child soldiers more as perpetrators than as victims.

Among its most effective strategies, the ICBL followed different mechanisms of shaming. They used it to highlight the gap between a country's proclaimed identity, on the one hand, and its unwillingness to conduct its foreign policy accordingly, on the other.⁸³ Particularly in the second phase of the landmine process, the ICBL developed a "good guy" list as part of a strategy to move the landmine-ban issue forward at the CCW conferences (Williams and Goose 1998: 31).⁸⁴ As they were getting more and stronger, ban proponents became increasingly outspoken in criticizing laggard governments after the Brussels Conference, such as Australia and Britain, who reserved the possibility of using landmines for "exceptional circumstances" (Price 1998b:635). Shaming served the purpose of putting the government on notice that its actions place it outside the

were more likely to rate the international media as having had a positive influence than representatives of NGOs (68 per cent, 68 per cent and 48 per cent, respectively).

⁸³ In addition, Axworthy talked about "the mobilization of shame" regarding the Ottawa Process (see Tomlin 1998).

⁸⁴ In concrete, the media strategy developed in the review conference included the twice-weekly production of the *CCW News*, the ICBL newsletter on happenings at the conference. The newsletter's column, "*The Good, The Bad and The Ugly*" frequently "forced some governments to try to bring their public statements in line with the realities of their negotiations positions, or vice-versa" (Williams and Goose 1998: 31). Other coalitions, including the CMC and IANSA will use similar strategies in their campaigns (see chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation).

international community.⁸⁵ The positive reaction of the governments of (until then) reluctant states such as Poland and Greece after the award of the Nobel Prize to the ICBL could be understood in this way.

3.3.5. *Contingent factors beyond the activists' control*

The success of this campaign was not always a matter of the work by the transnational coalition and its allies; they also benefited from favourable developments beyond their control. Specifically, three factors seem to have been of particular importance in the second phase of the landmine process and so, for the signature of the treaty (see also Hubert 2000):

(i) Landmines were not a highly profitable industry. At least, the military industry was not as concerned with this issue as it is with other campaigns target other weapons, such as the small arms case.

(ii) Military leaders did not have evidence to support their claims for the military utility of mines (even if they tried it at least until 1996). Chapter 5 will show a similar debate taking place in the case of the cluster munitions campaign.

(iii) Changes in government in France and Britain in the late spring of 1997. It was crucial to have two of the members of the Security Council of the UN in favour of the ban. This fact would

⁸⁵ In many cases, leaders of countries care what leaders of other countries think of them (Risse 2000). Some authors have found many examples of some human rights changes occurring apparently because leaders of countries care about what leaders of other countries think of them. Indeed, norms have a different quality from other rules or maxims. James Fearon argues that while rules take the form "Do X to get Y", norms take a different form: "Good people do X". Thus people sometimes follow norms because they want others to think well of them, and because they want to think well of themselves (Fearon 1997, quoted in Risse and Sikkink 1999).

have helped other campaigns to finally decide their position and end up joining as well the Mine Ban Treaty.

3.4. Conclusions: A new model of social movement diplomacy?

The study of the landmines campaign suggests that the ICBL was successful for a number of reasons: first, because it was able to adequately combine resources, particularly research, expertise, advocacy and use of the media; second, because of strategies of lobbying and protest, as well as communicative processes such as framing and shaming; and third, because of a flexible organisational form and the capabilities of allies, benefiting as well from certain contingent factors beyond its control.

This chapter has contributed to the understanding and knowledge of the landmines campaign by identifying three different phases from the creation of the international coalition to the final signature of the Mine Ban Treaty and the subsequent efforts in its implementation.

As the following chapters will show, some of the lessons learned (by other coalitions and campaigns) include favourable negotiation conditions (a like-minded chairperson, activists' access to the diplomats' meetings, and provision for voting), effective coalition building (among and between NGOs, governments and international organizations) and clear campaigning messaging (advocating stringent provisions within an explicitly humanitarian discourse) on concrete and feasible issues.

Nevertheless, the chapter also shows that the issue of success in this domain is far more complex than what could be previously thought. The ICBL had initially hoped to secure a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel landmines at the 1995 Review Conference of the CCW of 1980. A total ban was not achieved then, but a core group of pro-ban states emerged to undertake a drive for a complete ban, with some states unilaterally renouncing their use. That initiated a new phase of the landmine process, which would end in the signature of the treaty. The Review conference can

therefore be seen as a failure, but also an intermediate step to the Mine Ban Treaty. Could this be a trend in similar campaigns? In the small arms campaign and after the big failure of the 2001 Conference, in which no treaty was signed, more strength was gained by the activists and their coalition IANSA. Also, the cluster munitions process will have a similar turning point related to a failure in a review conference of the CCW.

Given that success for activists mean particularly the implementation of international law (in this case, the absence of landmines from anywhere in the world), the fact of achieving a treaty does not necessarily end an international campaign; it might transform it, creating new objectives and modifying its structure. Therefore, the Mine Ban Treaty is a turning point towards a world free of landmines, but the ICBL has continued working, producing 'Landmine Monitor Reports', campaigning for extending the ban to non-state actors, and ensuring the implementation of the Ottawa Treaty.⁸⁶

The thesis agrees with Rutherford (2000a: 106-110), when he presents and refutes alternative neorealist explanations to the success of the Mine Ban Treaty, such as "states ban landmines because they perceive some relative gains in prohibiting landmines", "states that do not use mines simply agree not to use them", "landmines are not essential to many state's national security", "the convention is meaningless because major powers did not sign the convention". He refutes them from a constructivist point of view, emphasising the role of NGOs independent of existing state power distribution in agenda setting, controlling the landmine issue, and encouraging states to sign. However, the thesis also agrees with Price (1998b: 614) when he admits that some states, such as Belgium, were pro-ban from the beginning partially because they did not use these weapons and so their

⁸⁶ However, even if the NGOs still have their role in this phase, the Convention contains obligations accepted by states parties to it, and thus the final success or failure of the Convention will ultimately be related to member states taking ownership of implementation (see Brinkert 2003).

prohibition does not affect state interests, but the argument cannot account for why relatively insecure states have committed to banning landmines, such as Angola, Cambodia and Afghanistan. The effectiveness of this treaty was clear already less than one year after its entry into force. Major states have implemented certain landmine-policy changes unilaterally.⁸⁷ While the ban convention cannot ensure that states will abide by the prohibition, it will increase the economic and political costs of using them. This fact also challenges realist theories of international relations that would have predicted a failure of such a treaty without the support of the US.

The study of the financial issue of the campaign has shown that, to a certain extent, there is a competition in the NGO sector not only to gain resources, but also a prominent space in the agenda-setting, etc. In the case of landmines, the ICBL was already aware of it in the third phase, once the highest effects in the agenda setting had finished, asking itself "How could keep action against mines in the public agenda, despite the high number of other humanitarian priorities such as the AIDS?" (Mine Action Canada 2003: Questions pour l'avenir, 35).

The successes gained in this campaign have led some scholars to talk about an exportable model (e.g. Rutherford 1999; Huberts 2000: chapter 5; Laurance and Stohl 2002; SAS 2002: chapter 5). However, other researchers think that the context and the characteristics of landmines make this campaign unique (e.g. de Larrinaga and Sjolander 1998; Peters 2000).⁸⁸ Chapter 7 will

⁸⁷ "In the past few years the number of states producing landmines has dropped dramatically from 54 to 16. The 38 who have stopped production include a majority of the big producers in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. 8 of the 12 biggest producers and exporters over the past thirty years have signed the treaty and stopped production" ICBL (1999: Major Findings: 5).

⁸⁸ In the Ekos survey, a small majority of respondents felt that the Ottawa Process had established a new model for dealing with other international disarmament issues (51 per cent).

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reflect on this issue with the help of the analysis of the other campaigns.

CHAPTER 4. IANSA AND THE CONTROL ARMS CAMPAIGN

4.1. Small Arms and Light Weapon (SALW). Introduction¹

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) constitute the type of armament that is most frequently used in armed conflicts. Moreover, they are used in more than 40 per cent of all homicides in the world. In 2006, the estimated number of existing SALW was around 640 millions (SAS 2006). The proliferation of SALW attracted the attention of the international community following the sudden increase of the global arms trade after the end of the Cold War (Spear 2005). SALW were massively used in the 1990s in the internal conflicts of Rwanda, Somalia and also in the Balkans. NGOs and international organisations were thus confronted daily with the effects of the use of SALW.

Following the signing of the Ottawa Convention in 1997, a treaty banning the use of anti-personnel landmines, numerous states, international organisations and NGOs called attention to the

¹ Different from the other chapters, in the processes analysed here there is not a legally-binding treaty yet. For this reason, parts of its structure such as its division in different phases are slightly different from other chapters. Due to constraints of time and resources, this research analyses in-depth the events that have taken place until the end of 2006. In subsequent revisions of the chapter, some additions and updates have been incorporated in order to account for more recent developments of these processes.

proliferation of SALW as the next human security issue which needed to be addressed by the international community. However, in contrast to the landmines case, the idea of the adoption of a comprehensive ban of SALW was never considered. Indeed, SALW are used by armed forces and police forces around the world and also legally owned by civilians in many states. A much broader approach would therefore be needed to effectively deal with the SALW issues.

Research in the field of international agreements on SALW has focused on specific aspects of the problem, mainly from an international relations perspective. Thus, the social movement dimension of the topic has been mainly under-researched. Moreover, the research has been almost exclusively conducted by insiders, that is, by activists. Although they are arguably experts in the issue, this perspective may be biased towards overemphasising the NGO role in these processes as norm entrepreneurs. On another front, the seminal work by Denise Garcia ends in 2001, with a few short papers going beyond that date. This chapter updates her analysis taking into account the recent 2006 events, offering also original empirical research from an external perspective and using the theoretical framework explained in Chapter 1, including therefore different elements from several academic literatures and particularly from social movements sociology.

The *International Action Network on Small Arms* (IANSA) is the global network of civil society organisations working to stop the proliferation and misuse of SALW. Founded in 1998, IANSA has grown to more than 700 member groups in over 100 countries. It is composed of a wide range of organisations concerned with SALW, including policy development organisations, national gun control groups, research institutes, aid agencies, faith groups, victims, human rights and community action organisations.

Initiatives dealing with small arms have been usually implemented at a local, national, and regional level. However, beyond some exceptions, global actions on SALW are more recent, being a turning point the Program of Action (PoA) adopted

in July 2001 in the first UN Conference on SALW, which was reviewed in the summer of 2006 without an agreement.

In 2003, IANSA joined OXFAM and Amnesty International in the launching of the international campaign *Control Arms*, which obtained its first positive result towards a future Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in the resolution that was approved in October 2006 by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), which deals with disarmament and international security issues.

This scenario offers a unique opportunity in order to study social movement 'successes' and 'failures', a field that has frequently faced analytical challenges (see Giugni, McAdam and Tarrow 1999; Giugni 2004). Among all the processes around SALW issues, the chapter focuses on the two events that took place in 2006. In fact, it can be argued that there was success in the latter but not the former by a relatively clear uncontested standard. As it will be seen in the chapter, the campaign for an arms trade treaty will be more successful than the review of the UN process on SALW firstly due to the change in the rules of the game from one setting to the next. Apart from such different institutional settings (consensus vs. majoritarian; a plethora of issues on the agenda vs. only one; the partnership with civil society organisations), another factor that will facilitate the success in the ATT resolution is the plural and strong leadership by a core group of states. Moreover, activists will improve their coordination and lobbying between the two negotiation meetings. The next section describes the evolution of the international process.

4.2. The evolution of the international process

4.2.1. IANSA and the evolution of SALW in the international agenda

In the early 1990s, when the problem first emerged, there were only two NGOs addressing the SALW problems from an advocacy

point of view (Laurance and Stohl 2002: 4). In January 1995, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented his 'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace' on the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the UN, including a new global threat: the spread and misuse of SALW.

At that time, only ten per cent of the governmental statements in the debates of the First Committee (FC) of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) mentioned the SALW problem in the debates. In December 1995, within the Resolution 50/70B, the UNGA asked the Secretary-General to prepare a report of small arms in collaboration with a group of governmental experts, the UN Small Arms Panel. The conclusion of this so-called 'group of 1997' recommended that a conference on the illicit SALW trade should be held. By that time, half of all the governmental statements included SALW in the UN agenda. A second group of experts, 'the group of 1999' presented in 1999 a report dealing with the objectives, field of application, agenda, dates and place of the Conference.

Table 4.1 Percentage of governmental declarations mentioning SALW in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly debates (1995-2001)²

1995	10,1
1996	18,6
1997	47,3
1998	66,3
1999	77,4
2000	83,9
2001	83,3

Source: Documents and declarations of the governments, www.smallarmssurvey.org/Database.html. For a similar analysis, see Small Arms Survey (2003: 227-236).

² The total number of declarations were 8 (1995), 18 (1996), 43 (1997), 57 (1998), 72 (1999), 78 (2000), 75 (2001).

The SALW issue continued its evolution in the UN agenda, reaching a noteworthy 80 per cent of the governmental statements the years before the UN 2001 Conference (see table 4.1). By analysing data from the First Committee of the UNGA on the global debate within States about SALW, Laurance and Stohl (2002) have observed a process of specialisation when describing the problem and also on the possible way to solve it. Initial discussions about these issues in the mid-1990s were vague and general on the “need to implement more efficient mechanisms for combat illicit transfer and purchase of conventional SALW”, given the “potential of threatening that they represent for peace and stability” (from the Hungarian statement, 16 October 1995). The main message expressed by the minority of states worried about this issue in the mid-1990s was that illicit proliferation of SALW was a destabilizing factor that should be controlled by the international community (SAS 2003: 228).

The UN SALW conference [July 2001] was the result of the recommendation made by the UN Group of 1997. The idea was to continue a series of global conferences to deal with global challenges, along the same lines as other UN conferences on environment and development [Rio de Janeiro, 1992], human rights [Vienna, 1993], natural disaster reduction [Yokohama, 1994], population and development [El Cairo, 1994], social development [Copenhagen, 1995], the advancement of women [Beijing, 1995], trade and development [Johannesburg, 1996], and human settlements [Istanbul, 1996].

The group of 1997 also contributed effectively to the framing of the SALW issue from a range of perspectives, including the humanitarian one. Through the examination of data from the First Committee of the UNGA and from the final session of negotiation of the PoA, Laurance and Stohl (2002) have shown the extent to which the framing of the issue by representatives of States has been sophisticated compared to the previous decade. Regarding the definition of the problem, closely related to the diagnosis of the issue (Snow and Benford 1988), four are the fields in which governments admitted a link with SALW proliferation: Human

security, stability, criminality and development. The overwhelming majority of states mentioned one or more of the consequences of SALW in their statements. As a result, all of these effects were included in the final *PoA* approved in the 2001 Conference, with the unique exception of the ‘human rights violations’, due to the strong opposition of some states, particularly China. With reference to the solution of the problem, closely linked to the prognosis of the issue (Snow and Benford 1988), the sophistication of the discourse is even more evident. Thus, states already accepted that each aspect of the problem had to be dealt with specific political and legal tools, although not all measures had the same degree of support.³

As table 4.2 shows, more than half of the states presented the problem in terms of human security. In particular, states expressed concern on civil casualties in military conflicts, human rights violations, child soldiers, the number of refugees and displaced people, and danger for humanitarian workers. Second, it was also broadly maintained that SALW make the end of a conflict more difficult, threatening stability in local, national and international contexts. Regarding criminality, this label included acts of national and international terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and illicit exploitation of national resources. Finally, a quarter of all declarations mentioned a link between constraints for

³ The measures mentioned in the 2001 UN SALW Conference are the following (% of governmental declarations is in brackets): International aid (73,1); marking and tracing (70,9); Disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion (61,2); exports control (59,7); brokering (59,0); exchange of information (57,5); export criteria (56,7); implication of civil society (55,2); stocks management and security (46,3); rules of civilian ownership of SALW (30,6); reduction of governmental arms stocks (30,6); arms collection and destruction (23,9); criminalization of illicit activities (17,2); cooperation between agencies responsible of law respect (14,2); national legislative measures (13,4); reinforcement of embargos effect on arms (10,5); public awareness (5,2). See www.smallarmssurvey.org/Database.html. For a similar analysis, see Small Arms Survey (2003: 227-236).

development and widespread existence of small arms in a territory.

Table 4.2 Percentage of declarations associating SALW with negative impact in each field⁴

<i>Field</i>	<i>2000 UNGA</i>	<i>2001 UN SALW Conference</i>
Human Security	59,0	56,7
Stability	41,0	54,5
Criminality	30,8	54,5
Development	24,4	28,4

Source: Documents and declarations of the governments, www.smallarmssurvey.org/Database.html. For a similar analysis, see Small Arms Survey (2003: 227-236).

From July 9 to July 20 2001, the UN Conference of the Illicit Traffic of SALW in All Its Aspects took place in New York. The states agreed on a Program of Action (PoA) that established for the first time at a global scale a series of measures that the countries had to take in order to deal with this issue effectively (UN Document A/CONF.192/15). Following the lead of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the problem was presented as humanitarian, with 500.000 deaths occurring annually from these weapons cited as prime evidence by the civil society organisations that participated in the international conference.

Despite major efforts by some states to restrict the language of the document to just the illicit trade in SALW, the *PoA* does agree on treating the problem ‘in all its aspects’. And this is so because a majority of states came to see SALW as more than a narrowly defined arms control problem, a human security issue (Borrie and Martin Rondin 2005 and 2006a). A broad definition of security

⁴ The total number of declarations were 78 (2000) and 134 (2001).

and the problems of SALW themselves allowed a broad range of states to cooperate and a broad range of NGOs to get together to do something about it.

Researchers proposing something similar to the Ottawa Process for the landmines case as a unique way to go beyond the UN framework have argued that the Conference was designed in order to prevent that the SALW problem was addressed in moral terms, since from the beginning a consensus document was the goal (see e.g. Laurance and Stohl 2002: 38, and SAS 2002: 231)⁵. One of the consequences of this rule is that human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law were never debated on the conference floor, not even in closed session (despite some of the statements linked them to small arms misuse and proliferation).⁶ As usually happens with instruments of soft law, the language of the PoA is non-binding, and leaves wide margins for states to exercise discretion or interpretation through frequent use of clauses, such as 'where applicable', 'as appropriate', 'where needed', or 'on a voluntary basis'. In this way, most objections were met.⁷

The *PoA* approved in 2001 is an instrument of soft law. It does not legally bind the States that adopted it. However, 'soft law' documents are usually a first step towards the creation of 'hard

⁵ In fact, the research community has been an important and legitimate player here (see Garcia 2006).

⁶ Indeed, NGOs that focused on the human rights and humanitarian effects of SALW have occupied peripheral positions in IANSA network, partially due to that they felt left out of the *PoA*, a fact that would have induced them to collaborate less with IANSA than more central organisations, such as organisations focusing on arms trade control.

⁷ Some indicators of that ambiguity are the following, with the number of times that each term appears in the final *PoA* in brackets: 'Where needed' (2), 'where appropriate' (10), 'encourage' (18), 'upon request' or 'where requested' (6), 'subject to their national practices' or similar expressions (4), 'in a position to do so' (4), 'within existing resources' (4), 'where applicable' (3), 'as appropriate', (12) 'where needed', or 'on a voluntary basis' (5) and 'if possible' (1).

law'. They frequently represent a commitment between states that would prefer a binding law and those more reticent to accept any kind of rule. In essence, it *encourages*, but not obliges. The next section tackles in-depth the most relevant issues concerning this document.⁸

4.2.2. The UN Program of Action (2001)

The PoA is a consensus document that shows worldwide agreement that the problem is multidimensional and global, but without providing any legally specific measures. This has created a gap resulting from the national security/arms control environment in which the Conference took place, partially because every state legitimately produces, stockpiles, exports, and/or imports SALW for its own defense and internal security needs. In addition, the PoA establishes a minimal follow-up process, ensuring that the issue will stay on the international agenda until 2006.

How to assess the PoA? Was it a success or a failure? One the one hand, it has to be noted that this would partially depend on the results of the 2006 UN Review Conference. Thus, a positive result of the latter could be partially the consequence of the failure of the 2001 agreement. But this analysis *a posteriori* could also be

⁸ An in-depth analysis of the content of this text is provided here, because it represents the first global framework to guide the work of national governments, regional and international organisations, and civil society in combating the illicit trade in small arms, and has served to raise the level of commitment of states to address the illicit trade in SALW. Moreover, it has provided the justification for all actors, including NGOs, to monitor, report on, encourage, and if necessary apply political pressure to those states that are not meeting their commitments. Thus, even if this instrument was agreed on in 2001, it is still the most important text up date. Moreover, several interviewees argue that the controversies around the negotiations for the text are believed to be a sample of what normally happens in this issue-area.

biased, overemphasising connections between both UN Conferences, by seeing the first one as a necessary first step (which strengthened the network and facilitated the creation of a *momentum* for the negotiations) in order to have a more positive result in the second one. On the contrary, it could be simply that the 2001 conference was a failure because it did not achieve a legally binding document. In order to prevent such a posteriori bias, the chapter carefully uses different analysis made right after the 2001 UN SALW Conference, both by scholars and by activists that participated in the conference.⁹ From the examination of this secondary literature and from the opinion collected through the interviews, the assessment of the political success of the PoA is summed up in table 4.3.

Table 4.3 Degree of success in the development of different public policy tools

Marking, tracing and brokering	Moderate
Regulating the trade in SALW	Low
Brokering	Moderate
Surplus weapons and destruction	Low
Stockpile management and security	Moderate
Information exchange and transparency	Low
Follow-up	Moderate

The assessment shown in this table should be understood as the extent to which the wording of the text meets the expectations raised by the NGOs, without accounting in this phase for the later

⁹ Among them, the IANSA' report of the conference (IANSA 2001), Stohl (2001), Project Ploughshares (2001) and Bachelor (2001), all published in September 2001 and SAS (2002: chapter 5), Biting the Bullet Project (2002), Dhanapala (2002), Karp (2002), Krause (2002), Reyes (2002) and Laurance and Stohl (2002). The second group are more analytical and reflexive critiques than the first one.

implementation of the *PoA*. Despite that at the end of 2005 states agreed on a specific instrument concerning the marking and tracing of SALW, in 2001 the feeling among the activists was that of deception (see e.g. HRW 2001 or Stohl 2001).¹⁰ The results represent a low/moderate result, with some outcomes much lower than what NGOs were to some extent 'realistically' hoping. However, the fact that a consensus was reached regarding the final document allows one to talk about the (moderate) success.¹¹

Among the measures not included in the *PoA*, two were strongly and openly contested by the US and the gun lobby (see Bolton 2001);¹² the rules for civilian ownership of SALW and the prohibition of transfers towards non-state actors. Indeed, the President of the Conference admitted being deceived by the fact that a single state had not allowed to include those two issues into the *PoA*, although others states having similar positions decided not to make them public in order to leave the US alone receiving

¹⁰ Regarding brokering, it is in this table in the same category than marking and tracing because the objective within the context of the Conference was the same: to negotiate an international legal instrument on this aspect. However, it has to be noted that the two issues were dealt with separately, being debates around the issue of brokering not as advanced as those on marking and tracing.

¹¹ For similar analysis, see Reyes (2002) and SAS (2002: chapter 5). For more critical views, see HRW (2001) and IANSA (2001).

¹² Some analysts and ancient diplomats have affirmed that some of the veto points of John Bolton's intervention were not as important for the US position as he pretended in his intervention. Following this idea, the mention of an opposition to measures limiting legal trade and fabrication of SALW, to the promotion of international activities of awareness rising by International Organisations or NGOs and to a follow-up Conference would be points in which the US had presented an exaggerated view. In reality, it seems that the American delegation was willing to accept a commitment if their two major points were respected: the civilian ownership of SALW and the prohibition of transfers towards non-state actors.

public pressure.¹³ It has to be noted that the African group insisted strongly on the two issues; they finally accepted their absence in the *PoA* because the President of the Conference agreed to make a declaration describing the evolution of the negotiations and the specific role played by the US.¹⁴ Other issues identified as crucial by certain states and NGOs were not included in the *PoA*, such as concrete commitments to negotiate an international instrument on marking and tracing; weapons, increasing transparency in the legal production, stockpiling, and trade in SALW, agreements upon specific criteria governing arms exports, and negotiating an international legal instrument on arms brokering.

With reference to table 4.3, the first *low* mark ('regulating the trade in SALW) is because there are not export control criteria in the *PoA*. Second, the low mark regarding surplus weapons and destruction is because the *PoA* does not insist on the destruction of surplus weapons, although some encouragement is present. In fact, the states could not agree on criteria for determining what constitutes a SALW surplus. Moreover, the *low* mark about information exchange and transparency is due to the fact that, despite the issue was discussed extensively early on the

¹³ In this sense, some states such as Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil, Mongolia, Chile, Nepal, Costa Rica, Burkina Faso, New Zealand, Kenya, Cameroon and South Africa made statements close to the US position in the 2001 UNGA (see SAS 2002: chapter 5).

¹⁴ In his declaration, the Colombian ambassador, president of the Conference, stated that: "While congratulating all participants for their diligence in reaching this new consensus, I must, as President, also express my disappointment over the Conference's inability to agree, due to the concerns of one State, on language recognizing the need to establish and maintain controls over private ownership of these deadly weapons and the need for preventing sales of such arms to non-State groups [...] The States of the region most afflicted by this global crisis, Africa, had agreed only with the greatest of reluctance to the deletion of proposed language addressing these vital issues... They did so strictly in the interests of reaching a compromise that would permit the world community as a whole to proceed together with some first steps at the global level to alleviate this common threat" (Reyes, 2001).

Conference negotiations (see e.g. first draft of the Program, UN 2000), in the final *PoA* states do not move very far on the issue. Finally, it is difficult to assess the ‘follow-up’ dispositions as far as they even more than the other tools depend on their further implementation. However, the *PoA* does incorporate a number of measures in which could be the beginning of a process by which the full range of actors can begin to tackle the SALW problem at all levels.

Regarding agenda setting, the 2001 UN SALW Conference certainly raised popular and elite consciousness. It also generated two weeks of high-level international media attention and as such raised awareness of the various dimensions of the SALW issue. As civil society was slow to contribute to the making a global public policy on SALW, it was let to states operating in the context of the UN system to take the lead in defining the problem and developing the outlines of an initial conference (Laurance and Stohl 2002: 28). However, once IANSA got under way, its members began to contribute significantly on different fronts, including the presentation of concrete policy options. Indeed, many policy tools in the SALW area did not originate with states. For example, the general support for weapons collection and destruction had its roots in the many voluntary weapons collection and buy-back programs developed NGOs since the mid-1990s. Activists also documented the negative impact that SALW have outside the confines of national security (for example, on development, human rights and public health).¹⁵

Some scholars have argued that NGOs have greatest input into agenda setting when the relevant issue first emerges onto the international stage, whereas this becomes more difficult once the actual work begins (Simons and de Jonge Oudrat 2001; Laurance and Stohl 2002: 28). This case seems to show exactly the opposite.

¹⁵ Also, UN agencies helped to foster these connections. For instance, the UNDP, operating independently, was able to focus on the negative effects SALW have on development, a connection that governments operating within the UN process were unable to make (Laurance and Stohl 2002: 28).

In other words, since states decided that the SALW problem mainly involved national security and arms control, and would consequently be dealt with within the framework of the UNGA's First Committee it was up to NGOs and international organisations to develop policy initiatives that covered all the dimensions of the problem.

The 2001 UN SALW Conference provided a process in which governments had to make specific commitments by which they would have to report on their progress in their implementation, something that would become crucial in order to build partnerships amongst civil society groups and government delegations. Therefore, "those governments and NGOs wanting to move forward on the issue now have a much better idea of which countries might be part of any coalition that could provide the necessary leadership in the next few years" (Laurance and Stohl 2002: 25).

Regarding organisational collaboration and partnership between states and NGOs, the results were mixed. Although by the time of the 2001 UN SALW Conference, NGOs were fully active on SALW issues, they could not be considered partners in the process of shaping the *PoA* and they did not have full access to the diplomats meetings (see low access in table 4.5). However, they were allowed to attend some of the Conference's sessions, were provided with space in the UN building for meetings and briefings, and were given space to display their material and exhibits, having as well three hours (shared with the organisations of the gun lobby) to present their views to the states. The result of this framework was that "despite broad recognition that the issue was multi-dimensional, members of governmental delegations tended to be specialists in only one aspect of SALW – the one related to national security" (Laurance and Stohl 2002:26).

Some interviewees mentioned a North-South cleavage within the negotiations. Table 4.4 below shows that this heavily depends on each dimension. Some of these results can be explained by the fact that, on arms control issues, states from the South with little capacity for indigenous defense production guard their right to

acquire weapons. In the first set of issues, it can be argued that there is a North-South divide, in which few southern states supported these measures, whereas they were the major focus of the EU, the US, Japan, and other northern industrialized states. States such as China, Russia, and some Non Aligned Movement states resisted any measures that would restrict their ability to export or re-export SALW. This is consistent with long-standing differences between arms suppliers like the EU and the US and recipient countries that have historically resisted any restrictions on their ability to acquire military equipment (SAS 2002: 223).

Table 4.4 Positions of Southern states regarding different issues

Export and re-export controls	North-South divide
Indicators (definitions)	North-South divide
Surplus weapons	North-South divide
Transparency relating to the legal small arms trade	North-South divide
Linking the Program to development and the prospect of conditionality	North-South divide
Use of the phrase: 'excessive and destabilizing accumulations'	All Southern vs. Arab states
Legally binding instruments	Different positions
Marking and tracing	Different positions
Civilian ownership	Different positions
Transparency	Different positions
Destruction of weapons	Different positions

Source: SAS 2002: chapter 5 and www.smallarmssurvey.org/Database.html.

However, a second set of issues shows that the Conference as a whole was not divided along North-South lines. Therefore, on most contentious issues the coalitions were less clear, having the

Arab states a particular role, such as in their opposition to the use of the phrase: 'excessive and destabilizing accumulations', as it was seen to relate to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the end, Canada, the EU, Norway and Switzerland (arguably the group of like-minded states) were usually supported by a number of affected countries, including African, Asian and Latin-American countries.

In all UN conferences, the negotiation of the Preamble is critical. It establishes agreed upon causes and consequences of the problem, the norms and principles needed to solve it, and the objectives of the conference itself. Leading states will logically argue that a program requires a shared understanding of the problem. Yet, reluctant delegations will take advantage to slow down the process, spending much time in definitional arguments. In the end, the option adopted in 2001 was to have no definition, supported by the notion that precision was not necessary in a political document.

With few exceptions, points of contention at the regional level involved concepts that some states would find unacceptable if applied in their own region or at the global level.

Since several regions had adopted far-reaching measures, like the EU, the OAS, and the OSCE (SAS 2001: ch. 7), it was difficult for states from those regions to object. China, India and some Arab states were active in limiting agreement on regional measures. To ensure that these would be applied only to specific regions and not globally, terms such as 'where needed' or 'where appropriate' were frequently used. Moreover, in many places the language was diluted to suggest non-financial forms of assistance.

States such as France and Switzerland argued for a legally binding instrument on marking and tracing, but they had to face the opposition by the Arab group, China and the US. Despite the absence of agreement on international legal instruments, Sections II and III contain a range of operational measures at the national and global levels on these issues that would allow future negotiation on these issues.

Regarding the follow-up, a firm date was set for a review and the establishment of a monitoring mechanism (biennial meetings).

That was a compromise between two different positions. This gave the US and other skeptics time to resist a review conference if the implementation of the PoA was not going well. However, it also tried to keep the process within the UN, giving those who might be unhappy with the rate of progress a reason not to take the issue outside the UN, along the same lines as the model of the Ottawa Process on landmines or the Oslo Process on cluster munitions.

As it happened in other international negotiations, reluctant countries worked to restrict the topics covered by citing other forums where such issues were being addressed. The US also argued that the focus on SALW control diverted attention away from more serious matters, such as a lack of good governance or terrorism. In the Post-Conference period, the Bush administration was highly reluctant to take part in multilateral efforts, and relied instead on unilateral or bilateral initiatives to address SALW issues. Independent observers have documented an increase in exports of US weapons to states that are known violators of human rights in the period following 11 September 2001 (HRW 2002). Other states could have also relaxed then their export policies in the name of combating terrorism. Indeed, the association between terrorism and the illicit trade in SALW appears in several places in the PoA (see SAS 2002: 228).

Although coalitions among countries were initially slow to form, once the process of the UN SALW Conference started, states were forced to take positions and form blocs around substantive concerns and interests related to SALW. While international organisations made brief statements as how the SALW problem affected their particular mandate (e.g. UNICEF on children), only after the Conference these organisations began to develop and fund programs across a broader range of dimensions.

Regarding social movement work, the PoA encourages 'NGOs and civil society to engage, as appropriate, in all aspects of international, regional, sub-regional and national efforts to implement the present PoA (section IV, paragraph 2).

Table 4.5 Assessment of the different effects of IANSA in its first phase

<i>Type of effect</i>	<i>Estimation</i>
Access	Low
Agenda	Moderate
Policy	Moderate / High
Cultural	Moderate

The analysis of the PoA allows an assessment of the achievement of the different effects of IANSA in the first phase of the SALW process. First, access to the institutions is low since the activists cannot attend the official meetings. Second, the two weeks of the 2001 Conference meant however a moderate success in terms of the agenda, because the topic was in the media for such period of time.

Third, despite the PoA does not contain many crucial norms, and those that it does contain are not legally binding, the UN SALW Conference served to begin the codification of a set of norms and principles that form the basis for the next phase to prevent and reduce the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects. This has been assessed as a moderate policy effect which could become higher in case of a positive result in the review conference to be held in 2006. Moreover, there are many examples of voluntary standards being very effective in shaping state and NGO behavior (see for example, Simmons and de Jonge Oudraat 2001).¹⁶ Finally, the cultural dimension cannot be assessed here as high, because SALW proliferation is still not considered as a priority by an important number of countries. However, the positive response by some governments and their domestic public opinions allows one to assess it as a moderate effect. Following the theoretical model

¹⁶ These authors conclude the study stating that “the binding nature of a bargain does not necessarily ensure its effectiveness, and voluntary rules or standards occasionally prove highly effective (Simmons and de Jonge Oudraat: 677).

outlined in the first chapter, table 4.5 above summarises the effects found in every dimension in this phase.

4.2.3. *The 2006 events: Two different although related processes*

Apart from the UN process on small arms, there are other interrelated processes dealing with arms control. The most important aims at achieving an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and is campaigned by ‘Control Arms’. The similarities and differences between the PoA and the ATT have generated some confusion. Which one is more important? Which one is broader in scope? Which one would have more effects on the terrain? Which one has been the main focus of the NGOs? Which one has more legal strength? Are both dealing with the same kind of weapons? Are both dealing with the same kind of arms trade? Table 4.6 summarises the differences between both processes.

Table 4.6 Differences between the UN Program of Action and the Arms Trade Treaty proposal

	<i>UN Program of Action (PoA)</i>	<i>Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)</i>
<i>Legal strength</i>	Politically binding	Legally binding
<i>Nature of the trade</i>	Legal trade	Legal and illegal trade
<i>Nature of the weapons</i>	Small arms and light weapons	All conventional weapons
<i>Scope</i>	All its aspects	Only trade

It may be argued that the *Control Arms* campaign is a bigger process because it ultimately looks for a legally binding treaty on all conventional arms (not only SALW) that will cover all arms transfers (not only legal ones). According to Prasad Kariyawasam, president of the 2006 Review Conference (RevCon): “An arms

trade treaty would be much bigger than the PoA, which is only for preventing and combating illegal trade in SALW. An ATT involves all trade, not only illegal trade. That's where the catch lies".¹⁷

However, the PoA is a document 'politically binding', which means that it is not legally binding. It covers all small arms and light weapons, such as pistols or rifles, but not heavy weapons, such as canyons, tanks or airplanes. Its relevance lies on the fact that it covers the legal trade of SALW in all of its aspects. That means transfers, but also brokering, civilian ownership, marking and tracing procedures, and so on. Both processes are different, but with a clear connection, given that in the process of the PoA, activists try to insert clauses and articles that mention efficient controls on SALW transfers as a previous step in order to achieve the ATT. Also, the process of adoption of a treaty could be useful to foster the debate on SALW issues in the public opinion and also in the positions of the governments.

The supporters of the ATT argue that the signature and the implementation of a treaty could have a deterrent effect for those implied in the illegal traffic and in the inappropriate use of weapons. Thus, violations of the treaty would have a sanction, which would help to promote respect and application of the ATT. Finally, such a treaty would reduce the need for most of other agreements and would facilitate coordination and application of common standards by different countries.

The process towards the ATT coexists in the international agenda with the UN process on small arms, which as seen before, achieved a Program of Action in 2001, which was later revised in 2006.

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http://www.armscontrol.org/interviews/20060727_kariyawasam.asp.

4.2.3.1. The Review Conference of the PoA (June-July 2006)¹⁸

In the first Revision Conference (RevCon) of the PoA, states had to reaffirm their commitment to eradicate the illegal traffic of these weapons. That commitment had to be captured in a document adopted by consensus that would complement the PoA, establishing the common guidelines for the next five or six years. But the RevCon ended without agreement.

In the weeks preceding the RevCon, the powerful US National Rifle Association (NRA) had launched a campaign of mass mailing to the UN to denounce the UN's attempts to deny the rights of Americans to guns ownership.¹⁹ This campaign prompted the Secretary-General to reaffirm in his speech that the RevCon would not negotiate a "global gun ban" or try to "deny law-abiding citizens their right to bear arms in accordance with their national law".²⁰ During the Conference, a small number of countries were intransigent in their positions and the rest of them not decided enough in order to lead the negotiations to an agreement, something already feared at the middle of the RevCon. According to IANSA director:

"After a week here I am very worried, because we are seeing a very similar situation to the 2001 UN SALW Conference, where the US seem ready to block many initiatives, despite most of other countries want to advance. I am not sure that the rest of the countries are organized and determined enough to overcome that blocking (...). If we do not achieve a progress in this meeting, the whole process of disarmament in the UN is going to lose much credibility."

Interview n. 43²¹

¹⁸ An expansion of this section can be found on Alcalde and Bouchard (2008).

¹⁹ See Hoge (2006).

²⁰ UN Secretary-General, Address to the United Nations Review Conference, 26 June 2006.

²¹ Interviewed by the author in New York, 1 July 2006, in the context of the RevCon.

The result of the RevCon is a political failure. After two weeks of intense negotiations, no consensus was reached.²² This was the worst of the possible results. The only positive assessment came from those, such as the ambassador of Sri Lanka (and president of the RevCon), to whom the success of the Conference meant a personal success. Thus, Prasad Kariyawasam said in the speech of conclusion of the conference that the RevCon had been “a success of participation and media coverage”.

When accounting for the failure, the first reason has to do with path-dependency. Thus, the PrepCon, the conference that took place in January 2006 in New York to prepare the RevCon, had also ended without consensus. Then the states did not reach an agreement to set the agenda of the RevCon. The literature of international negotiation has shown that the preparatory process of the international conference is one of the best indicators of the result of a Conference (see e.g. Martin Randin and Borrie 2005 and 2006b).

Secondly, the management of the process was severely criticized. Specifically, the fact that the negotiation phase was too short, because the preliminary discourses of the countries lasted during the first week. In addition, the timing coincided with Independence Day in the US on 4 July and the FIFA world cup. Other reasons include the fact that some of the EU representatives, who presumably had to lead the negotiations, and some of the facilitators (a kind of informal coordinators of each section of the final document), would have lacked enough negotiating skills, according to some interviewees. This fact was aggravated by the weak position of the president of the RevCon, who could have tried not to make new enemies given that another diplomat from

²² Negotiations at the PrepCom ended on 20 January without agreement on a final draft to forward to the Review Conference. The Chairman produced a conference room paper, but was unable to gain support for its incorporation into the final document (See A/CONF.192/2006/PC/CRP.17) and only texts of an organizational nature were adopted and forwarded to the officers of the Review Conference.

Sri Lanka was one of the candidates to substitute Kofi Annan as a UN secretary general in the October elections: the previous person responsible for disarmament issues in the UN, Jayantha Dhanapala. Finally, the informal negotiations “off-the-record” during the last days took place only in English and in the absence of translators. As a consequence, francophone diplomats showed repeatedly their marginalization of the process.

The role of transnational activists when pressing for the inclusion of their proposals in the final document was acknowledged by many governments. Through the campaign *Control Arms*, a million of pictures of faces of people that support the campaign were given to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan the day of the inauguration of the RevCon. This fact achieved important media coverage. Moreover, up to forty-five delegations included representatives of civil society among their members. This number would have been better if Mercosur countries would have not accepted a petition from the Venezuelan government, which asked them not to include activists’ in their delegations. Nevertheless, the coalition’s lobbying efforts presumably allowed to shape some governmental positions.

Regarding movement tactics, some activists have criticized the strategic choice of having up to sixteen different speeches on behalf of IANSA, following a parallel situation than in 2001, where they delivered twelve speeches. According to Mary Wareham (Oxfam New Zealand and ex-coordinator of the US campaign to ban landmines):

“Strategically, I think that this is a bit of a mistake, that ‘less is more’. And I think that governments may pay more attention if we have one strong statement calling to leadership. So IANSA is outside the room, still outside the room, after long time. (...) And if you look what is going on, not only the landmines case, but also the disabilities convention, where NGOs have got much more access, I think it's a shame they are locking them out. So access is always a key issue for civil society, but I think you have earned it by showing that you are coordinated, that you can speak with one voice, that you can have root-based membership and that you can be focus. IANSA

is a network with many interests in it, but it should be possible to put all of this together into a strong unified voice.”

Interview n. 51²³

In the UN SALW process, as a typical negotiation based on old diplomacy procedures, what ultimately mattered was the unanimity rule. For this reason, from the beginning the objective was to reach an agreement with the most reluctant states. And so, the expected outcome was exactly the minimum common denominator, as said the Italian representative in one of the coordination meetings between the EU and the NGOs. However, in the end this minimum common point amounted to virtually nothing.

Among the reluctant countries, the US delegation was the most active one, with constant communications between Washington and New York. The Bush administration had shown reluctance to participate in multilateral commitments. Indeed, its speech expressed vigorously its *red lines*: munitions, gun possession by civilians, arms transfers to non-state actors that could be considered allies and new processes of revision of the PoA. However, it did not exclude the possible codification of global guidelines for a future agreement in arms trade, if it was not legally binding. Nevertheless, Cuba, India Iran and Pakistan were not flexible at this respect. In other points, Venezuela, Egypt and Israel had no negotiable positions. Two of the main producers of SALW, China and Russia, kept hard positions, but without making much noise, playing with the consensus rule, where a sole negative voice is enough to block negotiations. Finally, Latin-American governments, most of them acting together within the Mercosur, did not have a strong bargaining position. Similar to what happened with many African and Asian countries affected for the proliferation of SALW, they supported proposals for

²³ Interviewed by the author in New York, 7 July 2006, in the context of the RevCon.

stronger regulation, but they did not fight actively to impose their preferences.

Consistent with the literature on EU international influence, a divided European Union was not able to defend effectively their positions (Elgstrom and Jönsson 2005). On the one hand, there were important divergences among its members. Thus, whereas the two delegations of the EU presidency in the each semester of 2006 (Austria and Finland) kept the formal leadership, the effective leadership of the UK was not shared by all members of the EU, and particularly by France, which voiced its discrepancies.

In addition, it seems that EU countries were not able to transmit their position clearly enough. In this sense, some developing countries, e.g. the CARICOM, vetoed in the text the mention of development, even when such an outcome would have benefited them. Their reasoning can be summarised in the argument: “we do not want to lose money from programs of development aid to be put in programs of SALW control”. As said repeatedly by some of the donor countries, the proposal was not the transfer of the funds, but the creation of new funds to deal with two problems that, as acknowledged in the PoA, are closely related. Therefore, the leadership showed in other cases of human security negotiations was not so evident here, maybe because in the SALW there are more interests. According to Raül Romeva, Member of the European Parliament:

“In the landmine case, the EU was producer, exporter ... but not purchaser! Because of that, the EU had a kind of calmness and it was easier to convince some governments that an opposition to the mine ban did not benefit them and, on the contrary, they could make a very good impression if they supported the campaign. The SALW case is different, because the EU is a producer and an exporter, but also a purchaser.”

Interview n. 40²⁴

²⁴ Interviewed by the author in New York, 28 June 2006, in the context of the RevCon.

This failure in a UN Conference is not the first one. Indeed, the recurrent failure of negotiations hold in the UN context has undermined its legitimacy and fostered its reform starting by the rule of consensus as the way of decision-making. Criticised by most of the closure speeches, they did acknowledge, however, the importance of dealing with this issue multilaterally. In short, they seemed to say: “we want to negotiate in the UN, but in a different negotiation environment”.

4.2.3.2. Control Arms towards the Arms Trade Treaty


In October 2003, there was a scale shift (Tarrow and McAdam 2005) of the NGO network for arms control. Some organisations (OXFAM, Amnesty International and the coalition IANSA) working on different *national* contexts decided to focus on a single issue *internationally*. They created the Control Arms campaign in order to push for the ATT. In the last phase of this campaign, the role of the NGOs was more efficient than in other campaigns in the field of human security, such as when campaigning for the RevCon. In this sense, only two months before the First Committee sessions of October 2006, Prasad Kariyawasam, the president of the RevCon was quite pessimistic about it, in part due to the failure of that Conference.²⁵

With initiatives, such as the "Race for an Arms Trade Treaty", where activists visited the headquarters of the 192 governments in New York in 192 minutes, the amount of favorable countries doubled, from the official sixty at mid-2006, until the final 139. That was a marathon of lobbying that ended the main phase of the *Control Arms* campaign, which had officially started in October 2003 and that in July 2004 had the support of only ten countries: Costa Rica, Mali, Cambodia, Finland, Island, Kenya, Slovenia, Brazil, the Netherlands and Macedonia (see figure 4.1 below).

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http://www.armscontrol.org/interviews/20060727_kariyawasam.asp.

Figure 4.1 Number of countries in favor of the ATT (October 2003-October 2006)



The success of the activists is also measured quantitatively by the number of countries who co-sponsored the resolution: 116. And qualitatively, by the insertion of clear references to human rights and international humanitarian law, something that was not included in the first proposal of resolution and that was added in the October negotiations.

Inside the organisations of the Control Arms campaign, this inclusion has to be understood as a specific success for Amnesty International and the NGOs that work particularly for the promotion of human rights. This activist from AI International Secretariat affirms that they have finally achieved to make clear in the resolution that:

“Many of the Human Rights violations which we document in so many different countries are committed with the use of SALW. And so SALW and human right violations are very closely connected issues.”

Interview n. 46²⁶

In the voting for the 2006 October resolution, 139 countries voted in favor, twenty-four abstained and twenty-eight did not participate. The US was the only one that openly opposed the resolution presented by the UK and six other countries (see section 4.3.3.1 of this chapter). Among those in favor there were countries affected by armed conflict and also some of the main world producers, for example France, the UK and Germany, other big exporters, such as Brazil, Ukraine and Bulgaria. However, other producers abstained, including China, Russia, India or Pakistan.

The fact that the US was left alone in its negative vote did not seem to worry the Americans, who know well the importance of consensus rule in the UN context. Thus, whereas maintaining a so minority position as the one reflected in the vote, which enables them to play a fundamental role: “The only way for a global ATT to work is to have every country agree on a standard”, said the spokesperson for the US mission to the UN.²⁷ In a recent report by the independent 'Congressional Research Service', the US was still the main arms supplier in the world, with a total of \$ 8.1 billions to developing countries in 2005, 45.8 per cent of the total and far

²⁶ Interviewed by the author in the context of the RevCon in New York (5 July 2006).

²⁷ See, for example, the articles in *Der Spiegel* (<http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,445129,00.html>) or *Guardian* (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/armstrade/story/0,,1933807,00.html>) 28 October, which reported this statement.

from the second of the list Russia (15 per cent) and the third one, the UK (13 per cent).²⁸

Table 4.7 Assessment of the different effects of IANSA in this phase: (2006 events)

<i>Type of effect</i>	<i>Estimation</i>
Access	Low/Moderate
Agenda	Moderate / High
Policy	Very low (RevCon) / High (Arms Trade Treaty)
Cultural	Moderate

Following the theoretical model outlined in the first chapter, table 4.7 summarises the effects found in this stage of IANSA and Control Arms. Thus, and as it happened in 2001, access remains low in the PoA process, but was higher in the ATT process, thanks to the coordinating efforts by the Control Arms campaign, which also achieved higher presence in the agenda. If, in the cultural dimension there are no particular differences in the two different, but interrelated topics, the main variation relates to the policy level: a clear failure in the first case and a first success for the transnational activists towards the future Arms Trade Treaty.

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http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/11/13/Global_arms_deliveries_in_2005.

4.3. Independent variables for the political influence of IANSA and Control Arms

4.3.1. Introduction

In this section, the thesis analyses the different factors that could have affected the political influence of IANSA and Control Arms in the processes under study. It starts by examining the multilevel political opportunity structure (POS), including the regional, the global and the national levels. The idea of multilevel POS refers to the different contexts at different levels that can be favourable to collective action. Indeed, IANSA and Control Arms decided to work at all the levels: global (for example, international conferences), regional (agreements in Europe, America and Africa) and national (national campaigns), using as well the local level to gather public attention by showing the magnitude and the consequences of the problem. The domestic POS of the United States and the activists' allies and opponents are also analysed. Afterwards, both activists' resources and strategies are presented. The section ends by examining other contingent factors.

4.3.2. Multilevel Political Opportunity Structure (MPOS)²⁹

4.3.2.1. Regional POS: The European Union

In the late 1990s, the EU became one of the most vocal actors to support UN actions taken to stem the proliferation of this type of weapon. This can be explained by a number of factors. First, several EU Member States were important exporters of SALW.³⁰ These began to recognize that an increasing portion of their

²⁹ An expansion of this section can be found on Alcalde and Bouchard (2008).

³⁰ In 1995 the EU accounted for 33 per cent of the total arms export. See Eavis and Benson (1999: 89).

SALW production was being “recycled” and illegally sold on the global arms market. In addition, systematic studies showed that large quantities of arms were smuggled through the EU and brokered by EU companies and individuals.³¹

Second, EU activities in the areas of development assistance, humanitarian aid and conflict prevention were being directly affected by the proliferation of SALW. The production and export of SALW remaining within the competence of EU Member States, EU actions on SALW would have to be agreed within the Common Foreign and Security Policy framework (Anthony 2001). The first real step to address the SALW issue in the EU was taken in 1997 when the EU Council of Ministers adopted a political declaration: the Program for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms.³²

This Program provided a framework for addressing the SALW issues and reiterated the EU support for UN initiatives tackling the illicit arms trade. A few months later, during its EU Presidency, Britain presented to its EU colleagues the idea of a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, which had originally been put forward by a number of UK-based NGOs, including Saferworld, British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and the World Development Movement.³³

In June 1998, after three months of intense negotiations in the Council’s COARM working group, the General Affairs Council formally adopted the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, which introduced criteria and guidelines to manage arms exports

³¹ Belgium, France and the United Kingdom were singled out as the EU countries most implicated in this illicit trade in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. See Saferworld (1998).

³² European Union Program for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms 9057/97 DG E- CFSP IV, 26 June 1997.

³³ The UK had already shown its commitment to the SALW issue when in 1997 the newly elected Labor government adopted a comprehensive ban of handguns.

by EU Member States.³⁴ In December 1998, a Joint Action on SALW was also adopted.³⁵ It suggested objectives and measures to combat the destabilizing accumulation and spread of SALW and provided financial and technical assistance to specific actions in this field, including projects managed by the UN. With the adoption of these various agreements, a more harmonised European approach to SALW started to materialize.

As early as 1999, the EU also began to support UN initiatives to create a legally binding international body to control the SALW trade and to convene an international conference on SALW.³⁶ With the adoption of an EU Plan of Action, the EU made clear its priorities with regard to a future UN Conference on SALW. These included a commitment to international law and human rights, an emphasis on the link between security and development, the promotion of strict national legislation to sanction the illicit possession of SALW and the adoption of global standards for marking and tracing.³⁷

The EU's efforts to reach an international agreement on SALW were supported by IANSA. The EU and IANSA first collective effort was to focus on the promotion of a UN

³⁴ European Union, EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Council document 8675/2/98 Rev.2, Brussels, 8 June 1998. On the Code of Conduct see also Bauerr (2003).

³⁵ See Joint Action of 17 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on EU on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of SALW, 1999/34/CFSP, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L9, 15 Jan 1999, pp.1-5.

³⁶ See A/54/260.

³⁷ This Plan of Action was adopted under the French Presidency. In fact, France had already adopted a number of stronger transparency measures on arms exports, following the creation, in 1997, of the Quilès Commission, which investigated the question of French arms exports to Rwanda during the genocide. The commission was a result of strong pressure from various elements of civil society, including some French NGOs, members of the media and a number of academics. See Krause (2002) and McNulty (2000).

conference on SALW, which would introduce stringent international commitments consistent with the policies already adopted at the EU level. These two partners were backed by several states including Japan and Canada which also believed that the Conference should address broader questions of arms holding, inter-states transfer and assistance to countries in conflict. However, a number of UN Member States, including several Latin American, Asian and Middle Eastern states and more significantly the US, were more apprehensive about the conclusion of international agreements on SALW.

Several states, including the US, visibly privileged national or regional approaches over the adoption of international guidelines and made it clear that a UN conference should only focus on the illicit, and not the legal, trade of SALW.³⁸ A few weeks before the beginning of this Conference, the European Commission, with the support of the Swedish Presidency, published in June 2001 a report entitled *SALW and the response of the EU*, which stated the EU's objectives for the UN SALW Conference.³⁹ The EU championed the implementation of international exports controls and principles, the development of international instruments on marking and tracing and on arms brokering. It also emphasized two controversial issues: the need to address the issues of civilian possession and transfer to non-state groups.⁴⁰

Following the 2001 UN SALW Conference, the EU remained active on SALW. In July 2002, the EU adopted a new Joint Action, which replaced the 1998 Joint Action.⁴¹ The new version

³⁸ See SAS (2002: 209-210). On the US position, see Bondi (1999).

³⁹ European Commission SALW- The response of the EU, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001.

⁴⁰ See Statement by Louis Michel on behalf of the EU at the 2001 Conference, New York, 9 July 2001.

⁴¹ The new one was the Council Joint Action of 12 July on the EU's contribution to combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of SALW and repealing Joint Action. 1999/34/CFSP, 2002/589/CFSP, Official Journal L 191, 19/07/2002, pp.1-4.

of the Joint Action reflected the German and French position on the role of ammunitions in conflicts affected by the negative consequences of SALW. Almost a year later, in June 2003, under the Greek presidency, the EU adopted a Common Position on the controls of arms brokering. This Common Position established a clear legal framework and requested from the EU Member States to adopt the necessary national measures to control arms brokering activities on their territory.⁴²

During its EU Presidency, Britain took several initiatives to address the SALW issue at the EU level. The General Affairs Council of the EU in October 2005 supported the idea put forward by the Control Arms campaign of an international treaty to establish common standards for the global trade in conventional arms.⁴³ A few months after the creation of the Control Arms campaign, the UK, the Control Arms campaign and the British NGO Saferworld organized a meeting in Brussels to discuss the ATT with representatives from EU Member States, the European Commission and the European Parliament as well as various European NGOs.⁴⁴ The idea of the ATT rapidly gained support among the EU Member States, as it would introduce international standards similar to the EU Code of Conduct, thus ensuring that EU arms manufacturers would not be disadvantaged in the global market.

With the PrepCom approaching, the UK also realised the need for a clear and strong united EU position. The EU Strategy to combat the Illicit Accumulation and the Trafficking of SALW and their Ammunitions was adopted by the European Council on 15-

⁴² See Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP of 23 June 2003 on the control of arms brokering. *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 156/79, 25.6.2003.

⁴³ Council of European Union, Press Release, 2678th Council Meeting – General Affairs and External Affairs, Luxembourg, 3 October 2005, 12514/05.

⁴⁴ See European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, The Role of the European Union in tackling SALW proliferation, EXPO//POLDEP/NOTE2005, 01/12/05.

16 December 2005.⁴⁵ The Strategy not only outlined measures to be taken at the international level but also within the EU.

At the EU level, the Strategy's Action Plan called for an effective response to the accumulation and the problems posed by the availability of existing stocks, but also for the establishment and development of the necessary structures within the EU to deal with the issue, including the strengthening of the Council Secretariat's capabilities to ensure a coherent application of the strategy. The EU Strategy was adopted just a few weeks before the beginning of the PrepCom, with the expectation that the EU would play a crucial role at the RevCon.

Despite the coordination efforts between the EU Member States and also with the NGOs, it soon became apparent that several EU member states were pushing for their own priorities. France and Germany wanted the document to include a reference to ammunitions and focused their efforts at the RevCon on trying to reach a deal with the Americans on this specific issue. Because Britain was also an extremely active player during the RevCon, as well as a strong supporter of the ATT, Britain was perceived capable of leadership at the RevCon.

Regarding European civil society, from the end of the 1990s, European NGOs intensely and successfully lobbied several key EU member states to adopt stricter regulations regarding SALW not only at the domestic level, but also at EU level. These efforts seem to have been fruitful as, between 2001 and 2006, the EU adopted more than a dozen agreements addressing the issue of SALW, including a series of Joint Actions, an EU Code of Conduct, an EU Plan of Action and the EU Strategy on SALW. The EU Member States also used European NGOs to raise awareness on the SALW issue and gained public support for their embrace of "humanitarian values".

⁴⁵ Council of the European Union, EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, Brussels 13 January 2006, 5319/06.

However, during the negotiations at the PrepCom and the RevCon, it became clear that these interactions had not yet formalised an effective relationship between these two groups of actors. The EU's apparent willingness to listen to NGOs did not transform itself into formal cooperation: no plan of action was agreed between the EU and IANSA. The two coordination meetings organised between EU government representatives and EU NGOs during the RevCon failed to produce a common strategy and therefore effectively influence the negotiations. Furthermore, as NGOs were not allowed to be full participants in the negotiations, their representation in national delegations was seen as quite crucial at the RevCon. Even though forty-five delegations at the RevCon included members of civil society, the representation of NGOs within the delegations of EU Member States was overall quite weak. With the notable exception of Germany, which had five NGOs representatives and Finland, and Sweden which both had three, most EU Member States delegations, including France, did not include a representative from civil society.⁴⁶ It is also interesting to note that Britain, which had developed strong relationship with IANSA, had only one civil society representative.

4.3.2.2. International POS: The negotiations within the UN

The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the SALW RevCon met in New York in January 2006. Negotiations on the preparation of a RevCon were difficult and both the group of like-minded states and IANSA multiplied their efforts to convince other states to support the adoption of strong international commitments. Prior to that meeting, the Chair, Ambassador Rowe from Sierra Leone, held several informal consultations in New York and Geneva, defining six "clusters" on which negotiations would focus: 1)

⁴⁶ Other notable exceptions include Spain with two representatives from civil society and Austria, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands with each one representative.

Humanitarian, socio-economic and other dimensions, 2) Norms, regulations and administrative procedures, 3) Excessive accumulation, misuse and uncontrolled spread, 4) International cooperation and assistance, 5) Communication, and 6) Follow-up and reporting mechanisms.

At the PrepCom, regional actors such as the EU presented its strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and the trafficking of SALW and their ammunitions, which had been adopted by the European Council in December 2005. In the framework of the PoA, the Strategy supported the adoption of a legally binding international agreement on the tracing and marking of SALW, the creation of a group of experts on brokering, the strengthening of exports control and the inclusion of minimum common international criteria and guidelines for controls on SALW transfers.⁴⁷ However, what also transpired at the PrepCom is that several EU Member States had their own priorities. On the one hand, France and Germany emphasized the need to combat the illicit trade of ammunitions.⁴⁸ On the other, the Netherlands and Britain presented a working paper on the negative humanitarian and development impact of the illicit trade of small arms and recommended that the link between SALW and development be clearly spelled out in the final document of the Conference.⁴⁹

The group of like-minded states was also well aware that the RevCon would not initiate a renegotiation of the PoA. With the support of the US and the League of Arab States, the EU insisted that the “goal of the RevCon [was] not to renegotiate or re-open the existing PoA” but rather to complement or enhance the PoA and its implementation.⁵⁰ Despite this general agreement,

⁴⁷ See EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and the trafficking of SALW and their ammunition (Adopted by the European Council on 15-16 December 2005). PrepCom, 17 January 2006, A/CONF.192/2006?PC/CR.14.

⁴⁸ See A/CONF.192/2006/PC/CRP.12.

⁴⁹ See A/CONF.192/2006/PC/WP.2

⁵⁰ See Statement by Dorethea Auer, Austria, on behalf of the EU, General Debate, PrepCom, New York, 9 January 2006.

negotiations remained difficult at the PrepCom with a number of states refusing to compromise on certain issues.

IANSA got directly involved in the negotiations regarding the organization of the RevCon. The NGOs' input and their support for the EU's position became crucial during the negotiations of PrepCom. IANSA had been especially active since the 2001 UN Conference. It had participated in the negotiations of the Firearms Protocol and in many regional conferences that achieved positive results, such as the legally binding ECOWAS convention on SALW.⁵¹ Moreover, IANSA had joined the EU's efforts to promote the idea of a global arms treaty. In October 2005, parallel to the UN SALW process, the EU supported the idea of an international treaty to establish common standards for the global trade in conventional arms.⁵²

If the process around the PoA was complex and multidimensional, including several national, regional and global initiatives, the call for an ATT was a single-issued campaign, which did not necessarily limit its scope to the UN forum.⁵³ In 2003, the Control Arms campaign was launched by three UK-based NGOs: Oxfam, AI and IANSA to support the ATT.⁵⁴ The campaign was led by three big organisations, which

⁵¹ The ECOWAS is the Economic Community of West African States.

⁵² The idea of an international ATT was first put forward by a group of Nobel Peace Laureates in 1995 with the aim of limiting the spread and misuse of conventional arms. The ATT would create legally binding controls and international standards on arms trade. The EU highlighted that the United Nations was the only forum, which could deliver this treaty and called for the start of a formal process at the UN at the earliest opportunity. See Council of European Union, Press Release, 2678th Council Meeting – General Affairs and External Affairs, Luxembourg, 3 October 2005, 12514/05.

⁵³ Indeed and because of the slow and bureaucratic characteristics of the UN processes on disarmament issues, the idea of engaging in an alternative process similar to the Ottawa Process for the landmines case, was envisaged as a real possibility by the NGOs. Interview n. 52.

⁵⁴ See www.controlarms.org.

complemented each other. IANSA is a coalition of hundreds of NGOs, most of them small, grass roots, working on very different kinds of projects and from many different places. In addition, both AI and Oxfam have international prestige, reputation, contacts among the press and international organisations – such as the EU or different UN departments - and many potential supporters to mobilise.⁵⁵ The Control Arms campaign put further pressure on states to address the SALW trade issue at the UN.

4.3.2.3. National POS: Domestic negotiations and leadership role by Britain and others

Following the 2001, UN SALW conference, Britain was one EU member states that most increased its involvement on the SALW issue. As early as July 2000, the British Government established the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, which included a strategy on SALW. This pool was managed jointly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence. The British SALW strategy aimed to coordinate existing Programs managed by the three departments under a single set of objectives and resources. It also included support for partnership with UN agencies and civil society. In addition to the SALW strategy, the British government adopted in 2002 the Export Control Act which introduced a strong revision of its export control legislation and,⁵⁶ in July 2003,

⁵⁵ Despite Amnesty International and OXAM are both formally members of IANSA, the creation of the Control Arms campaign meant that both organisations decided to use a huge amount of time and resources to the issue of the ATT, which from that moment became one of the top priorities for these international organisations. In the words of an NGO official: “Oxfam and Amnesty are the two organizations that have taken the initiative and that have the possibility of mobilizing more resources and, at least theoretically, millions of members around the world. Because of that their name is put so evidently in the materials of the campaign”. Interview n. 58, 2 July 2006 in New York.

⁵⁶ *Biting the Bullet and IANSA* (2006: 105).

Britain with the support of France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, launched the Transfer Control Initiative (TCI), which focused on assisting countries to strengthen controls over the export, import and transit of SALW.⁵⁷

As mentioned before, Britain also became a vocal proponent for the ATT, partially due to the presence within British government of Jack Straw as Foreign Minister at the time. In March 2004, Straw announced that Britain supported the idea of an international ATT.⁵⁸ In all its initiatives regarding the ATT, IANSA and the Control Arms Campaign supported Britain. In the end, Britain with the help of various European NGOs convinced its other EU partners of the need for the EU to support the ATT initiative; indeed the Control Arms campaign gained momentum when the EU member states supported the ATT during the European Council in October 2005. The British defence industry, including the British Defence Manufacturers Association (DMA), which regroups 550 defence companies, and key trade unions, also supported the ATT.⁵⁹

In the RevCon, Britain made several proposals on transfer controls to the President of the RevCon and also attempted to persuade the American delegation to support the inclusion of several issues in the final document. With the Netherlands, London also advocated for the link between fighting against the spread of illicit SALW and sustainable development to be recognized. This time, the opposition came from a number of states from the Non-Aligned Movement including India and Indonesia and the Caribbean States, who raised concerns about the

⁵⁷ See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department of Trade and Industry, Department for International Development and Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom Strategic Export Control- Annual Report 2003, June 2004, Cm 6173.

⁵⁸ European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, The role of the EU, p.6-7.

⁵⁹ See Control Arms. Parliamentary Briefing. 2006 - A crucial year for controlling the global arms trade. www.controlarms.org, accessed 27/10/2006.

idea of conditionality on development aid and about resources from the donor countries being diverted from development to SALW projects.

In addition, national NGO campaigns in several EU Member States, particularly in the Britain, Austria, Germany and Belgium successfully pressed their government to address the issue of SALW. From its creation, IANSA developed a close connection with several EU countries, but particularly with Britain. Indeed, it was partially the funding provided by the British Department for International Development, which allowed the creation and activities of the first years of the network.⁶⁰ This provoked critics from many organisations inside IANSA about being too Eurocentric and even too British-centric. In fact, the IANSA headquarters and most of its biggest and more influential members, including Amnesty International, OXFAM and Saferworld, are based in London (or Oxford). Even if this fact facilitates a better and faster coordination, it also causes difficulties to maintain the good relationships with the members of countries in other parts of the world, such as East Asia or Western Africa.⁶¹

The Austrian NGOs were also particularly effective: the Austrian government in May 2005 adopted a new Foreign Trade Act dealing with transfer control.⁶² Germany and Belgium were two other EU Member States that reiterated their commitment to curbing the negative effects of SALW following strong pressure from civil society. Both countries began to actively destroy their surplus and illicitly owned SALW. In 2002, Belgium was also the

⁶⁰ Interview n. 71. The interviewee has been SALW expert for the British government. The interview took place in London, 21 February 2007.

⁶¹ Interview n. 33. The interviewee is an activist from an Asian country. The interview took place in New York, 29 June 2006.

⁶² *Biting the Bullet and IANSA* (2006: 105).

first EU countries to incorporate the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports into domestic law.⁶³

4.3.2.4. The United States: Mid-term elections and the MPOS

An event took place in the last phase of this process that altered significantly the perspectives of creation of the ATT in the short/medium term: the mid-terms elections in the US in November 2006. From the social movements' literature, it could be said that the political opportunity structure was expanded (Tarrow 1996, Kitchelt 1986). From a public policy perspective, a new window of opportunity had been open to advance this issue at a US national level, but also internationally, given the international influence of the superpower.

From the point of view of the arms control debate, the choice was between pro-gun and pro-control candidates, between the Brady Campaign, name of the network of activists who work to make stronger US gun laws, and groups such as the National Rifle Association, known for its defense of the rights of the gun owners. The two differed in the assessment of the results.

The Brady Centre to prevent gun violence affirmed in its web page that the candidates that support a bigger gun control had won 95 per cent of the election contests in which they participated, including the five elections to governorship and the four races to the House of Congress and to the Senate in which the opponent was an official "NRA friend".⁶⁴ Yet, the calculations of the gun lobby were qualitative and quantitatively different. For example,

⁶³ In Germany, between 1990 and 2004, the Federal Armed forces destroyed more than 1.7 million surpluses SALW. Since 2001, Belgium has annually destroyed in average 12,000 to 13,000 of SALW from which 95% were illicitly owned. See *Biting the Bullet* and IANSA (2006: 105).

⁶⁴ "A National Momentum Shift: Supporters of Common-Sense Gun Laws Win Races from Coast to Coast", press released by the *Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence*, 8 November 2006. <http://bradycampaign.org/media/?pagename=release&release=851>.

Gun Owners of America (GOA), underlined that among the Republicans to be in the congress “there are eight A-rated (highest qualification they get depending on their defense of gun rights), being four of them clearly 'better' than the Republicans that they substitute”.⁶⁵ GOA also said that at least five of the Congressmen defeated were not strong supporters of the *gun rights* and that two of the Republican senators were clear defenders of a more rigorous legislation.⁶⁶ Finally, at least two of the democrat senators had declared publicly their support to the NRA.⁶⁷

It seems thus that activists pressing for a stronger control will be favored by the democrat majority in both cameras, having important allies. For instance, in the US House of Congress, Nancy Pelosi, leader of the House, John Conyers, head of the House Judiciary Committee; in the Senate, its leader Harry Reid and important members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, such as Senators Pat Leahy, Ted Kennedy, Joe Biden, Herb Koh, Dianne Feinstein, Russ Feingold, Charles Schumer and Dick Durbin, all of them known by their support for a stronger gun regulation. However, the future of the US gun political orientation is still uncertain, given that NRA supporters still keep important positions in the US administration, like John Dingell, who leads the influent committee of trade and energy.

Therefore, the Democrat victory in the Novembre 2006 US legislative elections opens new approaches for the US administration, so far closer to defending the gun rights than to imposing effective restriction of their possession and trade. The need to talk with a Congress and a Senate controlled by the

⁶⁵ “GOA House Ratings For The 109th Senate”, *Gun Owners of America*

<http://www.gunowners.org/109srat.htm>.

⁶⁶ “GOA House Ratings For The 109th Senate”, *Gun Owners of America*

<http://www.gunowners.org/109srat.htm>.

⁶⁷ “Election 2006 re-cap”, press released by the *National Rifle Association – Institute for Legislative Action*, 09 November 2006. <http://www.nraila.org/Legislation/Federal/Read.aspx?id=2482>.

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Democrats could mean significant concessions in foreign policy and in a rapprochement to the UN. However, the 2006 mid-term elections in the US should not be overestimated. Even if it could be essential for the US position on Iraq, its ability to carry over into a side issue not under congressional control is questionable. The real decisive event could have been 2008 presidential elections, although it is too soon to assess it.

4.3.2.5. Transnational activists' allies and opponents

The configuration of allies and opponents is very particular in the case of small arms. On the one hand, UN departments and regional organisations have been crucial allies in helping IANSA, adopting formal operation measures already before the 2001 UN SALW Conference. In fact, the interaction between regional and international processes constituted an important part of the political efforts aiming at creating a concerted international action regarding the problems of proliferation of SALW (Greene 2001).

On the other hand, the firearms community is a powerful opponent. Different from other campaigns, there is an organised contra-campaign which uses similar strategies than IANSA and Control Arms, such as lobbying the diplomats. That means that in each international conference, the two different sectors of civil society share the same space. For example, in the RevCon, the only members of the civil society inside the US delegation were the representatives of the *National Rifle Association*. Moreover, thirteen associations of the gun lobby (from different countries) participated in the speeches of the morning of 30 June 2006, space that the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, organisers of the event, had reserved for the NGOs, both for and against SALW control:

“Here we really have the dichotomy of 2 campaigns working at the same time, which are the gun lobby and the gun control one. This is different and more complex for us to negotiate, because that actually has an influence. Obviously, the NRA has a tremendous influence on

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the American delegation. They have done what we always recommend the NGOs to do, which is influence your government”.

Interview n. 48⁶⁸

The NRA is a lobby group with millions of affiliates in all the states of the US, organised following a very similar structure to the US multilevel political institutions. Thus, they can easily act and coordinate to respond to any initiative of control in any point of the country. According to the same official of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs:

“In the international conference they maintain an extremely low profile. But they are here and we know that they are here. Wayne Lapierre is registered, he has access here, but you don't see him around. But he has the badge to be here. They have a tremendous influence on the US delegation, but they maintain a low profile. They work much more effectively than IANSA. They also have more money. They want us to place them with the other NGOs, so we put them together in the UN. That's obviously pure propaganda. I think they do a better job, but I think that's because they play at home. When they go abroad they are not so successful. (...) They have a very good representative here. He is a very sharp, intelligent man and he read how things work here in the organization pretty early in 2000. And even if in the NRA web page you can see really crazy things, you will never hear anything like this from him. He plays the game very well; he is in contact with everybody. And he is the one here who got their pass as a recognized NGO. Here he can work the system; he knows how to do it.”

Interview n. 48⁶⁹

Second, their members have a high likelihood to participate in protest events. For example, US activists for rights to carry guns have a twice likelihood to send letters to their political

⁶⁸ Interviewed by the author in the context of the RevCon in New York, 1 July 2006.

⁶⁹ Interviewed by the author in the context of the RevCon in New York, 1 July 2006.

representatives than activists for gun control (Goss 2006). But this is not only a grass-roots organization; its leaders have learned how to deal with international organisations, something acknowledge also in the UN.

The World Forum of Sport Shooting Activities is the main umbrella association that represents the interest of the firearms community when they go international. They are present in the UN in New York, but also in other countries. For example, it is believed that they helped decisively the Brazilian gun lobby in the referendum that took place in 2005 about banning civilian possession of guns. They provided resources, advice and a very powerful frame: *“This is the first right they are going to take from you. Which will be the next one?”*, which had been very successful in the US context (Goss 2006). Contrary to the predictions by surveys, Brazilians voted against the ban on firearms.

In these UN conferences, a dozen of different groups spoke for the “firearms community”. Whereas half of them offered expertise and technical assistance on the issue, a bigger number emphasized the problem of the lack of a definition about what is a SALW. Therefore, they asked for a formal acknowledgment that sport or recreational shooting was not related to the issues under consideration. While reiterating support for the aims of the Conference to address the illicit trade in small arms, they also expressed concerns that the legitimate domestic rights of (particularly) US citizens to own and use legal arms might be restricted by the outcome.

The relationships between the two groups of NGOs were not always one of confrontation. For example, in 2001 they worked together in the process of the PrepCom in order to achieve the maximization of their role during the Conference (Atwood 2001). With a minor presence than in other global UN Conferences, (380 individuals of 118 organisations), they were part of some of national delegations (at least Canada, Ireland, UK, Côte d’Ivoire, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand and Switzerland).

Finally, the SALW industry has not played a similar role that other industries have played in other global issue areas, including

child labor and the environment, in which, partially due to public pressure, they have banded together to create comprehensive codes of conduct and collaborative efforts with public efforts. However, it has to be noted that, traditionally the NGOs sector has not a unique position regarding SALW industry. Thus, some NGOs feel that industry is part of the problem, not the solution, whereas other would like to have a dialogue with them.

4.3.3. Resources controlled by the NGOs

4.3.3.1. Organizational issues: Leadership and beyond

Many of the participants of the process of negotiations underlie the need of having a strong and plural leadership as a necessary element for its success. Some scholars have linked it with middle power countries.⁷⁰ For example, “middle power countries are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that gives them significant political credibility” (see e.g. The Middle Powers Initiative, <http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/about.html>). These are some of the countries that have participated in this initiative including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden. What do we have all these countries in common? Is it only geographical size, number of inhabitants, and GNP per capita? This quote by Mary Wareham, one of the closest collaborators of Jody Williams in the landmines coalition, provides an answer.

“Leadership is very important. (...) We need someone that has the *skills* to go out there and get governments to negotiate something

⁷⁰ See, for example, Stokke (1989), Cranford Pratt (1990), Cooper *et al.* (1993), Hurrell *et al.* (2000) and Begrubger (2003).

like an ATT. For that you need countries with *good record of diplomacy*, such as Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, New Zealand... It does not matter if you are not a superpower, but if you are willing to put the *resources* into it and if you are smart enough to do it, then you go out and do it. But we are not going to go anywhere with a country like Japan, which is not good at the diplomacy. “

Interview n. 51⁷¹

Firstly, in the leading group of countries that presented the resolution to the 1st Committee of the UNGA, there is Britain. This was a key country in the creation of IANSA because of its financial support (which to some extent shaped its aims and development, particularly in the first years of the coalition). Indeed, Britain has played so far a kind of leadership, but without assuming the role that Canada played in the banning of landmines or more recently Norway in the case of cluster bombs. However, it may be the case that Britain was aiming at having a better record of diplomacy. Particularly after the war-friend image gained because of his participation in the Iraq occupation. It has used skills and resources in order to build this core group of countries. Kenya has been a regional reference in several international disarmament negotiations and, particularly, both in the landmines and in the SALW cases. Finland, then president of the EU, had here a more active role than in other cases (for example, it did not sign the Ottawa Treaty). Costa Rica, a small state of Centro-America without an army and with a Nobel prize-winner as first minister supported the idea from the beginning. Finally, Australia, Argentina and Japan ensured an effective plural representation. Only one region was not represented in this group: Middle East countries lack an organized civil society pressing their governments in these issues and they are therefore in the group of the abstentions.⁷²

⁷¹ Interviewed by the author in the context of the RevCon in New York, 7 July 2006.

⁷² The journal in English Arab News began its editorial on 28 October its editorial stating: “Only a cynic would claim the UN’s

In terms of leadership, the case of the RevCon is very different from the ATT and the Control Arms campaign. Thus, the lack of strong leadership both within the EU and the IANSA network may have also affected the success of the EU-NGOs coalition at the RevCon. On the one hand, Austria and Finland, which held the EU Presidency during the negotiations, seemed to display a formal leadership. On the other hand, the effective leadership was mostly exerted by Britain, arguably the most active state during the RevCon. During the negotiations, the British made several proposals on transfer controls and also attempted to persuade the American delegation to support the outcome document. However, these British initiatives were criticised by other EU member states as some of these states felt that London was too close to Washington in advocating strict positions on some of the controversial issues. The British Foreign Office also made several proposals and suggestions to the President of the RevCon, especially on transfer controls, without consulting its EU partners. The EU's lack of leadership might also stem from other EU member states, including France and Germany, pursuing their own priorities rather than EU position. This resulted in a situation where "in attempts to take stronger positions on a number of themes, several EU member states spoke on behalf of their individual governments, rather than allowing the moderate joint EU statements to represent them" and influenced the EU's capacity to exert clear leadership in the negotiations.⁷³

Also on the NGOs side, it was unclear who held the real leadership. This is a factor frequently cited by participants in the

planned treaty to regulate and limit the international arms trade is an absurdity", without mentioning the position of their governments about it, being most of them part of the ad hoc coalitions that blocked the RevCon. See: "Arms Trade". 28 October 2006. *Arab News. The Middle East's Leading English Language Daily*.
<http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7§ion=0&article=79913&d=28&m=10&y=2006>.

⁷³ See Buchanan (2006).

RevCon as something that needed to be improved in the future.⁷⁴ For example, senior activists, who were neither part of the IANSA secretariat nor of the IANSA Steering Committee, headed most of IANSA daily meetings. Furthermore, IANSA had a weak approach towards the EU as a collective actor. Throughout the RevCon, several EU Member States, including Britain and the two states holding the EU Presidency, Austria and Finland, were perceived as the natural allies by most of the NGO Community. Partially because the majority of NGOs that created IANSA are UK-based and have already established relationship with certain EU Member States, activists tended to overly rely on a small number of EU member states to defend their position at the RevCon. In this process, IANSA not only neglected to support the EU as a collective actor, but also overlooked other potential allies, who could have helped to develop a broader approach towards all the states that participated in the Conference.

Finally, leadership also has to exist with respect to the chairperson. According to Martin Rondin and Borrie (2005: 83-84), the main attributes needed to be a leader include: patience, diplomacy and knowledge with a sense of timing and the possession of an implicit level of trust. Moreover, s/he needs to be able to give continuity to the process and, at the same time, maintain a sense of autonomy from their national position.

4.3.3.2. Organisational features: From IANSA to Control Arms

Regarding the organisational features of the international campaign, Control Arms is a campaign led by three big organisations, which complement each other. First, IANSA is a coalition of hundreds of NGOs, most of them small, grass roots, working on very different kinds of projects and from many different places. Second, both Amnesty International (AI) and Oxfam have international prestige, reputation, contacts among the

⁷⁴ Most NGOs officials interviewed in New York in the context of the RevCon emphasized this aspect.

press and the international organisations and many potential supporters to mobilise, something acknowledge even in the UN:

“IANSA people have to explain what IANSA is, but Amnesty people and Oxfam people don't need to explain who they are. And that was a very good thing for IANSA”

Interview n. 48⁷⁵

The activists are also aware of the benefits of going as a coalition. According to this campaigner from AI International Secretariat:

“When going together, we have some things that neither organizations have by themselves. So IANSA doesn't have such expertise and recognition on the question of human rights. Each of the organizations brings something and together we have more spine.”

Interview n. 46⁷⁶

Oxfam is a development organisation and AI works particularly on human rights. But formally both are part of IANSA. So why are they considered individually more relevant than the other members of IANSA such as Saferworld, which is also an IANSA founder? For example, why is their name highlighted in the materials of the campaign? As a Saferworld' official put it, the answer might lie in the level of resources that the organization spends in the campaign:

“Saferworld is part of Control Arms because it is part of IANSA. AI has many million of members around the world. Oxfam also has a huge membership. Saferworld is not a membership organization. We have people who support us, but we don't have members who pay a

⁷⁵ Interviewed by the author in the context of the RevCon in New York (1 July 2006).

⁷⁶ Interviewed by the author in the context of the RevCon in New York (5 July 2006).

contribution each month. So our job is more of lobbying, advocacy and policy research and less of campaigning. (...) Regarding the Control Arms campaign, Oxfam and Amnesty are the two organizations that have taken the initiative and that have the possibility of mobilizing more resources and, at least theoretically, millions of members around the world. Because of that their name is put so evidently in the materials of the campaign”.

Interview n. 50, Saferworld⁷⁷

When people talk about IANSA it generally means the hundreds of small organisations inside it, but not necessarily the big ones, which already have media coverage, access to the institution and prestige. IANSA is then the umbrella that coordinates all of them, particularly in international negotiations within the UN:

“And then IANSA developed its coalition and they always had exhibits, side events in every major conference, and all of that has helped us and make our life a lot of easier than dealing with 10, 12 or 15 different NGOs. (...) One of the most important things that they have done for us is the organization of the speeches for NGOs in each Conference, which I now that there is a lot of blood. These are not easy sessions for them.”

Interview n. 48⁷⁸

The secretariats of these three organisations exchange information and plan joint actions. The three of them are based in Britain and that facilitates contacts and coordination. However, that may also have an important geographical bias that affects many aspects and even the priorities of the campaign. This is an aspect that, together with the financial dependence from the British government (particularly IANSA in its first years), is

⁷⁷ Interviewed by the author in the context of the RevCon in New York (2 July 2006).

⁷⁸ Interviewed by the author in the context of the RevCon in New York (1 July 2006).

acknowledged by many inside the coalition. However, the organisational form is still criticised, particularly by members from Asian and African countries, such as in this representative from the South-East Asian region:

“It’s very difficult to develop a good and transparent relationship with members of so many different countries. IANSA has been seriously accused of lack of transparency of decision-making. (...) They need to democratize the decision-making process, the leadership. They need to make the leadership representative. And sometimes the IANSA leadership is dominated by some Western and European governments. Sometimes people feel that IANSA is an instrument in their hands. Specially striking is the position of the British government. If the British are one of the leading producers and exporters of small arms, why are putting so much money in IANSA? Maybe they are feeling that IANSA is helping their objectives. From the beginning the work of IANSA has been acceptable but they could do many more things. (...) There are already issues in South-Asia and East-Asia (poorly represented in IANSA) that should have more importance. They are putting so much focus on Africa and Latin America. But also the Middle East, and in general Asia is the most populated part of the world!”

Interview n. 33⁷⁹

The three main organisations share tools and reports, joint planning each step of the evolution of the campaign. In the words of an Oxfam official from Spain:

“At the organizational level, in the Control Arms campaign there are some minimum guidelines, which are much more close and concrete in the ambit of political science and more flexible in the ambit of mobilization, which are shared by the 3 organizations (AI, Oxfam and IANSA). In the end there is an adaptation of national capabilities to the needs of the campaign. (...) Then we share tools. For example, in the ambit of political science, the 80% of all reports and research

⁷⁹ Interviewed by the author in the context of the RevCon in New York (29 June 2006).

are done jointly. We plan what to publish and when to do it. Depending on the topic and on our possibilities, we decide if a report is led by AI or by OXFAM (and to a lesser extent by IANSA), but it receives the support of all the affiliates. And then there are some limits. Sometimes, AI has more freedom to point out to some countries than Oxfam, which may feel more restricted if it fears for its personnel working there or whatever.”


Interview n. 56⁸⁰

The main objective is, as said, the ATT, but it is not the only one. It has been chosen for different reasons, but among them, because of its marketing potential. The idea of the ATT is easy to understand and resonates strongly with previous initiatives such as the treaty that ban landmines. In the words of one of the spokespersons of the campaign:

“It wasn't limited exclusively to stating one objective (i.e. the ATT), but I think the ATT was the clearest objective, which was the most concrete for the possible supporters to adopt.”

Interview n. 46⁸¹

Figure 4.2 Summary of Control Arms' organisation



900 hundred NGOs and organizations widespread around the world, including IANSA's grassroots groups

⁸⁰ Interviewed by the author in the context of the RevCon in New York (5 July 2006).

⁸¹ Interviewed by the author in the context of the RevCon in New York (5 July 2006).

Then there is a higher coordination body, the Steering Committee of the ATT, a board that works specifically with the aim of the ATT, and which includes people from other NGOs, such as Saferworld (also based in Britain) and the Arias Foundation (from Costa Rica), which not necessarily are formally part of the Control Arms campaign (see figure 4.2. above).

4.3.4. Strategies around SALW processes

As happened with the landmine campaign, the first pragmatic and strategic decision was to focus on one single issue, isolating SALW as a discrete problem amenable to the identifiable solution of a treaty, although not just a comprehensive ban. In fact, some authors have stressed the necessity of focusing on one single issue for the success of any international campaign, especially during its first stages (e.g. Peters 2000). The next section of the chapter provides the evolution of this single issue in the framing by the activists.

4.3.4.1. The evolution of the framing of SALW within these processes⁸²

Framing processes are a central mechanism for understanding the character and course of social movements (Snow and Benford 2000). The way in which arguments are expressed into clear and simple messages shape the course of action. Therefore, this section the reasons presented in favor and against the regulation of arms trade.

First, as explained by the governments of Britain, Finland, Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Japan and Kenya in their proposal, there are many gaps, ambiguities and contradictions in

⁸² Some data about the framing of these processes, particularly in their first stages (1990s) have been provided in previous sections of this chapter dealing with each phase separately.

the national laws and in the regional agreements currently existing about arms trade, what makes them not efficient enough to control irresponsible trade operations. Second, and as stated by the treaty supporters, there is a strong moral and humanitarian motivation for efficiently regulating arms diffusion, because it is a factor that fosters fundamental problems for the international community, as combating the threats from international terrorism, promoting development in Africa or stabilizing the Middle East. Thus, the resolution approved argues that the lack of international standards in the conventional arms trade is a factor that increments the negative consequences of conflicts, displacement of people, crime and terrorism. The uncontrolled proliferation of arms extends war and aggravates their costs in terms of human lives, but it also has opportunity costs in terms of a potential development of the Third World countries. The case of Iraq would be an example of the intensification of the conflict with acts of resistance and terrorism by an excessively armed population.


Another interesting part of the framing of the issue by the representatives of the governments has to do with Cuba, most of Arab States and some of the South-East Asian countries. Those are the countries that somehow frame their discourse in terms of “the small arms crisis has been overemphasized”, “it is not so important” or at least “not as important as other issues of international security, such as mass destruction weapons”. In other words, without denying its relevance, they consider that it should not be the maximum priority regarding the disarmament policies. Sometimes they also frame SALW as the weapons of the weak.

Its opponents affirm that an ATT could have negative socio-economic consequences for labor markets due to the loss of jobs and the reduction of benefits by the industry of defense. However, its supporters argue that a global and binding treaty would protect the legal trade because it would create a homogeneous situation

that would prevent the exporters responsible from saying that “if I don't sell it, another one will do it”.⁸³

In the era of international terrorism and with the aim of protecting security of the international community, some inside the pro-control movement thought that the new priorities of the governments could mean a major support to the arms trade regulation. However, after the September 11 attack, some countries have reduced even more of their controls over arms exports in order to be able to provide arms to (governmental and non-governmental) armies of 'friendly countries' in the name of the 'war on terror'.

Figure 4.3 Summary of framing and contra-framing arguments



In fact, the ATT is seen by some states as a threat to national security and to their ability of self-defence. In addition, it is precisely this claim of self-defence that is used at an individual level, by influential groups, such as the National Rifle Association (NRA). The Second Amendment of the US Constitution is interpreted as a warrant of the rights of possessing arms by

⁸³ An illustration of this idea is shown in the character performed by Nicolas Cage in the film “Lord of War”. When confronted by his true occupation as arms dealer, he answers to his wife precisely with this sentence: “If I don't do it, others will do it”.

civilians, both in contexts of individual self-defense (i.e. if a thief enters into your place) and collective auto-defense (i.e. if your country is ruled by a dictator).

Some of these arguments were already expressed in the statements delivered by the civil society statements in the 2001 UN SALW Conference (see UN 2001c). The representatives of over forty organisations addressed a variety of issues reflective of the myriad challenges posed by the proliferation of and illicit trade in SALW.⁸⁴

Table 4.8 Number of NGOs statements mentioning each issue in the 2001 UN SALW Conference

Humanitarian	13
Stability	11
Legal trade	8
Small Arms definition	7
Marking and tracing	7
Technical knowledge	6
Health	6
Human rights	6
Development	6

⁸⁴ Representatives of Unitarian Universalist Association (United States and Canada) and Gun Free South Africa spoke on “Domestic controls of small arms and light weapons”. Issues of “Controlling and reducing arms and the International Action Program” were addressed by representatives of Coalition Français (France), Federation of American Scientists (United States), GRIP (Belgium), National Centre for Economic and Security Alternatives (United States), Fundación espacios para el progreso social (Argentina), Christian Council of Churches (Mozambique), and the Fund for Peace (United States). Representatives of Arias Foundation (Costa Rica), Biting the Bullet Project (United Kingdom), MALAO (Senegal, Eminent Persons Group, and the Institute for Security Studies (South Africa) spoke about “Implementation and follow-up”.

Sharing experiences	5
Children	5
NGO role	5
Human security	4
National laws are inefficient	4
Civilian possession	4
Follow-up	4
Women and gun violence	3
Governmental and non-governmental partnership	3
Regional initiatives	3
Brokering	2
Crime	2
Humanitarian assistance	2
Culture of violence	2
Transparency	2

Medical doctors and community health officials addressed issues related to firearm injuries and the effects of trauma. Other speakers addressed the impact of the illicit trade in SALW on the development of communities.⁸⁵ Several speakers also addressed the importance of domestic and international controls, as well as

⁸⁵ The ultimate aim of the Conference, said the representative of Viva Rio, a Brazilian organization, must be a reduction in the number of human lives lost because of small arms proliferation. In that connection, he proposed, on behalf of the Latin American members of IANSA, to cut the number of fatal victims of small arms by at least 35 per cent by 2006. Considering estimates for the last decade, this would mean that about 1 million lives previously doomed to be killed by small arms, would be saved.

follow-up measures.⁸⁶ Several representatives spoke of the humanitarian impact of the illegal arms trade on the most vulnerable populations, such as disabled persons, women and children.⁸⁷ A representative of the Christian Council of Sierra Leone stated that for decades the global community has been slowly and unconsciously creating a culture of violence in societies, which had adverse effects particularly on children, who viewed weapons as toys. Finally, the film industry portrayed gun-toting actors as heroes. The consequences were immeasurable, leading to an increase sense of insecurity, fear and mistrust.⁸⁸ Table 4.8 lists the main topics of these statements.

⁸⁶ A representative of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) said “now was the time to back words with commitments, and the commitments with action”. The first urgent task was for States to organize their own affairs. Civil society was willing and ready to help carry out the arduous task of implementing a comprehensive Program of action as long as the measures envisioned would make a real difference for communities.

⁸⁷ Fundación GAMMA IDEAR (Colombia), Physicians for Global Survival (Canada), and Russian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (Russian Federation) addressed issues of “Gun injuries/trauma and health community perspective”. “Vulnerable sections of population: disabled persons, women, children” were addressed by Leitana Nehan Women’s Development Agency (Bougainville). Representatives of South Asia Partnership International (Sri Lanka), InterBand (Japan), Franciscans International, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, and Pastoralist Peace and Development Initiative (Kenya) spoke under the heading “Impacts on communities and development.

⁸⁸ “Humanitarian and human rights concerns” were addressed by Oxfam GB (United Kingdom) and Amnesty International (Sierra Leone) with Human Rights Watch. Representatives of World Forum on the Future of Sports Shooting Activities (Italy), British Shooting Sports Council (United Kingdom), Canadian Institute for Legislative Action (Canada), Forum Waffrenrecht (Germany), Single Action Shooting Society (United States), Sporting Shooters Association of Australia, Fair Trade Group (United States), Federation of European Societies of Arms

The Conference also heard from the representatives of twelve firearms community groups. While reiterating support for the Conference aims to address the illicit trade in SALW, a representative of the American NRA expressed concerns that the legitimate domestic rights of US citizens to own and use legal arms might be restricted by the outcome.⁸⁹

Believing that the position of the US expressed during the ministerial segment represented “a minority view of a minority government”, a representative of the Million Mom March said she sought to correct the record. The majority of American citizens favored better regulation of guns, including licensing of gun owners, registration of guns and closing the gun show loophole that allows criminals and minors to get weapons. The American public was learning that guns purchased in legal markets in their country could and did flow into the global illicit market for SALW.

Collectors (Netherlands), and Safari Club International (United States) spoke for the “Firearms community groups”.

⁸⁹ What the firearms community sought from the Conference - stated the representative of Sporting Clays of America - was a formal acknowledgment that sport or recreational shooting was not related to the issues under consideration. The United States, like other countries around the world, had a long tradition of sport shooting. That industry pumped some \$30 billion through the United States economy -- more than giant conglomerates Coke and Microsoft. Small arms should be defined as military weapons of war designed for full and automatic firing. That definition was consistent with the weapons that were truly causing the most harm. If such a definition was adopted, delegations would take a giant step towards international consensus. In this sense, a representative of South Africa Gun Owners' Association said that, while he would strongly support measures to reduce the negative effects of small arms, he was concerned about a lack of focus on the real issues. Of particular concern was the call to restrict possession of sporting arms, which would serve no purpose in reducing conflict and would detract from real issues, such as the transfer of military weapons. "Wars are not fought with sporting arms, but with military weapons", he emphasized.

4.3.4.2. The negotiation setting and the rules of the game:

“At this kind of meeting consensus is the main means of decision-making. Consensus was the main means of decision-making for the landmines campaign in the Convention of Certain Weapons. In the end we ended up condemning the consensus and when the governments negotiated the treaty the rules of procedure were that for 2/3 and Jody agreed to change the text that had been drafted.”

Mary Wareham (Oxfam New Zealand and ex coordinator of the US Campaign to ban landmines)⁹⁰

The literature tends to distinguish between 'traditional' and 'new' approaches (McCarthy 2003) to diplomacy and bargaining contexts. The new ones add the perspective of 'human security' to the typical 'state security' putting thus the emphasis in the threats to individuals. A second aspect is inclusiveness of other actors as participants in the process, such as NGOs or international organisations like the Red Cross. Finally, they imply more flexibility regarding the negotiating conditions, particularly about the duration of the process, the negotiating environment and the voting procedures.

Table 4.9 below, based on Axworthy (1998), Brinkert (2003b), Cameron (1998), De Larrinaga and Sjolander (1998) and Rutherford (1999), sums up the differences between the two fora. For the purposes of this chapter, we can apply a similar framework to the SALW and the ATT cases. These are two processes taking place in the UN, with very different rules of the game applying in each case. On the one hand, the RevCon is very similar to the traditional disarmament fora, such as the Convention of Certain Weapons (CCW). In the landmines case, the Ottawa Process inaugurated a new multilateralism that has been understood by many as one of the factors that facilitated the final success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its governmental allies. Among other things, it allowed more

⁹⁰ Interviewed by the author in the context of the RevCon in New York, 7 July 2006.

flexibility in the organizational procedures; it considered NGOs as full members of the process; and decisions were taken by majority, overcoming then the major obstacle of the negotiating contexts of the traditional multilateralism: the rule of unanimity.

Table 4.9 New multilateralism (e.g. Ottawa Process) vs. old multilateralism

	<i>Traditional disarmament fora</i>	<i>Ottawa Process</i>
<i>Initiative</i>	International Organization	Invitation by an international political leader
<i>States vs. civil society</i>	Participation in regime creation is limited to states	Partnership: NGOs and IGOs participate (almost) as full members
<i>Leadership</i>	Major powers	Coalition of like-minded medium states
<i>Duration of the process</i>	Long and slow	Short, fast-track
<i>Negotiating environment</i>	Only official channels	Multilateral channels and rules facilitating like-minded participation
<i>Voting procedures</i>	Unanimity	Majority
<i>Verification measures</i>	Strong	Weak
<i>Objective</i>	Complex and ambiguous regulation (i.e. flexible interpretation)	Clear, simple and consistent prohibition

On the other hand, the First Committee of the UNGA seem to be a hybrid that shares some of the rules of the Ottawa Process as

a model of new multilateralism, but still has some constraints of the old approaches. Table 4.10 below summarises these ideas.

Table 4.10 Two different procedures. The RevCon vs. the 1st Committee of the UN General Assembly

	<i>UN SALW Revision Conference</i>	<i>1st Committee of the UNGA</i>
<i>Initiative</i>	International Organization	International Organization
<i>States vs. civil society</i>	Participation in regime creation is limited to states	NGOs have more access, but there is no partnership states
<i>Leadership</i>	Theoretically, powers	major Coalition of like-minded medium states
<i>Duration of the process</i>	Long and slow	Faster and more effective
<i>Negotiating environment</i>	Only official channels	Basically official channels, with some gaps for like-minded participation
<i>Voting procedures</i>	Consensus	Majority
<i>Verification measures</i>	Strong	Still to decide
<i>Objective</i>	Complex and ambiguous regulation of multiple aspects	Clearer and simpler treaty

One of the things missing in the SALW process compared to the model of new multilateralism is NGO access to the decision-making arena. According to one activist that has participated in the SALW process and in the ICBL:

“By the time the challenge was issued by Axworthy, Canada had accepted the ICBL as a full partner and we were giving a seat in the table, at that meeting in Ottawa in 1996, with the ICBL name played. And that changed the situation in the sense that every meeting of the states parties, at every official meeting, the ICBL was represented behind one name played, the ICBL delivered one statement on behalf of the movement. If the group was discussing different thematic topics, then we were at these different topics. (...) Here (in the RevCon) IANSA is like if we were back in 1996, still stuck on the outside. There is no IANSA played in the room.”

Interview n. 51⁹¹

Hence, the main elements shared by the Ottawa Process and the First Committee of the UNGA are the following: the leadership is shared by a coalition of like-minded medium states and the voting procedures go beyond consensus rule. That suggests that the fact that the initiative comes from an international organization is not so important. Then, NGOs have more access, but participation in regime creation is limited to states, the process is somehow faster, but official channels are still dominant. All of these factors might have been overemphasised as reasons for success in the landmines' case. From the experience of the First Committee what seems that matters, apart from the leadership and the voting procedures is the fact that the objective is clear and (to some extent) simple; in other words, a treaty, which does not imply a consistent prohibition, but a focus on a single issue: arms trade.

In conclusion, institutional decision-making rules can shape negotiations at the international level.⁹² Consensus does not require unanimity on all points from all the member states participating in negotiations; it is generally an agreement on general objectives. Yet, it is interesting to note that negotiations in UN-sponsored conferences only resume when there is a consensus

⁹¹ Interviewed by the author in New York, 7 July 2006, in the context of the RevCon.

⁹² See also Jupille (1999), Depledge (2006) and Buzan (1981).

that will not be challenged.⁹³ Hence, most often in UN negotiations, consensus is viewed as a type of informal unanimity. Consensus not only constitutes a very high threshold in decision-making, but also often becomes an extremely slow process.⁹⁴ With the clock ticking at RevCon, the EU Member States as well as IANSA realised that most of their efforts should be concentrated on convincing other states to support the final (weak) document rather than pushing for commitments that are more stringent. But not even that could be achieved.

4.3.5. Contingent factors: Obama vs. McCain

The 2008 elections between democrats and republicans in the post-Bush era would have arguably affected the prospects of the SALW process (see as well section 4.3.2.4 of the chapter). And this is so because there seems to exist a sharp division between the perception of gun control in the US, where several millions of people support the gun lobby arguing that the guns are embedded in the US history and its constitution, and the rest of the world, scared of massacres in schools and terrorist provision of weapons. For this reason, this is the most difficult dimension for the activists to work on. It shapes the development of negotiations and the whole process, especially due to the close relationship between the gun lobby and the American delegation, which gives them a crucial power in negotiation-settings based on the unanimity rule. If Barack Obama has a different perception from the Bush administration concerning this issue, then this could have a huge potential effect also on the preferences of other countries.

Regarding contingent factors, the study of this case has also shown that the space that these topics gain in the media (and political) agenda is crucially influenced by exogenous events, such as massacres in schools, or terrorist attacks where conventional

⁹³ Rittberger (1983).

⁹⁴ Depledge (2006: 11-12) and Buzan (1981: 341-342).

weapons and specially SALW were used. In this sense, most of national legislation on these issues in places such as Britain, Australia or some US states have been produced because of tragedies preventable by gun control.

A third future event capable to change the possibilities for an ATT is the outcome of the Oslo Process (see chapter 5 of the dissertation). Thus, similar to what happened at the end of the 1990s where the success of the landmine campaign fostered other similar initiatives of the civil society supported by a coalition of like-minded states. The positive outcome in the cluster munitions process could thus imply a reaction in the SALW processes, giving both the activists and the diplomats of this community of practice the sense of momentum needed in order to finish a legally binding treaty.

4.4. Conclusions: Accounting for several interrelated processes

The arms control campaign(s) is a very complex case, because it works within different international processes at the same time and because it has to face particular framing problems. As seen in this chapter, the two most important processes are a) the PoA on SALW, adopted in 2001 and reviewed in the summer of 2006, and which is not legally binding; and b) the negotiations aiming at a (conventional) ATT, which achieved a first success at the political level in the end of 2006, with a resolution that was approved in the UNGA, officially starting the negotiations phase.

Framing problems include the fact that UN member states decided that the SALW problem mainly involved national security and arms control. It has consequently been dealt with within the framework of the UNGA's First Committee. For this reason, NGOs cannot be considered partners in the process of shaping the PoA. Also, UN agencies have had very brief opportunities to present their views to state members, being thus somehow shut out of the process. Nevertheless, NGOs and international organisations developed policy initiatives that covered all the

dimensions of the problem, broadening the initial focus on national security and arms control. A problem of dealing with a multidimensional issue has to do with the competition of funds between NGOs, but also between international organisations tackling different aspects of the problem.⁹⁵

Different from the landmines case, the evidence indicates that national governments played a major role in bringing the SALW problem to light and developing policy tools to deal with it, initially acting almost exclusively within a regional or UN context, such as the 2001 UN Conference. NGO involvement was slow to develop in the case of SALW for several reasons. One was that the complexity of the issue precluded a simple solution, such as that underpinning the ICBL. It is always more difficult to agree on legal instruments aiming at regulating an issue than on a clear ban on all aspects of the problem. Moreover, many of the NGOs best placed to contribute to the resolution of the SALW problem were already engaged in the campaign against landmines. Afterwards, civil society has played the leading role in documenting the negative impact that SALW from a broad range of perspectives (for example, on development, human rights and public health).

Regarding access, activists are allowed to attend some of the sessions and are provided with space in the UN building for meetings and briefings, but the room is closed when it comes to the real negotiations. However, some countries include people coming from the social movement sector among their delegates, given that most of the experts in the field are in the activist side. For this reason, and also due to the work of like-minded diplomats, the transnational coalition is usually informed and updated about the course of the negotiations. In addition, the issue

⁹⁵ “Despite paying lip service to the need to work together, compared to other global issues such as AIDS, IGOs dealing with the SALW problem remain in competition for funds and have mostly used the rise of the small arms issue to increase their activities at the expense of the collaboration and partnering needed to come to grips with the problem” (Laurance and Stohl 2002: 30).

of access and procedures is currently being negotiated in the ATT process, as it will be crucial for later stages of the negotiations.

On the issue of agenda setting, the 2001 Conference raised popular and elite consciousness, creating, disseminating and sharing knowledge of SALW as a global problem. States were confronted with the multi-dimensional nature of the threat posed by SALW. It also generated a period international media attention, which was somehow repeated in the 2006 RevCon. However, the failure of that conference also meant an absence of major media coverage about its result, where as the first achievements in the ATT process have generated some media attention.

At the policy level, in 2001 after the UN SALW Conference the generalized feeling was that of deception. Generally speaking, the results (a PoA on SALW) represented a moderate result. That consensus could not be maintained five years later in the RevCon. NGOs under the umbrella organization IANSA undoubtedly pressed UN member states to include some of their proposals in the final document of the RevCon and several governments acknowledged their contribution. However, this chapter has shown that this partnership was not successful during the RevCon: the like-minded group of states and IANSA both failed to convince several reluctant states to support the reinforcement of the UN PoA on SALW. Thus, the leadership showed by “middle powers” seemed to have been less evident than in other negotiations on human security issues, such as the landmines case or the cluster munitions’ one. In contrast to these cases, the “middle powers” could not unite behind one specific goal during the RevCon. The challenges posed by SALW are multifaceted and involve various issues. This reality visibly complicated negotiations and might have led the middle powers to perceive that the costs of forming a coalition and leading negotiations would be higher than the benefits.

The literature on coalitions suggested that as NGO advocacy grows and stimulates more national support for their cause, the risks of middle powers of assuming leadership and forming coalitions should be lowered (see for example, Petrova 2007).

However, in the case of RevCon, these risks seemed not have been lowered enough to convince the states to effectively lead the dynamics of the Conference towards achieving a meaningful outcome document.

In the second related process, the success in the beginning of the ATT negotiations allows a positive assessment, which obviously will need to be reviewed in the following years taking into account the result of the current bargaining process. Led by three big organisations, the Control Arms campaign was created with a single objective: a treaty to regulate conventional arms trade (both small and heavy weapons). They lobbied in the UNGA's First Committee, a forum where unanimity rule is not always the main procedure, but also majority voting can be applied. The success of the vote that officially initiates the negotiations for the ATT, whereas still far for having a legally binding document, it is a positive step that will shape future strategies and organisational practices of the arm control activists.

Why were NGOs successful in one case and not the other? This text has advanced the argument that the primary explanatory factor could be the change in the rules of the game from one setting to the next. That is, the institutional setting (consensus versus majoritarian; a plethora of issues on the agenda vs. only one; the partnership with civil society organisations) affects how well civil society can affect the outcome.

In the chapter, other factors have been identified in the successful case, which are absent in a similar case of failure in the field of conventional arms international negotiations. Among them, plural and strong leadership by a core group of states seem particularly relevant. Between the two international meetings, the NGOs also improved their coordination and lobbying practices, increasing thus their political influence.

After 2006 events, the future of the *Control Arms* campaign is unclear. As usual in these kind of organisations, the fight for resources both internally (inside organisations) and externally (between organisations) will be a crucial part of its development.

It could continue, although in a transformed way, as affirm some of its representatives:

“In the last conversations we have had about this issue inside Oxfam, nobody wants to leave it aside. It will continue, but probably with less intensity than the *Control Arms* campaign. Maybe we will keep the label, but it will continue more lineally, with less hot points. Or maybe the label will disappear at the international level, and will remain nationally in some places. It will depend on the result of the international negotiations. If you do not have a decision-making process at the international level behind your petition, everything is more complicate. Depending on the final shape of the international campaign, the national campaigns will replicate it. I doubt that the campaign will die.”

Interview n. 56⁹⁶

“There is always a problem of competences. In that sense, AI is a very clear example. AI works for priority campaigns. During 6 months there is a priority campaign, but what happens when yours is not the priority? In order to make yours the priority it is complex and there is usually an important fight inside the organizations.”

Interview n. 55⁹⁷

Given that there are not mechanisms of follow up in order to review again the PoA as a whole, in order to have a more effective result, a topic so complex such as the SALW will have to be dealt with regarding each dimension at a different time. The first of them already got in a positive outcome in the instrument (non-binding) of tracing and marking approved in December 2005, which, however, does not regulate ammunitions. About the second one on arms trade, a first step has already taken place. The next one could be on brokering. The question that arises now is to what

⁹⁶ Interviewed by the author in New York in the context of the RevCon (5 July 2006).

⁹⁷ Interviewed by the author in New York in the context of the RevCon (5 July 2006).

extent is more effective to have so many international negotiations taking place at the same time or, on the contrary, dealing with each issue at different moments of time would be more effective.

Finally, it can be argued that the international context was significantly modified after the American elections. The role of the US with its renewed legislative houses, still the one and only superpower in international relations, will be doubtless very relevant in the evolution of these processes and their approach from a multilateral perspective. That can shape the legitimacy and the role that the UN can still play in international negotiations, particularly in the field of international security and disarmament. And, this is a field in which the UN has accumulated several failures, such as the RevCon of the PoA on SALW in July 2006. The recent emphasis by the Obama administration in multilateral negotiations could foster new successes in this field.

And yet, the ATT discussion moves forward, despite the US vote, which means that consensus is important for the PoA framework based on cold war disarmament, but the ATT went outside this to the First Committee of the UNGA and took a majority vote instead. In conclusion, the UN *as a whole* does not rule by consensus. In any case, the rules of the game finally adopted to continue with the processes will have their implications. Regarding the future ATT, the possibilities range from adopting an initiative by consensus in the UN context (like in the SALW process) to a faster and more efficient process (following the path of the landmines and the cluster bombs cases), even if that means risking the image and legitimacy of the UN for dealing with disarmament and international security issues. Between both models, the chapter concludes by suggesting that a successful negotiating environment should include a majority rule of voting and a clear message concerning the objective, but also a plural and strong leadership from both sides, governmental and non governmental, with the inclusion of civil society actors as full partners in the negotiations.

CHAPTER 5. THE CLUSTER MUNITIONS COALITION AND THE OSLO PROCESS

5.1. Cluster Munitions. Introduction¹

Chapter 5 analyses the process of international negotiation initiated at the end of February 2007 in Oslo with the objective of banning cluster munitions by 2008. By doing so, issues regarding the effective leadership by some NGOs and Norway in a new case of new diplomacy will be examined. This process imitates the model of the Ottawa Process, which resulted in the international treaty that bans antipersonnel landmines. From a framing perspective, arguments in favor and against this new process outside the multilateral traditional forums of disarmament will also be explored. The conclusions will take into account the prospects for the Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC), including an international treaty dealing with the humanitarian effects posed by cluster munitions.

¹ In the context of the research, this chapter is quite particular, as the main developments of the process analysed are currently taking place. For this reason, parts of its structure such as its division in different phases are slightly different from other chapters. Due to constraints of time and resources, this research analyzes in-depth the events that have taken place until the Oslo Conference in February 2007. In subsequent revisions of the chapter, some additions and updates have been incorporated in order to account for more recent developments of the process.

The campaign against cluster munitions is the closest case to the landmines campaign as most of the actors both within the governmental sector and the non-governmental sector are the same. However, as will be seen in throughout the chapter, some differences between the two cases have not allowed the protest coalition to completely mimic the landmines process.

NGOs claim that the effects of the use of cluster munitions are indiscriminate and excessively injurious; they pose “unacceptable harm to civilians”, in the words of the Oslo Declaration. For this reason, its use would constitute a violation of the International Humanitarian Law. First, their effects are scattered in a big area, making it thus almost impossible to delimitate them to a concrete objective. Hence, when these weapons are used near civilians, its use is by definition a form of indiscriminate attack, because in a broad area it is not possible to distinguish between civilian and military objectives. Second, not all sub-munitions that are fragmented end up exploding, but most of them remain hidden in the terrain, as if they were antipersonnel landmines, with the obvious danger for the inhabitants during the conflict and also once the armed conflict is over. Indeed, most of the victims of cluster munitions to date are civilians and, particularly, children.

This subject gained the interest of the organisations of development that work in places such as Lebanon, Kosovo and Cambodia. Consequently, some of the biggest donors of aid development have acknowledged the relationship between the use of this weapon and the difficulties for development in the affected communities. Due to the amount of news in the media about the use of cluster munitions by Israel in Lebanon in the summer 2006 and the inability of the traditional forum of disarmament, the Convention of Certain Weapons (CCW)², to move forward this issue, Norway organised an international conference at the end of February 2007 to initiate a process that deals with the

² The complete name of the CCW is *Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects*.

humanitarian aspects of the use of cluster munitions. That is a turning point for the process and it will start a new phase for the negotiations.

This is not the first time that the CCW is excessively ineffective, bureaucratic and slow. As seen in chapter 3, in a previous revision conference of the CCW (1995-1996) the absence of concrete results provoked the Canadian reaction, that along with the ICBL (the international NGO coalition against antipersonnel landmines), organised the alternative Ottawa Process, which concluded with the 1997 treaty that bans landmines. This decision proved beneficial also from a strategic point of view, since it has granted to Canada prestige and an international position in international negotiations and particularly, prestige in the field of disarmament. This leadership position is not frequent in countries that are not a great power. In a similar way, Norway has tried to play such a relevant role in the case of cluster munitions.

The NGOs working on these issues have been able to situate a humanitarian problem on the international security agenda. Within the Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC), founded in November 2003, they have carried out an effective strategy of awareness rising, by disseminating data and concrete messages through mass media. There has been an evolution of the perspective of the civil society organizations from positions aiming at only regulating the use of cluster munitions to the actual ban of the weapon.

As the chapter will argue, the CMC will be successful for a number of reasons. They include flexible and participatory rules of the game and an effective and credible leadership by a group of individuals representing certain countries, international organisations and NGOs. A 'community of practice' that shares ideas and interests has initiated an alternative bargaining process to overcome the paralysis of a traditional disarmament forum. They dedicate material (and organizational) resources to a security issue that has important humanitarian effects, as shown by the conflict in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel in the summer 2006, arguably the catalyst of the new process.

5.2. The Evolution of the international process

5.2.1. Cluster munitions within the CCW: Resonance of the landmines process

In the broad field of disarmament and international security, civil society has been traditionally more effective at the national level than internationally. A notable exception is the ICBL. The relevance and impact of the NGOs that formed the ICBL has been fully acknowledged since they obtained the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. Ten years later, some of those NGOs and some others, organised in a new network (the cluster munitions coalition or CMC), aim to play a role of similar magnitude in the negotiation process to ban landmines.

The Cluster Munitions Coalition was created in The Hague in 2003. The founding document called the states to acquire a special responsibility for the cleaning of the explosive remnants of war (ERW) left behind by armed conflicts. At that moment, the perception was that the CMC had to campaign not only against cluster munitions, but against all ERW; the argument was that the CMC had to fill a gap of the Ottawa treaty, which does not include sub-munitions in its mandate.

In the context of the post-treaty phase of the landmine campaign (third phase), some activists took advantage of several international contexts, such as the meetings of the State Parties to the Ottawa treaty, the CCW meetings and the Landmine Monitor meetings, in order to meet with other activists and to work on the awareness-raising of the problems posed by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and, particularly, by the use of cluster munitions.³

³ In this sense, Mines Action Canada published a document in the context of the CCW, where it argued that the comprehensive approach to the explosive remnants of war was not effective enough and that a new instrument to deal specifically with cluster munitions was needed. Interview n. 70. This activist worked then for Landmine Action and afterwards for UNIDIR. London, February 2007.

The launching of the CMC coincided with the celebration of the governmental meeting of the CCW in 2003, which would end up adopting the Protocol V of the CCW, which deals with ERW. In spite of the lobbying pressure by civil society organisations, such as the ICRC, Landmine Action, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and also by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the result was a weak document with respect to the initial aims by the NGOs. The text of this protocol has received critiques due to the fact that it contains many warnings (and not that many obligations), its technical annexes are not legally binding, it cannot be applicable retroactively and also because cluster munitions do not receive a specific treatment.⁴

As a result of the adoption of Protocol V, the approach of the CMC started to change. Activists realized that the countries had shown a willingness to face the problem of the ERW in general terms, but at the same time, they still defended the right to use the billions of sub-munitions they had stockpiled in their arsenals. For this reason, the NGOs decided to focus their work in obtaining a specific answer to the problems caused by cluster munitions (see Nash 2006).

Moreover, experiences of other humanitarian campaigns, such as the landmines successful model of new diplomacy, suggested that a clear and concrete message, as "*stop cluster bombs*" was essential for the success of such a campaign. Therefore, they decided to change the main objective of the CMC. From that moment, it will be limited to the specific problems posed by the use of cluster munitions: a) the problem of the (broad) extension of the area of their effects and b) the problem of the weapon as ERW, especially once the armed conflict is over. Since the end of 2004, all official documents of the CMC clearly specify this idea.

The resonance of the landmines case is therefore clear, as also the ICBL ended up restricting their objectives to the banning of

⁴ For a more optimistic interpretation of the possibilities of the Protocol V of the CCW, see the work by Gustavo Laurie (2007), coordinator of UNMAS in Geneva.

antipersonnel landmines. Nevertheless, the process for the creation of a new international norm could not follow exactly the pattern of the Ottawa Process at least for two reasons. First, the landmine was a weapon with a low military utility and, to a large extent, technically outdated. However, the debates about the military utility of landmines centred the international negotiations on this subject until 1995-1996, when different studies showed a disproportion between the (huge) humanitarian consequences of the use of the weapon and its (reduced) military advantages. In this sense, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) organised then a seminary between civilian and military experts, which ended up in a declaration that called for the ban of this weapon. Coincidentally, the ICRC organised expert meeting in April 2007 in the Swiss locality of Montreux, with the aim of discussing the military utility of the cluster munitions.

In this phase, some positive effects have been observed. First, lack of access was criticised by the NGOs present in the CCW conference, because they only could lobby the delegates in the corridors. However and partially due to the events in Lebanon, some media coverage was given to this topic, particularly in the second half of 2006. From a policy perspective, the Protocol V adopted in the CCW is not sufficient for the activists, but it is certainly an improvement compared to the previous situation. Moreover, it shows that some concern existed also among the governments, which had started to think that not all use of all cluster munitions was morally acceptable. Table 5.1 summarises these ideas.

Table 5.1 Assessment of the different effects of the CMC in this phase

<i>Type of effect</i>	<i>Estimation</i>
Access	Low
Agenda	Moderate
Policy	Moderate
Cultural	Moderate

5.2.2. The Oslo Conference starts the Oslo Process: A new process of new diplomacy

After the success of the landmines campaign in 1997, many other initiatives emerged from the effective collaboration between civil society organizations and a group of medium and small countries, which have tried to reproduce the conditions of the Ottawa Process, achieving different level of positive results. The case of the CMC arguably became one of its most successful replications when they achieved a new treaty on this issue by the end of 2008. Moreover, this is partially so because the cluster munitions campaign is the most closely related to the landmines one.

Indeed, the fact that the Oslo Process is somehow a consequence of the inheritance of the landmines process is acknowledged by most of activists and also by some diplomats. One of the founders of this new initiative, Steffen Kongstad, head of Norwegian delegation in the Oslo Conference in February of 2007, was the ambassador of Norway to the UN in Geneva and the head of their delegation in the CCW in the 1990s. He had a crucial role in the Ottawa Process. Indeed, it has been frequently argued that the Ottawa treaty should be known as the Oslo treaty, in reference to the fact that the most important part of the negotiations that allowed signing the treaty in Ottawa took place in the Norwegian capital some months before. From this perspective, the process on the banning of cluster munitions offers a new opportunity for the international role of the Scandinavian country, especially since Sweden, its neighbour and international competitor in the broad and trendy field of human security, had shown a willingness to play a role of leadership during the previous conference of the CCW in November 2006. It has to be noted that Canada used explicitly the wording 'Oslo Process' to talk about the new process of negotiations, when stating its support to the final declaration adopted in the Oslo Conference.

Thus, the action week against cluster bombs in February 2007 initiated a new process of international disarmament.⁵ There were three events that took place in the Norwegian capital on that week; (i) the social forum of the NGOs within the CMC, with high-level participation, including two ministers of the Norwegian Government and the Nobel Peace awarded Jody Williams, which achieved an intense press coverage; (ii) a governmental meeting with high-rank diplomats of forty-nine countries; (iii) a series of informative and capacity-building workshops for NGOs. The result was a formal declaration signed by forty-six countries, which affirms that the end of 2008 is the deadline for the international community to have a cluster bombs ban treaty.

The Oslo Conference had been carefully designed in order to promote a climate of understanding and collaboration among the diplomats. In the luxurious hotel Moria Soria, at the top of a hill close to the Norwegian capital and under an intense snowstorm, diplomats were isolated from the world during two days. As the official schedule of the meetings ended at 5 p.m., diplomats (and special guests) had a few hours per day to get to know each other and to establish relations, if not friendship, at least of good personal treatment.⁶ The fostering of this 'community of practice'

⁵ Both expressions, 'cluster bombs' and 'cluster munitions' are used here with the same meaning, although sometimes the use 'cluster bombs' is restricted to those which are sent from the air. Each bomb or munition is composed by an amount of submunitions that fragments and disperses at the moment of the impact.

⁶ Among the special guests there were individuals that have traditionally played roles of mediation off-the-record, such as the representatives of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Jody Williams and Stephen Goose; also David Atwood (director of the Office of the Quakers in Geneva and crucial in the negotiating processes of landmines and small arms), Patrick McCarthy (coordinator of the Geneva Forum, a particularly active informal mechanism of networking and information sharing based in the Swiss capital), together with some members of UNIDIR (that regularly analyze the international negotiations in the field of the disarmament) and Astrid Honeyman (executive director of the Foundation of the Memory of Diana, Princess

(Borrie 2005) was an aspect that facilitated the final agreement in the conference.

Also, the fact that the two meetings (the governmental meeting and the activists' meeting) took place in the same space helped the activists to get access to the diplomats. In fact, both were opened meetings and so many assistants alternated one and another room to participate in both events.

As explained in the theoretical chapter, and shown in the landmines chapter, the processes of new diplomacy are characterized by the multilateral and open channels of negotiation, with flexible rules and the participation of civil society organizations. In this process, the leadership of a group of countries with common ideas and interest facilitates alternative processes of negotiation as a reaction to the ineffectiveness of the traditional forums, in many cases due to the rule of the unanimity required for the decision-making. The Ottawa Process was one of them, and the Oslo Process was a promising attempt to be the next one. From this perspective, the meeting was characterized by a close collaboration between the CMC and the Norwegian government, with a constant interchange of information, even more fluid than with some of the countries attending the meeting.

The participation of the states in these types of processes is decided by different procedures of self-selection. In other words, those attending the meetings have to show a clear willingness to take actions to deal with the problem effectively. They have thus to accept a series of principles, which are more general at the beginning of the process and become more concrete as the process advances. In this sense, countries attending the second meeting after Oslo, which was in Lima, had to agree on a more concrete set of commitments, than the ambiguous and open text approved in Oslo. On the one hand, this is crucial to avoid blocking roles by the negative positions of reluctant countries that frequently

of Wales, one of the institutions that more resources donates to the causes of the landmines and cluster munitions).

obstruct the negotiations in the traditional disarmament forums. Therefore, the CMC has often highlighted as one of the main successes of the Oslo Conference that every state openly spoke against the Oslo process in their speeches. On the other hand, this forces the states and their representatives to choose between being part of the group of countries that will indeed negotiate a new process of international disarmament or to remain outside that group; that is to say, it forces them to take a public position. By doing so, the subsequent behaviour can be monitored to verify that it takes place according to the declared position. In case of contradiction between the promise and the behaviour, different strategies of 'mobilisation of the shame' can be used by the activists to publicly denounce the non-fulfilment of the promise by the country.

Finally, and different from what happens in other types of negotiations in which translation into different languages slows down all the process, in Oslo the only working language was English, without any translation service. That contradicts other studies that have attributed part of the failure of some disarmament conferences to the fact that negotiations had taken place only in English and in absence of translators (see for example, the case of the Review Conference of the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in chapter 4) of the thesis. This issue also poses a dilemma among those defending democratic practices such as the translation of documents and oral interventions who realize that their possibilities or reaching a positive outcome sometimes might need a reduction of the level of direct democracy in the working procedures of the process.⁷

5.2.2.1. The declaration approved in the Oslo Conference

The Oslo Declaration is deliberately based on an ambiguous text with soft language, and open to different interpretations. The first conflictive point was the title, which already specified that

⁷ This issue is further analysed in Chapter Seven.

there would only be banned those cluster munitions that have “severe and unacceptable humanitarian effects”. Hence, the process initiated would have to decide which of the cluster munitions produce severe and unacceptable humanitarian costs. Countries like Mexico and Lebanon argued in their interventions that all cluster munitions should be banned. Also, Costa Rica expressed its desire to make of Central America a zone free from these weapons. However, other states (including Britain, Germany and France) considered that the cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm are only a small proportion of the total.

The second controversial point makes reference to the formal context in which negotiations should take place. Ambiguity on this point was necessary to have on board all the governments in favour of dealing with this subject in the context of the CCW. In fact, a group of countries said in the moment of voting that their vote was positive, but only if conditioned to the understanding of the second point as keeping the CCW as the main forum for the negotiations. Among the states holding such position there were Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Latvia, Britain and Switzerland.

The third controversial point tackles the temporal definition of the process. The text says that a new treaty will exist by 2008. Nevertheless, some states conditioned their vote to the interpretation of this sentence as an ambitious objective, but not as something compulsory. Some of the countries that defended a slower process were Germany, Switzerland and Canada. The case of Canada shows that this country will not play in this process the crucial role it had in the negotiations to ban landmines.

A big group of countries expressed in their interventions their support to the text as a whole, without specifying particular conditions. Among them, Argentina, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Spain, Finland, Jordan, the Lebanon and Serbia. Also, the international organizations attending the Oslo conference supported the text, including the ICRC and different agencies of the United Nations, such as the UNDP,

OCHA, UNCHR, UNIDIR and UNICEF. In addition, also the Vatican and Malta expressed their total support to the text.

Some countries explicitly insisted in strengthening the text. Consequently, they offered resources for the organization of following meetings of the process. Among them, Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and Peru. Together with Norway, they were creating a new plural group of like-minded states, which, as seen previously, is considered as a necessary condition for the success of such coalitions. In further stages of the Oslo Process, all these countries have organized either regional or global conferences in their territories, with the same idea and similar procedures than in Oslo, allowing thus a real partnership between the diplomats and the activists of the CMC.

On the opposite side, three countries openly rejected to adhere to the text in Oslo: Japan, Poland and Rumania. Japan and Poland were among the first to vote, probably anticipating that there would be other countries that would vote against the text. These negative declarations were received with a cold silence from the representatives of the NGOs that were present in the room, who thanked with a warm applause the positive votes. This simple mechanism of mobilisation of the same proved quite effective. Thus, Japan, the first country publicly stating that it would not adhere to the declaration, was forced to make a second and strange intervention to clarify its position and to try to improve its image in front of the international public opinion and the rest of the governmental delegations. The arguments by Poland were also strange: "This process contributes to the effectiveness of the CCW, so now we can come back to negotiate within the framework of the CCW".

Finally, activists and diplomats in favor of the Oslo Process consider as an important success the positive responses from those countries that had played the role of opponents in the context of the CCW, particularly Canada, Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Switzerland. This would have caused a chain reaction, provoking the positive vote of other countries without preferences

clearly defined. However, the positive position with regard to such a general text as the Oslo Declaration does not mean that they are part of the like-minded group of states. On the contrary, they are still considered as the main target of the activists in order to move the issue forward in the following meetings and, particularly in the Dublin conference in May 2008.

In order to explain the shift of position of some countries, it is necessary to consider that states are not unitary organisations. In fact, they often have a diversity of opinions and interests, with frequent tensions between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and particularly (in those countries where it exists) with the Ministry of International Development. The example of Britain illustrates this idea. Thus, Britain, in spite of signing the Oslo Declaration, has been one of the countries willing to deal with this subject within the CCW context. Yet, it also affirmed in the words of the Secretary of State for International Development at the beginning of November of 2006 in a letter filtered to the NGOs: "It is difficult to see how can we maintain a position so prominent against landmines, and at the same time maintaining that the use of cluster munitions is, to some extent, legitimate". On 19 March 2007, Britain announced a ban of *dumb* cluster munitions, those without self-destruction mechanisms.

Following the theoretical model outlined in the first chapter, table 5.2 summarises the effects in the first stage of the CMC.

Table 5.2 Assessment of the different effects of the CMC in this phase

<i>Type of effect</i>	<i>Estimation</i>
Access	High/Very high
Agenda	Moderate/High
Policy	High/Very high
Cultural	Moderate/High

Because this is a case that has not finished yet, and as it happened with the arms control network (see chapter 4), it is difficult to assess its successes and failures at this moment. However, it seems clear that the issue has reached effectively the public agenda since the end of 2006, gaining momentum in 2007 and 2008 and initiating a serious alternative political process. Arguably most of this success has to do with the fact that the NGOs in this part of the process (second phase) are considered as full partners, participating in all the meetings and working closely to the group of like-minded states that lead the negotiations, thus enjoying a similar level of access as the landmine campaign did a decade prior to this.

Regarding the political dimension, the Oslo process shares many characteristics with the Ottawa process. Thus, if in the CCW Review Conference in 1995 no mine ban had been achieved, a group of like-minded states willing to lead a new process ended up being extremely effective in alternative negotiations. In the CMC case, a similar process has taken place after a new review conference of the CCW in November 2006, which meant a new impulse for the future agreement, confirmed at the Oslo conference in February 2007.

On the cultural level, impact has been so far only moderate since for most of the countries some types of the weapon are still considered legitimate. Nevertheless, successes in all dimensions are growing (represented in table 5.2 by two different numbers in each category) as the optimism in the conferences following Oslo has been also growing. In the beginning of 2008, both activists and diplomats agreed that before the end of that year a new treaty would be signed. What remained was the actual content of the text, namely if all types of cluster munitions would be banned.

5.3. Independent variables

5.3.1. Introduction: The relevance of the perceived military utility

In the aftermath the Oslo Declaration, the group of like-minded states needed to be broader. As it happened with the Ottawa Process on landmines, here the subject of the military utility is crucial. Thus, many of the countries have decided to adhere to the process initiated in Oslo depending on the military utility that they perceive to defend their own interests.

Table 5.3 shows the support expectations to the possible ban on cluster munitions with reference to the perceived military utility that existed in March 2007. This is arguably the most important dimension for the configuration of alliances in the multilevel political opportunity structure in this case.

From this perspective, the main variable for the support to the restrictions of this type of armament is the existence of a military doctrine that anticipates a direct threat to their troops based on the use of armed vehicles. Most of the countries of this group would have difficulties to resign possession of a weapon that they consider necessary to defend their interests. On another front, it is expected that countries with strong war industries and with high budgets in defense with respect to their size will have incentives to invest in technical improvements that increase the reliability of these weapons. Finally, it is improbable that poor countries will join the process, although they could be induced not to use the (little amount of) cluster munitions that they have stockpiled if a reasonable alternative is offered to them.

Table 5.3 Expectations of support to possible ban of the cluster munitions depending on its perceived military utility

<i>War industry</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Direct threat</i>	<i>Examples</i>	<i>Technical improvements</i>	<i>Ban/moratorium</i>
Strong	High	Yes	Israel, Taiwan, the U.S.A. ⁸	Likely	Unlikely
Medium	Medium	Yes	China, Pakistan, Syria	Unlikely	Unlikely
Primitive	Low-Medium	Yes	Most of African Countries and Asia	Likely	Possible
Strong	High Means	No	European Countries	Likely	Likely
Medium	Low-Medium	No	Latin American Countries	Unlikely	Likely

Source: Alcalde (2007c). Own elaboration from data collected by Pax Christi (2005).

The data suggest that there was not enough support for a ban in a negotiation forum governed by the rule of the unanimity, such as the CCW. Nevertheless, there was a group of countries with an elevated potential to support a treaty. First, the European countries, whose soldiers work mainly in peacekeeping missions and need reliable weapons capable to discriminate between

⁸ Here it is considered that the US would be part of the group because it has a military doctrine allowing military interventions in which it may be possible to face military armies based on armored vehicles.

civilian and military objectives. Second, the South Americans, who should not have to face a direct threat of huge amounts of armoured vehicles. Third, affected countries have a logical interest in approving a treaty that would include the cleaning of the contaminated zones and the aid to victims and survivors. This means that the future of the Oslo Process and its possible positive conclusion would depend on the role that these three groups of States played during the negotiations. In any case, a solid and effective leadership would be needed to be able to modify the perception of the military utility of those countries that anticipate the possibility of a direct military threat to their territory. Therefore, a positive sign was that among the signatories of the Oslo Declaration, there were half of the cluster munitions producers of the world (34), a third of those who stockpile them, six that use or have used cluster munitions, six affected countries and seven countries non-members of the CCW. This last fact has been often emphasised by activists regarding the inclusiveness of the Oslo Process, compared to the CCW (see chapter 3 of the thesis).⁹

⁹ The success of the process is also measured for the number of countries that endorsed the last set of commitments agreed in the international meeting of the Oslo Process before Dublin 2008, that is, the Wellington Declaration. The 105 countries are the following: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Comoros, Congo, Cook Island, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nauru, Nepal, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra

5.3.2. *Multilevel Political Opportunity Structure (MPOS)*

The different factors working in each of these countries shows the need to think in terms of a multilevel political opportunity structure in order to effectively account for this kind of processes. Thus, the next pages summarise the position of one of the main leaders of this process (Belgium as a national norm entrepreneur), the super-power US and the surprising case of Canada (here its profile is somehow much lower than in the landmines campaign). Finally, a big country such as France is also included, to examine some of the contexts behind the European Union. Afterwards, an analysis of the activists' allies and opponents is provided.

5.3.2.1. Different domestic political opportunity structures

First, Belgium is the model of a successful national campaign, where Handicap International (HI) was the crucial actor. By advocating a total ban and securing a national one in Belgium, HI was also able to influence the dynamics within the Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC). Thus, since the NGOs announced with enthusiasm that Belgium was the first state to adopt a total

Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia. However, not all of them had registered for the Dublin Conference in May 2008, where the most important part of the writing of the text should be discussed and (eventually) agreed. The 62 governments that initially registered to the Dublin Conference were: Albania, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, France, Germany, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, Vanuatu, Zambia.

ban on cluster munitions, this certainly reinvigorated the movement and inspired other NGOs to develop publicly oriented campaigns and to work on national legislations/moratoria to be used as stepping stones for a future international agreement. For example, Landmine Action in Britain followed this example and switched its position to a ban call in early 2006. However, despite having such a progressive legislation, Belgium is not playing a role of leadership internationally. The cautious position of the Belgian government changed only slowly after an increasing number of states pledged support for a negotiating mandate on cluster munitions at the CCW Review Conference in November 2006. Initially, the Belgian delegation had pointed out that the growing number of legislative initiatives on cluster munitions in a number of countries could facilitate the development of propitious conditions to address the problem multilaterally as well. However, they argued for an effective and inclusive approach that should advance step-by-step guided by a clear objective but also aiming at attracting a “solid consensus” around that aim, having thus a more conservative position than the CMC. At the Oslo Conference, Belgium decided to play a more active role by internationally announcing that it would held a regional European conference in the fall of 2007.

Second, France has not been an ally of the NGOs in this process. Despite the strong NGO campaign domestically and the momentum behind a proposal for a negotiating mandate on cluster munitions created at the CCW Review Conference in Geneva in November 2006, the centre-right French government did not move from its position. They insisted that the implementation of the ERW Protocol (that had just entered in force in November) would be adequate in addressing the post-conflict problems of cluster munitions. Moreover, it argued that technical improvements in the munitions design could solve the other problems related to their use. Thus, even though France did not openly oppose the CCW negotiating mandate, it did not join the fifteen EU countries that were supporting it (HI, 2006). However, France has participated in all the meetings of the Oslo Process and activists believe that they

will manage to get this country on board before the signing of the treaty.

Third, Canada in this case is not playing the supportive role it played in the landmines case and indeed, it has been an adversary for the CMC both in the CCW and also in the Ottawa Process. At the national level, Canada had not made any spectacular steps either, but there has been some progress toward limiting the dangers of old cluster munitions. Thus, it destroyed its stockpiles of old "Rockeye" cluster munitions by the end of spring 2006 and continued its review of the future of "DPICM" munitions. Moreover, it did not plan the acquisition of replacement munitions for the demilitarised ones. Canada committed to acquire only munitions with a 99 per cent or higher reliability. But until Dublin, its Defence Ministry remained opposed to any measures that might lead to a ban on cluster munitions. The destruction of Rockeyes could hardly be seen as motivated by the ongoing discussions at the CCW or the NGO campaign. Rather, it could also be interpreted as a part of a phasing out process for obsolete munitions. Indeed, in the wake of the Belgian national ban, the ministry was quick to assert its strong opposition to any attempt to undertake similar measures in Canada. Therefore, Canada has been formally part of the Oslo Process; so on-going negotiations could lead to a future agreement with the rest of the countries.

Finally, in the cluster munitions case, the United States are one of the states that most strongly oppose any international regulation, despite the fact that American NGOs have been quite active, particularly after the NATO bombing of Serbia. Even though the Mennonite Central Committee had been calling for a ban on cluster munitions for decades, the issue only surfaced in the media and in the work of Human Rights Watch (HRW) as a result of the NATO bombing campaign of Serbia in 1999, when the use of cluster bombs was identified as one of the major causes of the killing of civilian. The issue came into the spotlight of the media, especially after several cluster bombs fell in the centre of the Serbian city of Nis killing many civilians and damaging a city hospital.

In November 2006 some costly restrictions on the use of cluster munitions use came to be envisioned by a number of states requiring the adoption of a CCW mandate for negotiations of a legally binding instrument addressing the humanitarian problems of these weapons. There the US was again left in the opponent camp, deciding to oppose negotiations within the CCW and call the bluff of Norway, which was advancing the idea of alternative negotiations. So far, the US has not been part of the Oslo Process and in Dublin activists believed that the possibilities of including the super-power among the signatories of the treaty are very low.

5.3.2.2. Allies and opponents

Among the reasons for the optimism within the coalition of the like-minded states and the activists, the presence of important allies in the process is particularly relevant. For the first time, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has decided to thoroughly participate as such in a subject different from the landmines. Since it represents one of the most successful cases of a coalition of NGOs that has obtained a political result at the global level, it enjoys a great legitimacy for international governments, institutions, public opinions, and particularly within the NGO sector. Jody Williams, the first leader of the ICBL is a Nobel peace prize laureate.¹⁰ Moreover, it is a very unusual case in this type of organisations, because the network (the ICBL as such) has become even more important than its own members. The credibility of individuals such as Williams and Stephen Goose, head of disarmament of Human Rights Watch and a crucial person in the Ottawa Process, is reflected in the way they were introduced

¹⁰ Jody Williams is also the founder of the initiative of several women honoured with the Nobel peace prize, which the 15 November 2006 made a call to the Governments so that they began to work in a new international treaty on cluster munitions. The other members of the group are Shirin Ebadi, Wangari Maathai, Rigoberta Menchú, Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan Maguire.

to the press in the Oslo Conference: “the myth, the living legend for the movement”.

In addition, cooperation between NGOs that habitually work in others fields, such as small arms and light weapons, human rights or development, has been here more effective than in other cases. This type of cooperation among diplomats is fundamental at the time of engaging in a dialogue with diplomats, who usually participate in different negotiations within one issue-are, such as disarmament. In Oslo, this support was essential to shape the position of some governments, such as Britain.¹¹

Also, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) participated in Oslo. This is a neutral organization with the mission of guaranteeing the application of the international humanitarian law and for this reason, it is unusual that this organization expresses its clear support to such a campaign. Nevertheless, the ICRC has been expressing humanitarian concerns derived from the use of cluster munitions at least since their report on Kosovo in 2000. The ICRC has shown its commitment in the organization of the meeting of experts that took place in April 2007 in the Swiss locality of Montreux, to debate on the military utility of this type of armament.

Other allies of the NGOs and the countries that lead the process are the UN agencies. Many of them had written a declaration already in 2003 requesting a moratorium in the use of

¹¹ Britain argued that a consensus in the subject of the definitions was a necessary previous step to initiate the process, something opposed to what they had argued a couple of months before with respect to the arms trade treaty. In the words of this activist from Landmine Action: “The arms trade treaty was important this time, mainly because the United Kingdom was using opposed arguments to those that they have used in that forum. Oxfam and Amnesty were with us and were able to remind it to the British diplomats. Although they had not been implied in this type of meetings until Oslo, their broader perspective (and some personal relations) were very useful”. Interview n. 74. Also, the UNIDIR representatives had been present in the ATT forum, and they also reminded the paradox of the British position in their speech.

these weapons. Among them, UNICEF, UNMAS, the UNDP and OCHA. Also, Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the UN, made several declarations emphasising the humanitarian problems posed by the cluster munitions and requesting to the States that include this subject in the agenda of high-priority subjects to deal with in the CCW, the last one at the Dublin Conference in May 2008.

Nevertheless, some of these allies have shown their support only once the process had already started and their possibilities of success were, therefore, greater. That is to say, once Norway had declared at the end of the Review Conference of the CCW (November 2006) its intention to organize the Oslo Conference. Among them, the ICBL, absent in all the process of creation of the CMC, they did not take the decision until December 2006.¹² The main consequence of this fact has been that the CMC has remarkably increased its media coverage, its legitimacy and also its relationship with different sectors from the civil society and international institutions. Indeed, in the Oslo Conference there were six countries that are not members of the CCW, but that have close links with the ICBL.

In any case, those in favour of the Oslo Process applauded the decision of the ICBL only with limited enthusiasm, “better late than never” or “whatever the reasons, their help is welcome”, because they known that this late participation has reduced part of the credibility or moral authority that has traditionally been the main value of civil society in this type of negotiation.

¹² Interview n. 72. The concrete text of the declaration states that “the ICBL decides to actively support the international process to ban cluster munitions; moreover, the ICBL will be part of the steering committee of the CMC”.

5.3.3. *Resources controlled by the CMC*

5.3.3.1. Introduction: Delivering the message

The CMC success has been partially due to an effective marketing of the humanitarian campaign, with messages and data based on unique pieces of research. By using expertise and scientific research, the CMC has promoted statistics within the media to reach the public opinion to oblige states to recognize the problem.

As seen in the other cases of the dissertation, in such campaigns, it is crucial to transmit concrete, clear, simple messages understandable by different audiences. In order to do so it is essential to find the right individual to express each message. The CMC was aware of this idea from the beginning and in the Oslo Conference that was carefully designed (see table 5.4 below).

Table 5.4 Messages repeated during the week of action against cluster munitions (Oslo, 21-23/II/2006)

<i>Text of the messages</i>	<i>Main personalities that emphasized them in their speeches</i>
Cluster munitions are out of control	Steve Goose, Eric Solheim, Peter Batchelor, Thomas Nash
This week is the beginning of the solution	Steve Goose, Per Nergaard, Thomas Nash, Erik Solheim
It is necessary to negotiate in a forum that overcomes the tyranny of consensus	Jody Williams, Steve Goose, Thomas Nash
It is not necessary to protect cluster munitions, but to civil population and children	Jody Williams, Reuben Nogueira McCarthy, Peter Batchelor, Jean-Baptiste Richardier
In the arsenals of countries there are billions of submunitions	Mark Hiznay, Kevin Bryant, Thomas Nash

<i>Text of the messages</i>	<i>Main personalities that emphasized them in their speeches</i>
Cluster munitions are potentially much more destructive than landmines	Mark Hiznay, Thomas Nash, Reuben Nogueira McCarthy, Habbouba Aoun, Kevin Bryant
This is urgent. It is necessary to avoid another humanitarian crisis	Erik Solheim, Jody Williams, Peter Batchelor, Thomas Nash
Just do it	Steve Goose, Per Nergaard, Erik Solheim.
Technical improvements are not sufficient to stop the problem	Grethe Å¸stern, Kevin Bryant, Colin King
This is a humanitarian problem and also a problem for the development	Erik Solheim, Jody Williams, Jean-Baptiste Richardier, Peter Batchelor, Grethe Å¸stern
Cluster munitions use is in opposition to the humanitarian international law	Steve Goose, Louis Maresca

Source: Collected by the researcher in Oslo during the speeches.

Those delivering the messages have to be perceived as credible representatives of different sectors of civil society, with high legitimacy. This strategy of few messages, but repeated and carefully distributed between different personalities was very effective in Oslo. Therefore, the forum of the civil society aimed to make the humanitarian consequences of the use of the cluster munitions visible. Hence, it helped to effectively transmit the urgency and magnitude of the problem and so, also its possibilities of solution.¹³

¹³ This Forum took place the 1 February 2006 in the Nobel Peace Centre de Oslo,

The person in charge to introduce the Norwegian Initiative was Erik Solheim, Norwegian minister for International Development. He did it by mentioning the famous slogan by the brand Nike. After reminding the audience other examples of successful collective actions by civil society, including the fight against apartheid in South Africa, the civil rights movement of the Afro-American population in the US or the movement for the abolition of the legal use of slave practices, Erik Solheim used the famous message of the sports brand to illustrate the idea that the only thing needed to ban cluster munitions was to: 'just do it!'

Along with these messages, a series of statistics were distributed to diplomats and the mass media present in Oslo, humanised by the presence of survivors such as Branislav Kapetanovic or Gita Jovic, injured by the explosion of cluster munitions used during the conflict of Kosovo.

Also, the enthusiastic intervention by Williams can be understood from this perspective, as she explained with extreme directness the humanitarian situation in Sudan. Some of these data are shown in table 5.5 below:

Table 5.5 Statistics on the humanitarian post-conflict impact of the cluster munitions in Kosovo

At least 234,123 submunitions were used
At least 8,345 submunitions were thrown without a clear objective
32% of the victims died (compared to the 8% of the victims in the case of landmines).
97% of the victims are civilians (at least 27% children).
The average age of the victims is 20 years, with 67% under-19.
98% of the total of victims by ERW are civilians.

Sources: HI (2006), Human Rights Watch (1999), Landmine Action (2000) and Moyes (2007).

Table 5.5 shows data of the humanitarian impact of the use of the cluster munitions in Kosovo. These casualties are still taking place seven years after the end of conflict, despite they have been reduced by one of the greater humanitarian post-conflict operations in history, including a well-funded anti-mine project.

5.3.3.2. Leadership issues: Norway as a solid leader and a humanitarian superpower¹⁴

In other chapters, we have seen the relevance of different issues of leadership, both within the NGO network and also within the like-minded group of states with regard to the final result of the process. In the cluster munitions' case, and particularly since the beginning of the Oslo Process, the main role of leadership has been played by Norway. Different reasons could help to explain this fact.

In Norway, interest groups and voluntary associations play a particular role in society, including some NGOs with many financial resources to carry out development projects, and at the same time campaigns of awareness-raising and political lobbying (Petrova 2007: 291). Moreover, some of the Norwegian NGOs in the field of development have links with the government and with the Labour Party, as the other consolidated corporative systems of Northern Europe (Neuman 2002: 109-110)¹⁵. In addition, this Scandinavian country also participates in many peacekeeping operations.

Part of this humanitarian vocation has historical roots, including a humanitarian tradition bound in the missionary work). A central characteristic in the Norwegian international role in the last decades has been the promotion of humanitarian values, namely a contribution to development aid, the rule of law, human rights and the effectiveness of international institutions. This is not

¹⁴ Several issues in this section are also addressed by Petrova (2007: chapter 5) in a more detailed way.

¹⁵ Cited in Petrova (2007: 291).

only due to its commitment with international norms, but also because of self-interest. Thus, it is in the interest of small countries, such as Norway, to support the role of the UN and its capacity to guarantee a minimum degree of peace and order in international relations. A well-known example of this idea has to do with the efforts to obtain the peace agreement between Israel and Palestine in 1993.

Moreover, the number of individuals in the different departments of the Norwegian Government with a background in civil society organisations is the highest in Western Europe (Neumann 2002; see also Petrova 2007: 295). Two examples: first, in 1990 Jan Egeland was appointed as advisor of the minister of Foreign Affairs, and later as assistant minister of Foreign Affairs. He had previously headed the national Norwegian section of International Amnesty and he had also worked for the International Committee of the Red Cross. He became a key person for the leadership role that Norway played in the negotiations to ban landmines. Egeland is currently assistant to the UN Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, a position that he held during the crisis of the Lebanon in 2006. Second, since 2005 the new minister of Foreign Affairs is Jonas Gahr Store, who was previously General Secretary of the Norwegian Red Cross. He was the one in charge to inaugurate the institutional speeches in the forum of the civil society on the humanitarian effects of cluster munitions in Oslo Conference in February 2007.¹⁶

Thus, from the characteristics of the political culture of the Scandinavian country, the Oslo Process as an alternative process on cluster munitions could be interpreted as a renewed effort to increase the influence of Norway in the world. Indeed, and following Petrova (2007) this initiative could be understood as part of a new program initiated in 2003 with the objective of

¹⁶ Also Petrova (2007) mentions these two examples (e.g. in p. 299, 318 or 381) and details their individual role in different stages of the landmines and cluster munitions processes. See also Leonard and Small (2003).

creating an own national brand and prestige for Norway at the international level, as a reaction to the results of studies that showed the lack of knowledge about Norway within the foreign audiences (see Petrova 2007: 296). In other words, while countries such as the United States, China, Britain and France are normally concerned about how to improve their international image, the main problem for the Norwegian public diplomacy is the lack of visibility.¹⁷

As Petrova (2007: 296) has also observed, following its tradition and comparative advantage in the field of development, peacekeeping and peace building, the central brand that emerged from an academic study of public diplomacy in Norway was the fact of being a humanitarian superpower: “Norway may only be the country number 115 in terms of size, but it is leading the world as humanitarian power, overcoming all the other countries in terms of its contribution to development aid, its role in peacekeeping and in peace processes and its commitment to develop new types of global governance”.¹⁸

With the aim of transforming these principles into concrete legal instruments alongside other medium and small countries, Norway is one of the founder members of the human security network, a governmental network that tries to reproduce the model of new diplomacy of the Ottawa Process to other similar cases, such as the fight against child soldiers, for the international criminal court, against small arms proliferation or against the use of cluster munitions.¹⁹

Within the CMC, leadership also is an issue since they have to balance the power of different organizations and also of different regions in their Steering Committee. Currently it is composed of: Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action and Norwegian People’s Aid (Co-Chairs), Austcare, DanChurchAid, Handicap International, International Campaign to Ban Landmines,

¹⁷ Petrova (2007: 296). See also Leonard and Small (2003).

¹⁸ Leonard & Small (2003: 34). Also quoted in Petrova (2007: 296).

¹⁹ See <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org>.

Landmine Survivors Network, IPPNW Russia-Zambia, Landmine Resource Centre (Lebanon), Mines Action Canada, Pax Christi, and Protection (Egypt). Also, in this case the Anglo-Saxon dominance is clear, together with the strong presence of the Scandinavians organizations and some effort to include NGOs from affected countries. The next section will show how the evolution of the leadership within the CMC has shaped its aims and demands.

5.3.3.3. Ban or regulation: The evolution of the organizational form of the CMC

As a broad network, the organisational level of the CMC has accommodated different organisations with different ideas on how to carry out the campaign and, particularly, on what to campaign for. Overall, there were two main perspectives: to ban cluster munitions or to define strict requirements with respect to their use, which would allow a mitigation of their effects. Nevertheless, some researchers have highlighted that the difference between regulation and prohibition is to a certain extent artificial, since the understanding of a prohibition from a point of view, can also mean a regulation from another perspective.²⁰ Thus, the choice between prohibition and restriction depends partially on the definition of what is going to be banned or what is going to be restricted.

Due to a rigorous reading of international humanitarian law, human rights organisations, such as HRW, had been proposing for many years several complementary measures to deal with this issue, including a moratorium in the use of cluster munitions, a series of reforms with respect to the banning of the use of this type of armament near areas inhabited by civilians, and also banning those cluster munitions not equipped with mechanisms of self-destruction (see HRW 1999). On the contrary, other organisations, such as Handicap International and the Central Committee

²⁰ Interview n. 76 with an expert who has written extensively about this issue, Oslo, 22/II/2006.

Mennonite, are members of the CMC because of the experience of their staff that work in the field, in areas affected by cluster munitions. As they have been facing the effects of these weapons in their daily work, they have proposed a total ban of their use, by arguing that this would be the unique effective solution to avoid more victims. Finally, an intermediate position has been maintained by Norwegian People's Aid, co-organiser organisation of the week of action against cluster munitions in Oslo and supporter of the prohibition of (some of) cluster munitions. They accept restrictions to the prohibition, so long as it refers to concrete types of the weapon, whose use does not pose any humanitarian concern. In practice, this position is closer to the ban than to a regulation.

Until mid 2006, the common position of the CMC was close to the one maintained by HRW. In fact, the coordinator of CMC said then: "It seems that the lack of public support for the ban is leading us towards some mechanism of regulation of cluster munitions, in order to limit their use in populated areas, and the use of some types of cluster munitions with high failure rates" (Nash, 2006). Yet, several factors have affected the strategic perspective of the organizations of the civil society, which has been progressively evolving towards positions closer to the ban.

The first turning point was the success of the national campaign in Belgium. The Belgian legislation that bans cluster munitions came into force the 9 June 2006.²¹ Due to this fact, influential organizations in this field, such as Landmine Action in Britain, decided to modify their position. Despite that they had previously called for a national moratorium, they started to use the example of the Belgian case in order to call for the total ban of

²¹ That ban allows for two exceptions. On the one hand, weapons that do not contain explosive submunitions and those designed only to create smoke or lights; on the other hand, weapons that contain submunitions with individual mechanisms, which go directly to the objective and which, therefore, do not leave ERW, i.e. do not have post-conflict effects. These exceptions would be acceptable for the CMC in a future international treaty. For more on this, see CMC (2007).

cluster munitions within Britain. Second, the relation of forces within the CMC has been modified with the entrance of new organisations in its executive committee. Among them, it has to be noted the case of the Norwegian People's Aid, which meant an increase of the weight of those in favour of a total ban. This diversity of opinions in the organizations of the civil society, although increases the internal democracy of the movement, has been perceived in some occasions as a sign of weakness. In this sense, the opponents to a new regulation on cluster munitions, such as the weapons industry in Belgium, have tried to emphasize the differences among the NGOs themselves, as an effective argument against them.²² The NGOs are now aware of this fact. They have tried, particularly after the Oslo Conference in February 2006, to unify their message, spurred by the general optimism perceived during the conference and after the final declaration was approved. Thus, the current objective of the CMC is the total ban of cluster munitions, although that could also include the exceptions of the Belgian national law (see fn. 21).

In 2007-2008 there has been a feeling of momentum within the NGOs. And that has affected the organizational level of the CMC. Many organisations have incorporated in their working teams more people dedicated exclusively to the cluster munitions issue and as a consequence, more information and researches on cluster munitions have been published since 2006. The CMC is also broadening qualitatively and quantitatively its members, from ICBL members to peace groups, human rights and humanitarian associations. They are also improving and increasing its relations with NGOs from affected countries. The coalition has thus developed a common a strategy to deal with all its international efforts, focused on a greater public exposition of the problem, fostering as well more relationships with those in charge of making decisions at the national level, especially parliamentarians,

²² Evidence of this type of reaction has been gathered by Handicap International with respect to the representatives of the Belgian arms industry. See Nash on this matter (2006: 37).

to obtain coordinated measures in different countries (see CMC 2007).

At the international level, the approach of the CMC has always gone beyond the CCW. In fact, already before the Review Conference of the CCW in November 2006 it was argued that maybe its optimal result would be a clear failure, which could offer the possibility of launching new efforts to deal with the subject outside the conference halls of the UN (see, for example, Nash 2006: 42). And this was, indeed, what would end up happening.

5.3.4. Strategies

5.3.4.1. Similarities and differences with landmines

Due to the many similarities existing between both cases, many activists argued from the beginning of the process to take the Ottawa Process and the ICBL as a model and try to imitate its success. However, some differences have prevented the coalition from replicating the exact same model.

There are several important similarities: first, the use of the two weapons has socioeconomic effects in the affected communities beyond the purely humanitarian effects; second, in both cases important coalitions of NGOs support the cause; and third, in both cases it was decided to start a process of non-traditional diplomacy in the negotiations.

Yet, in the case of the landmines, the humanitarian crisis was something evident and of greater proportions than in the case of the cluster munitions, most of which have not been used yet. Thus, despite the cluster munitions have killed and injured thousands of people in the last decades, the main catastrophe has not yet happened and it can, therefore, be avoided. For this reason, the cluster munitions' campaign has mainly an objective of prevention. Apart from cleaning contaminated areas and helping the victims and survivors of cluster munitions, the fundamental objective is the destruction of the surplus of billions of

submunitions that are stockpiled in arsenals all around the world and ready to be used. Therefore, from a strategic point of view, gaining the attention of public opinion is more difficult in this case, because offering an image of a humanitarian crisis is different than in the case of landmines.

Due to their unusual forms and their colours, cluster munitions that do not explode attract the curiosity of the children; the parents, once they realise the risks for their children often try to move and hide them, with the evident danger of explosion. For this reason, it is argued that this weapon is even more dangerous to civilians than landmines.

Finally, links between both subjects, landmines and cluster munitions, are also frequent between the own actors who deal with this subject, both diplomats and activists. Indeed, some of the members of the CMC are national sections of the ICBL (like in Cambodia, in Japan and in Afghanistan). In fact, the office of the CMC is located within the offices of Landmine Action, in Britain, an organisation that is leader in the fight against landmines. Moreover, an important donor for Landmine Action, the Foundation for the memory of Diana, Princess of Wales, is also a donor of the CMC. Organisations like Human Rights Watch are members of the Steering Committee of the ICBL and also of the Steering Committee of the CMC. Finally, in both processes there are some countries, such as Belgium, and, particularly, Norway, that have tried to lead the negotiations. However, they have had to frame the issue in a slightly different way.

5.3.4.2. The framing of the CMC: Arguments in favour and against the Oslo Process

The countries reticent to the process initiated in Oslo have argued that the Norwegian Initiative outside the CCW is not representative, because it does not include the main producers of cluster munitions. For this reason, they argue that the main forum to deal with this subject should be the CCW. Nevertheless, in the last years the CCW (that only includes half of the UN members)

has been incapable to provide effective answers to the humanitarian problems caused by cluster munitions. Similarly, it is argued that countries such as the US, Russia and China will never agree to ban cluster munitions; for this reason, the countries should try to look for more realistic solutions, namely a commitment between supportive and reluctant countries. However, the supporters of the Oslo Process affirm that the negotiation of a new treaty banning cluster munitions could affect the practice of non-signatory states similar to the way the Ottawa Treaty has modified the practice of many non-member states.

More controversy raises the military utility argument. Thus, if cluster munitions were created mainly during the Cold War to be used against extensive columns of armoured vehicles, current military conflicts are different and the use of this type of armament can mean an added difficulty to political and military strategies, putting in risk civilians, but also the soldiers themselves. The problem is that a cheaper technological alternative effective enough to attack armoured vehicles does not exist yet. In any case, concrete evidence of its military effectiveness has not been made public to date. In front of this uncertainty, the activists argue that whatever its military utility, its humanitarian consequences are without any doubt more serious.

With respect to the idea that the existing international humanitarian law is enough to regulate the use of this type of weapon, the CMC highlights the weakness of this body of international legislation. It is argued that specific rules on cluster munitions would strengthen the norms that ban indiscriminate attacks and that force the users of the weapons to deal with their post-conflict effects.

Some states have expressed their concern about the problem and have affirmed their commitment to improve the reliability of cluster munitions. Nevertheless, technical approaches to improve the reliability of the weapon consider only the post-conflict problem, without tackling the problem caused by the extension of the area of the effects of the weapon, which makes the attacks with cluster munitions indiscriminate.

This type of arguments is not new. In the mid-1990s, the main debate in the disarmament forums took place about the virtues of “intelligent” landmines. Similarly, it is said now that cluster munitions with mechanisms of self-destruction do not pose the same type of risk than other types of cluster munitions. However, the conflicts in Iraq and in the Lebanon in the early 2000s have demonstrated that the reliability of the munitions with mechanisms of self-destruction is not clear. In the Lebanon, since the cease-fire (summer 2006) a great amount of sets of submunitions were found, some of them not exploded and so not fragmented, in spite of having self-destruction mechanisms incorporated. This has been considered by some experts as a gesture of good will from some Israeli soldiers that did not approve their own role in the conflict. Yet, this is an example of the difficulty to find rigorous data in this field.

Finally, those in favour to approach the subject from a technical perspective plead to reduce the failure rate of the weapon as the most effective measure to deal with the problem. Thus, they suggest that some categories of these weapons should be banned. The counter-argument says that the failure rate cannot be addressed from a technical perspective, since many contextual factors affect this rate, including the weather conditions, the state of the land, the experience of the pilot, and so on. But even if the failure rates could be diminished, the enormous amount of submunitions disseminated by the cluster munitions implies that a minimum failure rate could also mean a clear risk for the civilians. Moreover, the CMC argues that by banning a concrete type of cluster munitions, the problem of the huge surplus of these weapons that are stockpiled (and that will be (re)sold to a lower price, indeed as a result of the new legislation) remains unsolved.

Moreover, a success of the activists is the fact that the framing of the CMC has been mainly a reaction to the need of their opponents to defend the use of this weapon, more and more contested by the public opinion. Table 5.6 below summarises these ideas:

Table 5.6 Arguments against and in favor of the Oslo Process

<i>Contra-framing (countries supporting the status quo)</i>	<i>vs. Framing (NGOs + like-minded countries)</i>
Representativity is in CCW	Representativity is in the Oslo Process
Better a low commitment with reluctant countries	Better a strong treaty, even without big countries
Cluster munitions have a high military utility	Military conflicts have changed Data on military utility is unclear Humanitarian effects exceed any military utility
International humanitarian law already regulates the use of cluster munitions	Institutional humanitarian law is not enough. Specific rules are needed for cluster munitions
Technical approaches can solve the problem: a) improve reliability; b) reduce failure rate	All cluster munitions (even those most advanced technologically) have indiscriminate effects

5.3.5. Contingent factors: The bombing of Lebanon

When transmitting the existence of a humanitarian crisis, sometimes activists have the possibility to link it with a current event. In this case, and paradoxically, the bombing of the Lebanon ended up helping the cause of the fight against cluster munitions. Indeed, Jody Williams began one part of her speech of the 21 February in Oslo by thanking Israel for the use that it made of cluster munitions in the Lebanon. In fact, the events of the south of the Lebanon in the summer of 2006 had an extraordinary relevance.²³ The media coverage was very intense, even several

²³ In this sense, the coordinator of the CMC, Thomas Nash, highlighted the remarkable increase of visits to the web page of the

months after the end of the war, due to the difficulties of the tasks of clearing mines from the affected zones and the socio-economic problems for the communities, derived from the existence cluster munitions as ERW. Particularly, the data published more than six months after the cease-fire in the Lebanon included at least 200 civilians that died or were injured by the action of cluster munitions that remained in the terrain without having exploded yet.²⁴

Applying counterfactual terms to this case, we could even affirm that without those events, the Oslo Conference would have not taken place or, at least, not in the way it did. Hence, the events of the Lebanon have accelerated the process of negotiation on the cluster munitions treaty.

5.4. Conclusion

The cluster munitions coalition is the most recent case of the research. Officially created in November 2003, it aimed at concluding a legally binding treaty in 2008. In 2003 the perception was that the CMC should be an international campaign against all explosive remnants of war, not only against cluster munitions. The argument was that the CMC had to replace the vacuum left by the ICBL and the mine ban treaty, which did not include sub-

coalition www.stopclustermunitions.org because of the crisis of the Lebanon (Nash, 2006, p. 40).

²⁴ As a example, here are some articles published in the international press during the week of 8-14/I/2007: "Norway to Help Serbia Remove NATO's Cluster Bombs", *Serbianna.com* (Serbia), 10/I/2007; "Huge Bomb Disposal Task Lies Ahead", *Gisbone Herald* (New Zealand), 11/I/2007; "De-mining Official Expects South to be Clear of Cluster Bombs by Year's End", *The Daily Star* (Lebanon), 11/I/2007; "Both Hezbollah and Israel 'Broke Laws of War'", *The Daily Star* (Lebanon), 11/I/2007; "ATFL Campaign to Ban Cluster Bombs Endorsed by Ralph Nader", *PRNewswire-USNewswire* (USA); "Lebanese Ban Political Talk to Get Back to Work", *Sunday Telegraph* (United Kingdom), 14/I/2007.

munitions in its mandate. Moreover, the experience of other campaigns of public pressure suggested that a clear and concrete message, such as “stop cluster munitions” was essential. This has been explicit in the CMC documents since the end of 2004.

The framing of the issue case in terms of a humanitarian crisis has been more difficult than in the landmines. Thus, the main problem posed by the cluster munitions is the potential linked to the fact that there are hundreds of millions stockpiled in many countries, ready to be used. Moreover, the military utility of the weapon is bigger in the CMC case than it was with landmines.

The positive result of the Oslo Process is a big success for the NGOs of the CMC, for the countries that lead this process and, particularly, for the image and international prestige of Norway. The treaty recently approved is a compromise in order to have as many countries as possible in favour of restricting the use of these weapons and even of banning those with the highest failure rate, producing therefore greater humanitarian effects. In fact, the self-interest of the military is to find a more effective weapon than the current cluster munitions.

As this chapter has shown in the assessment of the successes and failures in the two phases, it seems that the issue reached effectively the public agenda, gaining momentum and initiating a serious political process. Part of this success has to do with the fact that NGOs in this process are considered as full partners who participate in all the meetings and work closely to the group of like-minded states that lead the negotiations. At the cultural level, on the contrary, successes have been only moderate since for most of the countries, there are still types of the weapon that are considered legitimate.

After the result of the Oslo Conference, the objectives for the CMC have focused in assuring that the treaty takes the form of a ban and not of a restriction and that cluster munitions with mechanisms of self-destruction are also included in the legal text. Yet, the group of 46 has been expanded to integrate more countries, particularly from the affected regions. Finally, important states, such as Britain, France, Germany and Italy, were

pressurised by these NGOs to take concrete national steps to resign to this type of armament through a ban, or a moratorium.

The hopeful beginning of the Oslo Process suggested that the organisations of the civil society can be really effective under a series of conditions, which include flexible rules of the game and an effective and credible leadership from the allied countries in order to dedicate resources and organization to a disarmament question that has humanitarian effects.

Also in this case an external event needs to be highlighted. Thus, the use of a huge quantity of sub-munitions by the Israeli army during the last days of the armed conflict in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel in the summer 2006 had collateral aspects, with intense media coverage of the victims and of the consequences the difficulties of the cleaning and demining difficulties of the areas.

Another reflection has to do with the temporary assessment of the effects of a campaign, often difficult to interpret. For example, the ICBL initially expected to obtain a complete prohibition from the landmines in the Review Conference of the CCW in 1995. Even though the prohibition was not achieved, from there a group of states came out with the will of leading a new process that finally was very effective. Thus, the review conference can be understood as a failure, but at the same time as a necessary step towards the mine ban treaty. In the CMC case, a very similar process has taken place after the failure of a new CCW review conference ten years later, ending up in the Oslo Process.

Both processes are examples of new diplomacy, open and multilateral negotiation processes, with the NGOs (and also international institutions, such as UN agencies) as full partners, where the leadership of a group of individuals representing countries and international organisations that share certain ideas and interests, impulse alternative bargaining processes, in order to overcome the paralysis of traditional disarmament forums, in many cases due to the unanimity rule required for the decision-making. Also in both processes the mechanism allowing the participation of states is based on self-selection, with the aim of

preventing the participation of potential blockers or countries with clear preferences against the treaty.

The current third phase of the Oslo Process starting in 2009 aims at ratifying by thirty countries the treaty so that it can entry into force. In May 2009 96 countries have signed the treaty, 107 have adopted it and 7 have ratified it. Also, the fully implementation of the treaty will need to be monitored by the activists.

CHAPTER 6. THE CHILD SOLDIERS COALITION (CSC)

6.1. Introduction: An application of the EAR method¹

In the context of the whole research, the case of the Child Soldiers Coalition (CSC) presents some specific methodological challenges. First, because the negotiation of the Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC), took place almost a decade ago (ending in January 2000), it has not been possible to attend (and participate in) the main meetings and conferences of the process. Second, because of the specific nature of this case, most of the individuals that had key roles in the 1990s are not closely connected to those of the other campaigns. This situation is different from what happened with the other ‘old’ case, the landmines campaign, where most of its protagonists are deeply involved in the cluster munitions coalition. Moreover, they are currently located far apart; and so it was not possible to reach most of them for a face-to-face interview. For this reason, they were interviewed using a questionnaire, which was sent both by mail

¹ Thirty-three key individuals were interviewed during the research of the chapter (see table 6.14). Thirty of them answered the questionnaire, including all five individuals listed in the section “Directors” of the Steering Committee for the year 2003-4 (see e.g. CSC 2004b, 2005b, 2006b and 2007b): Rory Mungoven (resigned 16/10/2003), Jo Becker, Eylah Kadjar-Hamouda (resigned 31/12/2003), Martin Macpherson and Andreas Rister (appointed 24/02/2004).

and e-mail to thirty people, who agreed previously to answer it. They were partially selected through snowball techniques, starting from the first three in-depth interviews for this research and continuing through some of the following interviewees.² This method of selecting key informants was complemented by the examination of relevant official documents that pointed to a select group of people that had participated in the events under study or/and had written influential scholarship on the topic of child soldiers.

Finally, the three key individuals that had been interviewed face-to-face before the questionnaire was sent were contacted again after the sending of the questionnaire to add a qualitative assessment of the results. The results of this research are presented in the following pages. A complete list of all interviewees, including those who asked to remain anonymous and so the use of their name and position have not been linked by any way to any of the answers, is presented in the end of this chapter (see table 6.14).

The technique used to assess the independent variables that have played a role in shaping the political influence of the CSC in the second phase of this process (the negotiation of the treaty) is inspired in a rigorous methodology of qualitative research, the so-called EAR method (see table 6.1 below). As explained in chapter 2, it consists in the combination of three elements: ego-perception, alter-perception and the researcher analysis. The first and the second elements are based on the perceptions of the participant actors: (i) key NGO representatives (ego-perception) and (ii) key representative of the States (alter-perception). In the third element, the researcher tries to reconstruct the bargaining and decision-making processes. This exercise of triangulation deliberately uses different (and even opposed) information sources with the aim of neutralising the positive bias of these perceptions, usually involving the overestimation of the political influence of NGOs, and the confirmation bias of process-tracing research (see George and Bennet, 2004: 217).

² See the methodological annex of the thesis.

Table 6.1 The EAR Method as applied to the CSC

<p><i>Ego-perception:</i> Views of the CSC representatives with regard to their own political influence (CSC claims)</p>
<p><i>Alter-perception:</i> Views of government representatives with regard to the political influence of the CSC (first control of CSC claims)</p>
<p><i>Researcher's analysis:</i> Researcher's assessment of the CSC claims based on policy documents and additional interviews (second control).</p>

Following Arts (1998 and 2001) and Arts and Verschuren (1999), the researcher analysis is constructed as follows. It will be examined whether the CSC has achieved their goal – fully or partially – with regard to a policy topic under investigation. Such a goal may refer to the enhancement of a desired ‘good’ or to the prevention of an undesired ‘bad’. The check itself will be done based on a comparison of the CSC's initial policy goal – deduced from documents and interviews – and the parallel policy outcome. In cases where the CSC did not achieve their goal, it will be assumed that they have not been influential at all. Second, it will be checked that this goal-achievement is caused by the coalition's own interventions and not by those of governments or other actors. In other words, it will be verified whether the outcome was more in line with the coalition's goals than if the latter had not intervened (counterfactual). To check this, the policy/decision-making process of the topic concerned has been reconstructed as accurately as possible.

The CSC will be successful for a number of reasons. First, because it will frame the problem on the legal vacuum between the ages of fifteen and eighteen. Second, because it will combine coalition-building in national contexts, while enjoying access to the international negotiators. Third, because of a partnership with UN agencies and allied countries. Fourth, because of its rigorous and worldwide research and the media coverage of international conflicts, as in the Congo, Angola or Mozambique. However, in

the third phase of the process, new challenges will difficult the implementation of the treaty, including the role of non-state armed groups.

The next sub-section specifies certain substantive characteristics of child soldiers that make them a very special case in the context of this research. Although children are not normally understood as a weapon, reality too often shows the extent to which this issue can be as much a human rights concern, as an important case of disarmament.

6.1.1. Child soldiers as a weapon

In many conflicts the leaders of armed groups see children as cheap and efficient fighters and are recruited to the military to become soldiers or sexual slaves. In situations of collapse of the family and/or of the social and economic structures, some of them decide to voluntarily enrol as a way of survival in regions affected by armed conflict. Many try to escape from situations of poverty, unemployment, domestic violence, abuse or exploitation. Others say that they decided to join after having witnessed tortures or murders of relatives by members of one of the parties in the conflict (see Brett and Specht, 2005).³

The reader could wonder why this case has been included in a research on disarmament campaigns. The reality is that children are physically used as a weapon in armed forces around the world that dramatically raise the cost of violence in war. Therefore, the negotiations to end with this practice have been seen for many countries as a fundamental dimension of human security and disarmament. Many of the representatives who attend the international conferences on disarmament are civil servants from the ministries of defense, high-ranking officials of the army and

³ An extensive bibliography about several issues related to child soldiers can be found here: <http://www.child-soldiers.org/library/solereport-jan05.pdf>.

also members of non-state armed groups. The participation of children in armed conflicts is usually considered by these representatives as an internal question of their countries' national security. A fundamental problem acknowledged by the majority of the interviewees is the fact that the governmental forces of many countries (those who can sign the treaties) still recruit children. Moreover, if they do not do it, they think that in some moments they might need to do it.⁴

The analysis of this case in the context of the present research also allows the comparison with a campaign where the main actors are not peace or disarmament organisations, but NGOs for the promotion and protection of children's rights and of human rights. From this point of view, this campaign would be more linked to the case for the International Criminal Court, another successful initiative by the civil society over the last number of years.

In addition, there is also an interrelation between the problems linked to child soldiers and those associated with other disarmament campaigns. Olara Otunnu, first representative of the UN General Secretary for the topic of children and armed conflict, insisted on creating an office on 'children and armed conflict' and not on 'children in armed conflict', broadening thus his legal mandate, which includes references to the effects associated to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and also to the explosive remnants left as a consequence of an armed conflict, such as antipersonnel landmines or cluster bombs.

Similarly, Graça Machel concluded her 1996 global report on the effects of armed conflict on children by mentioning several times these relationships. The main link is the fact that children usually become the main victims of most of current armed conflicts, and particularly in the case of the use of cluster

⁴ This happens not only in situations where armed forces have recruited children in a massive way, such as in Burma or in Congo. Other countries, including Great Britain and the United States, have a great need of nourishing their armed forces in certain moments and therefore they do not want to renounce the possibility of using children (i.e. under-eighteen years old).

munitions. This fact could allow a closer collaboration among the NGOs working on these different issues, something that, as we will see, has not been yet fully developed.

According to data from the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), approximately 50 per cent of the annual 15-20,000 victims of mines and other explosive remnants of war in more than 90 countries are children. In Colombia, about 40 per cent of the victims of mines from 1990 to 2003 were children. At present in Iraq and in the Lebanon the figures are higher, due to the effects of cluster munitions and mines left in schools and in residential areas.

Also, the relationship between child soldiers and small arms is becoming more and more evident. SALW are the main weapons used in most of current armed conflicts, and their availability is directly related to the dramatic increase of violence, the exacerbation of conflicts and the phenomenon of child soldiers. They are, by definition, weapons light enough that can be carried and used by single individuals, including children.

As part of the research for the chapter, a number of diplomats were asked the following question: "Do you think the existence of child soldiers, and, in general, the protection of the rights of the child are a key issue in international politics for States?" As a summary of one of the main problems in this field, a governmental representative in the UN committee on the CRC, who participated in the drafting of the Convention of the Rights of the Child⁵ answered that question in the following way: "*On paper, yes, in practice, no*". As we will see, the evolution of the international process might be interpreted from this perspective. Another diplomat argued: "what is relevant to my country is the issue of protecting children's rights of those who are living under a foreign

⁵ He was also observer to the sessions of the open ended working groups for DCI (1984-89). This diplomat asked to remain unknown.

occupation”, showing the political pressures surrounding this sensitive issue.⁶

Regarding the division of the process into different phases, this case has some similarities with the landmines campaign. Thus, after a first phase in which the main objective of the activists is to place the issue in the agenda-setting of the governments and the international institutions (especially in the Convention on the Rights of the Child), there will come the second phase of the negotiation of the treaty. This negotiation will last for several years and the signature of the treaty will represent a turning point within the whole process. Thus, once the treaty is achieved, the third phase will be mainly devoted to its implementation. The next section detail the evolution of the child soldiers' campaign in each of these phases.

6.2. Evolution of the international process

6.2.1. The Convention on the Rights of the Child

Prior to the 1990s, child soldiers' issues were mainly addressed from the international humanitarian law, that is a body of law based in the context of military conflicts and hostilities. The law emphasised the protection of civilians and prisoners of war, as well as in the restrictions on the use of certain weapons. Thus, the 1949 Geneva Convention number four provided seventeen articles that dealt with (civilian) children living in

⁶ When answering the question “Do you think the existence of child soldiers and, in general, the protection of the rights of the Child is a key issue for your country?”, the diplomat said: “No, for the issue of child soldiers, because in the law in Syria the recruitment of children under 18 years old was prohibited before the existence of the CRC and its protocols. Syria is a State party to the CRC since 1993 and to its protocols since 2003. However, what is relevant to my country is the issue of protecting children’s rights who are living under a foreign occupation.” Interview n. 10.

occupied territories and only in inter-state conflicts. In 1977, the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention addressed for the first time the issue of child soldiers in an international legal agreement.

In the 1980s, several individuals acted as norm entrepreneurs, placing the NGOs in the role of awareness-raisers and contributing to frame this issue in the context of human rights norms and in the perspective of non-violence. Among them, Dorothea Woods with the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva, was one of the pioneers. Another one was Martin McPherson, first with the Friends World Committee for Consultation and then with Amnesty International (interview n. 4).

In 1983, the Informal NGO Ad Hoc (INGAH) Group on the Drafting of the Convention of the Rights of the Child was created, with Defense for Children International acting as the Secretariat.⁷ In 1985, at the UN Working Group meeting, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland supported by Belgium, Peru and Senegal proposed the inclusion of an article on children in armed conflict, built from the NGO draft.

At the same time, international armed conflicts were showing images in the media of children, some of them through researches by Defence of the Children International and the ICRC, who found thousands of children in prisoner of war camps in the Iran-Iraq war. Some countries, including the US, were by this time supplying weapons to both sides of the war. Activists thus collected data and also organized awareness raising activities. In a coordinated effort and welcoming the UN's decision to consider child soldiers, NGO activists began calling for raising the recruitment from fifteen to eighteen, but countries such as the US, Britain or Canada, who actively recruited persons between the ages of fifteen and eighteen, opposed it. By the end of the

⁷ This group included other organisations, such as Amnesty International, the International Catholic Child Bureau, Radda Barnen, the Anti-Slavery Society, the Friends World Committee, the International Council of Jewish Women and the International Save the Children Alliance.

negotiations, only the USA was refusing consensus on this issue, despite the work by the American Chapter of Defence of the Child International.

Since the UN Working group operated based on consensus, final negotiations focused upon the US objections to increasing the standards of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. In the end, the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) was considered as an historic achievement for children's rights, but many NGOs and UN bodies pointed to the discrepancy between the CRC's definition of a child as a person under the age of eighteen and the article on child soldiers, who allowed recruitment since fifteen years.⁸ Despite this concession to the Americans, the US did not sign the Convention and it has not done it yet.

By the June World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, four different UN human rights bodies had considered the issue of child soldiers and the debate over amending the CRC. The Vienna Declaration that emerged from this conference supported the 1992 decision by the Committee of the Rights of the Child to "study the question of raising the minimum age of recruitment into armed forces" (Maslen 1999). On another front, the NGO sector was still active and some members of the INAGH decided to form a Child Soldiers Sub-Group, led by Jo Becker, from Human Rights Watch, to focus on both collecting data on the problem and continued advocacy. Other key individual in the NGO sector were Guy Goodwin-Gill and Rachel Brett, first with the Friends World Committee for Consultation and then with the Quaker UN Office; in the governmental sector, was crucial the election of Thomas

⁸ Article 38 reads in part: "States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 15 years to not take a direct part in hostilities (...) States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of 15 years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of 15 years but who have not attained the age of 18 years, States Parties shall endeavor to give priority to those who are oldest." Therefore, there was no mention child soldiers serving in non-state armed groups.

Hammarbert (who has been Director of Amnesty International and Secretary General of Radda Barnen) as Vice-Chairman of the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The NGOs decided to intensify the pressure and campaigning and so that a transnational coalition of civil society activists was necessary to participate in international forums with a single voice.

6.2.1.1. The 90s: Legal vacuum and agenda-setting

The coalition of NGOs to stop the use and recruitment of child soldiers or Child Soldiers' Coalition (CSC) was created in 1998 by six organisations of human rights and of the humanitarian issue-area: International Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, Save the Children, Defense of the Children International, the Religious Society of Friends (the Quakers), World Vision International and the International Federation Terre des Hommes. The CSC was created because a new treaty was needed to deal specifically with the recruitment and the use of under-18 year-old in armed conflicts. As we have seen, at that time there was a loophole: on the one hand, there was the Convention of the Rights of the Child, which establishes that a child is a person who is less than eighteen years old. On another hand, the Conventions of Geneva (the Law of War) establish that there can be recruitment and use of children who are above fifteen years old. Because the fact that the Law of War allows that someone between fifteen and eighteen years old can be considered as a soldier, it also implies that (as a soldier) he/she can also be considered as a target, and this fact made the protection of children problematic.

There was a legal loophole, but also a lack of interest and a lack of knowledge in many sectors of the international diplomacy. And this was translated into a lack of attention, because "if there is no interest and no knowledge, no one makes laws".⁹ For this reason, the CSC prioritised in this phase strategies aiming at strengthen their international influence. In a second phase,

⁹ Interview no. 2.

national coalitions would be created to work on the national legislations in this specific issue. The CSC had an immediate regional impact on Europe, where most of its steering committee members were based. Thus, it achieved a resolution by the European Parliament in favour of a new optional protocol to amend the CRC and increase the age to the 18 years old.

Concerning the international agenda, the topic of the children affected by armed conflict had been winning weight in the debates within the UN in the last two decades. In 1989, the Convention of the Rights of the Child was approved and this also created the Committee of the Rights of the Child with the mission of ensuring the fulfilment and the effective implementation of the Convention. Gathered by the first time in 1992, NGOs and representatives of UN agencies were also invited to contribute with recommendations for improving the Convention with respect to the situation of the children affected by armed conflict. By initiative of this Committee, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) approved the Resolution 48/157 (20 December 1993), in which the UN General Secretary designated an independent expert to conduct a global study about the consequences of armed conflicts on children. Graça Machel, former Minister of Education of Mozambique, was appointed as Expert of the General Secretary, with the mission of conducting the study. After two years of intensive research, consultations and visits to countries in conflict, the study was presented in 1996 to the UNGA.¹⁰

This report had a significant impact. Among other things, it promoted the Resolution 51/77, which suggested the creation of a Special Representative for the repercussions of armed conflicts on children. In September 1997, Kofi Annan nominated Olara Otunnu for this position, who extended his initial three-year mandate until April 2006, when Radhika Coomaraswamy

¹⁰ See Graça Machel (1996): "The impact of armed conflicts on children" (A/51/306 and Add.1).

succeeded him.¹¹ His main function has consisted of guaranteeing that the issues emerged as a consequence of the Machel report were on the agenda of the international community. Apart from some critiques that his office received concerning the political pressures for including or excluding some countries in his reports, the fact of creating a specific office for children affected by armed conflict is assessed very positively by both activists and diplomats.¹²

At the same time, as mentioned, the Commission of Human Rights of the UN had designated a Working Group with the mission of drafting an Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child that would increase the age of the combatant children from fifteen to eighteen years. The Working Group celebrated its first sessions in 1994 and since then they met annually in Geneva. Their last meeting took place in January 2000. In May 2000, the Optional Protocol on the participation of children in armed conflicts were adopted. It came into force on the 12 February 2002, as one of the optional protocols to the Convention of the Rights of the Child of the UN. Moreover, there are two other international legal instruments on the use of child soldiers: the International Criminal Court and the Convention 182 of the International Labor Organization.¹³

¹¹ The 2006 report includes the key priorities of the Office of the Special Representative in this new phase of the mandate. The report also highlights some important areas of progress in the efforts carried out by the international community to provide a tangible protection for the children affected by armed conflicts. See <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/spanish/home6.html>.

¹² Interview n. 2, 15 and 25, among others.

¹³ In June 1998, 120 governments adopted the Statute of Rome for the International Criminal Court, which describes the recruitment or use in hostilities of children fewer than 15 years as a crime of war. In June 1999, the member states of the International Labor Organization acted to forbid obligatory recruitment in conflict of under-18, and also the Convention about the Worst Forms of Child Work deals with it. Finally, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child is the first

Table 6.2 Assessment of the different effects of the CSC in its first phase

<i>Type of effect</i>	<i>Estimation</i>
Access	Moderate
Agenda	Moderate
Policy	Moderate
Cultural	Low

In this first phase, we can conclude that activists' access to the institutions was moderate, as the CSC as such had not been created, and so there were not fluid contacts with the UN agencies yet. However, the fact that some individuals did have some contact with the Working Group allows for the assessment of some successes already in this phase. Also, the creation of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, even if article 38 dealing with child soldiers was disappointing for the activists, had to be considered as a success from the broader perspective of the rights of the child, as it improved the situation that existed until then.

Moreover, in the transition between the first and the second phase, an impact in the agenda was achieved by a report about the consequences of armed conflicts in children. Directed by Machel, it was presented in 1996 to the UN General Assembly. One of the main consequences of this report was the creation of a UN office to deal specifically with children affected by armed conflict. This is assessed in this research as a moderate policy success in the first phase of the campaign, although the coalition did not exist as such, but taking into account the fact that their members were already lobbying in the corridors of the international forums as individual NGOs. As outlined in chapter 1, a full success in the policy dimension would have implied the exertion of political influence

regional treaty that establishes for both volunteer and participation in the hostilities the 18 years as the minimum age for every military recruitment.

by the transnational coalition when changing an international regime, something that in this campaign will not happen until the second phase.

Finally, the impact in the cultural dimension is assessed as low, because there were still many countries who considered the use and recruitment of child soldiers as a legitimate practice. In particular, Britain, the USA and the Netherlands posed problems to the development of new international law that would fill the mentioned legal vacuum. In fact, the CSC in the following phase will focus on a technical frame of the issue, as a broader cultural approach was believed to be more difficult to reach support among the reluctant states.

6.2.2. The negotiation of the treaty

The CSC led the campaign for the adoption, ratification and implementation of the Optional Protocol through an intensive process of political pressure, organising high-level regional conferences, documenting the practices and the policies of the recruitment of children all over the world, making pressure to the UN Security Council and to other international actors and creating regional networks to work for the end of the use of child soldiers.¹⁴ In coordinated way, national coalitions launched aware-raising campaigns, pressed for changes in the national practices and policies and helped many governments to achieve the ratification and the implementation of the optional protocol.

By specifically taking into consideration the treaty, it can be argued that the campaign was a clear success, since the text was

¹⁴ The attention on the topic of child soldiers also existed in many other forums, including the OSCE; the European Parliament; the Organization of American States; the Group of the European Union, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (EU-ACP), and the ECOWAS, with the result of a number of resolutions, and joint strategies to address the subject of children and armed conflict, and the establishment of regional mechanisms for the protection of the child.

signed, although some compromises with the US positions had to be reached. However, it still satisfied most of the NGOs demands. The issue at stake was what is known as 'straight-18'. That means that the minimum age had to be 18 for everything: for voluntary and non-voluntary recruitment, by armed non-governmental actors and the governmental armed forces, and for direct and indirect participation in hostilities.

The CSC framed the issue in a very clear and neutral way, which created difficulties among its opponents for the construction of contra-framing strategies. Formed mainly by legal experts, the NGOs focused their strategy on a technical and legal aspect: the loophole that existed among the Convention of the Rights of the Child and the Conventions of Geneva, between the Humanitarian International Law and the International Law of Human Rights. At this level, even pragmatic countries had to agree with most of the CSC demands. Other strategies based on broader, more complex and more ambiguous concepts, such as 'children have their own rights' would have been presumably more difficult to defend internationally and would have needed a bigger consensus about the problem posed by the participation of children in armed conflicts.

According to the coordinator of the CSC from 2002 to 2004 who had also participated in the negotiations of the Optional Protocol (OP) and with the aim of taking advantage of the media interest, the media strategy of the CSC focused on including frequent pieces of news about these children (almost on a daily basis), with the atrocities they have to commit or those that are committed against them.¹⁵ However, all this attention reached a saturation point, in which the picture of a child and his or her story could not have new impact. At that point more information was necessary and some media started to speak about the children more as perpetrators than as victims. The NGOs in response felt the need to re-educate the media. In other cases, the media had a preconceived and limited agenda, sensitive to possible political

¹⁵ Interview n. 5.

uses of the information about this subject, such as in the case of the Middle East, but also in others, such as in the case of Colombia.¹⁶ The role of the media in this topic is therefore more delicate and sensitive than in other cases. For this reason, the effects on the agenda-setting need not to be over-emphasised in this case.

The policy effects in this phase were high. The CSC found that the work of lobbying the writing of the Optional Protocol meant that around 80 per cent of their demands would have been achieved.¹⁷ Two demands are the main limitations of the treaty: (a) it allows in some situations the voluntary recruitment of under-eighteen on the part of governmental forces;¹⁸ (b) it does not develop enough mechanisms to ensure the implementation of the text.¹⁹

¹⁶ In the presentation of the Spanish coalition (Madrid, 20 November 2003), some Colombian journalists asked in a reiterated way to the representative of the Latin American CSC if 'it was not true that the only group that recruit children in Colombia are the FARC', without showing a deeper or wider interest in the structural problem of the participation of children in armed conflicts.

¹⁷ Discerned with several experts and activists, including Enrique Restoy, Casey Kelso and Felipe Gómez Isa. A good analysis of the final text approved is the article by Felipe Gómez Isa (2001).

¹⁸ For example, the treaty establishes that the states have to make a formal declaration before any recruitment of under-18 year-old. On the other hand, if they have to participate in armed conflicts, they have to be the last ones on making it.

¹⁹ It is a matter of measures to put in practice and to reinforce mechanisms of control, for assuring that the states effectively comply with the regulations that they have signed. Thus, the Optional Protocol (as it has happened with other Conventions) created a committee where the different states have to present their reports, but the only thing that this committee can do is to give recommendations about the efforts made by each state.

Table 6.3 Assessment of the different effects of the CSC in its second phase

<i>Type of effect</i>	<i>Estimation</i>
Access	High
Agenda	High
Policy	Very High
Cultural	High

Since the adoption of the OP, many are the countries that have adapted their national legislations in order to make them compatible with the Optional Protocol. South Africa, Portugal, Denmark, Finland, Afghanistan, Colombia and Sierra Leona were among the first countries to do it. Moreover, other countries, such as the United States, who had used soldiers of seventeen years in military operations in Somalia, Bosnia and in the Gulf War in 1991, stopped this practice after ratifying the treaty in December 2002. In a similar way, it seems that Britain changed its practice when announced that it would not send under eighteen soldiers to the invasion of Iraq, in contrast to the situation in the Gulf War in 1991, when 200 British minors participated in the armed conflict. In fact, two of them died during the war.

Seen as a 'neutral organisation', the CSC as an international network also benefited in this second phase from a better access to the international institutions than their NGO members, often seen as 'enemies' by some countries. The coalition often facilitated contacts to their individual members with international institutions, such as the UN Security Council or the European Union, to allow national partners to express their own problems and their research in international forums.

The political opportunity structure for the campaign on this second phase benefited from the existence of armed conflicts in places, such as Congo, Angola or Mozambique. These events, though not connected to the work of the activists, facilitated the presence in the media of images of children with their own

weapons, which affected public opinion and also some among the governmental sector. This helped to stigmatise the use of children as soldiers, therefore achieving a high impact in the cultural dimension, although that was not generalised across all countries.

6.2.3. A new phase for the CSC: After the Optional Protocol

Once signed, the treaty the members of the CSC discussed the need to end the coalition, but they decided that it was still necessary to have the treaty ratified and implemented. That means that achieving the international treaty is not the final goal or the mission of the Coalition. This final goal would be a situation in which there would be no more children in armed groups neither in armed forces and where there is no more recruitment (Annan, 2004; Otunnu, 2004). This is a very long-term goal and that is the reason why the CSC works on intermediate goals, such as the optional protocol.

A new phase, then, also very rapid (the treaty had been signed less than three years after the creation of the CSC) was the ratification of the treaty. Currently, 122 countries have signed the Optional Protocol and 116 have ratified it.²⁰ However, among the signatories there are countries that use child soldiers, including Congo or Rwanda-Burundi. They signed and ratified the treaty very soon, probably due to the international pressure. In these cases the signature still has some effects, but the CSC keeps on working there so that these states fulfil the commitments. Therefore, the work of lobbying for the CSC passes in this phase through the UN Security Council, the international courts of justice and also directly through the national governments; the emphasis is in the implementation of the treaty.

This evolution has also affected the CSC itself. Since the adoption of the treaty, the goal was its expansion, by creating as

²⁰ This data is from January 2009. Updated data can be found in <http://www.child-soldiers.org>.

many national coalitions as possible. In fact, the CSC aimed to have national coalitions in almost all countries where there was a presence of child soldiers. Currently there is a more recent sophistication of the strategy, which attempts to prioritise certain situations and which has been shaped by a new strategic plan. This document, drafted during 2004 and 2005 and agreed by all the components of the coalition, points out that for the member organisation at the national level and at the local level, as well as for other actors, including different UN agencies, the main benefit of the CSC is their work of lobbying and political pressure. For this reason, they have decided to focus specifically on this role of the coalition.

The priority since then is not to expand the CSC or to be present in all conflicts, but to be effective in achieving changes on the field (for example, demobilisation of child soldiers). Therefore, they work more in the prevention, by searching 'gaps of attention' in places where it is necessary to create changes and where there is not enough support to do it. This idea is also applied in the way the CSC does research. According to a Program Officer for the CSC:

"We were in a moment in which in certain countries everything which was necessary to know was already known. Nothing new could be found out in the Congo or in Burundi. However, there are countries, such as the Centre African Republic, Chad or the Lebanon, where there is no evidence of the presence of child soldiers, even though we believe that there are. As a matter of fact, since we have started to do studies about situations of armed conflict, we have found under-18 combatants in all cases (...). Before, our work was a more reactive question, now it is much more proactive. We work at the beginning of the conflict; we know that if there are no child soldiers, there will be. For this reason, we have to act in a preventive way".²¹

²¹ Interview n.3. He was Program Officer for the CSC. 9 February 2007, London.

This account shows human rights denunciation of a situation, while working at the same time at the level of communities and of armed groups. The main objective now would be therefore prevention.

The NGOs claim that there is no effective system of benefits and punishments for the recruiters depending on their behaviour (Becker, 2004). That is, given that children are very cheap and efficient fighters, in order to demobilise them it is necessary for the recruiters to perceive that the benefits of doing it overcome its military advantage or that the costs of keeping on using them are too high. On the one hand, benefits could include an improvement of the reputation and of the international legitimacy of the non-state armed actors, as well as concrete support for the rehabilitation of former child soldiers. On the other, costs normally include a negative image in the media and in the international forums, restrictions in the access to armament, the exclusion of future governments, or for amnesty agreements, and the prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC) or by other judicial mechanisms. If this is the theory, the practice shows that the efforts to reward or to punish attitudes in terms of benefits or sanctions are still very limited.²²

The last great event at the international level about child soldiers was the Conference of Paris, organised together by UNICEF and the French government in February 2007. This was fundamentally an institutional event aiming to adapt the principles

²² The problem is still more difficult regarding non-state actors, due to the fact that the possible points of pressure are here more limited and, in spite of several successes in this terrain, most of the commitments have not been kept. The reason has to do with the difficulties of carrying out a follow-up and systematic monitoring, partially because of the lack of resources. In addition, in cases where there have been programs of demobilisation and rehabilitation, they were only available for a small percentage of the children; moreover, the help arrived with a lot of delay and significantly girls was excluded from these processes. See Becker (2004).

of Cape Town (the programmatic principles on child soldiers)²³ to the modern times and to the rest of the world. In fact, these are principles originally designed for the African context, which had come out from a workshop by UNICEF and a group of organisations, and which did not have any character of universality. This document is a matter of principles and of background on what a child soldier is, on how a program that works with child soldiers should be designed, etc. According to this Program Officer for the CSC:

“The idea is that we already know many things about their rehabilitation that before were unknown. In this sense, for example, we know that demobilisation programs have to be long-term. Also, concerning what can be done and what cannot be done with them, before it was said that one should give them money. Now we know that money never has to be given to them”.²⁴ However, it seems that the impact of that conference will be mainly in fundraising and also as an exercise of public relationships by the governments. On the contrary, it does not seem that it will be useful for pressuring donor states to decide to condition their development aid to the behaviour of the countries with respect to the situation of children affected by armed conflict.²⁵

²³ The Cape Town Principles broadly defined a child soldier as follows: “Child soldier in this document means any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family members. It includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms”.

²⁴ Interview n. 59.

²⁵ As an exception and as a model of good practices, we can mention two cases. In 1999, the British government conceded Sierra Leone a conditional development aid of £10 million to promote stability and reconciliation in the country. Among the required conditions there was the end of the use of child soldiers. Human Rights Watch monitored the process and after new conversations between both governments, in 2004 there were no indication of the use of child soldiers. Secondly, the

Table 6.4 Assessment of the different effects of the CSC in its third phase

<i>Type of effect</i>	<i>Estimation</i>
Access	Moderate
Agenda	Moderate
Policy	Moderate
Cultural	High

With regards to the assessment of the different effects of the coalition, the third phase in this case is probably more important than in the rest of the campaigns of this research. As usual, the treaty needed to be ratified and implemented. Whereas the ratification was achieved quickly, the implementation seems a very long-term objective, in which the concrete effects achieved by the CSC are less clear. Thus, in the three global research reports done by the CSC on the situation of the children in armed conflict the total of child soldiers identified is always similar: (at least) 300,000 (see CSC 2001, 2004 and 2008). However, all interviewees agree that this figure would be higher without the work of the CSC. The lobbying tasks nowadays are focused not only in the UN Security Council, but also directly with national governments and also with international courts of justice to ensure compliance and implementation of the signed text.

The cultural dimension of the campaign on child soldiers is complex. Children can be considered not only as victims, but also as perpetrators. Moreover, many governments still think that they might end up using under eighteen year-olds in armed conflicts. The issue is particularly difficult with regards to non-state armed groups with limited resources, different cultural backgrounds and difficulties to be influenced by traditional strategies that work with governments. Thus, the international public opinion and also

Belgian parliament approved a new law in March 2003, which forbids arms transfers to governmental forces that use child soldiers. See Becker (2004).

institutions, such as international criminal courts, need to be clear about punishments and rewards in order to convince recruiters about the comparative advantages of not using children in armed conflicts. This was in the agenda, although it did not have a prominent position. Finally, in this third phase, the CSC prestige, status, and therefore access gained within the UN has been maintained, as recognised both by activists and by diplomats.

6.3. Independent variables: Analysis of the political influence of the CSC

As mentioned in chapter 2, this section is inspired in the technique originally applied by Arts (1998). The objective is to shed new light about the independent variables affecting the political influence of the CSC during the negotiations of the Optional Protocol (second phase of the child soldiers' process). Moreover, it might partially allow to test the results of the research by Arts, so far mainly used in the field of environmentalism. In that way, some suggestions for a future and innovative analysis across-issue will be provided in the thesis conclusions.

Section 6.3.1 presents the main results of the responses to the questionnaires. For each question, the number of respondents is also provided, both from the diplomat sector and from the activists. In some cases, multiple identities were present, as a person could be a member of a NGO, but also have participated in a governmental delegation. In such case, the person is considered to be from the activist sector. In other words, in cases of multiple identities, the person will be assigned to its dominant identity, as perceived by the researcher. Similarly, scholars that have written about the topic of child soldiers and answered the questionnaire were assigned to the diplomat sector if they had been governmental advisors or to the NGOs if the perspective of their writings were more aligned to the activists' claims. In cases of multiple identities across time, the one the person had in the

moment of the negotiation of the treaty (second phase of the child soldiers process) was the one considered as dominant.

The organisation of the section follows the structure of the questionnaire. Thus, respondents had the same order of the questions than the reader. This will help the reader to understand the thinking and the connection between the topics by the interviewees when answering the questionnaire. In the rest of the chapter, the main issues sketched in section 6.3.1 will be treated as independent variables that explore the impact of transnational activism in this case of the research and will be thus tackled afterwards for a more in-depth analysis.

6.3.1. *Analysis of the political influence of the CSC*

6.3.1.1. Exploring the political influence of the CSC

Twenty-two respondents answered the question regarding the relevance of different items to explain the political influence of the CSC. They had to rate from zero to five each of the items according to their own opinion as a participant in the negotiations. The results are presented in table 6.5.

Table 6.5 Relevance of the items to explain the political influence of the CSC

<i>Item</i>	<i>Average rate</i> (0 = not important. 5 = Very important)	
	Ego-perception	Alter-perception
Possession of new, rigorous or unknown information and knowledge	4.33	4.14
Contacts/cooperation between NGOs	4.13	3.71

<i>Item</i>	<i>Average rate</i> <i>(0 = not important. 5 = Very important)</i>	
	Ego-perception	Alter-perception
Level of attention of the mass media	4.00	3.43
Existence of supportive governments	3.73	3.71
Capability of the CSC for monitoring the commitment	3.67	4.00
Legitimacy of the CSC	3.67	3.71
Pressure of public opinion	3.53	3.71
Contacts with representatives of the States	3.40	4.00
Capabilities of the CSC representatives to carry out their interventions	3.20	3.43
International context (e.g. situation in the Congo)	3.07	3.14
Contacts with representatives of UN agencies	2.87	3.14
UN Representative for Children and Armed Conflict (Olara Otunnu)	2.67	3.43
UN Secretary General (Kofi Annan)	2.47	2.14

Number of respondents: 22 (15 ego, 7 alter).

The possession of new, rigorous or unknown information and knowledge is the item most rated in the answers, confirming the relevance of the research carried out by the CSC and in particular, the global report on the situation of the child soldiers in each

armed conflict of the world²⁶. That is agreed for both, the NGOs and the diplomats. Second, the contacts and cooperation between the NGOs show the relevance of the CSC as an organisational network, also from the perspective of the governments.²⁷ In the third place, and still very highly rated is the level of attention of the mass media, which, together with the pressure by public opinion, seems to be a consequence of the strategic use of the media by the CSC.²⁸ The fourth item is the existence of governments supporting the CSC, which, together with the contacts with representatives of the States members, seems to reinforce the idea of the like-minded group of states that works together with the coalition to move their claims forward.²⁹

Some respondents also mentioned the high legitimacy of the CSC. In the words of a NGO activist: “it has to be noted that the CSC influence was enhanced because it was created by major international NGOs, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Save the Children...” (Interview n. 4). In addition, some diplomats have argued that the fact of having a minor legal status than the states is an issue that affects the legitimacy of the NGOs. In the words of one diplomat: “governments tend to listen to other governments, not to outside coalitions. Outside groups are viewed as not dealing with the same spectrum of difficult issues. Moreover, they are not duty bearers who also have conflicts with national laws and the internal politics of adopting particular regulations” (interview n. 24). See table 6.9.

On another front, agreements need to be monitored in order to become effective. The fact that the CSC had been able to present a systematic account of the global situation regarding the issue of child soldiers was considered essential to show that the CSC would keep on monitoring this situation and the commitment

²⁶ This issue will be tackled more in-depth in section 6.3.3.3.

²⁷ This issue will be tackled more in-depth in section 6.3.3.2.

²⁸ This issue will be tackled more in depth in sections 6.3.4.1 and 6.3.5.

²⁹ This issue will be tackled more in depth in section 6.3.2.2.

taken by the countries, in a more objective way than the UN agencies.

Coherent with the framing of the issue (see section 6.3.4.1 of the chapter) the capabilities of the CSC representatives to carry out their interventions were appreciated by many in the governments sector, in particular with regard to the issue of the minimal age, the one the CSC had framed most of its discourse. See table 6.8.

The international context was also mentioned by several respondents, who connected it to the mass media strategy and the pressure of the public opinion³⁰. Also, although the issue of the capabilities of the CSC representatives to carry out their interventions (including charisma and clarity of their speeches) is only cited twice among the main items fostering the CSC political influence, many cite this item regarding the specific issue of the minimal age of participation in armed conflicts. That could explain the focus of the coalition strategies, including framing and shaming, in this specific point.

Finally, different items regarding the UN agencies, the UN representative for Children and Armed Conflict and the UN Secretary General were also considered as having some relevance for many respondents.³¹ In this case, it seems that diplomats considered as particularly important the relationship between the CSC and the Office of Olara Otunnu.

6.3.1.2. Exploring the lack of political influence of the CSC

As explained, the CSC was not successful in some issues. The item most rated when explaining the lack of political influence of the CSC is the existence of reluctant governments. Given that states are the only ones who in the end can agree or disagree (i.e. vote) to the text of the treaty and also given the fact that diplomats were trying to achieve consensus regarding each of the points,

³⁰ This issue will be tackled more in depth in section 6.3.5.

³¹ This issue will be addressed in more depth in section 6.3.2.

reluctant countries were quite powerful and so they achieved to include some of their demands in the text. Thus, the second item is the position or legal status of the CSC (not as high as other actors). It seems that in these negotiations states kept the monopoly of decision-making and also the capacity to be more influential than other actors, such as the social movement organisations present in Geneva. That could be connected with the fact that the rules of the game in this international forum were based implicitly on the consensus rule as the main way of decision-making. On these two items, activists seem to give more relevance than diplomats.

Table 6.6 Relevance of the items to explain the lack of political influence of the CSC

<i>Item</i>	<i>Average rate</i> (0= not important. 5= Very important)	
	Ego-perception	Alter-perception
Existence of reluctant governments	3.08	2.50
Position/legal status (not as high as other actors)	2.42	2.17
Use of mistaken approaches for defending their arguments	1.67	2.17
Lack of legitimacy	1.08	1.33
Internal institutional fragility	1.08	1.33
Public opinion hostility	1.08	1.17
Mass media hostility	0.92	1.17

Number of respondents: 18 (12 ego, 6 alter).

Other items that were consistently mentioned by diplomats as more relevant than activists include the use of mistaken approaches for defending their arguments, the internal institutional

fragility by the CSC and the hostility of public opinion and mass media in some countries, although all of them are only considered as having moderate or low relevance to explain the lack of political influence of the CSC during the negotiations of the Optional Protocol.

6.3.1.3. Conflictive issues during the negotiations of the OP

Not all the issues discussed in the negotiations had the same level of disagreement. An adviser to the direct negotiators of the Optional Protocol, who is a senior child protection specialist of one of the main NGOs participating in the coalition, argues that controversies in the negotiations came up as a consequence of the fact that “governments want to keep children in the training pipeline even if they do not see combat, and non-state (armed) actors continue to benefit from child recruitment, and no means of higher accountability addresses either of these effectively” (interview n. 18).

Some diplomats also considered the selection of the topics to be discussed during the negotiations rather controversial, claiming that key political issues had not been considered. A Syrian representative, for example, criticised an unnecessary restriction of the issue of children in war: “There are other aspects to the issue of children in armed conflict in addition to the aspect of ‘child soldier’. We believe that tackling this aspect at the expense of the others will not help in resolving and addressing the main thing and issue, which is protecting all children in a situation of armed conflict and foreign occupation. There should be a comprehensive approach to this problem, avoiding the selectivity due to political reasons by some governments, because it affects negatively this noble cause” (interview n. 10). However, as shown in table 6.7, there seems to be quite a general consensus on the issues considered most conflictive by the participants in the negotiations.

In the responses to the questionnaire, there are three issues considered as particularly controversial by a majority of respondents: (a) the minimum age of participation in armed

conflicts (art. 1 of the Optional Protocol); (b) the nature of participation in the hostilities as direct or indirect (art. 1 of the OP)³²; and c) the type of recruitment: compulsory or volunteer (art. 2 and 3).³³ The next pages will tackle each of these issues more in depth.

Table 6.7 Level of disagreement on different issues during the negotiations of the OP

<i>Issues for Debate</i>	<i>Average rate</i>	
	<i>(0= Agreement. 5= Disagreement)</i>	
Debate over minimum age of participation in armed conflicts (art. 1)	4.14	4.57
Debate over type of recruitment: compulsory or volunteer (art. 2 and 3)	4.14	4.14
Debate over the nature of participation in the hostilities: only direct or any (i.e. direct and indirect) types of participation (art. 1)	4.00	4.14
Debate over signing and ratification	3.07	4.00

³² Obviously banning any kind of participation was more difficult than banning only direct participation. In other words, some countries argued that direct participation should be banned, but indirect participation (not in combat, for example as servants in the kitchen) should be allowed.

³³ An activist from Human Rights Watch summarizes it in the following way: “The main points of contention were definitely the minimum age for participation (government forces) and minimum age for voluntary recruitment. Also, some debate over compulsory recruitment (Cuba wanted a lower age than 18). Moreover, some states (especially Pakistan) wanted language exempting states from these provisions in the case of struggles for self-determination” (interview n. 23).

<i>Issues for Debate</i>	<i>Average rate</i> (0= Agreement. 5= Disagreement)	
of the treaty (art. 9, reservation issue)		
Debate over the participation of children in non governmental armed groups (art. 4)	2.57	2.14
Debate over military schools (not in the text)	2.00	1.57
Debate over application of the Optional Protocol (art. 6 and 7)	1.93	1.57
Debate over mechanisms of monitoring (art. 8)	1.79	2.14

Number of respondents: 20 (14 ego, 7 alter).

As we can see in table 6.7, apart from these three, the reservation issue was also controversial, although the level of disagreement was not as high as in the previous issues. In the words of one high-rank activist from Human Rights Watch: “some governments (particularly France) were very upset about the OP being open to states that have not ratified the CRC (i.e. the US), but in the end it was necessary to reach an agreement” (interview n. 23). In the end, the U.S. demands were accepted by the rest of the countries, as explains this diplomat: “Article 9 allows a State that is not part of the Convention of the Rights of the Child to be part of the OP. This article took into consideration the situation of the US (the only country, together with Somalia that has not ratified the Convention yet). In this way, issues of politics had preference over principles. The final solution is a pragmatic one, which was assessed positively, because the US had already expressed their willingness to ratify the OP” (interview 24). The US ratified the OP on 19 June 2002.

There was less disagreement on those issues concerning military schools, the application of the optional protocol and the mechanisms of monitoring the treaty. Even if there are some differences between the diplomats and the activists, in all these cases the level of controversy is assessed as low.

With regard to the non-state (armed) actors, the final text of Article 4 has been assessed quite positively by some diplomats, such as this representative: “Article 4 represents a new solution to the issue of the obligations and responsibilities of non-state armed groups, as it “encourages” them not to recruit or use under-eighteen soldiers in armed conflicts. That article tries to cover a situation, which is real: the increasing incorporation of under-18 by non-state armed groups, considering at the same time the impossibility of making an international treaty for groups that are not subject by international law” (interview n. 24).

6.3.1.4. Exploring political influence in each issue

Sixteen interviewees answered the question on the political influence of the CSC in each issue, deepening the results that have been shown in table 6.5. See table 6.8 below. Almost all of the items present in table 6.5 appear here also, applied to each of the controversial issues. Consistent with those results, the existence of supportive governments is the item most frequently mentioned, followed by the high legitimacy of the CSC. These two items were mentioned by 14 of the 16 people that answered this question, being thus similar perceptions in both sectors (governments and NGOs). The combination of information and the international context is also cited concerning the type of recruitment and the non-governmental armed groups from both sectors. Thus, it seems that there is a consensus in the relevance of the possession of information both by those who have created it (NGOs) and those who have used it to form their opinions (diplomats). Finally, some respondents also mentioned contacts with UN agencies and media influence which, interestingly enough, were part of the diplomats sector.

Table 6.8 Items explaining the political influence of the CSC in each issue

<i>Controversial issues</i>	<i>Items</i>
Minimal age	Existence of governments in favour + contacts with states representatives + legitimacy of the CSC + capabilities of the CSC representatives
Nature of participation in the hostilities	Existence of governments in favour + contacts with states representatives + legitimacy of the CSC + public opinion + media
Type of recruitment	Possession of information + international context + legitimacy of the CSC + capacity of the CSC to monitor the agreement
Non governmental armed groups	Possession of information + international context + legitimacy of the CSC + existence of governments in favour + capacity of the CSC to monitor
Application of the Optional Protocol	Existence of governments in favour + legitimacy of the CSC
Mechanisms of monitoring	Contacts with UN agencies + existence of governments in favour + legitimacy of the CSC
Signing and ratification of the treaty	Existence of governments in favour + legitimacy of the CSC

Number of respondents: 16 (11 ego, 5 alter).

6.3.1.5. Exploring the lack of political influence of the CSC in each issue

Similar to the previous section, table 6.9 deepens the results presented in table 6.6 by examining if there are major differences regarding the different controversial points.

Table 6.9 Items explaining the lack of political influence of the CSC in each issue

<i>Conflictive issues</i>	<i>Items</i>
Minimal age	Existence of governments against + inferior legal status + hostile public opinion
Participation in the hostilities	Existence of governments against + inferior legal status
Type of recruitment	Existence of governments against + inferior legal status
Non governmental armed groups	Existence of governments against + inferior legal status
Application of the Optional Protocol	Existence of governments against + inferior legal status
Mechanisms of monitoring	Existence of governments against + inferior legal status
Signing and ratification of the treaty	Existence of governments against + inferior legal status

Number of respondents: 13 (8 ego, 5 alter).³⁴

³⁴ In this case, the views of the representatives of the activists and the diplomats are not presented separately, as their answers were almost identical. Even those mentioning a hostile public opinion were from both sectors.

This question, although only answered by thirteen people (others argued that they did not know enough about the topic to give such a specific answer), seem to point to the problems faced by the CSC when trying to be influential on the bargaining process. Thus, a homogenous pattern seem to apply to all of the issues; the combination of the existence of reluctant governments and the inferior legal status of the CSC, which allowed those states to exercise a position of pre-eminence vis-à-vis the NGOs.

6.3.1.6. Counterfactual. What if...?

The final question that respondents had to answer was “To what extent do you think the final text would have essentially been the same without the intervention of the Coalition (through lobbying, etc)?” Among those who answered (fourteen out of thirty), the most frequent answer (coming mainly from the CSC sector) explicitly stated that “without the CSC we would not have an OP” (e.g. interviews n. 4, 12, 13 and 23). One of the activists from Amnesty International said: “It would not have been as strong. In fact if it wasn’t for the NGOs there would not be an OP” (interview n. 4). Eight of them also answered the most detailed version of the question. Therefore, applied to every controversial point, the results of the questionnaire are the following:

Table 6.10 Counterfactual for each issue. Without the CSC, the final text...

<i>Conflictive issues</i>	<i>... would have been different</i>	
	Ego-perception	Alter-perception
Minimal age	100%	100%
Participation in the hostilities	80%	66%
Type of recruitment	80%	66%
Non governmental armed groups	60%	66%

<i>Conflictive issues</i>	<i>... would have been different</i>	
	Ego-perception	Alter-perception
Signing and ratification of the treaty	40%	33%
Mechanisms of monitoring	0%	0%
Application of the Optional Protocol	0%	0%

Number of respondents: 8 (5 ego, 3 alter).

Thus, it seems that participants in the negotiations consider the influence of the CSC particularly relevant in the issues of minimal age, participation in the hostilities and type of recruitment, whereas in the others their influence is less noted. As we will see, these results are also coherent with the strategies followed by the CSC, who focused specifically on these issues, considered as well as the most controversial ones (see table 6.7).

An independent researcher from the University of Bologna summarises the feeling as follows: “It is clear that the text is a compromise among States. Even if the CSC was asking for the maximum standards of protection, mediation among states was necessary. However, I think that the activities of lobbying conducted by the CSC are crucial means of keeping informed the public and on updating the information” (Interview n. 12).

6.3.2. Multilevel Political Opportunity Structure (MPOS)

When responding to the following question: “*what aspects do you think the lobbying activities of the Coalition were more influential*” during the negotiation of the treaty (i.e. the second phase of the child soldiers process), the director of the CSC Steering Committee Jo Becker listed several factors: (a) Formation of national coalitions in key countries, including European

countries and the US to lobby their national government; (b) creation of a group of “like-minded” states to strategize and support each other in the UN-context negotiations; and (c) regional conferences in various parts of the world to mobilise governments and NGOs and raise awareness of issue.

Another member of the Steering Committee of the CSC emphasises this idea of not only working globally, but also regionally and nationally: “the main influence of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers was to produce a climate that urges these Governments to have serious negotiations. Their main method was to alert the media and to hold five regional workshops with Governments, UN-bodies, NGOs and the media. For some governments, it was also crucial that popular NGOs of their country were actively involved, including UK, US and Germany (interview n. 13)”. The following sections tackle these issues in more detail.

Regarding the international POS, some interviewees have emphasized the fact that the CSC always had a very close relationship with the UN Office for Children and Armed Conflict and with UNICEF. In the words of one UN official: “the CSC was not perceived as an enemy, having thus the doors of the United Nations open”. On the one hand, this was because the issue of children is quite marginal in the area of human rights, which creates an image that the topic is less dangerous than others. On the other, this was also due to the working methods of the working group of the UN Commission of Human Rights. As a Working Group (WG) of the UN Commission of Human Rights, all members of the Commission were entitled to take part in (and to vote) at the meetings of the WG. At the same time, all observers – governments, UN and specialized agencies, the ICRC and the Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC were also entitled to attend and to participate in sessions of the WG (including speaking and submitting documents), though not to vote.

About the voting procedures at the WG, it has to be noted that although voting (by the majority of those members of the

Commission present) is dictated by the rules of procedure, the WG developed during 1994-2000 a practice of working by consensus. This enabled a single state to block a consensus accepted by the rest of the countries. The US did this routinely, using its veto power to ensure that their perceived interests were not affected by the result of the negotiations.

That is the reason why many felt that this was unsatisfactory and the reason why another option was proposed to prevent that to happen in the final round of the negotiations. If such a (veto) position was to arise at the 2000 session, either a decision to vote could occur, or the text could be referred for decision to a higher body, either the Commission or the UN General Assembly itself. In the end, an agreement with the most reluctant countries was achieved and so the voting was not necessary. However, certain participants perceived that the possibility of voting as a real threat had an effect on pushing the negotiators towards the agreement. Again, these findings strongly indicate the centrality of the rules of the game in shaping such processes.

With regards to the regional POS, regional conferences were arguably one of the most effective ways the CSC could mobilize and influence the position of the states, particularly during the second phase of the process. In the words of an activist from Amnesty International: "After organizing the regional conferences to mobilise and influence governments on their positions in the WG drafting the OP, generally strong declarations were adopted by all five regional conferences. That was a useful tool in the WG negotiations for reminding governments of the strong position they had taken at the regional level (interview n. 4)."

Thus, the CSC organized five regional conferences on child soldiers during 1999 and 2000, bringing together governments and NGOs to consider all aspects (legal, political and programmatic) of the use of children as soldiers by both governments and non-state armed groups. Most of interviewees consider this as one of the most effective ways for the CSC of advancing their aims. Indeed, the Declarations adopted were very progressive and would facilitate the text of the Optional Protocol at a global scale. It

should be noted that the weakest declaration was from Berlin, in the European Conference, due to the fact that some European countries still recruit volunteers under 18 years old.

First, the Maputo Declaration, adopted by the African conference (Mozambique, April 1999), was endorsed by the OAU Council and Assembly of Heads of State and Government in July 1999 with a specific call for the member states “to adopt and promote norms in respective countries prohibiting recruitment and use as soldiers of children under 18 years of age”. Second, the Montevideo Declaration, adopted by the Latin American and Caribbean Conference (Uruguay, July 1999), was acknowledged by the Directing Council of the Inter-American Children’s Institute of the OAS, which encouraged the member states of the OAS “to support efforts to end the use of children under the age of 18 years in armed conflict by any armed forces or armed group, and where appropriate, to adopt and implement national plans to end any recruitment of children under the age of 18”. Third, and following the adoption of the Berlin Declaration (Germany, October 1999), the European Parliament called on the EU Member States “to support the adoption of an optional protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child to outlaw the recruitment and use of children under 18 in armed conflicts”. Also, the OSCE Summit Declaration (Istanbul, November 1999) contained a commitment – paragraph 28 – to organise a special meeting on children in armed conflict 2000. Afterwards, the CSC had an Asian Regional Conference on the Use of Children as Soldiers in Nepal in May 2000.

Finally, regarding the national political opportunity structure, two issues are fundamental. While the influence of national legislation regarding this issue had a clear effect on the position defended by the governments, those countries in which legislation already banned the use and recruitment of under eighteen were more supportive to the CSC, whereas those countries with a legislation that allow this practice were more reluctant to form an agreement.

The negotiations for the OP started in Geneva in 1994. Since then, some countries tried to obstruct them, including four members of the UN Security Council: US, Britain, Russia and China. The European countries were also important in this process, as some of them had national legislation allowing the practice of recruiting volunteers under eighteen. That is the reason why “lobbying of national governments in European capitals was key to solidify those governments’ commitment to 18 as the minimum age for participation and consequently to persuading the US that it could not prevail in getting 17” (interview no. 23).

On another front and as would occur in every case study of this research, in many governments there was also a controversy between the foreign affairs minister, more in favour of the straight eighteen positions, and the Ministry of Defense, who would not go along. That was particularly evident in the later stages of the process, with an increasing role of the military representatives in the negotiations. In the words of one of the advisers of the diplomats, “countries which recruit volunteers are generally reluctant to change domestic legislation. Resistance came from the Ministries of Defense and armed forces chiefs, who already finding it difficult to recruit and retain volunteers in the armed forces, didn’t wish to make it even more difficult to recruit by raising the recruitment age” (Interview n. 4).

6.3.2.1. The US: Another controversial role of the super-power

In the case of the child soldiers campaign, the US again played a controversial role. President Bill Clinton had signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1995, but this treaty had not been ratified by the Senate, where it faced opposition from conservatives, who argued that it usurped the rights of parents. The US, together with Somalia, was the only countries in the world that had not ratified that Convention.

The Clinton Administration, under pressure from the Pentagon, had insisted for months that any agreement had to allow the United States the option of sending volunteers as young as 17

into combat. The administration's opposition had threatened to block the negotiations. However, in internal discussion the Joint Chiefs of Staff dropped their opposition to a minimum of eighteen years and accepted a compromise that would allow the armed services to continue recruiting and training seventeen year olds as they did before, but taking "all feasible measures" to keep them out of combat until they turn 18. Under a strong pressure by the US coalition of activists who lobbied effectively in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and also due to the situation of the American troops in Afghanistan, in danger because of child soldiers, on June 19th 2002, the US Senate voted to ratify the Optional Protocol.

In the end, as an Optional Protocol to the CRC, the Protocol did not amend the CRC itself, but it is binding only on those states who became parties to the Protocol itself. The US had proposed that the optional protocol should be open to any State, an attempt to justify their role in the negotiations on the text, since in this way they would be able to become a party to the Protocol without having to become a party to the CRC itself.

The American compromise amounts to a tactical retreat by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had feared that a strict age limit would prohibit recruiters from signing up seventeen-year-olds, who could join the military with parental consent. The Pentagon won the fight to continue that practice but agreed to take some unspecified steps to keep those youngest soldiers out of direct participation in the hostilities.

It should be noted that the new minimum age had little real effect on the American military, which had nearly 1.4 million of soldiers. In 1999, 49,900 enlistees were seventeen when they signed up to join the armed services, but only 11,000 were still seventeen when they reported to basic training. Of those, only 2,500 had not turned eighteen by the time the training was completed.

In any case, the Pentagon's retreat saved the administration the diplomatic embarrassment of blocking an agreement meant to prohibit the use of soldiers as young as nine or ten in some of the

world's most brutal conflicts. This historical path suggests that activists' tactics of mobilization of shame was largely successful with the super-power. In other words, this case shows that neither realist theories of international relations neither pure constructivists or transnationalists who emphasize the role of non-state actors behind the creation of regimes are enough to explain complex negotiation processes as those under study, but a combination of all of them is necessary. This study also demonstrates the limitations of NGO agency in confrontation with the US government position.

6.3.2.2. Allies and opponents

On an individual basis, the CSC had close contacts with some representatives of supportive governments as early as the mid-1990s. Sometimes the contact was the result of a country's policy alignment with the NGO. However, there were also some individuals that played specific relevant roles in governments who not necessarily had a strong preference on this issue. In these cases, activists provided with knowledge and research to the diplomats, who would act as norms entrepreneurs, creating a big coalition that showed to be quite effective during the negotiations.

This strategy has many parallels with the strategy employed by the ICBL in the Ottawa Process. Indeed, there were some contacts between leaders of both coalitions, facilitated by the fact that some big organisations, such as Human Rights Watch were part of the two processes. In the words of one activist "HRW was centrally involved in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, and I have had lengthy discussions with my colleagues about ICBL strategies and how they could be applied to the child soldiers' campaign" (interview n. 23).

The activists started the process with the idea of the Optional Protocol, which was soon spread among some governments. In the words of one of the former leaders of the CSC: "The CSC and the activists that created the Coalition initiated the concept of an Optional Protocol at the Convention of the Rights of the Child, in

Geneva, and pushed to conclude it positively during the negotiations” (interview n. 5).³⁵ Also another activist affirms that “in the talks the main methods were the forming of the group of like minded States, which tried to get the best result in our sense, Straight-18” (interview n. 13).

There was thus a group of like-minded countries that helped the NGOs during all the process of negotiation of the treaty. Among them, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Norway, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay and lately also China.³⁶ In some cases, these are countries from the Human Security Network.³⁷ In others, such as in the French case, the reason lies in the particular interest of a concrete person (a high-rank civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)³⁸. Another case of support of the NGOs in this context is China, an unusual fact that contrasts with the position that the Chinese authorities in other areas of human rights.³⁹

When asked about the main barriers for the CSC to have an influence, the majority of respondents mentioned the clash between the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of defense of the national governments. It seems that the military authorities

³⁵ Casey Kelso had taught former child soldiers in Zimbabwe in 1981. He had worked for Amnesty International – International Secretariat. He coordinated the CSC activities from 2002 to 2004, being thus its chief executive officer.

³⁶ This information has been contrasted with different experts and participants in the negotiations, including Jo Becker, Felipe Gómez Isa, Casey Kelso, Martin McPherson, Enrique Restoy, Andreas Rister, Yves Willemot and diplomats from four states, who asked to remain unknown.

³⁷ <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/>.

³⁸ Interviews n. 3 and 25.

³⁹ Given that China does not have problems for recruiting soldiers older than 18 years, this support can be interpreted as a strategic decision. Thus, it is more convenient for the Chinese authorities to talk more about this issue and less than others, such as torture or the conflict with Tibet.

of states came into negotiations towards the end of the process of drafting, a moment in which the US had a strong influence over the Canadian position, arguably one of the main allies of the CSC until then, given their strong position within the Human Security Network.⁴⁰

The CSC representatives argue that it proved very difficult to influence the US and the Britain,⁴¹ although they did modify their hard line positions during the life of the WG. The role of Britain here is radically different than in the case of small arms and light weapons (see chapter 4). That would show that in the field of human security, countries have different roles in different topics.

On the opponent side, a few countries were therefore reluctant to accept the legally-binding nature of the text. The most vocal were the USA and Britain, because they recruit volunteers below eighteen years as do some other countries, which hide behind the USA and Britain, including Australia, New Zealand. Again, there were two principal points of controversy: (a) setting the age limit at eighteen years for participation in hostilities, a point that was finally achieved; and (b) over voluntary recruitment, which remains the main deficiency of the treaty.⁴²

First, a group of countries opposed to the eighteen years as a minimum age in the participation in hostilities, including Cuba, Egypt, Kuwait, Pakistan, Singapore and particularly, the United States and Britain. In the end, their positions changed and they

⁴⁰ As explained in chapter 3, Canada had been the leader of the landmine process; it was still able to capitalize on that success, and its international prestige gained in the precedent years in other negotiations, such as this one on the Optional Protocol about child soldiers.

⁴¹ At that time, 35 per cent of British recruits was taking place between sixteen and eighteen (Brett 1996).

⁴² Among others, Germany, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Republic of Korea, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Holland, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay, the Vatican, Chile and China.

ended up accepting the 18 years as a minimum age of participation in the hostilities. However, these states were some very hard opponents for the CSC, since they insisted on restricting the language with respect to this topic.⁴³

With respect to the second point, the countries that defended the seventeen years as the age limit were those countries with legislations that allowed (and in some cases still allow) the voluntary enrolment from this age. Among them, Germany, Australia, Brazil, the Republic of Korea, Cuba, Egypt, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and New Zealand. Moreover, India, Singapore and Britain defended the 16 years. In the end, the solution was a proposal of the United States - who also argued for the 17 years -, that it included a group of safeguards or conditions needed for voluntary enlistment of 17-year-old was, as the fact that it must clear that there had not been pressures.

To conclude, we can quote the final press release, once the agreement was reached, where the CSC thanked several governments “for their strong efforts to achieve a prohibition on any recruitment or use of children in hostilities, including, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay”.⁴⁴

6.3.3. Resources controlled by the CSC

6.3.3.1. Material resources

Most of the interviewees agree that material resources were never a real problem for the CSC. This section analyses the amount and origin of the main funds during the last period (after

⁴³ Interview n. 23.

⁴⁴ I thank Jo Becker, first president of the Steering Committee of the CSC between 1998 and 2001, who provided me this press release, among other relevant primary sources.

2003, in the third phase of the child soldiers process); these data are public and available through its website.⁴⁵ Several interviewees agreed that this could provide a history of finances in the previous phases.

Table 6.11 CSC Donations, legacies & similar incoming resources (2003-2007, Sterling pounds)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Amount of Sterling Pounds</i>
2003	210136
2004	313145
2005	333361
2006	482674
2007	423376
Total 2003-2007	1762692

Source: Own elaboration from the data by CSC (2004b, 2005b, 2006b and 2007 b).

As table 6.11 shows, the main donors are countries in the Human Security Network, including the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Some of the funds are unrestricted and others are given for a concrete project. Examples of restricted funds during the period between 2004 and 2007 include a fund for a capacity building project, which took place in the Great Lakes between February 2003 and March 2004, a fund for a project to identify the general principals that should be applied in programs designed to re-integrate child soldiers into their societies; and a fund for a project on building the capacity for child soldiers work by NGOs in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. Tables 6.11 and 6.12 below summarise the data from these years.

⁴⁵ Indeed, an independent auditor monitors its content on a yearly basis.

Table 6.11 also shows that from 2003 to 2006, the funds received by the CSC doubled. Although in 2007 they have slightly decreased, they are still quite substantial. Moreover, after the Conference of Paris in February 2007 it is expected that these funds will increase in the following years.

When asked about the North versus South cleavage, the CSC coordinator Casey Kelso depicted a situation of division of roles in which “Northern states are providing assistance to Southern states that use child soldiers”. In fact, if we see table 6.12 below, several Northern countries are leading the provision of funds through the CSC.

Thus, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Ireland are the major donors to the CSC. Afterwards, France, Canada, Belgium, New Zealand and Luxemburg also show some consistency on the provision of resources for the CSC. Some other governments have made important donations, including the UK, Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic. Finally, some NGOs also help to finance the coalition, together with UNICEF.

These tables and their qualitative assessment by the interviewees show that the CSC does not have a lack of material resources. If it remains a small organisation, this could be interpreted as a strategic decision by its International Secretariat, which has designed the optimal structure for the work that the Coalition is entitled to do as one that it is not too big, but big enough to carry out all the tasks in order to fulfil its aims.

	<i>Total Funds 2003</i>	<i>Restricted Funds 2004</i>	<i>Unrestrict. Funds 2004</i>	<i>Restricted Funds 2005</i>	<i>Unrestrict. Funds 2005</i>	<i>Restricted Funds 2006</i>	<i>Unrestrict. Funds 2006</i>	<i>Restricted Funds 2007</i>	<i>Unrestrict. Funds 2007</i>	<i>Total Funds 2003-07</i>
German		8,425								8,425
Terre de Homme	6,439									6,439
World Vision	3,036									3,036
Philanthropic Trust				3,000						3,000
QUNO/ Hilfe	1,948									1,948
Austria	1,220									1,220
Czech						667				667
Quakers Geneva Meeting	325		214							539
Others	5,867		449		666		623		715	8,320
All	210,136	191,124	122,021	226,515	106,846	307,308	175,366	260,186	163,190	1,762,692

Source: Own elaboration from the data by CSC (2004b, 2005b, 2006b and 2007 b).

6.3.3.2. The evolution of the organisational form of the CSC

Different from what happened in other cases, the CSC began to work at the international level and afterwards it shifted to the national level. This is actually the opposite of the “scale shift” mechanism suggested by Tarrow and McAdam (2005). Therefore, the idea emerged in May 1998 within the international secretariats of a group of organisations (which would end up forming the steering committee of the CSC), mainly based in London, New York and Geneva. The CSC was formed after the 1998 session of the UN Working Group on the Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts. Its main goal was thus to achieve an Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child; that is, to influence the United Nations in order to introduce a new protocol to a treaty already existing. Later, the work has broadened and decentralised in order to play a role in the demobilisation programs and to persuade governments and non-state actors not to recruit under-18. The NGOs that form the international network have a very high level of collaboration. While they share information very effectively, they normally delegate the tasks of lobbying and political pressure to the international coalition.

Once the CSC was created, the main pieces of research have been made public by the coalition and sometimes by certain NGOs members, such as Human Rights Watch or the Quakers, which have a specific department on children. These organisations, and others, have produced very detailed reports on specific countries, but the CSC is the one that has carried out the global reports.⁴⁶ However, the CSC obtains most of its information through its members: On the one hand, organisations with expertise in human rights, such as International Amnesty or Human Rights Watch; on

⁴⁶ The third global report will be published in 2008 and will be available at the CSC website (www.child-soldiers.org). The first was published in 2001 and the second one in 2004.

another hand, humanitarian or development organisations, such as Save the Children or World Vision, who possess this information due to their presence in the region. That is the reason why they do not always have the facilities or the interest in publishing these data, because this could put in danger their work. Therefore, they use the CSC to say what they could not say as an individual organization.

Regarding its structure, some changes have taken place since the creation of the CSC, and particularly after the signature of the treaty during the third phase of the child soldiers process. First, World Vision has left the steering committee because it is now part of another coalition with a broader mandate: *Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict*, which emerged partially from the CSC to face the human rights abuses by the children in armed conflict who are not recruited as soldiers: the burning of schools, the death of children as civilians, etc. The CSC is part of the steering committee of this organization, which is based in New York.⁴⁷

Other members of the Steering Committee of the CSC without right of vote are UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the office of the UN special representative for children and armed conflict, who attends the biannual meetings regularly. One of these biannual meetings includes the presence of members (workers or consultants) of each regional coalition, who participate fully in the meeting. In this way, the steering committee is informed directly about the situation of the projects in the terrain managed by the CSC.

Inside the Steering Committee, there is another small management committee, formed by members of the steering committee that, together with the director of the Coalition, is in charge of the questions of accounting, presentation of reports and

⁴⁷ The international secretariat of Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict is composed by: CARE International, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, International Save the Children Alliance, Norwegian Refugee Council, Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and World Vision International. See <http://www.watchlist.org>.

of the day-to-day work of administration of the CSC. Finally, the members of the international secretariat are those who work as executives. This section changes a lot depending on the funding and of the concrete activities that they develop in the short term. In general, it is composed of individuals with a background in human rights work. They have often worked for the international secretariat of International Amnesty, which, with more than 300 people, nourishes many organisations in this area. AI has therefore a considerable level of influence in the CSC. Apart from the director, in the international secretariat of the CSC, there are four directors of regional programs. From 2005, one of the directors is also the coordinator of all regional directors. Moreover, there is a director of research for the global report and a person responsible for fundraising. Finally, a person is in charge of editing the psychosocial page of the CSC. Before, there was a program officer for Latin America; currently this is part of a program managed from Brussels, which is also in charge of the relations with the European Union. The rest of the members of the international secretariat are based in London.⁴⁸

In the last years, there has been an evolution with respect to the relationship of the CSC with the staff that works for them in the field. The CSC does not have enough presence in some countries to have formal staff there. For this reason, they are legally considered as 'consultants'. Thus, the only formal employee of the CSC in these countries is the responsible for South-East Asia, based initially in Bangkok and currently in Manila.

⁴⁸ Even though the CSC is currently based in London, the situation was different before. In a determinate moment, a previous coordinator decided to go to the British capital for personal reasons. It is necessary to say that the presence of NGOs like International Amnesty or Save the Children in London can facilitate the work of coordination. However, the fact that it is placed in a hostile country to the subject of child soldiers, because the British army uses under-18 year-old in armed conflicts is considered a handicap. Moreover, for an organization with goals of political influence at international level, the two cities where they could work more effectively would be Geneva and New York.

Moreover, there are consultants in the Big Lakes, in Uganda; and in the Western Africa, in Senegal.

At present there are national coalitions in almost all countries in conflict where there is the presence of child soldiers (Africa, Latin America, South-East Asia and, to a lesser extent, in the Middle East). Some coalitions have a contractual relationship with the CSC and these organisations have been created legally within the national context with its own statutes. (e.g. the Colombian, Burundian, and Congo coalitions). Other coalitions are better described as working networks, which meet as a coalition, but which do not really exist from a legal point of view.

The relationship between national coalitions in other countries and the CSC is quite flexible and is based on *ad hoc* collaborations. The coalitions in Europe tend to be much freer from the work of the international secretariat and the contacts consist mainly in exchanges of opinion. Sometimes they work together in concrete projects, but there is not a hierarchical relationship. Each national coalition has its own working plan and decides what its priorities are.

There are the national coalitions in countries in conflict, where there is a relationship of dependence. Thus, in many countries in conflict the CSC carries out a work of training and technical support, which allows the survival of the national coalitions. For example, in the Big Lakes and in Western Africa the international coalition is the one that manages the projects and subcontracts them to the national coalitions. In Colombia, however, the national coalition is totally independent from the CSC and they collaborate at the international level. Because the CSC has the capacity of facilitating contact with institutions such as the UN Security Council or the European Union, it allows them to express their own concerns and to present in international forums the research that they have carried out. Every time that there is a collaboration project, this relationship is formalised in a memorandum of understanding, which can have a series of *ad hoc* contracts.

To conclude this section, the history of the leaders of the CSC demonstrates how difficult it is for a coalition to combine different

kinds of skills in a single person, both in terms of familiarity with content and administration.⁴⁹ This problem arises often in activist's organisations as they are normally trained in substantial issues, but not in managerial ones. The deficit in these second kinds of tasks tends to be therefore particularly relevant.

Another key finding about how organisational factors shape coalitions' international success concerns how coalition leaders' position in organisation determines the direction of the network. The history of the CSC provides several examples of this idea. One is Stuart Maslen, who had been very active in the landmines campaign, was the CSC first coordinator and he leveraged his influence to frame the subject in the international humanitarian perspective. Another example is Rory Mungoven, a charismatic individual, but without specific background in management of NGOs. He achieved influence and presence in the international political and media agenda, placing the CSC in the international forums soon after its creation. The third CSC leader was Casey Kelso, who brought expertise in financial and fundraising, achieving strong financial stability for the organization. After having participated in the negotiations of the optional protocol, the CSC had to pass through a period of transition. Finally, the current director of the CSC is Victoria Adams, a person that has been four years as a director of regional programs, with a background of human rights and who had previously been manager with the UN. She has direct experience in the field across many situations and she also has the capacity to explain complex issues and to see all the dimensions of the child soldiers problem. Thus, it seems that the CSC has found a necessary (and difficult) equilibrium for this

⁴⁹ It would be necessary to think, then, of the possibility of the transnational coalitions of NGOs assuming a direction registered in the professional association, shared and divided in two persons; one specialized in the management (of resources and of staff) and the other one in the strategic direction of the coalition. Despite the difficulty of its application, this idea seems to have good reception among the people interviewed for this research.

position in the current context, with the evident process of sophistication of the CSC message.

6.3.3.3. Research and knowledge

One of the main resources of the CSC has been its ability to produce rigorous and complete pieces of research. Indeed, among the reasons for its success in the second (and crucial) phase of the treaty negotiations, both activist and representatives of the governments coincide in highlighting a rigorous and complete research of the situation on the field. In particular, the first Global Report on child soldiers was presented in 2001. This had a great repercussion, because it was the first time that all situations in all countries of the world were shown, and a first figure was launched: (at least) 300,000 children, in that moment, who were used by non-state armed groups and by governmental forces. With this figure and using also personal stories, the work of framing of the problem was easier and more effective. The figure was alarming, but conservative. In any case, it allowed to go a little bit further than what had been possible until then, with arguments such as "I can assure you that there are many, but..." Now it could be said: "I can prove you that there are 300.000 children participating in armed conflicts".⁵⁰ Indeed, the CSC when writing or publishing reports does not have the political limitations of international organisation like those carried out by the UN agencies. The result is that the reports of the CSC are often more rigorous and objective and so international actors increasingly relay on them to be informed on this issue.⁵¹

This work of documentation has been crucial to provide legitimacy to a coalition that until that moment had been better known for the prestige of its members (e.g. International Amnesty,

⁵⁰ As a matter of fact, the reason that has retarded the pressure of the NGOs on the use of girls in armed conflicts is precisely the lack of complete information (see Alfredson, 2001; Brett, 2002b).

⁵¹ A paradigmatic case is the conflict between Israel and Palestine.

Save the Children and Human Rights Watch), than for itself.⁵² It was endowed, then, with unknown knowledge and information by the governmental side. A governmental representative emphasizes that “due to the reports on the scale and mode of recruitment, the CSC has been influential.” The same diplomat argues that “arming multiple partners with the data and key points to be made led to an accretion of influence” (interview n. 24). Also, an independent researcher included the following items among those that increased the political influence by the CSC: advocacy and media work, internet database, research and reports on child soldiers (interview n. 12).

Therefore, the CSC increased its legitimacy when it was able to present such a global and rigorous research. Until that moment, many governments only trusted statements and reports by UNICEF or by other international organisation. When the CSC presented a report that was not 'decaffeinated' due to political considerations, some actors at the international level realised: “if they wanted to know what was really happening, it was better to contact the CSC than to trust the reports of the UN office for children and armed conflict, which, to make everybody happy, ended up saying nothing meaningful”.⁵³

6.3.4. *Strategies*

As seen in chapter 3 of the thesis, one of the lessons of the landmine campaign was that having a single aim was necessary to

⁵² “If we had had not organisation such as International Amnesty or Human Rights Watch behind us, it had been more difficult to explain what was the CSC” (Interview with Enrique Restoy, Madrid, 21 November 2003). This is a very similar situation to the ‘Control Arms’ campaign, where the prestige of Oxfam and International Amnesty facilitated the contacts and the public image of the network of NGOs against the proliferation of small arms (IANSA). See chapter 5 of this research.

⁵³ Interview n. 2.

construct a powerful and clear message, particularly during the first and second phases of the child soldiers process. This does not mean that a transnational coalition cannot have other aims or that this main aim does not have an evolution over time. However, many interviewees agree that the first strategic decision that a transnational coalition needs to face is to choose its main aim.

Hence, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers was formed in May 1998 to promote the adoption of, and adherence to, national, regional and international legal standards (including the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child) prohibiting the military recruitment and use in hostilities of any person younger than eighteen years of age; and the recognition and enforcement of this standard by all armed groups, both governmental and non-governmental (interview n. 23).⁵⁴ As shown in section 6.2.2 of this chapter, the result of the final text is a compromise between the positions by the CSC and some countries and those reluctant countries that still allow the recruitment of under-eighteen under certain conditions.

On a more general level, a former coordinator of the CSC differentiates among four different (although related) aims: (a) Adoption and ratification of the OP; (b) research into the extent of the problem; (c) campaigning (advocacy) to end the use of child soldiers and (d) capacity- building of a local movement in national coalitions (interview n. 5).

⁵⁴ This activist is a member of Human Rights Watch. At HRW, she is the advocacy director for the Children's Rights Division. For the Coalition, she has been on the steering committee since the Coalition began in 1998; she was the first chair of the steering committee (1998-2001) and afterwards she served on the management committee. She was also on the steering committee for the US Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. She was involved in the following tasks: formulating the Coalition strategy; spokesperson for the Coalition; meet with/lobby governments; participate in Coalition's regional conferences; edit/input Coalition reports, press releases, advocacy letters, etc. chair steering committee meetings; and mobilizing other NGOs (interview with Jo Becker).

The perception of the CSC aims from Amnesty International is similar. According to one activist, the CSC achieved several positive results. First, it raised international awareness about the problem with governments, media and civil society. Second, it improved international standards and contributed to UN and regional debates and decisions. Finally, it provided an impetus for research (interview n. 4).⁵⁵

There is always an evolution in the aims of a transnational coalition towards their final objective, which has to do with the real situation in the field and so with the implementation of the treaties. Therefore, one of the founders of the CSC affirms: “the OP is a step forward, but anyway what it is all about is its implementation” (interview no. 22).⁵⁶

Thus, a major objective was achieved in January 2000, when the OP was successfully negotiated, and in May 2000, when the UN formally adopted the Optional Protocol. It was ratified in February 2002. Indeed, the decision of not putting an end to the CSC after 2001 was taken after a process of discussion of different alternatives. In the words of the representative of the International Federation Terre des Hommes in the CSC, “after having achieved the OP we had a debate, whether to continue the campaign or to

⁵⁵ “Awareness of the issue through regional conferences, media, participation in drafting OP, campaigning for ratification of OP, participation in Security Council discussion on children and armed conflict, briefing UN Special Report on children and armed conflict, capacity building in the regions, global research and report on child soldiers”. Martin McPherson is a member of Amnesty International, a founder member of the CSC. He also advised the direct negotiators of the Optional Protocol. He represented Amnesty International in the UN working group. He carried out legal advice, lobbying diplomats to support AI’s position and involving AI’s membership to campaign for a strong and effective OP. In 1986, he participated in the WG drafting the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

⁵⁶ This activist was a member of UNICEF/Belgium and founder/coordinator of the Belgian CSC. Lobby work towards Belgian CSC, which started in 1999.

stop it. We decided to continue, because we had new aims: lobby the governments to get as much ratifications as possible; look after the implementation; monitor the situation of child soldiers worldwide; lobby the responsible People in the UN (Security Council); form a worldwide network on the issue; and support Demobilization, Rehabilitation, Reintegration of child soldiers” (interview n. 13).

In any case, with the adoption of the OP, the CSC shifted some emphasis from ratification campaigning to capacity building for the movement (interview n. 5) and to implementation. Following a member of the CSC steering committee, the current core areas of work are: (a) research and monitoring; (b) advocacy and public education; and (c) networking and capacity building.⁵⁷

Another adviser of the direct negotiators of the OP and also senior child protection specialist of one of the main NGOs participating in the Coalition agrees: “the signing of the OP led to an expansion of its concerns to include the exchange of programs and best practices” (interview n. 18).

⁵⁷ “a) Research and monitoring: The CSC is the leading network for monitoring and reporting on the use of child soldiers world-wide. We publish geographic and thematic research on child soldiering, while strengthening local, regional and international monitoring and reporting mechanisms; b) advocacy and public education: The CSC promotes universal ratification and implementation of international legal standards prohibiting the recruitment and use of children as soldiers. It campaigns against child soldiering by particular armed forces and groups. We support a “straight-18” policy to prevent any participation in armed conflict by children under 18; c) networking and capacity-building: With representation in every region of the world, the CSC promotes and coordinates training, information-sharing and capacity building activities for NGOs in priority countries and facilitates documentation and dissemination of experience and promising practices” (interview n. 23).

6.3.4.1. The framing of the CSC

As said in the previous section a single aim allows framing the message in a clearer way. In the second phase of the process, the CSC decided to focus their strategy in the technical problem of the different minimal age in the two different international legislations. In fact, several diplomats mentioned the capabilities and discourse of the CSC representatives among the main items that helped the political influence of the CSC on this specific issue.

Table 6.13 ICRC citizen consultation: “At what age are people mature enough to be combatants?”⁵⁸

<i>Age</i>	<i>% of respondents</i>
Under 15	01
15-17	06
18-21	53
Over 21	35

With the aim of transmitting their message, the activists used several data in order to reach the governments and the public opinion. An illustration of the data used by the CSC is the following. In 1999, the ICRC carried out a worldwide consultation on the rules of war, which included a question “At what age are young people mature enough to be combatants?” The overall response is provided in table 6.13. By presenting these data, the ICRC and the CSC argued that 88 per cent of the respondents believed that the minimum age should be at least 18 years. Given the attitude of the US in the negotiations on the draft Optional Protocol, sometimes also the data that in the US, where 53 per

⁵⁸ Respondents were offered the choices of: under 15, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, over 21.

cent responded “21 or over”, was also used and submitted to the media through press releases.

Thus, the strategic framing by the CSC focused on a technical problem: the legal vacuum between the 15 and the 18 years. At this level, even pragmatic countries had to agree. “The point is not whether the age limit should be 16, 17 or 18. The international community has already chosen to establish the dividing line between adults and children as being eighteen years: what possible justification can there be to make an exception for sending children into combat? How can such differentiation be justified in the context of the protection of children and their rights enunciated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights treaties?” (CSC 1999: 15).

The CSC believed that other strategies around controversial concepts such as 'children have their own rights' would have had more problems to obtain international support and would have needed bigger consensus on the problem posed by the participation of children in armed conflicts. In this way, they reached consistently the media and the public opinion.

Taking advantage of the media interest, the CSC achieved an almost daily presence in the news, with stories about child soldiers, regarding both the atrocities they must commit and those that others commit against them. However, at a certain point this mass of information reached a saturation point. After that point, some media looking for impact news have treated them more as perpetrators than as victims, making more difficult the NGO work. Moreover, in some cases the media have had a limited and partisan political agenda, as when informing about the Middle East or in the Colombian case.

To conclude, the transnational coalition against the use of child soldiers based most of its political success in previous efforts on rigorous and extensive research, as well as the construction of a powerful and clear message. With this aim, consensus was created and transnational links activated. After the signature and ratification of the treaty, new objectives have shaped the strategies of the activists, including a more careful use of the media.

6.3.5. Contingent factors: The collateral effects of some wars

Another factor of success has to do with an international political opportunity structure very favourable for the visibility of this issue. Up to six interviewees mentioned the international context among the factors that helped the CSC to increase its political influence when negotiating the Optional Protocol.

In the second phase of the child soldiers campaign, there were armed conflicts in the Congo, Angola, and Mozambique, among others. Thus, many images of children with their weapons reached the public opinion. Also at different political levels, there were people worried about these situations, including some people within the UN Security Council, which has approved five resolutions in the last ten years on the topic of children affected by armed conflict. As a consequence, the Security Council asked the General Secretary of the UN to elaborate and publish a first list of all conflicts in which there were participation of child soldiers and also a list of all governmental forces and non-state armed groups that recruited child soldiers. Both are assessed as important successes in an institution as politicized as the UN Security Council.

In table 6.5, the situation in the countries where there were armed conflicts was assessed as quite relevant (3.07/3.14 of relevance out of a maximum of 5) in order to explain the political influence of the CSC during the negotiations of the Optional Protocol. In concrete, the international context was mentioned by several diplomats regarding the items affecting the political influence of the CSC when negotiating the article about non-governmental armed-groups (see table 6.8). From this data, we could conclude that the existence of some wars mainly among non-state armed actors had as a collateral effect the pressure for an article in the optional protocol with strong language on the use and recruitment of child soldiers by non-state armed actors. However, the actual compliance with that article is complicated, given the

legal nature of such actors, who, different from states, cannot sign international treaties.⁵⁹

6.4. Summary and conclusions: Successes and failures of the CSC

The coalition of NGOs to stop the use and recruitment of child was created in 1998 by six organisations of human rights and the humanitarian field.⁶⁰ The problem was a legal vacuum between the Convention of the Rights of the Child (the International Humanitarian Law) and the Geneva Conventions (the International Human Rights Law). Whereas the first convention established that each person under eighteen years old is a child, the second treaty convention stated that recruitment and use as a soldier was possible when the person is at least fifteen years old.

The strategic framing by the CSC focused on this technical problem: the legal vacuum between the ages of fifteen and the eighteen. For this reason, the CSC began to work with the aim of influencing the international process. In a later stage, national coalitions were created to work on the topic of the national

⁵⁹ In this sense, the work of the organization Geneva Call is innovative and promising. This is an international humanitarian organization dedicated to engaging armed non-state actors to respect and to adhere to humanitarian norms, starting with the ban on anti-personnel landmines. In 2007, they started working as well on child soldiers (interview with Geneva Call project manager, Barcelona, April 2007). See <http://www.genevacall.org/home.htm>.

⁶⁰ International Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, Save the Children, Defense of the Children International, the Quakers, World Vision International and the International Federation Terre des Hommes. At the time of the negotiations of the text, the Steering Committee of the Coalition comprised also ANPPCAN, African Forum on Child Welfare and DCI-Gambia (as African regional representatives), the Colombian Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, CONAVIGUA and DCI-Uruguay (as Latin American regional representatives).

legislations. Now there are national coalitions in almost all countries where there is presence of child soldiers, and the lobbying tasks are not only focused in the UN Security Council, but directly with national governments and with international courts of justice to ensure compliance and implementation of the signed text.

One of the main resources of the coalition was the ability to produce rigorous and complete pieces of research, including the Global Reports on Child Soldiers. The figure of 300.000 that framed the issue in the context of a humanitarian crisis, exemplified by personal stories from international conflicts in the Congo, Angola or Mozambique.

Seen somehow as a 'neutral organization', the CSC as an international network also benefited since the second phase from a better access to the international institutions than their NGO members, often seen as 'enemies' by some countries. Therefore, the coalition has often facilitated contacts with international institutions to allow national partners to express their own problems and their research in international forums. In the third one, this prestige and status gained within the UN has been maintained.

Regarding the international agenda, the topic of children affected by armed conflict has been gaining space in the debates in the UN, and also in the media, in the last two decades. The creation of a UN office to deal specifically with children affected by armed conflict has been assessed in this research as a moderate political success in the first phase of the campaign, although the coalition did not exist as such, but taking into account the fact that their members were already lobbying in the corridors of the international forums. At the same time, the UN Commission of Human Rights had designed a Working Group to draft an Optional Protocol to the Conventions of the Rights of the Child that would rise the age of combatants from fifteen to eighteen years. The CSC emerged from that Working Group. From the point of view of the treaty, the campaign of the CSC was a success, given that the final text, which included most of NGOs demands, was signed. On the

negative side, the treaty allows the voluntary recruitment by governmental forces in some situations; it does not develop enough mechanisms to ensure the implementation of the text and the fact that compliance of the non-state actors by the treaty is very limited. The consensus rule used in the negotiations allowed the super-power (the USA) a veto power and so, the proponents of the treaty had to reach a compromise with the American positions.

The third phase in this case is crucial, with the implementation of the treaty as a very long-term objective, in which the concrete effects of the CSC are less clear. Many governments still think that they may end up using under eighteen year old people in armed conflicts. On another front, the issue is particularly difficult concerning non-state armed groups with limited resources, different cultural backgrounds and difficulties to be influenced by using traditional strategies that work with governments.

Concerning successes and failures of the CSC, there seem to be mixed feelings about it. For example, in the words of a former coordinator of the CSC “the organization can point to successes in gaining resolutions and declarations condemning the practice, but it continues unabated. The organization is successful in its advocacy, but the victimization of children continues. From our point of view, we would seek long-term reduction in child soldiers’ use” (interview n. 5).

Also, a member of the CSC Steering Committee argues in a similar way: “Satisfactory? The positive results have included the adoption of the OP, the fairly good rate of signature and ratification, changes in national legislation regarding the minimum age of recruitment, heightened international awareness of the issue, successful demobilisation and reintegration in some situations, the issue being taken up substantially by the UN Security Council and also by regional bodies. However, the unsatisfactory results include the failure to achieve a “straight-18” Optional Protocol and the fact that child recruitment and use is still widespread.” (interview n. 23).

From the governmental sector, there is a similar perception, as shown by this representative in the Working Group: “The results

have been satisfactory in political terms, but no in terms of prevention. The OP is not specific enough in the areas of DDR.” Another diplomat from one of the countries supportive of the CSC agrees: “The OP is stronger than we might have expected, but weaker than we’d hoped. It was a major achievement to secure 18 as the minimum age for participation in hostilities, given the significant opposition initially from the US and UK in particular. However, it was a disappointment that we were not able to achieve a minimum age of 18 for voluntary recruitment, and that Article 1 used the weaker term ‘all feasible measures’ (rather than ‘states shall ensure’) and specified a ‘direct’ part in hostilities rather than any participation in hostilities. It does leave the issue of military schools somewhat ambiguous, and does not really define the term ‘recruitment’ (particularly in respect to non-state actors).

If the CSC was created in a situation where it had to explain to the public opinion the fact that under-18 were recruited in many parts of the world (first phase); then the treaty helped to stigmatize this problem, but only to a certain point and in this sense, much remains to be done in the current third phase of the campaign.

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Enrique Restoy	CSC, Program Officer
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Jo Becker	Human Rights Watch. CSC spokesperson
Chris Revaz	American Bar Association
Anna-Pia Gludovacz	Austrian government. Department of HHRR and International Humanitarian Law
Eylah Kadjar-Hamouda	International Federation Terre des Hommes

Sara Sighinolfi	Researcher (LLM Essex and University of Bologna)
Françoise Dieryck	Amnesty International US
Araceli García del Soto	University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
Felipe Gómez Isa	Deusto University, Spain
Marcellina Mian	ISPCAN
Andreas Rister	International Federation Terre des Hommes
Murhabazi Namegabe	CSC DR Congo
Jorge A. Restrepo	Defense of Children International
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Casey Kelso	CSC. Coordinator 2002-2004
Mohamed Abdi Mohamed	Researcher
Joël Mermet	OHCHR
Michael Wessells	Christian Children's Fund. Consultant
Paulo David	OHCHR
Jenny Kruper	Essex University and London School of Economics
Martin McPherson	AI. International Secretariat
Florentino Moreno Martin	Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Glenda Ramírez	Southeast Asia CSC
Almudena Escorial	Save the Children and CSC Spain
Rania Al Haj Ali	Third Secretary. Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the UN, New York
Andrea Cavallari	Counselor. Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations. New York

Jean-Marc Hoscheit	Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Luxembourg to the UN. New York
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

7.1. Introduction. Added value of the research

The thesis has offered a detailed description of four campaigns dealing with international negotiation processes on disarmament issues. Although such a comparative work is frequently emphasised by the literature¹, there is no other similar comparative account available in that literature. Moreover, the comparison made it possible to disentangle broad categories often only sketched in the existing literature, such as the multilevel political opportunity structure or the rules of the game. In the next section, the model presented in the first chapter will be revised to include some elements revealed by the empirical analysis.

¹ For example, Bandy and Smith state: “methodologically, the case study analyses allow for a depth of research necessary to investigate the often hidden processes of coalition formation and the intersection of complex cultural, political, and economic forces. However, comparative methods are necessary to provide greater insight into dynamics of cooperation and conflict in transnational civil society. Such research would enable us to understand more fully those strategies of coalition that fail or succeed, those identities of solidarity and conflict that are possible, and those organizational structure that are effective and ineffective in achieving the dives goals of the coalition (...) Further given the growth of multinational and multi-issue campaigns, there is far more need to embrace multinational, not merely binational, approaches” (Bandy and Smith 2005: 248).

The comparative method used throughout the dissertation has proved essential to responding adequately to the research questions posed in chapter one. A study based on just one (or even two) of these cases would have easily led to specific conclusions that were difficult to generalise, as happens with most of the core studies on the landmine campaigns. Including the SALW case with the others, such as the landmines and the cluster munitions' processes, has allowed the thesis to broaden the perspective. Indeed, by only comparing these two highly correlated cases (landmines and cluster munitions) the thesis would have over-emphasised the influence of the NGOs in processes of new diplomacy, which, as shown in this research, is not common in all fields of human security. Moreover, the comparison made it possible to identify factors existing in some cases of success and absent in others of failure, such as the favourable rules of the game. Finally, the division of each case in different chronological phases has allowed a comparative perspective also across time.

Another benefit of the comparison relates to the analysis on small arms and arms trade. Thus, chapter 4 has shown that IANSA cannot be easily compared to the other coalitions. Different from the single-issue coalitions, IANSA is better described as a network with many objectives. For this reason, IANSA has not carried out such a campaign like the other cases, but it has been involved in several, although interrelated disarmament processes. This contradicts some literature that has compared both processes, namely landmines and small arms (for example, Huberts 2001, Brem and Rutherford 2001), and concluded by suggesting that further research on such comparison was required to fruitfully achieve meaningful results. On the contrary, the thesis has shown that the most recent 'Control Arms' that aims at the Arms Trade Treaty, this *ad hoc* alliance among IANSA, Oxfam and Amnesty International, is the real single-issue campaign in this field which is comparable to the other cases. For this reason, in parts of chapter 4 some analyses on the Control Arms campaign were incorporated. Yet, an in-depth specific analysis of this campaign remains for further research.

Methodologically, the research has shown the possibilities of participant observation and elite interviewing with different sectors of actors, mainly with key representatives from the social movement organisations. It has also faced challenges due to the international (and even global) nature of the issues and the actors at stake.

The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 reflects on the theoretical framework presented in chapter 1 and suggests modifications; Section 7.3 examines the empirical findings and compares the results of all the cases; Section 7.4 confronts such results with other scholarly accounts in related fields with a similar theoretical framework, such as Bandy and Smith (2005), Silva (2008) and Parks (2009). Taking into consideration that one of the main aims of the thesis is to identify pathways towards success, section 7.5 puts forward an ideal type of the evolution of a transnational campaign, which is developed through three different phases: (i) before the negotiations, (ii) during the negotiations and (iii) after the treaty is signed. The results allow a re-examining of several issues concerning the concept of success and failure in this field. Moreover, they also suggest several reflections on a number of theoretical, methodological and related issues, including the participatory procedures of these networks and processes, particularly at the global level. By way of conclusion, some proposals for further research are also offered with the aim of exploring the extent to which these findings can be generalised to related fields.

7.2. Transnational strategies in a multilevel political opportunity structure

As the theoretical chapter made explicit, Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2004) located a transnational coalition (TC) between a broader transnational social movement and a narrower transnational advocacy network. Therefore, a TC is a set of actors (most of them non-governmental organisations or social

movement organisations) linked across country boundaries, which coordinate shared strategies and tactics (such as transnational campaigns) to publicly influence social and political change.

This research has shown the utility of this definition by analysing four different transnational coalitions, but which are not coordinated with each other. For this reason, they do not form a unitary social movement for the promotion of peace, human rights and the development of the laws of war. Yet, they are much more than a concrete network with advocacy purposes.

We also saw that social and political changes could take place at different stages of the international political cycle, starting from the creation of a transnational coalition, accomplishing outcomes in the agenda-setting, improving participatory and transparent procedures (including the access to the institutions), achieving changes in the legal framework and finally shaping the implementation policies. Given that until very recently the legal and policy-making stage has been under examined by the literature, the thesis focuses specifically on these kinds of successes, although the other effects have also been considered.

Despite analytically assessing the different stages as independent from each other, each empirical chapter supports recent theoretical proposals that suggest the inter-dependence between different social movement outcomes (see for example, Bosi and Giugni 2009). In addition, the thesis has shown that the creation of a transnational coalition (TC) is not enough to have success in the other stages, such as the signature of the treaty or its implementation. For example, the case of IANSA shows that its creation *per se* was not a sufficient condition for the final success in the 2006 RevCon, even if at that meeting and according to most interviewees “it was the first time that the whole arms control movement acted together” and the result was indeed worse than in the 2001 Conference, where the activists’ level of organization was lower. In other words, other factors were at stake, including the role of some middle-power allies to the TC.

The tentative model on TCs’ outcomes presented two different groups of independent variables, namely those controlled by the


activists and those not controlled by them. However, the empirical research has shown that in most of cases two other factors are also needed to understand the development of the processes: (i) the rules of the game and (ii) the individuals' agency. First, the competition for setting the rules of the game is connected to the fact that these rules will shape the result of the negotiations. Second, access to key individuals who are highly motivated and in a position to modify a country position is one of the factors that is more linked with a positive outcome of the negotiations. The research has offered many examples of the possibilities of individual agency in different contexts, within NGO leadership, governmental delegations, in UN agencies, holding bureaucratic ad-hoc positions (such as president of the conference, chair of a committee), the media (like-minded journalists), and so on. This suggests that actors in these processes should not be understood as unitary entities, but as composed by individuals who can exert high levels of agency.

Considering these new ideas in our original theoretical approach, we will have a revisited model on transnational coalition's outcomes (see fig. 7.1 below).² We still have, on the one hand, those (internal) elements that are (to some extent) controlled by the actors that form the transnational coalition: their organisational features, including their resources and their strategic choices; on the other hand, the (external) factors grouped in the structure of political opportunities for collective action, which act at different levels, mainly national and international. They also include contingent factors, such as international conflicts or crisis. In between, some individuals are part of the controlled resources (individual as activists) and others of the contextual variables (i.e. individuals playing other roles). Finally,

² This is a general model and therefore it does not exclude other possible effects. Probably separating out the contextual variables from individual agency in such a neat fashion should be sophisticated in further research. For example, it does not seem illogical that the rules of the game could have some influence on the cultural effects or that the organizational form could determine access effects.

the rules of the game have an influence on the whole process, as it facilitates or makes more difficult TCs influence. However, these two factors (individual's agency and rules of the game) are not given, but endogenous; they are shaped by the actors at stake. In other words, activists and diplomats fight to set a favourable negotiation setting and they also try to push individuals in a position to do so to exert their agency in the direction closer to their aims and claims.

Figure 7.1 Model on transnational coalitions' outcomes revisited



Regarding the international context, the 'boomerang effect' described by Keck and Sikkink (1998) is still useful to identify some situations in countries that are less well off than developed democracies. Moreover, political support by the richer countries has also been involved as international donors and foreign NGOs, who became a decisive factor in making real change in countries

with a more difficult political environment than developed democracies. However, in other places this scheme did not apply.

Partially linked to the different stages of the international policy cycle, the theoretical perspective considered different successes that could take place in terms of impact on the access to the institutions and the procedures of the bargaining processes, in the setting of the (political and media) agenda and in the legal and policy-making dimension. In the long term, the model also considered the existence of cultural effects. The assessment of these effects has been carried out from a qualitative point of view, in a scale ranging from low to very high impact. As shown in the empirical chapters, there are many relationships between the different dimensions, for example, when there is more access and presence in the agenda, the success in the policy dimension is more likely.

As it has been the researcher who defined what a success is, the use of the success/failure terminology aimed at an honest recognition of subjectivity, allowing as well the identification of non-intentional effects. Throughout the thesis, there were two cases mainly successful (landmines and child soldiers, which achieved a treaty), one case mainly unsuccessful (small arms), and a case that started as unsuccessful and through the research has proved to be one of the most successful (cluster munitions), although each of them has a different degree of success in different dimensions, ensuring therefore the variability of the dependent(s) variable(s).

7.3. Discussing the empirical evidence: successes and failures of four recent disarmament campaigns

The international efforts under study were fostered by the Ottawa Treaty in 1997 which prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. The unprecedented achievement by civil society represented a successful example of humanitarian advocacy in several

dimensions, including the cultural sphere and the stigmatization of the weapon. Other coalitions, particularly those fighting against cluster bombs and small arms tried to follow the 'landmines model', applying different lessons learned since then, with different degrees of success.

The division of each campaign in three different phases has proved very useful for the interpretation of the data. Broadly speaking, each of such campaigns aims at achieving a treaty and it has thus evolved around the consecution of this legally binding document. In the first phase, the whole process begins when in different parts of the world and at the same time several organisations that are concerned about a global problem absent from the international political agenda decide to campaign for a future global treaty about it. This phase includes the first attempts to negotiate the issue, normally in the framework of an official formal process.

Afterwards, comes the phase of the concrete and real negotiating of the treaty. Sometimes this may imply a completely new process where by definition the main actors are states, particularly in UN-based contexts, whereas the NGOs sometimes may gain some partnership status. In any case, the activists need the help of like-minded states that take the lead among the diplomats. This partnership is a necessary condition for the success of such campaigns.

Once the treaty is signed and ratified, the objectives of the coalitions expand in a third phase. On the one hand, they need to be sure that the treaty will be effectively implemented (the states will finance it and the work in the field will be done, most of times by NGOs part of the coalition). On the other hand, they need to keep on campaigning for the issues that were not included in the final version of the text. Moreover, they work to produce a long-term aim: the cultural stigmatisation of the (use of the) weapon.

Table 7.1 below shows the assessment of the different successes and failures in each phase of the four campaigns. From this perspective, there are two cases (landmines and child soldiers) where the treaty was achieved and they are now in the third phase;

and two other cases (small arms and cluster munitions), where a legally binding treaty had not been achieved by the time the empirical research was over. The assessment of the second phase of these more recent cases is more difficult to make. In this sense, they usually have two values instead of a single one, reflecting the fact that these are campaigns still in evolution towards their main aim of a treaty.³

Table 7.1 Assessment of the different effects of the TC in each phase

Type of effect/Phase	<i>Landmines</i>			<i>Small Arms</i>	<i>Arms Trade</i>	<i>Cluster Munitions</i>		<i>Child Soldiers</i>		
	I	II	III	I	II	I	II	I	II	III
Access	1	3	3	1	½	1	3/4	2	3	2
Agenda	2	4	2	2	2/3	2	2/3	2	3	2
Policy	2	4	3	2/3	¹ (SALW) / ² (ATT)	2	3/4	2	4	2
Cultural	2	3	3	2	2	2	2/3	1	3	3

1=low, 2=moderate, 3=high, 4=very high.

7.3.1. Access and the relevance of individual agency

One of the main findings of this research is that individuals have the capacity to affect change at various organizational levels. This supports the literature that has studied the role of key individuals as the driving force behind normative changes and decision-making. They can be persuaded by activists to put an issue in the agenda or to decide in favour of a certain issue because of moral principles (see Lumsdaine 1993). In brief, a

³ In the small arms/arms trade case, the two values reflect the fact that we are indeed before two different (although interconnected) processes. Thus, the first value is about the UN small arms process, whereas the second one refers to the Control Arms campaign.

single individual in a governmental delegation or coordinating an international campaign can make the difference. In other areas as well, individuals have exerted influence, such as on the media. Indeed, part of the successes of these campaigns was the fact that they were able to rely on sympathetic journalists to promote and spread their core messages. This is one of the clearest lessons of the pioneer landmines campaign which has been subsequently learned and shared by the other campaigns.

First, in the ICBL, the relationship between NGOs and individuals with a very high profile (such as celebrities) and direct experience about the consequences of mines was important in some countries: Senator Patrick Leahy in the US, Princess Diana in Britain, Lloyd Axworthy in Canada or Archbishop Desmond Tutu in South Africa. This gave credibility to the national campaigns and facilitated contacts with governments. Although this was adapted by the other campaigns, it never achieved such a success.

The ICBL had to deal with problems of access to the negotiations' room. In fact, the first phase of the landmine process ended with the NGOs boycotting the final two Expert Group Conferences within the context of the CCW Review Conference, in protest over their lack of access. At that moment, very few countries included representatives of the social movement sector among the members of their delegations. In the second phase, there is an evolution in the status of the ICBL. After the Bonn Conference in April 1997, the ICBL would be treated as a full participant in the process. The activists were since then able to attend and make interventions at all sessions. In the third and last phase, NGOs are still allowed to participate in major meetings, working closely with some like-minded governments.

Second, the founding members of IANSA constituted an epistemic community of experts in the issues at stake, for example, they frequently held workshops and seminars to advice diplomats from a number of countries. In fact, some of them have been part of several official delegations in the international negotiations, such as those within the UN processes. Moreover,

NGOs are allowed to attend some of the Conferences' sessions, are provided with space in the UN building for meetings and briefings, and are given space to display their material and exhibits, but they cannot participate in most of the official meetings. Nevertheless, and due partly to the work of like-minded diplomats, the transnational coalition is usually informed and updated about the course of the negotiations. In addition, the issue of access and procedures is currently being negotiated in the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) process, as it will be crucial for later stages of the bargaining process.

Third, most of the success on cluster munitions has to do with the fact that the NGOs in this process (second phase) are considered as full partners, participating in all the meetings and working closely to the group of like-minded states that lead the negotiations, thus enjoying a similar level of access to the one the landmine campaign had a decade ago. This was partly because some of the key individuals in this process participated also in the landmines process, and some relationships of trust have been maintained in one of the most solid and most effective communities of practice of nowadays.

Fourth, the case of the CSC is slightly different from the others, because this coalition was seen somehow as a 'neutral organization' and also because the rights of the child were not always perceived as a core issue in the wider context of the UN. Therefore, this international network benefited from a better access to the international institutions than each of their NGO members individually, often seen as 'enemies' by some countries. Hence, it facilitated contacts with international institutions, such as the UN Security Council or the European Union, to allow national partners to express their own problems and their research in international forums. In the third phase, this prestige and status gained within the UN has been maintained.

7.3.2. Agenda effects and framing strategies

In order to reach the agenda, it is crucial to define clearly the goals of the campaign. First, in the case of the ICBL, a single issue was chosen, namely, isolating mines as a concrete problem with a solution identified as a total prohibition. It was believed that the agenda-setting would be this way easier to be shaped. In the negotiating process, the objective was even more concrete: the treaty would focus only on antipersonnel landmines, excluding others, such as anti-tank mines.

In terms of impact in the agenda setting and also in the arena of international public opinion, an important peak was observed at the end of the first phase, partially due to the huge coverage that Princess Diana's trips to Angola and Bosnia received in the international press. That helped to frame the issue in humanitarian terms. Thus, personal testimonies and graphic images of landmine victims were frequently and prominently featured around the world. This allowed the issue to generate international attention. In the second phase, there was some presence in the media due to the signing of the treaty and to the Nobel prize, but less than in the previous years. Being aware of it, the ICBL has frequently and explicitly stated that one of its main objectives in the current third phase is to keep political and public attention.

Second, in the small arms case, framing problems include the fact that UN member states decided that the SALW problem mainly involved national security and arms control. It has consequently been dealt with within the framework of the UN General Assembly's First Committee. For this reason, it has been up to NGOs and international organisations to develop policy initiatives that covered all the dimensions of the problem, broadening the initial focus on national security and arms control. The complexity of the issue precluded a simple solution, such as that underpinning the ICBL. It is always more difficult to agree on legal instruments aiming at regulating an issue that on a clear ban on all aspects of the problem.

However, the 2001 SALW Conference raised popular and elite consciousness, creating, disseminating and sharing knowledge of small arms as a global problem. That has been considered as a success in the agenda-setting dimension. Moreover, states were confronted with the multi-dimensional nature of the threat posed by SALW. It also generated two weeks of international media attention, which were somehow repeated during the 2006 Review Conference, although the failure of that conference also meant an absence of major media coverage. On the contrary, the first achievements in the Arms Trade Treaty process have brought some media attention. Nevertheless, it seems that the space that these topics gain in the media (and political) agenda are crucially influenced by exogenous events, such as massacres in schools, or terrorist attacks where conventional weapons and especially small arms were used.

Third, when the Cluster Munitions Coalition was created, the perception was that it should be an international campaign against all explosive remnants of war, not only against cluster munitions. However, the experience of other campaigns of public pressure suggested that a clear and concrete message, such as “stop cluster munitions” was essential. This has been explicit in the CMC documents since the end of 2004.

The framing of the cluster munitions case in terms of a humanitarian crisis has been more difficult than in the landmines case, because the main problem posed by the cluster munitions is potential: there are hundreds of millions stockpiled in many countries, ready to be used. Moreover, the military utility of the weapon is bigger in the CMC case than it was with landmines. Yet, the issue reached effectively the public agenda in the end of 2006, gaining momentum and initiating a serious political process. In addition, in this case, an external event needs to be highlighted. Thus, the use of a huge quantity of sub-munitions by the Israeli army during the last days of the armed conflict in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel in the summer 2006 had collateral aspects, with intense media coverage of the victims and of the consequences the difficulties of the cleaning and demining

difficulties of the areas. More recently, the use of cluster munitions by Russia and Georgia in the summer 2008 also was highlighted in international media.

Fourth, the coalition of NGOs to stop the use and recruitment of child was created by six organisations of human rights and the humanitarian field. The problem was a legal vacuum between the Convention of the Rights of the Child (the International Humanitarian Law) and the Geneva Conventions (the International Human Rights Law). Whereas the first established that each person under 18 years old is a child, the second stated that recruitment and use as a soldier was possible since the person is 15 years old. The strategic framing by the CSC focused thus on a technical problem: the legal vacuum between the 15 and the 18 years. In this level, even pragmatic countries had to agree. Other strategies around controversial concepts such as 'children have their own rights' were probably more difficult to obtain international support and would need bigger consensus on the problem posed by the participation of children in armed conflicts.

Regarding the international agenda, the topic of children affected by armed conflict has been gaining space in the debates in the UN and also in the media during the 1990s and 2000s. By the time of the negotiation of the treaty, the political opportunity structure of this case benefited from the existence of armed conflicts in Congo, Angola or Mozambique. These events, external to the work of the TC, facilitated the presence in the media of images of children with their own weapons, which influenced public opinion and also some among the diplomat sector. Taking advantage of the media interest, the CSC achieved an almost daily presence in the news, with stories about child soldiers, regarding both the atrocities they must commit and those that others commit against them. However, at a certain point this mass of information reached a saturation point. On the one hand, some media looking for impact news have treated them more as perpetrators than as victims, making it more difficult for the NGO working in this last phase. On the other hand, in some cases the

media have had a limited and partisan political agenda, such as when informing about the Middle East or in the Colombian case.

7.3.3. Policy effects: The treaty and beyond

First, The ICBL achieved some moderate policy results in the first phase of the landmines process: a growing number of governments taking unilateral actions to put moratoria on export or to end their own production, transfer, stockpiling or use of landmines and to support a global ban. However, the total ban was not achieved in the CCW Review and its perspectives in the short term were more utopian than real. In the end, the unexpected Ottawa Process was successful and the Mine Ban Treaty was signed in record-time by 122 countries. Most of them are submitting national reports to help the verification efforts undertaken by the Landmine Monitor in the current phase.

Second, the arms control campaigns is a very complex case, because it tackles different international processes at the same time. The two most important processes are (a) the Program of Action on small arms and light weapons (SALW), adopted in 2001, reviewed in the summer of 2006 and that is not legally binding; and (b) the negotiations aiming at a (conventional) arms trade treaty, which achieved a first success at the political level in the end of 2006, with a resolution that was approved in the UN General Assembly, officially starting the negotiations phase.

The results in the 2001 SALW Conference (a Program of Action on SALW) were a moderate result. Even if the document is not legally binding, the fact that an agreement was reached regarding the final document allows us to talk about the moderate success. That consensus could not be maintained five years later in the conference of revision of the Program of Action and that explains the low mark in the second phase of this process in table 7.1.

The Control Arms campaign was an effective way to overcome this situation, led by three big organizations with a

common objective: a treaty to regulate conventional arms trade (both small and heavy weapons). The Control Arms campaign lobbied in November 2006 in the UN First Committee, a forum where unanimity rule is not always the main procedure, but also majority voting can be applied. The success of the vote that officially initiates the negotiations for the Arms Trade Treaty, whereas still far for having a legally binding document, it is an unexpected success that will shape future strategies and organisational practices of the arm control activists.

Third, the cluster munitions coalition is the most recent case. Therefore, it is difficult to examine its successes and failures at this moment. Yet, so far its assessment is positive. Regarding the political dimension, the Oslo process has many similarities with the Ottawa process. Thus, if in the CCW Review Conference in 1995 no mine ban was achieved, a group of like-minded states willing to lead a new process ended up being extremely effective. In the CMC case, a similar process has taken place after a new review conference of the CCW in November 2006, which meant a new impulse for the future agreement, formalised at the Oslo conference (February 2007) and confirmed at the Dublin conference (May 2008).

The cluster munitions process resembles the landmines process in that both are examples of new diplomacy, open and multilateral negotiation processes, with the NGOs (and also international institutions, such as UN agencies) as full partners. The leadership of a group of individuals representing countries and international organisations that share certain ideas and interests, impulse alternative bargaining processes, in order to overcome the paralysis of traditional disarmament forums, in many cases due to the unanimity rule required for the decision-making. Also in both processes, the mechanism allowing the participation of states is based on self-selection, with the aim of preventing the participation of potential blockers or countries with clear preferences against the future treaty.

Fourth, the Child Soldiers Coalition achieved a high impact by a report about the consequences of armed conflicts in children.

Directed by Graça Machel, former Minister of Education of Mozambique, it was presented in 1996 in the UN General Assembly. One of the main consequences of this report was the creation of a UN office to deal specifically with children affected by armed conflict. At the same time, the UN Commission of Human Rights had designed a Working Group to draft an Optional Protocol to the Conventions of the Rights of the Child that would rise the age of combatants from 15 to 18 years. The working group met annually in Geneva since 1994 until January 2000. In the end, the treaty was signed, but the actual compliance of the non-state armed actors by the treaty is very limited. In this sense, the third phase in this case is probably more important than in the rest of campaigns of this research. As usual, the treaty needed to be ratified and implemented. Whereas the ratification was quickly achieved, the implementation seems a very long-term objective, in which the concrete effects of the CSC are less clear. Thus, in the three global research reports done by the CSC on the situation of the children in armed conflict the total of child soldiers identified is always similar: (at least) 300000 (see CSC 2001, 2004 and 2008). However, and using counterfactual thinking, all interviewees agree that this figure would be higher without the work by the CSC.

7.3.4. Stigmatisation and cultural effects

With regards to cultural effects, security issues are generally deemed particularly resistant to pressures exerted by nongovernmental actors. First, and nevertheless, the ICBL managed to draw attention to the humanitarian consequences of landmines to public opinion. During the Ottawa Process, the cultural change reached a peak fostered by the award of the Peace Nobel prize. Even those that still oppose the ban have been extraordinarily reticent in making a public case and contesting the legitimacy of the idea of eventually banning mines. Through a shaming process, the leaders of some reluctant states, such as

Greece and Poland, felt intolerable to be left outside the club of responsible international citizens. Today, the use of landmines is seen as something against human rights. Even in the countries that have not signed yet the treaty, such as the US, opinion polls show that public opinion does not consider this weapon legitimate.

Second, there are (at least) two specific problems in the small arms case, from a cultural point of view. On the one hand, nobody tries to ban anything, but to regulate a field in which some uses and transferences of weapons should in any case be legal, such as by the police in democratic countries. On the other hand, a sharp division seems to exist between the perception of gun control in the US, where several millions of people support the gun lobby arguing that the guns are embedded in the US history and its constitution; and the rest of the world, scared of massacres in schools and terrorist provision of weapons. This aspect influences the development of negotiations and the whole process, especially due to the close relationship between the gun lobby and the American delegation, which gives them a crucial power in negotiation-settings based on the unanimity rule.

Third, at the cultural level the impact of the cluster munitions coalition has been so far only moderate since for most of the countries some types of the weapon are still considered legitimate. Nevertheless, successes in all dimensions are growing (represented in table 7.1 by two different numbers in each category) as the optimism in the conferences following Oslo has been also growing. In the beginning of 2008, both activists and diplomats agreed that before the end of the year a new treaty will be signed. What remained to be known is the actual content of the text and if all types of cluster munitions would be banned.

Fourth, the cultural dimension of the child soldiers coalition is also a complex one. As showed when talking about the role of the media informing about child soldiers, children can be considered as victims, but also as perpetrators. Moreover, many governments still think that they may end up using under 18 year old people in armed conflicts. On another front, the issue is particularly difficult with regards to non-state armed groups with limited resources,

different cultural backgrounds and difficulties to be influenced by using traditional strategies that work with governments. Thus, the work of international public opinion and also institutions, such as the international criminal courts, needs to be clear about punishments and rewards in order to convince recruiters about the comparative advantages of not using children in armed conflicts. In conclusion, if the CSC was created in a situation where it had to explain the public opinion the fact that under-18s were recruited in many parts of the world (first phase); then the treaty helped to stigmatise this problem, but only to a certain point and in this sense, much remains to be done in the current third phase of the campaign.

7.3.5. Assessment of the independent variables

If table 7.1 presented the results of the different campaigns from the perspective of the dependent variable (success versus failure), table 7.2 summarizes the results from the point of view of the main independent variables of the research. Thus, it assesses each of the independent variables that were outlined in chapter 1 (see figure 1.5), by looking at their presence or absence in every phase of the studied campaigns. In a subsequent effort (see section 7.5 of the chapter), table 7.3 will go beyond these findings to present and ideal type of international campaign.

Concerning strategies, lobbying has been more frequently used than protest on these campaigns and it is arguably more effective, although an adequate combination of both in different moments and in different contexts has been identified as particularly valuable. Supportive mass media coverage has facilitated transnational collective action, but it has not been a sufficient condition for success.

Table 7.2 Assessment of the independent variables for each campaign in each phase⁴

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>ICBL (landmines)</i>			<i>IANSA/Control Arms</i>		<i>CMC (clus. munitions)</i>		<i>CSC (child soldiers)</i>		
Phases	I	II	III	I	II	I	II	I	II	III
STRATEGY DIMENSIONS										
Spectacular and/or large-scale protest events	Some	Some	No	Some	Some	No	Some	No	Some	Some
Supportive mass media coverage	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Institutional actions, e.g. lobbying	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Concrete, feasible and resonant message	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Human security framing	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ORGANIZAT. DIMENSIONS										
Formalization and professionalization	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

⁴ In table 7.2 ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ summarises nominal information, which is detailed in the text. These two values are simplifications on purpose in order to facilitate the comparative task. Thus, for example ‘no’ presence of supportive mass media coverage in the first phase of the landmine process does not mean that there was no piece of news in that period, but that it did not reach a significant level, which did happen in other cases, for example, in the second phase of the ICBL with the coverage of Princess Diana’s trips to the field. Moreover, the same can be said of the other variables, most of which need to be understood as ‘extensive use of’ (in the case of strategies) or ‘high level of’ (in the case of resources) the actual variable.

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>ICBL (landmines)</i>			<i>IANSA/Control Arms</i>		<i>CMC (clus. munitions)</i>		<i>CSC (child soldiers)</i>		
Phases	I	II	III	I	II	I	II	I	II	III
Research and expertise	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Material resources / Financing	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Territorial decentralization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Charismatic, inspirational leadership	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES										
Work within a multilevel POS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Allies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contingent factors	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Flexible and participatory rules of the game	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Defining the goal into concrete and feasible messages is a necessary condition and it seems most of current campaigns have learnt it from the landmines case. Transnational activists have always tried to frame disarmament issues in terms of humanitarian crisis. These frames have been more successful when they have been used to bridge different positions, including those based on hard security concerns (most diplomats) and those representing the workers in the field (most activists). When possible, TCs have also tried to develop a discourse which resonated with existing legal bodies, such as international humanitarian law.

With regards to the variables related to resources and organization, generally speaking it can be said that even if a minimum of material resources was necessary to begin transnational collective action, there is not a correlation between high levels of financial resources and success at the policy level. The case of IANSA and its 1 million pounds sterling is illustrative in this sense, as it was probably the wealthiest network and arguably the one which has achieved the lowest policy effects: the failure at the 2006 Review Conference.

On another front, despite neither formalization nor professionalization seem to be necessary conditions for success (the ICBL was a very loose network of mostly volunteers until it achieved the landmines treaty and the Nobel Peace prize), there has been the understanding within activists' circles that these two factors (formalisation and professionalisation) help, particularly after the signature of the treaty, when they have to deal with its implementation. Recent debates within the coalitions are questioning this aspect, especially in IANSA, where some activists consider that there has been an excessive formalization of the network by overemphasising a centralised decision-making structure and the consequent weakening of its relationships with the local communities in the field. The issue of leadership is a complex one. Thus, the existence of a charismatic leader helps (for example, the ICBL), but it is not a necessary condition as such. A more sophisticated collective leadership within communities of practice has been instead identified as more frequent in the cases

under study. Finally, about the territorial distribution, the constitution of national chapters of the coalition has always taken place, although not always in the same phase. Some have done it mainly before signing the treaty to facilitate the lobbying of domestic governments, whereas others started at the international level and it has been mostly in the phase of the implementation of the treaty when they have strengthened the links with the affected communities (for example, the child soldiers' coalition).

Finally, contextual variables at different levels have been crucial for the development of the processes. The fact of taking advantage of the political opportunities within the UN, plus at the regional settings and within every national context has allowed the activists to increase its possibilities of success. Partnerships with certain countries, mainly middle and small powers, have been a necessary condition for most of the positive outcomes. In addition, in the case where the lowest impact was identified (the UN process on small arms and light weapons) the coalition had to face a group of opponents (i.e. the so-called gun lobby). This suggests that a positive configuration of the activists' friends and foes is essential for their success. On another front, contingent factors are present in all cases.⁵ When activists have managed to see them as an opportunity for mobilization such events have catalysed transnational collective action, mostly through the use of the media. Thus, the facilitating condition here would be the combination of 'contingent factor' + 'supportive mass media coverage'. The last factor within the contextual variables is arguably the most important one. On the whole, there are certain innovative rules of the game that facilitate activists' political influence, whereas in traditional forums the search for unanimity and the lack of access reduce it (see section 7.6 of this chapter).

Therefore, in the successful cases, especially at the second phase, namely in the actual negotiation of the treaty, there was an

⁵ Only in the case of landmines in the third phase contingent factors are absent, as the use and trade of landmines by governments have been drastically reduced (see Landmine Monitor 2005).

emphasis on lobbying over protest actions, a human security frame translated into a concrete message, an understanding of the context as a multilevel POS (including the capabilities of the activists' allies) and a negotiation setting based on participatory and flexible rules of the game. Moreover, material resources, including rigorous and extensive research, a charismatic leader and the combination of contingent factors and supportive media coverage have all been features that have facilitated coalitions' political influence.

Apart from the comparison across cases, the temporal perspective helps to specify the effect of each variable in each phase. There seems to be an evolution from the first phase in which a coalition is created, normally without many resources, clear message or substantive and worldwide research supporting it towards a third phase in which successful coalitions are bigger, more formalized, more institutionalised and in which, on the whole, the different variables of the 'organisational form' have gained relevance (see also table 7.3).

Next section confronts these results with existing literature on transnational collective action, mostly from other fields, such as campaigns on labour, finance or environmental issues.

7.4. Confronting these results with the literature

The thesis has confirmed several of the findings by Bandy and Smith (2005).⁶ It has added empirical evidence to four types of

⁶ According to these authors, the conditions that enable transnational coalitions are: the presence of IGOs or INGOs that facilitate network development, such as the UN; the presence of well-organised national movements; the presence of well-organized foreign movement allies; many pre-existing similarities among movements of different nations; the capacity for regular communication between national movements; government or corporate institutions that are open to change; economic conditions conducive to movement resource building; the absence of

action that Bandy and Smith identified as facilitating transnational collective action and of which this research agrees that they are directly linked to the success of coalitions. The first one is the idea that leadership in coalitions need to be based on skilled movement brokers. Brokerage may be defined as the “linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 26). Coalitions could not survive without each organisations’ members taking some responsibility for brokering bonds of solidarity. As Bandy and Smith observed, brokers promote dialogue among members, and thus mutual learning, trust, and the sharing of resources. By having multiple identities, those brokers can help members of different communities to trust and identify more strongly with one another and facilitate coalition building. In this research, several examples have been provided of this kind of leadership as brokerage, particularly developed by certain individuals based on Geneva and belonging to the same or interrelated communities of practice.

A second type of action that facilitates transnational collective action that was identified by Bandy and Smith and that has been confirmed by the thesis is the promotion of international forums, the public spheres within which transnational civil society may be built. Practically these forums are conferences, workshops, activist exchanges or protest events. In these spaces, brokers are able, not only to shape the bargaining process by lobbying diplomats, but also to promote all aspects of coalition building. Thus, they articulate international norms and allow movements to share resources, frames and aims. These add human faces to what otherwise may only be abstracted differences among organisations that are not geographically close, allowing greater interpersonal trust and intercultural education than only e-mail-based relationships.

international political conflict such as war on terrorism; and mass public dissent.

The third one is the development of a flexible organisational culture that accommodates members' autonomy and diversity, while nonetheless uniting them around common goals. That was already found by Bandy and Smith as a necessary condition to create strong coalitions.

Fourth, coalitions were found to be sustainable when they could convince members that there was reasonable progress toward common goals. Activists and diplomats need to feel this momentum or motivational frame; in other words, that this is historical moment in which they are therefore "making history" and achieving change. When coalitions have achieved (or progressed toward) stated goals, members have regarded continuing participation as legitimate and worthwhile. This is what happened in the landmine case. Conversely, when coalitions have been unable to achieve progress, internal conflict can emerge among members who doubt the effectiveness of its leaders, its organisational form, and its goals. To a certain extent, this has happened in IANSA.

As it will be seen in section 7.6 of the chapter, some conflicts have been identified within transnational coalitions. Some of them were already suggested by Bandy and Smith (2005), including the fact that richer organisations inside the networks can inadvertently dominate coalitions, as they have greater access to communication technologies, travel funds and a staff more familiar with organisational forms and practices that have developed in the North. The consequence of that is a difficulty to avoid replicating global inequalities within activists' coalitions. Second, organisational conflicts include those between larger professionalised organisations and those smaller and more locally based. In the end, successful coalitions need to find a way to both demands, effective coordination and decentralised participation. Third, conflicts over goals and strategies usually arise, as tactics that are readily accessible to one part of a coalition may produce results that counter the interest of another. The Child Soldiers Coalition making public reports made by organizations that work

in the field to protect the work of such local activists is an example of a way of overcoming this potential problem.

Two other recent works have aimed to highlight transnational coalitions' outcomes through the technique of process tracing. First, Silva's (2008) campaigns deal with trade, labour and finance through international conferences of civil society organisations and grassroots meetings. In a similar way to this research, the author interprets the need for conferences and grass-roots as helping internal cohesion and exchange that is ascertained in networking strategy. Silva also finds as particularly effective the combination between the need to learn about global issues in order to build up the substantial knowledge essential for lobbying, and the presence of the traditional character of unconventional protest social movements display. In the end, also in the field of trade, labour and finance, different strategies seem to cohabitate at the transnational level and are present in the coalitions' repertoires of actions. However, and similar to what happens in the human security area, extensive forms of lobbying, would have had more "causal relevance" than the protest action and the construction and existence of an epistemic like community (Silva 2008: 290). Concerning the organisational form, Silva's network analysis conclude that networks show generally a lower degree of segmentation in cases of impact, emphasising as well the role of brokerage performed by crucial individual and organisations.

Second, Parks (2009) has studied the impacts of campaigns carried out by coalitions of social movement organisations in the transnational arena of the EU, including two campaigns concerned with environmental / public health policy and two concerned with social policy. These processes leading to access, agenda or policy outcomes provide the basis for some conclusions on the nature of campaigning in the EU. The author finds that elite allies are important in achieving outcomes by the campaigns, as are solid, previously agreed shared frames between organizations within the coalitions. Yet, Parks' campaigns within the EU show that the EU is not an arena where conventional tactics (such as lobbying) are always enough – indeed the ability to campaign effectively at

multiple levels (a multilevel political opportunity structure) using appropriate tactics is identified also here as a major factor in such campaigns that saw positive effects.

The ideas that alliances do matter is not a new finding given the stress already put on the concept of alliances by social movement scholars in their case studies on the national level (Shumaker 1975, Gamson 1991, Kriesi et al. 1995). Its relevance at the transnational level has also been confirmed by international relations researches (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998, Florini 2000). However, other insights emerge from the thesis' findings. Within the realist approach in the field of international relations, alliances are thought of mainly in reference to the most powerful states since these ones are believed to be able to affect outcomes in world policymaking. According to this analysis, coalitions are more likely to succeed when they succeed in changing the preferences of the most powerful states (Krasner 1993). This research on the human security campaigns confirms what other research has already shown, i.e. that transnational coalitions are able to have an impact despite the opposition of powerful states. Even if some states, in accordance with the realist approach's predictions, are indeed capable of influencing the course of international events, coalitions and partnerships between less powerful states often prove equally politically effective.

The crucial role that expertise plays for transnational activists is well supported in the literature (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Florini 2000, Arts et al. 2001, Risse 2002, Passy 2005, Silva 2008). In most cases, scholars base this expertise on the concept of epistemic community (Haas 1990 and 1992). For instance, in Keck and Sikkink's work (1998), the epistemic community refers to that community of academic figures and institutional experts sympathetic to social movements' ideas who reframe an issue, which is then at a later stage politicized by the coalitions. A difference between the thesis' findings and the findings in the literature has to do with the concept of community of practice. As we will see in section 7.6 of the chapter, a community of practice is much more than an epistemic community.

A point that recurs within the literature on transnational collective action concerns the specific nature of global issues. Some scholars have argued that activists' impact is determined by the nature of the specific issues treated (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 203-206). Drawing on specific cases of human rights protest and environmentalism, they argue that these issues are extremely susceptible to activists' influence since they are 'soft' issues, as opposed to 'hard' issues, such as those in the field of economic and finance, or security. However, even in such hard issues literature on transnational coalitions contain a variety of cases in which activists equally had an impact on other issues. Thus, Silva (2008) found successes in the field of economic and finance. And this dissertation has found successes even in the field of international security.

That said, there are indeed some topics that more than others facilitate coalitions' actions. Certain issues, such as certain human rights violations, carry an intrinsic moral force due to the atrocity of the practices linked to them. That would explain the sustained efforts by coalitions here analysed to reframe security issues into human rights' ones. Arguably, the best illustration of this fact is the concept of human security, which aims at bridging the gap between both sectors, human rights and international security.

7.5. The evolution of an ideal type of international campaign

"NGOs cannot change the world on their own. They can identify problems and what needs to be done about them. Governments are the ones who must make the changes. They are the ones who have the power to change laws, create new laws, and ensure that they are implemented" Rebecca Peters (2005: 519)

Although the inexhaustible complexity of the issues makes isolating particular variables responsible for success difficult, it is possible to delineate pathways to the formation of a successful international coalition. Table 7.3 presents the evolution of an ideal type of transnational campaign towards success from the point of

view of the main independent variables of the research. Again, the temporal perspective of a process that develops through different phases will be used to see the changes that take place since the coalition is created until the treaty is signed and even beyond the treaty.

Table 7.3 The evolution of an ideal type of international campaign

	<i>Before the treaty</i>	<i>Negotiating the treaty</i>	<i>After the treaty</i>
Objectives	Agenda-setting Access and procedures	Achieving a (good) treaty (Keeping) Access	Implementation Cultural dimension
Repertoire of actions	Protest	Lobbying	Lower profile: work concentrated in the field
Organizational form	Loose organization Geographically diverse	International Committee National partners	Decentralisation Professionalisation
Framing	Humanitarian crisis	“The treaty is the solution” “Now we can do it”	“This is a success, but...”
Resources	Limited	Endogenous: actors negotiate about resources	More resources
MPOS	National / International	International / National	National
Alliances	Partnership NGO–States	States are the main players	NGOs are the main players
Formalisation of the process	Official channels: UN based	Co-habitation: UN / alternative process	Path-Dependence

First, objectives modify through the whole process. With the double aim of setting the issue into the agenda and campaigning for a binding global treaty, a third parallel aspect is working on access and procedures. Achieving access to the negotiating room is crucial for shaping the result of the negotiations. As Rebecca Peters, director of IANSA, makes clear “a private meeting with a minister can yield more results than copious national press coverage” (Peters 2005: 521).⁷

⁷ The complete sentence gives a feeling of the need of complement all tactics and resources available to the activists: “a private meeting with

In the second phase the coalition focuses on facilitating the agreement and, when possible, making a good treaty out of it. After the signature and ratification, the objective turns into its implementation and, at a long term, also achieving the stigmatization of the weapon. Table 7.3 above sums up these issues and helps to refine figure 7.1 through the introduction of time.

Regarding the repertoire of actions and the strategic choices by the coalition, it seems that the protest activities (boycotts, petitions, sit-ins, public demonstrations) are more used during the first phase, when spectacular actions are needed to reach the attention of the media, the international public opinion and the political agenda. On the contrary, once the negotiating process starts, lobbying strategies by NGO experts to the official ambassadors take priority and, depending on the procedures of the process, they can even participate at the negotiations, either in the capitals or in New York and Geneva. In the third phase, coalitions oriented to implementation have a lower profile. However, they still use other strategies, such as naming and shaming (use international public opinion to make opponent governments publicly ashamed of their positions) in order to make reluctant countries sign or ratify the treaty.

Similarly, the framing is crucial for each campaign. In all of the cases analysed, the issue comes up in the agenda as a humanitarian crisis. The idea of human security provides a coherent intellectual framework for framing issues and negotiating on substance in these contexts, enabling shared analysis between donor and affected countries to develop and consequently generate money and resources (Borrie 2005: 24). NGOs are seen as among the experts in the field, having usually unique, original and updated data about the issues at stake. Moreover, during the

a minister can yield more results than copious national press coverage, although of course the press coverage might have helped to get the meeting with the minister in the first place” (Peters 2005: 521). This quote shows the need to study each dimensions of the NGOs success separately, but taking into consideration all of them.

negotiations the delegates need to be convinced they are in the position to take advantage of the only possible chance to give a solution to a global problem (motivational frame). In any case, there will always be a similar assessment of the treaty by the social movement activists: “This has been a (civil society) success, but much remains to be done”, mainly in terms of universalizing and implementing the treaty in order to fulfil the ultimate goal of the activists; a world without child soldiers, landmines or cluster munitions.

Financial resources at the beginning are limited by definition. As the campaign gains popularity and allies, it will have more resources. Given that some of the NGOs will participate in the tasks of implementing the treaty, in the negotiating phase, resources are somehow endogenous. In other words, governments also discuss how much they are going to spend on the issue in the future. This fact affects the capacities of the coalitions, which normally increment their resources in the third phase.

In general, one of the main resources for the activists is updated information, which gives them the ability to produce rigorous and complete pieces of research on the field.⁸ Moreover, coalitions’ reports tend to be more rigorous and neutral than those made by UN agencies, because they do not have to face the political pressures and limitations of the international institutions.

One of the shared characteristics at the beginnings of these coalitions is the fact that their organisational level is very low. Sometimes there is not even a person in charge of the whole network, although normally two different actors within the coalition can be identified: (a) an international committee in charge of the coordination of all the organization and the high-level lobbying; and (b) the NGOs and grassroots groups at the

⁸ For example, the first Global Report on Child Soldiers achieved significant publicity. As was made clear in chapter 6, for the first time the situation in all countries was presented and a first figure was made public: 300.000 children, in that moment, that were used by armed groups. This figure helped to frame the issue in the sense of a humanitarian crisis, together with personal stories that humanised it.

local and national level. As the network grows and the process becomes more complex (especially during the phase leading to the signature of the treaty and beyond), the network tends to professionalize and decentralize, to be able to deal with the new resources. Section 7.6.3 of the chapter will discuss this issue.

Such organisational form needs to deal with conflictive interests among the actors. That means internal tensions within the TCs, between those coming from the First World and those coming from the Third World, between the donor countries and the affected countries or the countries that are part of an armed conflict. This situation is visible in other topics, such as environmentalism and the climate change, where developing countries claim for their right to development against some rich countries who want a sustainable world.

Regarding the different levels of the political opportunity structure, there is a first duality national/international: campaigners acting from the global perspective of a needed treaty and, at the same time, pressuring the national authorities to participate in the process. Once the negotiations start, the different members of the coalition specialise into different profiles, spending some resources in shaping the content of the text, but also reaching individual delegates through their co-national activists. After the treaty, the international structure is still present in every stage of the revision and verification process of the implementation of the text. However, the NGOs work more at a national level, monitoring compliance and reporting bad practices, even to international courts of justice. Other levels, such as the local and the regional, can have at a certain times their relevance through mechanisms of scale shift. For example, local actions can precede and prepare a national success. Similarly, a success in a whole region can help the international process and also affect reluctant national contexts in that region to modify their position.

When activists achieved higher levels of success, these processes were characterized by an effective partnership between NGOs and some states (usually organised in a group of like-minded middle and small states) and, to a certain extent, also other

actors, such as research centres, churches, trade unions and others. This can be seen even as a necessary condition to have a real bargaining process. Once the negotiations start, states become the main players, those who can agree or disagree on each of the points, those who can vote and those who can decide. However, activists will remain there in a secondary role, ensuring that states will not cut nor veto the text. Once the treaty is signed, the states' role focus on financing NGOs (and UN agencies) activities (for example, demobilisation and reintegration of former child soldiers, activities of cleaning mined zones or recollection of small arms), and thus, in practical terms, NGOs take again the lead.

The relevance that transnational activists give to research and production of new scientific knowledge is very high in all the cases, as they know that a rigorous report on a human security issue is very difficult to face by the representatives of states. The CSC has already produced three global reports of the role of the children in armed conflict. The ICBL has provided unique information about human costs and about military utility of antipersonnel mines, and also the yearly Landmine Monitor, which is widely used by the governments and has become a milestone for international humanitarian law on the NGO role on compliance. The real effectiveness of the IANSA research is still unknown, but so far, they have produced a huge amount of data on the human costs of this kind of weapon. The CMC has also produced seminal research, somehow benefitting from the news coverage of the crisis in Southern Lebanon. Whereas the ICBL was able to take advantage of the famous people's coverage, such as Princess Diana, other campaigns have not achieved it. Moreover, while the CSC effectively framed their claims as a necessary part of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, the others had not previous legislation so directly related with their claims and so, new treaties were envisioned.

Finally, the set of rules and procedures of the whole process is one of the determinants of the success of these campaigns. In brief, processes characterised by flexible rules allowing decision-making by majority voting and participatory procedures that

include the activists as partners will be more permeable to the NGO influence, strengthening thus the partnership with the group of like-minded states. Coalitions will normally try first the established official channels through international institutions, such as the UN. In a situation where there is no progress and the activists already have important allies in the governmental side, then a new and alternative process will be discussed and could eventually take place, running parallel to the official one. The success of this new process will shape the way the issue will be dealt with in the future. This variable in the third phase will thus be dependent on the results of the second one. If the alternative process is successful, it will affect the official one, and the new set of flexible and participatory rules will be dominant even after the treaty is signed.

As shown in the empirical chapters, these findings underline the relevance and implications of framing issues, organizational features, leadership and the 'rules of the game' for these and other similar transnational civil society initiatives. However, to a certain extent each case is unique and context-dependent. Thus, it is not possible to totally predict the success of new campaigns. Each new process will be shaped by the procedures agreed in the first phase, the resources that will be negotiated in the second one and the path-dependence of the formalization of the process, particularly in the third phase. Moreover, events related to the moment that are not under the activists' control, such as governmental changes, terrorist attacks or economic crisis will potentially play a role, making more difficult the predictability of the final result. Yet, every new campaign will develop around the three phases identified and will be affected by the variables examined in this research.

7.6. Final thoughts

7.6.1. The concept of success revisited

The analysis of these initiatives of disarmament by the civil society allows to reflect on the concept of success applied to the new diplomacy. First, and assuming that all of them are at the same time successes and failures (all achieve something, but not everything what they aimed at), it could be affirmed in hypothetical terms that without the pressure of the ONGs, these disarmament and human rights treaties would have not taken place. Or, at least, they would not have had place with the same depth and speed. Therefore, a certain level of success is undeniable. In other words, civil society organisations can be politically influent under a set of conditions. They include flexible rules of the game and a solid and credible leadership by allied countries willing to spend resources and organisation in an issue that has humanitarian effects. Moreover, the most effective coalitions know how to use better the different levels and contexts favourable to collective action, thus how to combine its resources (research, experience, grass-roots membership and the media), strategies (protest and political pressure, but also communicative processes, such as framing the problem and shaming the irresponsible governments), a flexible organization and the capacities of their international allies. Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge the existence in certain moments of events that have facilitated their work. This research has identified some examples, including the changes of government in France and England during the landmines process or the massive launch of cluster bombs by Israel during the crisis of the Lebanon in the summer of 2006.

However, the ultimate goal of the peace and human rights movement is to improve the situation in the field. From the point of view of the NGO, success means the implementation of the treaties. The problem in this sense is that it is difficult to affirm if the situation is better now than before the campaign was carried

out. For example, in the case of the human rights, there is very concrete and sophisticated information, but it is complicated to compare situations (for example, those related with different kinds of torture).⁹ Therefore, it is difficult at a global level to be able to say that due to such campaigns, the world is now better than twenty years ago, even though it can be argued that without them the current situation would be worse. From an analytical point of view, in order to measure if a campaign has been effective, the key point does not necessarily lie on describing certain parameters depending on the final goal (for example, that there are no more child soldiers in the world), but on much more concrete questions, like the introduction of a new international instrument that allows to improve the legal work on this subject.

Another reflection on the success/failure dimension has to do with the temporary assessment of the effects of a campaign, often difficult to interpret. For example, the ICBL initially expected to obtain a complete ban on landmines in the Review Conference of the CCW in 1995. Even though the ban was not achieved, from there a group of states came out with the will of leading a new process that finally was very effective. Thus, this review conference can be understood as a failure, but at the same time as a necessary step towards the mine ban treaty.

Has this trend been reproduced in other campaigns? In the CMC case, a very similar process took place after the failure of a new CCW review conference ten years later, that became the Oslo Process. But even the SALW process and the future Arms Trade Treaty can be interpreted from this perspective. The positive result of the resolution approved at the end of 2006 in the ONU in favour of the ATT is related, at least partially, to the previous failure in the review conference of the Program of Action on SALW in the

⁹ There are some techniques to assess human rights violations, similar to those used by health-care companies to assess injuries because of accidents. However, the interviewees consulted were not very convinced by their accuracy and usefulness and they still believe that it is arguably an impossible task to do.

summer 2006. Such findings suggest that it is necessary to sophisticate the theoretical concepts in this field.

Given that the conception of success for the activists is related with international implementation, the fact that a treaty is achieved does not necessarily mean the end of the campaign, but it is often transformed, creating new goals and modifying its structure. The case of the ICBL and its renewed interest in the subject of the cluster munitions, the enlargement of the contents of the treaty to the non-state armed actors and the continued efforts to produce an instrument for the compliance of the treaty is a good example of this idea.

7.6.2. The need for synergies and (intra and) inter-coalition cooperation

The thesis has shown the relevance of alliances among different organizations with common objectives and very different dynamics. For example, in the case of child soldiers, some of the main members of the international coalition are development organizations, which, because of their presence on the field, do not have the facility neither the interest to make public some data that could put in danger their activities on some countries. The transnational coalition, coordinated partially by human rights organisations, carries out a crucial role in order to bring this information to the public opinion.

However, beyond the collaboration among NGOs from different sectors inside a single coalition, a topic not well developed yet refers to the potential for synergies among different networks on interrelated topics. In other words, an effective coordination between international campaigns with common objectives is missing. For instance, regular exchanges of information, participation in acts together or exchange of effective strategies. In order to do so, it would be necessary to overcome defensive attitudes and distrust. Several examples have been mentioned in this research, which should be understood as models

of good practices. Also, some potential spaces of collaboration have been identified.

People that have had positions of responsibilities in the campaigns analysed admit that the collaboration among the different networks would have positive effects in different fields. A unique effort to facilitate cooperation among the representatives of these campaigns took place in 2002. Kate Buchanan (from the Center for the Humanitarian Dialogue), Don Huberts (author of a very influent study about the landmines campaign and its potential, see Huberts 2000) and David Atwood (from the Quakers) organised a three-day meeting in Geneva among the leaders of ICBL, CSC, IANSA, the NGO network for the international criminal court and the NGOs of the Kimberley Process on the diamond conflicts.¹⁰ Even that the organisers observed then an excess of mistrust and suspicion among the participants, one of the main consequence of that meetings was reflected in the so-called Kimberley Process. In fact, “most of the work on the diamonds conflict came up from that meeting” (interview n. 49).

This kind of cooperation is crucial when having dialogues with diplomats. And this is so because diplomats very often participate in different negotiations of the same field, as disarmament. Concrete effects of this idea were appreciated in the negotiations on the regulation of cluster munitions. Thus, in the Oslo Conference in February 2007, the collaboration of NGOs that normally work in other fields, such as small arms, human rights or development, was very fruitful to shape the position of some governments, including Britain. As explained in chapter 5, the presence of Oxfam, Amnesty International and UNIDIR members in Oslo allowed reminding Britain that they were having in Oslo a position totally opposed to the one they had maintained weeks before in New York regarding the UN resolution in favour of the future arms trade treaty.

¹⁰ See Atwood (2002 and 2006).

In addition, discourses and framings by the governments are changing. Many of them, and of the UN agencies, are beginning to understand that many of these issues are part of the same kind of problems. At the same time, some organizations in the field try to expand their initial objectives to be able to be financed by the international donors. Indeed, many of the national sections of the ICBL are also members of IANSA and some of them are also part of the CMC and of the CSC, particularly in the affected countries. Thus, the same people on the field have carried out lobbying tasks in several issues in which internationally there is no mechanism of coordination among them.

Nationally, this is easier to observe than internationally. For example, in Spain a good example were the campaigns for transparency in arms trade and the one on landmines, both taking place at the same time and by the same organisations. This fact allowed them to join efforts and reduce costs with very positive results.¹¹

Moreover, a treaty about a concrete issue can have implications in other issues, by facilitating the accountability of the governments and this can be monitored transversally among the campaigns. In other words, the fact of mentioning a treaty that has been signed and ratified facilitates the work of lobby and campaigning in other countries. In this sense, the relationship between the issue of child soldiers and arms trade can be highlighted. One of the positive effects of the fact that a country signs the Optional Protocol against the use of child soldiers is that, if this country does not implement the treaty, activists have a reason to lobby other countries so that they do not trade weapons with that country: “you should not sell small arms to country x,

¹¹ “The fact that the NGOS of the transparency campaign participated as well on the landmines campaign created some situations of confusion. Yet, many of the political and parliamentary negotiations were done at the same time and by the same individuals. That means that in whatever negotiation on transparency we took advantage to move the landmines issue forward, etc. Results were good and that allowed to move both issues forward very quickly” (Fisas, 1998: 18-19).

because country x has signed the child soldiers treaty and it is not implementing it; these weapons could end up in the hands of child soldiers". Even if country x has not signed the treaty, the government can also be lobbied, but not as strongly. The corollary of this idea is the following: if the success of a campaign has positive effects in other campaigns of the same sector, strategies should be designed with the aim of facilitating cooperation among networks with related objectives. The recent decision of the organisation Geneva Call to expand their work with non-state armed actors to include commitments of refuse to use child soldiers in the declarations signed by non-state armed actors on landmines represent a model of good practices that should be more deeply studied. Section 7.6.5 and appendix II will further elaborate on this.

Finally, the relationships between these networks and global movements are in this field less close and intense than in other fields, such as labour, environment or social justice. Thus, specific organisations dealing with the 'global justice movement' are not playing here a protagonist role. However, it has to be noted that crucial organisations that are present in this network, such as Oxfam or Amnesty, are also members of other networks. For that reason, a dialogue can eventually take place and a potential for further collaboration among different networks has been identified. The huge demonstrations against the war in Iraq (15 February 2003) can only be understood as the fruitful cooperation between the global justice movement and the peace movement, which includes the campaigns here analysed.

7.6.3. A trade-off between participatory procedures and outcomes?

One of the frequent findings in processes and campaigns such as those studied in this research is the existence of trade-offs, which can create controversies. Among them and to a certain extent counter-intuitive, it can be argued that it might exist a trade-

off between democratic (i.e. participatory) procedures and outcomes, particularly in the UN context. Both the relationship between democracy and social movements and the relationship between the UN and democracy is characterised by controversies. Also, democratic claims, democratic principles and democratic procedures all play a role in negotiation processes to a different extent democratic.¹² In brief, the idea is that sometimes the most democratic systems are socially ineffective and lead to bad results for the society. In these contexts the most democratic results are not always related to the most democratic processes. With the empirical help of the recent international processes of disarmament negotiations here analysed it is possible to better reflect upon this idea. Therefore, the thesis suggests that both negotiators and activists would gain by being more open-minded to deal with new procedures in order to reach efficient results (i.e. overcoming certain path-dependence practices), such as new international treaties banning inhumane weapons.

A first controversial issue concerns representation. All actors in these processes claim to be representative. NGO networks would be representative of the peoples, through the humanitarian values and the general interests, whereas states and governments would represent the citizens through their votes received. At a global scale, the legitimacy of the UN as the most democratic institution in the world society is contested by those who consider that this legitimacy lies in other spaces, such as in the global social forums. There are no black and white assessments in this field and so several perspectives should be taken into account to understand each other's interests and claims, such as UN supporters versus

¹² This section has an exploratory nature. With this purpose, democracy can be understood as the system that allows decision-making by as many people as possible in transparent and open procedures. Second, democratic outcomes can be intuitively understood as those that will be ultimately beneficial for the common good. These definitions are not extremely precise on purpose, but the idea is however clear and the image of the trade-off visual enough to allow a promising debate on this field.

global social forums supporters. Indeed, inside the coalitions analysed different perspectives coexist and there is a frequent debate on the use of the UN channels to move issues forward or, on the contrary, to opt for new processes outside that multinational institution.

Second, these are networks made up by hundreds of organizations, but their activities are the consequence of transnational relationships of a few group of activists and diplomats. As seen in the empirical chapters, this *community of practice*¹³ (Borrie 2005) interacts together, sharing spaces and practices, in certain initiatives, in which civil society can take the lead in the international political process.¹⁴ Thus, there is a sector of activists who usually work together with the diplomats, in

¹³ The community of practice approach, as developed by Etienne Wenger is also used in other fields. Wenger and Smith (2000) stress in a summarising article in the Harvard Business Review, that the approach is meanwhile used globally in the private and public sectors, and give examples as diverse as Hewlett Packard, the World Bank and the US Department of Defence.

¹⁴ The core idea is that organisations cannot be only projected as formal structures and units, but also as informal ones. Communities of practice are “groups of people informally bound together by shared expertise and passion for a joint enterprise” (Wenger and Smith 2000: 139). They can “drive strategy, generate new lines of business, solve problems, promote the spread of best practices, develop people’s professional skills, and help companies to recruit and retain talent” (Wenger and Smith 2000: 140). They provide infrastructure (electronic platforms or meeting rooms) and resources (off-time for participation in communities, or money for organizing meeting and inviting speakers) to their members. They can be created by identifying informal communities and encouraging them to engage in a strengthened dialogue. In essence, the idea of communities of practice is to enable dialogue and communication between dispersed members of organizations working on similar issues, which have the independency to organize themselves and their agenda. As Wenger (1999) highlighted, communities develop rituals, common language codes, protect their boundaries and naturalize or black box object, concepts and issues.

places such as New York and Geneva (the two places where these UN agreements are negotiated). They are normally experts on the issue and share time, experiences and practices with some diplomats. Occasionally, the same individual is part of an NGO who lobby the diplomats and two years later is working for his government on this issue and two years later is representing UNICEF or another UN agency in this topic. These individuals forming the community of practice are the ones who in the end carry out most of the real negotiations in the bargaining process. This community is composed of a transnational elite of experts because their members need to have proved expertise on the issues at stake. Yet, the problem may arise when insider/outsider dynamics develop preventing alternate individuals to be part of that group.

This could contradict the essential grassroots aspect of the networks. To what extent is the concept of the community of practice participatory or democratic? Are we witnessing here a clash between elite (i.e. expert) democracy and direct democracy? Those supporters of the concept would answer that communities of practice are the only way things can work in the complex international world faced by transnational activists. They need to have many skills, to be an elite of professional, experts on law and other technical issues, English-speaking people, and so on, but perhaps a better and more democratic community of practice would be a community of practice more open and more transparent. Arguably, its members could disseminate their knowledge, being more generous in working on capacity building, for example, through workshops to form new people and facilitate hence rotation in these contexts, in order to overcome static groups of people made up by insiders and offering almost no possibility for outsiders to participate within this group.

Third, the thesis has shown in different negotiations the existence of controversial language issues. In processes where participants have a transnational nature and are geographically diverse, in most cases, the Anglo-Saxon domination is however clear. That means that, despite their attempt to prevent it (for

example, translating their main documents to reach a global audience), those pertaining to the community of practice come generally from First World English-speaking countries. At least two reasons explain this practice. First, there is a structural element. In other words, Northern organizations from the English-speaking countries tend to have more power and resources than the rest. Second, there is the strategic aspect. Given the nature of the bargaining processes at the international level, transnational coalitions need to adapt to a context (even in the UN), where English is still the most used language for crucial issues, particularly when time is limited.

To what extent is this non-democratic? Is there a trade-off between internal / external democracy and effectiveness concerning political influence? Internally (in NGO meetings), to what extent are less democratic/participatory/open networks (those who work only in English) more efficient than those who try to translate everything into several languages and to have non-native English-speakers among the members of their board and the international secretariat? Externally (in diplomats meetings), countries that want to block the negotiations in an international process have many tricks to do it, basically arguing that for democratic reasons each word should be agreed by everyone. One of the ways or tricks to block negotiations is to argue for language rights and to claim for translating everything. And this is so because translations consistently slow down the process and reduces dramatically the time existing for negotiations.

This research has shown that in some of the processes of new diplomacy (landmines, cluster munitions), there is almost no translation. Most of documents and discussions are in English. Things are faster than in traditional forums where everything is translated into several languages, and normally there are more positive results from the perspective of the general interest; an agreement is reached. But of course some people lack knowledge of English. A possible solution could be conducting most of the activities in English, ensuring at the same time that the crucial documents and debates are translated to those who need them.

Moreover, the results concerning rules of the game are somehow counterintuitive. Majority rule and consensus rule: which of the two is more democratic? Unanimity rule can be related to deliberation (people that reach a consensus after having deliberated) and deliberative democracy is believed to be a more developed system than representative democracy. Yet, in unanimity rule everybody needs to agree in order to reach the agreement. This is characteristic of old diplomacy forums, such as the UN Security Council. And so, big countries, such as the US, have in fact a veto power. To what extent are then majority procedures more democratic than unanimity rule? Sometimes the search for consensus ends up in a suboptimal result in terms of game theory (for example, the UN Security Council). In any case, the empirical result shown in this research is that in recent international negotiations processes there is a fight for the rules of the game that will guide the whole bargaining process. In the discussions, the group of states more supportive to the activists' claims push for the possibility of using majority voting procedures in case of reluctant states using a kind of veto power. For example, in the child soldiers' negotiations, it seems that the threat to use such procedures fostered the final consensus that allowed the participants to reach an agreement. Section 7.6.4 of the chapter will elaborate further on this idea.

Another debate regarding the democratic features of the processes under study tackles the advantages and disadvantages of negotiating inside or outside the United Nations. On the one hand, the UN is a way of dealing with international or global problems from a multilateral point of view. However, due to traditional policy of blocking international negotiations within the UN by big countries, activists usually face the dilemma of pushing for negotiate in a faster and more efficient process outside the UN (following the path of the landmines and the cluster bombs cases), even if that means risking the image and legitimacy of the UN for dealing with disarmament and international security issues. The thesis has shown such dilemmas in the cases analysed in the research. In the landmines case, a new alternative process was

created when the traditional disarmament forum collapsed. The same happened in the cluster munitions case. Both in the small arms process and in the arms trade treaty activists have suggested this idea, although so far no country have decided to take the lead on a new alternative process on these issues.

To sum up, being inside or outside the UN has advantages and disadvantages in democratic terms. To what extent are we facing a trade-off between the UN legitimacy to deal with human security issues and the effectiveness of negotiations which need to achieve positive outcomes in a faster way? The US, especially with the last Bush administration, expressed its conviction that international issues should be dealt with from a unilateral point of view, not multilaterally. Failures, such as the RevCon in the summer 2006, were used to emphasise this perspective. Some activists are thus wondering if they are not risking too much when negotiations take place outside the UN on a regular basis.

A normative reflection concern the idea that not “everything which is related to NGOs is good or is democratic.” Thus, despite all NGO networks claim to defend democratic principles, the practice of their articulation has also many shadows. For example, many non-transparent procedures regarding the decision-making within NGO networks have been observed. This research has provided some examples, particularly within the IANSA network in its last phase. Is it possible to do it differently? Probably part of the answer lies on the fact that local and national organizations have problems to adapt democracy to the transnational level. If it were indeed difficult to adapt democratic practices used at a local level, maybe activists would need to adapt also the concepts of democracy to the transnational one.

One of the main innovations of the communities of practice here analysed is that their members have realised the potential of concepts created in the humanitarian sector in the disarmament field as a broker between different political alignments and different conceptions of security. They have understood such dynamics and they try to move these ideas forward in a coalition with other diplomats and lobbyists of similar opinions. The

concept of community of practice implies that the interactions among their members (some of them having multiple identities) are dynamic and so they change with time. That means that the exploitation of these interactions could facilitate negotiation and multilateral commitments to achieve political aims. For example, diplomats with a humanitarian background are often part of several communities at the same time, with the possibility to play roles of brokers effectively. In the end, inherited structures, and working methods are as important as attitudes, style and personal opinions of the participants of such negotiations, which will shape the final success of the bargaining process through their iterative dynamics. Applied to the disarmament negotiations, there are some characteristics that are exclusive of the community of disarmament negotiators, because the legal and diplomatic precedent often guides them and the same officials often work on different negotiation processes.

Finally, the relationships between activists and states (and also with international institutions) are becoming more complex and sophisticated than some decades ago. The combination of lobbying activities and protest events is increasingly leading to a situation in which low profile activities (such as participating in governmental delegations to international meetings) is perceived as more effective than spectacular mass media oriented actions. Yet, vertical alliances between NGO officials and government representatives are usually based in personal contacts between a rather small group of activists and diplomats who share experiences and common understandings of global problems and disarmament processes, working together to develop effective and concrete proposals to solve them. The next section will tackle this issue, as it is believed to be one of the necessary and promising areas of further research in this field. By considering that both organisations and states are made up by concrete individuals our knowledge and understanding of the dynamics and the evolution of such processes can be improved.

7.6.4. The 'tyranny of consensus' revisited

In many parts of the thesis, and particularly in section 7.6.3 of this chapter, consensus, unanimity and the rest of the 'rules of the game' have been addressed. The point at stake frequently was the veto power or the 'tyranny of consensus' exercised by certain countries at different points of the processes. The alternative and creative procedures of the Ottawa Process in the landmines case and the Oslo Process in the cluster munitions one were specifically designed to overcome the blocking nature of the traditional forums of disarmament, especially the Convention of Certain Weapons. But also in the child soldiers' negotiation the threat of voting was crucial to a successful agreement among the players. And it was exactly the voting what allowed to move the arms trade treaty process forward in the UN.

The study of these campaigns show that there have been learning processes and that some individuals and some organizations (particularly some of those based in Geneva and participating in several of these processes) have understood that they need to work on these issues in order to achieve a successful outcome in the negotiations, also in those more difficult that take place in New York. The recent Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) Parties to the Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (July 2008) was a crucial test to this idea and they were quite successful in formulating facilitating negotiation conditions and an innovative idea of consensus. The update of this case (and also the ATT process) will help to illustrate a new proposal to achieve agreements.

In fact, the organisers of the third BMS had prepared carefully the rules and content of that meeting, following what some diplomats call "the Geneva style". In a similar way they are innovating forms and procedures regarding the Arms Trade Treaty process. In brief, the idea was to conduct informal meetings by the community of practice of arms control negotiators to move the process forward. Thus, on 25-27 July 2008, the Geneva Forum convened an informal meeting at Glen Cove Mansion on Long

Island, New York, to discuss the modalities of moving towards an effective Arms Trade Treaty (see www.geneva-forum.org). Twenty-one of the 28 States represented on the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) participated, together with 13 other interested States and a number of experts from NGOs, international organizations and the arms industry. The aim of the meeting was to facilitate interaction between GGE members and a wider group of States, along with civil society and industry experts. As stated by one of the organisers, Patrick McCarthy: “the outcome of the meeting suggests two things: first, that the differences of opinion that do still exist are not insurmountable and, second, that there would seem to be a strong preference for an ATT with a broad scope and relevant, clear parameters that include, at a minimum, considerations related to the respect of UN Security Council arms embargoes, international human rights law and international humanitarian law.”¹⁵

Regarding the third BMS and with the precedents of the failure to achieve any concrete result in the first two BMSs (2003 and 2005) and in the RevCon in 2006, two main reforms were proposed months before by the Chair: (a) to make international cooperation and assistance and national capacity-building the overarching theme; (b) and to focus the meeting on a small number of other issues, such as tracing, brokering, and stockpile management and surplus disposal. This time and different from the previous three events mentioned, states engaged in an in-depth, substantive interactive debate on the focus issues, avoiding the unfocused national statements, which had taken up so much valuable time at the previous meetings. Moreover, the substantive discussions had been prepared in advance of the meeting by States designated by the Chair - Egypt, Colombia, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland. Each consulted in advance of the meeting and prepared discussion papers. NGO experts introduced the discussions with overviews of the problems and the draft text for

¹⁵ See <http://disarmamentinsight.blogspot.com/2008/07/un-small-arms-process-back-on-track.html>

the outcome document based on the discussions was posted on the meeting's website by 9 am every morning.

All these innovations can be also interpreted as a consequence of the creative and alternative processes on landmines and cluster munitions, outside the UN. The idea of the organisers was to learn from those processes, but to keep the negotiations inside the UN, which adds in terms of legitimacy, resources, etc. having also the flexibility and effectiveness of the new diplomacy procedures. The meeting also broke a number of other diplomatic moulds, including a relevant role for music (an up-and-coming rapper from Sudan performed in front of delegates in the plenary hall a song on his experiences as a child soldier). In the end, however, Iran made public his opposition to the new procedures and to the outcome document. For this reason, the only option remaining to the Chair was to proceed to a vote - a first for the UN small arms process: in the end, Zimbabwe joined Iran in abstaining. All other participating 134 States voted in favour of adopting the outcome document as an integral part of the meeting's report.

Was there consensus on how to move forward with global efforts to curb the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (just Iran and Zimbabwe chose not to join it)? The answer obviously depends on our understanding of what agreement by consensus means. Consensus is not the same as unanimity, where absolutely everyone is in agreement. Rather, the concept of consensus encompasses the possibility of disagreement; a situation where almost all parties agree. Yet, and as observed by McCarthy, the fact is that this understanding of consensus has been largely overshadowed in disarmament diplomacy by an interpretation that equates consensus with unanimity, thereby granting *de facto* veto power to every party to a negotiation.¹⁶

One of the unintended consequences of the success of the Oslo Process is that this overly restrictive interpretation of consensus is now being reconsidered, as illustrated by the vote that took place

¹⁶ See <http://disarmamentinsight.blogspot.com/2008/07/un-small-arms-process-back-on-track.html>.

at the end of the third BMS on small arms. If this new way of working becomes more often applied to disarmament and arms control negotiations, more progress will probably take place, albeit with some states likely deciding to opt out.

Both the Oslo Process on cluster munitions and the Ottawa Process on anti-personnel mines showed a significant grouping of States losing patience with inadequate progress on humanitarian issues and deciding to go outside of the framework of the UN in order to achieve human security goals. The success of these processes has affected disarmament diplomats, who, feeling uncomfortable with having to move outside of UN structures to achieve results, would probably have preferred to achieve the same result in the UN. Therefore, it would seem that these experiences have made many countries more committed to making progress on disarmament and arms control within UN structures. Having been demonstrated that there are alternatives to traditional processes, if the UN wishes to remain relevant in disarmament and arms control negotiations, it will have to deliver results that demonstrably improve national and human security. A flexible and creative understanding of consensus is essential to achieve positive outcomes.

7.6.5. Further research

One could argue that the model examined in the thesis could be applied to other cases in the human security field, but also in other areas where a global agreement is negotiated and where there is a partnership between civil society organisations and a group of states willing to effectively lead the formal process. In this sense, the negotiation of the International Criminal Court seems to have followed a similar path (see Glasius 2002). Moreover, the shared post-Cold War geopolitical context of these cases should not be forgotten. In other words, in a geopolitical context with new roles for future superpowers, including Russia, India and, particularly, China, arguably, transnational campaigns

will have to adapt to the new situation and comparative research will have to take into account this factor.

When expanding the analysis, other cases for further research on transnational coalitions and international campaigns include the Fatal Transactions (diamonds' campaign) and the Kimberly process, the negotiations around the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women or the environmental campaigns leading to the Kyoto protocol and its follow-up process.

The example of Fatal Transactions can be illustrative of the possibilities of the inclusion of another case of the human security field in the analysis.¹⁷ Launched in October 1999 by four international organizations (Global Witness, Medico International, the Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, and Novib/Oxfam Netherlands), it has been focused on the links between the global diamond trade and the funding of armed conflicts in places such as Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The main aim has been to ensure greater transparency and accountability in the procurement of diamonds through the pressing of diamond companies to establish policies, controls, and management systems. By using worldwide media coverage and helped by the evolution of consumer awareness it has been able to mobilise the diamond industry and governments into joint efforts to fight against the trade in conflict diamonds.¹⁸ The analysis of

¹⁷ For more information, see <http://www.fataltransactions.org>.

¹⁸ Taking into consideration the need for turning points to divide the case into different phases (an analytical tool proved essential in this research), a concrete possibility to do so would be to focus on the first international meeting of the diamond industry (which included producer countries), which was held in Kimberley South Africa, in 2000. That meeting started a process of intensive negotiations that concluded with a positive outcome, i.e. an agreement on a new document: the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for rough diamonds. The characteristics of this case make it particularly useful to study the effective cooperation between NGOs and private firms. Different from other cases, such as the small arms process, here corporations are not seen as the enemies and so

this case would provide new empirical evidence in order to fully account for transnational collective action on human security.

Finally, there is potential for comparison with other international institutions and issues. For example, the existing scholarly accounts dealing with the rights of indigenous peoples has shown the permeability of the UN to the demands of transnational activists through both formal and informal channels and the role of coalition's allies (Passy 1999).¹⁹ And as we have seen in section 7.4 of the chapter, also Silva (2008) and Parks (2009) have carried out research with similar theoretical frameworks, but different targets (not only the UN, but also regional, such as the EU) and different issue-areas (not human security, but labour, finance and the environment) with promising results, which partially confirm those provided by the thesis.

some alliances have taken place between activists and corporations. In concrete, a transnational company, De Beers, which controls some 60 per cent of the world's uncut diamonds, would have realized the potential commercial risk posed by an association with armed conflict and would have then cooperated with the activists to achieve the Certification Scheme, which represents mutual benefits for the activists and for the industry. In the end, the document outlining the political (and practical) aspects of a worldwide certification scheme for rough diamonds was agreed (by consensus) by states, industry representatives, and NGOs in November 2002. This case is finally helpful to analyse the role of the UN in such campaigns. Thus, although the UN is not a formal signatory, it has been essential to the process through different ways, including its publication and dissemination of a panel of experts' report, its leverage on governments, and its formal endorsement of the Certification Scheme since December 2000.

¹⁹ Another example at the domestic level took place in Brazil, where an alliance between foreign NGOs and indigenous peoples successfully put the issue of rain-forest destruction on the world agenda. Furthermore, transnational alliances helped to press then-President José Sarney to attempt to change government policies which gave tax incentives to environmentally destructive agricultural and ranching interests (Haufler 1993).

For example, Silva's (2008) study on transnational collective action in the field of trade and labour has found a combination of protest and lobbying as necessary for coalition building. Moreover, Parks' (2009) study on the impact of European concerned with environmental and social policy found that both activists' allies and shared frames between organizations within the coalitions are crucial to achieve positive outcomes. Therefore, a systematic research on other international institutions and issues as the ones mentioned would be particularly useful to compare with the results of the thesis and reflect on what is specific to human security and what not and what is specific to the global level and what not. Such work remains for further research.

ANNEX A. METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

A.1. The evolution of the fieldwork process

The first two interviews for the research took place in the city I was living in November 2003, Madrid, both of which had an exploratory nature. The interviewees were Itziar Ruiz-Giménez, currently International Amnesty president for Spain and previous coordinator of campaigns and lobbying in the same organization, and Enrique Restoy, policy officer of the Coalition to Stop the Use and Recruitment of Child Soldiers, which is based in London. These interviews were crucial in defining some specific aspects of the research, allowing me to develop the interview design and decide on my first case study: the process of negotiation of the treaty banning the use of child soldiers, which had been recently approved in the year 2000. With this objective, I selected the relevant people (elite and expert representatives both of the NGO sector and the government and diplomatic sector) that could answer adequately a detailed questionnaire about that process and about the specific role(s) of the NGOs. The purpose of this wave of contacts was two-fold. First, I aimed to test the potential of this kind of interview conducted in a systematic way as a methodological tool to study the successes and failures of international campaigns in the field of disarmament and human rights. Second, I aimed to know some facts and informed opinions about the evolution of the legislation on child soldiers and about the evolution of the roles of the NGOs in this topic, identifying as

well the relevant people I should meet face-to-face to go farther and acquire more details.

After reworking on the questionnaire, it was mailed and/or e-mailed to potential interviewees in the following weeks and the answers arrived in the next three months (February-May 2004). The result was encouraging. Even if some people did not answer, I was able to obtain valuable information about the case study, to identify aspects that needed to be improved in the questionnaire (unclear questions, missing issues, etc.) and in the whole interview process, to recognize most of the key individuals in the field and to collect insights of possible explanatory factors that would help me analyze the successes and failures of international campaigns dealing with disarmament and human rights issues.

Already in Florence, in March 2006 I had the opportunity to discuss the tentative conclusions of the first case study in one of the sessions of the Security Working Group at the Robert Schumann Centre with Massimo Toschi, who had been working with the UN representative for children and armed conflict.

After that, I initiated a second phase of the fieldwork. The place would be Brussels during a whole week of intensive interview work in April 2006. I would talk with key people from all the cases under study, including the representatives of the Coalition of NGOs for an International Criminal Court, which was by then another case study of the research. These interviews were complex because the researcher had to use an expertise in all the different areas (child soldiers, landmines, small arms, arms trade treaty, cluster bombs and the international criminal court) in order to fully take advantage of the knowledge and well-informed opinions of the interviewees. The purpose of this week of intensive interview-making was different for every case-study. In the child soldiers case I analysed the results of the questionnaire from a qualitative perspective. In the landmines case I aimed to update the information I had obtained through secondary sources on the process and also test my tentative theoretical model for a case that had been already studied in the literature. In the cluster bombs case, the idea was to evaluate the potential of success of a

new international treaty after the accomplishment of the revision of the Belgian law. In the small arms and arms trade treaty cases the primary aim was to prepare the next fieldwork period which would be the following summer in New York for the Review Conference of the UN Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. In the International Criminal Court case, I wanted to assess to what extent it made sense to include that case in the research from a comparative point of view. In all the cases, I aimed at taking advantage of the strategic situation and role of the Belgian capital to explore all possible European links with my research, including the work of the different EU institutions in the international processes under study and the NGO lobbying of the EU politicians and diplomats.

The next step of the fieldwork developed around the Review Conference of the UN Plan of Action in June-July 2006. There I would have the opportunity for the first time in the research to do participant observation, including the speeches presentation of the countries and the NGO meetings. Moreover, I would do a number of interviews with people from all around the world that otherwise would have been impossible. Finally, I met many key individuals, some of them I would contact again to conduct in-depth interviews (e.g. David Atwood in Geneva). There I would also talk with some other researchers that were studying similar issues (e.g. Caroline Bouchard from Edinburgh University, people from the Small Arms Survey team and others based in Geneva). In the end, more than 20 semi-structured interviews and informal conversations were held in New York in the UN building where I spent an average of 13-14 hours during 11 days. There I could attend some of the meetings of the diplomats, including a coordination meeting between the EU diplomats and the EU NGOs. However, due to the traditional rules concerning participation in disarmament forums, many of the meetings were closed only for diplomats and so researchers and NGO representatives could not attend them.

Some months later, I prepared another intensive period of interviews in London and Geneva, two centres of lobbying and diplomatic work. In London there are the headquarters of many

international organizations, including Amnesty International, the Coalition to Stop the Use and Recruitment of Child Soldiers, the International Action Network on Small Arms, the Control Arms campaign, OXFAM (although this one in the near city Oxford), etc. In Geneva, the fact that most of UN institutions are based there has facilitated the concentration of many lobby groups and also diplomats from every country, including many experts on disarmament issues and participants in the Conference on Disarmament. I would take advantage from previous contacts with some relevant individuals to carry out in-depth interviews in their office (e.g. David Atwood or Daniel Prins in Geneva, Enrique Restoy in London). In Geneva, I also had the opportunity to attend as an observer to one session of the Conference on Disarmament, the institutional UN forum traditionally used with deal with disarmament issues.

The same month of February 2007, I was in Oslo for the launch of the Oslo process, the second opportunity I would have to carry out participant observation in a totally different setting: a new diplomacy meeting and so where I had access to virtually all places and people both from the NGO sector and the diplomats. Some interviews were also carried out there. Moreover, before coming back to Florence I could spend again some days in London finishing some interviews that for different logistic reasons I could not have done in the previous trip with very relevant individuals (e.g. Geraldine O'Callahan, Sally Joss).

In April 2007, I attended in Barcelona a workshop on cluster bombs and landmines with the presence from representatives of the influential organisation Geneva Call, the Saharui Front of National Liberation, the Spanish organisation Moviment per la Pau and some Colombian activists, among others. I was able to talk to all of them informally, having as well a long interview with the host organizer Maria Josep Parés, historical Spanish activist from ICBL and CMC.

The final step of the fieldwork concerned the Oslo process on cluster munitions and its final negotiating meeting. I was lucky to be present both in the conference that inaugurated the process in

February 2006 and the one where an agreement was reached on the clusters ban treaty in May 2007. The open and flexible conditions and rules of this new diplomacy process allowed me as in Oslo some months before to participate actively in many sessions of the meeting in Dublin (including the civil society meetings, the NGO training seminars and the governmental sessions) and also having some interesting conversations with key individuals, some of them I had already met before in New York, Geneva, London, Barcelona or Oslo. This resource (the contact I kept with them across time) proved essential to receive updated information of the state of the negotiations, especially during the ten days of these final negotiations, e.g. with Richard Moyes and Eugeni Barquero.

Moreover, I have taken the opportunity to meet with some people in contexts that were not originally designed as part of my fieldwork. For example, in September 2004 I had my first contacts with some members of the international peace movement that were attending the *Focus Group 'Peace and Human Security Aspects of the U.N. Reform'*; similarly in February 2008 I met (and interviewed) some relevant individuals that were attending the London Conference on the Peace Movement at the London School of Economics; also in February 2008 in several seminars held in Sweden about military research I had the opportunity to talk with some members of different arms control networks I had been studying for a number of years.

A.2. Participant observation

Before conducting the actual participant observation, some general recommendations were considered. The following are a summary of a presentation given by professor Dieter Rucht at the IUE in May 2008 on this issue (see table A.1 below). The idea is that every detail has to be planned in advance, including the test of the instrument and a previous familiarization with the context. Moreover, honesty is crucial, without using tricks and making

explicit the research aims, providing as well feed-back of the results of the research to the observed subjects. Resources also improve the technique, so more than one observer and additional sources of information are also advised. Keeping a low profile may facilitate the necessary critical distance with the object of the study. Finally, although sometimes it may be expensive and difficult, keeping records is a positive aspect of the research, which will show its relevance in different stages of the work.

Table A.1 General recommendations on participant observation

Define in advance the basic strategy and the aims
No tricks, no undercover
Be explicit about the purpose and background of your research without providing too many details
Familiarize yourself with the group or situation before starting with taking field notes or coding
Test and improve your instrument
More than one observer, if possible
Keep records (tape or video-recording, field notes, immediate notes afterwards, etc.)
Keep a low profile
Provide a feed-back to those observed
Additional sources (casual conversations, interviews...)

However, as we will see, some of these advices have been difficult to follow systematically in this research. In other words, if this is how participant observation should be ideally done, in practice flexibility was an asset and some concessions and compromises were reached in order to use this technique effectively.

As said, participant observation has particular characteristics in this research (see table A.2 below), which have represented

added difficulties that needed to be dealt with. In the first place, it has not been carried out in a unique setting, but in different ones, including NGO meetings, diplomat meetings, meetings between NGOs and diplomats, etc. That requires different ways of doing participant observation. In this sense, it is not the same to be an observer in a diplomat meeting where the researcher's role is more passive than in an open NGO meeting where sometimes the researcher had to introduce himself to the participants and even spoke on the debates, taking thus a more active role.

Table A.2 Characteristics of participant observation in this research

Different settings:

NGO meetings

Diplomat meetings

Meetings between NGOs and diplomats

Regular small group meetings (discussion, decisions, habits...)

Organizational routines (offices, headquarters...)

Congresses, large meetings

Press conferences

Interaction with diplomats and with opponents

Protest actions

Transnational nature of the networks

Few critical meetings

Many objectives: Shaping the bargaining process & strengthen the network

Time pressure

Especially relevant have been the regular small group meetings, such as the meetings held twice a day in the two weeks of the negotiations of the UN Review Conference on SALW in June – July 2006. Also in the conferences of the Oslo Process on

Cluster Munitions, both in Oslo (February 2007) and Dublin (May 2008), such NGO meetings were crucial to grasp the dynamics behind the different groups and individuals of the civil society. Moreover, some press conferences and visits to the offices and headquarters of the organizations have also taken place in order to perceive the routines within the organizations.

Participant observation has not only taken place in a formal environment, but these contexts have also allowed informal interactions with other participants, such as diplomats and also opponents to the transnational coalitions, including members of the war industry and of the gun lobby. In fact, some of them were actually more useful than usual and more formal semi-structured interviews. Finally, the researcher has also participated in some protest actions with presence of the media, including the delivery of a million of faces to the UN Secretary General in New York in June 2006 and the delivery of thousands of signatures in favour of the Oslo Process to the Spanish Embassy in Dublin in May 2008.

In this research, participant observation has been undertaken for a number of motives and not all of them could obviously be considered a priority. In this sense, the analysis of democratic practices of the activists will be a sub-product of the research. For this reason, no systematic participant observation has been carried out with this aim (i.e. no use of codebook). However, the concluding chapter of the research has included some impressions and reflections of the researcher's experiences on the democratic quality of these networks and international processes.

Regarding the advice of taking notes, they were taken both during the meetings and immediately afterwards. In some cases, also audio records have been kept, but its usefulness needs not to be overemphasized (i.e. sometimes the quality of the recording was bad, or the number of people talking too high to be able to process an adequate transcription).¹ Some interviews were

¹ The researcher also noted that a modern mp3 recorder was less influential on the behaviour of the interviewee than the previous tape recorder. In this sense, it seemed that size did matter.

recorded, but in general the interviewee felt more relaxed without it and that is also the reason why some of the informal conversations became crucial for obtaining new information, new interpretations of what had been said or further (and more secret) details about it. In some occasions, when it seemed that the interview was finished and so I turned the tape recorder off, then they started speaking more frankly.

On another front, some contact with other researchers working in this field have facilitated fruitful shared work (i.e. notes, contacts, impressions, etc.), such as with Caroline Bouchard, Anne-Marie Gratz, Margarita Petrova, Jennifer Erikson or Simone Tholens.

The transnational nature of the networks emphasises the importance for the researcher to possess language skills. Thus, people coming from every part of the world, speaking different languages and having different cultures of communication expressed their views in different ways. That posed particular challenges to the participant observation carried out in this research, but luckily in most cases they were successfully overcome.

On another front and due to the fact that these individuals came from places geographically very diverse, the number of international meetings attended was relatively few and each of them is critical, i.e. it has a crucial importance to understand each case-study. Therefore, when activists gathered together in such international conferences, they did it to lobby the governments (to shape the negotiation processes), but they also tried to take advantage of these gatherings to strengthen the network (to add face-to-face contact to the usual and more frequent e-mail and telephone contact).

For this reason and as explained in the following section, a key aspect here has been time pressure, which has affected the contact with the interviewees. Thus, it has been difficult to be close to the object of study, as there were critical meetings where participants were very active on a number of issues and so they could spend little time with the researcher.

As a consequence and from the perspective of the democratic quality of the networks, results on their deliberative practices would be very different here than in those meetings characterized by routine practices. Indeed, in the meetings studied, by definition there had to exist an outcome (they needed to decide what were they going to do for the day, who was going to do what, etc.) and this pressure sometimes was translated into a decrease of the deliberative procedures.

Regarding honesty and transparency, the researcher has participated in most of the meetings with a double affiliation, both as a researcher and also sometimes as a member of a Spanish NGO (Fundació per la Pau, Foundation for Peace). Thus, when the main justification for the researcher to be there was because he was a member of a NGO, then the participant observation was more active and so he had to help in the campaigning and lobbying efforts of the activists. That increased the access to the key individuals, but it also reduced the distance with the object of study.

A.3. Semi-structured in-depth interviews

Interviews constitute the pivotal tool for the research, as they are the primary access to measure the way in which coalitions judge whether their objective has been accomplished or not, that is, whether they estimated that they had a political impact or not. Each interview lasted an average of 90 minutes. Some of the interviewees asked directly or indirectly to remain anonymous. In these cases, only the place and date of the interviews are specified.

Most of interviewees are considered key informants. The reason for identifying the interviewees as 'key informants' is twofold. Firstly, 'key' rests on the fact the people interviewed were not only representing an actor involved in the processes under analysis, but also took part in one (or more) of them personally. Secondly, they are considered 'key' given that they hold a high or the highest position within their TC. This made

them directly involved in most of the specific decisions and actions their organization carried out.

Other valuable information came from some informal interviews that were carried out parallel to the official ones. For instance, the case study on IANSA and the small arms process gained from the information provided during many informal coffees hold at the Vienna café at the UN, the same place where analysts maintain the 2001 UN Plan of Action on Small Arms was agreed. None of the data gathered in these conversations are directly quoted since they derive from informal and not recorded conversations. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out how this information was useful in developing hypothesis and suggesting new directions of enquiry and have as such overall contributed to the research, by confirming or contrasting the information obtained through the formal interviews.

Some of the interviews have been conducted taking advantage of the same setting where the participant observation was also conducted. Indeed, both sections are closely connected, as most of the problems faced by the researcher when conducting both participant observation and interviews with the crucial players in these processes are similar.

As most of the relevant individuals for the purposes of this research attended the critical international meetings, that has represented a unique opportunity to have people coming from all around the world to one city at the same time. However, as they were under pressure to carry out several tasks during those days, the quantity of time they could offer to the researcher was limited. For that reason, when possible, those environments were used to have a first introductory contact with the potential interviewee, who was going to be interviewed a second time at his or her office in his or her home town, in a more relaxed environment better suitable to talk in-depth about particular issues.

The relationship researcher-interviewee is asymmetrical because the researcher wants information, but has little to offer. Among these few things, a summary of the final report was

offered to the interviewees, having generally a very positive reaction about it.

There was sometimes mistrust coming from different sectors. The potential NGO interviewees were stressed because they were negotiating and lobbying the diplomats, but they were also concerned about how was I going to depict them and about how I was going to reflect the conflicts they dealt with. Thus, there was mistrust about the result of the research, but also about the role of the researcher on the process of campaigning and lobbying (the relationship of the researcher with other actors, including the diplomats, the media, the war industry representatives, and so on). Moreover, sometimes these coalitions have had people working for the arms industry of the gun lobby in their meetings, specially in the US, so they were usually a bit suspicious about new people (for example, members of the gun lobby group National Rifle Association attended the IANSA meetings in the 2001 SALW UN Conference which concluded with the adoption of the Program of Action).

A.4. Doing elite interviews

In this research most of the interviewees can be considered as part of an elite. In fact, when being asked about the motivations behind their job positions some of them answered: the “excitement of being part of an elite group”.

There are specific reasons to study elites. Researchers gain a “unique opportunity to understand the worldview of those who wield significant influence in society and become part of a small, but very rich, tradition within sociology and political science (...) Organizations and institutions of varying types are filled with groups of elites that we know far too little about and there is a

particularly strong need for ethnographic studies and interviewing elites across different organizational types” (Delaney 2007: 208).²

Interviewing elites is partially similar to, and partially different from, interviewing anyone else. However, different from what happens in most of quantitative studies, very few studies based on interviews to elites actively reflect on methodological issues, such as access or sampling.

In any kind of interview it is essential to be well-prepared (including the skill of consciously attempting to be a good listener), to have (an appropriate number of) well-formulated questions and to be ready with many good probes and follow-ups to the general questions to push the conversation deeper when needed (and possible).

Time is extremely precious, so the researcher needs to find the best way to take full advantages of every opportunity. A rule I tried to follow was to explain to the interviewee beforehand what would be the topic and aims of the questions. That helped them to focus the answers.

To ask too broad or too general questions was a mistake that happened sometimes in the first phases of the fieldwork (with the legitimate aim of going step by step into the topic), because it reduced the precious time to extract real information. In the end, answers to general questions were very similar across the different interviewees and normally in the expected (and politically correct) direction. Additionally, questions were tackled to the specific knowledge of the interviewee.

Similarly, there was no point in asking questions about information the researcher could easily get in the webpage of the organization. That only means less time for the real interview and also shows that you do not have all the knowledge you should in order to get the details or the specific information the interviewee

² Apart from these reasons, Delaney adds other side benefits of interviewing elites, including the fact that “the view is often remarkable during the interview and you are sometimes served excellent coffee; you get to meet people who you might not otherwise encounter in your own social circles” (Delaney 2007: 208).

possess. On the contrary, it proved very useful to start some questions by talking about something that was posted in the webpage to show that the researcher had a knowledge about the topic and then asking for the motivations behind it or for further and related information.

An important difference between most of elite interviews (also in expert interviews) and other interviews is that the number of them is not so important because the information will not be dealt with quantitatively, since the research is based on process-tracing. Here the main aim is to understand the dynamics, reasons and motivations behind each step of the decision-making processes. And also to have balanced and contrasted sources of information. For this reason, the objective was to have a sample where most of crucial actors were represented. The amount of interviews was not important *per se*, although in the end it turned out to be very high, as there were different case studies, different needs to be addressed using this methodological tool and a number of opportunities to do fieldwork close to the subjects studied, most of them pertaining to an elite group.

In this point, a question arises. Who is part of an elite? Are only politicians members of the elite? Are all politicians members of the elite? Maybe there are as well other people who are not politicians, but who are also part of an elite group. Following the classification by Delaney (2007), who includes categories such as 'philanthropic elites' (e.g. George Soros) or 'ultra-elites' (e.g. Barack Obama), most of my interviewees are both 'political elites', i.e. individuals with a particularly influential role in the policy process and 'organizational elites', i.e. those holding a particular (high) position in an organization, network or coalition.

Delaney identifies a number of potential problems, opportunities and challenges in interviewing this kind of elites. In the following pages I will address those issues making explicit in which ways I have dealt with them through the development of the research.

1. *Gaining Access*. Key to gaining access was to write a strong introductory letter explaining the project, showing its relevance

and importance and making as obvious as possible that the future interviewee would bring unique and even essential expertise to the topic. With this aim, each letter (or e-mail) had to be written individually, after having done some research on the person.

Problems in this sense, apart from the usual fact that most of elite people are extremely busy, could arise by the suspicion caused by research that claimed to evaluate the role of certain individuals and certain organizations in the processes under research. In other words, top NGO representatives were sometimes uncomfortable granting me access on a sensitive topic over which they would have little control (in some sense I would end up assessing their own work) and the same could be said of diplomats and representatives of the governments that had participated (or were participating) in the negotiations of the processes studied. In this sense, the reframing of the description of the current study in more general terms helped to partially overcome this problem. It also increased the probability of gaining access the fact of making clear that I was engaged in an ongoing project and that I could be flexible to interview the person the time that was more convenient to them.

Snowball techniques were used to select some of the interviewees. That was very useful, because it was a direct way to identify crucial actors. However, that could also be a potential source of bias and for this reason other techniques were also used from a perspective based on triangulation, including official documents that report the participants in major events or negotiation meetings, sometimes even approaching them face-to-face during the event to ask for a future in-depth interview in their office. In those cases, I would send an e-mail reminding them our previous conversation.

Experience taught me several useful techniques for effectively conducting research. Such as that a good moment to send an e-mail is on Monday afternoon, when the person has already read and cleaned the account after the usual accumulation during the weekend.

Due to the geographical and logistics characteristic of most of the interviewees I had to travel to different countries and cities to conduct interviews. By doing so I was able to use the pressure of the upcoming trip to help schedule interviews. Similar to what other researchers have written about their experiences (see e.g. Delaney 2007: 213), I noted how by talking about how I would be meeting with many people during my visit (e.g. they often asked me “who else are you seeing in your trip?”) a sense of excitement and interest was being created and somehow it was implied that they also should be part of this research process. Other times the pressure was too much and we could not find the right spot for our meeting. In these cases I chose to follow up by e-mail or by phone, although acknowledging that some of those were to some extent missing opportunities. Some of these elite people were familiar with academic research, were willing to contribute to the production of knowledge, often believed that they have important things to say and were thankful to active listeners.

However, e-mail interviews have also had advantages, because the person had more time to reflect and so the discourse was more coherent and structured. For this reason, they were particularly suitable for using them in the quotes presented in the final draft.

Finally, there are significant decisions the researcher needs to take before approaching the interviewee, particularly concerning the when, where and how to do it. For instance, is it better during a conference or major event? Is it better in a public place or in his/her office? In this research and generally speaking interviews in the office of the interviewee were much more relaxed and the researcher could go straight to the point, taking full advantage of the available time.

Is it better when the person is alone or maybe when he or she is talking with other people? In that case, is it better to interrupt him, to wait, to look for a third person to help to initiate the first contact? In general, each possibility had advantages and disadvantages. Yet, more often than not a real decision between different alternatives was not possible because not all possibilities

were available, but the researcher had to take advantage of every opportunity, as it might not be repeated again.

In case of different languages between the interviewee and the researcher and both known by the researcher, the instinctive option was to use the language in which the interviewee felt more comfortable to facilitate communication. However, that meant sometimes that the interviewee was in control of the interview. For this reason, as far as the fieldwork process was advancing the decision changed and in cases where it was up to the researcher to choose (i.e. when the interviewee answered "I do not mind, you choose the language, everything is fine with me) then English, Spanish and Catalan were the language primarily used.

Another set of decisions concerned the length of the interview. In this respect, an unwritten rule worked in the sense that most of interviewees became more accessible, more talkative and less stressed by the pressures of the interviews, such as the tape recording. In fact, all the interviews that lasted more than one hour and half contained pieces of very valuable information. In order to do so it was essential to build trust to the extent that after 1,5 hours the interviewee might be saying new things and after 3 hours could turn also into the fine frontier between the professional and the personal, revealing details unknown, but crucial to understand some steps of the decision-making process. For ethical reasons, these moments will obviously not be shown in the written part of the research.

2. *The 'spokesperson' problem.* Delaney, among others, has also emphasized the problem posed by the propensity of elites to assume the role of 'spokesperson'. In part, it is understandable as most of them spend their time acting as a spokespeople for their organizations, networks or coalitions and so the interview becomes an extension of their daily routine. Unfortunately that also happened in this research, especially in the early phases of the fieldwork (e.g. some of the interviews held in New York). In some cases that were not considered a problem, because the actual aim of the interview was to understand the 'official position' of the organization. However, as far as the researcher was becoming

more experienced, more skills were acquired in carefully asking polite questions to invite the person to remember, present, reflect on competing alternatives to the decision that had been finally taken. That was essential to trace the decision-making processes under study.

Also when the person started to repeat the same ideas it became necessary to change politely the course of the interview. Similarly in occasions when the individual spoke too much about himself/herself it was necessary to stop politely the conversation and introduce a new topic.

3. *The 'shared colleague' problem.* Sometimes a very young interviewee could act a bit arrogantly, maybe feeling that he had to prove that he/she deserves his/her position, something that would not happen with an older interviewee who could have a more paternalist, patient or teaching attitude towards the researcher. However, this kind of attitude particularly (but not only) of those more aged than the researcher and with a rich background of experiences and knowledge in the field could also become a problem. In this sense, they might be tempted to try to help framing the project along with the researcher and even to speculate about the theory, methods and also the results of the research.

That can be sometimes a real help in very specific instances. However, normally it supposes a cut of the precious time reserved for the interview and even worse, it challenges the nature of the whole interviewing process: by the speculation of the interviewee about the content, aims of the research (including the analysis of the data), they become "conscious about the meaning and implications of what they will be saying and the way that it will be analyzed, rather than spontaneously providing the data you are trying to gather" (Delaney 2007: 214). Also here the experience as a researcher became very important in the later stages of the research, for example, by keeping the introductory part very short and general, making explicit that the analysis of the data would take place in another (posterior) phase. In other cases, however, it was extremely useful to present the interviewee with some

tentative conclusions to use his or her expertise and to assess how academic results could be understood by practitioners in the field.

4. *The problem of 'not controlling the interview'*. Some elite interviewees may treat the researcher with a subordinate status. Taking this problem as something given, Delaney advises to consider this as an asset and take advantage of the situation to ask for more details, clarification or explanations. This is exactly the way I approached this problem when I had to face it during this research and in many cases that turned out to be a quite successful exercise. Moreover, and as the same author points out (2007: 215), mitigating this problem is the fact that "many organizational elites have a high regard for college and university faculty members" and that helped to re-define the asymmetries posed by the high status of the interviewee, especially in late stages of the fieldwork process, when I was able to show expert knowledge of the field and also present other interviews already made as credentials for my status.

5. *The problem of the 'dilemma of seduction'*. When faced by a very intelligent and charismatic leader of an organisation, "it is tempting by the end of an interview to 'envision' yourself in the particular career path or life circumstance of your interview subject" (Delaney 2007: 217) and assume therefore positive interpretations of the actions and opinions of the interviewee far beyond what would be typically normal after the interview. This is actually one of the biggest problems when interviewing elites and no magic recipe exists to combat it. The key question was 'how do these views reflect this person's structural position and experiences?' (Delaney 2007: 218). Again, experience was the main point of departure for the researcher. After a number of interviews and particularly during the writing process, I was more able to see the interview data in the same manner as one would analyse an interview with someone in another circumstance.

6. *The problem of the 'dilemma of the negative seduction'*. A related point not considered by Delaney is what we could name as the 'dilemma of the negative seduction'. In other words, when the interviewee makes such a bad impression that it is very difficult to

adopt an objective perspective. That might be consequence of difficulties in the phase of gaining access to the interviewee, including the person having adopted a not very collaborative role. That might also be consequence of information provided by other interviewees or previous knowledge of some background of the person, which could turn into prejudices actually having an impact on the interpretation of the data obtained in the interview. The recipes to combat this problem are logically very similar to the ones used to combat seduction. Thus, experience and trying to view the interview data in the most objective and distant way as possible helped to partially overcome this problem.

In general, many of these problems were substantially mitigated through triangulation; comparing and contrasting the position of the interviewees with other positions (either with those directly expressed by other interviewees or by secondary sources or even by competing logical possibilities developed by the researcher) and through the writing process. The final advice by Delaney has also been taken into consideration regarding this point. In this sense, the author argues that the researcher should use clear “tonal shifts’ in the writing to indicate that you are leaving the world of the elite whom you are describing and entering your own analytic territory (...) By using such tonal shifts, the analyst helps inform the reader of movements from descriptive rendering of interview data to analytic interpretations by the author” (Delaney 2007: 218-219).

In the whole fieldwork process, it was important to keep in mind the time distance between the moment in which the interview takes place and the moment where the facts under research took place, as the same question could have different answers depending on in which point of time the interviewee situates it.

It was also crucial to understand that each interview is not necessarily an individual act. On the contrary, they often affect the next one. Moreover, one cannot foresee the result at 100 per cent, there is always new data, etc. Therefore, the fact of having already interviewed certain people had an influence on the new

interviewees, giving the researcher more credibility, trust and authority, especially (but not only) if there was a good relationship between the current interviewee and the previous ones.

A.5. The conducted interviews

In total, and taking into consideration the fact that with at least 20 of these people I talked more than once, for this research more than 100 interviews were carried out (see Table II.3). From the interviewees, about 60% are Europeans (30% of them from Spain), but all continents of the world are represented. More than half of the individuals are activists and at least 20 per cent of them are diplomats or have worked for a government. At least 20 per cent can be considered as academics and almost 10 per cent work or have worked for some military group or national army or the NATO or the gun lobby. At least 20% work or have worked for an international institution, generally an agency of the UN. The distribution across the different case-studies is fairly equal, being the ICBL (landmines) and the CSC (child soldiers) less represented than the SALW (small arms) and CMC (cluster munitions), as corresponds to the cases where participant observation was possible and so more possibilities of contacting potential interviewees.

These data highlights multiple identities and different communities of practice, especially in different moments of time. For this reason, labels and categories are often unclear. For example, some people have several nationalities or jobs in different sectors (NGOs, UN and government) or I contacted them through several means (often face-to-face plus a follow-up e-mail) or I used them for more than one case-study. In each case, I have chosen what its main category was, allowing exceptionally two different values in a few specific cases. Extended affiliation is given when necessary in footnotes below the Table A.3 below. The rest of the necessary information to understand the table is also presented in a footnote below the table.

Table A.3 Summary of the interviews conducted

<i>N</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>T</i> ³	<i>C</i> ⁴	<i>Way</i> ⁵	<i>Affiliation</i>	<i>Case</i>	<i>C</i> ⁶
1	10/11/03	Madrid	Inf	1	FF	AI Spain ⁷	CSC	ES
2	21/11/03	Madrid	SS	1	FF	CSC	CSC	ES
3	17/02/04	On-line	SS	1	E-mail	Christian Children's Fund, academic ⁸	CSC	US
4	19/02/04	On-line	SS	1	E-mail	AI ⁹	CSC	UK
5	19/02/04	On-line	SS	1	E-mail	CSC ¹⁰	CSC	
6	20/02/04	On-line	SS	4	E-mail	Expert	CSC	
7	27/02/04	On-line	SS	1	E-mail	Southeast Asia CSC ¹¹	CSC	PH

³ “SS” means semi-structured and “inf” informal (and non recorded) conversation.

⁴ Codes: 1 NGO, 2 Government, 3 UN (or other international organisation), 4 Scholar, 5 NGO+Gov, 6 NGO+UN, 7 Gov+UN, 8 NGO+Gov+UN 9Other.

⁵ FF means face-to-face.

⁶ Country follows ISO code: ISO 3166-1 and ISO 3166-1-alpha-2), see

http://www.iso.org/iso/country_codes/iso_3166_code_lists/english_country_names_and_code_elements.htm The ones used here are the following: AF (Afghanistan), AL (Albania), (AT) Austria, AU (Australia), BD (Bangladesh), BE (Belgium), BR (Brazil), CA (Canada), CH (Switzerland), CG (Congo), CO (Colombia), DE (Germany), DK (Denmark), DZ (Algeria), EC (Ecuador), ES (Spain), FR (France), IE (Ireland), IT (Italy), JP (Japan), NL (Netherlands), NZ (New Zealand), PE (Peru), PH (Philippines), PL (Poland), PY (Paraguay), SE (Sweden) SO (Somalia), UK (United Kingdom), US (United States of America).

⁷ AI Spain Campaigns. She is now AI Spain president.

⁸ Christian Children's Fund and Professor at Columbia University and Randolph-Macon College.

⁹ Director Legal and International Organizations Program.

¹⁰ Coordinator.

¹¹ Regional coordinator (also AI Philippines).

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<i>N</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>T</i> ³	<i>C</i> ⁴	<i>Way</i> ⁵	<i>Affiliation</i>	<i>Case</i>	<i>C</i> ⁶
8	01/03/04	On-line	SS	1	E-mail	IF Terre des Hommes	CSC	DE
9	12/03/04	On-line	SS	1	E-mail	ISPCAN ¹²	CSC	
10	14/03/04	On-line	SS	2	E-mail	Government	CSC	SY
11	21/03/04	On-line	SS	1	E-mail	AI US ¹³	CSC	US
12	25/03/04	On-line	SS	4	E-mail	Researcher ¹⁴	CSC	IT
13	29/03/04	On-line	SS	1	E-mail	IF Terre des Hommes ¹⁵	CSC	
14	01/04/04	On-line	SS	1	E-mail	American Bar Association	CSC	US
15	06/04/04	On-line	SS	3	E-mail	OHCHR	CSC	BE
16	17/04/04	On-line	SS	1	E-mail	Coalition DR Congo ¹⁶	CSC	CG
17	27/04/04	On-line	SS	3	E-mail	OHCHR ¹⁷	CSC	BR
18	29/04/04	Online	SS	1	E-mail	Defense of Children International ¹⁸	CSC	
19	04/05/04	On-line	SS	4	Post	Essex University	CSC	
20	05/05/04	On-line	SS	4	E-mail	Washington ¹⁹	CSC	ES
21	11/05/04	On-line	SS	4	E-mail	Deusto University	CSC	ES
22	15/05/04	On-line	SS	3	E-mail	UNICEF ²⁰	CSC	BE
23	21/05/04	On-line	SS	1	E-mail	HRW	CSC	US

¹² President.

¹³ Coordinator.

¹⁴ LLM Essex University.

¹⁵ Coordinator.

¹⁶ Assistant Director of BVES, DRC Coordinator Coalition.

¹⁷ Secretary Committee on the Rights of the Child Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Geneva.

¹⁸ Coordinator. International Secretariat.

¹⁹ Ex C3A.

²⁰ Director Communication and Programs, UNICEF Belgium.

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<i>N</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>T</i> ³	<i>C</i> ⁴	<i>Way</i> ⁵	<i>Affiliation</i>	<i>Case</i>	<i>C</i> ⁶
24	25/05/04	On-line	SS	2	E-mail	Austrian government, HHRR Dept ²¹	CSC	AT
25	07/03/06	Florence	Inf	8	FF	UN ²²	CSC	IT
26	25/04/06	Brussels	O	1	FF	Pax Christi International	ICBL	BE
27	25/04/06	Brussels	SS	1	FF	CICC ²³	ICC	IT
28	26/04/06	Brussels	SS	1	FF	Handicap International ²⁴	ICBL	BE
29	27/04/06	Brussels	SS	1	FF	GRIP	ICBL, SALW	IT
30	28/04/06	Brussels	S	1	FF	NPWJ ²⁵	ICC	US
31	28/04/06	Brussels	SS	1	FF	Save the Children ²⁶	CSC	SE
32	26/06/06	New York	S	1	FF	Victims association ²⁷	SALW	EC
33	27/06/06	New York	SS	1	FF	BD Devt Partnership Centre	SALW	BD
34	27/06/06	New York	Inf	2	FF	Dutch Delegation ²⁸	SALW	NL
35	27/06/06	New York	SS	9	FF	NATO	SALW	US
36	27/06/06	New York	Inf	4	FF	SAS	SALW	AT

²¹ Human Security Network.

²² Collaborator of Olara Otunnu, UN Representative on Children and Armed Conflict.

²³ European Coordinator CICC.

²⁴ ICBL and HI.

²⁵ Legal Counsel/Coordinator International Criminal Justice Program NPWJ.

²⁶ Policy Officer.

²⁷ He himself is a victim of SALW.

²⁸ Follow up on 8 February 2007, in his office in Geneva. Chair of Brokering group of experts.

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<i>N</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>T</i> ³	<i>C</i> ⁴	<i>Way</i> ⁵	<i>Affiliation</i>	<i>Case</i>	<i>C</i> ⁶
37	27/06/06	New York	Inf	1	FF	Fundació per la Pau ²⁹	SALW	ES
38	28/06/06	New York	O	9	FF	Canadian Firearms Association ³⁰	SALW	CA
39	28/06/06	New York	Inf	4	FF	SAS ³¹	SALW	FR
40	29/06/06	New York	SS	5	FF	Europarlamentarian ³²	ICBL, SALW	ES
41	29/06/06	New York	S	1	FF	Music activist ³³	SALW	CO
42	30/06/06	New York	Inf	4	FF	University of Edinburgh ³⁴	ICBL, SALW	CN
43	30/06/06	New York	SS	1	FF	IANSAs	SALW	AU
44	01/07/06	New York	Inf	1	FF	Fundació per la Pau ³⁵	SALW	ES
45	02/07/06	New York	SS	5	FF	Cáritas France ³⁶	SALW	FR
46	02/07/06	New York	SS	1	FF	AI – Control Arms ³⁷	SALW	
47	03/07/06	New York	SS	1	FF	GRIP	SALW	BE
48	03/07/06	New York	SS	3	FF	UN Disarmament	SALW	US
49	04/07/06	New York	SS	1	FF	QUNO	ICBL, SALW	US
50	04/07/06	New York	SS	1	FF	Saferworld	SALW	IT

²⁹ Director. Ex Intermón Oxfam. Campaigns coordinator.

³⁰ President. He passed away in September 18, 2007.

³¹ PhD about SALW.

³² Ex Escola de Pau, Spanish disarmament campaigns.

³³ Leader of the music activism project “Escopetarra” .

³⁴ PhD about EU and SALW, ICBL & CSC.

³⁵ Campaigns coordinator. Ex C3A.

³⁶ Ex-ambassador of France.

³⁷ AI Steering Committee.

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<i>N</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>T</i> ³	<i>C</i> ⁴	<i>Way</i> ⁵	<i>Affiliation</i>	<i>Case</i>	<i>C</i> ⁶
51	05/07/06	New York	SS	1	FF	Oxfam New Zealand ³⁸	ICBL, SALW	NZ
52	05/07/06	New York	SS	1	FF	GRIP ³⁹	SALW	BE
53	05/07/06	New York	SS	2	FF	Spanish Delegation	SALW	ES
54	06/07/06	New York	Inf	1	FF	Japan IANSA	SALW	ES
55	06/07/06	New York	SS	1	FF	Escola de Pau / IANSA secretariat ⁴⁰	SALW	ES
56	06/07/06	New York	SS	1	FF	OXFAM Spain ⁴¹	SALW	ES
57	06/07/06	New York	Inf	1	FF	AI Paraguay	SALW	PY
58	02/02/07	London	SS	2	FF	DFAIT (British govt) ⁴²	ICBL	UK
59	06/02/07	London	SS	1	FF	CSC	CSC	ES
60	06/02/07	London	SS	6	FF	UNIDIR	SALW, CMC	GB
61	07/02/07	Geneva	SS	8	FF	UNIDIR ⁴³	ICBL, CMC	AU
62	08/02/07	Geneva	SS	5	FF	GIDHC ⁴⁴	ICBL, CMC	CH
63	08/02/07	Geneva	SS	2	FF	Dutch Government	SALW	NL
64	09/02/07	Geneva	SS	1	FF	QUNO	SALW, ICBL	US

³⁸ ex Human Rights Watch, ex ICBL.

³⁹ Ex IANSA.

⁴⁰ PhD about this issue. Currently in South America working for Save the Children.

⁴¹ Intermon Oxfam representative in Control Arms.

⁴² Mine Unit.

⁴³ Ex diplomat, ex activist.

⁴⁴ Ex diplomat.

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<i>N</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>T</i> ³	<i>C</i> ⁴	<i>Way</i> ⁵	<i>Affiliation</i>	<i>Case</i>	<i>C</i> ⁶
65	09/02/07	Geneva	SS	1	FF	Geneva Process ⁴⁵	SALW, CMC	IE
66	12/02/07	Geneva	SS	7	FF	UNMAS ⁴⁶	ICBL, CMC	PE
67	13/02/07	Geneva	SS	3	FF	UNDP	SALW	CH
68	19/02/07	Oxford	SS	1	FF	AIDS UK Campaign ⁴⁷	SALW	UK
69	22/02/07	London	SS	1	FF	Global Witness and IANSA	SALW	UK
70	20/02/07	London	SS	1	FF	British Government	SALW	UK
71	20/02/07	London	SS	2	FF	British DFAIT ⁴⁸	SALW	UK
72	21/02/07	Oslo	SS	8	FF	HI Belgium ⁴⁹	ICBL, CMC	UK
73	21/02/07	Oslo	SS	1	FF	Austrian CMC ⁵⁰	CMC, ICBL	AT
74	22/02/07	Oslo	SS	1	FF	Landmine Action	ICBL, CMC	UK
75	22/02/07	Oslo	SS	1	FF	Mennonite Central Committee	CMC	US
76	22/02/07	Oslo	SS	4	FF	University of Exeter	CMC, others	UK
77	23/02/07	Oslo	SS	1	FF	ICBL ⁵¹	ICBL, CMC	PL
78	23/02/07	Oslo	SS	2	FF	Spanish	SALW,	ES

⁴⁵ Currently working for the UNDP.

⁴⁶ Ex diplomat.

⁴⁷ Ex IANSA Coordinator.

⁴⁸ Ex IANSA Steering Committee, UNIDIR, British DFAIT.

⁴⁹ Ex soldier, ex consultant.

⁵⁰ Ex Austrian ICBL.

⁵¹ Ex HI Belgium, ex ICBL Poland.

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<i>N</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>T</i> ³	<i>C</i> ⁴	<i>Way</i> ⁵	<i>Affiliation</i>	<i>Case</i>	<i>C</i> ⁶
						government	CMC	
79	23/02/07	Oslo	Inf	3	FF	Danish Red Cross	CMC	DK
80	23/02/07	Oslo	Inf	2	FF	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ⁵²	CMC	NW
81	23/02/07	Oslo	Inf	4	FF	Professor. Chuo University	ICBL	JP
82	06/04/04	Barcelona	SS	5	FF	Polisario Front ⁵³	ICBL, CMC	DZ
83	06/04/07	Barcelona	SS	1	FF	Moviment per la Pau (ICBL, CMC)	ICBL, CMC	ES
84	06/04/07	Dublin	Inf	3	FF	Geneva Program Officer	ICBL, CMC	
85	28/05/07	Dublin	Inf	1	FF	Institute of Strategic Studies	CMC	NC
86	28/05/07	Dublin	Inf	5	FF	Greenpeace Spain	CMC	ES
87	29/05/07	Dublin	Inf	4	FF	Military expert in Human Rights	CMC	ES
88	30/05/07	Dublin	Inf	1	FF	Human Rights Watch. Monitor	ICBL, LM CC	US
89	20/06/07	Madrid	SS	1	phone	Save the Children, Spain	CSC	ES
90	01/02/08	London	Inf	1	FF	IKV Pax	CMC	NL

⁵² Senior Advisor. Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs.

⁵³ Chief of anti-landmine action team.

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<i>N</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>T</i> ³	<i>C</i> ⁴	<i>Way</i> ⁵	<i>Affiliation</i>	<i>Case</i>	<i>C</i> ⁶
						Christi ⁵⁴		
91	16/02/08	Stockholnr	Inf	1	FF	Svenska Freds	SALW, SW CMC	
92	17/02/08	Stockholnr	SS	1	FF	Engineers and Scientists for Peace	Others	AL

⁵⁴ Senior Policy Advisor. Also in the CMC Steering Committee.

ANNEX B. LESSONS LEARNED OR SOME ADVICES FOR OTHER CAMPAIGNS¹

¹ This section was not originally written as such in the first draft of the thesis, although most of the ideas were present in different parts of the manuscript. However, several reasons account for their systematisation in a specific section, which has been included in the final draft. In the first place I believe into giving a policy aspect to social research, to connect social science and society. I am part of those scholars who think that science and research should be more than just the production of knowledge, but it should also be useful to improve our society and the social conditions of the people who live in. It is quite undisputable that the world is a better place without children using guns or without having to play in soccer fields where some thousand bombs, such as landmines or cluster munitions remain unexploded. Finally, it was suggested by some of the first readers of the manuscript to include a range of other proposals that campaigners could find useful in their work. As this political science research aimed to have some practical applicability, the section will comment some workable ideas that came through the research. They are in fact a sub-product of the dissertation as no particular research question was designed, but the empirical work has collected some inspiring remarks about this issue. So this section was growing from different notes taken through the whole process of research and even if was not written in previous drafts, it somehow was still there. So what I have just done here is to make it visible and explicit. In most of cases, they also were discussed with the interviewees, especially in those interviews carried out in the later stages of the data collection (2007-2008). Therefore I thank them for their inspiring work and the generosity when accepting to share their own thoughts on these subjects. Other toolkits already present in the literature can be found in Arts (1998), Fitzduff and Church (2004), Hussein (2003), International Alert and Saferworld (2003), International Alert and Women Waging Peace (2004) and Wolf (2001).

This study ends by pointing to fifteen potential paths that transnational coalitions could take in order to increase their political influence.

1. The first proposal refers to *where to locate the coalitions' headquarters*. The Cluster Munitions Coalition was once based in Peru and now it is in London, together with the Child Soldiers Coalition and IANSA. This research has shown that coalitions that aim for political influence are more efficient being based in Geneva or in New York because it is where diplomats actually negotiate on international issues. Sometimes it is difficult to move to another country once the coalition has been established. However, new coalitions should seriously consider locating themselves in a politically significant place that is easily accessible by transport. Therefore, Brussels could also be a logical option, but definitely not Peru.

2. The second principle lesson derived from the thesis concerns *the focus of the coalitions*. Should each one focus on its particular issue or in all related issues? The reality is that diplomats tend to be present in different forums concerning different issues, which makes it difficult to think about an issue in an isolated way. Their concerns are fundamentally interrelated, and what happens in one forum is related with other negotiations. Studying a single case always leaves out crucial components making it very difficult to obtain solid and conclusions that can be generalised. An UNIDIR researcher specialized on disarmament issues admits that 'researchers know very little'. This lack of knowledge suggests a real need for research that is comparative in scope. Last chapter provided several examples that cooperation across issues works.

3. The third recommendation argues that *the structure of the coalition should be optimised*. There is not a single and unique ideal type of a coalition, although in every case each coalition is something more than an advocacy network, but something less than a social movement. Working through coalitions has several advantages, compared to a single NGO, even if we are talking about big and powerful ones, such as Oxfam or Amnesty

International. Thus, a coalition can be used strategically to make statements that its individual members cannot. The dissertation recommends that activists decide very carefully if they should publish a report or to organize an event as a single organisation or as a coalition. Another benefit of a coalition is its role as privileged interlocutor who often enjoys more and better access to the different institutions.

The study of the leaders of these coalitions suggests the difficulties of a single individual performing all the functions of a coalition. This dissertation suggests separating leadership into political and administrative tasks. In this proposed structure for the organisation, a strong board would monitor the secretariat and decide the political direction of the whole coalition. This reorganisation of the structure of coalitions is not easy to implement but is widely approved of by the consulted interviewees.

Another important recommendation from the research is maintaining high transparency and accountability to strengthen the network. The organisational form arguably matters more at the transnational level than at the national level. Thus, issues of leadership are crucial for keeping the network together and increasing legitimacy and credibility both inside (among the members) and outside (with other transnational networks and with states and international organisations). The relationship with grass-roots groups geographically dispersed is something a strong leadership has to take care of in order to develop a sustainable campaign that aims to be effective transnationally. Moreover, leadership needs to be clearly defined also in the like-minded group of states that play the role of NGO allies in the processes studied in this paper. They do not need to include super-power(s), but any country with resources, credibility and influence in different regions.

4. The fourth main recommendation concerns *financial issues*. A logical rule would suggest that funding should be as diversified as possible to avoid financial dependence, particularly from states. Moreover, there should be mechanisms created to reduce

competition for resources, because that could affect the effectiveness and strength of the network. One aspect activists do not normally reflect on is about the prospect of having a lot of money. They should be prepared for the possibility of sudden increases of resources and have an answer to this question “what would we do if we get all the money we are asking?” This problem arose when IANSA received 1 million pounds. In addition, it is important that a coalition does not become a donor association, as it would lose its essence, as well as create perverse dynamics.

5. The fifth proposal reflects on the role played by the place where the negotiations take place. It argues that NGOs should always push for *Geneva* to be this place. First, Geneva was crucial for the Ottawa Process, playing a brokering role between civil society and the governments. In addition, the ICBL decided to locate their headquarters in Geneva in the third phase of the landmines process. In Geneva, there is the Geneva Forum, the Geneva Process, as well as many other examples of diplomatic processes taking place at the Swiss capital. As opposed to New York, relationships in Geneva seem to be more natural, informal and relaxed, in part because diplomats feel more distant to the hard centres of decision-making and of course, also more distant from the superpower, the United States. Activists should exploit this possibility and try to set all the negotiations there, as opposed to New York. Moreover, there has been something that has been called a Geneva style which could have its roots in the way traditionally Quakers exercise this diplomatic influence, by facilitating pleasant environments to discuss and dialogue about issues which could be potentially more controversial in other more formal and official forums. This kind of work was behind the achievement of concrete and feasible commitments in the recent 2008 Biennial Meeting of States in the UN small arms process, as opposed to the total failure that supposed the previous BMS in 2003 and 2005.

6. A integral strategy to maximize NGO influence should include the *dialogue with the “adversaries”*. In the effort to foster

dialogue, a frequently unexplored possibility by social movement activists is the inclusion of some of the opponent sector among the potential allies. This dissertation suggests a new policy, “try to divide the enemies”. In order to do so activists need to be open-minded. For example, gun control activists could start by establishing channels of dialogue with non-extremist associations of the gun lobby, like some hunters associations. In this case as in many others, they partially share similar aims. Explicit support from these kinds of organizations for the IANSA objectives could improve social movement activists’ credibility before some countries, international organizations and a big part of the public opinion particularly in the United States. Such interlocution with “adversaries” should also include the arms industry, if possible with proposals of feasible reconverting. The German organisation BICC is a pioneer in this field. In order to do so, there need to be fluid communication channels and credible interlocutors in both sides.

7. Another central implication of this study is how important it is *to bring creativity to the tactics of social movement activists*. One example would be to invest in strategies of naming and shaming. These kind of tactics are one of the most effective possibilities coalitions have to make an influence on the negotiations of an international issue. No country wants to be on a list of “bad guys” from a human rights organization. That worked well in the Ottawa Process and it has been learned by more recent campaigns, such as the small arms one and especially the cluster munitions coalitions. In the Dublin Conference of the Oslo Process, where most of the real negotiations took place, diplomats were confronted every day with a world map in which each country had a different colour (green, yellow, red) representing their position towards the cluster munitions ban. Many diplomats recognised that this simple map had a tremendous effect on their conversations. It was something visual for journalists who frequently took it as an uncomfortable headline “our country is listed as part of the bad guys”. And, it was something that evolved during the negotiations as changes in colours were frequently

reported even in official discourses by the governmental delegations. This is an area activists could further explore with little cost and huge potential.

Another tactic involves connecting messages and audiences. In this field, flexibility in objectives, partnerships, contexts, and structure is a key asset. It is important to carefully choose the objective, the message, and the planning of the campaign for the right audiences (and several if there are different ones). Both the existing literature and this dissertation emphasize the connection between message and audience. In addition, the framing strategies need to be issue-specific. And activists need to be aware of the limitations of media to deliver messages, not always big coverage is good coverage. The media issue is a complex issue, as shown by many examples in this research, as the press coverage that presents child soldiers more as perpetrators than as victims.

A final way of bringing creative tactics to social movement activism is to involve the people closest to the social problems, the victims themselves. Giving voice to the affected is important socially and strategically and campaigns would only be strengthened through their incorporation. Similarly, the growing inclusion of victims on government delegations will have a significant impact on the content and direction of negotiations.

8. *Emphasis on research*: Another finding from the thesis is that activists should devote a big portion of their resources to research. The fact that research is necessary for action is illustrated by the case of the use of female children in armed conflicts, where the lack of information has prevented until recently NGO work on this issue, according to some interviewees.

Research should be understood as the first phase of campaigning. It provides credibility, access, consideration of expertise, and a very valuable asset: unique information that is necessary to understand the global situation. The dissertation has provided positive experiences in all cases, especially at the global level (i.e. global report on child soldiers) and at the monitoring level (i.e. landmine monitor), but also the Red Book on small arms. Transparency on the methods and the sources, as well as

accuracy in the data, is necessary. Normally there is no need to exaggerate, as the problems are big enough to make an impact. An overestimation can put in danger the reputation of a whole campaign. The example of the first data on landmines in Afghanistan, Iraq and Angola is a good illustration of this idea. Activists should campaign only on the data they are certain about.

Also good knowledge of humanitarian law is essential to be considered experts in the subject, to fully participate in the conversations and have the opportunity to maximize the access to the negotiation room. Because access is crucial, activists should maximize it as far as possible. If not inside the same room where members negotiate, at least activists should open constant meetings with the member of the delegations.

9. Multilevel Political Opportunity Structure. In any ideal new diplomacy process, there is a facilitating condition that reduces transaction costs: the shared background of key individuals in policy-making positions and NGO activists, which enables communication between the two sides of the like-minded coalition. Sometimes, this is made possible by the opening of positions within a government to former NGO members. Going further in the idea of multilevel opportunity structure and the relevance to build strong and diversified alliances, a particularly important actor to have contact with is the ICRC. The International Committee of the Red Cross is a crucial ally, because it is an international organization with a reputation of being a neutral humanitarian actor that does not normally play a role in political pressure campaigns. They make a difference whenever they decide to change this pattern. The presence of the ICRC in several processes can help the dialogue between coalitions and thus synergies and cooperation. And similarly alliances with UN agencies, including UNICEF, UNMAS, PNUD, OCHA, or the UN Office for Children and Armed Conflict, improve the chances of positive results.

From the results of the research, it has also become clear that activists would benefit from a bigger role for the European Parliament in these processes, the international institution which

constantly has shown to have most similar preferences to NGO claims. However, the Members of the Parliament do not have any executive power and their support has to be therefore understood as having symbolic nature.

10. *Countries are not unitary actors.* This study recommends NGOs not to take for granted that the position of a country in an issue will be coherent with the position of the same country in other related issues. For example, the thesis shows that countries that are leading the international efforts to restrict the use of an inhumane weapon can at the same time oppose to sign the treaty banning another inhumane weapon. It works in both directions. Thus, even if a country is opposed to a campaign, the other campaigns should still study the possibilities of having this country on board. Also, the positive background of a country decision should not prevent activists to focus on lobbying that country to achieve its support on the new issue, because the new position could be different. Sometimes that is because individuals in diplomat delegations change. To sum up, the past is useful to predict behaviours to some extent, but it is crucial not to be too deterministic, because each process is unique. An example is China, which is usually a difficult player in human rights negotiations but was quite helpful in several issues related to child soldiers. So even with the presumed opposition there are some common projects that can be accomplished. In fact, it is also in those countries' interest as they try to improve their image and international prestige.

11. *Take advantage of the international context.* Negotiation processes do not take place in isolation. On the contrary, they happen at the same place as terrorist attacks, wars, school shootings, economic crisis, climate disasters, etc. Activists could improve their effectiveness if they created more accurate links between the issues they are campaigning for and contemporary events. For example, Hurricane Katrina made visible some problems that authorities had to face because most of the people and equipment of guards/firemen, etc. were in Iraq with the rest of US troops at that time. That situation was useful to highlight some

contradictory issues about the way the last Bush administration was managing both the conflict in Iraq and the problems caused by Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and in the state of Louisiana.

All the cases in the thesis show that transnational activism can be particularly effective in periods where citizens (including diplomats) are particularly concerned by the consequences of armed conflicts or other events beyond the social movements' control. Cluster munitions in Lebanon, small arms in a shooting massacre, landmines in Cambodia, child soldiers in Congo, etc. It is vital to an NGOs' success to be updated about the news of the world and to continue intensifying their activism in the face of conflicts. For example, in the occasion of a school shooting the community will understand easily the need for stricter regulation on civilian possession of guns. Despite the horror of war, it is ironically an activist opportunity as it offers a high-coverage of the effects of the use of inhumane weapons.

12. *More and better relationships with other coalitions are needed.* There needs to be a change in the perception of competition between campaigns or between coalitions to reduce struggles for resources, media coverage, or simply for political support. Often individual organisations are only concerned about their concrete mandate. For example, during the RevCon, there were human rights activists interested only in the inclusion in the text of mentions to the relationship between the small arms proliferation and violations of human rights. That seemed their only aim, without a deeper concern in other related issues.

Now the question is "to what extent is this competition among NGOs positive?" Is there any other way of doing things? Activists need to engage these questions. Seeing each issue as a much larger human security situation would promote the type of cooperative thinking that a success in a (sister) campaign is something positive for their organization as well. From this perspective, it makes less sense to ask, "How can we maintain anti-mine action in the public agenda given all the other humanitarian priorities existing in the world, such as AIDS?" (Mine Action Canada, 2003). This dissertation suggests that NGOs and campaigns need to cooperate

to increase (the whole of) human security issues as priorities in the agenda.

Due to their complexity, campaigners are not always aware all the interrelationships between the different issues. But the future will necessarily pass through the construction of synergies between related areas. For instance, currently development and human rights issues are having more and more space in disarmament forums. And NGOs need to be ready to adapt to these globalised and interdependent contexts. Arguably, the clearest example to show the potential of cooperation between the networks is the role of the ICBL in the CMC. Since the ICBL involvement in the first Oslo Conference (February 2007), the CMC has been more successful: first, it has managed to get on board high-profile individuals, such as Nobel Peace Prize recipients; second, countries that are not part of the CCW, but that have special relationships with the landmine network; third, higher media coverage. These two successful actors (the ICBL and the CMC) can provide more legitimacy and credibility to other coalitions. Moreover, the contribution in terms of offering experience of a similar campaigning process, including having effectively overcome personal conflicts would be extremely valuable. In other words, learning and diffusion processes in this sector would lead to a higher rate of achievements.²

² Two important individuals in the landmines campaign discuss in a recent book the process of diffusion of the lessons learned from the campaign: 'Not as many NGOs as one might expect have sought out the ICBL to discuss lessons learned – both positive and negative – from the work to ban landmines. On the other hand, the ICBL has done little to proactively share those lessons' (Williams and Goose 2008: 195). But the actual main criticism is posed by Jody Williams by the end of the book when she affirms that 'many NGO members of the ICBL, have missed opportunities to advance the human security agenda. This is explained by their focus on maintaining their own momentum to reach the goal of a world free of landmines. But to be able to advance the human security framework as a viable multifaceted approach to security, NGOs must

13. *Non-state armed actors are a growing field of work.* As we have seen, the work by the Geneva Call organisation is inspiring, but much more could be done. Many activists (and diplomats) have not realized yet that, for example, those non-state armed actors that recruit and use child soldiers often exhibit all attributes of states, even if they are not officially recognized as states by other countries. They are the only “law” makers and enforcers on large territories, have their armies recruited from the local population, their political agenda is often supported by the population and there is no external force exerting any control over them.

Especially after the treaties have been approved the problems of child soldiers, landmines, cluster munitions and most of the topics dealing with human security issues concern mainly non-state armed actors: “By 2004 up to 70 per cent of the world’s child soldiers in armed conflicts were involved with a range of non-state armed groups, many fighting in opposition to government forces” (CSC 2005). The figures for landmines are still bigger, as documented yearly by Landmine Monitor.

14. *Don’t forget implementation and monitoring.* The third phase in the processes has achieved a big repercussion with the Landmine Monitor and this experience should be adapted to other campaigns. NGOs keep their status and relevant roles in a complicated phase in which normally there is a decrease of media coverage and access to the decision-makers. Campaigners still possess unique, global and updated information which help them to improve the work and the real situation in the field.

The third phase sometimes comes unexpectedly. Activists have put so much energy and efforts in the first and the second phases that they forget to design a strategy for them to face the third phase. There will probably be a transition period and a debate about the future. Activists need to be aware that things change, it is to be expected that different organizations do different things. In

recognize that human security is indeed an overarching framework and they must recognize their own place in it’ (p. 293).

the case of landmines and child soldiers, some NGOs keep on working on the same issues, others go to work on other issues, the coalition diversifies, some NGOs specialise and others expand their mandate if they have enough resources to do so. However, it is important that the coalition banner keeps staying in the collective imaginary to remind the citizens what has been achieved and so, the strength of the transnational social action. The International Center of Geneva of Humanitarian Demining is an example of evolution, adaptation and expansion of its aims and work, as it was created to deal with landmines issues and now it has integrated other issues, including cluster munitions in their original mission.

15. *Which countries should be targeted when activists need to develop a list of supporting countries?* Should so-called spoilers be targeted? What about the USA? Some scholars, such as Finnemore and Sikkink, would advise to go for critical states, countries with a high moral stature. Therefore, in the first phase of the campaign activists need to remember that some countries base part of their foreign affairs policies on being considered a “super-humanitarian power”, despite their status as an economic or military middle power. Norway is the best example of countries that are more likely to participate and play an active role in these issues. Other small (and very small) countries that can play a crucial role in international forums are those countries without an army, as Costa Rica has in the Arms Trade Treaty process. These countries are normally easy targets for the activists to make a symbolic act that puts them from the beginning in the list of the “good guys”. In fact, some of these small countries appear well-located in the list of major donors per habitant, e.g. Luxemburg.

From a European point of view, it seems that internationally only the positions of big states, such as France, UK and Germany matter. This brings up another question about the remaining states: should the Spanish or the Italian activists focus their work on lobbying those diplomats, assuming that their government will follow the perceived as the European position, which is arguably formed by the opinion of these states?

15a. A recurrent debate that before or after all international campaigns need to face is “*what to do with spoilers?*” Is it necessary to have all of them on board? Maybe having a solid representation of some of the major producers, major exporters and major users of the weapon at stake, together with the main affected countries can be enough to achieve success in the support to a campaign. In fact, in some of the most successful disarmament negotiations (e.g. the Ottawa Process and the Oslo Process) there were strict rules to participate and especially, the countries had to agree to a series of principles, more and more concrete as the process evolves. That was crucial to prevent negative position of countries aiming at blocking negotiations, which they often do effectively in the traditional forums.

15b. Which attitude should the activists adopt towards the USA? Any answer needs to consider that the USA is not a unitary actor, but a set of individuals who change with every new political administration. On another front, it is still the only unique superpower in the post-Cold War world. It is thus a key actor but the reality is that its support is not always necessary to achieve success. Moreover, normally its role is complex and ambiguous. Even if they are not in favour of the whole process, they can be of help in particular issues, e.g. the financial one. For example, the US has not signed the Ottawa treaty, but they spend a huge amount of money to demining activities every year, partially as a consequence of its no-signature. The landmine case study also shows the number of internal actors who participate in the final decision the country adopts on security issues. If possible, lobbyists to the US delegations should include Americans. That would improve their legitimacy and prevent claims of anti-Americanism frequently used by the adversaries of the campaigners to undermine their credibility.

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