Behind the frontlines : identity, competition, and violence in civil wars

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Abstract:	El estudio de la violencia contra civiles durante conflictos armados internos ha estado mayoritariamente inspirado en los procesos de violencia que tienen lugar en el contexto de guerras civiles irregulares. En esta tesis se investigan conflictos armados denominados convencionales, que tienen características parecidas a las de los conflictos interestatales por la naturaleza de su tecnología de guerra –pesada– y de sus frentes de batalla –estables. El núcleo de la tesis intenta responder a la pregunta de por qué los grupos armados que se enfrentan en guerras civiles convencionales deciden asesinar a civiles que viven en sus retaguardias, y por qué lo hacer en mayor o menor grado en distintos lugares y momentos del tiempo. Se distingue entre violencia directa e indirecta según el nivel de interacción entre grupos armados y víctimas y se teoriza sobre los determinantes de una y otra violencia, vinculados en ambos casos (aunque de formas distintas) a las dinámicas políticas locales previas a la guerra. Y es que la violencia se genera por parte de grupos armados que pretenden eliminar del territorio a sus enemigos políticos, y es promocionada por parte de civiles que la utilizan a fin de cambiar el statu quo político de sus localidades. Las implicaciones observables del modelo teórico se comprueban a partir de análisis cuantitativos y cualitativos con datos de un único caso de conflicto armado, la Guerra Civil Española, 1936–39. El principal hallazgo es que la competencia política, medida a través de datos de las elecciones generales de febrero del 1936, explica el nivel de ejecuciones que tiene lugar a nivel local. En particular, se observa que –independientemente del color político del grupo armado y de su estructura interna– una mayor paridad en la distribución de poder local, ofrece como resultado un mayor nivel de violencia directa. Por otro lado, el análisis de los bombardeos en Cataluña muestra que las localidades con mayor dominación política por parte de la izquierda son, junto con las ciudades portuarias y fronterizas, las más afectadas por los bombardeos fascistas. Así, se demuestra que los factores que explican la violencia directa son diferentes a los que explican la violencia indirecta. En un segundo plano, la tesis explora las consecuencias de la violencia sobre las identidades políticas. La evidencia obtenida sugiere que las experiencias traumáticas que tienen lugar en el contexto de una guerra modifican las identidades de las víctimas y sus familias. De forma clara, estos recuerdos aumentan el sentimiento de "rechazo" de las identidades del grupo victimizador. La principal implicación de todo ello es que la violencia es contraproducente para los grupos armados que cometen violaciones contra civiles y que aspiran a gobernar un país una

vez que el conflicto armado ha finalizado.

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BEHIND THE FRONTLINES: IDENTITY,
COMPETITION, AND VIOLENCE IN CIVIL WARS

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Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

AGR	Agrario (agrarian party)
BOP	Boletín Oficial de la Provincia (oficial bulletin of the province)
C	Conservador (conservative party)
Cacique	Local political boss
Caciquismo	Clientelism; vote-buying; patronage
CCW	Conventional civil war
CE	Centrista (centrist party)
CEDA	Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (conservative coalition party)
Cenetista	Member of CNT
CNT	Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (anarchist trade union organization)
Desamortización	Legal Action to liberate goods own by the church, the novelty or the municipal government so that they can be sold in the private market
EC	Esquerra Catalana (left wing catalane nationalist party)
Ejército del Norte	Northern Army (division of the Francoist/Nationalist army)
Emboscados	Hidden people (very often, deserters)
ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Catalan republican and secessionist party)

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Estat Català	Catalan State (Catalan secessionist party)
FAI	Federación Anarquista Ibérica (anarchist political party)
Faista	Member of FAI
Falangista	Member of Falange Española
FE	Falange Española (fascist political party)
FED	Federal (federal/centrist party)
ID	Independiente de derecha (right wing party)
IR	Izquierda Republicana (left wing republican party)
IZ	Independiente de izquierda (left wing independent party)
Latifundio	Large agrarian property
LD	Liberal Demócrata (democratic liberal party)
LlR	Lliga Regionalista (right wing catalanist party)
Paco	Sniper
Panachage	Open list electoral system
Paro agrícola	Agrarian unemployment
Paseo	Irregular individual or mass execution
PCE	Partido Comunista Español (communist party)
PNV	Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque nationalist party)

POUM	Partit Obrer Unificat Marxista (Trotskist party)
PRO	Progresista (progressist party)
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (workers's socialist party)
PSUC	Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (Catalan Communist party)
Rabassaire	vine grower peasants of Catalonia
RD	Radical (radical/centrist party)
RE	Renovación española (Spanish renovation party)
S	Sindicalista (trade unionist party)
Saca(s)	Mass irregular execution
SCW	Spanish Civil War
SNC	Symmetric non-conventional civil war
SSV	Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya (co-authors of several reference books)
T or TYRE	Tradicionalista (Traditionalist party)
UdR	Unió de Rabassaires (Catalan wine grower peasants" party)
UGT	Unión General de Trabajadores (socialist trade union organization)
UME	Unión Militar Española (military union of Spain)

UR   Union Republicana (left republican party)

Conventions

a) Throughout the manuscript, I make reference to several oral sources. These are people who I interviewed and who are listed, with a corresponding id number. (to guarantee anonymity), in Table 7.1 (chapter 7). I call them out as *Testimony + id number.*

b) All names of locations (i.e. municipalities, counties and regions) are included in English. When there is no translation, the original name in Catalan or Spanish is included in italics.

c) All quotations from written and oral sources in Spanish, Catalan or French have been translated to English.

ABSTRACT

Recent research on violence against civilians during wars has emphasized war-related factors (such as territorial control or the characteristics of armed groups) over political ones (such as ideological polarization or prewar political competition). This dissertation distinguishes between direct and indirect violence and presents a theory of the determinants of these two types of violence for conventional civil wars —where armed groups and civilians face a structure of incentives that broadly differs from that in civil wars fought via irregular warfare. In contrast to much of the literature, the dissertation focuses on political factors as well as those set in motion by war. I generate a set of testable implications for conventional wars and suggest that some also occur in other civil war contexts. Specifically, political variables are hypothesized to have a key explanatory role on the perpetration of lethal violence at the local level, and to affect direct and indirect violence differently.

To test the observable implications of the theory, I draw on archival and historical sources to construct a new dataset of victims of lethal violence, pre-war election results, and geographical and socioeconomic variables in 2,700 municipalities during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). I show that direct violence against civilians goes up where prewar electoral competition between rival political factions approaches parity; this finding is consistent across armed groups and zones. Using data on bombings by Fascist forces on all 1,062 municipalities of Catalonia, I also show that lethal indirect violence is negatively and monotonically associated with levels of prewar support for the group.

Additionally, following the first round of violence, war-related factors are found to gain explanatory relevance at the expense of

prewar political variables: on the one hand, there is a clear endogenous trend whereby, at the local level, subsequent levels of direct violence perpetrated by one group are highly correlated with initial levels of direct violence perpetrated by the rival group; on the other hand, the likelihood of bombings is positively affected by executions perpetrated by the rival armed group in a municipality during an earlier period. Overall, the findings indicate that understanding the determinants of violence requires a theory that combines the effects of political cleavages and wartime dynamics.

At a secondary level, this dissertation explores the consequences of civil war victimization on the political identities of individuals. Using qualitative and survey data from Spain, I observe that victimization broadly generates "rejection" toward the identity of the perpetrating group. Identities endogenous to the war seem to be transmitted across generations. In addition, in the long run, victimization is found to have a negative effect on political participation.

This thesis contributes to the understanding of the relationship between political identities and violence during civil conflict: while identities are explanatory of wartime violence, they are also affected by them. In other words, political identities are both exogenous and endogenous to wartime dynamics.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

"When we cannot control the assignment of the potential causes, we are at the mercy of history . . . . Where history was kind enough to have generated different causes under the same conditions we will know more and know better."

Adam Przeworski, "Is the Science of Comparative Politics Possible?"

1.1. Puzzle and State of the Art

Between 1936 and 1939, during almost the totality of the Spanish Civil War (hereafter SCW), the county of *La Cerdanya*, in Northern Catalonia, was under control of the Republican or Loyalist army. Between July 1936 and May 1937, anarchist militiamen led by Antonio Marín patrolled the county. During that period, the militias killed 36 civilians in the capital town of the county, *Puigcerdà* (i.e. 10.1‰ of its population); less than 18km away, in the second most important town of the county, *Bellver de Cerdanya*, the militias did not kill a single civilian. In *Das*, a tiny village of 243 inhabitants located 11 km from *Puigerdà*, the anarchists were ferocious (16.5‰ of its population was executed); in the meantime, in *Llívia*, a village of a similar size, located 6.6 km at the Northeast of *Puigcerdà*, there was not a single death. Given that during this time period there were no combats in this area and that the Nationalist army had no presence whatsoever, the

variation in levels of violence cannot be explained by military variables. Also, given that the militias patrolling this area were all composed by the same men, and they were led by the same person (i.e. Antonio Marín), principal agent or organizational factors cannot explain this variation either. Variation in levels of violence is likely related to the local level characteristics of the municipalities; in particular, as will be shown, local political characteristics are at the core of these executions.

The empirical puzzle above introduces the research question in this dissertation: what explains variation in levels of violence across time and space during civil wars? Why do armed groups use high levels of violence in some places, but not in neighboring places with similar characteristics? More specifically, why do groups fighting a conventional civil war decide to perpetrate violence behind the frontlines, when this type of violence is unnecessary based on standard rationalist assumptions?

The question of civilian victimization has been at the forefront of recent research on civil wars. To date, two types of explanations have emerged: a first generation of scholars considered prewar characteristics of countries; following Clausewitz (1832/1968) and Schmitt (1976), civil conflicts were seen as the result of existing political cleavages, and violence as the consequence of these divisions.[1] Recent empirical research has pointed instead to security concerns related to warfare, e.g. the military incentives of armed groups (Valentino *et al.* 2004; Kalyvas 2006); to the survival incentives of civilians (Kalyvas 2006); to the organizational characteristics of the armed groups (Mkandawire 2002; Weinstein 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). These authors, who have used more systematic research methods than the previous generation of scholars, have been theoretically inspired by Mao Zedong's (1978) insight that war cannot be

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[1] Clausewitz did not refer exactly to political cleavages in his theory, but he argued that "war is a mere continuation of policy by other means" (1832/1968: 23), and that "under all circumstances War is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument" (25).

equated with politics because it has its own particular characteristics. This body of research has de-emphasized political variables despite the fact that civil wars are usually fought over political issues, e.g. demand for self-determination, regime or leadership change.[2] The tendency has been to assume that, even if politics matter at the outbreak of conflict, the internal dynamics of war are driven by factors that are not necessarily political.[3]

Additionally, despite the fact that the empirical literature on civil conflict (e.g. in Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004; Ross 2004) has largely challenged the hypothesis that internal conflict is the outcome of economic factors (e.g. exploitation of natural resources), the idea that rebels are thugs motivated by looting incentives, with no interest in political aims whatsoever, still represents a quite accepted stream of thought. Authors such as Azam (2006), Azam and Hoeffler (2002), and Hegre *et al.* (2007) have emphasized the role of pillaging and have explained violence as a collateral effect of combatants's taxation interests, if not of pure greed. These authors have been largely inspired by Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) piece, which provides a rationalist explanation to civil war mostly based on economic incentives.

In a more macro-oriented set of recent works, violence against civilians is explained by what has been called an "anti-civilian" ideology. This stream of research, rather connected to the "new wars" literature (e.g. Munkler 2005; Sofsky 2003; Brzoska 2004; Hironaka 2005), has viewed armed groups as intrinsically biased against civilians, and has argued that violence is a consequence of this predisposition: "armed groups seem to have despised the population and sought only to terrify and control them" (Slim

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[2] See, for instance, Gurr (1970), Horowitz (1985), Bates (1999), Gurr (2000), Hechter (2001), Sambanis (2001), Reynal-Querol (2002), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), Toft (2003), Esteban and Ray (2008).

[3] Interestingly, political variables have been much less neglected when explaining other forms of political violence such as riots (Wilkinson 2004), street violence (De la Calle 2007), or terrorist attacks (Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2004; Schulhofer-Wohl 2006).

2008: 205-206). Yet, because these authors do not offer any specific causal mechanisms by which somewhat abstract ideological factors can account for effective levels of violence on the ground, these explanations are limited in their potential to account for temporal and spatial variation in lethal violence.

Some macro-level approaches, such as Lacina's (2006) or Downes's (2006) have linked civilian victimization to national level features such as regime type. Since their unit of analysis is the state, these works do not offer an explanation of variation in violence within a single conflict. At the theoretical level, they have the problem of conceiving violence as somewhat one-dimensional: they implicitly assume that combatants have a constant set of incentives, and that the observed violence varies simply as a result of the existence of greater or lower constraints on violent behavior (Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2009b).

In a more recent set of studies, violence against civilians has been conceived as the collateral outcome of bargaining negotiations between groups (Hultman 2007; Choi 2009; Wood 2010), shifts in the military balance of power (Vargas 2009), or battlefield losses (Hultman 2007: 206; Ziemke 2008). Some of these studies —although not all of them– have been backed by cross-national analyses made on the basis of internal conflict data collected for a large number of countries, e.g. UCDP one-sided violence dataset (Eck and Hultman 2007); ACLED dataset (Raleigh and Hegre 2005).[4] The data in these works is aggregated at a far too large unit of analysis (i.e. the country) to allow testing claims of causality referring to groups interacting within national units. Indeed, while they can potentially explain temporal variation in violence (for example, after battlefield losses), they cannot account for spatial variation. Furthermore, these theories fail to explain who the victims of violence are –as they pool all the civilians living in the territory of a country altogether. Recent

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[4] Yet, these databases largely rely on data of dubious reliability, collected from newspapers and similar secondary sources (e.g. ACLED), which are likely biased sources to study violence (Kalyvas 2006).

research has made it increasingly obvious that, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective, the study of intentional violence against civilians requires a local level approach: on the one hand, this is consistent with a microlevel explanation of the phenomenon that gives the locus of agency to individuals –and not to abstract entities such as ethnic or political groups;[5] and, on the other hand, this allows measurement error and omitted variable bias to be minimized.[6]

In general terms, as research on warfare develops (e.g. Arreguín-Toft 2001; Kalyvas 2005; Kalyvas and Balcells 2008; 2009; Lyall 2009), it is becoming increasingly obvious that we need different theories in order to analyze wars as defined by their technology of warfare: the technology of rebellion in a civil war (or the way a war is fought) is likely to imply diverging patterns of civilian victimization (Balcells 2009b). Nonetheless, the literature on civil wars, following Fearon and Laitin's influential article (2003), has tended to equate all civil wars to insurgencies or guerrilla wars, which fought between a weak rebel group and a strong state.[7] For example, Hultman (2007) argues "internal conflicts are characterized by asymmetry —the rebels are the weak contenders that challenge the central power" (208); Azam

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[5] See, for example: Petersen 2001; Wood 2003; Gagnon 2004; Kalyvas 2006, 2009; Weinstein 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Fuji 2009. On the study of genocide, Fuji says: "Examining the social dimensions of genocide also helps to locate agency at the microlevel, rather than assuming it away or assigning it to whole groups of actors, such as "the Hutu" or "the masses""(2009: 20).

[6] Indeed, using small units of analysis (e.g. community, municipality) allows not only collecting fine-grained data, but also better controlling for sources of unit heterogeneity that can otherwise bias the empirical results.

[7] Guerrilla or irregular wars are civil wars "in which the government or state army faces guerrilla forces that usually evade direct clashes and hide among the civilian population. Frontlines are unclear and the underlying character of irregular war is military asymmetry between the two sides" (Kalyvas 2005).

states that "regimented wars are an image of the past" (2006: 53). Yet, this assumption has recently been questioned (Kalyvas and Balcells 2008; Duyvesteyn 2005): irregular civil wars are not the only type of civil wars.

In Table 1.1, we can see the distribution of civil wars, as characterized by their technology rebellion, throughout the second half of the twentieth century. In addition of conventional and irregular, this classification also includes symmetric non-conventional civil wars (hereafter, also SNC).[8] This evidence suggests that Azam's assessment is overly misleading: while in the period 1944-2004 a majority of civil wars were irregular (53.06% of them), a non-negligible share of civil wars (33%) was conventional.[9] And in the Post Cold War period (i.e. 1991-2004), almost 48% of civil wars were conventional, while 26.09% were irregular and 26.09% were SNC.[10]

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[8] Symmetric non-conventional are civil wars in which "two irregular armies, none of which is the government army, face each other across a frontline equivalent in a war consisting primarily of raids" (Kalyvas 2005).

[9] According to Duyvesteyn, "The concept of conventional war has without much consideration been marginalized and sometimes even neglected as a concept for analysis, in particular in wars occurring in collapsed states" (2005: 65). She also says that "there seems to be strong biases toward regarding conventional war as a form of war that is Western, modern, uses high-technology weapons, and is relatively clean. There are strong prejudices at work in the preferred way of seeing this kind of war. Such prejudice does injustice to some striking conventional features of wars in the developing world that hitherto have been categorized as guerrilla struggles." (2005: 79).

[10] Kalyvas and Balcells (2008) explain that the dynamics associated with the end of the Cold War (i.e. the loss of external aid to the states and rebel groups) are connected to the decrease in the relative number of irregular civil wars, and the increase in symmetric conflicts such as conventional and SNC civil wars after 1991.

Table 1.1. Types of Civil War by Technology of Rebellion (1944-2004)

Technology of Rebellion	Cold War		Post-Cold War		Both Periods	
	N (1944-1990)	% (1944-1990)	N (1991-2004)	% (1991-2004)	N (1944-2004)	% (1944-2004)
Conventional	27	26.73%	22	47.83%	49	33.33%
Irregular	66	65.35%	12	26.09%	78	53.06%
SNC	8	7.92%	12	26.09%	20	13.61%
Total	101	100%	46	100%	147	100%

Source: Kalyvas and Balcells (2008).

In short, the evidence in Table 1.1 indicates that civil war cannot be equated to irregular war, and this is especially true for the Post Cold War period. I argue that theories of victimization in civil wars should take into consideration these differences, and they should be careful at applying theories that are largely inspired in one particular context (i.e. type of warfare) to all civil war settings. In this dissertation, I consider conventional civil wars (hereafter CCW), which are wars that "have clear frontlines, where attacks take place mostly from barricades and stable positions, and in which there are big major battles that are usually determinants for the war outcomes" (Kalyvas 2005). In CCW, there is military symmetry between the two sides; one of the main differences between them and irregular or guerrilla wars is that, except for zones that are extremely close to the frontline, the control of the armed groups over the population is overwhelming in all the localities in their "zone". In irregular civil wars, areas of

total control are much scarcer, smaller and less stable. This implies that while in irregular wars violence against civilians is likely the result of the warfare itself and the competition to achieve territory (Mao Zedong 1978; Valentino *et al.* 2004; Kalyvas 2006; Vargas 2009), in CCW this violence is not so connected to the military struggle –as it takes place in a space separated from the battlefield (i.e. cities, towns, villages with no combatants). I theorize on the determinants of civilian victimization in this context, and I generate a set of observable implications, which I then test empirically. I focus here at exploiting internal variation in lethal victimization within one conflict, the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), while keeping in mind other cases for comparative analysis —for the sake of external validity.

I argue that understanding the determinants of violence in CCW is not only relevant *per se*, but that this should contribute to our understanding of the broad phenomenon of civilian victimization in war. Above all, I use CCW as a device to explore the choices made by individuals (the relevant actors in war, namely armed groups and civilians) under the structure of incentives sharpened by this type of warfare. By looking into a subset of wars that have been largely neglected in the contemporary literature, I should be able to provide novel insights into the topic. Yet, as we shall see, this exercise should allow me to generate implications for other types of civil wars, where this structure of incentives may reproduce at particular places and/or moments of time. Indeed, I believe that the findings here will be relevant for understanding wars that have conventional features at particular points of time (as it is the case of the late periods of the Vietnam or Chinese civil wars), civil wars that share conventional and irregular features during extended periods of time (e.g. civil wars in Russia, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, or Colombia), or international wars that imply the internal division of countries (e.g. the Russian-Georgian war on South Ossetia of 2008). Besides, the framework here may also

generate implications for non-conventional civil wars (e.g. zones of full control in irregular conflict).

My research brings political variables back to the fore in an explanation of violence against civilians during conflict. I argue that, in the last decade, these variables have suffered from an unjustifiable neglect.[11] I believe that their inclusion in a theory of wartime violence can only be made in the light of the recent developments on the topic; by including political variables in a strategic type of framework, the so-called "political bias" (Kalyvas 2006) of the first generation of scholars can be overcome. As will be explained, in my theoretical framework, the relevance of political factors derives directly from the importance of public identities for the production of violence. In settings such as those of CCW, threats behind the lines (and their detection by armed groups) are very much connected to the political identities of people.[12]

1.2. Theoretical Strategy

The research conducted in this dissertation is grounded on rationalist principles and on methodological individualism. In other words, the theory is built on the assumption of rational self-interested individuals who have rational beliefs and try to

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[11] Referring to insurgencies in Africa, Mkandawire argues: "Regrettably, the recent focus on the means of financing rebel movements and the failure of most movements to coherently articulate, let alone achieve, their proclaimed objectives have encouraged an easy dismissal of the politics of such movements and an inclination towards economistic, culturalistic and militaristic interpretations of the conflicts" (2002: 182-83).

[12] The importance of public identities distinguishes dynamics and patterns of violence in conventional civil wars from those in interstate conventional wars; while these two share technology of warfare (i.e. fixed and stable frontlines, use of heavy artillery), the existence of threats behind the frontlines is much less of an issue in interstate wars.

maximize their utility by pursuing a set of actions (Elster 2007: 191-213). Yet, the role of norms, psychological factors and emotions on human behavior will also be taken into account. Indeed, non-rationalist factors such as "trust", "rivalry", or "revenge" will be taken as crucial in the explanation of violent outcomes. That is because, just like in any other social and political behavior, the motives leading individual behavior in civil war are mixed (Petersen 2001, 2002; Wood 2003; Elster 2007; Kalyvas 2006; Baranova 2008). Thus, while relying on a rationalist framework, I do not constrain myself to a narrow rational-choice explanation of the phenomenon under scrutiny. First, because pure rational-choice explanations are less successful in situations involving extremely high levels of stress (Maoz 1990), or when the options of an agent are not fixed (vis-à-vis possible actions of others) (Elster 1986: 19-2); both of these conditions are very plausible in wartime situations. Second, because —in social science in general– relying on analytical conditions that are too strict, conveys the risk of generating misleading explanations for the phenomenon of interest (Elster 2007; Green and Shapiro 1996). Third, because the findings in behavioral economics (e.g. Sen 1986; Simon 1977; Bowles 1998, 2004; Bowles and Gintis 2000) have indicated that individuals often fail to behave like narrowly self-interested subjects, as it is assumed in the neoclassical paradigm (Chacón 2004a).

Both the theoretical framework and the empirical test of this dissertation give special emphasis to the mechanisms by which objective outcomes take place. No causal explanations will be defended without their corresponding microfoundations. In the event that different processes are hypothetically contributing to one same result, I will try to provide a complex framework accounting for them all. Finally, I do not adjudicate between alternative mechanisms unless one of them is either analytically flawed or plausible to reject in the light of empirical results.

1.3. Empirical Strategy: Research Design

The dependent variable in this dissertation is lethal violence against civilians; specifically, I focus on violence against civilians in the rear territories of a CCW. I distinguish between direct and indirect violence, which are two forms of violence that are usually studied separately in the literature, and for which I provide a common explanatory framework. I develop on these types of violence, and on their relationship with one another, further below.

The multi-method empirical strategy of the dissertation, which contains a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses, is intended to match the theoretical endeavor. Large-*n* statistical analyses are combined with the analysis of evidence collected from oral sources and over a hundred published sources on the Spanish Civil War, including general history books, regional and local studies. Following a recent trend in political science (Wilkinson 2004; Posner 2004; Kalyvas 2006; Straus 2006; Lyall 2009), the research design consists of systematically exploring intra-country variation (i.e. large-*n* sub-national data), and combining it with additional secondary evidence from other cases, in order to provide external validity.

The selection of the SCW for the sub-national analysis stems from a number of theoretical and empirical factors: first, the SCW is, together with the US Civil War, a paradigmatic case of conventional civil war. Analyzing an "ideal" case is more helpful than doing so with a less paradigmatic or a more "mixed" case.[13] Second, using this case constitutes a challenge to the aforementioned neglect of historical cases (or so-called "old" civil wars) in the study of civil war violence, which risks generating wrong conceptualizations of the phenomenon. After all, it cannot be really argued that there are "new" and "old" civil wars; their distinction is a burden for a comprehensive study of internal conflict (Kalyvas 2001). Third, the SCW has a special relevance

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[13] See chapter 8 for a response to potential critiques over the classification of the Spanish civil war as a conventional civil war.

on its own because 1) it was a crucial conflict in the West European interwar period, which led to the first open confrontation between the antagonistic ideologies of Fascism and Republicanism/Democracy (Lannon 2002), and 2) it was a particularly severe conflict, with 800,000 estimated deaths (including combatant and civilian deaths). As a matter of fact, in comparative terms, the SCW is the fourth deadliest among all conventional civil wars that took place from 1936 to 2007.[14] Finally, the Spanish case allows for the use of fine-grained reliable data at a local level; at least for a set of regions, the numbers have been revisited by several historians, and they are extremely trustworthy.[15] It is less common for this type of reliable data to exist in more contemporary cases, where existing figures must be corrected by highly complex statistical processes before they can be analytically explored (Ball *et al.* 2002).

Within Spain, this dissertation focuses primarily on the regions of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia. At a secondary level, it focuses on Extremadura and the province of Malaga, in Andalusia. The historical characteristics of these regions will be described in detail in chapter 3. The focus on these territories issues not only from the availability of historical data, but also from the fact that their combination provides with rich variation in both the dependent variable(s) and the independent variable(s) that will be taken into consideration. And this variation is not only given by the combination of all these cases;[16] each of these regions displays high internal variation too.

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[14] According to data from Kalyvas and Balcells (2009). Also, among all civil wars since 1936, this is the fifth deadliest conflict (after Pakistan 1971, Liberia 1992-97, China 1946-49, Nigeria 1967-70, and before Rwanda 1990-93).

[15] Details on data sources and coding are provided in Chapter 3, as well as in the Appendix of Chapter 4.

[16] As will be shown, the study of areas of Nationalist control in Aragon, and its comparison with areas of Republican control in Valencia, Malaga and Catalonia, will provide with a lot of empirical leverage.

1.4. The Spanish Civil War as a Motivating Puzzle

It must be noted that the SCW is not only an appropriate case of study for the different reasons aforementioned, but it also constitutes a motivating puzzle for the main research question in the dissertation. Indeed, if we check the extent to which existing theories of civil war violence can explain violence against civilians in this civil war, we can assess that each of these approaches have a number of shortcomings in doing so. From my point of view, this is highly indicative that something relevant is missing in these theories. Let me address this point in further detail:

Some authors have explained bombings during civil war by taking into account military bargaining factors, namely factors related to the balance of power between groups in conflict, or the willingness to resolve by one of the sides, "as long as bombardment does not utterly destroy the target's ability to resist" (Horowitz and Reiter 2001). Yet, bargaining factors can barely account for spatial variation in violence, including bombardments, and sometimes they cannot even explain variation along time. For example, why did the Francoists bomb Catalan localities in 1939, when it was clear that they were winning the war and any form of political bargaining was going on with the Republican government, which had already "fled" the country? Some other authors have argued that bombings can be understood from a purely militaristic perspective (Pape 1996). In the SCW, bombings indeed served combat purposes, and they aimed at destroying military enclaves, ammunition deposits, and/or crucial production and communication centers (SSV 2003; Maldonado 2006a). There were however a large number of bombings against cities full of noncombatants (e.g. *Guernica,* on 26 April 1937; *Granollers*, on 31 May 1938), which cannot really be explained from a militaristic perspective, and that may seem "irrational" at first

glance.[17] Historians have usually referred to the will to inflict terror (Leitz 1999) as the main causal explanation of these bombings. Yet, inflicting terror among civilians has not proved to be efficient to win a civil war (Kocher *et al.* 2008). This is quite particularly the case in CCW, where the actions of civilians (e.g. informing) are not significant for the war outcomes –in other words, in which civilian actions are quite irrelevant for the military prospects of the civil war.[18] Finally, if the objective was terrorizing the population, one should not find systematic variation in the targeting; in other words, these cities should have been as likely as others (i.e. neighboring ones) to be attacked (bombings should be distributed as "white noise" across localities).

What I call "direct violence" against civilians is just as (if not more) puzzling in the context of a CCW such as the Spanish one. I define direct violence as violence perpetrated by small weapons in a "face-to-face" type of interaction. Coherent with the tradition of the first generation of scholars, some historians have characterized direct violence during the SCW as the result of political factors. Yet it is not very well established from these studies how politics influenced violence: some argue that violence affected localities that were politically polarized (Ledesma 2003) while others argue that it affected communities with a higher density of political opponents, e.g. that leftist violence was higher in places where the right had a greater degree of electoral support (Gaitx 2006), and conversely for rightist violence (Linz 1996; Casanova *et al.* 2001). Also, some others argue that violence affected areas with greatest economic inequalities (Casanova 1985; Chaves 1995). Furthermore, none of these authors has performed rigorous empirical analyses in order to test their hypotheses, thus their

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[17] "During the Spanish civil war, air forces bombed cities in rearguard territories for the first time in European history" (Balcells 1987: 34).

[18] Note that, due to the nature of the frontlines, bombardments against cities of the rearguard of CCW have probably little (if any) connection with warfare, and they usually generate more civilian than combatant victims.

insights are not confirmatory. The major question that arises from this perspective is: if politics matter, why is it the case that victimization does not seem to follow patterns of political domination? Some recent empirical research indicates that support for the Popular Front in the elections does not explain wartime victimization at a provincial level (Herreros and Criado 2009). And, why did a leftist region such as Catalonia experience the highest levels of violence perpetrated by the anarchist militias? The total of leftist violence in this region amounts to 3.92‰ inhabitants; this is considerably higher than the 2.96‰ estimated in the much less leftist region of Valencia, which was, in fact, under Loyalist control for a longer period of time. Conversely, why was Mallorca —a traditional enclave of the right (Oliver 1983)– heavily victimized by the Francoist forces? Estimates are of circa 2,000 victims on this island of slightly over 100,000 inhabitants in 1936, which represent a striking 20‰ of its population.

Echoing the opportunistic type of arguments, which are represented in the political science literature by authors such as Mkandawire (2002), Weinstein (2006), Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) or Cohen (2008, 2009), some historians have argued that violence on the Loyalist side was the result of the undisciplined nature of the Republican army, and the insufficient level of control that the Republican governmental authorities had over anarchist and communist militias that emerged and established their authority at a local level (Preston 1986; Vilar 1986; Luengo 1998; Torres 2002; Rodrigo 2008). Some have even argued that "red terror" was the result of spontaneous outbursts of violence, which gives this violence the category of "communal" violence (Brenan 1967: 238; Ors Montenegro 1995). Following this approach, violence should have been greater in those places where Republican authorities could not control the militias, and lesser where they could impose their rule over them. While this might seem an adequate explanation, it is an incomplete one: on the one hand, at the beginning of the war, just after Franco's coup, there was a vacuum of power in most of the Republican territory and

violence still diverged across localities. For example, Republican control of the territory was equally weak in the Catalan county of *Osona* than in the county of *La Cerdanya* (within this county, it was equally weak in the town of *Puigcerdà* as in *Bellver*), and the same for the remaining of the rearguard territory. On the other hand, this approach cannot explain violence that occurred in the few territories where the Republican government managed to maintain a higher degree of territorial control, for example, Valencia or Menorca.[19] Finally, this perspective cannot really account for violence carried out by the Francoist army, since this organization has been described as having a high level of hierarchy and rank-and-file control, which gave little potential for opportunistic behavior (Preston 1986; Casanova 2001; Calzado 2006). Indeed, Calzado explains that "the direction of the repression was always controlled by the Army and the militarized public order organizations, which allowed or backed the actions of *Falangist* militiamen, *Carlists*, mercenaries paid by big landlords" (Calzado 2006: 17-18). Espinosa explains that, in the military record of the formation of the (Nationalist) "Madrid column", discipline within the units was explicitly mandated with the following words: "acts of cruelty will be severely punished; riots and pillage discredit the unit that commits them, and they dishonor the Army" (Espinosa 2007: 109-110).

Opportunistic or principal-agent explanations consider the two blocs fighting the SCW as conceptually very different entities, which actions cannot be understood within a single explanatory framework. Somehow, they implicitly or explicitly argue that leftist violence was not driven by rationalist motives ⸺that it was just the by-product of the state collapse–, and that this differentiates it from Francoist violence, which is considered

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[19] "Valencia remained during almost all the war in a situation of strict rearguard, where the structure of the State was maintained" (Bosch 1983: 373), but the number of victims of leftist violence in this region is nonetheless significant: 4,634, according to Gabarda (1996). In Menorca, the military command was strong from the early stages of the war (Martín Jiménez 2000), and leftist violence was still high.

highly strategic. This explanation not only displays some degree of "tautology", but also is likely to be flawed from an analytical perspective. [20] A parsimonious causal theory —i.e. relying on counterfactuals– should rely on the assumption of unit homogeneity (Przeworski 2007). [21] In particular, it should attempt to account equally for violence perpetrated by all armed group(s).[22]

It could be that strategic approaches, which conceive violence as the result of the interactions between combatants and civilians, are more helpful in explaining why armed groups killed people in their respective rearguards. For example, it can be argued that armed groups decided to commit violations motivated by the need to attain consent and control of civilians (Kalyvas 2006), or to influence patterns of civilian support (Valentino *et al.* 2004). Yet, it is not clear what could have led to variation in the levels of violence in municipalities located in the same military zone, since, from a strategic perspective, armed groups would have had the same incentives to kill anywhere, and civilians would have had

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[20] Interestingly, organizational arguments have also been applied to explain bloodshed by some of the Latin American dictatorships, which in fact had a very tight internal structure, but whose violence is attributed to "uncontrolled" commanders (Schirmer 1999: 24). Thus, it seems that this kind of arguments can be used in many different settings, and –I would tentative argue- are quite useful in processes of "historical rationalization", which may allow softening the attribution of responsibilities of groups. In fact, Hart argues that this very clearly happened in the case of Ireland's revolutionary war of 1916-1923 (Hart 1998: 292).

[21] "We have seen that since each unit can be observed only in one state at one time it is not possible to identify the individual causal effect without making some assumptions. Hence, we need identifying assumptions, such as unit homogeneity. This assumption is not testable. But it seems reasonable" (Przeworski 2007: 6).

[22] It could very well be the case that our analysis ended up illuminating that there is not an empirical basis for unit homogeneity. Yet, I would argue that this should be the ending point of the research, not its foundation.

constant incentives to collaborate with the group. In other words, if ─following Kalyvas (2006)– we consider that maximizing likelihood of survival is the main factor explaining civilians's decision to collaborate with armed groups, there are no reasons to think that civilians would present diverging patterns of behavior across localities in the same control zone. And if we consider that informational needs are the only factor explaining armed group's decision to target civilians, then there are no reasons to think that this would vary throughout the rearguard territory (Balcells 2009b).

A similar caveat applies to explanations based on greed incentives of groups: since direct violence was disconnected from dynamics of military conquest, spatial variation in victimization cannot be explained by attempts to occupy more "desirable" (i.e. wealthier) territories. Terrorizing civilians in one's side (Azam and Hoeffler 2002) does not account for direct violence either, as individuals could not easily defect to the other group. Finally, since armed groups had relatively strong military capacities and relied on routinized conscription, taxation and recruitment incentives (Azam 2006) cannot account of violence either. Repression of deserters or defectors (i.e. people that did not comply with the wartime authorities) took place; yet this was not the norm, and it did not constitute the greatest share of violence perpetrated by each of the groups.

Summing up, none of the existing theories can explain lethal violence during the civil war under scrutiny in this dissertation. I would argue that this is the case because these theories have been largely inspired by violence in conditions of irregular warfare (i.e. fragmented control, fluid frontlines), and they have left violence in other contexts (i.e. full territorial control, fixed frontlines) out of their scope conditions. By digging into the patterns of violence during the Spanish Civil War, a paradigmatic case of a CCW, the *lacunae* in the literature become patent.

1.5. Roadmap of the Argument

The core of this dissertation attempts to answer the questions of why we observe violence against civilians in conditions such as those prevailing in a CCW, and what explains variation in levels of violence when this takes place. On the one hand, I argue that mass violence against civilians in CCW is explained by prewar political mobilization; this accounts for variation across cases as to why some civil wars are more lethal than others (see below). I hypothesize that armed groups will only perpetrate mass violence against civilians when there are significant levels of prewar mobilization in a country. Some would argue that high mobilization leads towards fighting a "total war" (Roxborough 2009),[23] but I avoid using this term as this tends to be associated with wanton violence against *all* civilians of the "rival society".[24] In this dissertation, I suggest that even if violence is widespread in these contexts not all rival civilians are equally likely to be targeted, and that not all aspects of the rival society are evenly targeted.

When there has been prewar mobilization, political identities become crucial for armed groups to detect potential threats in areas of full control. In this context, militants of political groups associated with the enemy, or simply strong supporters of the rival's "cause", are perceived threatening —as they for example can promote resistance movements (including armed resistance). The existence of potential threats within armed groups's rear territories is one of the main differences between conventional

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[23] "A 'total war' is a war fought for unlimited aims (i.e. the destruction of the adversary polity) and with unlimited means. All of society is mobilized and all aspects of the adversary society are legitimate targets" (Roxborough 2009, 5, fn. 4). Sharma (2008) argues that "total war" happens when the stakes of the war are social institutions (what rules) vis-à-vis the leaders (who rules).

[24] A total war implies that "the entire population and all the resources of a nation are sucked into the maw of war" (Douhet 1921, cited in Neely 2004: 439).

civil wars and interstate wars. With the exception of groups of spies or "fifth columnists", countries fighting a war with another state do not have to generally worry about threats arising from one's own territory (Downes 2008). And the same happens in the context of CCW where no major political mobilization has taken place during the prewar (e.g. US civil war, Ivory Coast), and where groups can have some degree of confidence in their control of the territory.[25]

The relevance of political identities for the detection of potential threats in the rearguard territories implies that, at the meso-level, the distribution of prewar loyalties is crucial in explaining variation in levels of violence across space and time, within a single civil war.[26] In this dissertation, I distinguish between indirect and direct violence against civilians, and I argue that the distribution of political loyalties relate differently to each of these types. These differences arise from the diverging form of production of each of these types of violence: indirect violence is perpetrated with heavy weapons (i.e. tanks, fighter planes), and it is unilateral from the armed group's perspective. Direct violence is perpetrated with small weapons (i.e. machetes, rifles) and it is jointly produced by armed groups and civilians: armed groups

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[25] McPherson (1988) details some instances of internal challenge in the Union during the American civil war, e.g. the New York City riots. Yet, these were quite concentrated to cities and did not signify a major threat. In Ivory Coast, groups did not seem to face much challenge over their control of the territory, even though people from both 'sides" or religious groups (Muslims and Catholics) lived in communities of the two war-divided areas (Basset 2003; Polgreen 2005). Interestingly –and also consistent with the framework here- the lack of fluidity or mobility in this civil war, which was imposed by the nature of the war frontlines, led to some tensions and violence at the local level; in other words, there were tensions endogenous to the civil war itself. Yet, this did not necessarily lead to violence: "In Fengolo, villagers say they are determined to reconcile, because they have little choice short of wiping one another out" (Polgreen 2005).

[26] Thus, we can expect violence to vary systematically –not to be "white noise" across space and along time.

have agency on the targeting, and civilians provide with the collaboration necessary for violence to effectively take place. (Note that the assumption here is that combatants are not local and that therefore depend on local collaboration for the production of direct violence.) This implies that while indirect violence is mostly driven by armed group's tactical and strategic incentives, direct violence is not only driven by armed group's incentives, but it is also conditioned by civilian's behavior vis-à-vis the groups, which can either constrain or enhance their killing capacity. This makes indirect violence to be negatively associated with the degree of prewar support for a perpetrating group in a locality, and direct violence to be positively related to prewar parity between political factions at the local level. The rationale is the following:

As for indirect violence (e.g. bombings), in addition to being instrumentally used by armed groups in order to destroy the enemy's capacity and will to fight (Arreguín-Toft 2001), it is also conveniently perpetrated in order to eliminate the enemy's strong supporters. Attacking the political strongholds of the enemy may appear necessary and/or desirable to armed groups (i.e. when civilians are mobilized).[27] The odds of eliminating strong supporters of the enemy by means of indirect violence will monotonically increase with the density of these supporters among the population of a location.

As for direct violence (i.e. executions, massacres), this is much less unilateral from the perspective of the group; as said, its production requires the cooperation of local civilians, who can restrain or, conversely, promote it. In consequence, groups are able to perpetrate higher levels of direct violence in places where not only they find larger number of enemies, but also greater support from the local population. Due to strategic political motivations from civilians, collaboration and backing of lethal actions of the groups is greater in places where political factions

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[27] Thus, it is not necessarily the case that political targeting with aerial bombings will only happen in non-conventional civil wars (Kocher *et al.* 2008).

display greater levels of parity in the prewar period. In these places, civilians have incentives to push for assassinations that will lead to changes in the local *status quo*, and they collaborate with the groups (by not vetoing or enhancing violence) in order to do so. The converse does not happen in either places where the group has overwhelming support (violence is not necessary to change the already favorable status quo) or where the group is a minority (for violence, unless genocidal, cannot change the state of affairs). In addition to this, prewar political competition, in addition to local polarization and specific forms of mobilization (i.e. trade union mobilization), enhances direct violence through another channel: it promotes the revelation of the identities of strong supporters of the groups (i.e. strong loyalties), which are those people that the armed groups are interested in annihilating during wartime. That is the case because, in order to establish their beliefs about the nature of the supporters of the enemy (i.e. "weak" or 'strong"), groups rely on "priors" relating to prewar mobilization and behavior, and not on wartime behavior of civilians. These priors are largely dependent on local level *prewar* political dynamics, which determine the extent to which rank-and-file individuals come across as militants (i.e. strong supporters) of a group or not. In contexts of political parity, where groups have symmetry in political power, confrontation is more common (Gould 2003), and so it is the revelation of strong political identities.

A major lesson in this dissertation is that, while tactic and strategic considerations on the side of the armed group are (naturally) relevant for the perpetration of any type of violence, strategic considerations on the side of the civilians must also be taken into account in explaining violence. It is the agency of civilians is what makes the incidence of direct and indirect violence to diverge across localities.

Local collaboration has its roots in factors exogenous to the military dimension of the war (i.e. local distribution of political identities), but this is also affected by events endogenous to the war (e.g. denunciations and executions) –as feelings of resentment

and revenge are awaken by these events. On the one hand, this makes direct violence both more likely and more intense in places where there has been a greater degree of victimization in previous periods of the war. On the other hand, this makes indirect violence more likely in places where violence against one's constituents has been harsh (i.e. for the sake of reprisal, and in order to satisfy "domestic" audiences with desires of vengeance).

In this dissertation, "wartime" factors are added to a theoretical framework that relies on prewar political rivalries and strategic political concerns of both armed groups and civilians.[28] The idea that violence comes about as the result of a combination of rational and irrational motives is not seminal (see theoretical and empirical insights on this in, among others: Petersen 2001; Kalyvas 2006; 2009; Baranova 2008; Hart 1998). Yet, here I provide a chronological distinction of the relevance of each of these factors, at both the theoretical and empirical levels. I show that rationalist (i.e. strategic) factors have a greater relative weight at the first stage of the civil war, and that irrational variables (i.e. revenge, vengeance) gain relevance over time, as the war develops —that is, in subsequent stages. This is coherent with the idea that dynamics of violence in (low intensity) long duration civil wars (e.g. Maoist insurgency in India; guerrilla insurgency in Colombia) are likely to lose much of their "ideological" components over time, and that violence is likely to become mostly driven by non-ideological motives.[29] The empirical nature of violence in the context of a CCW provides leverage for a better isolation of each of these types of factors, which may be much more indistinguishable in guerrilla war contexts.

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[28] Elsewhere, I have labelled this framework as "rivalry and revenge" (Balcells 2007a; 2010a).

[29] Regarding Colombia, this is a controversial statement, as there are many scholars and practitioners that consider it a conflict still driven by ideological variables. See Osterling (1989), Restrepo and Spagat (2004), Johnson *et al.* (2005), Arjona and Kalyvas (2008), Vargas (2009) for different approximations to violence in this conflict.

1.6. Scope Conditions and External Validity

More than on a category of warfare itself (i.e. conventional), this dissertation is focused on explaining violence against civilians under a particular set of conditions that lead toward a specific structure of choice both for armed groups and civilians. The insights obtained in this research are expected to apply not only to other cases of CCW, but also to other contexts where these conditions are reproduced. In other types of civil wars, the theory will not travel blindly, but it may do so with variations. For example, in cases of SNC civil wars, the condition of fixed boundaries will also apply. Yet, given that armed groups will be generally weaker, with less policing capacities, the assumption of "full control" of the rear territories will have to be relaxed. This may have implications for the incentives of armed groups, e.g. they may display greater genocidal motives (in order to assure control), or may will have greater taxation needs —as described by Azam (2006), for example. Also, instances of communal violence may be more frequent in SNC wars, precisely because of the weak degree of control of the territory by the armed groups. In cases of irregular civil war, the theory may apply in large areas of full control by one armed group. Given the fluidity of frontlines, displacement may be more common in these civil wars, as an alternative to killings, or as a way to pursue ethnic (Bulutgil 2009) or ideological (Steele 2009) cleansing. Hence, different types of violence may arise given these diverging constraints.

Also, while the empirical focus here will be on a civil war with an ideological cleavage, the theory should also travel to cases with other war cleavages (i.e. ethnic, religious). Where ascriptive identities are associated with the civil war cleavage, we may expect groups to have somewhat lesser identification problems.[30]

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[30] According to Horowitz "Ethnic groups are defined by ascriptive differences, whether the indicum is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof…" (1985: 17).

Yet, provided prewar mobilization, which makes identities public and visible, conditions should not vary dramatically across wars with different types of cleavages. First, because mobilization makes informational cues to arise and become clear and apparent to everyone in a society; second, because ascriptive features are just one of the defining elements of any identity, including ethnic identity (Chandra 2004). The case of Ivory Coast is particularly relevant to illustrate this point: while this civil war was articulated along an ethnic-religious cleavage, and therefore war-related identities were supposedly more visible than ideological identities, violence was much less significant, in relative terms, than in the SCW. In Ivory Coast, groups did not face a much mobilized society, and therefore threats "behind the lines" were minimal. Armed groups had a high degree of control of large pieces of territory, where they would tax people with bribes, for example (Akindes 2007; Polgreen 2005). Violence against civilians, which was undertaken by the army and governmental militias, as well as by three factions of the rebel group (HRW 2003), took place mostly in areas close to the frontline (i.e. the West); in many cases, noncombatants victims were collateral damage of battlefield violence (Nordas 2008).

This dissertation does not deal with violence in the context of genocide, which is a type of political violence that is produced unilaterally by armed groups and that does not aim at achieving governance of the targeted population: "Genocide is premeditated, purposive, and centrally planned; it aims toward extermination rather than coercion" (Kalyvas 2006: 30). While some of the observed local level dynamics may have resemblances with patterns that have been described in the context of genocide, e.g. in Rwanda (Straus 2006; Fuji 2009), here I am focusing on violence perpetrated in the course of armed conflict between "at least two political actors who enjoy partial and/or overlapping monopolies of violence" and "at least one actor intends to govern the population it targets rather than exterminate or deport it" (Kalyvas 2006: 31). Thus, I am assuming that the groups are the main perpetrators of violence (vis-à-vis civilians), and that they

are not interested in wiping the territory out of population, or at pursuing cleansing (either by killing or moving large proportions of the population); groups are interested at eliminating only those individuals that are particularly challenging (i.e. strong supporters of the enemy) for their current and subsequent control of the territory. Instances of mass killing, conceived within the category of civil war violence, are nonetheless contemplated in the theory —particularly with the study of indirect violence.

1.7. Endogenous Identities? The Political Consequences of Civil Wars

One of the main findings of this dissertation is that political identities matter for the perpetration of violence during civil war. One may at the same time wonder if violence has any effect on political identities: if identities are at the core of the causes of violence, it is plausible that they will also be at the core of its consequences. Also, as we find that local civilians (in alliance with armed groups) are interested in changing the distribution of power at the local level, we may as well analyze whether they are successful in doing so or not. Thus, in a secondary plane, the thesis explores the consequences of violence on political identities; chapter 7 displays a set of exploratory hypotheses about the effect of victimization during war on political identities, which are also tested with data from Spain.

The psychological effects of violence and other forms of victimization (e.g. torture, sexual violence, imprisonment) have largely been studied in the academic literature on conflict (e.g. with the study of the well-known "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder" or PTSD). Yet, the particular effects of traumatic experiences on political identities and political behavior have been largely disregarded. Part of the reason has been the lack of available data allowing for suitable research. While the recent development of surveys in postwar settings has allowed the development of empirical studies tackling with some of these

issues,[31] this evidence refers predominantly to short-term effects of traumatic events, and it is still quite fragmented. There is not a lot of evidence on the long-term effects of victimization on political identities during civil war, and there has not yet been a clear-cut identification of the mechanisms by which traumatic experiences of individuals may evolve into long term political attitudes and/or identities, or on how they may be transmitted across generations (Balcells 2007b).

At a theoretical level, chapter 7 inductively explores a set of alternative hypotheses on the effects of victimization on political identities of people having witnessed a civil conflict. These are mostly based on psychological and emotional mechanisms, which are labeled as "rejection", "acceptance" and "demobilization" effects. With regard to the former, I hypothesize that people that have been victimized during conflict develop psychological feelings of rejection against the group(s) and the political label(s) of those having victimized them. Subjects manage to communicate this rejection to their descendants, through intergenerational transmission mechanisms (Styskal and Sullivan 1975; Jennings and Niemi 1981). This hypothesis implies that victimizing armed groups should face both short and long-term rejection from victimized constituencies. Regarding the acceptance hypothesis, I argue that, as a consequence of victimization, people develop psychological feelings of attachment towards armed groups and their respective labels. Acceptance may arise a consequence of terror, which makes people develop a connection with the terrorizing group in order to get protection, or as a consequence of a rejection of the group not defending (or not protecting) them from the perpetrator's attacks.[32] Terror can be built on a large

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[31] E.g. Sierra Leone (Bellows and Miguel 2006; 2008; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), Burundi (Samii *et al.* 2009), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria (Backer and Kulkarni 2009), Colombia (Arjona and Kalyvas 2008), Uganda (Blattman 2009; Blattman and Annan 2009) or Indonesia (Shewfelt 2009).

[32] On the effects of indiscriminate and/or arbitrary violence, see Kalyvas (2006), Lyall (2009), Herreros (2006), or Kocher *et al.* (2008).

variety of repressive actions ―not necessarily lethal (e.g. public humiliation, rape, torture)– and it can consolidate support for groups by making people believe that the repressor group is somewhat superior than the rival and thereby deserving of their support. According to this hypothesis, armed groups perpetrating violence should face *increased* support by the citizenry. I would argue that the effects of terror can also have an impact in the long run, given an intergenerational transmission of these identities. Finally, the demobilization hypothesis implies that, as a consequence of trauma, victimization leads to a rejection of all political labels. A clear-cut observable implication of this is that political apathy and demobilization (e.g. lack of political participation) should be significantly different among victimized vis-à-vis non-victimized individuals or groups of individuals (i.e. communities).

In order to adjudicate between these alternative hypotheses, I draw on three different pieces of empirical evidence, all of them coming from the case of Spain. First, I analyze data from fifty-five semi-structured interviews of survivors of the SCW, which I conducted in two different waves between 2005 and 2007. Second, I analyze data from a specialized survey that I co-designed, and that was implemented on a representative sample of the Spanish population in April 2008.[33] Third, I analyze electoral continuity between 1936 and 1977 for the 1,062 municipalities in the region of Catalonia, and I explore statistically the relationship between civil war violence at a local level and patterns of continuity/change in political alignments.

While the results of the three different tests are not totally conclusive, and especially because of the methodological burden imposed by the passage of time ―between the civil war and the moment in which the research is being undertaken, these are broadly supportive of the "rejection" hypothesis. Wartime

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[33] The survey was designed by Paloma Aguilar, Hector Cebolla and myself, and it was implemented by the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (Study 2760).

victimization seems to have a long-term effect on political identities, leading to a rejection of the perpetrator's identity, in addition to a quest for justice and reparation.[34] The effects are neat at the individual level, but slightly more blurred at the community level, as demographic changes and socioeconomic development generates some empirical noise and/or measurement error.

1.8. Plan of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized as follows: the next chapter develops a theory of direct and indirect violence in CCW, which incorporates political variables in a strategic approach of wartime violence against civilians. This theory also considers emotional factors —endogenous to the war–, which are taken as complementary to exogenous political factors. I present a set of testable hypotheses on the determinants of both 1) direct violence and 2) indirect violence. The chapter also presents a number of additional observable implications derived from the theory.

Chapter 3 introduces the case of the Spanish Civil War and presents descriptive data that should allow the reader to acquire a sense of the dynamics of violence that took place in this conflict —in general–, and in the different regions that will be analyzed empirically —in particular. This chapter generates valuable descriptive inference, as it develops a number of novel insights on the SCW. In particular, executions taking place in the rear territories of both Nationalist and Republican areas of control seem to follow a similar pattern of local level interactions between 1) armed groups, 2) political committees, and 3) civilians. Hence, despite they have usually been conceived as extremely different, this chapter depicts similar dynamics of violence against civilians as taking place in both fighting sides.

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[34] The latter is observed when studying attitudes towards transitional justice (Aguilar *et al.* 2009).

Chapter 4 includes a set of empirical tests of the hypotheses on the determinants of direct violence at the local level. I collected large-*n* data from different Spanish provinces, and I use a variety of statistical techniques that range from non-parametric tests (e.g. comparisons of means) to parametric tests (e.g. multivariate regressions) and spatial regression analyses. The results of these tests are supportive of the idea that prewar competition at the local level is explanatory of levels of direct wartime violence at the first stage of the war, and that wartime factors (i.e. previous violence) gain explanatory relevance as the war goes by. The results also indicate that domination is not the mechanism linking political alignments and violence, as it would be argued from a pure "Clausewitzian" perspective. Furthermore, the robustness —across armed groups– of the variable local political competition challenges the hypotheses that organizational factors account for levels of violence against civilians in conflict (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2006). In contrast, principal-agent explanations do show to be helpful in explaining dispersion of violence across rear territories, pointing out avenues of further research on the consequences of armed group cohesion for human rights violations.

Chapter 5 includes a test of the determinants of indirect violence at the local level by using large-*n* data from the region of Catalonia, and also drawing on a variety of econometric techniques (i.e. multivariate and spatial regressions). The results indicate that political variables are explanatory of spatial variation in indirect violence (i.e. bombings) and that the relationship between support for a group and bombings is monotonically negative. This finding is supportive of a "domination" type of framework, and it derives logically from the motives of armed groups in these civil wars, as well as from the nature of production of indirect violence –unilateral from an armed actor's perspective. Furthermore, what I have labeled as emotional (war-related) factors are also found to be playing a significant role in explaining indirect violence, as demonstrated by the occurrence of what can

be called "retaliatory bombings" in advanced phases of the civil war.

In chapter 6, I introduce qualitative evidence on the mechanisms explaining violence, which are pinpointed in chapter 2 and validated through the econometric analyses in chapters 4 and 5. I present evidence from qualitative (i.e. semi-structured interviews), as well as secondary and primary (i.e. archival) sources, and I compare different sets of selected cases in Catalonia. In addition to being crucial for supporting the micro-foundations of the theory, this chapter includes the test of some additional observable implications. In particular, it includes a test on the effects of non-lethal violence during one stage of the civil war (e.g. economic victimization) on lethal violence during a subsequent stage, with data from Valencia. It is particularly relevant to find that not only killings, but also other types of victimizing experiences generate resentment leading towards violence in further stages. I believe that this raises a lot of avenues for further research, as well as some lessons for policy-makers and practitioners.

Chapter 7 is a stand-alone chapter that addresses the issue of the effect of violence on political identities. The analyses in this chapter suggest that the findings obtained in short-term settings may not be applicable to long-term contexts. Wartime victimization is found to have an impact on political identities. The overall evidence in this chapter suggests that victimization generates a "rejection" of the identity of the groups perpetrating violations. More specifically, the survey data analyses indicate that identities that are endogenous to the war seem to be transmitted across generations. Furthermore, both the survey data and the semi-structured interviews point out that, in the long run, victimization has a negative effect on political interest and political participation of individuals.

Chapter 8 summarizes the dissertation, outlines the main implications of the findings, addresses a number of caveats, presents external evidence that connects to the findings here

obtained —thus contributing to their generalizability–, and traces some avenues for further research.

CHAPTER 2. A THEORY OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS IN CIVIL WARS

"You know you have a good theory when it generates a statement you had not already thought about and when further empirical investigation confirms the new statement"

Roger Gould, *Collision of Wills*

"We all know that death is the ultimate vengeance"

Susan Jacoby, *Wild Justice. The Evolution of Revenge*

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I develop a theory of violence in civil wars. I bound the theory to a set of conditions that are predominant in the context of CCW. Following Gould, I view theory "as an integrated set of propositions, some of which might be intrinsically untestable, from which specific and testable hypotheses can be derived logically and nontrivially" (2003:65). Prior to presenting a theoretical model and hypotheses, I tackle a number of conceptual issues. First, I justify the focus in this dissertation on lethal violence –vis-à-vis other forms of violence or victimization. Second, I present a new typology of wartime violence against civilians, which distinguishes between direct (or "face-to-face") and indirect violence. This typology is distinct to that of selective

and indiscriminate violence –introduced by Kalyvas and now commonplace in the literature; I would argue that the taxonomy here is more intuitive and empirically portable. Third, I justify the focus on a particular type of civil war (i.e. conventional) and I develop the idea that the distinction of civil wars according to their warfare has significant implications for patterns of civilian victimization: every type of warfare (or technology of rebellion), including the nature of frontlines and armed group's control of the territory, implies a different structure of incentives leading to violence against noncombatants. After exploring the main disparities between conventional and other types of civil wars, I introduce a theoretical framework that should account for violence against civilians in the conditions prevailing in this particular type of civil war. I then present a set of testable hypotheses derived from this framework, as well as a set of additional observable implications.

2.2. Conceptual Considerations

This dissertation focuses on the study of the determinants of lethal violence against civilians in the rear territories of a civil war with stable frontlines and relatively large pieces of territory fully controlled by armed groups (i.e. where there is no armed contestation). The study of battlefield violence, which predominantly involves the assassination of combatants, is thereby out of the scope of this piece. While violence against combatants is very important, especially in the context of CCW —where this is in fact larger than violence against civilians (Balcells and Kalyvas 2009)–, this can be accounted by military factors.[1]

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[1] Given the nature of warfare in CCW, I consider the assassination of combatants and civilians independent of each other. This is contrary to what has been defended by authors such as Hultman, who argue that there is a connection between combatant and non-combatant killings:

Civilian and combatant are considered here as two mutually exclusive categories: a combatant can be a soldier who is in charge of a weapon, or merely one who works in any job related to the military endeavor (e.g. bridge and barricade construction, cooking, transportation, etc.).[2] A civilian is a non-combatant.[3]

2.2.1. Dependent Variable: Lethal Violence against Civilians

During war, victimization of civilians can take a wide range of forms: sexual violence, mutilation, torture, forced labor, displacement, marginalization or property expropriation, to list a few.[4] Despite being just one among these forms of victimization, lethal violence is the focus of this dissertation; these other forms of victimization will only be taken into account if they are ancillary and/or contingent to it. The focus on lethal victimization has theoretical and practical motivations: first, the dissertation aims at making a bounded contribution to the study of this phenomenon; considering other forms of violence would demand a broader theoretical framework, and it would also require loosening a number of assumptions that are hereby made for theory-building purposes (see below). I believe that concentrating on making a solid (even if more narrowly defined) contribution may be more valid than to engage in a potentially over-ambitious

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"the fewer soldiers the rebel kill, the more civilians are likely to kill instead" (2007: 218).

[2] The definition of combatant is here slightly broader than in Downes (2006; 2007; 2008), who only considers munition workers as combatants.

[3] Kalyvas (2006) defines civilians "all those who are not full-time members of an armed group, thus including all types of part-timers and collaborators" (19).

[4] Wood calls *repertoire of violence* "a set of practices that a group routinely engages in as it makes claims on other political or social actors" (2009: 133).

project.[5] In a nutshell, by focusing on a specific dimension of victimization of civilians during conflict, I hope to make a significant contribution to its general comprehension.

Second, measuring non-lethal forms of violence is extremely complex, and it raises numerous methodological problems, which should be less severe when studying lethal violence (Kalyvas 2006: 19-20). Intentional death (or assassination) can be more easily recognized —and distinguished from non-intentional death– than other forms of victimization (e.g. property expropriation or displacement), which can easily be perceived as collateral to other actions; for example, distinguishing intentional from non-intentional is particularly complicated in the case of displacement.[6] At the same time, measures of non-lethal victimization are usually poor, if not inexistent. For example, underreporting is a major methodological problem that inhibits the study of sexual violence during war (Wood 2009: 133-4).[7] Very often, there are no systematic records on economic victimization,

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[5] A number of scholars are currently researching and making substantial contributions towards the understanding of non-lethal victimization in irregular or symmetric non-conventional civil war settings (e.g., Bernard 1994; Wood 2006; Steele 2009; Blattman 2009; Cohen 2008; 2009; Hoover 2006); future research on non-lethal victimization in conventional conflict shall build on the insights provided by these scholars, as well as those in this dissertation.

[6] Kalyvas is quite strict in his own assessment of this issue: "homicide does not exhaust the range of violence, but is an unambiguous form that can be measured more reliably than other forms (Spierenburg 1996: 63; Buoye 1990: 255), which is why it is used as the primary indicator of violence in quantitative studies (e.g., Poole 1995; Greer 1935). In addition, there is a general consensus that homicide crosses a line: it is "an irreversible, direct, immediate, and unambiguous method of annihilation" (Straus 2000:7); in this sense, death is "the absolute violence" (Sofsky 1998: 53)" (Kalyvas 2006: 20).

[7] As a matter of fact, while fine-grained data on civilian executions during the SCW is available for some regions, local data on displacement is almost inexistent. The exceptions are extremely focused local studies (e.g. Gaitx 2006).

imprisonment, torture or mutilation.[8] These problems apply to all wars, whether historic or contemporary.

2.2.2. Direct vis-à-vis Indirect Violence

In this chapter, I present a novel typology of violence, which distinguishes direct and indirect violence, and I identify the main dimension over which these two types diverge, which is their technology of production. Direct and indirect violence are both intentional forms of violence; the classification thus differs from that in Valentino *et al.* (2004), who also embrace non-intentional deaths (e.g. as a consequence of famine) as indirect violence. The typology also differs from Arreguin-Toft's (2001), which refers to warfare strategies. In his typology, direct stands for approaches that target an adversary's armed forces in order to destroy that adversary's "capacity to fight"; indirect stands for approaches that seek to destroy an adversary's "will to fight". In the taxonomy here, *direct violence* is defined as violence that is perpetrated with light weaponry (e.g. guns, knives, shotguns, machetes) in a face-to-face type of interaction (e.g. individual or mass executions). The production of direct violence results from the interaction of armed groups and civilians living in the localities where this violence takes place. In order to perpetrate direct violence, armed groups take actions that either require the collaboration of local citizens, or that are potentially hindered by a lack of collaboration

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[8] As will be explained in further detail in chapter 7, in the survey I co-authored and that was carried out on a representative sample of the Spanish population in April 2008, people were asked about other (non-lethal) victimizing experiences. I did the same in my interviews with survivors of the civil war. While this could give us a rough idea of the extent to which these forms of victimization prevailed in the SCW, the data has obvious problems of measurement error and endogeneity, and it is thereby not reliable. In that chapter, though, all these forms of violence will be considered as independent variables —e.g. to explain political identities; I will not delve into the determinants of their variation.

of the civilians. These include procedures such as the localization of suspects, arrest, transportation to execution locations, and/or the assassination itself. Local civilians may denounce their neighbors, help identify them, or they can even arrest them (this enhances an armed group's capacity to assassinate). Conversely, civilians can hide potential victims, they can help them flee to other places, or they can give false indications to the groups (this constrains the lethal capacity of groups).[9] Civilian collaboration is particularly crucial if the armed groups do not have local knowledge or they have no access to sources of information such as registration records or political militancy lists. I assume that combatants are not local and that the perpetration of direct violence thereby depends on civilian collaboration.

Kalyvas (2006) argues that the production of selective violence in an irregular civil war depends on the intersection between the actions of the armed groups (who can have greater or lesser incentives to pursue killings) and the actions of civilians (who can have greater or lesser incentives to provide information to the armed groups). This author distinguishes selective from indiscriminate violence; the criteria is the mechanism by which victimization takes place: if there is a selection process at the individual level, violence is selective; if the selection process is at the collective level, violence is indiscriminate.[10] He also argues

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[9] Civilians can also presumably be neutral to the actions of the groups (Wood 2003). Yet, remaining neutral does not seem to be easy in wartime contexts (Kalyvas 2006; Petersen 2001).

[10] This typology is empirically complicated because the knowledge of the process by which somebody has been victimized is very often impossible to attain —among other reasons, because the actors themselves might mask their preferences or rationalize their acts. The limits of what can be coded as individual or collective identification are blurred. What happens, for instance, if one decides to bomb a whole city for having supported the opposite side? Unless all of their citizens (or all the victims of the bombings) have been identified individually as defectors, violence should be coded as indiscriminate. But, is it really indiscriminate? If the city had not supported the enemy, it would not

that selective violence has different effects on the population, as compared to indiscriminate violence; the latter tends to alienate civilians from the armed group; the former does so in a lesser extent. And since in irregular wars the groups heavily depend on civilians's support, they will have incentives to be selective in their use of violence (Valentino *et al.* 2004).

In Kalyvas (2006), the fact that it implies a selection process at the individual level is what makes selective violence hinge on local provision of information by civilian. Note that, contrary to this author, I argue that the intersection of civilians and armed groups is relevant for the production of *any type of direct violence*, not necessarily selective. For example, armed groups may decide to kill a group of people in a locality, without an identification process at the individual level; the groups may have suspicions that a set of individuals (e.g. those wearing hats; those wearing suits) are supporters of the enemy, but still not individually identify them as such. Also, they may decide to kill individuals without any type of previous identification, e.g. if they think that everyone in a locality is a strong enemy; or if they see an individual as potentially suspicious.[11] Even in this context, local civilians have some degree of agency: for example, they can display resistance towards these actions, helping the would-be targets to flee, and even impeding the actions to take place; and vice-versa, they may act in a way that violence is enhanced, i.e. participating in the capture and assassination of these subjects.

In general terms, what I call civilian's "veto power" over groups's actions is a factor that should not be underestimated. As a matter of fact, this veto power has been empirically observed, in

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have been bombed; and so the bombing therefore has a selective component. (Balcells 2009b: 148).

[11] Augusteijn (1996) provides with several examples of non-selective direct violence in the context of the Irish war of independence. He reports, for example, that after the IRA burned the houses of local loyalists (non-selectively), the Crown Forces were unable to get to the perpetrators, and innocent civilians were made to suffer (323). The latter were killed directly but non-selectively.

one way or another, in a great number of historical and contemporary experiences, ranging from Jewish pogroms in Poland (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010), riots in India (Varshney 2002), persecution during World War II in Europe (Hoffman 1968), the Napoleonic wars in the nineteenth century (Fraser 2008; Sharma 2008), the soviet occupation in the Baltic states (Petersen 2001) or the civil war in Angola (Azam *et al*. 1994; Azam 2006), to more recent civil wars in El Salvador (Wood 2003), Colombia (Arjona 2009a) or Peru (Starn 1995).[12] Some authors have named these processes involving "non-cooperation with an enemy or occupier, civilian disobedience, industrial action, and ideological opposition" civilian defence (Roberts 1967). Minor forms of civilian resistance have also been even observed in extreme cases, such as Rwanda, the site of a well-known genocide (Fuji 2009),[13] or in the 2008 armed incursion of Israel in Gaza, where the Israeli army was overwhelmingly superior to the Hamas militants.[14]

Indirect violence, by contrast, is perpetrated with heavy weaponry (e.g. tanks, fighter planes), and it does not require face-to-face interaction with the victims. Because of its technology of production, indirect violence is unilateral on the part of the group, giving very limited agency (if any) to civilians; for example civilians cannot veto the throwing of a bomb from a plane or the shooting of a missile from a tank. Attacks with precision-guide

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[12] Starn explains that the disenchantment with the Shining Path among peasants in Peru led to a successful mobilization of counterinsurgency in rural communities. Organized military resistance took the form of the so-called *rondas campesinas*. Starn argues that this mobilization was a reaction to the myopic inflexibility and planned use of mass violence by the Shining Path (1995: 561).

[13] Fuji explains that some people were saved because neighbors/friends warned that they were being targeted (93). Conversely, she emphasizes the fact that neighbor cooperation with militias and violent actions were in some measure behind the genocide.

[14] El-Kohdary (2009) cites a Gazan woman who claimed that she would always open her house to protect Hamas fighters.

amunitions (PGMs) or predator strikes that exploit intelligence from local informers to locate high priority targets, may be an exception to this; for the sake of parsimony, due to the limited agency of these informers (who are a minority share of the population anyway), and due to the relative rarity of these attacks (e.g. PGMs only started to be used after the Vietnam War), I will assume no civilian agency involved in the production of indirect violence. Additionally it is worth noting that indirect violence can be perpetrated in areas where the armed group has no territorial control (e.g. through aerial strikes). This makes it fundamentally different from direct violence, which can only be perpetrated under conditions of presence of the group in the territory inhabited by its would-be targets. [15]

All of the above makes the logic of direct and indirect violence necessarily different. In this dissertation, I focus on the determinants of each of these two types of violence, which I conceive as two separate phenomena, albeit having common explanatory grounds. I focus on the variation within each of these types —taken separately. The theorization on the determinants of the use of indirect vis-à-vis the use of direct violence is out of the scope of this dissertation. While I could attempt to theorize about the likelihood of different types of violence (i.e. direct or indirect) in a particular place and at a particular time, during the conflict, this would be somewhat determined by the technology available to armed groups, as well as by patterns of territorial control and battlefield dynamics. I am taking these as exogenous here. Also, at a cross-national level, the relative use of each of these types of violence could be related to the type of civil war (i.e. irregular, conventional, SNC), and this would be problematic insofar as the

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[15] Hence, when referring to direct violence, I will always assume that it is perpetrated in a territory under the control of the armed group. Armed groups can occasionally perpetrate direct violence in non-controlled territories, for instance through occasional raids and ambushes. Yet, in conventional wars, this can only happen in places close to the frontlines, which are usually depopulated; so this sort of victimization is quite rare.

definition of the type of war involves the consideration of the technology used in the war, as well as the type of frontlines (Kalyvas and Balcells 2008), which are also decisive for the type of violence used by the armed groups. For example, indirect violence may be more likely in conventional civil wars for the mere reason that heavy artillery are more common in these civil wars than in, say, SNC wars.

2.2.3. Conventional vis-à-vis Other Types of Civil Wars

Unlike in irregular wars, violence against civilians and combatants in CCW takes place in clearly delineated spaces. Combatants are generally young men, voluntarily or forcibly recruited by armed groups, who engage in combat primarily on a frontline. They wear uniform and are eye-ball distinguishable from civilians. Combatants are generally killed in the course of battles, which usually include the use of artillery and bombings. Civilians are frequently isolated from the battlefield: while some may live close to the frontlines, or even go there to visit combatants, their everyday life tends to be independent from the events occurring on the frontline. Insofar as there are civilian assassinations, they are usually due to armed groups entering villages/towns, to aerial or naval bombings, or to executions or massacres taking place in the course of territorial conquest.[16] Instances of communal violence or killings between civilians may also take place, but —from a rationalist framework– we should not expect these to be the norm because, as will be explained, armed groups are relatively strong and maintain an overwhelming control of the territory where they

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[16] Conquest does not necessarily involve violence against civilians, though. Non-violence during conquest was common during the American Civil War (1861-1865) (Neely 2004; Paskoff 2008). "The Union army's way of war emphasized the defeat of Confederate's forces in battle. Thus, a county through which federal forces marched was not necessarily one devastated by the war" (Paskoff 2008: 45).

have a presence.[17] This aspect is a dimension over which conventional civil wars can be distinguished from SNC wars, in which armed groups, while having symmetric strength vis-à-vis each other, have a more precarious control of the territory, and where we may expect instances of grass-roots or communal violence to be more frequent.

In irregular civil wars, the clear-cut spatial distinction between battlefield and non-battlefield areas does not hold, as the war takes place unevenly across space; as a result, there is a much greater mingling of civilians and combatants (Mao Zedong 1978; Guevara 1967; Augusteijn 1996; Wood 2003), who therefore partake in the same basic process of violence.[18] Since frontlines are permeable and any action from a defector is potentially threatening the control of a locality and the safety of an armed unit, actions by defectors become relevant for war outcomes; hence control of information (in order to identify defectors among civilians) is essential for armed groups. Wood explains that the FMLN in El Salvador was able to maintain an insurgency that fought the government to a stalemate thanks to close and cooperative relations with civilians, who provided it with high quality intelligence (Wood 2009: 152-3). Valentino *et al*. (2004), for their part, argue that mass killings are perpetrated by groups in irregular conflicts in order to "dry up the sea in order that the guerrillas cannot swim".[19] According to Kalyvas (2006), in irregular civil wars, selective violence is highly linked to the control of territory because combatants need civilian compliance in order to achieve

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[17] Full control of the territory by armed groups, in the context of CCW, is an assumption of the model. Yet, it may not be strictly speaking always true due to lack of resources of armed groups.

[18] In fact, in irregular civil wars, civilians might have greater probabilities of being killed than combatants (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007b).

[19] According to these authors, the primary interest of counterinsurgent forces is to prevent civilians from supporting the guerrillas. In any case, they also very clearly state that counterinsurgency is not the only motivation for the intentional killing of civilians during war.

control —they cannot identify and eliminate defectors without civilian collaboration;[20] at the same time, without a minimum level of control, it is impossible for the groups to access local information, because civilians are unlikely to collaborate.

Control of information is on the other hand less crucial in conventional wars, where frontlines are non-porous and the outcome of the war is mostly determined by the evolution of battles. Only in areas close to the battlefield will civilian behavior be especially relevant for the war, as key information may be transferred to the other side. In these areas, civilians might be targeted for their wartime behavior, to prevent defection — therefore following a similar pattern to that observed in irregular civil wars.[21]

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[20] He refers to collaboration in the form of provision of information. Yet, as we will see, collaboration can take other forms (Petersen 2001; Wood 2003; Arjona 2009a).

[21] Kalyvas explains the occurrence of selective violence in irregular civil wars with a formal model that takes into account the utility functions of civilians and armed groups. The former (obviously) want to survive during the war, and they undertake actions that allow them to maximize the probability of doing it. At the same time, they have private incentives to eliminate their enemies. Armed groups want to maximize their territorial control, and in order to do it they need to obtain information from civilians. But the acquisition of information by the groups is conditional on the level of control that the armed group has in a particular territory; that is the case because civilians only dare to denounce the opponent if they have some sort of guarantee on protection. Thus, selective violence only takes place in those places where the incentives of civilians to collaborate with the armed group intersect with the interests of the group to acquire information on their enemies (in order to kill them). In a continuum where full control of the territory by the incumbent is 1, full control by the insurgent is 5, shared control is 3, and hegemonic but not total control by the incumbent and insurgent are 2 and 4 —respectively–, Kalyvas predicts that higher levels of violence will take place in zones 2 and 4. These are the two areas in which civilians have incentives to collaborate with the incumbent (i.e. in zone 2) or with the insurgent (i.e. in zone 4), and in which armed groups have

Hence the puzzle: why do groups in conventional civil wars decide to perpetrate violence behind the frontlines, when this type of violence appears to be unnecessary, based on standard rationalist assumptions? And, moreover, why does this violence vary? Insofar as the internal organization of groups does not vary across the rear territories, as is often the case in conventional wars, violence cannot be explained on the basis of greater or lesser degree of internal cohesiveness of the groups (Weinstein 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). In conventional wars, armed groups often rely on routinized conscription mechanisms (i.e. draft), and consist of disciplined and strong organizations —i.e. parts of split armies (Kalyvas and Balcells 2009). Even when this is not the case (e.g. when internal discipline is weak), there are no reasons to think that the internal structure of the group will vary systematically across the rearguard territory. The same applies to explanations based on greed incentives of groups (Azam and Hoeffler 2002): since —except for areas close to the frontline– direct violence against civilians is in these wars disconnected from the dynamics of military conquest, and spatial variation in victimization cannot be explained by attempts to occupy more "desirable" (i.e. wealthier) territories (e.g. Hegre *et al*. 2007). Terrorizing civilians already on one's side (Azam and Hoeffler 2002) does not make clear sense in this context either, as civilians cannot easily defect to the other group, for this has no presence whatsoever in the territory. Also, terror mechanisms cannot explain spatial variation in violence unless we have priors that terror will be systematically more effective in some places than in others. Finally, since —as just said– in CCW armed groups have strong military capacities and rely on routinized conscription,

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incentives to eliminate potential defectors. In zone 1, the incumbent does not have incentives to acquire information about civilians and to kill them because it already has hegemony over the territory, and the opposite occurs for insurgents in zone 5. In zone 3, while armed groups are surely interested in acquiring information, civilians are not willing to provide it because they do not have any certainty that the armed group will be able to protect them.

taxation and recruitment incentives (Azam 2006; Gates 2002) cannot explain violence in the rearguard. (Although this violence can be marginally used to coerce conscription or to punish deserters.) [22]

In addition to all this, in conventional civil wars the distribution of supporters is not clearly associated with patterns of military control; this is different than in the case of irregular civil wars, where compliance is endogenous to control (Kalyvas 2006; 2008). This difference is again connected to the nature of the warfare, and —I would tentatively argue– also to the factors explaining the occurrence of different types of civil wars: while irregular wars happen in contexts where relatively weak groups rely on civilian support in order to emerge as "robust insurgencies" against relatively strong incumbents, conventional wars happen in contexts where there is a symmetric challenge between strong rebels and incumbents (Kalyvas and Balcells 2008). In irregular wars, insurgents undertake processes of state-building aimed at winning the "hearts and minds" of local civilians (Lilja 2009), partly to gain this civilian support (Arjona 2009a); yet these insurgent state-building processes are less present in the context of SNC or conventional civil wars, which are in fact significantly shorter conflicts (Kalyvas and Balcells 2009). Finally, the fact that many CCW's take place after the split of national armies (i.e. after military coups), makes the distribution of military control much more random, namely connected to unsystematic factors, and not necessarily in harmony with the distribution of supporters on the ground. Some might argue that an exception would be separatist CCW, where the constituents of the secessionist group are likely to be

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[22] Indeed, sometimes the army does not totally succeed at achieving routinized conscription, as was the case of Serbia when fighting against Croatia. Gagnon (2004: 109) argues that between 50 and 85 percent of Serb men called up to fight in Croatia went into hiding or left the country rather than fight, and that 50,000 reservists deserted from the front. However, explaining the success of mobilization strategies is out of the scope of my research.

geographically concentrated in one area (Kaufmann 1996; 1998; Lilja 2009). Yet that is not necessarily the case: ethnic civil wars have increasingly been demonstrated to involve more complex processes than the mere confrontation of monolithic ethnic groups (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007a; Fearon 2004). Members of the groups can be more or less connected to the macro-cleavage of the civil war, and display mixed loyalties. In fact, ethnic defection is frequent in these settings (Lyall 2009; Kalyvas 2008; 2009).[23]

I argue that the decision to perpetrate direct violence against civilians in conventional civil wars is related to the degree of political mobilization during the prewar period. "The word 'mobilization' conveniently identifies the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life. Demobilization is the reverse process" (Tilly 1978: 69). Because mobilization produces deep loyalties and attachments,[24] mobilized individuals are a key asset for armed groups in wartime contexts (Mao 1978; Guevara 1967; Slim 2008: 204). Particularly, because these may become recruits

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[23] Note that, while sharing many characteristics with interstate wars, a particular feature of conventional civil wars is that the belligerents have an intrinsic interest in exerting control over the population, even if these are members of a different ethnic or ideological group. In interstate wars, the potential lack of interest in controlling the enemy population makes the dynamics of violence slightly different (e.g. Downes 2008).

[24] On political mobilization, see, among many others: Tilly (1978); McAdam (1988); Verba *et al* (1995); McAdam *et al*. (2001); Beissinger (2002). Tilly argues that mobilization is "the process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action. These resources may be labor power, goods, weapons, votes and any number of other things, just so long as they are usable in acting on shared interests" (1978: 7). Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) define political mobilization as support for intergroup conflict and divide it in two types: "activism" (i.e. readiness to engage in legal and non-violent political action) and "radicalization" (i.e. readiness to engage in illegal and violent political action).

(Bearman 1991; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008),[25] they may encourage economic production (Wood 2003), or they may hinder the enemy's actions (Petersen 2001). Mobilized individuals can also coordinate and wage their own rebellion against the controlling armed group.[26] Indeed, mobilization is a necessary — albeit not sufficient– condition for collective action (Tilly 1978). [27]

At the same time, highly mobilized individuals are those least likely to be assimilated, and therefore those who the group may be more interested in targeting if aiming at building a "new society" (Sharma 2008),[28] or at re-establishing an old political order. Also,

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[25] For example, the mobilization of local identities (at the expense of a Southern identity) explained desertion in the Confederate bloc during the US Civil War. Localism replaced the Confederate/Southern identity that had initially propelled men into war (Bearman 1991: 326). Humphreys and Weinstein find that, in Sierra Leone, "70% of CDF fighters reported joining because they supported the group's political goals" (2008: 438).

[26] For example, Fraser (2008) extensively explains how guerrilla warfare germinated from Spanish society against the Napoleonic army in the early nineteenth century. Also, guerrilla warfare started off in Missouri after "a radical Cohort, the true Fourty-eighters, managed to convince thousands of others, ordinary German workers, shopkeepers, and farmers, to participate in armed rebellion against the legally constituted government of a state on behalf of a distant federal government" (Rowan 1983: preface).

[27] Along similar lines, Downes's (2006a) argues that, in interstate conflicts, targeting of civilians occurs when states fight wars to seize and annex territory (from other states) because the conqueror perceives a threat from the enemy population in the area, which could form a fifth column and rebel behind the front lines. Yet, this author does not consider political mobilization, and its differential impact on individuals.

[28] This was the objective of the so-called "red terror" in the SCW, which aimed at eliminating the elements of the "Ancient Regime" (landowners, clergy, etc.), somewhat emulating the leftist and revolutionary movements of that historical era —i.e. the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 (Payne 2004). Examples of similar processes in other civil wars are numerous: e.g. the Red guard terror and Finland (1918),

in further periods (i.e. postwar), strong supporters of the enemy are particularly dangerous as they can trigger cascades of rebellion or resistance against the new ruling group (Petersen 2001).[29]

In short, during war, armed groups are interested in eliminating strong enemies (i.e. mobilized individuals) both for tactical and strategic reasons. Armed groups are likely to devote resources to eliminating highly mobilized individuals by "sweeping the rear" (Downes 2008). [30] For this purpose, they tend to use militias or irregular forces, which are complementary to regular armed forces.[31]

As opposed to strong supporters, weak supporters are by definition more malleable and less dangerous, and they are less unlikely to be targeted by groups —that is assuming that the group is interested in governing a populated territory and not in committing gratuitous genocide. The latter assumption is plausible if we consider the fact that human capital is a basic resource to win the war (e.g. recruits, workers for the army) (Wood 2008; Lilja 2009), and a basic source for economic advance. In short, given that armed group's resources devoted to victimize civilians are limited, groups are likely to selectively target highly mobilized people, (i.e. "strong supporters" of their rival, who represent the most serious threat).[32]

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the protestant/catholic violence in France (1562-1629), the Cultural Revolution in China (1966-1976).

[29] An alternative to elimination is "demobilization": "For those elites who decide to protect the status quo, demobilization is a crucial goal, since the most serious immediate threat comes exactly from part of the population being mobilized by challenger elites for fundamental change" (Gagnon 2004: 7). Yet, we can expect demobilization to be more costly and somewhat more risky for armed groups than straight elimination.

[30] Note that, in contrast with Kalyvas (2006), here strategic (and not only tactical) calculations are included in the utility function of groups.

[31] For an extended elaboration on the difference between these military forces, see Arreguín-Toft (2005).

[32] Despite the fact that it could be argued that prewar mobilization makes the war "total" (see chapter 1), I believe that —because their

It should be emphasized that, in the context of a CCW, prewar mobilization —and not wartime mobilization– is the one that matters to explain violence. During wartime, armed groups are equally likely to mobilize civilians in their respective rear territories,[33] and civilians have incentives to respond positively to these mobilization efforts (e.g. enlisting in recruitment lists, political organizations, etc.), based on survival maximization reasons. Indeed, in zones under full control of one of the armed groups, civilians do not have incentives to show allegiance to the other armed group —to use the language of game-theory, this is a behavior "off the equilibrium path"; they instead have incentives to demonstrate compliance with the group controlling the territory. Wartime mobilization is therefore uninformative for the groups in the context of a CCW. In irregular and in SNC conflictd, dynamics of political mobilization and their effects over civilian behavior are likely to be very different. I will return to this point later on.

In a nutshell, a prediction of my logic is that, in the absence of prior mobilization, conventional wars should not be the sites of mass violence against civilians, while the converse should also hold.[34] In other words, I argue that *prewar* levels of political mobilization are likely to explain cross-country variation in levels of *wartime* violence. A quick inspection of both historical and contemporary conventional civil wars reveals an empirical pattern according to which rearguard violence has been atypical in civil wars where the majority of the population was not highly mobilized along the war cleavage before the conflict, as was the

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resources are limited– armed groups do not target "all aspects" of the adversary society, but instead focus first and foremost on the "most dangerous" elements.

[33] In fact, mobilization is a must for armed groups in war (Wood 2008).

[34] Prior mobilization can also exist in irregular contexts but we should expect it to display a different dynamic (this is outside the scope of my dissertation).

case of the civil wars in the US (1861-1865),[35] in England (1641-1651) or the more recent case of the Ivory Coast (2002-2005).[36] On the contrary, rearguard violence has been more intense in countries with high levels of prewar mobilization and polarization, as was the case of Finland (1918), Ireland (1922-23) (Hart 1998, 2003),[37] Russia (1917-1923), Spain (1936-39), Bosnia (1992-95), Croatia (1991-95) (Gagnon 2004), South Ossetia (1988-1992) and Abkhazia (1992-1993), Georgia (Zürcher 2007) or Tajikistan (1992-97) (Akbarzadeh 1996; Driscoll 2009).[38] Again, I am not distinguishing civil wars by type of mobilization (i.e. ideological, ethnic, or religious); I assume that the cleavage along which this mobilization takes place does not lead to fundamental differences in dynamics of violence. Plus, sometimes mobilization is mixed,

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[35] Even though there has been a long-lasting debate on the issue, historical accounts now coincide at characterizing the US civil war as displaying low levels of violence against civilians (Neely 2007). Victimization took place mostly under conquest, that is, it was largely driven by military dynamics, and it did not affect the rear territories. Missouri was the exception: the Union army was brutal in that state (Fellman 1989; Maben 2008), despite the fact that, in the 1861 elections, 80% of white males voted for the Union (i.e. only 20% of them had secessionist preferences). Missouri was an outlier in the context of the American war partly due to the guerrilla warfare that took place in it, as well as in oriental Kansas (Edwards 1877; Fellman 1989). According to some, the irregular war in Missouri led to a switch from a limited to a total war on the side of the Union army (McPherson 1988); the causal mechanism is however not obvious.

[36] There is no specific estimate of the number of civilian deaths during the US war, although the overall scholarly consensus is that it was a limited war with regard to civilian deaths (see, for example, Neely 2004, 2007). On the Ivory Coast, the number of civilian deaths is estimated to be 4,000 (Peace Reporter 2007), which represents circa 0.02% of the population of 2002.

[37] Exact figures of civilian deaths in Ireland are not yet available (Hopkinson 1988), although approximations are around 4,000.

[38] Although Driscoll's (2009) description of the conflict raises some doubts as to the classification of Tajikistan's as a conventional civil war.

e.g. ethnic and religious at the same time (Trejo 2009), or simultaneously ideological and ethnic (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007a; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010).

A number of considerations should be made at this point. First, here I consider mobilization as exogenously given. In other words, I do not investigate the causes of variation in levels of prewar mobilization across conflicts. I assume that political parties and social organizations (e.g. trade unions; churches), which are strategically motivated in their mobilization efforts (Posner 2004), play a major role in this. I subscribe to Przeworski's (1985) "Gramscian" conception of political party, "which creates and sustains individual identities and hence both their perceptions of what their interests are as well as their subsequent actions" (Kalyvas 2009: 603). Thus, I consider that identities will be relevant insofar as they have been mobilized and they are meaningful to individuals —not by essence. Social identities are endogenous to mobilization (Kalyvas 1996; Trejo 2009).[39] Second, and related to this, the identities that matter are those around which the conflict is articulated, which I assume are those most highly ranked by individuals at that point in time (Gould 1995).[40] The ranking is neither fixed nor unchangeable, and in fact the civil war itself may have effects on this, as well as on the

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[39] Some authors argue that mobilization is endogenous to the perception (by activists) that society is more polarized than it is. "The limited perception of the external reality —specifically, the fact that the people around them share their attitudes and the fact that society splits into apparently disjoint groups– can transform, in the context of action over the long run, otherwise negligible chances into tangible achievements. This is exactly why shared identities play such a strong role in fostering actors's commitments to their political beliefs and consequent actions" (Baldassari and Bearman 2007: 811).

[40] While choice is determinant of the cogency and relevance of particular identities (Sen 2006: 4), I consider that political mobilization makes identification around some cleavages more likely than around others. In other words, the relevance of political identities is not a pure bottom-up process.

creation of new cleavages or identities (Mayhew 2002; Balcells 2007b; Kalyvas 2008). Third, I am not distinguishing between ethnic and ideological identities because, unlike Kaufmann (1996), I do not assume that there are differences in the way different cleavages affect dynamics of violence. Political identities are not always "difficult to assess and changeable" (Kaufmann 1996: 72), and ethnic identities are not always "fixed and unchangeable."[41] Fourth, I am not assuming that because of prewar mobilization every member of a group is what I call a "strong supporter" (i.e. potential target of the rival one). Neither am I buying into the assumption that "only a minority of the population can really be described as holding tightly to one pole or the other; the majority tends to remain either weakly committed or uncommitted, part of a 'grey zone' between the two poles" (Kalyvas 2009: 602). I assume that mobilization makes the number of committed people (i.e. strong supporters) relatively significant among the population. Finally, I assume the degree of mobilization to be a national level feature, as well as a sub-national one. At the national level, mobilization explains the willingness of armed groups to assassinate supporters of the enemy in the rearguard territories. At the subnational level, the degree of mobilization is affecting levels of violence through its impact on political competition and polarization (see below). In general terms, in a context of mobilization, there should not be much variation across blocs or groups: while political parties or groups may be more or less successful in their mobilization efforts, there are spiraling processes that make mobilization quite even across sides —and this is specially the case when a country is at the verge of a civil war.

Since mobilization reflects prewar cleavages, it follows that the targeting of noncombatants in conventional civil wars will likely relate to these cleavages; in other words, political identities

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[41] See, among many others, Horowitz (1985), Gagnon (2004), or Bulutgil (2009) for ethnic conflict, or Nasr (2000) or Holt (2005) for religious conflict.

are crucial for the groups's detection of potential threats behind the frontlines, and —as I will explain– they influence the extent to which there is variation in direct violence across space, i.e. across localities. Thus, political alignments at the local level and violence are connected via individuals's political identities. Nevertheless, as I shall explain, I am not assuming that there is a mechanical connection between the conflict cleavage (e.g. class) and violence taking place on the ground. Whereas the existing cleavage (and its mobilization) contributes to a cleavage-related identification of would-be targets of violence, the production of violence implies an interaction between armed groups and individuals, and it makes the process, and the outcomes, more complex (i.e. non-linear). It is to this point that I now turn.

2.3. A Theory of Direct Violence

In this section, I outline a theory of direct violence that relies on the interaction between two actors that take decisions with clear-cut implications on levels of direct lethal violence taking place at the level of the locality. As I have mentioned above, a local level approach is the most appropriate to understand the interactions that lead to violent outcomes during civil war. In the context of a local political community or municipality, civilians have leverage on the armed groups because they hold relevant information, and they have bonds that allow coordinated actions regarding the armed groups (Petersen 2001). While other administrative or judicial levels (e.g. county, region) may be relevant from an institutional perspective, the "intimate" character of violence (Kalyvas 2006) underscores the relevance of the locality, the lowest space of political interaction between individuals.[42]

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[42] Note this may be different when understanding other forms of violence, e.g. gangs, riots or terrorist attacks, for which the relevant unit may be either a smaller or a larger one. Also, the particular

In a civil war context, the armed group patrolling a territory decides whether to kill civilians in a location or not. When doing so, they also take the decision on the extent to which they want to assassinate, in other words, on how many people they want to kill. Following the framework above, this is going to be defined by the number of strong supporters of the enemy that they identify in a locality. As we shall see, the latter will depend on a set of parameters, and very particularly on the distribution of prewar political identities, as well as on the local prewar political dynamics. Second, local civilians decide whether to collaborate with the armed group or not regarding the perpetration of lethal violence. In this context, all civilians are significant, but we may assume that local political elites (and, particularly, those linked to the armed group perpetrating violence) have a greater influence than ordinary citizens (Christia 2008).[43] The added leverage of local elites can be a consequence of their symbolic (i.e. authority) or coercive power (i.e. they have weapons or control of security).

Table 2.1 depicts, in a very simple way, how the interaction between the actions of armed groups and civilians can lead to different effective levels of lethal violence in a locality.

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administrative unit that it will be relevant may vary across countries. For example, the community (a lower level than the municipality) has been argued to be the suitable unit of analysis in Colombia (Arjona 2009b), where municipalities include very diverse and dispersed "communities". In Bosnia, as well as in other European countries, the municipalities are a fine unit of analysis, because they are small and homogeneous.

[43] Local elites (i.e. meso-level factors) have important interaction effects between micro-level economic incentives and macro-level ethnic cleavages (Christia 2008: 475).

Table 2.1. Armed Groups, Civilians and Lethal Violence

		ARMED GROUPS	
		Kill	**Do not Kill**
CIVILIANS	**Collaboration**	High Violence (A)	No Violence (B)
	No Collaboration	Little Violence(C)	No Violence (D)

Note that in Table 2.1 I am depicting outcomes derived from the assumption that the decision to target implies the willingness to kill a significant number of people; yet, this is in fact a continuous decision, not a dichotomous one (that is, it could be that the armed groups were interested in killing very few people in a locality). Outcomes B and D are observationally equivalent: of course, regardless of civilian collaboration, no violence should take place if armed groups are not interested in pursuing killings (i.e. if there are no identified enemies to eliminate). C implies greater violence than outcomes B or D because of the asymmetrical power of armed group vis-à-vis civilians: even if civilians veto the actions of the former, it is unlikely that they can avoid the occurrence violence if the group is interested in pursuing it; in other words, some levels of violence will be observed in locations where the armed groups are interested in killing. Violence is however likely to be lower than in those places where the armed group has willingness to kill and civilians collaborate (as is the case in outcome A).

In order to understand the production of direct of violence, we need to inquiry further on what explains the respective actions of armed groups and civilians.

2.3.1. Explaining Direct Violence

Let's imagine a hypothetical country where a civil war erupted after a period of intense political confrontation between political parties A and B, whose platforms are now championed by respective armed groups, A and B. The citizenry of this country has been mobilized along the A-B cleavage. Now imagine a hypothetical armed group A that is patrolling territory that has been newly conquered from group B. The two groups, which fight a conventional war with relatively stable frontlines, enjoy exclusive military control of relative large areas from which they have excluded the rival group. Following the definition of a conventional civil war, one group has full control over a relatively large area of territory, whereas the other group cannot have access unless it wins battles and proceeds to militarily conquest. Relevant interactions in the territory controlled by A involve combatants of this group and all civilians living in it.

In addition to confronting B on the battlefield in order to increase the share of territory under its control, A is interested in getting rid of strong supporters of B (thereafter, also B_{SS}), who are perceived as a potential threat. The crucial interactions leading to direct violence take place at the local level, where the degree to which A targets civilians depends on two factors: (a) the number of B_{SS} living in it and (b) the behavior of civilians in the locality, who can choose to back the killings or to constrain them:

(a) In each locality there are political activists or individuals who are highly mobilized and intensely identify with one of the groups. As a general norm we can expect that the presence of B_{SS} will be proportional to the existence of supporters of B in a locality (the same should hold for A and A_{SS}). The number of B_{SS} will also be determined by the presence of particular institutions mobilizing along the war cleavage lines (e.g. trade union, churches, and professional organizations). We can also expect more B_{SS} in places with a record of social unrest and political confrontation between A and B. Identities are not totally public; the identification of strong supporters (vis-à-vis weak supporters)

of the rival is facilitated to the group by her local supporters (i.e. A's supporters).[44] The prewar interactions of A's and B's supporters allow them to capture each other's degree of intensity of their loyalties (I will say more on this further below).

(b) Collaboration with the armed group in power (in my example, A) is subject to constraints. In this regard, local civilians identified with group A are likely to take into consideration the effects of violence for the future of their locality. I argue that these considerations are shaped by the distribution of local power between groups, as expressed in elections before the war: when electoral power approaches parity (i.e. the margin of victory is small), violence can decisively alter the local political balance; in this context, A's supporters are likely to opportunistically push the armed group toward violence against B's supporters.[45] However, where A's supporters are either a distinct majority or a distinct minority (i.e. the margin of victory is large), they are likely to restrain their respective armed groups: where they are a majority, they do not need to use violence in order to change the status quo. Plus, killing members of the B minority may also breed hatreds and generate unnecessary tensions in the locality, which may complicate further governance. Where they are a minority, only genocidal levels of violence would help reverse the balance; short of that, they would endanger themselves without altering their position vis-à-vis B's supporters. Indeed, following Valentino (2004), interest in genocide usually comes from strategically-oriented national leaders, with long-term views (e.g. "radical communization of their societies"). These motivations are therefore less likely to exist among local level leaders, who will be interested in maximizing their chances of survival (first and foremost), of holding power in the near future, and of eliminating their private adversaries. Also, in contexts where A is the

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[44] As said above, the assumption is that combatants are not local.

[45] Of course, personal hatreds may be playing a role here: it is not unreasonable to think that the leader of a political group might feel inclined to add the name of his main political rival to a "black list" if there has been strong political competition between them.

minority, members of the B majority are more likely to exert their "veto" power over the actions of the group, just because they are more and thereby more powerful "in numbers" (to paraphrase DeNardo 1985).

Translating this conjecture in operational terms, we would expect A's supporters to promote armed group violence where the prewar electoral balance approaches parity (i.e. a 50-50 percent distribution) and to constrain armed group violence where this balance moves away from parity.[46] Consequently, and also because of the intervening force of the "veto" actions of B's supporters, as political competition approaches parity both the presence of strong supporters of the enemy in the locality and civilian behavior combine to generate greater levels of violence.

Hypothesis 2.1: *The greater the degree of prewar electoral parity between groups, the higher the level of direct violence perpetrated by the armed group controlling that locality.*

According to this theoretical framework, the perpetration of direct violence is explained by the decision of armed groups to kill civilians, which will in turn be determined by the group perception of the existence of strong supporters in a locality, and the decision to collaborate of civilians, which —I have argued– largely depends upon strategic incentives related to the distribution of local political configurations. I have already addressed the latter. However, can the group's perception of the existence of B_{SS} in a locality be subject to further constraints?

First of all, it is important to make clear that, in the context of a CCW, prewar political behavior of individuals is the most informative (to either A or A's local supporters) of their political identities. In the context of full territorial control, civilians have no

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[46] The idea that the balance of power between groups may be a trigger for lethal violence is not new (e.g. Wilkinson 2004; Chacón 2004). In contrast with previous works, the loci of the agency here are the intervening local political actors, not the national political forces (as in Wilkinson 2004) or of the armed groups (as in Chacón 2004).

incentives to show any type of allegiance towards armed groups not controlling the territory, while they have many incentives to display open collaboration and loyalty to the controlling armed group. Both A and A's supporters are aware of this (I am assuming that they are rational actors), and they do not update their prior beliefs in the light of the wartime behavior of people: they only trust what they have seen them doing or heard them saying before the war started.[47] So, people who have demonstrated strong support for B in the prewar period will be the would-be targets of A —independently on if, once the war has started, they display a different set of preferences/identities.[48] As said above, at the local level, we can expect that the number of B_{SS} to be roughly proportional to the number of B supporters (this can be proxied as % support received by B in the elections);[49] and we can also think of it as positively associated with the presence of particular mobilizing institutions in the locality (e.g. churches, trade unions). Yet, perceptions of the *intensity* of the support of B's sympathizers are likely to also be affected by prewar political dynamics. Following insights in social psychology and sociology, we could argue that —everything else being equal– identities will be more intense in places with greater levels of political symmetry between groups, that is, in the context of political competition.[50]

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[47] A very simple model of imperfect information shows why this is the case. While I have used it as a heuristic, I have not included the model here.

[48] This will make this people more prone to flee —in order to avoid being killed. Yet, as we explained, due to the low fluidity or permeability of the frontlines in CCW, this possibility will be limited in these civil wars (as compared to, for example, irregular civil wars).

[49] One thing is the total number of supporters that a group has, which will be relatively large in the contexts of domination, and the other is the "quality" of supporters that this groups has (i.e. more or less intensively identified).

[50] Hereafter, I will use the terms political competition and parity (as well as "balance of power") indistinctively. Indeed, Bardhan and Yang's (2004) conceptualization of political competition is substantively

Competition or parity, because it is associated with instability of political power, implies greater confrontation between groups (Gould 2003); and open confrontation implies the revelation of strong identities by the members of these groups. In a nutshell, prewar competition can be affecting levels of violence by the operation of the following mechanism: the revelation of intense identities. Following Esteban and Ray's (1994) conceptualization, polarization could also be making a contribution to the unveiling of strong political identities. I will come back to this further below.

Given the above just said, local level competition has an impact on levels of violence through two different mechanisms. On the one hand, competition implies a greater revelation of strong identities by supporters of the enemy (I call this the "identity revelation" mechanism). On the other hand, competition implies strategic behavior on the side of local civilians, who have incentives to promote the assassination of their political enemies and not to "veto" the actions of the armed groups in order to change the balance of power in their favor (I call this the "strategic collaboration" mechanism). These two mechanisms are complementary and leading to the same prediction: direct violence increases with the degree of political competition or political parity. In my empirical research, I will try to adjudicate between both of these mechanisms (see chapter 4 and chapter 6). Yet, this may not be totally plausible and, in fact, this should not be a major concern for the concatenation of the propositions related to these

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equivalent to political parity: "The term "political competition" has been used in various studies to describe quite different phenomena. One interpretation of political competition, which we shall refer to as *accountability for incumbents*, focuses on the process of political turnover. According to this interpretation, political competition is more intense when the public can more easily remove incumbent leaders and replace them with challengers. Note that this view of political competition is inter-temporal in nature: political competition affects the behavior of incumbent leaders today via tomorrow's threat of dismissal." (Bardhan and Yang 2004).

mechanisms is logically consistent, and the observable implications are equivalent.

To sum up, in the context of CCW, and in a first stage of the conquest of a territory by a group, the perpetration of direct violence against noncombatants issues from the interaction between the actions taken by armed groups and local civilians. Identities —exogenous to the war– matter a great deal for both the identification and assassination of individuals. Armed groups target enemy supporters by relying on priors about their type (strong or weak), drawing on knowledge and beliefs held by their supporters in a locality. This implies a greater willingness to kill in places where there has been a greater revelation of intense preferences in the prewar period and therefore greater priors that the supporters of the enemy are strong (instead of weak). These places are the locations with high prewar local level competition (and, potentially, polarization) between groups. They also match locations where politically oriented organizations (e.g. trade unions, church organizations) have been active and successful at organizing and mobilizing their constituencies, as members of these organizations tend to display their preferences openly in all sorts of public actions (e.g. strikes, church mass). Also, everything else being equal, the expectation is that the number of strong supporters of a group will maintain a proportional relationship with the number of supporters of this group (in other words, we can expect to find more militants of the left in places with greater number of leftist supporters than elsewhere).

At the same time, the perpetration of violence is constrained by the actions of civilians: armed groups are more able to kill in places where they find local civilians willing to provide collaboration and/or not to constrain their actions. The actions of local civilians are motivated by strategic considerations related to the political configuration of their localities —in the long term–, in addition to security considerations —in the short term. This leads civilians to push for killings in places where there is a balance of power between groups, and to restrain from doing this in locations where they are dominant or dominated —following Collier's

conceptualization of the term (2001). Thus, I predict violence to display a non-monotonic relationship with the number of supporters of the group in a locality, increasing with levels of political parity between groups. At the empirical level, the proportion of supporters of groups can be proxied with electoral returns (if there have been elections some time before the outbreak of the war), but not necessarily.

A number of considerations shall be made at this point. First of all, it is worth noting that, in my approach, the quest for local political power is a motive underlying civilian's behavior. Armed groups are also driven by political interests, but —more than anything else– they are assumed to have an interest in getting rid of potential military threats. This nested consideration of macro and micro processes draws also on the idea that "civil war can be analyzed as a process that transforms the political actors's quest for victory and power and the local or individual actors's quest for personal and local advantage into a joint process of violence." (Kalyvas 2009: 609). This also differentiates my approach from works which emphasize armed groups's strategic considerations at the local level (Chacón *et al*. 2006) and that have not taken into account civilians's agency and/or civilians's strategic motives — as well as the joint production of violence.

Second, while having mixed motives, I assume that political considerations are likely to weigh heavily on the rationale of civilians living in a country undergoing a civil war that has erupted in a context of high mobilization (and, potentially, polarization). In a way, the private and the political are likely go together in this context, where friendship and kinship ties are likely to be associated with political rivalries (Fisher 1997, cited in Kalyvas 2006: 66; Raguer 2007). As Petersen (2001, 2002) explains, there are circumstances where people are primed by political grievances, which have a crucial impact on their behavior (e.g. towards an invading group). Darden (2006) has found that in contexts of successful nationalist mobilization (where a 'scholastic revolution" has taken place) national views and the ties of individuals are extremely closely connected to personal bonds and

insurgent action. I believe that this should be the case for any type of political mobilization, not only nationalist.

Finally, hypothesis 2.1 assumes a one-shot, static setting (let's call it t_1). Intuitively, past instances of violence will likely influence subsequent ones in t_{1+n}; this is coherent with my theoretical framework. Imagine, for instance, a second period where the territory that was initially controlled by A is conquered by B, a group that faces similar incentives toward the use of violence against civilians. The identification and assassination of A_{SS} will be, at this point, connected to both the electoral profile of the locality *and* the actions taken by A's supporters in t_1. On the one hand, those that have openly collaborated with A (i.e. by backing or perpetrating executions) during t_1 will be easily identified as A_{SS} —regardless of their prewar identities and regardless of prewar political dynamics. B and its local supporters will update their expectations on A_{SS} according to the behavior of people and to the events that have taken place in t_1. On the other hand, local supporters of B (and other civilians) will choose to promote or restrain violence —in their interaction with the armed group– depending on their experiences during t_1. We can expect that if they have been victimized by A in the first period, they will push for killings, and vice-versa.[51] The mechanism associated with the latter is the desire for revenge (Fridja 1994) or retaliation (Gould 2000). These emotional motives will add to the strategic or opportunistic incentives depicted above.[52]

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[51] Again, victimization refers not only to lethal violence. However, for simplicity reasons, I will operationalize it here as such –with the understanding that a victimized person is a relative or friend of a person who has been killed.

[52] According to Petersen "emotion is a mechanism that triggers action to satisfy a pressing concern" (2002: 17). While emotions such as fear, hatred or resentment (analyzed by Petersen) may be present in the first stage of the war –and trigger violence at the local level, I would argue that revenge will be an added or "new" emotion derived from the events that have taken place earlier in the conflict. And it will itself build "pressing concerns" that people will try to satisfy.

A clear-cut observable hypothesis to be derived from these propositions is that the more violence used at t_1 (against B's supporters) the more violence we should expect at t_2 (against A's supporters), and vice-versa.

Hypothesis 2.2: The greater the levels of violence perpetrated by an armed group controlling a locality at one time period, the greater the levels of violence perpetrated by the rival armed group in the same locality during the subsequent time period.

A corollary of this is that, independently of prewar political configurations, if few B_{SS} are killed at t_1, few A_{SS} are likely to be killed at t_2, and vice-versa: if many B_{SS} are killed in t_1, many A_{SS} are likely to be killed in t_2.

Given that after accounting for wartime events (i.e. those having taken place in the previous phase of the civil war) armed groups and civilians update both their beliefs on the local presence of supporters of the enemy and their preferences for assassinating them, we can presume that wartime factors will supersede prewar identities and balance of power considerations as the war develops and violent events accumulate. At an operational level, this implies that, throughout time (and through waves of conquest) political factors will likely lose relevance in favor of war-related variables. In the long term, this may make violence progressively distilled of ideological motives.[53]

I would like to emphasize the fact that both armed groups's willingness to kill and civilian collaboration will be affected by these endogenous-to-the-war type of factors. In both cases, the relevance of prewar political competition will be diminished, as

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[53] Obviously, ideological factors are not absent in subsequent phases insofar as initial violence is determined by them. Yet, wartime factors are likely to gain increased relevance in front of identity ones. Also, the fact that the war events themselves are likely to generate new political identities (Kalyvas 2008; Balcells 2007b; chapter 7), makes that, as time goes by, ideological factors become increasingly related to wartime events, and somewhat harder to disentangle from the war dynamics.

compared to its relevance in previous periods. First, in t_2, identification of strong supporters (i.e. willingness to kill) will be conditioned by people's actions in previous periods of the war: actions taken by A's supporters during t_1 will be informative of the type of supporters they are. For example, if people have engaged in burning properties, expropriating land from landowners, or assassinating people (in collaboration with A), they will be identified as strong supporters of this group (A). Second, in t_{1+n}, civilian collaboration will also be conditioned by actions having taken place in t_1. For example, people will have incentives retaliate against individuals or their families (Gould 2000) for actions that have victimized them (e.g. assassination of a family member; confiscation of property). This will be done independently of political considerations.

Somewhat tangentially to the argument, but nonetheless relevant, it should also be emphasized that wartime events are likely to have an impact on social trust and community cohesion. Hypothetically, this also could have an impact on violence taking place in further periods of time, if affecting collaboration with the group (i.e. this may lead towards enhanced acquiescence or collaboration with the opposite group). Some authors argue that when people feel part of a cohesive community, they are more likely to cooperate and less likely to betray each other (Putnam *et al*. 1993; Varshney 2002). From a more rationalist framework, and bearing in mind Fearon and Laitin's model of interethnic cooperation (1996) (although not necessarily applying it to an ethnic civil war), one could argue that communities generate informal contracts and develop mechanisms of internal group control —in order to avoid violence against members of the other group. If these contracts are broken, tit-for-tat dynamics evolve into spirals of defection and inter-factional violence.

All in all, it seems plausible to think that events having taken place in a first stage of a civil war have a somewhat path-dependence effect on further events, and that this implies escalation dynamics involving individuals and communities.

2.3.2. Additional Observable Implications

In addition to the testable hypotheses outlined above, an additional set of observable implications can be derived from this theoretical framework. First of all, in CCW violence against noncombatants takes place in places away from the battle frontlines as a consequence of the desire of the armed group to clear their rear territories from potential enemies. We can think that this desire will vary through time, and that it will reach a peak soon after the beginning of the civil war or at any time a group conquers a new piece of territory (within that area), and that it will decrease afterwards. That is mainly because the armed group's willingness to kill will decrease as strong supporters are eliminated. In other words, as the supply of strong supporters of the enemy decreases, the demand for assassinations of the armed group will also decrease.

Furthermore, the need to clear the rear territories of potential enemies will be more urgent in places located close to the frontline, as compared to other areas. As I have argued, individual actions in these locations will be more crucial for the development of the war than elsewhere. In consequence, at the empirical level we should note that in areas close to the frontline armed group's incentives to assassinate should be relatively more relevant in the explanation of violence than local level political dynamics (i.e. competition). While the incentives to collaborate —if driven by political dynamics– should not vary across territory, the imperatives of eliminating potential defectors will do so (i.e. will be greater in these particular zones) and this will have an impact both on the determinants of violence and on the number of executions.

Third, one of the main differences between conventional and irregular civil wars is the degree of fluidity or permeability of the frontlines. In irregular wars, people can flee more easily, so greater levels of displacement will be observed in areas with would-be targets of the armed group —this will make levels of violence to be associated differently to political identities than in

the case of CCW, where people have much lesser options to flee; they are trapped in the rearguards. This has two different implications: on the one hand, displacement may be a substitute form of violence in irregular wars, and observed more intensively in locations that, in the context of CCW, would be more intensively victimized (i.e. competitive locations). On the other hand, absent the option of fleeing, in CCW people may hide more frequently than in other civil wars (e.g. deserters or people that fear being targeted by the groups).

A fourth observable implication has a connection with the existing literature on polarization (including ethnic and religious polarization) and conflict, and that can help me adjudicate between alternative mechanisms leading toward a greater degree of violence in competitive settings. Authors such as Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), as well as Esteban and Ray (2008), have predicted a positive relationship between polarization and outbreak of violence, at the macro-level. Furthemore, Esteban and Ray (2008) have argued that violence is expected to be greater, within war, in more polarized settings, and they have related this to the stakes of the groups in this context –i.e. they are higher. Polarization is conceptualized by Esteban and Ray (1994) as "the sum of interpersonal "antagonisms" that result from the interplay of the sense of group identification (group size) and the sense of alienation with respect to members of other groups (inter-group distance)". This definition implies a continuous metric capturing distances between groups.[54] Montalvo and Reynal-Querol have somewhat simplified Esteban and Ray's measure of polarization, by conceiving it with a discrete metric. This simplification is driven by the absence of information on a continuous measure of

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[54] "The Esteban-Ray measure attains its maximum polarization when the population is concentrated on two equally sized poles located at the maximum distance from each other. However, the measure captures not only the extent to which a distribution is bi-polarized, but the concentration around any number of poles as well. Of course, the fewer the number of poles, the higher is the recorded polarization. (Esteban 2002: 12).

distances across groups, in many important dimensions (like ethnicity or religion) (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2008: 1835). They conceive and measure polarization as the extent to which the distribution of groups is far from the (1/2, 0, 0, ... 0, 1/2) distribution (bipolar), which represents the highest level of polarization (Reynal-Querol 2002).[55]

It must be noted that, in neither definition, polarization does mean the same as competition, as defined here. As conceived by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, a bipolar distribution implies parity in the size of the groups *only* when there are only two groups; when there are more than two groups, one may find high levels of competition or parity between all (or a subset) of these groups in non-polarized settings. In Esteban and Ray's conceptualization of polarization, as it includes a continuous metric for the distance between groups, one can find highly-polarized low-parity settings (e.g. two groups representing 70% vis-à-vis 30% of the population, very far from each other), as well as non-polarized high-parity setting (e.g. two groups representing 45% vis-à-vis 55% of the population, very "close" to each other). Thus, *parity* and *polarization* are not capturing exactly the same, and they should be distinguished theoretically, as well as empirically.[56]

At the theoretical level, we could expect micro-level polarization (as conceptualized in either of these definitions) to generate high levels of violence through the "identity revelation" mechanism. That is because it is plausible to assume that in polarized settings people show more intense attachments or loyalties to groups, especially if these are well-organized. Thus, prewar polarization may lead to a greater targeting/willingness to kill —i.e.strong supporters are more likely to be identified– but not necessarily towards greater collaboration by local civilians (i.e. it is not necessarily strategically advantageous to eliminate

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[55] Reynal-Querol´s (2002) index was originally aimed at distinguishing ethnic polarization from ethnic fractionalization.

[56] Some authors have incorrectly used the term polarization referring to what here is called "parity" or "competition" (e.g. Chacón 2004, Chacón *et al*. 2006, De la Calle 2007).

political enemies). Polarization *per se* should not lead towards greater killings through the mechanism of civilian strategic collaboration because violence is not necessarily beneficial for locals in these types of settings. Violence can be more "useful" for A in a non-polarized setting where it has 30% of the support while other three groups have the remaining 70% —killing members of the other groups may put it in an hegemonic position– than in a polarized setting where A is a minority, with 10% of the support, and B is a majority, with 90% of support —killing members of B does not change the distribution of power. It is possible to empirically test for this by employing an appropriate measure of political polarization (e.g. Reynal-Querol's); if I find that polarization does not have an effect on violence, I will then be able to suggest that competition is having an effect (on violence) through the mechanism of "strategic collaboration of local civilians", rather than through the "identity revelation" mechanism. In other words, using a measure of polarization can help me adjudicate between the two mechanisms by which local competition is hypothesized to affect levels of violence (see chapter 4).

Finally, the argument presented here should potentially be better at explaining violence in small localities than in bigger ones, where anonymity is greater.[57] On the one hand, in larger settings, identification of strong supporters of the enemy may be more troublesome and less reliant on local collaboration; on the other hand, revenge dynamics may be less plausible both because it may be more complicated to locate or identify the perpetrators of violence. This is coherent with the idea that both cooperative and perverse social dynamics may be more intense in smaller social

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[57] In the case of the Irish war of independence, indiscriminate violence was greater in a large urban area like Dublin city —once a sufficient level of support existed– due to looser social ties and anonymity (Augusteijn 1996: 334).

settings than in larger and thereby more anonymous ones (Augusteijn 1996).[58]

2.4. A Theory of Indirect Violence

Indirect violence consists of aerial, artillery or maritime bombardments.[59] In the war literature, bombardments are not usually studied in conjunction with executions or massacres. By placing these two types of violence within the same explanatory framework, I hope to make a contribution towards a more comprehensive understanding of violence against civilians during wartime.

I contend that indirect violence (see above) is not necessarily indiscriminate, although it is so following Kalyvas's (2006) definition. The reason is that this author's conceptualization of indiscriminate violence does not take into account the fact that there can be some degree of selectivity in attacks against localities/collectivities; in other words, that there may be selectivity even when the identification process does not take place at the level of the individual.[60] In practical terms, this means that armed groups may decide to selectively perpetrate mass violence against civilians in a particular locality, and not another. Pape argues, for instance, that aerial power has a lot of comparative advantage (over land power and naval power) with regard to selectivity: "Unlike sea power, bombing can focus on specific categories of targets, attacking either political, economic, population, or military targets in isolation or combination" (45). In

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[58] At the empirical level, this implication is testable: we can check for the interactive effect of competition and size of the locality.

[59] The use of nuclear weapons can also be included in this category, but given its rarity (especially in civil conflicts), they will not be taken into account.

[60] Along similar lines, Steele (2009) argues that selective violence can be inflicted on groups, in forms of what she calls "collective targeting".

short, indirect violence can have some degree of selectivity,[61] and this has implications for the factors that we should take into consideration when trying to understand variation in indirect violence across space and time.[62]

The literature on International Relations and International Security has very much focused on studying bombings in order to understand the relationship between violence against civilians and the determinacy to win and coercion (Pape 1996; Horowitz and Reiter 2001). For example, Arreguín-Toft argues that in asymmetric conflict, by means of barbarism (i.e. attacking civilians) the strong actor seeks to coerce its weaker opponent into changing its behavior by inflicting pain (destroying its values) (2001: 102). He says that this strategy has been used to destroy an adversary's will and capacity to fight. Instances of what I have called indirect violence are usually considered as intrinsically indiscriminate, and they are thereby assumed to be related to these coercive strategies. As a consequence of this, the focus in the literature has mostly been on the consequences of violence for war outcomes, namely in their combat and strategic effectiveness (i.e. Lyall 2009; Kocher *et al*. 2008). Downes (2008) is an exception as he also investigates the causes of civilian targeting, although he refers to any type of civilian targeting in war —in other words, unlike me, he is not bounded neither to indirect violence nor to civil wars.

The civil war literature is not much more helpful in providing us with explanations for indirect violence. While not referring exclusively to indirect violence, several authors argue that overall civilian victimization is related to the balance of power between contenders (Ziemke 2008; Hultman 2007; Vargas 2008; Boyle 2009). Ziemke argues that massacres are perpetrated in order to

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[61] Note that direct violence, according to my definition, will also comprise instances of "indiscriminate" violence.

[62] Again, my intention here is to be able to explain variation in this violence across space and time, behind the frontlines of conventional civil wars —I am not trying to explain why groups use indirect violence in the first place.

drastically resolve the war, and she therefore predicts violence to be highest in the latest stages of a war, and to increase with the length of the war. She also argues that greater losses on the battlefield lead to increased victimization of civilians. Similarly, Hultman (2007) predicts more intense violence against civilians by rebels when they are losing on the battlefield. She argues that this violence works as a "cheap and easy" military strategy to raise the government's costs for standing firm and continuing fighting (Hultman 2007: 206). Vargas (2008) predicts violence to be greater when there is a shift in the balance of power, as violence is also conceived as instrumental for bargaining purposes. All these approaches have the shortcoming of not being able to explain spatial variations in violence; mostly, because they do not distinguish between "targets" of this instrumental violence. The exception in this regard is Boyle (2009), whose explanation of civilian victimization in Iraq is grounded on three different mechanisms related to bargaining processes, but who derives implications for spatial variation in violence (i.e. they are conditional on the ethnic composition of localities). Yet, his "theory" is *sui generis* for the case of Iraq and it does not seem to apply easily to other conflicts.

As mentioned earlier, many of these works are also limited in that they are either explicitly or implicitly inspired by the nature of warfare in irregular conflicts. In conventional civil wars, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants is clearer than in irregular civil wars, so that the bombing of rearguard territories is likely to generate a relatively larger share of civilian victims. These bombings may be much less accounted by military factors, although this does not mean that military factors will not play a role, as in any civil war "both parties to a conflict will target strategic locations such as crossroads, bridges, ports and airports held by the opponent and invest resources to protect them" (Hegre, Ostby and Raleigh 2007: 5).[63] Following my theoretical

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[63] Military explanations should not make us think of events such as bombings against civilian localities as "inevitable". As is exemplified by

framework, political factors should also matter for explaining variation in indirect violence in the rearguard territories.

In CCW, when violence takes place in rearguard territories, this is motivated by the will of armed groups to clear the rear territories of strong enemies —again, these are people that have strong identities due to prewar mobilization. As we have seen, this can be done by means of direct violence, but not only: it can also be done by means of indirect violence. The latter is obviously a less efficient way to kill selectively, but it is still potentially useful. It is for instance plausible to think that group (A) will use heavy technology to bomb towns or villages where there are very high densities of supporters of B. They will prefer this than to bomb a place where A has manifest support, and supporters of B a minority. In the former locations (i.e. "dominated" by B) they maximize the probability of eliminating foci of potential insurgencies and future dissidents; in the latter, they are potentially killing many of her supporters. Since A is limited in her access to information on the existence of strong supporters of B in a particular location, she is going to be driven by informational shortcuts to know the composition of the localities to be bombed, e.g. level of support for B in the elections, trade union presence, and similar indicators of presence of strong supporters of the enemy.

2.4.1. Explaining Indirect Violence

Let's now imagine the same country, civil war and territory I made reference to above. B is a well-equipped armed group, which has heavy artillery allowing shelling from land (in places close to the frontline), sea (in places close to the seashore), and air (presumably, anywhere). In addition to using this technological capacity to attack A in the frontlines and/or militarily strategic

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several cases in the American Civil War, restraint is also a possible option (Neely 2007).

enclaves, B can choose to deploy some of its resources to attack civilian locations in the A's rearguard.[64] These attacks, while barbaric, can be perpetrated on a selective basis: that is, the group can decide to assassinate civilians in a particular locality and not in another. This choice will be very often necessary for armed groups because their resources are not unlimited. Furthermore, genocide is not always in the strategic interest of the military leaders (Valentino 2004).

Military-strategic factors would be expected to play a crucial role in the decision to bomb a location. For this reason, industrial and other infrastructure locations are likely to be targeted. The same happens with strategic communication enclaves, such as harbors, nodal train stations or roads. Yet, political factors may play a relevant role too: everything else being equal, B is likely to attack places with the greatest number of strong supporters of the enemy group, i.e. number of A_{SS}. That is because B is ultimately interested in eliminating those people that are providing greater support to A during the civil war (again, highly mobilized people are those who offer greater logistical and material support to A), or who will constitute a potential threat in a future period, when the group will potentially exert control over this territory. Given the degree of imprecision of indirect type of attacks such as bombings, the armed groups can only make sure that they are targeting strong supporters of the enemy by attacking locations with a relatively large share of these supporters. In these locations, the effects of indirect violence are more likely to be positive than elsewhere.

If we conceptualize the degree of support for the enemy group in a locality —and therefore the relative number of strong supporters– with the degree of prewar electoral support for the enemy group, we can hypothesize that:

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[64] It does not make sense to think that B will deploy resources to assassinate civilians indirectly in its own rearguard.

Hypothesis 2.3: *The greater the electoral support for a group during the prewar period, the greater the likelihood that a locality will be the target of lethal indirect violence by the enemy group.*

Conversely, we can expect the likelihood of indirect violence to decrease monotonically with the degree of prewar support for the political bloc linked to the armed group perpetrating it. Armed groups, if rational, should not be interested in assassinating their own supporters. Although they will probably not be able to avoid causing casualties to their own side, they will seek to minimize the chances that A's supporters will be killed in the indirect attacks. Again, they will do so by not targeting locations they politically dominate.

At the same time, armed groups might be interested in sending signals to their own constituencies in the rearguards. Despite the existence of stable frontlines, in wartime contexts, information on violent events, on the brutality of attacks —and similar– is likely to travel fast. Refugee flows have usually been a source of information of the events occurring on the other side of the frontline; in recent times, mass communications do the job. Thus, if we consider that armed groups want to satisfy their "domestic audiences" in order to enhance mobilization (Gagnon 2004), we might think that they will be interested in attacking specific locations in order to retaliate for the previous killings of their supporters (i.e. in a place where their supporters are widely known to have been highly repressed). Revenge, as we have seen, is an important emotion in social interactions. These retaliatory attacks, explained by what I call "emotional motives", can be expected to take place in non-initial places of the civil war, and to become more likely as the war continues and direct violence by the rival group continues to take place (in the cases where it does take place).

2.4.2. Additional Observable Implications

In a framework where armed groups are targeting civilians with the intention to cleanse rearguard areas of strong enemies, we may think that the group will have an interest in eliminating strong supporters of the enemy regardless of their place of origin. Areas hosting internally displaced people that are associated with the rival group, B (e.g. cvilians who are fleeing from areas that are occupied by A), may be more targeted (directly and indirectly) by A because of this. For example, Steele (2008) has observed, in the civil war in Colombia, that massacres by the paramilitary were more likely in locations with greater density of internally displaced (IDPs), e.g. people having fled from paramilitary control zones. "Fleeing" has not been fully considered as an option in my theoretical framework because the non-fluidity of frontlines makes it very complicated —not a viable option– in the context of CCW. Also, in my model, this can be considered to be a behavior off-the-equilibrium path because, by leaving, individuals disclose their identities to the group —from that point in time onwards, they will be regarded as strong supporters of the enemy. The only occasions in which fleeing may be an optimal option are those in which individual's strong identities are already publicly known as strong and thus leaving is not implying the disclosure of any identity. While theorizing about displacement is beyond the scope of this dissertation, targeting internally displaced people may however be a tangential implication of the model above —where political identities are an informational shortcut for armed groups that are sweeping the rear territories of enemies. At the same time, this type of behavior by armed groups can also be derived from a strategic type of framework: for example, groups may be sending a signal to their own constituents that they should stay on their side, and deter them from fleeing (and therefore defecting). Finally, with these kind of attacks, armed groups may reduce the degree of support that refugees show toward the other side, which is "unable to protect them" (Kalyvas 2006). In other words, by attacking IDPs, groups might not only be sweeping the rear

territories of potential enemies (clearly so because they have fled their own rearguards), but also manipulating civilian emotions in their favor (i.e. provoking fear and terror in order to prevent defection and flight from the area under control).[65]

To sum up, in the context of a conventional civil war, armed groups are likely to perpetrate indirect violence in zones out of their territorial control in order to pursue military objectives, and this will imply the targeting of geostrategic enclaves (e.g. big cities, harbors, communication nodes, etc.).[66] At the same time, political and what I have labeled as emotional variables may also be playing a role, leading groups to attack places with a greater density of potentially strong enemies, as well as places that have victimized their supporters. Finally, and building on previous findings on massacres in Colombia (Steele 2008), we may conject that groups will be interested in indirectly targeting locations with a greater density of internally displaced people, driven by a mix of political, emotional and strategic motives.

In general, the inclusion of political and emotional factors makes the theoretical framework explaining indirect violence here slightly broader than those in the existing literature, which has either focused on military factors (Pape 1996), bargaining

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[65] We could try to derive the same types of implications for direct violence. However, it is not straightforward to clarify the direction of the effects of this type of violence, because local civilians's agency can play either in favor or against the IDPs or newcomers. On the one hand, as future local politics should not be affected by people inhabiting the locality temporarily, civilians may not push for to have them killed even in situations of competition. On the other hand, we should expect direct violence also to be greater in locations hosting IDP's because the 'strong identity" of these individuals will already be disclosed. Hence, the predictions are mixed.

[66] We cannot have a set of priors on the geostrategic interests, as they are largely affected by the dynamics of warfare. However it is to be expected that big cities, close to the sea and foreign borders, etc. are likely to be more affected by bombings, for instance, than smaller locations.

considerations and/or military balance of power between groups (Hultman 2007; Boyle 2009; Vargas 2008); or in a combination of military and political factors, but that has left emotional variables out of the picture (Kocher *et al*. 2008).

2.5. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has presented a theory seeking to explain intentional violence against noncombatants in civil wars. Following Gould's prescription, I have logically derived a set of testable hypotheses from an integrated set of propositions. Direct (or face-to-face) violence has been distinguished from indirect violence, and two different logics —corresponding to each of these types– have been provided. I have argued that the determinants of direct and indirect violence are necessarily different due to the diverging characteristics of their form of production: while the former implies the joint production of armed groups and civilians, the latter is mostly unilateral from the perspective of the armed group.

In general terms, I have used CCW as a theoretical device to introduce a set of conditions under which existing theories cannot explain violence against civilians, and in which —I argue– political identities become central, thereby challenging recent research on dynamics of violence during conflict that have given primacy to economic, organizational or military factors (e.g. Azam 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). I have argued that, at the meso-level, local political alignments are key in explaining the perpetration of violence during civil war, and that they do so in different ways depending on the type of violence (i.e. direct or indirect). This is the case because, regarding the perpetration of violence, political identities intervene in two different levels: 1) the *decision to target* (by armed groups), 2) the *decision to collaborate*, i.e. acquiescing in the perpetration of violence and/or promoting it (by the civilians).

The theory here implies that prewar politics are important in understanding wartime violence; yet, this does not mean that political variables affect violence in a linear way (i.e. domination hypothesis), or that there is a mechanical extension of political conflict to the battleground.[67] The relationship, as established here, is non-monotonic and more complex. [68]

Importantly, in addition to incorporating political variables, factors endogenous to the war have also been considered here as crucial in a dynamic explanation of violence. In other words, I argue that understanding the determinants of violence requires a theory that combines political cleavages and wartime dynamics; while the former will be particularly relevant during the first stages of the civil war, the latter will gain relevance as the war goes by and there are changes in the territorial control of armed groups. This framework should apply to all types of civil war, not necessarily CCW.

Also, I have argued that factors such as variation in the degree of military control shall not be ignored in CCW —despite not being as relevant as in irregular conflicts. Due to this, violence against civilians is likely to be more intense in particular locations

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[67] The argument thus challenges considerations such as Fuji's, regarding violence in Rwanda: "the same kind of factors —conflicts between political parties and by extension, ethnic groups– were the underlying cause for the violence that followed" (Fuji 2009: 94).

[68] This approach coincides with Gould´s suggestion that it is generally misleading to think that "conflict is a matter of overthrowing domination" (2003: 38), which is somewhat latent in explanations of violence that rely on political factors. Also, here I have defined domination in a very straightforward way, based on the number of 'supporters" of a faction or political group at the level of the locality. However, domination, which can be applied to any type of social relationship, can be taken as a more compound issue (see Gould's discussion of the concept, 2003: 27-66). "Domination is an abstract concept that encompasses all sorts of mechanisms for social influence: authority, coercion, unequal exchange, manipulation, deception, persuasion, demonstration of superior competence, and so on" (Gould 2003: 49).

(i.e. localities neighboring war frontlines),[69] and at particular moments of time (i.e. at the beginning of a war, just after the occupation of a new territory), where control is more precarious. Yet, in the context of a CCW, information considerations mostly affect the utility function of armed groups: we should not expect civilian behavior to be very much influenced by these considerations in a context where territorial boundaries of the armed groups are quite clearly defined, and they comprise large areas of territory. In this context, civilians have little chances to defect against the controlling armed group (i.e. they have no exit options).

With regard to indirect violence, the theoretical framework above emphasizes the military strategic character of this type of violence, although it also brings political identities to the fore. In addition to targeting militarily strategic locations with these rather imprecise attacks (i.e. bombardments), armed groups are also maximizing the elimination of strong supporters of the rival. Since indirect violence does not depend on civilian collaboration, we expect this to have a negative monotonic relationship with the degree of support for the perpetrating group (or, conversely, a positive relationship with local level support for the enemy group), as well as a positive relationship with the presence of militants of groups linked to the enemy (that is, political enclaves of the enemy). Endogenous to the war factors (i.e. instances of collective retaliation) are also potentially driving the perpetration of indirect violence, insofar as armed groups can obtain benefits from satisfying the desires for revenge of civilians in their areas of control; thus, we may expect this violence to be marginally explained by levels of direct violence perpetrated by the rival group during earlier stages of the civil war.

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[69] Close to the frontline, civilians may have an important role for military actions of groups (e.g. they can transfer information to the other side). Thus, as control is more contested, we can think that the dynamics of violence against civilians are likely resemble those in irregular civil wars.

The theoretical framework here has avoided the inclusion of grand strategy considerations on the determinants of indirect violence; even if military factors must naturally be taken into account to explain civilian victimization during war. To explain variation in indirect violence, I have considered the civil war frontlines are exogenously given; the focus has been on understanding why there is variation in targeting across large and clearly delineated rearguard territories. This focus is useful theoretically as much as empirically for grand strategies are usually very hard to know with certainty. As Neely explains for the case of the US Civil War "we simply do not know what the grand strategies of the Civil War were. We must infer them from events and from passing remarks left us here and there in the military and political record, official and unofficial. . . . it is important to maintain a humble attitude and realize that the policies are not clear and never will be" (2007: 202-3). Something similar is illustrated by the mismatch between what the Italian air force said that they had destroyed in their aerial attacks on the city of Barcelona (i.e. the harbor), and what they had destroyed, in reality (i.e. much more than the harbor) (SSV 2004: 303).[70]

All in all, the framework above has brought together types of violence that are often studied separately, namely executions/massacres and bombings. While almost all studies focus on one or the other, I have here argued that political identities constitute the common grounds for understanding them. Recovering Clausewitz (1832/1968), politics are brought in a strategic explanation of violence. However, because of the existence of diverging constraints —related to their form of production–, political variables are expected to affect differently each of the types of violence.

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[70] SSV (2003) explain that acccording to Francoist press releases, only military objectives, harbours, railroad stations were attacked –yet, this was not the case, many rearguard territories full of civilians were targeted. In short, it seems better to focus on analyzing objective "harm" (e.g. bombs thrown, number of killed people) than on "planned strategies".

This chapter has also highlighted the fact that micro-level approaches to factors such as political competition or polarization contribute to a better understanding of conflict. While macro-level approaches to competition and polarization have been widespread in the academic literature on conflict (e.g. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; 2008; Reynal Querol 2002; Esteban and Ray 2002), micro-level approaches have been largely overlooked.[71] This has probably been as a consequence of the so-called "political bias", which has assumed that the micro-level relationship between politics and violence is linear, and which has restrained the exploration of more complex forms of relationship between these two variables (at the micro-level). In a way, it looks like economists have either focused on political variables at the macro-level or on economic variables at the micro-level.[72]

A caveat to the theoretical framework is that civilians's agency regarding the perpetration of direct violence can be viewed as excessive. One might argue that because armed groups are more powerful than civilians, their objectives will prevail over those of defenseless noncombatants. Nevertheless, local information, as well as social support at the local level, are extremely valuable assets for armed groups, and these should not be underestimated for the production of violence. That is particularly the case of militias that patrol rear territories with light weapons, with rather "selective objectives" in mind.[73] This assumption is backed with previous findings in the literature, which has demonstrated the crucial role of non-elites and popular classes in civil war processes and outcomes, in very different types of settings (e.g. French wars

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[71] The exception is Esteban and Ray (2008).

[72] The neglect of politics at the micro-level is in some ways puzzling because this has not occurred in other areas of study. See, for example, Pranab Bardhan's body of research.

[73] Note that the assumption in these contexts is that armed groups are willing to kill on a selective basis. This does not mean, however, that they always do so —e.g. they may kill people without previous identification. However, I would assume that these indiscriminate killings are not the norm in the absence of unlimited resources.

of religion, Holt 2005: 196-97; the Napoleonic war in Spain, Fraser 2008; the Irish War of Independence, Augusteijn 1996: 312-334; the civil war in El Salvador, Wood 2003, 2009; rebel governance in Colombia, Arjona 2009a). An additional caveat is that armed groups are, like any other social organization, imperfect entities. The interests of each of the actors that constitute the armed groups are not likely to converge perfectly, and the result of the aggregation of their preferences is not likely to be rational, or even coherent, along the lines of Arrow's (1951) theorem. At the same time, we can think that groups can make tactical and strategic mistakes that can lead not only to war losses but also to "irrational" violent acts. Nonetheless, departing from an assumption of non-rationality of the actors would make impossible any theorization; while I understand that this will not be strictly speaking always true, I believe that assuming that armed groups are organizations that behave as rational actors is an appropriate assumption for theorization purposes. In any case, as I argued above, this does not compel us to stick to a narrow definition of "rationality".

Before concluding, I would like to make a final point: the theoretical framework here does not exclude private hatreds or personal motives such as greed or jealousy as relevant factors accounting for violence taking place at the local level. As it has been made clear, these variables are strongly at play in the non-initial stages of the war, generating spiraling processes of violence. However, one could object that these are playing a role in early violence, as well: these types of factors have been shown to be very relevant in explaining violence in other types of wars (André and Platteau 1998; Kalyvas 2006; Fuji 2009).[74] My take on this is as follows: there are no reasons to think that these private

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[74] Fuji argues that in Rwanda, situational factors and personal motives, such as greed and jealousy, explain violence better than ethnic hatreds and fears (2009). Frésard (2004) explains that motivations for human rights violations range from ideological ones to personal ones, including obedience mechanisms. All of these motivations are combined to produce the outcome of violence.

motives vary systematically across localities; in other words, at the meso-level, we should expect these to be distributed stochastically across space (i.e. to be "white noise").[75] For this reason, at an initial stage of the conflict, we should not expect them to explain variation either in the occurrence or in levels of violence. In the later stages of the conflict, these private hatreds will no longer be distributed stochastically across localities: they will be greater in places where victimization within the conflict has been more severe. That said, at the empirical level we may nevertheless be interested in taking into account variables that can potentially capture the existence of private hatreds in a locality in the initial stages of the civil war;[76] in particular, we may take into account factors connected to prewar political dynamics at the local level (e.g. political violence events; political confrontations) —if they could be measured in any systematic way.[77]

In chapters 4 to 6, I test the hypotheses and observable implications developed in this chapter with quantitative and qualitative data I gathered from the Spanish Civil War. Before that, in chapter 3, I develop a historical depiction of this conflict with the aim to provide a context to the reader, as well as to undertake an exercise of descriptive inference that should hopefully add to the analytical contribution of this chapter.

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[75] That should be the case unless private hatreds were associated with political variables. See below.

[76] For example, André and Platteau (1998) observe that land distribution and socioeconomic grievances have an impact on private hatreds, even within the family.

[77] Further research may attempt to develop explanations and measures of private hatreds, or try finding reasonable instrumental variables for these —if existent at all. In the meantime, I believe that sticking to the assumption that these are stochastically distributed across localities (in t_1) is at this point the most suitable way to proceed analytically.

CHAPTER 3. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AND DESCRIPTIVE DATA

"Good causal hypotheses are complementary to good description rather than competitive with it."

Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*

3.1. Introduction

The Spanish Civil War began as a military coup against a legally constituted democratic government. It lasted for almost three years (18 July 1936-1 April 1939) and generated around 800,000 deaths and over 440,000 externally displaced.[1] The civil war took place between two main political blocs: 1) the army of the Republican government or Loyalists, which also included militias of political parties,[2] trade unions,[3] and the International

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[1] As will be explained further below, data on total deaths during the civil war is still incomplete, and various historians are involved in debates about estimations (Salas 1977; Martín Rubio 1997; Preston 1986; Torres 2002; Juliá 2004). Hence, we should take this as an orientation number. Data on refugees is also very fragmentary, and should be viewed with caution. The sources here are Rubio (1977) and Gaitx (2006).

[2] I.e. POUM, FAI, PC.

Brigades. I include all of them under the label of the "left", even though there were important differences between them, including intense rivalries that eventually led to violent clashes; 2) the army of the rebels (Francoists or Nationalists), which also included factions of the regular army and various militias;[4] I include them all under the label of the "right."

This chapter aims to briefly outline the history of the SCW, in order to contextualize the dissertation's main research question. I describe the antecedents of the outbreak of the war, and the dynamics of the war as it developed. I also briefly outline the specific war history of Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Extremadura and Andalusia (the regions under empirical scrutiny). After making a methodological note on the existing data limitations for the study of dynamics of violence during the SCW, I present some preliminary data on civilian victimization in these regions, which are put in a comparative perspective. I also explain how these territories resemble the remaining areas of Spain, where findings should be generalizable.

One of the most important insights obtained from the descriptive data presented in this chapter is that the micro-dynamics of violence were not fundamentally different in the two sides of the Spanish Civil War, as it has been usually thought. It will be shown that, on the contrary, there were key commonalities between them.

3.2. Precedents of the Civil War

3.2.1 The Spanish Second Republic

The Spanish Second Republic was a democratic period following a dictatorial regime (Primo de Rivera, 1923-1930), which started with the dismissal of the King Alfonso XIII on 14

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[3] I.e. CNT, UGT.

[4] I.e. *Falangists*, *Carlists* or *Requetés*.

April 1931. The Republic was characterized by major reforms that polarized the Spanish society, and were accompanied with major upheaval both at the social and political levels. The regime consisted, on a first period, of a leftist government (1931-1934), which was followed by a phase of right-wing (also called counterrevolutionary) government (1934-1936), and a final period of leftist (also called Popular Front) government, which lasted only for 6 months (from February to July 1936), as it was interrupted by the coup led by General Francisco Franco (18 July 1936), its failure, and subsequent civil war.

Major historians have analyzed the period in great detail, and have generated key insights into the relationship between the events of the period (e.g. political violence, governmental reforms) and the onset of the civil war.[5] It would be senseless to replicate the work of these scholars here, so instead I shall concentrate on briefly reviewing the main issues that structured the political debate and political activity during that period. I tackle them insofar as understanding political mobilization and political polarization during the Second Republic provides us with some key insights into the determinants of violence during the civil war.

Land distribution was a crucial issue in Spanish politics during the 1930s, as it was in other European countries such as Finland, Italy, Denmark and Czechoslovakia (Luebbert 1987). Disputes over land issues, including the different reform initiatives and counter-initiatives undertaken by the governments of the Republic had their origins in earlier periods of Spanish history.[6] Land distribution was extremely unequal in areas of Spain such as Extremadura and Andalusia, where the most common forms of property organization, known as *latifundios*, consisted of extremely large properties owned by a small number of landlords

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[5] E.g. Brenan 1967; Preston 1994; Beevor 1982; Malefakis 1976; 1996; Payne 1990; 2004; Tusell 1999.

[6] Indeed, the nineteenth century had been characterized by big disputes over expropriations of land owned by the Church and big landlords - the so-called *desamortizacione*s (García de Cortázar and González 1994).

and worked by peasants earning very low salaries.[7] This unequal distribution of property contributed to a structural problem in the Spanish economy, the so-called "agrarian unemployment" (*paro agrícola*) (Vila Izquierdo 1984). The big landlords naturally opposed Republican reforms aimed at improving the conditions of the peasants, e.g. the Law of Agrarian Reform (*Ley de Bases de la Reforma Agraria*), which was approved on 9 September 1931 and the "*Yunteros* reform" of Caceres and Badajoz, which was approved in 1934. In consequence, big confrontations took place between landlords and peasants in a numerous places of Spain during that period, even in quite urbanized regions such as Catalonia, where land distribution was not as unequal as in the South (Balcells 1971; 1980; Riquer 1972).[8] Demands for land redistribution not only threatened large landowners, but also middle peasants: "the Spanish Socialists" campaign for land reform in the south of Spain antagonized peasants even in the north" (Luebbert 1987: 461). In short, issues around land distribution were one of the main catalysts of political violence during the Second Republic (Payne 1990; Mintz 1982),[9] and in fact have been considered to be one of the main determinants of the Spanish Civil War (Malefakis 1976; Riesco 2006).[10]

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[7] A classical piece on this form of property was written by Carrión (1932).

[8] Riquer (1972) explains that in the summer of 1993, there was an accentuation of social conflict in the Catalan countryside –the so-called *rabassaire* conflict. He argues that this led the LlR to explicitly assume the defense of the interests of the big landowners, as well as to oppose the social reformism of ERC.

[9] Besides the occasional anarchist insurrections, the main sources of violence were the persistent confrontations between radicalized poor peasants and the authorities in rural districts, primarily the centre and south, stemming from agrarian strikes and vociferous peasant demands (usually stimulated by the anarchists) for drastic economic changes (Payne 1990: 274).

[10] The agrarian social cleavage also had implications for dynamics of violence during the war: peasants or landlords were often the target of violence by one or the other side. Even in the rural areas of Catalonia,

Also in line with what was occurring in Europe during that period, "class" was a major cleavage in Spanish politics. This cleavage was strongly connected to land distribution, as is obvious, but it went beyond it —for it also involved urban classes. Left and right represented the two sides of the ideological cleavage, roughly articulated by Marxist, Anarchist or Social-democratic political parties on the side of the workers, and by Fascist, Liberal or Conservative parties, on the side of the agricultural and industrial landlords. Anarcho-syndicalism was a very important political force in Spain, much greater than in other European countries, with a significant presence in the regions of Catalonia, Andalusia and Aragon. Yet, the number of people affiliated with the anarchist trade union (CNT) shrunk between 1919 and 1931, perhaps due to the decreasing influence of the Russian revolution on the worker's ideological mindset, or to the growing prevalence of a reformist ideology, which was also reflected in the growth in the figures of those affiliated with a more moderate trade union, the UGT (Cucó i Giner, 1970: 183-184).[11]

In Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we can see the distribution of people affiliated with the CNT and UGT trade unions across the different regions of Spain during the first decades of the twentieth century. We can observe that —both in 1931 and in 1936– a large share of CNT affiliates was located in the regions of Andalusia and Extremadura (highly rural) and Catalonia (highly industrialized).[12] With regards to the UGT, we can see that the highest share of its affiliates in 1931 were from Castile (42.09%), followed by Andalusia (18%). Catalonia had a very negligible share of the total

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and especially the vine-growing ones, more than half of the executed were peasants (Linz 1996).

[11] The UGT was the trade union associated with the socialist party (PSOE), which also experienced a big growth in militancy during the 1920s.

[12] Yet, we can observe that the CNT lost half of its affiliates in Catalonia between 1931 and 1936, in line with the declining trend indicated by Cucó i Giner.

UGT affiliation in 1931.[13] The diverging regional presence of these two trade unions is indicative of their programmatic differences: the more radical union (i.e. the CNT) prevailed in areas with either a high proportion of industrial workers or landless peasants, whereas the more moderate union (i.e. the UGT) prevailed in areas with middle sized agrarian properties.

Table 3.1. CNT Affiliation in 1936 and 1931. By Regions

	1936		**1931**	
	Affiliated	% Spain	Affiliated	% Spain
Andalusia and Extremadura	156,150	31.89%	108,725	20.14%
Catalonia	140,952	28.79%	297,481	55.09%
Valencia and Murcia	50,972	10.41%	54,548	10.10%
Castile (La Mancha) and Madrid	39,200	8.01%	12,988	2.41%
Aragon, Rioja, Navarre	35,263	7.20%	28,081	5.20%
Galicia	23,865	4.87%	13,418	2.49%
Asturias, Leon and Palencia	22,731	4.64%	25,960	4.81%
Canarias	10,555	2.16%	1,025	0.19%
Basque country and Cantabria	7,337	1.50%	2,983	0.55%
Balearic Islands	2,593	0.53%	.	0.00%
Unknown Locat.	.	.	953	0.18%
Total	489,618		539,958	

Sources: Cucó i Giner (1970) and Solidaridad Obrera (1936).

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[13] Data on UGT affiliation for 1936 is not available, so we do not have evidence that the decrease of CNT affiliation was accompanied by an increase in UGT affiliation in this region.

Table 3.2. UGT Affiliation 1922-1931. By Provinces and Regions

		1922	% Spain	1928	% Spain	1931	% Spain
Aragon							
	Huesca	20	0.01%	27	0.01%	958	0.14%
	Teruel	491	0.24%	191	0.09%	3,289	0.48%
	Zaragoza	748	0.37%	3,453	1.68%	11,966	1.73%
	Total	*1,254*	*0.61%*	*3,671*	*1.79%*	*16,213*	*2.35%*
Catalonia							
	Barcelona	2,052	1.00%	4,112	2.01%	12,853	1.86%
	Girona	523	0.26%	645	0.31%	551	0.08%
	Lleida	56	0.03%		0.00%	103	0.01%
	Tarragona	796	0.39%	1,129	0.55%	3,176	0.46%
	Total	*3,427*	*1.68%*	*5,886*	*2.87%*	*16,683*	*2.42%*
Valencia							
	Castellon	17,037	8.33%	15,313	7.47%	7,721	1.12%
	Alicante	7,635	3.73%	10,251	5.00%	19,768	2.86%
	Valencia	8,904	4.35%	16,137	7.87%	29,147	4.22%
	Total	*33,576*	*16.41%*	*41,701*	*20.35%*	*56,636*	*8.20%*
Extremadura							
	Caceres	9,474	4.63%	8,063	3.93%	16,075	2,3%
	Badajoz	5,966	2.92%	4,420	2.16%	22,855	3,3%
	Total	*15,440*	*7.55%*	*12,483*	*6.09%*	*38,930*	*5.6%*
Andalusia							
	Almería	490	0.24%	661	0.32%	12,905	1.87%
	Cádiz	2,564	1.25%	2,198	1.07%	7,671	1.11%
	Córdoba	8,530	4.17%	5,590	2.73%	17,558	2.54%
	Granada	1,758	0.86%	2,750	1.34%	15,017	2.17%
	Huelva	414	0.20%	340	0.17%	13,557	1.96%
	Jaén	2,314	1.13%	3,310	1.62%	20,527	2.97%
	Malaga	4,152	2.03%	2,175	1.06%	17,338	2.51%

	Sevilla	1191	0.58%	2155	1.05%	19814	2.87%
	Total	*21,413*	*10.47%*	*19,179*	*9.36%*	*124,387*	*18.02%*
Asturias							
	Total	*18,147*	*8.87%*	*12,808*	*6.25%*	*17,706*	*2.56%*
Canarias							
	Total	*50*	*0.02%*	*1,547*	*0.75%*	*3,433*	*0.50%*
Baleares							
	Total	*317*	*0.15%*	*2691*	*1.31%*	*3,597*	*0.52%*
Castile							
	Santander	4,358	2.13%	4,288	2.09%	7,245	1.05%
	Burgos	637	0.31%	552	0.27%	2,330	0.34%
	Logroño	768	0.38%	912	0.45%	3,264	0.47%
	Soria	240	0.12%	.	.	935	0.14%
	Segovia	330	0.16%	418	0.20%	1,503	0.22%
	Avila	505	0.25%	939	0.46%	2,477	0.36%
	Madrid	54,744	26.76%	56,072	27.36%	228,618	33.11%
	Toledo	1546	0.76%	2,242	1.09%	21,317	3.09%
	Ciudad Real	2,498	1.22%	2,710	1.32%	17,072	2.47%
	Cuenca	263	0.13%	237	0.12%	4,159	0.60%
	Guadalajara	812	0.40%	642	0.31%	1,702	0.25%
	Total	*63,128*	*30.85%*	*65,423*	*31.92%*	*290,622*	*42.09%*
Galicia							
	La Coruña	1,521	0.74%	2,935	1.43%	8,115	1.18%
	Lugo	549	0.27%	895	0.44%	1,712	0.25%
	Orense	963	0.47%	1,696	0.83%	2,800	0.41%
	Pontevedra	7,073	3.46%	5,220	2.55%	9,121	1.32%
	Total	*10,106*	*4.94%*	*10,746*	*5.24%*	*21,748*	*3.15%*
Leon							
	León	2,518	1.23%	2,781	1.36%	5,204	0.75%
	Zamora	881	0.43%	719	0.35%	3,806	0.55%

Salamanca	3,155	1.54%	3,294	1.61%	9,717	1.41%
Valladolid	4,016	1.96%	3,181	1.55%	13,063	1.89%
Palencia	747	0.37%	756	0.37%	2,099	0.30%
Total	*11,317*	*5.53%*	*10,731*	*5.24%*	*33,889*	*4.91%*
Navarre						
Total	1,244	0.61%	805	0.39%	3,846	0.56%
Murcia						
Albacete	2,036	1.00%	1,007	0.49%	9,963	1.44%
Murcia	2,633	1.29%	4,131	2.02%	23,939	3.47%
Total	*4,669*	*2.28%*	*5,138*	*2.51%*	*33,902*	*4.91%*
Basque country						
Alava	166	0.08%	233	0.11%	587	0.09%
Guipúzcoa	2,760	1.35%	1,901	0.93%	7,508	1.09%
Vizcaya	17,575	8.59%	9,938	4.85%	19,076	2.76%
Total	*20,501*	*10.02%*	*12,072*	*5.89%*	*27,171*	*3.94%*
Ceuta and Melilla						
Total	*3*	*0.00%*	*62*	*0.030*	*1677*	*0.243*
Spain						
Total	***204,597***	***100%***	***204,943***	***100%***	***690,440***	***100%***

Source: Cucó i Giner (1970).

Trade union affiliation was associated with electoral support for leftist political parties, although these did not match up perfectly, as we can observe if we compare electoral results of the 1936 elections by region/province (see Table 3.3 further below) with the trade union affiliation figures we just made reference to.[14] This is probably because the radicalism of trade unions surpassed that of political parties, on the one hand, and because the determinants of these different types of political participation (i.e. voting vis-à-vis trade union membership) are generally different.[15]

During the first decades of the 20th century, peripheral nationalism flourished politically, socially and culturally in Spain. According to Balfour and Preston (1999) "the cleavages were not just political and ideological but also regional because economic growth and urbanization had taken place above all in the more developed periphery of Spain, whose elites had occupied subordinate positions in the structure of political power" (4). In the Basque country and Catalonia political forces representing regionalist interests (i.e. PNV, LlR, ERC) not only had a hegemonic presence in their respective polities, but they brought regional issues to the national level, where they bargained over political decentralization. The regional cleavage was extremely deep during the Second Republic, which witnessed the conception of the Catalan, Galician, and Basque Autonomous Constitutions,[16] and it was also significant during the civil war, where the Francoists heavily targeted members of the ethnic minorities (e.g. Catalan, Basques, Galician) (SSV 1987; Sales 2007; Thompson

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[14] This relationship was also loose at a lower administrative level. In Figure A3.1 of the Appendix, we can see the relationship, at the county level, between electoral support for the left in the elections and rate of CNT affiliation in Catalonia: while we can see that there is a positive and curvilinear relationship, this is not perfect.

[15] For a general account of the determinants of different forms of political participation, see Morales (2004).

[16] The Basque Autonomous Constitution was however never approved due to the outbreak of the war.

2005).[17] In any case, there is no doubt that the main structuring cleavage of the civil war was the class (i.e. left-right) cleavage. An indicator of this is that, at the time of the coup, the different regional political parties (and their constituencies) sided with the rebels or the government following their position on the left/right scale, and not following their position on the (peripheral) nationalist scale.[18]

A religious cleavage added to the class and center/periphery cleavages, with a big overlap between them: "The social cleavage between religious adherents and non-adherents coincided in reality, and to a great extent, with the political cleavage between supporters and enemies of the Republican regime" (Ledesma 2009a: 20). Like the class cleavage, the religious cleavage also had strong roots in the history of the country (Montero 1961). The articulation and persistence of a political identity and social movement known as "anticlericalism" took place during the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century: "In 1936 Spain, anticlericalism was one of the clearest collective identities, and with the highest mobilizing potential" (Ledesma 2009a: 24). Reforms aimed at reducing Church land and property had been a major source of conflict during the nineteenth century; but not only this, different secularizing reforms were enacted by the leftist governments of the Second Republic: civil marriage, divorce, and civil funerary services were allowed, and the Church hegemony

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[17] SSV explain that, during the occupation of Catalonia by the Nationalist army, the hatred and against everything "Catalan" was extremely obvious. This was followed by what they name "cultural genocide" of Catalonia, which implied "the prohibition of the usage of the language , the printing and distribution of publications in Catalan, destruction of libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, cult places and other institutions" (SSV 1987: 14).

[18] The exceptions were the right-wing political parties in Valencia and the Basque Country, which supported the Republican government and not the rebels. The *Lliga Regionalista* (LlR) –the main Catalanist right wing party- and its constituency of Catalan conservatives, supported Franco despite his anti-Catalanist discourse and behavior.

over education was strongly challenged by a set of legislative reforms.[19] On top of this, the Constitution of the Second Republic established the principle of the separation between the State and the Church. Naturally, all this led the clergy to develop great suspicion against the left.

In the rural world, political mobilization during the Second Republic was highly marked by confrontations over religious issues (de la Cueva 1998; Delgado 2001; Casanova 2004; Ledesma 2009a). This, as we shall see, had consequences for wartime violence: on the one hand, religious people constituted a big share of the victims of the left in the Republican zone; on the other hand, priests and other religious people had an important role in the perpetration of violence in the Nationalist zone, i.e. they often were the denouncers of leftist individuals in the localities. For example, *Testimony 38* explains that the priest of his locality (under Nationalist control since the beginning of the war) exerted the functions of policeman for a long time, and that he was in charge of elaborating the lists of "suspects", together with the landowners. Vila Izquierdo explains that the priest of Badajoz (padre Lomba) was in charge of signaling would-be targets in the famous "massacre" (1984: 55). Kaminsky argues in his memoirs:

> They are uncountable the priests who have taken part of the civil war on the side of the fascists. According to many irrefutable testimonies, many priests shot from their churches against the people, on 19 July in Barcelona. They have also said that, in a hospital of Barcelona, religious nurses have killed wounded antifascists (Kaminsky 1937/2002: 146).

Social polarization based on all the cleavages listed above was deepened at the political level because of the characteristics of the electoral system of the Second Republic (Linz 1967; 1978; Linz and De Miguel 1977; Riquer 1991; Colomer 2004). This consisted

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[19] Education was believed to be a function emanating from the State, with private education being permitted only if it did not have political or confessional purposes (Ruiz 1993: 37).

of an open lists system (the so-called *panachage*, which implied that the number of votes for different candidates of the same political party could be different), with a majority or plurality rule. The system encouraged the creation of large electoral coalitions — that unified candidates of political parties– in order to increase their chances of success (Riquer 1991: 85); this contributed to polarization between two main blocs.[20] Also, this plurality system was highly disproportional –benefiting the big parties, and, quite particularly, the winning coalition.[21]

There were three major electoral contests in Spain during that period: the 1931 elections —also so-called foundational elections (*elecciones constituyentes*)–, the 1933 elections, and the 1936 elections —also called the Popular Front elections (Tusell 1971).[22] Table 3.3 depicts the total percentage of votes for each of the political parties and blocs in the February 1936 national elections, and the percentage of seats they gained in the Parliament. It can be observed that with 42.9% of the votes, the left obtained 60.5% of the seats; on the other hand, the right gained only 23.7% of the seats with 30.4% of the votes.

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[20] There were two rounds, but the second round was not generalized across the territory because it could be avoided if there was a pre-established minimum level of support for the winning candidate in the first round.

[21] "The disproportionality characteristic of all electoral systems tends to favor the larger parties and to discriminate against the smaller ones. . . . Although the reduction in the effective number of parties is a general effect of electoral laws, it is a much stronger tendency in plurality and majority systems than in P.R. systems" (Lijphart 1984: 165-166).

[22] The 1931 elections are considered to be "transition elections" in the sense that "there was an official candidature, partial mobilization and a clear-cut intervention of the civil governors in the electoral process" (Tusell 1991: 48). Hence, "only the 1933 and 1936 elections can be considered polls that took place in conditions of normality similar to those in a country with institutions and stable democratic behavior" (Tusell 1991: 48).

Table 3.3. General Elections 1936: Results by Political Party

		Votes	**Seats**
Left		**42.90%**	**60.50%**
	PSOE	16.40%	21.40%
	IR	13.70%	18.80%
	UR	5.80%	8.40%
	EC	4.10%	7.80%
	PCE	2.50%	3.70%
	POUM	0.17%	0.22%
	S	0.13%	0.22%
Center		**21.10%**	**14.80%**
	CE	5.10%	3.50%
	RD	3.60%	0.90%
	ID	3.10%	0.90%
	LlR	2.80%	2.60%
	AGR	2.60%	2.60%
	PNV	1.40%	2.20%
	PRO	0.90%	1.60%
	C	0.80%	0.30%
	LD	0.80%	0.22%
Right		**30.40%**	**23.70%**
	CEDA	23.20%	19.00%
	RE	3.80%	2.80%
	T	3.40%	1.90%
Total		**9,572,908**	**463**

Source: Linz and de Miguel (1977).

The political polarization affected not only the national party system, but also the different regional party sub-systems. For example, while the Catalan political system was two-dimensional (with rightist and leftist Catalan nationalist forces, and rightist and leftist Spanish forces), bipolarity took place around two Catalanist parties from the left (i.e. ERC) and the right (i.e. LlR).[23]

3.2.2. Polarization, Coup and Frontlines

Prewar Polarization

The Second Republic was a period of major political agitation provoked not only by strong popular reactions to the political reforms enacted by the various governments and by trade union mobilization, but also by a certain degree of militarization of the political life. From 1933 onwards, a number of political parties created militias or so-called "defense sections", e.g. *Joventuts d'Esquerra-Estat Català*, *Comités de Defensa de la CNT*, *Grups d"Acció del BOC-POUM* (Pozo 2002: 8-9). These groups engaged in public order disturbances during the 1936 electoral campaign (and afterwards) to a point where the fascist political party *La Falange*, founded in 29 October 1933 by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, was made illegal in March 1936 as a consequence of its undemocratic practices, including sustained acts of violence.[24] In Extremadura, for example, "Alterations of public order constituted a constant during the period of the Popular Front. The efforts of the government to make Spanish society operate in a context of normality, within the existing legal framework, became useless. The criminal activities of leftist and rightist extremist groups left

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[23] Riquer (1972) argues that Catalonia was a clear bipolar party system since 1932, and he explains that already in the General elections of 1933, ERC and LlR jointly received 85% of the votes cast.

[24] "Their activities were boosted after the illegalization, in spite of the fact that they had a number of important leaders in jail" (Chaves 1995: 29). In July 1936, The Falange still had around 10,000 affiliates.

the executive isolated in a number of occasions; this was unable to stifle the outrages and attacks against people and objects" (Chaves 1995: 6). In fact, already before the war outbreak, there were in the entire Spanish territory at least 1,287 assaults, 269 political murders and 160 burned churches (Thomas 1986: 5). Payne speaks of around 2,000 deaths during this time period (1990: 269).

The political turmoil was accompanied by a non-negligible degree of mobilization of the citizenry, especially during the period surrounding the national elections of 16 February 1936 (Jackson 1965; Tusell 1971). "During the periods preceding the elections, and very especially in February 1936, all the political parties (including the anarchists) were involved in intense campaigning and they organized a large number of rallies . . . . The propaganda was unprecedented in Spanish politics, especially that of the CEDA, with large posters showing the figure of their leader Gil Robles" (Chaves 1995: 25). As a matter of fact, the level of participation in the 1936 elections, in which the anarchists joined the Popular Front coalition (they had mobilized for "abstention" in the 1933 elections), was the highest of the period: around 71% of the Spanish adult population cast a vote. In the campaign for the 1936 elections, verbal violence was intense, and, according to some historians, it was a presage of what was to occur afterwards (Vicente Alós 1978: 19).

The "October insurrection" was a crucial event in the Second Republic; after the conservative government revoked most of the leftist measures implemented by the first Republican government (e.g. with the annulment of the Law of Agrarian Contracts, reimplementation of the 48 hour labor day –which had been reduced to 44 hours, among others), there was a call from the main trade unions in the country for a "general strike" on October 1934. This strike, which in Asturias was accompanied by more than a few atrocities –e.g. the murder of priests (Payne 1990: 278), triggered a set of important events, which can be summarized as follows: 1) The proclamation of the Independent State of Catalonia (*Estat Català*) on 6 October 1934 by the president of the autonomous government, Francesc Macià, of ERC. This

proclamation was declared void some hours later by the Spanish central government, and triggered a ferocious political repression against the local and regional members of ERC.[25] 2) A severe (militarized) repression of the miner's strike in Asturias by units led by General Francisco Franco.[26] 3) Widespread repression (including imprisonment) of workers and Catalan nationalists. More than 30,000 Republicans, and Socialists were put in prison (including Azaña, who could not however be condemned due to the absence of charges),[27] and at least 20 people were condemned to death. 4) The suspension of the Agrarian Law. This measure contributed to discontentment among agrarian workers.

The repression surrounding the October insurrection has been considered to foreshadow the escalation of events surrounding the outbreak of the SCW; in fact, this has metaphorically been considered a "rehearsal" of the armed conflict (e.g. Díaz Nosty 1975). Overall, the events illustrate the extent to which Spain was undergoing a period of intense social mobilization and polarization. More generally, from a large number of historical accounts, one gathers the understanding that prewar polarization (including the events of the October insurrection) bred much hatred, and that this simply "exploded" with the civil war. For example, Pous and Solé i Sabaté (1988) argue that the imprisonment of many leaders of the secessionist political party ERC triggered many confrontations at the local level that culminated in violence during the civil war. Mota (2001) states that many executions were the result of conflicts and situations lived during the Republic and even before that. SSV argue that wartime violence as a "reflex of the social disputes of the 1920s"

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[25] Interestingly, the proclamation of the Catalan independent state was not backed by the CNT.

[26] This has considered to have been General Franco's "momentum", providing him with the necessary reputation and status within the Spanish military to later pilot a military coup. For an extended account on this, see Díaz Nosty (1975) or Jackson *et al*. (1985).

[27] Although Payne argues that the figure was 20,000 detainees, and not 30,000, which has been claimed by leftist groups.

(1996: 116). Payne argues: "The immediate outbreak of political mass murder on both sides stemmed from years of extreme tension, previous attempts at violent revolutionary insurrection, the most virulent forms of mass propaganda, and extreme dehumanizing and demonizing of the enemy by both left and right" (Payne 2004:117). Yet, we should not assume that war dynamics were an automatic continuation of peacetime politics, for the determinants of civil war are different than the determinants of civil war violence (Kalyvas 2006). While we may think that polarization dynamics and mobilization at the local level had likely implications for local-level violence during the civil war, the relationship was probably not that simple.

In brief, in 1930s Spain, long-lasting social and political hatreds developed in a context of political mobilization and social polarization, as well as a militarization of political life.[28] At the macro-level, these dynamics have been thought as the underlying cause of the breakdown of the democratic regime of the Second Republic (Jackson 1965; Linz 1978; Payne 1990).[29] At the micro-level, it is plausible that these dynamics also had implications for violence taking place on the ground, although we should not assume that the connection was mechanical, in other words, that war was the pure "continuation of politics by other means", to cite Clausewitz's (1832/1968) famous clause.

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[28] The monk and historian Hilari Raguer illustrates the polarization of the Spanish society after the 1936 February elections when he explains that, in his parish, he and his friends played at fighting leftists vs. rightists instead of cowboys vs. Indians or cops vs. criminals (Raguer 2007).

[29] "Political violence can normally only destabilize systems if associated with parties or movements of importance, if it provokes strong reactions from other forces that do not themselves accept the system, or if it achieves an extremely high level. None of these conditions have obtained since 1976, but all existed under the Second Republic, ultimately the most polarized of all modern European democratic systems" (Payne 1990: 285-286).

Coup

The coup led by General Francisco Franco (and the sector of the army stationed in the Spanish protectorate of northern Morocco) took place on 18 July 1936.[30] "Within approximately forty-eight hours, more than one-third of the garrisons in peninsular Spain also revolted –although scarcely 50 percent of the regular army supported this action. Instead of a rapid coup that could have completed in a week or two, the revolt led to complete internal division and civil war" (Payne 1985: 15). Thus, shortly after that event, Spanish territory became split between areas of Loyalist (Republican) and Rebel (Nationalist) control. In map 3.1, we can see the distribution of the controlled areas few weeks after the coup; the darker are areas of Rebel control, and the clearer are areas of Loyalist control.[31]

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[30] Some historians date the coup on 17 July (when the revolt in Morocco took place –Payne 1985: 15); others on 19 July, when it fully reached peninsular territory. The common date has however been set on 18 July. For an account of the determinants and dynamics of the coup, see, among many others, Jackson (1965), Beevor (1982), Thomas (1986), Preston (1994), Payne (2004), Moreno de Alborán (1998).

[31] Maps 3.1 and 3.2 have been retrieved from reliable web sources.

Map 3.1. Control Zones in August 1936

Source: Atlas de la Historia de España, Sabuco.

The coup divided Spain in large areas of control delimited by quite stable and trenched frontlines; these frontlines moved as a function of the success/defeat of the armies in big battles.

By provinces, the coup was victorious in: *Burgos, Pamplona, Oviedo, Vitoria, Valladolid, Zaragoza, Cádiz, Sevilla, Córdoba, Granada, Mallorca, Islas Canarias*. And it failed in: *Barcelona, Madrid, Menorca, Bilbao, Valencia, Donosti, Asturias (except for Oviedo), Santander, Málaga, Almería, and Cartagena. Badajoz* and *Toledo* were occupied by the rebels in August 1936; *Irún* and *Donosti* were conquered in September 1936. The spatial distribution of Loyalist/Rebel areas has some connections with that of political alignments before the war, but that they do not match perfectly. Map 3.2 shows the distribution of votes for the Popular Front (hereafter, also PF) in the 1936 elections for the totality of Spain; the darker areas are those where the PF (the left)

had won the elections; the clearer areas are those where the Nationalist Front (the right) had won the elections.

Map 3.2. Distribution of Support for the Popular Front in the 1936 Elections

Source: Atlas de la Historia de España, Sabuco.

Comparing maps 3.1 and 3.2, we can see that there is not a complete correspondence between support for the blocs in the elections and the side holding military control of the territories at the onset of the war. Indeed: a) There are a number of zones where the left had won in February 1936 and where the rebels won the coup. These are, for instance: the region of Galicia (except for a small part of the province of Lugo, which was won by the Republicans);[32] the Andalusian cities of Sevilla, Cadiz,

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[32] "Galicia, it should be noted, returned more Popular Front deputies than any region. It was the only Republican region that the insurgents

Algeciras;[33] Zaragoza city and part of Aragon –including Huesca;[34] the city of Caceres and part of its province; part of the province of Salamanca; Oviedo. b) There are a number of zones where the right won the elections in 1936 and where the rebels did not win the coup. These are: Cuenca and other parts of the region of *Castilla la Mancha*, a large part of Asturias (except for Oviedo), a big part of the province of Teruel, and the island of Menorca. This was also the case of the province of Santander.[35]

The factors that determined spatial variation in the success or defeat of the coup will not be analyzed here. The outcomes were the result of a combination of factors, a lot of them apparently more contingent than systematic. For example, the success of the coup in places with military garrisons depended on idiosyncratic features of military leaders (i.e. people who were willing and/or

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immediately captured, and it provided the nationalists with perhaps the most important contingent of troops, 237,385 or one-fourth of Rebel manpower (Payne 1967: 519, cited in Seidman 2002: 120). Also, more than two-thirds of Galician had voted in favor of the Statute of Autonomy on June 28 of that same year, less than a month before the uprising" (Thompson 2005: 77).

[33] Shortly after, in November 1936, more than half of Andalusia was under Francoist control, including cities such as Huelva, Sevilla, Cadiz, Córdoba, and Badajoz.

[34] In the province of Zaragoza, which was an anarchist enclave (e.g. it held the CNT congress in May 1936), "the CNT (the anarchist trade union) was victim of its own disorganization, and much of the province immediately fell under rightist military control. The same thing occurred in "Red Seville", seized by General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano in an audacious coup de main, the greatest initial achievement by any of the rebel leaders" (Payne 2004: 111).

[35] The case of Santander is explained in detail by Gutiérrez Flores (2000: 55-56), and Solla (2005). Gutiérrez Flores argues that the rebels did not succeed in Santander because communications between Burgos and Valladolid where cut as instructions were coming from Valladolid; during that time the leftist groups mobilized and organized to defeat the rebels.

capable of undertaking the specific orders sent by Franco),[36] and on the evolution of the events taking place right after the *putsch* of 18 July 1936, namely the reaction of the government (the political elites) and the popular masses. In Barcelona, for example, the defeat of the coup can be explained by the militant actions of the workers added to the forces of the Autonomous government (*La Generalitat*), which ended up forcing the surrender of General Goded on the afternoon of 19 July (Kaminsky 1937/2002; Pozo 2002: 46). Vilar refers to factors that are simultaneously related to: 1) popular support for political groups, 2) the unity of Republican political parties and trade unions, 3) the strength of the security forces of the Republic. Furthermore, "chance" seems to have had a lot to do with the outcome of the coup.[37]

In short, the main frontlines of the conflict did not follow a pattern that could have possibly been predicted before the coup. These patterns of exogeneity make the SCW an appropriate case in which to study dynamics of violence, and particularly with which to connect levels of violence to prewar political alignments at the local level. Plus, for the purposes of analyzing violence perpetrated by different armed groups, this provides with a quasi-experimental setting (Przeworski 2007).[38]

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[36] The preferences of the military were not homogeneous. For instance, among the officials and the generals there was a lot of division: "22 generals remained in service in the Republican zone; 17 in the rebellious zone" (Pozo 2002: 58). These preferences also varied in the lower grades of the military; the lower rank soldiers were broadly uninformed about what was going on.

[37] "Why did the Movement win in the Republican and autonomist Galicia? Why did the Republicans of Menorca win over General Bosch, while in Mallorca they failed easily in front of Goded? Why did Extremadura become divided into two, with Badajoz uniting with the Republic and Caceres with the Movement? Chance had a lot to do with these outcomes" (Vilar 1986:63).

[38] I will avoid using this term, as well as the term *natural experiment*. I cannot straightforwardly assume that the distribution of control areas by each of these armed groups was "as if" random (Dunning 2008), even if different pieces of historical evidence suggest that this was the case.

Frontlines

The civil war involved both pitched battles and aerial attacks. Over the course of approximately three years, the Francoist army conquered all the Republican territory and won the war (this ended formally on 1 April 1939). I will not enter into details relating to the military history of the Spanish Civil War, as these have been already outstandingly depicted by reference historians.[39] I will merely mention that the war had a set of stable frontlines, whose rupture by the Nationalist army crucially determined the outcomes of the war: e.g. the Ebro frontline; the Madrid frontline.[40]

The territory studied in this dissertation (except for Extremadura and the province of Malaga) was divided by the Ebro frontline between July 1936 and December 1938, and it was controlled by Nationalist forces (on the West) and Republican forces (on the East), respectively. With the end of the battle of the Ebro in December 1938,[41] Republican Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia began to be conquered by the Francoist army. At that point, the Republican army offered little resistance to the advance of the Francoist troops, and most Republican soldiers fled toward France, trying to avoid being imprisoned; only some of them succeed at it.

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[39] See, among many others, Martínez de Baños (2004, 2006), Reverte (2003, 2006), Espinosa (2005), Solano (2006), Arcarazo *et al*. (2007), Maldonado (2007), Flores *et al*. (2008).

[40] According to Gaitx and Plaza (2007), the SCW can be divided into 5 main military phases: 1) Establishment and development of the military frontlines (August 1936-March 1937); 2) Northern Campaign (March 1937 – January 1938); 3) Aragon Frontline (January 1938- July 1938); 4) Battle of the Ebro (July –December 1938); 5) Francoist offensives (December 1938 – April 1939): occupation of rest of the territory.

[41] The battle of Ebro was the most important of the SCW, for its duration and lethality. It generated a total of 90,000 battledeaths: 30,000 were Francoist soldiers; 60,000 were Republican soldiers (Source: Museum of the Battle of the Ebro, Gandesa, Terra Alta).

3.3. Inside the War

3.3.1. Armed Groups

The two blocs in conflict during the SCW were comprised of both regular and irregular forces. During most of the war, the Nationalist bloc was organized in a much more structured way, and was much more coordinated and disciplined than the Republican bloc.[42] As mentioned, this has led historians and political scientists to generate organizational explanations on the determinants of violence perpetrated on each side: they have referred to Francoist violence as systematic and terrorizing, and as the result of intentional efforts to eliminate the enemy; conversely, they have referred to violence on the Republican side as the by-product of the anarchy and disorder of the militias that made up the leftist army (e.g. Jackson 1965; Reig Tapia 1984; Brenan 1967; Luengo 1998; Casanova *et al*. 2001; Preston 2006).[43]

I would argue that the conceptualization of the Nationalist army as a single homogeneous bloc (and the opposite for the Republican army) is misleading. On the one hand, the Nationalist

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[42] The main reason for this was that, right after the coup, the Republican state decomposed and there was a multiplication/fragmentation of political powers (Azaña 1986: 85).

[43] For a historian's critique to this approach, see Ruiz (2009). Thomas (1961), Payne (2004), Ors (1995) and Ledesma (2003) have also made contributions challenging this perspective, as they have shown that anarchist militiamen were very often under the strict commands of the leadership of political and trade union organizations. This idea is supported by an article that appeared in *Diari de Barcelona*, which was at that time the voice of the political organization *Estat Català*, in which an anonymous writer said the following: "Almost all the villages of Catalonia have suffered from the tyranny of the local dictators. All the counties of Catalonia have suffered the barbarism of the "uncontrolled" that followed orders of the membership card that sheltered them. In Catalonia there have not been uncontrolled. Everybody was well controlled, well disciplined and well sheltered by the organizations that represented the Revolution."

army was also comprised of irregular forces that did not obey the instructions given by the main commanders on many occasions. For example, Chaves argues that the chief of the Northern Army, *Ejército del Norte*, gave instructions to the irregular forces not to kill people in the rearguards, but "the *Falangists* kept assassinating irregularly until the War Courts were instituted in the fall of 1936" (Chaves 1995: 102-103). Along similar lines, Vila Izquierdo describes many of the acts of the *Falangist* militias and the Moroccan units of the Nationalist army in Badajoz as perpetrated by undisciplined men, who were having fun looting, torturing and raping women: "When the night fell, moors and *Falangists* proceeded, within clouds of alcohol, with their atrocious "games". . . . shots and screams of death would go on during the night" (1984: 55). Sexual ritual acts (i.e. castration), which were perpetrated by these troops, and in fact were supposedly forbidden by Franco, did not stopped: "Castrated corpses were found in Toledo, and in Madrid, some time later" (Vila Izquierdo 1984: 55). In a nutshell, also on the Nationalist side there was some degree of fragmentation (Cruz 2006), if not indiscipline, and this affected the level of violence that was inflicted on the ground. This is an aspect of the Nationalist bloc that has either voluntarily or unconsciously been neglected by many historians (Ruiz 2009), who have provided a quite unidimensional version of the dynamics of repression on this side of the civil war.[44]

On the other hand, it is indeed the case that the Republican bloc was highly fragmented (Orwell 1938; Pozo 2002; Ledesma 2003; De Guzmán 1938/2004): tensions within the leftist bloc were constant from the beginning of the war. In May 1937, members of the communist party engaged in an armed confrontation with members of the trotskyist party –the POUM-

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[44] For example, irregular violence in the nationalist zone has been assumed to be more connected to political goals than irregular violence in the republican zone: "The paramilitary groups killed to terrorize and eliminate specific objectives that could not be eliminated through war trials" (Sánchez Marroyo 1995: 19).

and the anarchist party –the FAI- in the streets of Barcelona. The Communist party emerged as the leader of the leftist bloc after these events, which marked the transition from a loose and decentralized organization of the leftist army to a more strict and centralized one (with the constitution of the so-called Popular Army). Internal division within the Loyalist bloc not only involved differences between communists and anarchists: these two were, in turn, challenged by the Republican governmental authorities, who opposed lethal violence in the rearguards (Azaña 1986). Nevertheless, despite these divisions and fragmentation, by October/November 1936 —as the various organizations realized that a centralization of political and military power was necessary in order to win the war– they had started to organize themselves in a disciplined way (Azaña 1986; Pozo 2002; Ledesma 2009b; De Guzmán 1938/2004).[45] Indeed, after May 1937 events, with the expulsion of the anarchist political forces from the government, the centralization of the military forces in communist hands and the creation of the Popular Army, a reasonably high degree of cohesion had been achieved.[46] Interestingly, a testimony such as Pablo Uriel, who was a combatant both in the Nationalist and the Republican army, explains that "he was impressed by the strict discipline in which the Republican army was commanded, which was greater than in the Francoist army" (Uriel 1936/2005: 388). While violence decreased after this concentration of power, it did not totally vanish (Ruiz 2009).

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[45] For example, the Official Bulletin of ERC (1936-1937) offers clear-cut evidence that the leaders of this political party were very interested in bringing discipline in the Republican rearguard, as well as within the army, in order to win the war.

[46] The role of Soviet external aid was non-negligible with respect to this centralization: 'Soviet military aid was accompanied by intense pressure to curb the revolutionary tendencies on the Republican side. . . . the revolutionary militia were starved of arms and their political organizations crushed in the civil war within the Republican camp in Barcelona in May 1937" (Balfour and Preston 1999: 7).

Each of the armies or blocs received a great deal of external support, which was in fact crucial for the development of the civil war (Thomas 1986; Balfour and Preston 1999; Radosh *et al.* 2001; Payne 2004). "It is now an unquestionable assumption among historians that the history of Spain has been an integral part of European and international process and indeed has been a regional variant of that process" (Balfour and Preston 1999: 1). Italy and Germany used the Spanish battleground as a training arena for the strategic air war that they would undertake in World War II (SSV 2003),[47] while the Soviet Union, Mexico and Czechoslovakia provided material support to the Republican side.[48] "The British and French arms embargo and the isolationism of the United States in the 1930s deprived the Spanish Republic of the right to buy arms from the democratic powers" (Balfour and Preston 1999: 6). Salazar's Portugal allied with Franco, and it allowed the Northern and Southern Rebel armies to remain connected, using Portugal as a corridor.[49] The intervention of the Great Powers had a clear-cut effect on the military evolution of the civil war, as well as on its outcomes:

> There is no doubt that the international context essentially determined, directly and crucially, both the course of the war in Spain and its final outcome. Without the consistent military, diplomatic and financial support given by Hitler and Mussolini, it is highly unlikely that the side led by Franco would have been able to achieve such an absolute and unconditional victory. Without the suffocating embargo imposed by the non-intervention policy and the inhibition of the Western powers, with its serious effect on military

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[47] "Of the few comments Goring made at the Nuremberg Trials about the Spanish Civil War, he emphasized the need to test this Luftwaffe as a motive for Germany's intervention. . . . Luftwaffe planes and pilots were undoubtedly trained in Spain" (Leitz 1999: 130).

[48] Radosh *et al.* (2001) analyze the ambivalent role of the Stalinist Soviet Union in the Spanish civil war.

[49] Also, the Salazarist police detained thousands of Spanish citizens that crossed the border to enter Portugal, and yielded them to the *falangist* in Badajoz (Vila Izquierdo 1984: 58).

capacity and moral strength, it is highly unlikely that the Republic would have suffered an internal collapse and a military defeat of great proportions (Moradiellos 1999: 121).

Despite their significance, these external powers will not be considered as independent actors in the conflict. That is because there were strong connections with the major military commanders of each of the armies, and the national commanders did not generally relegate decision-making powers to foreign actors. For example, the International Brigades were disbanded by the Republican first minister Juan Negrín in September 1938, and their members were compelled to leave the country.[50] Also, Franco's "determination to stand up for his own interests" led him to take actions against those who were challenging his orders whenever this was considered necessary (Leitz 1999); in other words, he kept control of the military decisions all times.

3.3.2. Technology, Warfare

According to Kalyvas (2006), the SCW is, together with the US civil war, a paradigmatic case of a CCW. As Kaminsky put it: "The civil war has evolved and has become a big war between two large armies, which have all the methods of destruction and the most modern techniques" (Kaminsky 1938/2002: 197). Indeed, the military tactics used during this conflict were predominantly conventional, with big battles determining the outcomes of the war; the weaponry used in combat mostly heavy; the frontlines were quite stable along time and they had little fluidity.[51]

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[50] The reasons behind this decision were mostly geostrategic: Juan Negrín, who announced this decision in front of the League of Nations, attempted at forcing the withdrawal of the Italian and German Fascist forces from Spain, and he wanted to persuade Western democracies to end their embargo on the Republic.

[51] Map A3.1 is a fictional map that was published in the French newspaper *L"Humanité*, describing the presence of *maquis* rebels in

Of the approximately 800,000 deaths during the civil war, 122,000 were civilians. In other words, as is common in CCW (Kalyvas and Balcells 2009), more combatants than civilians were killed in this civil war. At the subnational level, the extent to which victims were either combatants or civilians was very much dependant on the dynamics of warfare on the ground. For example, in Extremadura, Badajoz had a greater relative share of battlefield deaths than Caceres, which was much more of a rearguard province.[52]

Another crucial feature of CCW, also exemplar in the case of Spain, is routinized conscription (Kalyvas and Balcells 2008). In the SCW, this took place across armed groups: indeed, young men were recruited either to the Republican or to the Nationalist army simply depending on the side where they happened to be located (physically) when the frontlines were settled. Although women were also highly mobilized for the "war effort" (Cenarro 2006), they were not conscripted.

The combination of what I have called exogenous frontlines (i.e. frontlines given by the outcomes of the coup at the subnational level) and routinized conscription made recruitment somewhat independent of the ideological background and/or political affiliation of individuals. This led to a lot of divisions within families, and even to eclectic situations such as that of two brothers fighting against each other. *Testimony 38* explains, for

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Spain in February 1946 (in Sànchez 1999). While not real, this map illustrates very well the difference in the nature of frontlines in irregular versus conventional civil wars, especially if we compare it with map 3.1.This provide us with further evidence supporting the view that the SCW was a conventional war: the nature of the frontlines was such that control zones were well delimited, relatively large, and zones of military contestation (i.e. battlefield) were clear-cut and concentrated. And this contrasts with the nature of the frontlines as they would have been in an irregular civil war; they are much more blurred and dispersed.

[52] The total number of battledeaths in Extremadura was 6,678; 5,760 of them died in Badajoz, whereas 918 of them died in Caceres (Chaves 2004).

example, that two of his brothers fought on the Nationalist side while one brother fought on the Republican side just because he was in a different location (Madrid) at the time the war started. Similar cases are reported in Fraser (2001: 151).

Also, because of conscription, combatants in the Nationalist and Republican army were drawn from everywhere across the rear territories (that is, from anywhere within the territories controlled by these armies). This is the reverse of what happens in irregular civil wars, where recruitment seems to be associated with the degree of presence of a group in a territory (Arjona and Kalyvas 2008). As an illustration of this, Map 3.3 shows data on combatants killed during the conflict by county of origin, for the region of Catalonia.[53] We can observe that the distribution of death combatants, a proxy for recruitment,[54] is not associated with proximity to the frontline, which would be an indicator of (lesser) degree of control of the territory by the Republican army.

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[53] The data is from a subset of localities in the region (a total of 516 localities in 20 counties). They have been collected from a wide variety of secondary sources (e.g. books, newspaper reports, history magazines), and they have been aggregated at the level of the county for mapping purposes. Unfortunately, data on many localities/counties is still unavailable. To give some geographical context, a map of this region with its current internal county division (which is essentially the same as that of the 1936-39 division), is included in the Appendix. The current county division of Catalonia is based on the division that was created in 1936, and which was abolished after the end of the civil war. In 1987 it was re-established by the Government of Catalonia. The only differences from the 1936 derive from the inclusion of three new counties in 1988.

[54] The assumption here is that all combatants were equally likely to be killed.

Map 3.3. Combatants Killed in Battlefield (by Counties), Catalonia

Combatants Killed (per Thousand Inhabitants)

No data	
<11‰	
11<‰<15	
>15‰	

In sum, despite the fact that irregular tactics were used sporadically by some groups in some places (e.g. in the county of *Pallars Sobirà,* at the end of the war; in some areas of Extremadura), the prevalent fighting method during the SCW was trench battle with heavy artillery, performed by well-organized and heavily armed groups drawing on routinized conscription in the rear territories.

3.4. Rearguard Violence or Repression

3.4.1. Red Terror

Leftist violence, which has been labeled as the "Red Terror," consisted of both individual and organized mass executions in the Republican zone. Following Martín Rubio (1997), we can identify at least three moments of leftist violence: a) *Suppression of the coup*: the resistance to the coup in a number of localities ended with the execution of some of its participants or supporters. This period ended at the beginning of August 1936, once the situation on the ground was largely clarified and the two zones were clearly delineated. b) *Revolutionary violence*: after the stabilization of the front, a large number of executions took place in zones under leftist control. These constitute the core of leftist violence. c) *Withdrawal phase*: executions that took place when the Nationalists came close to taking over a Republican area, or as the Republican army was forced to withdraw.

Members of the clergy constituted a large proportion of the victims of the so-called "red terror" or revolutionary violence: a total of 6,832 members of the clergy were assassinated in the Republican zone during the civil war (Rodrigo 2008: 99).[55] "There was not another institution or social group, not even the insurgent army or *La Falange*, that suffered from such fast and methodic violence" (Ledesma 2009a: 10). Yet, religious people were not the only targets of leftist violence: "This purge was also applied to politicians, conservatives, employers, landowners, farm workers, the middle class, shopkeepers, factory workers who were known for their moderate ideas, technicians and personnel managers in

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[55] Casanova (2004) provides the total figure of 6,549 members of the clergy killed in the Republican side. Of them, only 283 (4.3%) were women; the remaining were men. As he explains, this pattern makes religious violence in Spain very different than in other civil wars such as the Russian, where over a total of 7,100 clergy members ─3,500 nuns (49.2%) were executed.

different sectors, and Catholics; especially Catholics" (Casanova 2005: 95).

In addition, there was violence within the Republican Army (e.g. against deserters), as well as violence between leftist parties (e.g. during the "events of May", between CNT and POUM and the Communist Party). Nevertheless, this intra-leftist violence was not substantially as important as one would argue judging from some historical accounts (e.g. Orwell 1938) –in Catalonia, for example, it only represented around the 1.7% of the total of leftist violence (SSV 1989).

The left also perpetrated indirect violence consisting mostly of aerial bombings, but also by employing artillery attacks by land and sea. Leftist indirect violence against non-combatants was however less intense than rightist indirect violence (SSV 2003; Abellà 1973), which highly benefited from the aid of the air forces of fascist Germany and Italy (Balfour and Preston 1999).

In the early phases of the conflict, leftist direct violence was perpetrated without any type of judicial procedures, "the *paseo* was much faster" (Casanova 2005: 95). Later on, when order and discipline was imposed behind the scenes by political organizations with governmental representation, such as the UGT, the CNT, as well as communists, republicans and Basque and Catalan nationalists, violence was perpetrated through judicial channels (Popular Courts) (Casanova 2005: 95-96). The same process of legalization of violence took place in the Nationalist zone (Rodrigo 2008: 97-98). Yet, in both areas, legalization was more fake than real, as it covered a great degree of arbitrariness.

The so-called *sacas* in prisons were a common form of violence during early stages of the war. The following excerpt exemplifies how these would usually take place:

> On the night of 20 October 1936, a group of around three hundred militiamen, together with forces of the exterior guard of the Ocaña reform institution, entered into the Director's office, and asked for the delivery of the detainees, to which he refused. With threats and violence, they entered the area of the cells, and they took out 152 people who were unjustly detained and tied two by two, and they put

them in four lines. . . . they then executed them in Ocaña's cemetery. Not all of them died immediately and some of them were buried alive. Signed: The Temporary Attorney (Causa General de Toledo-Cáceres, 10491, Pieza 3).

In addition to lethal violence, leftist armed forces also victimized civilians in the rear territories through other means. For example, some people were dispossessed of their properties (e.g. lands, industries, real estate) in the context of the collectivization campaigns.[56] These forms of what can be called "economic victimization" also generated grievances among the population (see chapter 6). Leftist soldiers and militiamen also perpetrated rapes and mutilations, mostly against members of the clergy (Gil 2006: 45; Causa General), although sexual violence and mutilation practices do not seem to have been as widespread as on the Francoist side.

Again, a wave of contemporary historians (Brenan 1967; Preston 1986; Vilar 1986; Jackson 1965; Vila Iquierdo 1984; Espinosa 2003) have argued that leftist violence was neither tactical nor strategic, but that it was merely the result of spontaneous acts of aggression by anarchists and communists in different localities. This violence has been conceived as communal (instead of perpetrated by armed groups), and wanton (instead of

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[56] Collectivization campaigns were quite widespread across the Republican rearguard. Yet, their incidence was highest in places dominated by the anarchists: "In those places where the committees were Anarchist, there was a definite policy of collectivization which was intended to prepare the way for a thorough-going social revolution" (Brenan 1967: 318). Although the Catholic Church was one of the main victims of these processes, they also affected landlords and industrial owners. "They collectivized all the large and many of the small industries in Catalonia, urged peasants to collectivize not only the estates which had been expropriated but their own plots as well and in some cases they used force to compel them to do so. There was often a connection between the "elimination" of factory owners and landowners and these expropriations" (Brenan 1967: 320).

systematic).[57] While we shall not challenge the terrorizing and revolutionary nature of leftist violence on the Republican side, we need to be cautious at giving "terror" the status of a causal factor. This only hinders the possibility of identifying systematic patterns of violence, and clear-cut causal factors (Kalyvas 1999).

3.4.2. Blue Terror

Rightist violence, also called blue terror (Salomón and Ledesma 2006),[58] took the form of indirect and direct violence. In places controlled by the right, executions affected people on an individual or collective basis; in places not controlled by the right, violence was indirect, i.e. through aerial bombings. Violence lasted several years after the war in the form of executions that had a proto-legal nature: until the mid 40s, almost all the executions perpetrated by the Francoist regime were related to the civil war.

Again, historians have considered violence by the Rebel forces as being fundamentally different from the repression perpetrated by the Loyalists forces. This has not been considered spontaneous and chaotic but rather finalistic and systematic, as perpetrated by a cohesive army. "Rebel repression responded to a plan of extreme violence traced with anticipation and exposed in the *Directivas para Marruecos* (June 1936) or in General Mola's two guiding principles for the *coup d'état*. Repression is intrinsically part of Francoism from its roots and progressive formation" (Calzado

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[57] Interestingly, a similar explanation has been given to revolutionary violence in Ireland in the 1920s. ". . . the Civil War did not represent an insurgency of the poor or dispossessed, as is sometimes suggested. The social violence that did occur in the revolutionary years, from sabotage to murder, was as much a by-product of the availability of guns and the absence of a normal police force as of class conflict" (Hart 2003: 21).

[58] Some have called it "white terror" (e.g. Gabarda 1994).

2006: 14).[59] Yet, like leftist violence, rightist repression had both a legal and an illegal form, or what might alternatively be described as a regular and an irregular character. The direction of the repression was heavily controlled by the Army and the (militarized) public order bodies, which either collaborated or supported the actions of *Falangists*, *Carlist* militiamen or mercenaries paid by big landlords (Calzado 17-18), but —as explained– there were some instances of indiscipline among these armed rank-and-file men, which would lead them to perpetrate violence without the permission of their superiors. Irregular assassinations were relatively more common during the early stages of a territory (Linz 1999; SSV 1987).[60]

At the same time, rightist repression consisted of much more than lethal executions; it also implied social marginalization, arrests (e.g. concentration camps, prisons), deportations (with the aim of isolating people from their social networks) and labor subordination (García Piñeiro 2002: 137-147). During the war and the postwar periods, those who were considered to be against the interests of the insurgents were either expelled from their jobs, or relegated to subordinated positions (García Piñeiro 2002). Economic sanctions were also imposed on suspected leftists.[61]

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[59] "The repression sought to eliminate the political personnel of the Popular Front (mayors, deputies, civil governors, etc.), members of associations and intellectuals and cultural representatives (Calzado 2006: 14). "According to rebel documentation, the "Movement" foresaw a very strong repression, which had to impede the Republicans to achieve their goals, which were the destruction of the existing order and the appropriation of the State" (Calzado 2006: 17).

[60] SSV explain that during the military occupation of Catalonia, the Nationalists employed war trials, which left the "local populations under the personal arbitrariness of the military chief of every zone or sector" (1987: 37).

[61] The so-called Law of Political Responsibilities, which was approved after the finalization of the Catalonia campaign (on 9 February 1939) was a legal umbrella for all the postwar repressive processes. Sanctions imposed on anybody considered a suspect included: 1)

Also, many women were raped and publicly humiliated (e.g. having their head shaved) by Francoist irregular and regular forces (Salomón and Ledesma 2006; *Testimonies 3, 31, 38*). Torture was a common form of victimization by Nationalist forces during the civil war and by Francoist public order agents during the subsequent dictatorship. Exile and mass displacement was a major source of victimization by the Nationalists, especially due to the so-called 1939 exile (Pujol 2003; Artís Gener 1976; Fillol 1973). Finally, as mentioned above, the Francoists undertook widespread cultural repression, both against ethnic minorities (i.e. Basque, Galician, and Catalans) and against people with a liberal and leftist ideology.

Spatial variation in rightist direct violence has sometimes been thought to be associated with the degree to which there was resistance to the coup at the local level. Nevertheless, it is not always the case that there was greater victimization in more leftist regions or places where there was more resistance to the coup. For example, the province of Huelva was quite acquiescent to the coup and there were almost no assassinations during the short period of time under leftist control, and yet the column that conquered it (the "Castejón column") undertook a slaughter in this province (around 6,000 deaths) (Torres 2002: 18).

As mentioned above, since the Nationalists were the victors of the civil war, rightist violence took place in the postwar period too (up until around 1945). I argue —following the example of respected historians on the SCW (Gabarda 1982; Juliá 2004; Casanova 2001; Solé i Sabaté 2000)– that this early postwar violence can be conceptualized as wartime violence. Indeed, in "La Causa General", we can find hundreds of files of trials on individuals who were charged over their behavior or ideology during the civil war, and who were sentenced as late as 1945, if not later (e.g., Caja 1049/2 Toledo; Díaz-Balart and Friend 1997;

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absolute or special inability to carry out professional activities; 2) limitations on freedom of residency; 3) economic sanctions.

Solé i Sabaté 2000; Gabarda 1993).[62] Postwar violence included the assassination of not only civilians but also many former combatants, namely members of the Republican army who were punished for their wartime service. Espinosa (2003: 261) argues that the postwar in Spain is idiosyncratic precisely because of this: violence was maintained for a long time after the arrival of peace. Martín Rubio (1997: 418) argues that postwar violence affected motsly (even if not exclusively) zones that had remained under Republican control until then, and it was articulated in two periods: 1) 1939/40: period of highest intensity, with a large number of judiciary processes (e.g. in April 1939, there were more than 100,000 imprisoned; at the end of 1939, there were 200,000 imprisoned); 2) 1941-43: moment of lesser intensity. In order to avoid potential measurement problems, in my empirical analyses (chapter 4) I will try to not mix wartime and postwar violence; that is, I will analyze Nationalist wartime violence (e.g. in Nationalist Aragon) and Nationalist postwar violence (e.g. in Catalonia and Valencia, once conquered) separately.

During the war, the right perpetrated indirect violence, mainly through aerial bombings, and they did it more extensively than the left. The intervention of the German Condor Legion and Italian military forces contributed to this. Bombings have usually been considered as randomly (i.e. non-systematically) distributed across localities, with the only aim of instituting terror among the population: "Bombing raids on Spanish cities such as Madrid and Barcelona were often undertaken without any military targets in mind, but simply to frighten the Republican population into submission" (Leitz 1999: 130).

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[62] Ruiz (2005) argues that mass repression had come to an end by 1944 due to the crisis of the Francoist bureaucratic system.

3.4.3. Micro-Dynamics of Direct Violence

If we look closely, we can identify a set of common patterns in the microdynamics of direct violence perpetrated by both leftist and rightist armed forces in their respective rear territories.[63]

1) On both sides, direct violence was perpetrated by **both regular and irregular forces**. The most common form of violence perpetrated irregularly in the rear territories were the so-called *paseos* (rides), in which people would be detained and killed without previous trial. These were predominant at the early stages of the civil war. The following excerpt illustrates the common *modus operandi* of these "rides" on the Nationalist side:

> In Plasencia – explains Severiano Caldera- unprecedented events happened: during the nights, military and fanatic *Falangists* would enter the houses by force and violently take out men who were put in lorries and later murdered on the outskirts of the city. Their corpses would appear scattered in ditches and neighboring paths. They were not buried, they say, to teach them a lesson. Others were thrown to the river with their hands and feet tied (Chaves 1995: 105).

These executions also took place on the Republican side, and they were perpetrated mostly by anarchist and communist militiamen. They have been described in a large number of historical accounts (e.g. Bosch 1983; Casanova 1985; SSV 1989; Ledesma 2003; Cenarro 2002a; Dueñas 2007). Clara Campoamor explains how these *paseos* occurred in Madrid when the capital city was under Republican control:

> Patrols of militiamen started to practice detentions in households, on the street, in any place where they thought they would find enemies. Militiamen, operating outside the law, would emerge as "popular judges" and carry out executions following those arrests. Very soon

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[63] In this subsection, I will focus merely on direct violence; indirect violence was unilaterally perpetrated by military forces and its production was therefore straightforward.

a tragic phrase became popular in the rearguard: they would give someone "a ride" (Campoamor 2005: 99).

Interestingly, testimonies and historians have drawn parallels between executions on both sides: when talking about *paseos* on the Nationalist side Brenan argues: "The method of execution was similar to that employed on the Republican side: the victims were taken from their houses in lorries driven by young *Falangists* and *Carlists* and shot before dawn outside the town." (Brenan 1967: 322). Also, the *cenetist* Adolfo Bueso explains in his memoirs:

> A revolutionary committee had emerged in every district, which detained all those that appeared suspicious, many of whom disappeared after having left in a car, escorted by armed militiamen, for a "ride" (*paseo*). Later on, he learned from reliable sources, that the *paseo* system had been also employed in fascist zone, exactly like in the red zone, and using the same name. As it could not be thought that they agreed in this, it could be assumed that these acts were an atavistic reminiscence of previous civil wars" (Bueso 1978: 191).

2) As was explained above, on both sides, violence became **regularized** (or legalized) at some point, and it took the form of death penalty executions, which followed war trials or equivalent judicial procedures (in the Republican side, these were undertaken by the so-called "Popular Courts"). Even if in war circumstances it may be difficult to draw the line between what is lawful and what is not (Frésard 2004: 27), it is beyond discussion that the procedures underlying these trials were not objective and implied a significant level of arbitrariness by the armed groups.[64] During the civil war "regularized" violence was less significant than irregular violence; yet, regular violence was the predominant

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[64] Kaminski explains how the revolutionaries argued that the courts "could not judge as in normal times" during the conflict (2002: 173). For a reflection on the degree of arbitrariness of these "Popular Courts", see Chamocho (2004). This author argues: "Was repression exerted through the popular courts? Undoubtedly" (227).

during the postwar (Solé i Sabaté 2000; SSV 1989; Linz 1996; Ledesma 2009b).[65] Also, with regards to leftist violence, "legal" violence was more predominant in big cities than in villages: judicial procedures operated earlier in the former than in the latter (Gabarda 1996).

3) On both sides we can identify **three main actors** intervening in the perpetration of irregular violence:

1. *Militiamen*: during the Second Republic, extremist parties had paramilitary organizations such as the *Requetés*, the first line of the Falange or groups of leftist activists (workers" and peasants antifascist militias), which relied on the advice of professional members of the army. These were the embryo of the militia organizations that operated during the civil war. On the Republican side "they were reduced groups composed of members of the new revolutionary local governments, local militants in the union and political organizations, and especially, voluntary militiamen related to these organizations" (Ledesma 2009a: 31). Militiamen were, together with regular soldiers, the main perpetrators of direct violence against civilians.[66]

2. *Local Committees*: called *Comités Antifascistas* (on the Loyalist side),[67] or *Comisiones Gestoras* (on the Nationalist side).

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[65] The data in Solé i Sabaté (2000) shows that all but 30 or 40 executions by the Nationalists after the occupation of Catalonia took place following a military trial. I have compiled a total of 513 deaths in Catalonia during the Francoist occupation of the territory (see further below).

[66] Similar paramilitary organizations existed in Ireland in the 1912-22 period, and they had a crucial role in the violence during the revolution and civil war (Hart 2003: 89-90). Hart argues that these militias proliferated in interwar Europe, most notoriously in Germany and Italy, and that their appearance was symptomatic of political polarization and the decline of governmental legitimacy in the eyes of a majority of the population. "And in each case, the end result was the breakdown of democracy and the imposition of a new state" (Hart 2003: 90).

[67] *Comités antifeixistes* -in Catalan- or *Comités antifascistas* -in Spanish (Antifascist committees). Other names were *Comités*

During the civil war, these committees were the real centers of political decision-making (Pozo 2002: 19); they did not have any constitutional legitimacy, and yet they replaced the legally constituted local councils from before the civil war in a process that started simultaneously everywhere right after the onset of the civil war. "They aimed at generating a new social structure and at controlling all the aspects of social life" (SSV 1996: 114). "The local committees regulated local political life, taking the role of the old city councils. They had sections such as Taxes, Health, Social Assistance, Defense, and so on." (Pozo 2002: 440). In some regions, these committees were united under the umbrella of supra-local organizations (e.g. the "Antifascist Militias Central Committee", in Catalonia), which had varying degrees of internal cohesiveness and discipline. In other regions, they were no connections between local committees; no provincial organizations existed (e.g. Extremadura, as explained by Vila Izquierdo 1984). In December 1936, the Republican government approved a decree according to which new City Councils had to be constituted, and the local committees eliminated. In practice, this did not implied major changes, as these committees remained dominated by leftist political forces.

With regards to violence, the local committees had some degree of agency. Their interactions with the armed militias coming from other localities had an impact on the levels of violence that took place on the ground. Mainly, during the civil war the committees would hold meetings in order to compile lists of suspects –potential "suspects" and would-be targets of the militias- but they could also arrest people, help the militias find them, and participate in ransoming activities (e.g. the burning of churches). Chaves suggests that the role of the local authorities

revolucionaris (revolutionary committees) or *Comités antifascistas revolucionaris* (antifascist revolutionary committees). The inclusion of the word "revolutionary" in the name of the local committee usually implied the predominance, within the committee, of revolutionary political forces such as the anarchists or the communists, versus political parties of the moderate left.

was crucial in explaining variation in violence at the local level when he argues:

> In those places where the local authorities such as the mayor, the local chiefs of the Falange, etc. opposed the perpetration of acts of this sort, there were no assassinations and, if they took place, they were minimal. The same cannot be said in places where this will did not exist, where the repressors acted with total leeway (Chaves 1995: 97).

Several historical accounts seem to indicate that the behavior of the local committees was determined mostly by local factors; in other words, the supra-local organizations (i.e. governmental or military authorities) did not have any crucial role in defining the behavior of the local committees vis-à-vis the armed groups.

It is also relevant to point out that, on some occasions, people in the local committee were armed (Azpíroz 2007: 384; Gabarda 1996), and that they would perpetrate violence against civilians in their municipalities. Yet, militiamen did not perpetrated violent acts in their own localities, in general terms; sometimes they would do so in neighboring ones (Gutiérrez Casalá 2004; Maymí Rich 2001). Delgado (1993) speaks of the existence of mutual delegation on the perpetration of ransom against religious monuments, as well as of assassinations, in Republican Catalonia, by militias of neighbouring localities. This was a useful strategy in order to avoid the attribution of responsibilities for these actions.

On the Nationalist side, the leaders of the local committees were authorized to use the police garrisons, as well as their weapons and munitions, not only for personal defence, but also "to preserve order in the municipalities and to aid in the task of keeping the localities under insurgent control" (Chaves 1995: 35). On the Republican side, Maymí Rich describes the *Orriols's* committee, which became famous for its atrocities in the Catalan county of *Pla de l"Estany* as "a group of people that had a twofold line of action: 1) a political line of action that was concentrated in clearly progressive social measures, coherent with an anarchist ideology; 2) a repressive line of action that targeted mostly

religious people and right-wing militants" (Maymí Rich 2001: 56). In all these cases, the division line between local committees and armed militias was blurred, and there was a high degree of coordination between the actions of militiamen and the local committee (who could overlap in some cases). Yet, in the vast majority of locations, the committees were not armed, and they were victimized by militiamen that were either settled in specific locations (e.g. *Salt*, *Orriols, Puigcerdà*, in Catalonia) or that were in transit (i.e. heading to the frontlines in order to fight the other armed group).

3. *Civilians*: regarding the perpetration of violence, inhabitants of localities had a role not only as victims, but also as collaborators. Indeed, local civilians could help armed groups by denouncing their neighbors, giving people in, or arresting them. Conversely, they could also exert some sort of limited "veto power" over the perpetration of violence (e.g. by helping threatened people flee, by hiding them, by manipulating information, etc.). "The neighbors, led by the Committee, used to accompany the militiamen around the streets of the village, guiding them to the houses of the would-be targets, and signaling to them in order to avoid mistakes (Casanova 2007: 43). Casanova also emphasizes the fact that civilians very often had a say in the decisions taken by the local committees: "The vast majority of the committees were not alone at the time of taking these difficult decisions. The meetings would be attended by leftist people of respected authority, as well as by other members of the trade unions. Sometimes they would even be attended by women, who could have an influence with their comments" (Casanova 2007: 44).[68] Cenarro (2002b) argues that civilian collaboration was

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[68] Casanova summarizes the execution process in the following way: "The procedure was always the same: several militiamen went to look for the people on the list, at their households or at their workplaces, guided by a neighbor who would indicate to them the place where they could be found. They usually would first lead them to the Committee and, from there, to the place habilitated as a prison, or they would directly oblige them to jump into a lorry"(Casanova 2007: 43).

necessary for the perpetration of violence even when this was extremely "institutionalized" through Francoist channels (i.e. during the postwar). And in less organized instances, such as in the context of the massacre of Badajoz, civilians (i.e. the local members of the Falange) were also in charge of "signaling" who were those that had to be killed (Vila Izquierdo 1984: 55).

The interaction between these three actors (*militias*, *committees* and *civilians*) affected violence in specific ways, and through the following (stylized) dynamic: leftist (or rightist) executions were perpetrated by irregular militias that patrolled in a decentralized way across the Republican (or Nationalist) territory, but that were connected to political parties and/or the military. When militias entered a municipality, they would get in touch with the local council, composed of a combination of leftist (or rightist) political parties, in order to get information on right-wing (or left-wing) supporters in the locality. Sometimes these people would have already been imprisoned by the local committee. If not, members of the committee could individually or collectively provide the militias with a list of suspects, or show the militiamen where these people lived. Conversely, they could choose not to provide a list of names, not to help the militiamen find the suspects, or even inform would-be targets about the intentions of the militias –so that they could escape in time.[69] Civilians in the locality could also decide to either help the militias by denouncing their neighbors or helping to find would-be-targets, or seek to "veto" violent actions (again, helping people flee, confronting the militias, and similar).

In the early postwar period, the interaction between civilians, local authorities and militias/armed groups was also relevant for the perpetration of violence. For example, rightist violence took place in Catalonia during and after the occupation of the territory

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[69] These processes are detailed in many regional and local historical accounts. See, for example, Garriga (1986), Solé i Sabaté and Pous (1988), Segura (1999), Gutierrez Flores (2000), Crosas (2004), Gaitx (2006), Dueñas (2007), Casanova (2007).

by the Nationalist army, and it was therefore much more institutionalized than earlier leftist violence (Solé i Sabaté 2000; Vila Izquierdo 1984). However, again, this does not mean that its perpetration was unilateral on the side of the Nationalist army: when this army or its irregular militias conquered a locality, it relied on local civilians in order to compile lists of suspects, who would be imprisoned and eventually (in almost all circumstances) executed.[70] In other words, members of the local community (i.e. civilians) had some agency in the process leading up to executions: for example, people could easily denounce their neighbors by saying that they were *rojos* (reds), or by arguing that they had been involved in "blood crimes" during the war –that is, they could push for killings (see chapter 6). Local rightist politicians or religious authorities (i.e. local leaders) could write letters to ask for the absolution of detainees, and people could hide neighbors or help them flee –in other words, they could constrain the perpetration of violence. This was common in all the territories where Nationalist violence took place through institutional channels. For example, Chaves provides details on how the mediation of local civilians affected executions or death penalties in Caceres (1995: 229-230).[71] Cenarro argues that in Aragon "The participation of civil society in violence through right-wing mobilization during the civil war and the different practices, such as accusation and emission of reports or endorsement letters in the postwar were crucial for the materialization of terror" (Cenarro 2002b: 71).

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[70] Very often, people would not be immediately killed, as the Francoist apparatus followed a series of proto-legal procedures before carrying out the executions (i.e. in Military Courts). On some occasions, people would be imprisoned during months or years before being assassinated. The release of prisoners could only take place after the intervention of local authorities in favor of the detainees.

[71] Interestingly, this author identifies the conditions under which violence takes place –when there is a collaboration of local civilians - but he does not identify the conditions under which this collaboration takes place.

3.5. The Study of Violence during the Spanish Civil War: Caveats

The study of violence during the SCW has advantages and disadvantages versus other civil wars that we could potentially study. On the one hand, because this is a historical civil war, the figures could potentially be more reliable than other contemporary civil wars, in which political and/or ideological factors are more likely to play a role at biasing the data (e.g. Ball *et al.* 2002). On the other hand, the politics of the Francoist regime —of ignoring and masking violence perpetrated by the Nationalists while scrutinizing and publicizing revolutionary violence perpetrated in the Republican areas (i.e. with the creation of the "Causa General")– has not facilitated objective knowledge of the actual figures. Already during the civil war, many deaths on the Nationalist side, and especially those committed irregularly, were not registered in the Civil Registries (Reig Tapia 1984); and even in the cases where they were registered, the real cause of death was not indicated (Chaves 1995: 104). This, together with the closure of the military archives during Francoism, has complicated the collection of data on these deaths: historians have had to triangulate sources (i.e. civil registers, historical archives, oral sources) in order to attain these data. Josep Maria Solé i Sabaté and Joan Villarroya (SSV) have made an exemplar use of this methodology (explained in further detail in the appendix of chapter 4), and they have laid the foundations for this type of historical research (Linz 1996; Ruiz 2009).

With the intellectual openness that accompanied the transition to democracy, historians have been able to start debating about sources and figures that were biased towards the Francoist discourse, e.g. those provided by authors such as Salas Larrazábal (1977) or Martín Rubio (1987), and they have been able to increasingly provide more reliable data (Juliá 2004: 410). The slow release of documents in the 1980s implied new opportunities for research (Ruiz 2009: 457). For example, while Salas Larrazábal concluded that the deaths in the Republican zone were

72,344 and in the Nationalist zone 57,662, later studies demonstrated that these figures (and especially those referring to the Nationalist zone) were rated too low. According to Ruiz (2009) the final figures on civilian deaths are 150,000 in hands of the Nationalists (including 50,000 deaths after the end of the war), and between 50,000 and 60,000 in hands of the Republicans (including over 6,000 members of the catholic clergy). Nevertheless, actual figures on Francoist violence are not yet available –and this is especially the case for those territories where the Nationalists controlled the territory from the very beginning of the civil war, or areas that were conquered shortly after the coup. In these areas, irregular killings or *paseos* were more widespread there than in areas that were occupied some months later (Linz 1996).

With the application of the recent Law of Historical Memory (approved by the Spanish Parliament in December 2007), the exhumation of mass graves, and increased disclosure of information by victims and/or perpetrators, some further data on these regions will hopefully become available soon. That is the case despite the fact that this Law is less ambitious than what was claimed by a large section of Spanish society (Aguilar *et al*. 2011; Anderson 2009); for example, this law does not contemplate the establishment of trials against war criminals, or the creation of research commissions on human rights violations. A burden to this process is the advanced age of the survivors of the war, which complicates the collection of information through oral sources (most survivors have, in fact, already passed away).

Given current data availability issues, a municipal (versus regional or national) level analysis is the most appropriate for the study of the Spanish case.[72] At the local level, we can rely on very

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[72] The municipality is the lowest administrative level in Spain, and it has a relatively small size. In Catalonia was in 1936 comprised of 1,062 municipalities, which extended over a territory of approximately 32,100 km2. The average population of a municipality was 1,647 inhabitants. In Aragon, the average of the 940 localities that were encompassed in the territory of approximately 47,179 km2; the mean of inhabitants in a

fine-grained sources —at least, for a few particular regions, e.g. Catalonia (SSV 1986, 1989; Solé i Sabaté 2000), Aragon (Casanova 2001; Ledesma 2009b), and Valencia (Gabarda 1993, 1996). This makes our results more reliable than if we were to undertake a regional or provincial level analysis (e.g. Linz 1996; Herreros and Criado 2009). In this dissertation, I have focused my empirical analyses on regions for which the data is highly reliable and robust —that is, where it is not expected that the numbers change after the exhumation of mass graves (see Table 3.7 further below). I hope that the analyses performed with this subset of provinces will be possible for the whole territory of the Spanish state in the near future.

3.6. Regional Patterns of Violence and Descriptive Data

3.6.1. Direct Violence

Popular repression did not develop homogeneously across the territory (Maldonado 2007: 160). In this subsection, I briefly depict the patterns of violence in each of the various regions analyzed empirically in the dissertation, and I also make some references to the existing (fragmented) data on the entire territory of Spain.

Catalonia

The region of Catalonia is located in the Northeast of the Iberian Peninsula. It is delimited by the Mediterranean Sea in the East, with France and Andorra in the North, and with the Spanish region of Aragon in the West. The Pyrenees are the natural boundary between Catalonia and France. During the SCW, one of the most stable frontlines was the one created along the Ebro

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locality was 1,119. In Valencia, the average of the 541 localities extending over a surface of 23,255km2 was of 3,605 inhabitants.

River, which divided the region of Aragon into two sides. As the Nationalist army advanced in 1938, it conquered Lleida (the capital of the County of *El Segrià*, in the Midwest of the region) and some parts of the Western counties, which were a "combat zone" (or battlefield) for a while. One of the most affected counties was *Terra Alta* (in the Southwest of the region), which was witness to the largest battle of the war (the battle of the Ebro, July- December 1938), and the counties of the Midwest (*Pallars Jussà, Segrià, Noguera, Alta Ribagorça*), which were affected by the so-called battle of the Segre (April- December 1938).

Catalonia was under Republican control during most of the war, and it was conquered by the Nationalist army in an offensive that started after the breaking of the Ebro's frontline ―right after the Nationalist victory in the battle of the Ebro (July-November 1938) (Reverte 2003; SSV 1987).[73] On December 11th 1938, the Francoist army started the offensive that led to the conquest of Catalonia. The use of aerial attacks combined with well organized land forces made it a ferocious occupation, leading to the surrender of this region on 13 February 1939.[74]

Violence thus took place in Catalonia in two stages: first (from July 1936 to 1938/39) violence was perpetrated by leftist militias and the Republican army; later (during and after its occupation of the territories) violence was perpetrated by the Nationalist army and right-wing militias. In other words, direct violence in Catalonia can be thought of as a two-stage process: a period t_1, in which executions were perpetrated by the left; and a period t_2, in which executions were perpetrated by the right (Balcells 2007a; 2010a). The estimated number of victims of leftist direct violence in Catalonia (while it was under Republican control) is 8,352

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[73] As we said, few localities close to the Ebro frontline were conquered by the Nationalists in mid-1938; the first Catalan town to be occupied by the Nationalist army was Lleida (3 April 1938).

[74] On that day "There is not a single piece of Catalonia controlled by Republican soldiers, who have to abandon their country, and who break into tears while they contemplate the tricolor flag burning in flames on the other side of the (French) border" (Reverte 2006: 496).

(SSV 1986: 450); the estimated number of people who were victims of rightist direct violence in Catalonia is 3,388 (Solé i Sabaté 2000). (This last figure does not include victims of irregular violence by the right, which was perpetated during the occupation of the territory and amounts to around 513.)[75]

As for rightist indirect violence, this took place in the form of aerial bombings in the majority of Catalonian territory until the right occupied the region. With the occupation of Catalonia, rightist violence took place in the form of direct violence (more or less selective), as the army advanced through the territories. However, rightist violence did not only take place during wartime, but lasted several years after the war.

Map 3.4 shows the distribution of leftist direct violence in Catalonia, by counties (in deaths per thousand inhabitants).

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[75] I have compiled data on these illegal killings from SSV (1983), and from various local historical accounts.

Map 3.4. Executed Left (by Counties), Catalonia (1936-1939)

Executions (per Thousand Inhabitants)

0-1	
1-2	
2-3	
3-4	
4-5	
5-10	
10 and +	

Map 3.5 shows the distribution of "legal" rightist/Nationalist violence in Catalonia, also by counties (also in deaths per thousand inhabitants).

*Map 3.5. Executed Right ("Legally") (by Counties), Catalonia
(1938-1953)*

Executions (per Thousand Inhabitants)

0-1	
1-2	
2-3	
3-4	
4-5	

Maps 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate that leftist violence was particularly severe in the Western regions (roughly, where the Ebro and Segre rivers are located), which are those closer to the frontlines. The greater presence of militias and the lesser degree of control of the territory by armed groups in these areas (due to the proximity to the frontline) might explain this pattern, although violence was not severe in the counties of the Northwest, which were also sharing frontline, and they are more mountainous. Nationalist violence was especially severe in the Southwest of Catalonia, and it was much less pronounced in the Northwest. This is coherent with the idea that violence in t_2 is directly related to violence in t_1. The data

in Map 3.5 refers only to the "legal" repression by Francoists, namely executions that took place after trials. Hence, in order to get a real picture of the distribution of rightist violence, we should add victims of irregular violence —or what can be called "illegal violence"– to these numbers. The data is still quite fragmentary. Map 3.6 shows its distribution across counties.

Map 3.6. Executed Right ("Illegally") (by Counties), Catalonia (1938-1953)

Executions (per Thousand Inhabitants)

0	
0<‰<0.1	
0.1<‰<0.4	
0.4<‰<1	
>5‰	

On the one hand, and quite interestingly, this map seems to correlate even better than Map 3.5 with the map on leftist repression. On the other hand, an outlier shows up: the county of

Pallars Sobirà (top county, second from the left). This is a case that registered an extremely high number of killings, rapes and disappearances by the Francoists (Gimeno 1989) but that had suffered from very low levels of leftist repression —much lesser, for example, than the neighboring county *Pallars Jussà* (Prats 1991). Despite having been qualified as extraordinary, mass killings by the national army in the *Pallars Sobirà*, and its disproportional nature with regard to previous leftist violence, has not yet been very well accounted for in historical research. One conjecture is that this violence was related to a "scorched earth" strategy by the Nationalist army, connected to the existence of leftist guerrilla activities in the zone.[76]

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate temporal variation in direct violence by both the left and the right in Catalonia. These graphs indicate that 1) leftist violence reached a significant peak just after the military coup, in July 1936; 2) the highest levels of rightist repression took place in those months that preceded and immediately followed the end of the war (1 April 1939).

Figure 3.1 indicates that the peak of leftist violence in Catalonia was August 1936.[77] After November 1936, it decreased quite abruptly, only slightly increasing again in 1938 and in the first two months of 1939, right before the occupation of the region by the Francoist army, illustrating the death throes of Republican control of the area.

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[76] Indeed, this county is highly mountainous, with a lot of forest and rough terrain that encouraged the development of guerrilla activities by Republican soldiers and militiamen (Gimeno 1989; Sànchez 2006). And mass killing is often a calculated military strategy used by regimes attempting to defeat major guerrilla insurgencies as they try to eliminate the guerrilla's base of support (Mao Zedong 1978; Valentino 2004; Valentino *et al.* 2004).

[77] This graph has been retrieved directly from SSV (1989). These authors do not provide temporally disaggregated data that I could digitalize for research purposes, and that would have allowed a better presentation of the data.

Figure 3.1. Executed Left in Catalonia
(Total Number of Deaths by Months of War)

GRÀFIC DE LA REPRESSIÓ
A CATALUNYA 1936 - 1939

Source: SSV (1989).

Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of rightist violence in the four Catalan provinces.[78] We can see that it reached a peak right after the occupation of the territory by the Francoist army, and that it decreased thereafter.

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[78] This graph is elaborated from data in Solé i Sabaté (2000), who does provide with a systematic disaggregation of the data.

Figure 3.2. Executed Right in Catalonia
(Percentage of Deaths by Year)

Source: Solé i Sabaté (2000).

Aragon

Aragon experienced most of the civil war divided by the Ebro frontline, which remained stable for almost 2 years. A total of 366 municipalities of Aragon were under Francoist control during the totality of the war —I will label them as Nationalist. The remaining municipalities in the region (a total of 582) were under leftist control at some point during the war —I will label them as Republican despite some of them were what I call "battlefield zone" (i.e. they were conquered by the groups several times during the conflict)[79] and all of them were sooner or later conquered by

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[79] The "battlefield nature" of this region is exemplified by the figures provided by Solano (2004) for the province of Teruel: of the total numbers of the leftist repression (2,879), 1,611 (56%) were victims or revolutionary repression (mostly civilians); while 1,268 (44%) were victims of war actions (mostly combatants).

the Nationalists. The distribution of municipalities of Aragon by control zones is shown in Table A3.1 of the Appendix.[80]

The total number of civilian victims of rightist violence in Aragon was around 8,500, and of leftist violence, 4,000 (Cenarro 2006). Violence was thus quite intense in this region, as compared to other areas of Spain (see Table 3.5 further below). One reason for this may be the battlefield nature of a share of its territory and the proximity to the frontline, which generated greater uncertainty about control to the groups, and thereby a greater willingness to eliminate enemies: "In addition to being the stage of two parallel processes —the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary one–, the proximity to the frontline and the perception of closeness to the enemy increased the repressive practices" (Ledesma 2006c: 13).[81] Similar to Catalonia, the bloodiest months of violence in Aragon's rear territories were those of the summer and fall of 1936 (Salomón 2006: 13).

Violence in Nationalist Aragon, which took place in a first stage of the conflict (i.e. t_1), was perpetrated by the army and rightist militias and it highly targeted (but not exclusively) members of leftist political parties and trade unions, on a selective basis: "Governors, deputies, mayors, council members committed to the Republican cause were the first to enter the long list of arrested and executed" (Cifuentes and Maluenda 2006: 41). There

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[80] Because of the battlefield nature of part of this area, it is not straightforward to code the localities of Aragon as belonging to one or the other control zone. What I will hereafter refer to as "the Republican zone of Aragon" encompasses the following judicial parties (or counties): *Albarracin, Alcañiz, Aliaga, Barbastro, Belchite, Benabarre, Boltaña, Cariñena, Caspe, Castellote, Fraga, Hijar, Huesca, Montalbán, Mora de Rubielos, Pina, Sariñena, Tamarite, Teruel, Valderrobles*. Again, these are counties which were either partially or fully controlled by the left during the civil war. I thank José Luis Ledesma for his help at elaborating this table.

[81] Something similar can be argued with regard to zones of Extremadura that were close to the frontline, e.g. Don Benito, Villanueva de la Serena (Guitérrez Casalá 2006: 93-94; 290-300).

were however many instances of massacres or group executions, e.g. in the *Torrero* cemetery of Zaragoza (Heredia 2006), *Teruel* or *Mediana de Aragón* (Ledesma 2006: 37).

The distribution of rightist violence –of both the war and the early postwar- in all the region of Aragon is depicted in Map 3.7.[82] The area that was most heavily victimized by the Nationalists was the province of Zaragoza (in the West); we can observe that Huesca was the least victimized province of Aragon.

Map 3.7. Executed Right Aragon

Map 3.8 depicts the distribution of executions by the left in Aragon; we can observe that the left managed to control only the Eastern part of the region, although they killed some residents of

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[82] Wartime and postwar violence will be analyzed separately in the empirical analyses (chapter 4).

the Western territories too. Within the Eastern territories, leftist violence presents a big deal of variation, which at first glance cannot be associated with any particular factor (i.e. geography, proximity to frontline).

Map 3.8. Executed Left Aragon

Leftist violence in Republican Aragon was highly determined by the paths of the columns or armed militias that were coming from Valencia or Catalonia:[83] "The majority of villages and cities of Republican Aragon registered the gross of the repressive episodes as columns were passing through" (Ledesma 2006b:

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[83] These groups and troops had names such as *La banda negra* (The black band), *Hijos de la noche* (Sons of the night), *Brigada de la muerte* (Death squad).

93).[84] Map 3.9, which is taken from Ledesma (2006a), illustrates the Aragon frontline (stabilized in August 1938), and the paths of the different columns that conquered different territories of Eastern Aragon during July-September of 1936. These seem to correspond roughly to the variation in levels of violence depicted in Map 3.8.

Map 3.9. Aragon Frontline and Paths of the Militias

Source: Ledesma (2006a).

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[84] Ledesma (2006b) also says that in those places where there had been no rebellion and the liberating role of the columns was minimal, and violence was consequently low. He also argues that violence was much greater in places where the rebellion was consolidated, or where the leftist militias faced armed resistance at their entry (e.g. Calanda, Caspe), where the militias undertook a "cleansing" of enemies.

The dynamics of violence in these areas of Aragon that were either initially dominated by the Nationalist army (or not dominated by any group) or conquered by the leftist militias at the early stages of the war are likely to be different to other places of the Republican rearguard (i.e. Catalonia, Valencia, or Murcia) or to places that were always controlled by the Nationalist army (e.g. Nationalist Aragon).[85] Again, this is due to the "battlefield nature" of this area, where control was imperfect, closer to what it would look like in the context of guerrilla war. Because the mechanisms outlined in my theoretical framework (chapter 2) are arguably at work in battlefield zones, in this dissertation I will not devote too much time to the analysis of this territory. Furthermore, from a methodological point of view, this is a tricky area to study: the various military movements and irregularities in patterns of control imply too many complexities to be adequately explored in large-*n* analyses; they can only be analyzed with in-depth qualitative analysis —as has been done in some outstanding historical research (Ledesma 2003; Casanova 2004; Casanova 2007; Azpíroz 2007).

Anticlerical violence was, like in Catalonia, very significant among the violence perpetrated by the anarchist militias in Republican Aragon. Only in the town of Barbastro 123 priests (87.8% of the clergy) were assassinated (Casanova 2004). Direct violence by the left also affected non-religious people, and particularly members of right-wing political parties and organizations. Table 3.4 shows the political affiliation of the

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[85] Some of the localities in this zone were conquered several times by the two sides during the war. See for example what happened in the towns of Teruel and Belchite, as described by Ledesma: "Members of the police, Falangists and soldiers left between 100-200 executed in Teruel and Belchite. Afterwards, the Republicans entered into severe battles in Belchite in September 1937 and in Teruel in January 1938, and provided their dose of death, with 60 and 153 victims, respectively. And when they were recovered in February and March [1938] by the Francoist army, the repressive machinery bore witness to the horror and vengeance with a predictable result: dozens executed" (Ledesma 2006c: 27-28).

victims of the left in the city of Teruel, as compiled by Martín Rubio (1987). We can observe that almost half of them (42.86%) were members of the CEDA. Interestingly, 20.51% of these victims were identified as members of leftist political parties –that is, they were victims of intra-factional struggles.

Table 3.4. Political Affiliation of those Executed by the Left in Teruel City (Aragon)

Group	Victims	Percentage
CEDA	117	42.86
FE	30	10.99
T	10	3.66
PR	9	3.3
Others right	51	18.68
Left parties	56	20.51

Sources: Martin Rubio (1997; A.H.N. Causa general; legs. 416-420).

Valencia

With the exception of the province of Castellon, the region of Valencia was under Republican control throughout all the war; this was one of the last territories to be conquered by Nationalist forces in late March 1939, that is, right before the end of the civil war.[86] The cities of Valencia and Alicante were occupied on 30 March 1939. The province of Castellon, on the other hand, was conquered on 13 June 1938, and remained under Nationalist control from then on (Gabarda 1993). By controlling this area, the Nationalists broke the continuity of the Northeast territories of the Republican rearguard.

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[86] The Republican government was transferred to Valencia on 6 November 1936 until 30 November 1937, when it was moved to Barcelona.

As in Catalonia, violence in Valencia took place in two subsequent phases: a first phase of revolutionary violence by the leftist militias patrolling the Republican territory (t_1); a second phase of Nationalist violence by the army and its militias, which took place mostly during the postwar (t_2). The peak of executions came in 1939, when repression was regularized in all Valencia (Gabarda 1993). The exceptions are those killings that took place during 1938, which were a product of the military advance over Castellon and Valencia.

According to data collected by Gabarda (1996), in Valencia there were 4,715 victims of leftist violence over a total population of 1,896,738 (see Table A3.2 in the Appendix for the distribution of victims by the provinces in this region). The rate of leftist repression was therefore 2.49‰ inhabitants, which is less significant than in Catalonia, where the rate was 3.92‰ inhabitants, according to data in SSV (1989). Gabarda (1993) also presents detailed data on Francoist assassinations in Valencia: he counts a total of 4,714 victims (2.34‰). This makes for a greater rate than in Catalonia, which had 3,385 victims of Nationalist violence (1.2‰) (Solé i Sabaté 2000). Gabarda argues that the greater rightist victimization of Valencia is due to the fact that people did not have the same opportunities to escape as they did in Catalonia. While Valencia is a coastal region, it does not border France, and thus people could not easily flee to this country.

Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of Nationalist violence in the provinces of Valencia for the years between 1938 and 1945. We can see that rightist violence arrived earlier in Castellon (as it was conquered first) and that it peaked in Valencia and Alicante in 1939.

If we compare figures 3.2 and figure 3.3, we can observe that in Catalonia the distribution of executions by the Nationalists is slightly more skewed towards the initial years of occupation (1939) than in the provinces of Valencia, where executions took place over a longer period of time. The case of the province of Lleida is somewhat exceptional in Catalonia because the peak of the repression was 1940 and not 1939. Solé i Sabate (2003: 133-

134) argues that this is due mostly to bureaucratic reasons, and to the fact that Lleida had been occupied beforehand, and had suffered a lot of exile –hence, it took longer for the Francoist administration to locate the denounced people. Something similar may have happened in Castellon, where violence peaked slightly later than in the other provinces of Valencia.

Figure 3.3. Executed Right in Valencia (Percentage of Deaths by Year)

Malaga

The reasons for the inclusion of the province of Malaga (in Andalusia) in the dissertation are manifold: since this region is located in the Spanish south, which had different geographical, economic, social and demographic characteristics than the *Levante* (the Northeast) it is especially useful to test the external validity of the argument. In Malaga, the agrarian conflict was intense, as the *latifundios* were the predominant for of land property (Linz 1996), and social and economic inequality was striking. A proof of this was the relevance of the workers's movement throughout the 1930s, which was accompanied with 93 strikes (Nadal 1981,

1984).[87] During the civil war, Malaga was under Loyalist control for much a shorter time than the provinces of the Northeast (specifically, for 12 months, as it was conquered by the Nationalist forces in February 1937), and this control was considered to be very precarious and to have led to wanton violence by the left. Indeed, the early stages of the civil war in Malaga have been described as particularly chaotic, with a lack of organization such that the defeat against Nationalist forces was made unavoidable (Seidman 2002: 78). The anarchist militias that were autonomous of the Republican army, and they even created "the independent Republic of Malaga" (Salas Larrázabal 1973).

The total numbers for rightist violence, which took place during and after the conquest of the province by the Francoist army, are still unknown. Rodrigo (2008) speaks of a total of 7,000 executed in this province between 1937 and 1940 (1,500 of whom were killed at the moment of "conquest", in February 1937).[88] Due to the missing data, this region will allow us to test our argument only with regard to leftist violence.

Extremadura

Extremadura is another suitable case to test the external validity of the argument. This region has very different characteristics to Catalonia, Aragon or Valencia. Geographically, it is located in the Southwest of the Peninsula, sharing a border

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[87] Also, this province had the highest levels of abstention of Spain in 1931 and in 1936 (with 47.16% and 55% participation respectively); this contrasts with the level of participation in Malaga city, which had one of the highest in 1936 (93.4%). The degree of affiliation with the CNT was not extremely high (12.9% in Malaga city, 1.16% in Malaga province); the UGT was the predominant trade union in the area (in 1931, affiliates of Malaga were the 2.51% of the affiliates in the totality of Spain, as it is shown in Table 3.2).

[88] Some journalistic sources argue that total numbers were probably at least three times this figure.

with Portugal. Economically, it a traditionally poor region, and in the 1930s it was characterized by a very unequal distribution of land (the so called *latifundios*), and had a significant leftist militant tradition (Vila Izquierdo 1984). During that decade, there were several political upheavals in the region due to the Agrarian Law reform, including occupation of properties by land workers (mostly in the counties of Jerez de los Caballeros, Llerena, and Mérida) in late March 1936 (Espinosa 2007: 28; Riesco 2006). Thus, this region was witness to high levels of prewar political violence, which has been considered to be driven by the political polarization to which reference has been made above. Chaves illustrates how heated the political arguments were in many parts of the province of Caceres:

> To all this, we have to imagine everyday scenarios characterized by confrontations and aggressions between people with political disagreements. Very easily, heated arguments, including both men and women, become physically violent, with punches and sticks and stones being recurrently used as instruments. In addition, the militancy in organizations such as the Falange was responsible for much of the social unrest of the period, with a clear destabilizing aim (Chaves 1995:7).

At the military level, the region had a war trajectory that differs from the other provinces under analysis. It became divided into two main areas by a reasonably stable frontline: one area was controlled by the Nationalists at the beginning of the war (that is, after the coup) —most of Caceres' province– or conquered shortly after by military columns that came from Sevilla. That is the case, for example, of the city of Badajoz, which was conquered by the so-called Madrid column, led by General Juan Yagüe Blanco (Espinosa 2007: 108). Another area remained Republican until the summer of 1938, when the insurgent army advanced through *La Serena* valley. Thus, Extremadura was witness to leftist violence —in the zones that were initially controlled by the Loyalists (for a description of this violence, see, for example, Gallardo 1994), and of high levels of violence by the right, for example, including the

well known massacre of Badajoz (see, for example, Espinosa 2005). Like Republican Aragon, the region was more of a "battlefield" than a rearguard zone, with the exception of a piece of the province of Caceres that was controlled by the Nationalists from the very beginning, and which rapidly became rearguard territory.[89]

The region had a historical leftist tendency: tables 3.1 and 3.2 show that the workers's militancy in this region was significantly high in the context of Spain. Rightist violence has been seen by many historians as "counterrevolutionary" in this territory, namely planned by *Falangist* groups —supported by the most powerful landlords– who were unhappy with the results of the 1936 elections, and, especially, with the agrarian reform. "Everything that was associated with the Republican experience, or could be associated with it, had to be destroyed" (Espinosa 2007: 29).[90] Nevertheless, the left also managed to perpetrate violence in the region –although with less intensity than the right. In Badajoz, according to Martín Rubio (2005), there were around 1,500 victims of left, who were predominantly killed during the summer and fall of 1936. 94 of 1,419 (that is 6.5%) of these victims were members of the clergy. Other victims were landlords, liberal professionals and industry owners. In Caceres, the level of leftist violence was much lower (a total of 130 executed in of 17 municipalities); this is probably due to the fact that the rebels managed to control this province quite early (Chaves 1995).

In a nutshell, Extremadura is an enlightening region to include in our empirical test. Since the lack of fine-grained systematic data on crucial variables will not allow us to perform a parsimonious econometric analysis, the strategy for this region will consist on performing a less refined (i.e. non-parametric) empirical analysis with the available data —from the province of Caceres (see

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[89] See Chaves (2004) for a detailed description of the military movements in the province of Caceres.

[90] Rightist violence in this region took place mostly against peasants (Linz 1999).

chapter 4)–, and on using published sources in order to present qualitative evidence on the dynamics of violence taking place in it (in chapter 6).

All of Spain

From data in Juliá (2004: 411-413), I have generated a table based on existing data on civilian victims in 33 Spanish provinces (Table 3.5).[91] Regarding Nationalist violence, the data is still being collected and it is preliminary, in some of these provinces; preliminary and final figures are included in different columns.[92] In some provinces, there was only Nationalist violence, and not Republican violence, because they were controlled by the Nationalists from the very beginning of the war. The opposite does not occur because all provinces that were controlled by the Republic ended up, at some point or another, being controlled by the Nationalists. Also, contrary to Nationalist violence, Republican violence has been fully studied. Hence, if there are empty cells for Republican violence, this is because there was no violence perpetrated by this group in the province.

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[91] Some of these authors" tables are confusing, as they mix administrative levels (provinces and regions). Also, some provinces such as Huesca, for which there is data on Republican violence, are missing in their tables. The total numbers for Aragon provinces are slightly different from Casanova *et al.* (2001): I present the data in Juliá in these tables, but I will use Casanova's in the empirical analyses.

[92] Data on violence in the Balearic Islands is missing from Table 3.3. Yet, we know that the island of Menorca had a large number of Republican victims. Eivissa and Menorca's toll during the civil war is 400 deaths (SBHAC 2009). As mentioned above, the Francoists killed at least 2,000 people in Mallorca.

Table 3.5. Total Figures on Direct Violence. Spain (1936-1945)

Region	Province	Nationalist Violence (war and postwar) fully studied	Nationalist Violence (war and postwar) partially studied	Republican Violence	Ratio Nation/Rep
Total Spain		72527	8568	37843	2.143
Catalonia					
	Girona	519		767	0.677
	Barcelona	1716		4581	0.375
	Lleida	450		1173	0.384
	Tarragona	703		1488	0.472
Aragon					
	Huesca	1519		1456	1.043
	Zaragoza	6029		742	8.125
	Teruel	1340		1702	0.787
Valencian Country					
	Castelló	1052		1031	1.020
	Valencia	3128		2844	1.100
	Alacant	742		840	0.883
Murcia					
	Murcia	unavailable		740	-
Andalusia					
	Almería	373		471	0.792
	Granada	5048		994	5.078
	Jaén		1392	1368	1.01*
	Córdoba	9579		2060	4.650
	Málaga	7000		2607	2.685
	Cádiz		1210		-
	Huelva	5455		145	37.621
	Sevilla	8000		480	16.667
Extremadura					
	Cáceres	1680		130	12.923
	Badajoz		6610	1416	4.67*
Castilla La Mancha					
	Ciudad Real		1614	2186	0.74*
	Toledo	3755			-
	Albacete		1600	920	1.74*
Castilla León					
	Segovia	356			-
	Soria	281			-
La Rioja					
	La Rioja	2000			-
Navarra					
	Navarra	2789			-
Cantabria					
	Santander		923	-	-
Asturias					
	Asturias	5952		-	-
Canarias					
	Las Palmas	1000		-	-
	Tenerife	1600		-	-
Madrid					
	Madrid		2663	8815	0.3*

These ratios are provisional and should be corrected when all data on Nationalist violence becomes available.

Even if these data are provisional, they depict some interesting patterns. For example, if we take into account the provisional total figures, the proportion of civilian deaths by political bloc is 2.14 victims of Nationalist violence for each victim of Republican violence. Thus, as Juliá (2004) argues, the accounts of historians such as Salas or Martín Rubio —who had attributed more victims to the Republican side than to the Francoist side– are significantly

challenged with these (more recent) figures. To this, we have to take into account the fact that more victims will be added to the Nationalist side once the exhumation of mass graves has taken place.[93] On the other hand, if we look at those provinces that were victims of both leftist and rightist violence, we can observe that leftist violence was proportionally and relatively more severe than rightist violence, in general terms. This is particularly the case of provinces such as Madrid, Girona, Lleida, Barcelona and Alicante, which remained under Republican control for longer periods of time. The picture is rather different for the provinces of Aragon, which were much more victimized by the right than by the left (the ratio is 8.12 in Zaragoza), and for those of Andalusia, which present much larger ratios (37.6 in Huelva; 16.6 in Sevilla). This is indicative that wartime patterns of control and conquest had clear-cut implications for civilian targeting and victimization at the provincial level.[94]

The provinces analyzed in this dissertation belong to different geographical areas, which present divergent patterns of victimization by the left and the right. While I have been constrained by the lack of availability of fine-grained and reliable local data, I have selected the cases with the attempt to maximize inferential leverage (KKV 1994). By analyzing two provinces in the Northwest (Caceres and Badajoz), one in the South (Malaga), and nine in the Northeast (Valencia, Alacant, Zaragoza, Huesca, Teruel, Girona, Lleida, Tarragona, Barcelona), which had different prewar social cleavages, wartime patterns of control, proximity to frontlines, and wartime violence, I should be able to make

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[93] The Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory (ARMH), founded in 2000, has begun to exhume the bodies of Civil War victims from common graves and to draw attention to the fact, unknown to the vast majority of citizens, that several thousands of murdered Republicans remained unidentified (Aguilar 2008: 428).

[94] This again supports the idea that the municipality is the most appropriate level of analysis for the study of violence in this conflict.

generalizations regarding the remaining Spanish territory, as well as regarding other civil wars.[95]

Map 3.10 shows the distribution of support for the PF in the 1936 elections for all the localities in the nine provinces on which I have collected local level data. Map 3.11 shows the distribution of executions by the left (in ‰ inhabitants of 1936) —during the whole period 1936-39–, and Map 3.12 shows the distribution of executions by the right (also in ‰ inhabitants of 1936) —for the whole 1936-1945 period (that is, including postwar violence). The two latter maps illustrate the variation in local level victimization, by both armed groups, which will be explored empirically in the next chapter. Importantly, these three maps, taken altogether, suggest that lethal violence does not have a direct correlation with patterns of support in the prewar elections: at first glance we do not observe less leftist violence in localities with greater level of leftist support in the elections, and vice-versa. We can observe, for example, that the right was relatively harsh in the provinces of Aragon that had showed lesser support for the left in the 1936 elections; this evidence is thus contrary to the domination hypothesis (i.e. that groups kill more in places where they dominate less politically).

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[95] Issues of external validity are further addressed in chapter 8.

*Map 3.10. Percentage of Support for the Popular Front
(by Municipalities), 1936 Elections*

Map 3.11. Executed Left (by Municipalities)

Map 3.12. Executed Right (by Municipalities)

3.6.2. Indirect Violence

Unfortunately, fine-grained data on bombings (e.g. which localities where affected by it, the number of casualties they generated) is still limited for most of the Spanish territory. The pioneering work of Josep Maria Solé i Sabaté and Joan Villarroya (SSV) (1986) in Catalonia has not been replicated yet in other regions. Data from some primary sources that I have obtained from the Spanish National Library (e.g. propaganda booklets counting the number of bombings in the Republican cities; Anonymous 1938, 1939) seem slightly too biased to be used in reliable statistical analyses. Reliable figures on violence can only be obtained with the triangulation of data from different historical sources, which I could not possibly undertake.

In this dissertation I will thus work with the only subset of reliable data on bombings, the one for Catalonia. Spatial and temporal variation in aerial strikes in this region will be presented

in great detail in chapter 5. In the Table 3.6 below, I show the total figures on victims of indirect violence in Catalonia, as well as some (rough) data on bombings in Aragon, which I include here for comparative purposes.

Table 3.6. Figures on Indirect Violence in Catalonia and Aragon

	Bombings	**Civilians Killed in Bombings (Nationalist)**	**Civilians Killed in Bombings (Republican)**	**Total Civilians Killed in Bombings (Nat & Rep)**
Catalonia	688	4,774	34	4,808
Aragon	>2,000	(no data)	(no data)	1,000-1,500

Sources: SSV (1986), Maldonado (2007).

In Table 3.6, we can observe that the number of bombings was much greater in Aragon than in Catalonia; this is due to the fact that Aragon was a battlefield zone during a large part of the civil war. While some bombings were directed towards civilian locations (e.g. *Alcañiz*), a big share of the bombings of Aragon war seems to be related to battlefield dynamics (Maldonado 2006b).

3.6.3. Summary of Large-n Empirical Data

Table 3.7 summarizes the data that I have been able to collect from existing sources, and that will be used to test the hypotheses, for each of the regions above described.

Table 3.7. Summary of Collected Large-n Empirical Data on Lethal Violence, by Perpetrator and Period

Region or Province	Direct Violence (i.e. Executions and Massacres)		Indirect Violence (i.e. Bombings)	
	RIGHT	*LEFT*	*RIGHT*	*LEFT*
Catalonia	Yes (1938/9-45)	Yes (1936-39)	Yes (1936-39)	Marginal, combat-related. Will not be analyzed
Nationalist Aragon	Yes (1939-45)	Not perpetrated	Marginal, combat-related. Will not be analyzed	*Not available*
Republican Aragon	Yes (1936-45)	Yes (1936-39)	*Not available*	*Not available*
Valencia	Yes (1939-45)	Yes (1936-39)	*Not available*	*Not available*
Malaga	*Not available*	Yes (1936-37)	*Not available*	*Not available*
Caceres	Yes, but fine-grained data not available (1936-45)	Yes, but fine grained data not available (1936-38)	*Not available*	*Not available*

In italics, I have marked those data that has not been collected because of its unavailability from fine-grained sources. This differentiates these cases from those in which there data was not collected because it was merely not perpetrated (e.g. leftist violence in Nationalist Aragon), or because this violence was very marginal (i.e. connected to combat) and it is not relevant for the purposes of my analysis (e.g. leftist indirect violence in Catalonia; Nationalist indirect violence in Nationalist Aragon).

Appendix Chapter 3

Table A3.1. Aragon Municipalities by Wartime Control Zones

Province	Nationalist	Republican	Total
Huesca	77	282	359
Teruel	34	248	282
Zaragoza	255	52	307
Total	366	582	948

Table A3.2. Victims of Leftist Violence in Valencia, by Provinces

Province	Population	Victims	Total %	Pop ‰
Castellon	308,746	1,031	21.87	3.34
Valencia	1,042,154	2,844	60.32	2.72
Alicante	545,838	840	17.81	1.54
Total	1,896,738	4,715	100	

*Figure A3.1. Left Vote and CNT Affiliation (per Thousand) in 1936
(by Counties), Catalonia*

Map A3.1. Fictional Presence of Maquis in Spain (1946)

Source: *L'Humanité*, in Sànchez (1999).

Map A3.2. County Division of Catalonia

Source: Institut Cartògrafic de Catalunya.

CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL TEST (I). DETERMINANTS OF DIRECT VIOLENCE

"Violence is rarely a solo performance."

Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*

4.1. Introduction

This chapter contains a comprehensive empirical test of the hypotheses on the determinants of direct violence presented in chapter 2 (i.e. hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2). For this purpose, I use a set of cross-sectional datasets, which include a total of 2,644 municipalities of eleven provinces in four different Spanish Autonomous Communities.[1] Specifically, the datasets include data on 1,062 municipalities of the region of Catalonia; 948 municipalities of Aragon; 547 municipalities of Valencia and 93 municipalities of Andalusia. The explanatory models will be tested in a joint analysis for the whole sample of municipalities, but also for the different regional subsamples; the latter will allow me to include information on explanatory variables that was only possible to collect for some territories, on the one hand, and to

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[1] The provinces analyzed are: *Lleida,* Tarragona*, Barcelona and *Girona*, in Catalonia; Alicante, Valencia and Castellon in Valencia; Huesca, Teruel and Zaragoza in Aragon, and Malaga in Andalusia.

control for some regional-specific factors (e.g. military control patterns, geographical location of the groups), on the other.[2] As data on some variables is missing for a number of municipalities, in the estimation of some of the regression models the size of the sample(s) will shrink.[3]

The municipality, the lowest administrative level in Spain, will be the unit of analysis throughout this entire chapter. As I have already argued, the local level approach is appropriate both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective: on the one hand, it is consistent with a micro-level explanation of the phenomenon of intentional violence against civilians. In this sense, I support Fuji's argument that a smaller administrative unit permits a closer approximation to the geographic and social spaces that people occupy in their daily lives (Fuji 2009: 187), which are those that matter most in accounting for dynamics of violence. On the other hand, the local level approach allows us to minimize measurement error: using the municipality as the level of analysis permits us not only to collect fine-grained data, but also better control for potential sources of unit heterogeneity that could otherwise be biasing the empirical results. I will come back to this methodological consideration further below.

Data on violence was coded at the municipal level by "group/period under which the municipality was under its control". Thus, all the violence perpetrated by the right in a locality is pooled together; and likewise for leftist violence. While it would be more appropriate to have a time-series dataset, e.g.

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[2] The analysis by regions makes sense because most of the historical data has been collected in line with these divisions.

[3] For example, no electoral data is available for the 135 municipalities in Castellon. This data was missing from the archives. Data on geographical location (i.e. latitude, longitude) and on the altitude of a number of municipalities was also missing from national statistical records.

with data points for "municipality/group/month",[4] this sort of data is still not available from the existing historical sources.

The crucial independent variable in all the regression models in this chapter is the variable *Competition*, which captures the balance of power between political factions (e.g. left and right) in a locality.[5] Some authors have used the term *Polarization* to refer to the degree of parity between groups (De la Calle 2007; Chacón 2004b; Chacón *et al*. 2006; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010). Nevertheless, I believe that the term competition is more appropriate because polarization entails considering the distance between the groups (Esteban and Ray 1994), and it therefore has different theoretical and empirical implications. Political competition captures more optimally the idea of parity or balance of power between groups (Bardhan and Yang 2004).

Following the theoretical framework, I expect wartime violence in a first stage of the civil war (on either side of the conflict) to be associated with prewar competition (hypothesis 2.1); and I expect violence taking place in further stages (e.g. when an armed group conquers a locality previously controlled by another group) to be coupled with previous violence (i.e. degree of violence perpetrated by the enemy group in the locality), as well as with competition (hypothesis 2.2).[6] Different parametric and non-parametric tests will be implemented with the aim of capturing the independent effect of each of these variables in the non-initial periods of the civil war.

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[4] For example, this would permit us to analyze temporal variation in violence or it would allow us to study, in a disaggregated way, violence that was perpetrated at the beginning of the war, violence that was perpetrated once the frontlines were stabilized, and postwar violence.

[5] As will be explained, I use a quadratic measure for competition (formula provided below); although I will run a set of robustness tests with alternative measures (i.e. absolute values).

[6] An implication of the theoretical framework is that other indicators of victimization in t_1 should also have an impact on violence in t_2. Evidence on this is provided in chapter 6.

The Spanish Civil War has a number of characteristics that provide leverage on the study of the effect of political alignments on *wartime* violence, which put us in a comfortable position regarding so-called identification issues. The electoral results that will be used to proxy local political configurations are previous to the civil war and its violence. As the 1936 elections took place five months before the onset of the civil war, it cannot be that violence (or the prospect of violence) had an impact on electoral results –in other words, that electoral results are in any way endogenous to violence. The latter is the case for elections that take place in wartime contexts, where we cannot possibly think of the electoral results as independent of wartime dynamics (e.g. Colombia, Afghanistan, Iraq, US Civil War). I will be using the electoral results of the 1933 elections for robustness checks, and this will provide additional exogeneity to the prewar political data. Furthermore, the study of electoral stability over time (or the converse of this: *volatility*) —throughout the democratic period that led up to the civil war– will also be helpful in providing a great deal of exogeneity to the model. Despite all this, given that prewar polarization and violence could be simultaneously determined by a third (omitted) variable (e.g. socioeconomic inequality), and absent a suitable instrumental for political competition (Chacón *et al*. 2006), I will perform some analyses with county fixed effects, as well as with geo-referencing indicators, which shall provide additional robustness to the results.

Again, for all the provinces under scrutiny, the local level electoral data that will be used in the analyses comes from the *national* elections that took place in 16 February 1936.[7] Data on these elections are the most suitable for a number of reasons: 1) while being early enough to guarantee exogeneity, these are the closest democratic elections to the outbreak of the civil war; this assures us that they are proxying political configurations that

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[7] Following convention in English, I use national to refer to the level of the country. That is despite Spain is a plurinational state.

existed at the time of the civil war, and not older ones;[8] 2) these elections were exceptional regarding levels of political participation: specifically, 71% of the Spanish adult population went to the polls (Linz and De Miguel 1977). The extremely high turnout means that we can obtain a clear-cut picture of local level political configurations with the electoral results;[9] 4) we can expect that vote-buying and patronage, which was common in rural areas of Spain since the period of *La Restauración* (1874-1923) (Brenan 1967), was less widespread in national than in local elections for the simple reason that local *caciques* would exert more pressure to assure their own power than to help national leaders keep theirs. Thus, potentially being the least biased by patronage practices, national elections data should be the most reflective of local social and political configurations, as well as the most reliable for analytical purposes.

Due to the nature of the electoral system of the Second Republic, which promoted the creation of pre-electoral coalitions (e.g. CEDA, created in 1933 —also called *Frente Nacional*–[10] and *Frente Popular,[11]* created in 1936), some of the published sources have the results of the 1936 elections gathered by electoral blocs, that is, instead of by political parties (e.g. Vilanova 2005; Zubero

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[8] For example, in their analysis of pogroms in Poland, Kopstein and Wittenberg (2010) use data on elections that took place 20 year earlier than these events –this is problematic as local political configurations may not have remained stable throughout this long period of time.

[9] The high turnout was to some extent the consequence of the anarchists's participation in these elections, but also of the large amount of resources that political parties devoted to electoral mobilization (see chapter 3).

[10] In some places, this Coalition was called "Counterrevolutionary Candidature" (*Candidatura Contrarrevolucionaria*). In Catalonia, it was called "Catalan Order Front" *(Front Català d"Ordre)*. It included political parties that have been considered "centrist" such as *La Lliga Regionalista*, which was the main right-wing party in this region, and it had a Catalan nationalist platform.

[11] In Catalonia, this received the name of Catalan Leftist Front (*Front Català d"Esquerres*).

1982); in consequence, the vote for the individual parties cannot be distinguished from the vote for these macro pre-electoral coalitions.[12] The analysis will therefore be based on the vote for the main blocs, whose division (i.e. left vis-à-vis right) corresponds to the macro-cleavage of the civil war. Also, since this was not generalized across the territory, the results of the second electoral round will not be used in the empirical analyses.[13]

In the first part of the chapter, I will estimate negative binomial II (NB) and zero inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regressions on the different samples of municipalities of Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon; these are the regions for which I have been able to collect the most comprehensive set of indicators. The NB and ZINB are count regressions models, which are the most suitable for the nature of the dependent variable(s): number of people executed by the left, in t_1, and number of people executed by the right, in t_2. I use regression count models because the linear regression model would lead to inefficient, inconsistent and biased estimates. "Even though there are situations in which the LRM provides reasonable results, it is much safer to use models specifically designed for count outcomes" (Long and Freeze

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[12] Interestingly, these were purely electoral coalitions. Once the elections had taken place, and the deputies had taken possession of their seats, the political parties behaved autonomously in the Parliament (Linz and de Miguel 1977: 15).

[13] One might wonder if the results of the elections during the II Republic are reliable at all. Brenan explains that *caciquismo* was widespread in Spain (Brenan 1967: 300). If electoral results are affected by clientelist networks rather than by the political preferences of individuals, these would provide us with little information, and they would be quite useless. However, the election results in Catalonia are believed to be very reliable (Vilanova 2005), as this region supposedly had election monitoring mechanisms and less patronage (partly because it was less rural) than other areas. Aragon (Zubero 1982, 1984) also seems to provide with reliable figures. I am however slightly less convinced about the reliability of electoral results in Valencia, where patronage was more extensive, as well as in some rural areas of Aragon (Azpíroz 2007). See below.

2001:223).[14] NB allows us to control for overdispersion, which the Poisson count model cannot do; the ZINB allows us to control both for overdispersion (which leads to inefficient and downward biased standard errors) and for the excess of zeros in the dependent variable.[15] In all the regressions below, the ZINB is shown to be more adequate than the NB model.[16] Nevertheless, I will also present the results of the NB for robustness purposes. Finally, in this first part of the chapter, I will also present a number of descriptive and post-estimation graphs, as well as some non-parametric tests (i.e. comparison of mean tests). I would argue that together these analyses constitute a comprehensive test of hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2.

In the second part of the chapter, I will run a set of complementary analyses, which consist of: 1) the test of a set of interactive hypotheses, 2) the inclusion of additional measures of the independent variable in the models; 3) the analysis of the determinants of violence in the municipalities of the province of

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[14] As will be explained, I will also run a set of robustness tests with LRM and the dependent variable normalized (on population), which provide with consistent results.

[15] "Zero-inflated count models, introduced by Lambert (1992), respond to the failure of the PRM model to account for dispersion and excess zeros by changing the mean structure to allow zeros to be generated by two distinct processes" (Long and Freeze, 2001: 250). They also allow the variance to be different from the mean, that is, to control for overdispersion.

[16] The Kernel distribution plots for the dependent variables (in the Appendix) show that there is a concentration of zeros in each of their respective distributions. I have performed different analyses with Poisson, NB and ZINB regressions and checked which of them adjusts better to the data; following Long and Freeze (2001), I have plotted the observed and the predicted counts in order to see which models fits the data best: the ZINB shows itself to be the most appropriate. Also the Vuong selection model statistic will confirm the need for a ZINB model.

Malaga; 4) a descriptive analysis of data on violence in the province of Caceres, in Extremadura.[17]

In the third part of the chapter, I will use spatial econometric techniques in order to test for the spatial dependence in the data. While empirical researchers on violence frequently overlook this factor, spatial dependence may be biasing ordinary regression estimates (Ziemke 2008); it is thus necessary to test for it. Plus, as we will see, the study of the spatial relationship in the data can provide us with useful insights into the dynamics of violent repression on the ground.

4.2. Main Test

4.2.1. Econometric Models

Throughout this chapter, I will estimate four main different econometric models, with some variations: two models for violence in t_1 (Models 4.1 and 4.2) –by either the left or the right, depending on who controlled the area at the first stage of the civil war in the territory; two models for violence in t_2 (Models 4.2 and 4.3) –in this case, only by the right, as I am not considering regions of Spain that were first controlled by the right and then by the left.[18] However I will also estimate variations of these models, which will imply the inclusion of either different measures of the independent variable(s), or the of different combinations of them.

The main econometric models that will be tested are the following:

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[17] For this latter region, the unavailability of systematic data on violence and other crucial indicators makes it impossible to perform multivariate type of analyses.

[18] The exception is the set of localities in the "battlefield" zone of Aragon, which were initially controlled by the Nationalists, and were later conquered by the leftist militias coming from Catalonia. Yet, as will be explained, this zone is problematic —precisely due to its battlefield nature–, and will not be included in the core of my analyses.

Econometric Model 4.1: Direct Violence in t_1 (NB)

$Executions_i = \alpha + \delta Competition_i + \beta X_i + \mu_i$

Econometric Model 4.2: Direct Violence in t_1 (ZINB)

For all cases, a logit regression is estimated with the dependent variable being a dummy variable Y_i with value 1 if Leftist $Executions_i = 0$, and 0 if Leftist $Executions_i > 0$:

$Y_i = \alpha + \delta Competition_i + \beta X_i + \mu_i$

A NB regression is estimated for all cases with $Executions_i > 0$:

$Executions_i = \alpha + \delta Competition_i + \beta X_i + \mu_i$

As explained, Competition is a measure of electoral parity between opposed political factions (in this case, left and right) in a locality. Below I provide details on the computation of this index. Since my main theoretical hypothesis (Hypothesis 2.1) is that competition is explanatory of direct violence, the null hypotheses in these models is $\delta = 0$. X_i is the vector of all the control variables that will be taken into account; this includes geographical and demographic variables.[19]

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[19] X_i will include different variables depending on the region and on the availability of indicators in the region. The vector will however be roughly the same in all regressions, including the variables Frontline, Population, CNT Affiliation, UGT Affiliation, Border, Sea, Rough Terrain, and Catholic Center. The specific coding of these variables, which in some cases varies between datasets, will be explained further below.

Econometric Model 4.3: Violence in t_2 (NB)

This model has two different versions:

$$\text{Executions}_i = \alpha + \delta\text{Competition}_i + \beta X_i + \mu_i \qquad [1]$$
$$\text{Executions}_i = \alpha + \delta\text{Competition}_i + \gamma\text{Executed } t_{1i} + \beta X_i + \mu_i \qquad [2]$$

Econometric Model 4.4: Violence in t_2 (ZINB)

Like before, two logit regressions are estimated with the dependent variable J_i with value 1 if $\text{Executions}_i = 0$, and value 0 if $\text{Executions}_i > 0$:

$$J_i = \alpha + \delta\text{Competition}_i + \beta X_i + \mu_i \qquad [1]$$
$$J_i = \alpha + \delta\text{Competition}_i + \gamma\text{Executed } t_{1i} + \beta X_i + \mu_i \qquad [2]$$

NB regression are estimated for all cases for all all cases with $\text{Executions}_i > 0$:

$$\text{Executions}_i = \alpha + \delta\text{Competition}_i + \beta X_i + \mu_i \qquad [1]$$
$$\text{Executions}_i = \alpha + \delta\text{Competition}_i + \gamma\text{Executed } t_{1i} + \beta X_i + \mu_i \qquad [2]$$

Again, X_i is a vector of all the control variables that will be taken into account, and corresponds to the same vector in the econometric models 4.1 and 4.2 (above). Competition is included in these models in order to test for the null hypothesis that $\delta=0$. The test of the second theoretical hypothesis (hypothesis 2.2) is undertaken with the estimation of models 2 (both in 4.3 and 4.4); the null hypothesis is in this case $\gamma=0$. As will be explained, additional estimations shall be made in order to properly identify the independent effect of Competition and Executed in t_1 on Executed in t_2.

4.2.2. Results

As said, the local level data has been collected and organized by regions: that is because the data in the archives is classified by either provinces or Autonomous Communities, and historians have usually worked within the context of these political communities. Hence, in practice, I am working with five different cross-sectional datasets: one dataset for each region (Catalonia, Valencia, Aragon and Malaga), and one dataset pooling all municipalities in these regions. Details on the variables in each dataset, as well as on their coding, are provided in the subsequent pages. I first estimate the econometric models (4.1-4.4) with the different sub-samples of regions, which I have organized by control zones (Republican or Nationalist) ——subsections a and b; I then estimate the models with the totality of municipalities —subsection c.

a. Republican Zone

Catalonia

In Table 4.1, we can see the description of the dependent variables and independent variables that will be used in the estimations with the 1,062 municipalities of Catalonia, as well as their sources.

Table 4.1. Description of Variables (Catalonia Dataset)

Name of the Variable	Characteristics	Data Sources
Executed Left	Total number of people executed by the left in a locality	SSV (1989)
Executed Right	Total number of people executed by the right in a locality	Solé i Sabaté (2000)
Support Left	% support for the Popular Front in the 1936 general elections	Vilanova (2005)

Competition	Index from 0 (minimum parity) to 1 (maximum parity)	Calculated from Vilanova (2005)
CNT Affiliation	% inhabitants affiliated with the CNT in a locality	CNT (1936), Cucó i Giner (1970)
UGT Affiliation	% inhabitants affiliated with the UGT in a locality	UGT (1931)
Population	Inhabitants of the municipality in 1936	*Instituto Nacional de Estadística*
Catholic center	Dummy variable, 1 if the municipality had an archbishop in 1936; 0 otherwise	*Conferencia Episcopal Española*
Frontline	Dummy variable, 1 if the municipality is in a county that shares the military frontline at any time during the war, 0 if not	SSV (2005)
Border	Dummy variable, 1 if the municipality is in a county that shares the French border, 0 if not	Coded from *Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya*
Sea	Dummy variable, 1 if the municipality is in a county with seashore, 0 if not	Coded from *Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya*
Altitude	Altitude of the municipality, in meters	Coded from *Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya*
Latitude (Frontline, Sea)	Degrees (UTM, fus 31, datum ED50)	Coded from *Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya*
Longitude (Border)	Degrees (UTM, fus 31, datum ED50)	*Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya*
Priest Executed	Dummy variable, 1 if one priest or more executed in the locality, 0 if no priest executed	Calculated from SSV (1989)

Executed Left and *Executed Right* are the dependent variables of the models; they measure the total number of victims of direct violence by the left and the right in a locality, respectively. *Support Left* indicates the percentage of support for the leftist

coalition in the Spanish general elections of 1936; this variable will be included in a set of models to test for the alternative hypothesis that non-domination leads to greater degree of violence (i.e. a monotonic effect of electoral alignments on violence) —I will come back to this later on. To the electoral results data, I will apply a basic quadratic index to generate the variable *Competition*, which measures the extent to which there was parity in electoral support for the two blocs: $1-[(\%VoteLeft36-\%VoteRight/100)]^2$. Note that this index has value 0 when one of the groups received all votes in the elections (i.e. a 100% share), and it has value 1 when both groups received 50% of the votes.[20] Following the theoretical framework, we expect this variable to exert a positive effect on the number of executions. An alternative parity index, which will be used in a set of robustness checks, is *Compabs*: $1-|(\%VoteLeft36-\%VoteRight/100)|$. This index has a greater variance than the quadratic measure of competition.[21]

The control variables in the X_i vector are either theoretically grounded in the civil war literature or connected to particular features of the SCW: the dummy variable *Catholic Center* allows us to control for the ratio of members of the clergy living in a locality, which we can expect to have a positive effect on leftist violence. As explained, members of the clergy are expected to be considered strong supporters of the right —thus, the larger they are (as a group), the higher the number of would-be targets of the left. Density of clergymen can also have a positive effect on violence by the right, as these individuals are strong supporters of this political bloc, and therefore likely committed to the elimination of enemies (i.e. more likely to collaborate with the right-wing militias on the elimination of leftist supporters). In fact, there are several pieces of historical evidence that suggest that the priests of the localities were often involved in the prosecution of leftists in areas controlled by the Nationalists (e.g. Vila Izquierdo

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[20] See figure A4.1 for the Kernel density estimate for this variable.
[21] See figure A4.2 for the Kernel density estimate for this variable.

1984). Unfortunately, more fine-grained data on clergy presence in a locality is not available from existing sources.

CNT Affiliation and *UGT Affiliation* are measures of prewar political and social conflict in a locality. We should expect these variables to have a positive effect on violence, insofar as conflict makes identities more visible and hypothetically more intense. Also, as in the case of the priests (who were strong supporters of the right), trade unionists were strong supporters of the left, and therefore we can assume that they were more likely to denounce and perpetrate violence against neighbors of the opposite bloc. In some cases, trade union organizations were armed, so they could perpetrate violence against neighbors without a need to acquire information or without facing major constraints on the perpetration of violence (e.g. they knew who the leaders of the local right were, and/or where they lived). Conversely, in places with a greater percentage of trade union affiliation, there should be a greater ratio of (identifiable) strong supporters of the left and therefore more would-be targets of the right.[22]

The dummy variable *Frontline* should allow us to capture the uncertainty that is likely to take place in zones close to the war frontline(s), which we can expect to boost levels of violence. That is because, in these areas, control is more precarious, and the groups face greater incentives to target potential defectors.[23] I will

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[22] With regard to CNT presence in a locality, this could potentially be estimated through the change in electoral turnout between 1933 and 1936 (a greater CNT presence would correlate with a greater degree of relative abstention in 1933, and therefore a greater volatility in turnout between these two dates). I have checked for the effect of this variable on levels of violence, for Catalonia and Aragon (the only two regions for which I could collect data on electoral turnout in 1933), and this does not show as significant.

[23] Casanova (2008) explains, in the case of Teruel during the SCW, that "in those villages located in the frontline, militiamen controlled peasants that could transfer information from one side to another" (49). She mentions, for example, the case of a postman that was imprisoned (by the leftist militias) accused of transferring information to the fascists.

include this variable in models both for rightist and leftist violence. Despite there were no frontlines during most of the period in which Catalonia was under Nationalist control, this variable will allow capturing the zones that remained under higher levels of uncertainty for a longer period of time.[24] The dummy variable Sea should capture the effect of a potential escape gate on the number of assassinations taking place in a particular area: we can expect this to reduce them.[25] And the same happens with proximity to the French border (*Border*). *Altitude* is a measure for rough terrain, and it should capture the effect that knowledge of local terrain and difficulties for access can have on violence against civilians; in rough terrain locations, people can more easily hide in the mountains or forests in order to avoid being assassinated (Fearon and Laitin 2003); thus, we can expect that it will have a negative sign.[26] Finally, I also include thousands of inhabitants of the village in 1936 (*Population*) in order to control for size of the locality, which should obviously have a positive effect on number of executions.

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[24] I will however replicate the analyses on violence in t_1 by taking out all the cases of localities that were located close to the war frontline —to make sure that there is not a bias due to possible clustering of most violent events in places with higher degree of uncertainty of control– specially as far as leftist violence is concerned; the results are consistent. Also, I will run the models on violence in t_2 without including the variable Frontline —in order to avoid the inclusion of a variable with measurement problems due to the changing nature of the frontline during Francoist occupation of the territory. Again, the results do not change. Further below, I also test the interactive effect of this dummy with Competition.

[25] Exile through sea was very important at the beginning of the SCW. In Catalonia, it was even co-sponsored by the Catalan republican government (Doll-Petit 2004).

[26] Nonetheless, there are some exceptions to this prediction. For example, Gulden (2002) observes that in Guatemala massacres took place in more remote locations. This seems to be a quite odd case.

Executed Left in t_1

Table 4.2 depicts the results of the econometric models 4.1 and 4.2 for Executed Left in Catalonia.[27] Models 1 and 2 in this table include Competition as the main independent variable. Models 3 and 4 replicate Models 1 and 2, but ―instead of Competition– they include Support Left as the main independent variable. This permits us to test the competing hypothesis that support for the group in a locality implies lesser levels of direct violence. I have called this the "domination hypothesis", conveying the idea that the group kills more the less it dominates a locality. This is a hypotheses that has been present in some of the historical literature on the SCW (Gaitx 2006, Rodrigo 2008), but that has not yet been tested systematically. I believe that it relies on the somewhat "naïve" assumption that groups behave in genocidal ways, and that they kill more where they find more enemies. According to Collier (2001), a society qualifies societies as dominated (versus polarized) if the largest group contains between 45% and 90% of the overall population; I am however not applying a dichotomous measure of domination but a continuous one. At the methodological level, the inclusion of this variable permits us to check for the possibility that the results obtained with the variable Competition are not driven by the imposition of a particular functional form (i.e. non-linearity).

The estimates of M1 and M2 in table 4.2 indicate that, as hypothesized, Competition is substantively and statistically significant in explaining levels of direct violence: the greater the level of parity between political factions in a locality, the greater the number of executions by the left. Yet, the coefficient is not significant in the logit portion of the ZINB model; in other words, this variable is not relevant in explaining the occurrence of

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[27] Note that the ZINB models have two columns each, one for a logit regression estimating non-occurrence of violence, and another for a negative binomial regression estimating number of deaths in places with non-negative number of deaths.

violence. These results are coherent with the fact that, at the empirical level, there are some factors that affect the occurrence of violence and that are independent of the degree of competition in a locality: for example, in many localities on the Republican side, the priest is the only victim of leftist violence. I will empirically address this issue further below. In M3 and M4, the variable Support Left is not significant in explaining violence (not the occurrence neither the levels of this). Thus, the competing domination hypothesis can be ruled out in the light of these results.

With regard to the control variables, their estimates are quite consistent across the models. CNT Affiliation has a significant positive effect, which indicates that the presence of affiliates increases the number of assassinations. In fact, this variable cannot be included in the logit part of the ZINB model because it over-predicts violence: there are no places with positive levels of CNT affiliation that did not observe leftist violence. UGT ffiliation is also positive and significant in explaining levels of violence, as expected. With regard to the geographical variables, Frontline has a positive effect on violence; this indicates that military control factors are not superfluous in explaining violence during conventional civil wars, and it is consistent with the theoretical framework provided by Kalyvas (2006). Proximity to the French border and proximity to the sea take negative signs, indicating that —consistent with historical accounts– the possibility of fleeing reduces the degree of lethal victimization at the local level.[28]

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[28] However, forced displacement can be in fact a form of collective targeting and a way to generate of ideological cleansing (Steele 2009). The fact that exile was associated with ideological cleansing has been lent support by both testimonies and historians of the SCW (Artís-Gener 1976; Fillol 1971; Piñeiro 2002; Doll-Petit 2003; Pujol 2003; Gaitx 2006).

Table 4.2. Executed Left in Catalonia. NB and ZINB Models

	M1 NB: Number of executed	M2 ZINB: Number of executed (NB)	M2 ZINB: Non-violence (Logit)	M3 NB: Number of executed	M4 ZINB: Number of executed (NB)	M4 ZINB: Non-violence (Logit)
Competition	**1.3*** (0.337)	**1.46*** (0.375)	**1.79** (1.47)			
Support Left				0.00021 (0.0049)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.0055 (0.013)
Frontline	0.264** (0.15)	0.284** (0.14)	0.69 (0.7)	0.271 (0.152)	0.238*** (0.152)	1.44* (0.855)
Population (*1000)	0.08*** (0.12)	0.064*** (0.001)	-6.8*** (1.9)	0.08 (0.12)	0.35*** (0.04)	-0.008*** (0.002)
CNT Affiliation	0.121* (0.091)	0.079 (0.049)	0.126** (0.062)	0.05*** (0.017)		
UGT Affiliation	0.101 (0.091)	0.079 (0.049)	0.037 (0.504)	0.113 (0.092)	0.041 (0.039)	0.163 (0.59)
Border	-0.39** (0.162)	-0.388** (0.16)	-0.432 (0.522)	-0.44** (0.18)	-2.54** (0.153)	-0.478** (0.564)
Sea	-0.339** (0.14)	-0.118 (0.154)	1.45* (0.94)	-0.373** (0.14)	-0.08** (0.134)	2.52** (1.25)
Altitude in meters (*1000)	-1.2*** (0.4)	-0.75*** (0.28)	1.3 (1.02)	-1.3*** (0.39)	-0.2 (0.134)	-2.7** (0.39)
Catholic Center	2.164*** (0.82)	2.15*** (0.46)		2.22** (0.86)	0.88* (0.468)	
Constant	0.497*** (0.438)	2.153 (0.461)	-1.64 (1.282)	1.7 (0.29)	1.17*** (0.24)	-1.35 (1.17)
Lnalpha	*0.65* (0.096)	*0.411* (0.08)	*0.411* (0.08)	*0.67* (0.0944)	*0.24* (0.0835)	*0.24* (0.0835)
Alpha	*1.91* (0.18)	*1.509* (0.125)	*1.509* (0.125)	*1.955* (0.184)	*1.27* (0.106)	*1.27* (0.106)
Observations	870	583	870	870	583	870
Wald Chi2	284.06	489.9	489.9	243.14	476.77	476.77
Prob > Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

Altitude also takes a negative sign, capturing the hypothesized depressing effect of rough terrain over number of executions; this variable also takes a positive sign in the second part of the ZINB equation (model 2), indicating a lower propensity to kill in mountainous locations. Finally, Catholic center has a very strong positive effect on level of executions, indicating that the presence of large number of strong rightist supporters (i.e. religious people) leads to greater levels of leftist violence.[29]

Table 4.3 shows the marginal effects of Competition on number of executions. The displayed coefficients correspond to those in M1 and M2 in Table 4.2. Since Competition is a variable with little variance (see descriptive statistics in the Appendix), the most intuitive indicator of marginal effects is %StdX, which indicates the percent change in the value of the dependent variable for a change in one standard deviation in the value of this independent variable. According to the results of the ZINB model, as a locality gets closer to a situation of prewar political parity (by one standard deviation), its level of lethal violence increases by 25.2%; according to the results of the NB model, this increase is of 22%.

Table 4.3. Effect of Competition on Leftist Executions

	Percentage change in expected count **M1 (NB)**	Percentage change in expected count **M2 (ZINB NB)**	Factor Change in Odds **M2 (ZINB Logit)**
B	1.3***	1.47***	1.79
%X	267.6	333.4	501.3
%StdX	22	25.2	31.6

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[29] As in the case of CNT Affiliation, Catholic Center is a variable that also over-determines the occurrence of violence. It cannot be included in the logit part of the ZINB models.

Table 4.4 depicts the results of an additional model, which consists upon a variation of the ZINB models in table 4.2. On the one hand, this model includes Latitude and Longitude of the locality as geographical indicators (instead of the dummies for frontline, border and sea); on the other hand, this includes the index of competition calculated in absolute values, Compabs (in Model 2). I expect latitude to have a negative effect on violence because the greater this is, the further a locality is from the frontline, and the closer it is from the sea. I expect longitude to have a positive impact on violence, for the greater this is, the further south is a locality, and therefore the further it is from the French border.

The results in Table 4.4 table are broadly supportive of the results in Table 4.2. On the one hand, Competition remains significant after the inclusion of fine-grained geographical indicators (i.e. Latitude and Longitude), which indicates that its effect is robust to these "location" fixed effects.[30] This allows us to be confident when faced with endogeneity concerns; further below, I will perform the regressions with county fixed effects that will add evidence in this direction.

On the other hand, the results of Table 4.4 show that the significance of the variable Competition is not determined by the skewed distribution of the quadratic index, as Compabs is very much statistically and substantively significant to explain levels of violence by the left. Again, this variable does not explain the occurrence of violence.

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[30] While latitude is statistically significant in the NB part of the ZINB models in table 4.4, and it has the expected negative sign, longitude is not statistically significant, although it also takes the expected signs. The substantive interpretation of the coefficients of these variables is not straightforward, as their units are UTM degrees.

Table 4.4. Executed Left in Catalonia. Alternative ZINB Models

	Model 1 NB: Number of Executed	**Model 1 Logit: Not violence**	**Model 2 ZINB: Number of Executed**	**Model 2 Logit: Not violence**
Competition	**1.48*****	**2.37**		
	(0.362)	(1.34)		
Compabs			**0.973*****	**1.27**
			(0.28)	(0.885)
Population (*1000)	0.11***	-2.1***	0.115***	-2.1***
	(0.0002)	(0.2644)	(0.0002)	(0.2644)
CNT Affiliation	0.019***		0.0194***	
	(0.002)		(0.002)	
UGT Affiliation	0.048***	0.1	0.047***	0.1
	(0.007)	(0.112)	(0.007)	(0.111)
Lat (*1000)	-0.00015***	0.00006	-0.0015***	0.011
	(0.00005)	(0.0006)	(0.000005)	(0.00001)
Long (*1000)	-0.0007	0.088	-0.0007	0.00016
	(0.00003)	(0.0001)	(0.00003)	(0.0002)
Altitude (*1000)	-0.0008	0.45	-0.001	0.44**
	(0.00007)	(0.33)	(0.007)	(0.33)
Catholic Center	1.43***		1.44***	
	(0.044)		(0.044)	
Constant	3.68***	-8.19	4.87**	-7.24
	(2.2)	(11.7)	(2.28)	(11.6)
Lnalpha	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.37
	(0.076)	*(0.076)*	*(0.076)*	*(0.076)*
Alpha	*1.43*	*1.43*	*1.45*	*1.45*
	(0.109)	*(0.109)*	*(0.11)*	*(0.11)*
Observations	583	870	582	869
LR Chi2	513.22	513.22	509.49	509.49
Prob> Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

The fact that we cannot include CNT Affiliation in the second part of the equation in any of the ZINB regression models above (because of over-determination issues) suggests that the existence of highly committed individuals (i.e. trade union affiliates) might be driving the occurrence of baseline levels of violence. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of executions across localities distinguished by CNT militancy (if they had CNT militancy or not). We can observe that, in Catalonia, executions took place both in CNT and non-CNT locations, but that all CNT locations experienced executions. In other words, while CNT affiliation was not a necessary condition for violence in a locality, it was a sufficient one.

Figure 4.1. Executed Left by CNT Militancy

The results so far support the hypothesis that prewar political parity is a crucial variable for explaining executions. In chapter 2, I have argued that this is because competition leads both to the unveiling of a greater share of strong supporters in a locality (i.e. increased willingness to kill of groups), and to a greater degree of strategic collaboration of the civilians. However, what happens in

those cases where the unveiling of strong supporters is independent of political dynamics at the local level? That is the case when supporters can be clearly identified from the outset, and —I would add– when there is no way that they can hide their preferences or try to come across as weak supporters in front of neither their neighbors nor the armed group. This was probably the case of members of the clergy living on the Republican side: regardless of the political dynamics in their locality, they could automatically be identified as strong supporters of the right. Furthermore, their assassination was probably independent of local political dynamics because it had a symbolic value: killing the priest became a sort of a revolutionary obligation that could not easily be avoided by militiamen (even in those cases where they would spare the lives of other citizens, e.g. landowners) (Delgado 1992). All of the above has a clear-cut empirical implication: the determinants of religious violence should be different from the determinants of violence against non-religious individuals. Local level political variables such as Competition should not be explaining violence against priests, for example. If we run a logit regression on the dummy variable Priest Executed (using the same explanatory variables above; Table 4.5),[31] we can observe that, indeed, Competition does not significantly explain the execution of the priest in a locality, which is coherent with these predictions.

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[31] Figure A4.6 (in the Appendix) displays a histogram with the distribution of "number of priests executed" across the sample (not including the city of Barcelona, which is an outlier with 429 cases). The distribution concentrates around the values 0 and 1. The variable Priest Executed, which takes value 1 if the number of priests executed in a locality is greater than 0, simplifies the information in this graph.

Table 4.5. Logit on "Priest Executed"

	DV: Priest Executed
Competition	**0.489**
	(0.50)
CNT Affiliation	0.082
	(0.06)
UGT Affiliation	0.057
	(0.08)
Frontline	0.350*
	(0.19)
Border	-0.090
	(0.20)
Sea	-0.448**
	(0.20)
Altitude	-0.001***
	(0.00)
Population	0.001***
	(0.00)
Constant	-0.633
	(0.48)
Observations	862
Chi2	66.166

Standard Errors in Brackets.
Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

Executed Right in t_2

We turn now to the analysis of direct violence perpetrated by the right in t_2, in Catalonia. The dependent variable is the total number of executions that took place at the local level during and after the occupation of the territory by the Nationalist army. As explained in chapter 3, early postwar violence can be conceptualized (in the case of the SCW) as wartime violence perpetrated by a group having full control of a territory. Figure A4.7 in the Appendix shows the correlation of leftist (in t_1) and

rightist violence (in t_2), for the 24 counties of Catalonia. We can observe a very strong linear correspondence between these values, with only few outliers.[32] This is consistent with hypothesis 2.2.

Table 4.6 shows the results of the econometric models 4.3 (1 and 2), which constitute a more robust test of this hypothesis.

The results in Table 4.6 are supportive of hypothesis 2.2: leftist executions (in M2) have a positive and significant effect on rightist executions. In both M1 and M2, Competition also has a positive effect on rightist executions, supporting the hypothesis that prewar political dynamics are still significant in non-initial phases of the war. This variable does not lose statistical significance when we introduce leftist executions into the regression, although its coefficient shrinks slightly. CNT Affiliation is not significant in these regressions. UGT Affiliation takes a negative sign in M2, which is contrary to our expectations. As before, proximity to the border also implies lesser killings, which indicates that the possibility of fleeing to France reduced the levels of rightist violence.[33] As predicted, Altitude also implies lesser assassinations. Proximity to the war frontline and to the sea did not have an effect on level of killings by the right: the former is consistent with the short time period in which the frontline existed, in this second phase of the civil war. The latter is consistent with the lesser possibilities of fleeing by sea that existed under Nationalist rule, as compared to the period of Republican rule (Dòll-Petit 2004).

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[32] Those counties of Catalonia where the left victimized much more than the right correspond with counties in the war frontline (e.g. *Terra Alta*). There are only three counties where the right perpetrated much greater levels of violence than the right (*Concà de Barberà, Segarra* and *La Garrotxa*); I do not have a clear explanation for these outliers.

[33] The bibliographic (e.g. Clara 1991) and qualitative evidence (see chapter 6) is very supportive of this finding.

Table 4.6. Executed Right in Catalonia. NB Models

	M1 Number of Executed	M2 Number of Executed
Competition	**2.02*** (0.42)	**1.62*** (0.41)
Executed Left		**0.034*** (0.093)
Frontline	0.06 (0.15)	-0.074 (0.13)
Population (*1000)	0.07 (0.1)	-0.08 (0.009)
CNT Affiliation	0.084 (0.055)	0.102 (0.092)
UGT Affiliation	0.016 (0.08)	-0.042* (0.023)
Border	-0.56*** (0.17)	-0.49*** (0.17)
Sea	-0.031 (0.16)	0.088 (0.16)
Rough Terrain (*1000)	-0.86*** (0.33)	-0.87*** (0.31)
Constant	-0.844** (0.42)	-0.59 (0.42)
LnAlpha	*0.81* *(0.102)*	*0.69* *(0.08)*
Alpha	*2.24* *(0.23)*	*2.01* *(0.16)*
Observations	870	870
Wald Chi2	141.98	132.88
Prob>Chi2	0.0000	0.0000

Robust Standard Errors in Brackets.
Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

Table 4.7 depicts the results for the econometric models 4.4 (1 and 2) on rightist executions in Catalonia.

Table 4.7. Executed Right in Catalonia. ZINB Models

	M1 NB: Number of executed	M1 Logit: Non-violence	M2 NB: Number of executed	M2 Logit: Non-violence
Competition	**1.47***	**-0.17**	**1.01****	**-0.29**
	(0.47)	(0.85)	(0.435)	(0.811)
Executed Left	----------	---------	**0.018***	**-0.67***
			(0.04)	(0.13)
Frontline	0.03	0.22	-0.15	0.114
	(0.14)	(0.35)	(0.13)	(0.37)
Population (*1000)	0.03***	-4.9***	-0.05***	-3.8***
	(0.001)	(0.79)	(0.002)	(0.611)
CNT Affiliation	0.064***	-4.07	0.079***	0.024
	(0.017)	(46.26)	(0.014)	(0.047)
UGT Affiliation	0.01	-12.05	-0.0264	0.235
	(0.047)	(54019.5)	(0.041)	(0.15)
Border	-0.52***	-0.226	-0.49***	-0.26
	(0.164)	(0.357)	(0.15)	(0.34)
Sea	-0.014	-0.47	0.033	-0.71**
	(0.142)	(0.367)	(0.13)	(0.33)
Altitude (*1000)	-0.44**	-0.22	-0.56**	0.65
	(0.28)	(0.53)	(0.13)	(0.53)
Constant	0.023	2.37***	0.49	2.93***
	(0.46)	(0.882)	(0.42)	(0.841)
LnAlpha	*0.09*		*-0.18*	
	(0.097)		*(0.09)*	
Alpha	*1.09*		*0.833*	
	(0.106)		*(0.081)*	
Observations	*455*	*870*	*455*	*870*
LR Chi2	211.22	211.22	273.4	273.4
Prob>Chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Robust Standard Errors in Brackets.
Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

The results in Table 4.7 are fairly consistent with the previous ones (Table 4.6), with only few diverging results. As before, M2 indicates that the revenge mechanism is important in order to account for levels of violence in t_2: indeed, the greater the violence by the left in a locality in one period, the greater the violence by the right during the subsequent period. This table provides us with some further interesting evidence: the revenge mechanism seems to be explaining the *occurrence* of violence. To be sure, the greater the level of (leftist) violence (in t_1), the larger the probability of (rightist) violence in (t_2). This is relevant as it indicates that, contrary to the "rivalry" mechanism, the "revenge mechanism" is operating both for explaining *occurrence* and *levels* of violence in a locality.

In M2, we can see that proximity to the sea increases the likelihood of violence; this may again reflect the limited possibilities of fleeing by sea during the period of Francoist control; indeed, in maritime locations, would-be targets could have found themselves in a *cul-de-sac*. Finally, in Table 4.7 we observe that CNT Affiliation has a positive effect on rightist executions, as we expected (this variable was not significant in the NB model in Table 4.6). CNT affiliates were strong supporters of the enemy, would-be targets of the Francoists, and easily identifiable by the neighbors due to their actions during the previous stage of the war (e.g. burning of churches, collectivization campaigns, and similar). Despite many of them fled the country before the Nationalist army entered their locations, and they could not found, violence would take place because relatives of the *cenetistas* would be targeted (for retaliation purposes). Chapter 6 deals more extensively with this issue.

In order to better illustrate the effects of the key independent variables in this econometric model (i.e. Competition and Executed Left) on the dependent variable (Executed Right), Table 4.8 summarizes the marginal effects of M2 in Table 4.7.

Table 4.8. Effects of Competition and Executed Left on Executed Right

	Percentage change in expected count **Competition**	Percentage change in expected count **Executed Left**	Factor change in odds **Competition**	Factor change in odds **Executed Left**
B	1.01**	0.018***	-0.29	-0.67***
%X	174.9	1.9	-25.6	-49
%StdX	16.7	354.6	-4.4	-100

Table 4.8 illustrates that Executed Left in t_1 is statistically and substantively more relevant than Competition for explaining both the occurrence and the level of rightist executions in t_2. On the one hand, while one standard deviation change on leftist executions generates a change of -100% on the probability of non-violence, competition is not significant to explain non-violence. On the other hand, a standard deviation change in leftist executions generates a change of 354.6% on the expected count of rightist executions, while a standard deviation change in competition generates a much smaller change (of 16.7%) on this expected count.

If we compare the marginal effects of Competition on Executed Left (i.e. table 4.3) and on Executed Right (i.e. table 4.8), we can see that they are smaller in the latter case. The marginal effects of a standard deviation change in this variable drop from 25.2% (for leftist executions) to 16.7% (for rightist executions). Hence, as predicted, as the war develops, wartime variables (i.e. previous violence) gain relative explanatory power at the expense of political variables such as prewar political competition.

With respect to the models in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, it could be argued that the effect of Competition and Executed Left are endogenous, and that including both of them in the same regression does not solve this problem (Achen 2005). In an

attempt to illustrate the effect of executions in t_1 on executions in t_2 —independent of political competition–, I proceed at doing a very specific comparison of means test. I identify a subset of localities that are highly similar in terms of prewar levels of political competition (i.e. they had high levels of competition) and I partition them into two groups: one that experienced *high* levels of leftist violence during the first period of the war, and one that experienced *low* levels of leftist violence during the same period. I then compare the mean level of rightist executions during the second period of the war for each of these two sub-samples of municipalities. Table 4.9 shows the results of this test: Sample 1 includes localities with high levels of political competition in the prewar period[34] and experienced no violence or very low levels of leftist executions;[35] Sample 2 includes localities that also had high levels of competition in the prewar period[36] but that experienced high levels of leftist executions.[37] I calculate the difference in the mean number of executions by the right (during period t_2) for each of these sub-samples, and I check if the difference in means is statistically significant.

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[34] It includes those that have a competition index equal or greater than 0.987004, which is the value of the third quartile of this variable.

[35] It includes those with no deaths or with one death.

[36] Again, this includes localities with a competition index equal or greater than 0.987004.

[37] I code as such localities that had equal or more than 4 deaths by the left, which is the third quartile of the distribution of this variable.

Table 4.9. Comparison of Means Test for Sub-Samples of Highly Competitive Municipalities with Different Levels of Leftist Violence

	Sample 1 Low Leftist Violence	Sample 2 High Leftist Violence	Combined	Sample 2- Sample 1
Mean of Executed Right	0.5 (0.088)	6.6 (0.69)	2.7 (0.32)	6.08*** (0.533)
Observations	143	81	224	

Standard Errors in Brackets.
Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

The results of this test indicate that violence by the left in t_1 is a key factor in explaining violence by the right in t_2: localities that were highly competitive and experienced high levels of violence in t_1 present a much greater average in the number of rightist executions in t_2 —as compared to places that were also highly competitive but that experienced very low levels of leftist violence or no violence at all in t_1. The difference in the means of the two sub-samples is statistically significant at the 1% level.

In order to increase the robustness of this finding, I proceed with similar calculations for sub-samples of places that in the prewar period had low levels of political competition (Table 4.10).[38]

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[38] I coded as such those that had a Polarization index under 0.8, which is the value of the first quartile of this variable.

Table 4.10. Comparison of Means Test for Sub-Samples of Low Competitive Municipalities with Different Levels of Leftist Violence

	Sample 1	Sample 2		
	Low Leftist Violence	**High Leftist Violence**	**Combined**	**Sample 2- Sample 1**
Mean of Executed Right	0.39	5.22	1.28	4.83***
	(0.09)	(1.03)	(0.25)	(0.52)
Observations	136	31	167	

Standard Errors in Brackets.
Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

Again, the results of Table 4.10 indicate that ―independently of prewar political competition– the number of deaths in the first period had a strong impact on the number of executions in the second period. Among the subset of localities considered in Table 4.10 (those that had low levels of political competition before the civil war), direct violence (by the right) in t_2 was significantly higher in places where the left perpetrated high levels of violence in t_1 than in places where the left perpetrated low levels of violence in t_1.

Furthermore, in order to make sure that there are no interactive effects between competition and victimization, I have performed interactive hypotheses tests (Franzese and Kam 2007), which do not provide significant results. The results of this test are available upon request.

Robustness Checks

By and large, the results obtained with the data from Catalonia are consistent with the theoretical hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2. In the Appendix (IV), I present a graphic assessment of fit of the ZINB models to the actual executions in Catalonia (for both leftist and rightist executions). The models seem to fit well the data except for urban locations, where they over-predict killings. This is indicative that the theoretical model may apply better in smaller

locations –where interpersonal relations are tighter and civilian collaboration may be more crucial for the perpetration of violence. This intuition is confirmed with a test on the interactive effects of competition and size of the locality (i.e. population), which shows that competition loses explanatory power as the population of a municipality increases.[39]

Also for the sake of robustness, I check if the results for violence in t_1 are robust when introducing county dummies in the regressions.[40] I believe that this is quite a suitable way to control for a potential omitted variable bias (Clarke 2005);[41] in Spain — and quite particularly in Catalonia– counties are an economically significant administrative unit; therefore, all localities in a county tend to share economic characteristics that could potentially be having an impact on their levels of prewar competition (or other aspects of the political configuration of localities), as well as on violence in t_1. By including county dummies in the regressions, I will be explaining the determinants of variation in violence within these economic units, and therefore controlling for the effect of these potential omitted variables.[42]

If I introduce 37 dummies (all but one county dummy) in the ZINB regression for leftist violence (Table 4.11), the coefficient

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[39] The results of these interactions are not included here, but they are available upon request.

[40] I only present here the results for Catalonia, although I have also run these robustness tests for all the other regions, as well as for the analyses with the global dataset (these results are also available upon request).

[41] As explained, methodological concerns are raised by the fact that an omitted variable could be explaining both prewar distribution of power (i.e. competition) and violence. While at the qualitative level, we have evidence showing that prewar conflict is not explanatory of violence, and that many localities with "peaceful" cohabitation before the war were affected by violence (Linz 1996: 407), we still need to make sure that the econometric results are not influenced by this potential bias.

[42] This type of strategy has been used by other scholars dealing with similar issues (e.g. Chacón *et al.* 2006).

for Competition remains statistically significant (at the 1% level) to explain number of executions perpetrated by the left. The coefficients of the control variables remain robust, not changing significantly their sign or size. In sum, the results in Table 4.11 show that the results above are robust to a county fixed effects specification.

I tried to run a similar regression with county fixed effects for rightist violence, but this could not be optimized. Yet, the omitted variable bias problem is less relevant in this case, for violence in t_1 is included in the vector of covariates. This variable —although it cannot be considered an "instrument"– is likely to be capturing any omitted effect on both violence in t_1 and Competition.

*Table 4.11. Executed Left in Catalonia. ZINB Models
with County Fixed Effects*

	NB: Number of executed
Competition	1.334***
	(0.163)
CNT Affiliation	0.017***
	(0.002)
UGT Affiliation	0.029***
	(0.009)
Frontline	1.448***
	(0.382)
Border	-0.148
	(0.362)
Sea	-0.968**
	(0.392)
Altitude (meters)	-0.002***
	(0.0001)
Population*1000	0.122***
	(0.0029)
Catholic Center	1.929***
	(0.07)
Constant	0.726*
	(0.403)
INFLATE	**Logit: Non-violence**
Competition	0.642
	(0.653)
UGT Affiliation	0.102
	(0.126)
Frontline	1.499
	(1.09)
Border	22.700
	(28587.3)
Sea	0.766
	(39836)
Altitude	0.000
	(0.00065)
Population	-0.2***
	(0.325)
Constant	-23.095
	(28587)

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01
6 dummies dropped due to outcomes being perfectly predicted.
29 temporal dummy variables in specification not shown.

Valencia

Valencia, like Catalonia, constituted rearguard territory during almost the totality of the civil war. It was controlled by the Loyalists, first, and by the Nationalists, later.[43] Since electoral data is unavailable for the province of Castellon, I focus here only on the provinces of Valencia and Alicante (a total of 406 municipalities). Following the example of Catalonia, I estimate econometric models 4.1-4.4 with municipal data of these two provinces in order to test the hypotheses on the determinants of violence. The description of the variables in the models and their respective sources can be seen in Table 4.12.

As in the previous analyses a set of control variables are included in the regression models: Population, CNT Affiliation, UGT Affiliation, Latitude, Longitude and Rough Terrain (measured here in thousand feet —due to data availability reasons). As in Table 4.4 for Catalonia, I use here Latitude and Longitude instead of the dummies for Frontline, Sea and Border; these are more refined geographic measures.[44]

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[43] Valencia was under a Republican control for a longer period of time, as compared to Catalonia. Together with the provinces of *Albacete, Almería, Ciudad Real, Cuenca, Jaén and Murcia*, and the areas of Granada, Cordoba, Badajoz, Toledo, Madrid and Guadalajara that still remained under Loyalist control, it was conquered by the Nationalists in the so-called "offensive for the victory" that started in March 1939.

[44] Latitude of the locality serves as a proxy for both Sea and Frontline: since the frontline was to the West of all these territories, and the sea was to the East, we can expect the greater the latitude, the smaller the level of violence. With regard to longitude we expect it to have a positive impact on levels of violence, as a bigger longitude implies a greater distance from the French border.

Table 4.12. Description of Variables (Valencia Dataset)

Name of the Variable	Characteristics	Data Sources
Executed Left	Total number of people executed by the left in a locality	Gabarda (1996)
Executed Right	Total number of people executed by the right in a locality	Gabarda (1993)
Support Left	% support for the Popular Front in the 1936 general elections	*BOP Alicante 1936, BOP Valencia, 1936, BOP Valencia 1937-1937*
Competition	Index from 0 (minimum parity) to 1 (maximum parity)	Calculated from BOP sources
CNT Affiliation	% inhabitants affiliated with the CNT in a locality	CNT (1936), Cucó i Giner (1970)
UGT Affiliation	% inhabitants affiliated with the UGT in a locality	UGT (1931)
Population	Inhabitants of the municipality in 1936	*Instituto Nacional de Estadística*
Catholic Center	Dummy variable, 1 if the municipality had an archbishop in 1936; 0 otherwise	*Conferencia Episcopal Española*
Altitude (Feet)	Altitude of the municipality, in feet	Global Ganzeeter Version 2.1
Latitude (Frontline, Sea)	Degrees	Global Ganzeeter Version 2.1
Longitude (Border)	Degrees	Global Ganzeeter Version 2.1

Executed Left in t_1

The results of the econometric models 4.1 and 4.2 (for violence in Valencia in t_1) are depicted in Table 4.13.[45]

Table 4.13. Executed Left in Valencia. NB and ZINB Models

	M1 NB: Number of executed	M2 (ZINB) NB: Number of executed	M3 NB: Number of executed	M4 (ZINB) NB: Number of executed
Competition	**-0.204**	**0.089**		
	(0.59)	(0.49)		
Population	0.000*	0.000***	0.000*	0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
CNT Affiliation	0.071*	0.052	0.067	0.047
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
UGT Affiliation	0.037	0.052	0.034	0.040
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Latitude	0.062	-0.023	0.086	0.022
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Longitude	-0.474	0.151	-0.419	0.244
	(0.54)	(0.41)	(0.51)	(0.42)
Altitude	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Catholic Center	-7.559	-3.311*	-7.406	-3.766**
	(5.06)	(1.83)	(4.71)	(1.79)
Support Left			**0.003**	**0.009**
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-1.132	2.649	-2.390	0.593
	(7.81)	(8.09)	(8.45)	(7.91)
LnAlpha	*1.214****	*0.720****	*1.214****	*0.717****
	(0.15)	*(0.13)*	*(0.15)*	*(0.14)*

[45] As in the case of Catalonia, CNT Affiliation cannot be introduced in the second part of the ZINB regression models because this variable overpredicts the occurrence of violence.

INFLATE	Logit: Non-violence		Logit: Non-violence
Competition	1.917*		
	(1.15)		
Population	-0.003***		-0.003**
	(0.00)		(0.00)
UGT Affiliation	0.048		0.037
	(0.16)		(0.17)
Latitude	-0.353		-0.225
	(0.44)		(0.46)
Longitude	2.970**		3.252**
	(1.24)		(1.35)
Altitude	0.001**		0.001*
	(0.00)		(0.00)
Support Left			0.047**
			(0.02)
Constant	15.027		9.854
	(17.30)		(18.18)
Observations	280	280	280	280
Chi2	39.871	84.374	39.804	86.373
Aic	1424.766	1378.936	1424.677	1372.178

Standard Errors in Brackets.
Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

The results in Table 4.13 are slightly inconsistent with those obtained for Catalonia. First, Competition is in this case not significant in explaining direct violence by the left; second, Catholic Center takes a negative sign, which is counterintuitive and contrary to what we observed above; third, in M2, Competition has a positive effect to explain non-occurrence of violence, which is also contrary to that observed in Catalonia, and contrary to my hypotheses; fourth, in M4, Support Left has a positive effect to explain non-occurrence of violence, which is contradictory with M2 and also inconsistent with my theoretical priors. The inconsistencies of this set of models convey that there may be some issues with the data, which may be encompassing

measurement error biasing the results. My major concerns have to do with the electoral data, which in this case has been collected from primary sources. While I have done my best to aggregate the electoral results according to the established rules in the discipline of history (see Appendix III), it could be that there are errors. Also, as I explained above, it could be that in Valencia the electoral results are not reflective of the social composition of the localities, due to the extended practice of *Caciquismo*. In other words, it could be that electoral returns are not a good proxy for the social distribution of the locality.

Executed Right in t_2

The results of the econometric models 4.3 and 4.4 (that is, for violence in t2), with data from Valencia, are depicted in Table 4.14 (NB models) and 4.15 (ZINB models).

Table 4.14. Executed Right in Valencia. NB Models

	M1 **NB: Number of** **executed**	**M2** **NB: Number of** **executed**
Competition	**-0.286** (0.47)	**-0.208** (0.46)
CNT Affiliation	0.028 (0.05)	0.017 (0.05)
UGT Affiliation	0.064* (0.04)	0.067** (0.03)
Population	0.000* (0.00)	0.000* (0.00)
Catholic Center	-14.343* (7.82)	-13.155* (7.35)
Latitude	0.188 (0.17)	0.199 (0.16)
Longitude	0.040 (0.41)	0.035 (0.41)
Altitude	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Executed Left		**0.013** (0.01)
Constant	-6.284 (6.89)	-6.829 (6.58)
LnAlpha	*1.240**** *(0.18)*	*1.229**** *(0.19)*
Observations	280	280
Chi2	30.743	29.489
Aic	1428.649	1428.278

Robust Standard Errors in Brackets.
Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** 01

Table 4.15. Executed Right in Valencia. ZINB Models

	M1 NB: Number of executed	M2 NB: Number of executed
Competition	**-0.091**	**0.087**
	(0.46)	(0.45)
CNT Affiliation	0.076**	0.061*
	(0.04)	(0.03)
UGT Affiliation	0.053*	0.048
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Population	0.000***	0.000**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Catholic Center	-3.952**	-3.847**
	(1.64)	(1.77)
Latitude	-0.170	-0.153
	(0.17)	(0.17)
Longitude	0.678**	0.636*
	(0.34)	(0.33)
Altitude	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Executed Left		**0.002**
		(0.01)
Constant	9.207	8.324
	(6.65)	(6.65)
INFLATE	Logit:Non-violence	Logit:Non-violence
Competition	**1.162**	**0.719**
	(0.91)	(1.21)
UGT Affiliation	-0.426	-0.587
	(0.35)	(0.36)
Population	-0.002***	-0.001***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Latitude	-0.976***	-1.284***
	(0.37)	(0.44)
Longitude	1.695**	1.454*
	(0.86)	(0.87)
Altitude	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)

Executed Left		-0.971***
		(0.27)
Constant	40.358***	52.953***
	(14.86)	(17.64)
LnAlpha	*0.218*	*0.237**
	(0.15)	*(0.13)*
Observations	280	280
Chi2	65.172	63.961
Aic	1337.829	1312.669

Standard Errors in Brackets.
Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

Regarding our hypotheses, the results of Tables 4.14 and 4.15 are not much better than those in Table 4.13: most of the variables display insignificant regression estimates. Yet, consistent with the results for Catalonia —and consistent with hypothesis 2.2– executed left in t_1 has a positive effect on the perpetration of violence by the right in t_2. This is significant in the logit part of the ZINB model, thus explaining the *occurrence* but not the *level* of executions.

To sum up, the results for Valencia are not supportive of my first hypothesis: political competition, while having a positive sign, is not statistically significant in explaining violence by either of the two armed groups. The results are partially supportive of the second hypothesis, as leftist violence during t_1 has a positive effect on the occurrence of rightist violence in t_2. As opposed to Catalonia, this has no effect on levels of rightist violence, though. The internal inconsistency in the results of some of the models estimated with data from this region (particularly in the ZINB models in Table 4.13) suggests that there are likely measurement error issues in these data.

Republican Aragon

In Aragon, a total of 366 municipalities were under Francoist control during the totality of the conflict; I code them as Nationalist. The rest of municipalities in the region (a total of 582) were under leftist control at some point during the war; I code them as Republican. The distribution of municipalities by control zones (and provinces) of this region is as shown in Table A4.1 of the Appendix. In Table 4.16, I present the description of the variables that will be used in the analyses with municipalities of this region.

Table 4.16. Description of Variables (Aragon Dataset)

Name of the Variable	Characteristics	Data Sources
Executed Right	Total number of people executed by the right in a locality	Casanova *et al* (2001)
Competition	Index from 0 (minimum parity) to 1 (maximum parity)	Calculated from Casanova *et al* (2001)
Support Left	% support for the Popular Front in the 1936 general elections	Calculated from Germán (1982)
CNT Affiliation	% inhabitants affiliated with the CNT in a locality	CNT (1936), Cucó i Giner (1970)
UGT Affiliation	% inhabitants affiliated with the UGT in a locality	UGT (1931)
Population	Inhabitants of the municipality in 1936	*Instituto Nacional de Estadística*
Catholic center	Dummy variable, 1 if the municipality had an archbishop in 1936; 0 otherwise	*Conferencia Episcopal Española*
Latitude (Frontline, Sea)	Latitude degrees	Global Gazetteer 2.1
Longitude (Border)	Longitude degrees	Global Gazetteer 2.1
Altitude	Altitude of the municipality, in feet	Global Gazetteer 2.1
Previous Violence	1 if violent events in the prewar period, 0 if not	Calculated from Casanova (1985)

In addition to the usual correlates, in the analyses for Aragon I also include Previous Violence, an indicator for which I have obtained data only in this region, and which allows us to control for political conflict in the prewar period (a period that could be labeled t_0). Following the argument in my theoretical model, this should have an incidence on victimization in t_1, as priors on the existence of strong supporters should be greater in places with prewar incidents of political violence. Also, dynamics of retaliation could be driving denunciations and enhance strategic local civilian collaboration in those locations with a history of political violence.[46]

What I refer to as Republican Aragon encompasses locations that were either partially or fully controlled by the left during the civil war; yet, in some cases, these municipalities were conquered several times by the different groups. The patterns of direct violence against civilians that took place in this region cannot really be explained from my theoretical framework because military competition between the armed groups was very strong, and civilian victimization was usually a consequence of this military struggle. Indeed, none of the groups had full control of the territory during a sufficient period of time for it to be considered "rear territory". In this "battlefield zone", I would predict violence to follow similar patterns to those observed for irregular civil wars; in other words, violence should mostly be explained as the result of tactical maneuvers and the relative control of the territory by the armed groups (following Kalyvas 2006).[47] In a nutshell, I

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[46] Linz (1999) suggested a relationship between political and social violent events previous to the onset of the war and wartime violence, at the regional level. However, he never empirically tested this hypothesis.

[47] A regional historian argues that the violence taking place in the battlefield areas of Extremadura was directly related to the degree of military control of the territory by the groups (Chaves 1995: 20-21). Yet, he challenges Kalyvas's predictions for he argues that violence was greater in places where military control was poorer (and not where it was more contested).

expect the estimation of the econometric models 4.1-4.4 with data on these municipalities to convey non-results.

Table 4.17 depicts the results of econometric model 4.1 for Republican Aragon.[48] The assumption here is that violence in this area was only perpetrated by the left in t_1 (this assumption can be however challenged; see below). This table provides some interesting results: as expected, Competition is not significant in explaining violence. Support left is significant, and it takes a negative sign, backing the domination hypothesis. Yet, when including a quadratic value for Support Left in the regression, in order to check for non-linearity, Support Left loses significance (the quadratic value of Support Left takes a statistically significant sign, its value is 0). Thus, regarding to the role of local level political factors on levels of violence, the results in this territory are mixed, although they basically provide with non-results that are coherent with my theoretical framework. Again, I do not expect my logic to apply to violence in battlefield areas.

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[48] I only include here the results of the NB models (econometric model 4.1) because there were some optimization problems in the estimation of the ZINB for M3. The remaining models did not generated diverging results —as compared to those generated by the NB.

Table 4.17. Leftist Executions in "Republican" Aragon. NB Models

	M1	**M2**	**M3**	**M4**	**M5**
Competition	**-0.413**	**-0.423**			
	(0.29)	(0.29)			
Population	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
CNT Affiliation	0.021*	0.022*	0.026**	0.026**	0.025**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
UGT Affiliation	-0.088	-0.090	-0.036	-0.037	0.042
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Latitude	-0.179	-0.176	-0.180	-0.176	-0.183
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Longitude	0.378**	0.371**	0.416**	0.408**	0.368**
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Altitude	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Catholic Center	-1.668*	-1.695**	-1.697**	-1.730**	-1.668**
	(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.85)	(0.85)	(0.84)
Previous Violence		-0.140		-0.183	
		(0.35)		(0.35)	
Support Left			**-0.016***	**-0.016***	**0.017**
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Support Left2					**-0.000**
					(0.00)
Constant	8.932	8.807	9.156	9.009	8.869
	(5.79)	(5.81)	(5.68)	(5.70)	(5.75)
LnAlpha	*0.267*	*0.266*	*0.233*	*0.233*	*0.209*
	(0.10)	*(0.10)*	*(0.10)*	*(0.10)*	*(0.10)*
N	395	395	395	395	395
Chi2	138.633	138.554	180.567	180.990	161.022
Aic	2142.030	2143.886	2132.331	2134.080	2128.024

Robust Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

Table 4.18 depicts the estimates of econometric models 4.2 (NB) on rightist violence, in this same region (i.e.Republican Aragon). As before, Competition is not a significant explanatory variable; yet, in M2, Executed Left does show to be statistically significant and positive to explain Executed Right. While this may be indicative that retaliation was driving levels of violence, a major concern is that in this region Nationalist violence took sometimes place earlier in time than leftist violence (e.g. Ledesma 2003, Casanova 2007, Azpíroz 2008). In other words, some of the executions by the Nationalists cannot be explained by retaliation dynamics, but rather the opposite: they may be explanatory of some of the executions carried out by the left. The unavailability of time-series data on violence in these localities does not allow us to explore this in further detail. Thus, I leave these results in "stand-by", hoping that further data collection will allow me to refine them.

Table 4.18. Executed Right in Republican Aragon. NB Models

	M1	M2
Competition	**0.231**	**0.210**
	(0.46)	(0.49)
Population	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
CNT Affiliation	0.031	0.060
	(0.05)	(0.05)
UGT Affiliation	0.121***	0.140***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Latitude	-0.006	0.114
	(0.23)	(0.23)
Longitude	-1.300***	-1.494***
	(0.33)	(0.34)
Altitude	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Catholic Center	-1.235	-4.977***
	(1.05)	(1.55)
Prewar Conflict	-0.143	0.105
	(0.42)	(0.39)
Executed Left		**0.029***
		(0.01)
Constant	-0.582	-5.780
	(9.78)	(9.87)
LnAlpha	*1.119****	*1.063****
	(0.13)	*(0.14)*
Observations	395	395
Chi2	165.290	244.928
Aic	1395.916	1387.651

Robust Standard Errors in Brackets.
Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

Overall, the non-results from this region are supportive of the hypothesis that the determinants of violence in battlefield areas are likely to be different than those in rearguard territories. In the former, these are potentially more associated with military control factors, which are similar to irregular conflicts, and not to local political dynamics. I will come back to this discussion in light of the spatial regression analyses in the fourth section of this chapter.

b. Nationalist Zone

In this section, I focus on the subset of localities of Aragon that I have coded as Nationalist. I test the econometric models 4.1 and 4.2 (for violence in t_1) with data on violence perpetrated by the Nationalist army and rightist militias. The vector of control variables is thus the same as that in the analyses of Catalonia and Valencia, namely including Population, CNT Affiliation, UGT Affiliation, Rough Terrain (i.e. Altitude, in feet), Catholic Center, Frontline, and Border. As in Tables 4.17 and 4.18, I also include Previous Violence.

In these regressions I again use latitude of the municipality to capture proximity to the frontline (though, in contrast to Valencia —since the frontline was to the East of all these territories– the greater the latitude, the greater the proximity to the frontline). Similarly, for a more refined measure of proximity to the French border, I use the longitude of the municipality. The results of the coefficients in the NB and ZINB regressions are summarized in tables 4.19 and 4.20, respectively.[49]

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[49] Note that the variables Previous Violence and Catholic Center cannot be introduced into the second part of the ZINB model due to over-determination issues.

Table 4.19. Executed Right in Nationalist Aragon. NB Models

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Competition	**1.694*****	**1.624*****			
	(0.48)	(0.47)			
Population	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
CNT Affiliation	0.016	-0.053	0.003	-0.071	0.024
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)
UGT Affiliation	0.116**	0.092***	0.093***	0.077***	0.126**
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Latitude	-0.554*	-0.647*	-0.419	-0.496	-0.566*
	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.30)
Longitude	0.522	0.461	0.443	0.351	0.528
	(0.41)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.41)
Altitude (Feet)	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Catholic Center	2.911***	2.325***	2.928***	2.347***	2.921***
	(1.10)	(0.83)	(1.10)	(0.85)	(1.12)
Previous Violence		1.287**		1.334**	
		(0.51)		(0.64)	
Supp Left			**0.023*****	**0.022*****	**0.074*****
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
SuppLeft2					**-0.001****
					(0.00)
Constant	25.720**	29.626**	20.495	23.688	26.192**
	(12.86)	(14.09)	(13.75)	(15.34)	(12.78)
LnAlpha	*0.739****	*0.665****	*0.774****	*0.699****	*0.738****
	(0.13)	*(0.13)*	*(0.14)*	*(0.14)*	*(0.13)*
Observations	251	251	251	251	251
Chi2	140.058	176.454	125.699	167.692	140.883

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

The results of the NB model show that Competition has a positive effect on direct violence, as predicted. Also, as expected, proximity to the French border has a positive effect on violence, and rough terrain has a negative effect, showing that municipalities located in higher locations were, on average, less victimized.

The results from the ZINB regressions (Table 4.20) are similar to those in Table 4.19, and they indicate that competition at the local level is relevant in explaining direct violence by the right (in t_1). As for leftist violence, Competition is relevant in explaining levels, but not the occurrence of violence. Also, the results of M2 and M4 indicate that political violence in the period previous to the civil war has a positive effect on levels of wartime violence.[50] Importantly, though, the significance of this variable does not eliminate the relevance of political competition in explaining violence.

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[50] The high standard errors of this variable in the logit piece of the regression indicate that Previous Violence might be overestimating the *occurrence* of executions.

Table 4.20. Executed Right in Nationalist Aragon. ZINB Models

	M1 NB: Number of executed	**M2** NB: Number of executed	**M4** NB: Number of executed	**M5** NB: Number of executed
Competition	**1.360*****	**1.150*****		
	(0.43)	(0.42)		
Population	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
CNT Affiliation	0.034	-0.038	-0.07	0.013
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
UGT Affiliation	0.086**	0.072*	0.052	0.067
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Catholic Center	2.021***	1.661**	1.602**	1.991***
	(0.76)	(0.73)	(0.72)	(0.76)
Latitude	-0.072	-0.182	-0.125	-0.002
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Longitude	0.952***	0.797**	0.804**	0.912***
	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Altitude (Feet)	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Previous Violence		1.055***	1.105***	
		(0.33)	(0.33)	
Support Left			**0.022*****	**0.031**
			(0.01)	(0.02)
SuppLeft2				**-0.000**
				(0.00)
Constant	6.289	10.824	8.644	3.528
	(12.15)	(11.86)	(11.47)	(11.98)
INFLATE	**Logit:** Non-violence	**Logit:** Non-violence	**Logit:** Non-violence	**Logit:** Non-violence
Competition	**-1.328**	**-1.455**		
	(1.04)	(0.95)		
Population	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
CNT Affiliation	-0.131	-0.102	-0.145	-0.112
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.17)

Latitude	0.789	0.766	0.507	1.109
	(0.65)	(0.61)	(0.56)	(0.67)
Longitude	2.095	1.73	1.864*	1.501
	(1.32)	(1.11)	(1.02)	(1.08)
Altitude (Feet)	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Previous Violence		-20.087	-20.647	
		(17577.44)	(24311.76)	
Support Left			**0.000**	**-0.119****
			(0.02)	(0.05)
SuppLeft2				**0.002****
				(0.00)
Constant	-31.674	-30.704	-20.685	-45.379
	(28.40)	(28.10)	(25.44)	(29.13)
LnAlpha	*0.238*	*0.109*	*0.099*	*0.225*
	(0.15)	*(0.15)*	*(0.16)*	*(0.15)*
Observations	251	251	251	251
Chi2	207.368	218.971	220.759	210.119

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

Overall the results from the Nationalist area of Aragon are also supportive of the theoretical model, and they are coherent with what we observed in Catalonia. They show that levels of direct violence are explained by local level competition; in other words the greater the degree of political parity between groups, the greater the levels of direct violence. In other words, these results show that the same mechanism explaining variation in levels of violence perpetrated by the left is accounting for variation in levels of violence perpetrated by the right. This finding is extremely relevant as it indicates that, despite the fact that levels of violence might have been overall different on each of the sides, the determinants of violence are not necessarily dissimilar: local political dynamics are important regardless of the group under scrutiny.

The following graphs (Figure 4.2) show post-estimations drawn from the ZINB models for Catalonia (Executed Left) and

Aragon (Executed Right); they depict the predicted levels of violence by each of the armed groups/militias at different levels of political competition. We can see that the effect of competition is slightly smaller in Catalonia (the slope is slightly flatter), and that Aragon has greater baseline levels of violence (the intersection value is greater). In general terms, though, the graphs illustrate a similar impact of competition on number of executions by either of the armed groups.

Figure 4.2. Predicted Executions on Level of Prewar Competition (ZINB Models)

CATALONIA (Leftist Violence)　　　**ARAGON (Rightist Violence)**

c. All Zones

In this subsection, I run regressions with all the municipalities above considered (i.e. in Aragon, Valencia, Aragon), as well as the 97 municipalities in the province of Malaga (described further below). They are all pooled in the same database. The regressions with this "global" dataset (including a total of 2,644 municipalities) should allow us to confirm that the findings obtained with the different regional subsamples are generalizable to all zones and armed groups. The dependent variable is the total

number of people killed in a locality (by one or the other side). The dummy variable, *ZoneRep*, indicating if the municipality was located in a Republican/Nationalist zone, is a compulsory control variable in this regression. The remaining controls are the same as those included in the regressions above, with the exception of those variables for which information was available only for particular regions (e.g. previous violence for Aragon).

As for geographical measures, I include here only dummies for Border and Sea, coded as in the dataset for Catalonia. I do not include a Frontline variable because this would have contradictory effects for the areas East and West of the Aragon frontline. Similar interpretation issues would arise if geo-referencing variables are included such as latitude or longitude. Table 4.21 presents a detailed description of the variables in the global dataset.

Table 4.21. Description of Variables (Global Dataset)

Name of the Variable	Characteristics	Data Sources
Executed	Total number of people executed by the left and by the right in a locality	Sources listed above
Support Left	% support for the Popular Front in the 1936 general elections	Sources listed above
ZoneRep	1 if Republican control zone, 0 if Nationalist control zone	SSV (2005), Casanova (2001), Ledesma (2009)
Competition	Index from 0 (minimum parity) to 1 (maximum parity)	Sources listed above
CNT Affiliation	% inhabitants affiliated with the CNT in a locality	CNT (1936), Cucó i Giner (1970)
UGT Affiliation	% inhabitants affiliated with the UGT in a locality	UGT (1931)
Population	Inhabitants of the municipality in 1936	*Instituto Nacional de Estadística*

Catholic center	Dummy variable, 1 if the municipality had an archbishop in 1936; 0 otherwise	*Conferencia Episcopal Española*
Border	Dummy variable, 1 if the municipality is in a county that shares the French border, 0 if not	Sources listed above
Sea	Dummy variable, 1 if the municipality is in a county with seashore, 0 if not	Sources listed above

In Table 4.22, we can see the results of the NB and ZINB specifications that test for the determinants of total wartime violence at the local level. The results indicate that Competition is a significant variable in explaining levels of violence by both armed groups; again, however, this variable is not significant in explaining occurrence of violence. This is an important finding, and it provides a lot of robustness to the previous results. As could be expected, proximity to the (French) border implies a lower likelihood of violence, as well as lower levels of violence: the possibility of fleeing reduces lethality in a locality. No effect is however found for proximity to the sea. Catholic center and trade union affiliation are remarkably significant in explaining overall levels of violence, which is supportive of the hypothesis that the presence of strong supporters of either one or the other group boosts direct violence.

Table 4.22. Determinants of Executions by the Two Groups (All Locations). NB and ZINB Models

	M1 NB: Number of executed	M2 NB: Number of executed
Competition	**0.449***	**0.402**
	(0.16)	(0.16)
Population	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
ZoneRep	**0.136**	**0.007**
	(0.11)	(0.11)
CNT Affiliation	0.083***	0.076***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
UGT Affiliation	0.074***	0.068***
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Catholic Center	1.810***	1.767***
	(0.38)	(0.35)
Border	-0.798***	-0.592***
	(0.11)	(0.12)
Sea	-0.040	-0.026
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Constant	1.161***	1.477***
	(0.16)	(0.16)
LnAlpha	*0.806***	*0.603***
	(0.04)	*(0.04)*
INFLATE		**Logit: Non-violence**
Competition		0.231
		(0.56)
Population		-0.008***
		(0.00)
ZoneRep		**-2.095***
		(0.41)
UGT Affiliation		-6.057
		(287.06)
Border		0.622**
		(0.31)
Sea		0.343
		(0.37)
Constant		2.544***
		(0.64)
Observations	2041	2041
Chi2	990.089	978.407
Aic	1.2e+04	1.2e+04

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

Interestingly, being in the Republican zone implies a greater likelihood of violence in a locality, as is shown by the coefficient of ZoneRep in the second part of the ZINB model. The same is observed when only taking into account Aragon and Catalonia (Balcells 2009a).[51] From my point of view, these results indicate that organizational variables can have a complex effect on violence: less cohesive armed groups may be perpetrating violence in a more dispersed way, but they may not be necessarily generating a greater level of casualties. More cohesive armed groups may be able to perpetrate greater levels of violence in a more territorially concentrated way.[52]

To sum up, the results of the regressions in this subsection — namely with the whole sample of municipalities–, are supportive of the previous results, as well as of the theoretical hypotheses. I have run the same regressions excluding Aragon's battlefield areas, and the results are consistent. Overall, these results show that competition is a crucial variable in explaining violence during wartime, independent of the war zone and perpetrator. Interestingly, these results also show that competition cannot explain the *occurrence* of violence, and that armed group organizational characteristics may be behind some of this variation.

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[51] In fact, we could think that the results are likely to be driven by Nationalist Aragon and Catalonia, as they are not observed for Valencia or Republican Aragon. Yet, they are also observed when only looking at Malaga (see below).

[52] I have tested for an interactive effect between ZoneRep and Competition, and this indicates that the effect of Competition diminishes in the Republican zone: in other words, that the impact of local levels of Competition on violence is greater in Nationalist than in Republican settings. The results are not included here but they are available upon request.

4.3. Additional Analyses

In this section, I develop a set of additional analyses that complement the multivariate empirical framework in section 4.2.[53] These analyses are wide-ranged and they imply the test of more elaborate (i.e. interactive) hypotheses, the use of supplementary proxies for the main independent variable in the models, and the use of data from additional regions in Spain.

4.3.1. Interactive Hypotheses

One implication of my theoretical model is that in places with deeper prewar political cleavages, violence is likely to reach greater levels during the civil war. As said, political parity is explanatory of violence not only because it conveys a strategic use of violence by local political competitors, but also because it leads to a greater disclosure of identities, and to a greater perception that supporters of the groups are highly committed to their political platforms. In consequence, in places with more profound political cleavages supporters of the groups are likely to be perceived as

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[53] In order to make sure that the results of section 2 are not driven by the specification of the explanatory models, neither by the count models, I run some alternative regressions, which I do not include here but are available upon request. These specifications are as follows: first, I run the same set of ZINB and NB regressions without including the variable CNT Affiliation. As we have seen, this variable correlates with the dependent variable "Executed Left" (it is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for this violence). The results do not change with this specification of the model(s) and, in fact, the estimate of the variable Competition has greater substantive or statistical significance when CNT is not included in the vector of covariates. Second, I run OLS models with a normalized dependent variable (‰ executed in a locality), instead of the count models. The results change in some cases (i.e. in the case of Catalonia, Competition 1933 and Polarization RQ lose significance), but in most of them, Competition retains significance.

more committed to political platforms, and therefore as more threatening both for the armed group and for their local political enemies, who will therefore have greater incentives to eliminate them.

One way to measure the depth of the political cleavages —as tenuous as this concept might be– is by using electoral volatility of a locality, namely stability of electoral support for the political blocs throughout time. If patterns of support for the political blocs are stable, and therefore volatility is low, we can think that cleavages are deeper than if patterns of support for the blocs are unstable, and therefore volatility is high. By using electoral results of the 1933 and 1936 elections, I can measure local level electoral volatility in municipalities of Catalonia and Aragon, and include this in the regression models. I do this and I generate a dummy variable measuring stability, which has value 0 if the difference between the electoral support for the left bloc in 1936 and 1933 is greater than or equal to 10%, and value 1 if it is smaller.[54] This variable is included as an additional explanatory variable to the ZINB regressions for Catalonia (table 4.23) and Aragon (table 4.24).

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[54] These data are returns, at the local level, in the Spanish Courts/Parliament elections (General elections), which took place in 13 November 1933 and 16 February 1936, respectively. I collected these data both for Catalonia and Aragon. Volatility is a variable that has value 1 if the difference in % support for the left between these two elections is greater than 10%, and 0 otherwise. Stability takes the reverse values.

Table 4.23. ZINB Regression with Stability (Catalonia)

	M1 NB: Number of executed
Competition	**1.333***
	(0.36)
Stability	**0.217****
	(0.10)
CNT Affiliation	0.044***
	(0.02)
UGT Affiliation	0.030
	(0.04)
Frontline	0.310**
	(0.13)
Border	-0.288*
	(0.15)
Sea	-0.079
	(0.14)
Altitude	-0.000
	(0.00)
Population	0.000***
	(0.00)
Catholic Center	0.831
	(0.45)
Constant	-0.322
	(0.34)
INFLATE	**Logit: Non-Violence**
Competition	**1.380**
	(1.40)
Stability	**0.342**
	(0.43)
CNT Affiliation	

UGT Affiliation	0.030
	(0.50)
Frontline	0.804
	(0.80)
Border	-0.357
	(0.51)
Sea	1.622
	(1.15)
Altitude	0.002*
	(0.00)
Population	-0.006***
	(0.00)
Constant	-1.955*
	1.17
LnAlpha	*0.147*
	(0.11)
N	869
Chi2	450.572

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

Table 4.24. ZINB Regressions with Stability (Aragon)

	M1 NB: Number of executed
Competition	**1.399*****
	(0.44)
Stability	**0.213**
	(0.24)
CNT Affiliation	0.044
	(0.05)
UGT Affiliation	0.081*
	(0.04)

Latitude	-0.122
	(0.30)
Longitude	0.967***
	(0.37)
Altitude (feet)	-0.001***
	(0.00)
Population	0.000
	(0.00)
Catholic Center	2.168***
	(0.78)
Constant	8.298
	(12.64)
INFLATE	**Logit: Non-Violence**
Competition	**-1.480**
	(1.05)
Stability	**-0.113**
	(0.71)
Latitude	0.901
	(0.69)
Longitude	1.825
	(1.39)
Altitude (feet)	0.001***
	(0.00)
Population	-0.002**
	(0.00)
Constant	-36.718
	(30.11)
LnAlpha	*0.232*
	(0.15)
N	251
Chi2	207.451

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

This conjecture is confirmed for Catalonia but not for Aragon. In Catalonia, violence is greater in places with a degree of stability in voting patterns; however stability does not explain the occurrence of violence. In Aragon, stability is not significant to explain neither the occurrence nor levels of violence.

In the light of the significant results for Catalonia, one can wonder what explains stability of voting patterns in a locality; potentially, an omitted variable could be explaining both stability and violence (in the same way an endogenous factor could be explaining competition and violence, as I have argued). I do not have priors on what can exogenously account for stability of voting patterns in a locality —again, the assumption is that this variable is accounting for depth of political cleavages, which can be given by a myriad of factors (e.g. the particular socioeconomic structure of localities, their political history, and so on). I check the relationship between this variable and a number of electoral, social and demographic indicators in my datasets —through a set of simple comparison of means tests. And I observe the following: in Catalonia, the degree of support for the left is statistically significantly greater in "stable" localities than in "non-stable" localities (at the 99% level); yet, in Aragon, the relationship is exactly the reverse (non-stable localities being more leftist). In both Catalonia and Aragon, the level of parity (Competition) is significantly greater in non-stable localities than in stable ones (at the 95% level and 99% level, respectively). In Catalonia, CNT Affiliation is significantly greater in stable locations (at the 90% level); the relationship is not significant in Aragon, where UGT affiliation is significantly greater in stable localities (no significant association between UGT and stability is found in Catalonia). There are no significant differences in the size of these sub-samples of localities in neither regions, although there are differences in their geographic characteristics: in both regions, non-stable localities are significantly higher (in altitude) than stable ones (at the 99% level), somewhat indicating that cleavages are deeper in less mountainous locations. In Catalonia, stable localities are found further South and to the East (both longitude

and latitude are significantly greater for these locations); in Aragon, stable locations are also further to the East, but they are also significantly further North (I do not have a theoretical explanation as to why this may be the case). Overall, it seems that depth of cleavages may be connected to a greater tradition of democratic politics at the local level —measured by a greater trade union presence– and lesser isolation. Yet, most importantly, it seems plausible to assume that the results in Table 4.22 are not driven by any type of omitted variable bias.

Hypothetically, Competition and Stability could be having an interactive effect; I test this by adding an interaction term (Stabilitycomp) to the regressions above. I do not present the estimated coefficients of these regressions because in non-additive models these coefficients are not effects, and their interpretation, as well as that of their standard errors, is not straightforward.[55] Following Kam and Franzese (2007:32), I compare predicted number of executions at varying meaningful levels of Competition and Stability,[56] holding any other variables in the model at their sample mean.

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[55] "Mere presentation of regression coefficients and their standard errors is inadequate for the interpretation of interactive effects. As we have seen, the estimated effects of variables involved in interactive terms and the standard errors of these estimated effects vary depending on the values of the conditioning variables" (Kam and Franzese 2007: 60).

[56] The distribution of volatile and stable localities, as I have classified them, is as follows: in Catalonia, 37.38% classified as stable, and 62.62% classified as volatile. In Aragon, 11.68% classified as stable, and 88.32% classified as volatile.

Figure 4.3. Predicted Number of Executions by the Left in Catalonia.
Interactive Model with Stability

Figure 4.4. Predicted Number of Executions by the Right in Aragon.
Interactive Model with Stability

I have plotted the predicted values on a graph in order to facilitate their interpretation (confidence intervals cannot be issued from the ZINB regression estimates, so they cannot be included in these graphs). In Figure 4.3, we can see that stability has an

interactive effect with competition: the marginal effect of competition on violence is rather modest in volatile places, and it is more substantive in electorally stable locations. Figure 4.4 —for Aragon– depicts a similar pattern. In brief, these tables indicate that political parity has an influence on levels of violence, but that it does so to a greater extent in places with deeper cleavages than elsewhere. According to my theoretical framework, the mechanism driving this is, again, local level collaboration with the armed groups.

    I perform a similar set of analyses with the data from Catalonia, now testing for the interactive hypothesis between Frontline and Competition. At the theoretical level, these analyses are relevant because they can help isolate the differentiating effect of: 1) an armed group's interest in killing people from a particular locality (this is expected to be greater in places closer to the frontline due to a greater uncertainty about control by the groups); 2) local civilians's interest in eliminating local enemies (which should not vary across space if they are determined by political dynamics). I proceed as above, first generating an interaction variable between the dummy Frontline and Competition, and including it in the NB regression —together with the remainder of the model. I calculate predicted values of executions at different levels of Competition. Figure 4.5 plots these predicted values by type of locality (i.e. close to the frontline or not).

Figure 4.5. Predicted Number of Executions by the Left in Catalonia.
Interactive Model with Frontline

In Figure 4.5, we can observe that the interactive hypotheses cannot be rejected, as predicted values of executions increase in a steeper way in locations close to the frontline. This is supportive of the idea that both armed group and civilian's motives are operating in a significant manner to explain killings of civilians, and that they reinforce each other. Violence peaks when both armed groups have strong incentives to kill and civilians have a strategic interest in collaborating to promote this violence. This type of interactive effect, which also illustrates the joint explanatory effect of political and military variables in the context of civil wars, should be further explored in the context of other civil wars, with different warfare features (i.e. guerrilla wars, SNC).

4.3.2. Additional Measures of the Independent Variable

I further analyze the Catalonia database by using two alternative proxies for the main independent variable in the models. On the one hand, I apply the political polarization index

formula developed by Reynal-Querol (2002) (hereafter RQ) to the electoral results of the 1933 national elections; on the other hand, I use these same 1933 electoral results to compute Competition (using the usual quadratic formula) with data on these elections.

RQ's polarization index seeks to capture how far the distribution of the groups is from the (1/2, 0, 0, ... 0, 1/2) distribution, which represents the highest level of polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005:798). I use this variable, which I call *PolarizationRQ* in order to test if the mechanism that I have developed for political competition also applies to political polarization, as conceived by this author, who is inspired by the concept of polarization as developed by Esteban and Ray (1994).[57]

I am using RQ's polarization index in a novel way, as I am applying it at the local level, instead of at the national level —as is usually the case. But, more importantly, as explained in chapter 2, using variable will help me adjudicate between the two mechanisms intervening in the hypothesized relationship between political parity and violence. We would expect that —similar to when there is political parity at the local level– when there is polarization at the local level, confrontation will be more frequent, and identities will be expressed more intensely (and therefore they will become more visible), as compared to situations of non-polarization. In other words, polarization should have effect on civilian targeting through one of the mechanisms by which competition is hypothetically affecting it: by making identities more intense and visible, and by thereby increasing armed groups's priors that supporters of the enemy are "strong supporters." Again, the latter increases the willingness of armed

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[57] I do not have any measure of alienation neither inter-group distances, so I cannot test Esteban and Ray's (1994) index; in other words, I need to abide a discrete measure of polarization. I use Reynal-Querol's measure, which uses a discrete measure of the distance (belong/do not belong), and it fixes the values of sensitivity. "This makes the RQ index easily applicable to data on ethnic and religious diversity" (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005: 801).

groups to kill civilians in a particular locality.[58] Under my theoretical framework, polarization could not however be driving the perpetration of violence through the mechanism of 'strategic collaboration", for polarized settings are not necessarily settings where violence can change the balance of power in favour of the political bloc perpetrating violence (e.g. a locality can be very polarized but have a 90/10 distribution of supporters, thus making violence not instrumental to change distribution of power). In a nutshell, local level polarization should be having an effect on assassinations by increasing the willingness of groups to kill and not by increasing strategic civilian collaboration. If we find that polarization does not have an impact on violence, we may then think that the mechanism by which competition is affecting violence is not the "identity revelation" mechanism, but by the "strategic collaboration" mechanism.

Table 4.25 shows the results of the ZINB models with these additional independent variables: *Competition 1933* (that is, competition measured with electoral data from the 1933 elections instead of 1936) —in M1–, and RQ's index of polarization, also calculated with electoral data of 1933 —in M2.[59] Interestingly, in the NB part of the ZINB model in Table 4.25, Competition 1933 is statistically significant, but PolarizationRQ is not. The coefficient of the variable Competition 1933 is substantively smaller than the one I had obtained with the 1936 election results (e.g., in Table 4.2), although it is highly statistically significant. This is a very intuitive finding because 1933 competition should not be as

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[58] Note that this differs slightly from Esteban and Ray's (2008) approach, who connect intensity of conflict in polarized societies with regime *statu quo* allocations. Their type of argument, made at the state level, cannot be applied in the type of micro-level context, where war/violence is a given. Indeed, the intensity of the conflict at the local level is disconnected to the causes of civil war (Kalyvas 2006).

[59] I calculate this index with data from the 1933 elections because parties were competing individually in those elections, that is, not under the umbrella of pre-electoral coalitions (vis-à-vis the 1936 elections), and the RQ index does not make sense in the context of two-party systems.

relevant for violence as 1936 competition —it is reasonable to think that local political configurations will lose some explanatory power with the time lag. The remaining variables in the model take values consistent with the previous results: neither Competition 1933 nor PolarizationRQ are statistically significant to explain the non-ocurrence of violence, i.e. in the logit part of the ZINB model.

The non-significance of the value PolarizationRQ is important as it indicates that the mechanism by which competition dynamics at the local level determine levels of violence may have more to do with local civilian's strategic behavior than with a greater visibility of strong identities. While these are tentative conclusions, they generate important avenues for further research.

The difference in the estimated coefficient for PolarizationRQ and Competition 1933 is even more striking if we take into account that the Pearson's correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.88. The Kernel density function of each of these variables, which is included in the Appendix, indicates that the polarization variable has a slightly greater variance than the competition variable. While these could be driving the results, I test for the effect of Absolute competition with values of 1933 (Compabs 1933), which is a variable with also a greater variance than Competition (its Kernel density graph also is included in the Appendix), and this shows to be highly statistically significant (i.e. at the 1% level) to explain levels of violence.[60]

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[60] The regression results with Compabs1933 are however not included here.

Table 4.25. Executed Left in Catalonia. ZINB Models with Additional Measures of the Independent Variable

	M1 NB: Number of executed	M2 NB: Number of executed
Frontline	0.302**	0.323**
	(0.15)	(0.14)
Population	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
CNT Affiliation	0.114***	0.118***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
UGT Affiliation	0.083*	0.084*
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Border	-0.425***	-0.440***
	(0.16)	(0.16)
Sea	-0.115	-0.103
	(0.15)	(0.15)
Altitude	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Catholic Center	2.171***	2.170***
	(0.50)	(0.48)
Competition 1933	**0.844*****	
	(0.32)	
PolarizationRQ		**0.432**
		(0.39)
Constant	0.891***	1.215***
	(0.30)	(0.35)
INFLATE	**Logit: Non-violence**	**Logit: Non-violence**
Frontline	1.143	1.621*
	(0.95)	(0.92)
Population	-0.007***	-0.009***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
UGT Affiliation	0.113	0.235
	(0.56)	(0.60)
Border	-0.519	-0.676
	(0.59)	(0.64)
Sea	2.223	3.134**
	(1.53)	(1.50)
Altitude	0.002	0.003*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Competition 1933	0.787	
	(1.14)	
PolarizationRQ		-0.167
		(1.27)
Constant	-1.411	-1.266
	(1.19)	*(1.42)*
LnAlpha	*0.458****	*0.499****
	(0.09)	*(0.08)*
Observations	865	867
Chi2	459.798	475.992

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

4.3.3. Analyses with Additional Regions

Malaga

The province of Malaga was initially controlled by leftist militias (i.e. anarchists). The province was shortly afterwards conquered by the Nationalist army, who committed a well-documented slaughter (Rodrigo 2008). Fine-grained data on rightist executions are still not available from primary or secondary sources, so in this province I will not be able to test the hypotheses for violence in t_2 (I will only test the hypotheses regarding violence in t_1). Running this test is particularly important because this Southern province presented patterns of social and economic inequality that diverged considerably from those in the other provinces analyzed in this dissertation. Also, since the attributes of chaos and anarchy have been quite definitional of the type of control held by the anarchist militias in this province (Seidman 2002) —even greater than for Catalonia, Valencia or Aragon–, if Competition is significant to explain levels of violence, the relevance of local level political factors will show to be quite robust vis-à-vis organizational theories of violence.

I proceed to test the econometric model 4.1 with data on 93 municipalities in this province. A description of the variables in the models is presented in Table 4.26.

Table 4.26. Description of Variables (Malaga Dataset)

Name of the Variable	Characteristics	Data Sources
Executed Left	Total number of people executed by the left in a locality	Nadal (1984)
Support Left	% support for the Popular Front in the 1936 general elections	Velasco Gómez (2008)
Competition	Index from 0 (minimum parity) to 1 (maximum parity)	Calculated from Velasco Gómez (2008)
CNT Affiliation	% inhabitants affiliated with the CNT in a locality	CNT (1936), Cucó i Giner (1970)
UGT Affiliation	% inhabitants affiliated with the UGT in a locality	UGT (1931)
Population	Inhabitants of the municipality in 1936	*Instituto Nacional de Estadística*
Catholic center	Dummy variable, 1 if the municipality had an archbishop in 1936; 0 otherwise	*Conferencia Episcopal Española*
Altitude (Meters)	Altitude of the municipality, in feet	*Infraestructura de Datos Espaciales de España*
Latitude (Frontline, Sea)	Degrees	Global Ganzeeter Version 2.1
Longitude (Border)	Degrees	Global Ganzeeter Version 2.1
Strikes	Number of workers" strikes in the locality during the Second Republic (1931-1936)	Velasco Gómez (2008)

In addition to the usual independent and control variables (in Model 1), in Tables 4.27 and 4.28 I present the results of NB and ZINB regressions that include data on the number of workers's

strikes during the Second Republic in a locality (in Models 2 and 3). I expect this variable to have a positive impact on levels of violence —insofar as social conflict, of which this is a proxy, should lead towards a greater degree of identification of strong supporters.[61] In fact, figure A4.8 shows that, at the descriptive level, there is a positive correlation between the number of strikes in a locality (coded from Velasco Gómez 2008), and violence during the civil war.

Also, in these models, I have introduced the variable Catholic Center in a third —separate– model in order to make sure that this does not imply statistical over-determination problems; this variable has value 1 only for the capital city (Malaga), which is problematic statistically.[62]

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[61] The workers's movement was particularly strong in this Spanish province, and it led a relevant strike movement throughout the 1930s (Nadal 1981).

[62] Malaga, while being the most populated municipality in the province, was also the one with greater number of victims: 899 executed by the left, approximately 7,000 by the right.

Table 4.27. Executed Left in Malaga. NB Models

	M1	M2	M3
Population (*1000)	0.074	0.073*	0.148***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
UGT Affiliation	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
CNT Affiliation	0.030	0.030	0.024
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Competition	**1.290***	**1.289***	**0.957**
	(0.68)	(0.69)	(0.58)
Altitude (Meters)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Strikes		0.003	0.079
		(0.13)	(0.15)
Catholic Center			-24.382***
			(8.65)
Constant	1.248**	1.247**	0.776
	(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.65)
LnAlpha	*1.013****	*1.013****	*0.841****
	(0.20)	*(0.20)*	*(0.21)*
Observations	90	90	90
Chi2	16.811	17.554	.
Aic	583.937	585.937	575.231

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

Table 4.28. Executed Left in Malaga. ZINB Models

	M1 NB: Number of executed	M2 NB: Number of executed	M3 NB: Number of executed
Population (*1000)	0.040***	0.030	0.064***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
UGT Affiliation	0.021	0.019	0.023
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
CNT Affiliation	0.007	0.003	-0.007
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Competition	1.348**	1.362**	0.831*
	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.45)
Altitude (Meters)	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.001*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Strikes		0.052	0.198**
		(0.10)	(0.09)
Catholic Center			-14.508***
			(2.74)
Constant	1.941***	1.917***	1.806***
	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.42)
INFLATE	Logit: Non- violence	Logit: Non- violence	Logit: Non- violence
Population (*1000)	-0.316***	-0.468***	-0.464***
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.16)
UGT Affiliation	0.059	0.061	0.060
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Competition	0.290	0.144	0.036
	(1.00)	(1.03)	(0.96)
Altitude (Meters)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Strikes		0.497*	0.488*
		(0.29)	(0.28)
Constant	0.986	0.978	1.109
	(1.15)	(1.17)	(1.11)
LnAlpha	*-0.457**	*-0.461**	*-1.124***
	(0.23)	*(0.22)*	*(0.24)*
Observations	90	90	90
Chi2	60.088	61.810	90.666
Aic	562.281	562.750	535.894

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .01

The results of both the NB and ZINB models are supportive of our hypotheses: Competition is significant and positive in explaining the level of executions by the left. Consistent with the previous results, Competition is not explanatory of the occurrence of violence. The Chi2 statistic, which cannot be estimated in the NB Model 3, indicates that the inclusion of the variable Catholic Center conveys some overdetermination issues, as we suspected. Contrary to what we would expect, in the ZINB model, the number of workers's strikes in a locality leads to a greater probability of non-occurrence of violence by the left. Yet, this variable is also significant to explain levels of violence (in the NB portion of the ZINB Model 3), which is consistent with my hypothesis (although internally inconsistent with the results of the logit portion of the ZINB model 3). None of the other control variables seems to be significant in explaining leftist violence.

To sum up, the estimates for Malaga are consistent overall with our previous results, and they confirm the relevance of local level prewar parity to explain violence during wartime, even when this is perpetrated by loose, decentralized and even "chaotic" armed groups such as the anarchist militias who controlled this province during the early SCW.

Extremadura

As explained in Chapter 3, the study of the region of Extremadura can be very helpful in conferring external validity to the previous findings. Unfortunately, the available data on this region does not allow me to perform adequate large-*n* analyses. For the province of Badajoz, I could gather data on violence from published sources (Martin Rubio 2006; Chaves 2006), but I could not find fine-grained data on electoral results at the local level, neither from published nor from primary historical sources. For the province of Caceres, data on electoral returns is complete (Ayala Vicente 2001, 2002), but data on violence is not; I have only been able to collect data on executions in the few localities where the left perpetrated violence (a total of 19) (from Chaves

1995). I thus proceed to analyze the cases in Caceres for which I have data on prewar electoral configuration (that is, these 19 localities). Since regression analyses are not possible with so few cases, and these would be biased anyway —due to selection on the dependent variable– I have decided to analyze them non-parametrically. The following scatter plot (Figure 4.6) shows the relationship between political competition and leftist direct violence (in executed per one thousand inhabitants) in these 19 localities where *some* leftist violence took place (all these locations were controlled by the Republicans at the beginning of the civil war). We can observe that the relationship is not clear, although the places with greater levels of leftist violence seem to be located at the upper end of the competition axis.

Figure 4.6. Competition and Executed Left in localities of Caceres (in ‰)

I partition this subset localities between rightist (if the CEDA and PR had more than 50% of the votes in the 1936 elections) and leftist (if the Popular Front had more than 50% of the votes), and I do a basic scatter plot of "alignment of the locality" (in the 1936 elections) and "number of executions" (Table 4.29). I do not find

any significant relationship between political alignment of the locality and number of executions.

Table 4.29. Alignment of the Locality and Executed Left in Caceres (Cross-Tabulation)

Number of executed in the locality	Alignment (1936 Elections)		Total
	Left	**Right**	
0	78	130	208
1	0	2	2
2	1	1	2
3	3	1	4
4	1	2	3
7	1	2	3
13	0	1	1
15	1	0	1
51	0	1	1
Total	85	140	225

Pearson chi2(8) = 6.6176 Pr = 0.578
Likelihood-ratio Chi2(8) = 8.2148 Pr = 0.413
Cramér's V = 0.1715
Gamma = -0.0731 ASE = 0.246
Kendall's tau-b = -0.0194 ASE = 0.067

Although the evidence in Table 4.29 is not confirmatory, it is indicative that there is not a linear relationship between support

for a group and violence by the rival group, which is consistent with my previous findings.[63]

4.4. Spatial Analyses

Spatial autocorrelation can bias any type of regression analysis with geographical data (Anselin *et al*. 2004), and there are different techniques that permit us to control for it. In this section, I conduct different analyses with polygon and point spatial data (using GIS and GeoDa software), in order to ensure that the results in the first section of the chapter are not biased due to any type of spatial dependence between municipalities. Also, the spatial analyses will allow us to explore the possibility that there is any sort of contagion or neighboring effect between the units, e.g. that greater violence in one locality leads to a greater probability of violence, or to greater (lower) levels of violence in nearby municipalities, *ceteris paribus*.

I first run a set of diagnostic tests to see if the data in the different databases (i.e. total and regional datasets) present relevant spatial dependence or autocorrelation patterns, which could be biasing the results. I then run spatial regression analyses. Since the spatial regression software does not allow us to run NB or ZINB regressions, I run linear regression models with the same covariates I have used in the count regressions models. It must however be noted that OLS estimation is not appropriate for event type of data, and this makes the results of these regressions less reliable (in fact, the Breush-Pagan test will show that there is heteroscedasticity in the linear regression models, which implies that the standard errors are biased). These analyses, while providing non-reliable estimates, should in any case still be

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[63] I also undertake a comparison of means on levels of political competition in places that experienced violence and places that did not experience violence, and I do not find any significant difference (these tests are not included here).

helpful in gathering information on the existence of spatial dependence in the data.

I begin by checking for spatial autocorrelation in the leftist violence data from Catalonia. I first check the existence of spatial autocorrelation by employing a Euclidean specification of the neighborhood between municipalities.[64] With this, I calculate the statistic Moran's I, which indicates the level of association between the values of this variable and the lagged version of the variable (the weighted averages of the values for neighboring localities).[65] I also generate Moran's scatter plot (Figure A4.9 of Appendix V). The value of the Moran´s I statistic is very small (close to 0) and the relationship between the spatially lagged variable (*w_killed_left*) and the variable (*killed_left*) is almost inexistent: this is clear from the almost flat line in the scatter plot. These results remind us that we should not expect any sort of distortion in the ordinary regression results due to spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variable.

In order to confirm this last conclusion, I run a spatial lag regression model, which includes a spatial lagged version of the DV in the matrix of independent variables. The results of this linear regression, which are again not very reliable due to the heteroscedasticity (we cannot rely on the standard errors), are presented in Table A4.8. As expected, the spatial lagged dependent variable Executed Left is not statistically significant in the regressions, which reinforces the idea that there are no neighborhood effects in these data.

In any case, since it could be still possible that the spatially lagged independent variables were having an effect on the dependent variable (e.g. that political competition of a locality had an incidence on the level of violence perpetrated in a neighboring place), I perform an additional test: I run a spatial error model,

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[64] I have created a weight matrix with the 3-nearest neighbors and using a Euclidean metric.

[65] Moran's I checks for global spatial autocorrelation in the data (Anselin 2003).

which allows us to test for the existence of spatial error dependence in the weights matrix: I run a linear regression (including the vector of independent and control variables in the model in Table 4.2 above, as well as the weight matrix) and I check the spatial dependence in the error term with the diagnostics provided by the spatial regression software. The results (in Table A4.9) show that there is no spatial dependence in the independent variables.

Overall, all these tests allow us to reject the hypotheses that the data on leftist violence in Catalonia (or the explanatory model that I have used to explain it) are biased due to spatial dependence dynamics. I proceed at doing these same tests (that is, the Moran's I and Moran´s scatterplot, the Spatial Lag Regression and the Spatial Error Regression) for the following dependent variables: Executed Right in Catalonia, Executed Left and Executed Right in Aragon, Executed Left and Executed Right in Valencia, Executed Left in Malaga, and Executed Left, Executed Right and Total Executions for all the municipalities. I depict a summary of these spatial checks in table 4.30, which includes the value of Moran's I (according to which I evaluate the existence of spatial autocorrelation in the data), as well as the significance of the spatially lagged variable in spatial lag and spatial error OLS regressions.

For the regional databases, I have used point data, and I have built the weights matrix with Euclidean distances (3-nearest neighbors). For the database of all localities, I have used polygon data, with which I have been able to compute contiguity based spatial weights; specifically, I have built the weights matrix with Rook contiguity weights, which are defined according to common boundaries between localities (Anselin 2003).[66] The results of the tests should not be different to the ones obtained with distance-based spatial weights in the regional analyses, and by using a

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[66] I have used first order contiguity neighborhood indicators, as it is the one that makes more sense from a substantive point of view.

different type of weight I give greater robustness to these spatial analyses.

Table 4.30. Summary of Spatial Analyses

DV(Dataset)	Moran's I	Spatial Autocorrelation	Spatial Lag Regression	Spatial Error Regression
Executed Right t_2 (Catalonia)	-0.0006	No	Lagged DV is not sig.	Lambda non sig. LR test for spatial dependence not sig.[67]
Executed Right t_1 (Aragon Nat)[68]	-0.0047	No	Lagged DV is not sig.	Lambda non sig. LR test for spatial dependence not sig.
Executed Right (Aragon Rep)[69]	-0.0014	No	Lagged DV is not sig.	***Lambda has value 0.16 and is statistically significant at the 95% level. LR test for spatial heterogeneity also significant***
Executed Left (Aragon Rep)	***0.09***	***Maybe***	Lagged DV is not sig.	Lambda non sig. LR test for spatial dependence not sig.
Executed Right t_2 (Valencia)	-0.0013	No	Lagged DV is not sig.	Lambda non sig. LR test for spatial dependence not sig.
Executed Left t_1 (Valencia)	-0.0033	No	Lagged DV is not sig.	Lambda non sig. LR test for spatial dependence not sig.
Executed Left t_1 (Malaga)	0.067	No	Lagged DV is not sig.	Lambda non sig.LR test for spatial dependence not sig.
Executed Left t_1 (All)	0.0066	No	Lagged DV is not sig.	Lambda non sig.LR test is sig at the 95% level
Executed Right (All) t_1 and t_2	0.0116	No	Lagged DV is not sig.	Lambda non sig.LR test for spatial dependence not sig.
Executed Total (All) t_1 and t_2	0.0034	No	Lagged DV is not sig.	Lambda non sig.LR test for spatial dependence not sig.

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[67] The likelihood ratio test compares the spatial and the non-spatial analyses, and tests the null hypotheses that the spatial analyses are different from the non-spatial analyses (i.e. that there is spatial dependence).

[68] These analyses are only for the Nationalist zone of Aragon.

[69] These analyses are only for the Republican zone of Aragon.

Importantly, the results in Table 4.30 show that spatial dependence is relevant only when exploring variation in levels of violence in battlefield zones. In particular, patterns of spatial autocorrelation only show up as relevant with regard to leftist and rightist violence in the Republican zone of Aragon. On the one hand, the Moran's I for leftist violence in Republican Aragon, although not being extremely high, is greater than for the rest of subsamples. On the other hand, the lambda coefficient and the LR test in the spatial error regression for rightist violence in Republican Aragon indicate that there is spatial heterogeneity. These results are consistent with the idea that violence in this region was determined by the military conquest. As I said, leftist violence in Republican Aragon was predominantly determined by the paths that were followed by the different militia groups that conquered the territory, and that went back and forth; being located in one place or another was highly decisive for a municipality's fate, and this is reflected in the spatial dependency of the data.[70] Rightist violence also took place in a context of military re-conquest and battles, so that the finding that there is spatial heterogeneity in the model explaining rightist violence in t_2 in this area also makes sense theoretically.

In general, the results in this subsection indicate that processes such as spatial dynamics of contagion or spillover of violence between neighboring places are not taking place in the context of the rearguards of the SCW, but that they are taking place in battlefield zones such as Republican Aragon. This is important from a theoretical and methodological point of view. On the one hand, they indicate that, in rearguard territories, the local determinants of violence are not spatially dependent, and thus somewhat conditional on purely local factors (as I had hypothesized); on the other hand, they indicate that spatial regression techniques have to be applied when studying violence in battlefield areas —otherwise, the results are likely to be biased.

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[70] I would argue that this empirical finding opens several avenues of further research on civil war dynamics.

Overall, since the spatial analyses show that there are no patterns of spatial dependence in the data on violence in the rearguard territories that I have analyzed in the first part of this chapter, they confirm that the results are reliable, and they provide robustness.

4.5. Conclusions

This chapter contains a variety of empirical tests that are broadly supportive of the theoretical framework and the hypotheses on the determinants of direct violence presented in chapter 2: they are coherent with the idea that civilian targeting in conventional civil wars is very much coupled with the political identities of the war cleavage. The econometric findings support the hypothesis that direct violence is the outcome of both identification processes undertaken by armed groups, which are connected to prewar political dynamics, and to civilian collaboration. On the one hand, armed groups are willing to perpetrate violence where they learn (from local civilians) that supporters of the enemy are strong followers; on the other hand, armed groups manage to assassinate where they have supporters that collaborate with them, and where they find acquiescence of the population towards their actions. I had hypothesized that these are locations where groups have a distribution of power that approaches parity.

The results demonstrate that while political factors such as prewar competition are highly relevant and they should be included in models explaining dynamics of violence in civil wars, wartime dynamics are also relevant. Indeed, wartime events have an effect on victimization in subsequent periods; that is because victimization in t_1 affects both identification of strong enemies in t_2, and because it promotes collaboration and acquiescence by the local population in this second period. This finding sheds some light on the relationship between violence by two rival actors in war, which is quite unclear to date (Eck and Hultman 2007: 241).

I have provided results from a set of databases I built with secondary and primary sources of data on the Spanish Civil War. The results from Catalonia, Malaga and Nationalist Aragon show that levels of direct violence against civilians are explained by local level dynamics —i.e. prewar competition–, which can also account for variation across armed groups. Organizational characteristics and principal-agent hypotheses show to be partially explanatory of violence: yet, these can only explain variation in the occurrence of violence, not in levels of violence.[71] More loosely organized armed groups may be able to perpetrate violence in a much more widespread way than tight organizations, which can in turn be more effective at perpetrating greater levels of violence in the locations they target. I believe that this finding is relevant, and that it opens an avenue for further research. The results from Valencia are not supportive of this hypothesis (the competition variable is not significant in any of the specifications). This non-result may be related to measurement issues in the data, or to the fact that electoral results were not a good proxy of prewar political configurations in this region, which suffered from greater patronage than regions such as Catalonia (Vilanova 2005) or Aragon. In the case of Republican Aragon, competition is not significant either, but this is consistent with my theoretical framework, as this was a "battlefield" zone, where military dynamics are expected to weight more than prewar political dynamics in order to explain lethal violence.

I have tested the hypothesis that the depth of the political cleavages (conceptualized here as "stability") matters for the perpetration of violence. I have found only partial evidence on this direction, and I have found that this cannot rule out the finding that local level competition explains direct violence; in fact, the effect of these two variables (Competition and Stability) is

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[71] The difference between occurrence and levels of violence is relevant, and applies to other cases. For example, Gulden observes that in Guatemala frequency of killings municipality display only a weak correlation with quantity of killings (2002: 6).

interactive. In substantive terms, it can be argued that in those places with greater political competition, and greater depth of cleavages, violence is likely to be higher. According to my theoretical framework, this should be the case because in places with deeper political cleavages armed groups have greater priors of facing strong supporters of the enemy group(s).

On the other hand, the chapter includes a number of robustness checks that provide with internal validity to the findings just pinpointed. First, the results remain robust to the inclusion of dummies for counties, as well as geo-referencing indicators, which allow controlling for omitted variable bias. The results with county fixed effects implies that the crucial variation takes place at the local level, and it has to do with features that do not correlate with county-level characteristics (e.g. wealth, socio-economic structure). Second, the patterns of violence observed for the regions of Aragon and Catalonia seem to be also taking place in very different geographical areas such as the province of Malaga, in Andalusia, and Caceres, in Extremadura. Third, different specifications of Competition does not change the results obtained. The inclusion of a measure of Polarization, instead of Competition, does not show significant and it indicates that the mechanism at place may have more to do with the strategic collaboration of civilians than with the unveiling of political identities driven by political competition; we would expect this to also take place in polarized (but not necessarily parity) locations. Fourth, no spatial dependence dynamics are interfering with the results obtained.

The chapter reveals a striking pattern of correlation between violence perpetrated by one group at the first stage of the civil war, and violence perpetrated by another group at a second stage —which, in the Spanish case, coincides with the postwar period. We observe this for the two regions for which we have local level data on violence in t_1 and t_2 (Catalonia and Valencia and Republican Aragon). This is coherent with hypotheses 2.3. The non-parametric analyses for violence in t_2 in Catalonia also support the hypothesis that, over time, wartime events gain

explanatory power at the expense of prewar political configurations.

Appendix Chapter 4 (I). Additional Tables and Figures

Figure A4.1. Kernel Density Plot for Competition

Figure A4.2. Kernel Density Plot for Compabs

Figure A4.3. Kernel Density Plot for Competition 1933

Figure A4.4. Kernel Density Plot for Polarization 1933

Figure A4.5. Kernel Density Plot for Compabs 1933

Figure A4.6. Priests Executed in Catalonia. Histogram

Table A4.1. Aragon Municipalities by Control Zones

Province	Nationalist	Republican	Total
Huesca	77	282	359
Teruel	34	248	282
Zaragoza	255	52	307
Total	366	582	948

Table A4.2. Descriptive Statistics of Additional Independent Variables for Catalonia

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation
Competition Index (1933)	0.8477	0.186
RQ Polarization Index (1933)	0.8315	0.158

Figure A4.7. Executed Left (t₁) and Executed Right (t₂) in Catalonia, Counties

Figure A4.8. Number of Workers" Strikes in a Locality (1931-1936) and Leftist Executions Malaga

Appendix Chapter 4 (II). Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the Models

Table A4.3. Catalonia Dataset

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Population	1,058	1,647.56	19,726.11	50	637,841
Executed Left	1,062	7.5414	73.65	0	2,328
Executed Right	1,062	2.79	14.29	0	431
Support Left 1936	1,058	52.27	16.94	2.2	100
Support Left 1933	1,052	54.51	19.08	0	100
Competition	1,058	0.88	0.16	0	1
Compabs	1,058	0.725	0.204	0	1
CNT Affiliation	1,062	0.982	4.49	0	49.61
UGT Affiliation	1,058	0.088	1.02	0	20.36
Frontline	1,060	0.20	0.40	0	1
Border	1,060	0.22	0.41	0	1
Sea	1,060	0.28	0.45	0	1
Altitude (Meters)	875	368.22	317.3	0	1,539
Catholic center	1,062	0.0075	0.0865	0	1
Stability	1,062	0.626	0.484	0	1
Stabilitycomp	1,058	0.55	0.4443	0	1
PolarizationRQ	1,051	0.847	0.158	0	1
Competition 1933	1,057	0.831	0.158	0	1

Table A4.4. Valencia Dataset

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Population	528	3,605.17	14,602.5	115	31,58
Executed Left	540	8.58	40.82	0	872
Executed Right	541	8.04	21.11	0	354
Competition	292	0.844	0.217	0	1
Latitude	524	39.31	0.6562	37.17	49.83
Longitude	524	-0.427	0.331	-1.43	0.48
CNT Affiliation	541	0.551	2.8	0	45.18
UGT Affiliation	541	0.6	2.3	0	20.81

Table A4.5. Aragon Dataset

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Population	940	1,118.3	5,414.86	71	162,12
Executed Left	948	4.09	11.88	0	188
Executed Right	948	8.89	117.64	0	3,543
CNT Affiliation	938	0.633	3.545	0	77.22
UGT Affiliation	938	0.124	1.07	0	13.23
Catholic Center	948	0.0063	0.0793	0	1
Latitude	914	41.54	0.709	39.91	42.76
Longitude	914	-0.736	0.652	-2.15	0.716
Altitude	914	2481.62	1,187.65	0	6,676
Support Left 1936	659	27.39	16.75	0.2503	85.068
Competition	659	0.683	0.264	0.0099	0.99
Previous Violence	948	0.036	0.186	0	1
Compabs	659	0.499	0.25	.0050063	0.99
Stability	950	0.117	0.32	0	1
Stabilitcomp	659	0.095	0.24	0	0.99

Table A4.6. Malaga Dataset

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Executed Left	91	23.24176	95.71	0	899
Population	93	6,315.4	1.91E+04	360	1.80E+05
UGT Affiliation	93	1.089	4.022	0	21.92
CNT Affiliation	93	1.462	3.85	0	19.005
Competition	93	0.773	0.25	0	0.999
Altitude (Meters)	92	517.75	234.67	39.9	1061.2
Strikes	93	1.549	4.202	0	39
Catholic Center	93	0.0107	0.1037	0	1

Table A4.7. Dataset with All Municipalities

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Population	2,617	2,019.35	15,000.27	50	637,841
Executed Left	2,644	7.076	53.8	0	2,328
Executed Right	2,644	5.95	71.70	0	3,543
ZoneRep	2,644	0.862	0.345	0	1
CNT Affilation	2,634	0.634	3.364	0	77.22
UGT Affiliation	2,634	0.2415	1.6	0	21.91
Support Left 1936	2,101	43.18	20.67	0	100
Sea	2,590	0.194	0.396	0	1
Border	2,642	0.136	0.343	0	1
Catholic Center	2,644	0.0072	0.0845	0	1
Altitude	1,976	1,682.7	1,339.706	0	6,676
Competition	2,101	0.81	0.2277	0	1
Executed	2,644	13.03	96.183	0	3,567
Battlefield	2,644	0.2205	0.414	0	1

Kernel Distribution Plots of the Dependent Variables

Catalonia

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = .66

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = .5

Aragon

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.04

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.52

Valencia

Malaga

Appendix Chapter 4 (III). Notes on Sources and Coding

Electoral Results

The availability of electoral data at the local level during the Second Republic is very much fragmented, and it varies a lot with the region. My work has consisted of digitalizing previously collected data —in some cases– and in collecting raw electoral results —in others. Electoral data for the regions of Catalonia has been compiled in secondary sources, mainly Vilanova (1989; 2005). These reference books provide excellent fine-grained data on electoral results for the whole period of the Second Republic (1931-1936) —for all 1,062 municipalities of Catalonia. For Malaga, data on electoral results in all the localities of this province was also collected from rich secondary sources (Velasco Gómez 2008), and it involved few codification issues. For Aragon, I have obtained data from Zubero (1982); in this case, the collection of the data from primary historical sources had been done by the author, but the information was very poorly organized and the manuscript very badly preserved; this meant that some data went missing with the digitalization process (in other words, some data could not be read).[72]

For Valencia, the collection and codification of electoral data was more complicated, in general terms. On the one hand, data on electoral results were completely unavailable for Castellon. For Alicante and Valencia, raw data on electoral results had to be collected from primary sources (i.e. *Boletin Oficial de la Provincia, BOP*), and then digitalized. The open list system of the Second Republic makes it quite cumbersome to calculate the total number of votes received by each party/coalition in a municipality. The system was such that every citizen had to vote

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[72] It must be said that the figures that could not be read refereed to localities randomly distributed; there were no apparent systematic factors that could explain it.

for a number of candidates; this number would vary depending on the size of the circumscription (for example, in Valencia province they could vote for 13 candidates).[73] There were some constraints to vote for a number of candidates in the same coalition or political party (e.g. a maximum of 80%), so people would sometimes split the vote between candidates of different parties. However, it was quite common for them to maintain a degree of consistency in their vote (e.g. only voting for candidates of a single coalition or party).[74]

The archival electoral records of Valencia and Alicante provide information only on the number of votes received by individual candidates, so in order to calculate the number of votes that each party obtained in each municipality I first had to check the party to which each candidate belonged. I gathered information on party membership of the candidates from the website of the Spanish assembly (*Congreso de los Diputados*) and Calzado (2004).[75] I then grouped the votes by political parties, as well as by bloc (left/right).[76] Information on the location of

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[73] Note that the province of Valencia and Valencia city had at that time different electoral districts.

[74] For more details on the practice of "split voting" during the Second Republic, see Linz and De Miguel (1977).

[75] There are a number of candidates in Alicante for which there was no information on their affiliation, but these are minority candidates (with few votes) so this was not a major concern.

[76] To all the complications of this process, we can add the fact that there are alternative ways by which the percentage of votes received by each party can be calculated. One is by weighting the total number of votes received by a political party according to the total number of votes that each individual was able to cast in the elections –this varied with province. The other is by aggregating the number of votes received by each candidate/party and dividing them by the total number of votes cast in the locality. As Linz *et al*. (2005) explain, the first method allows for the size of the province to be controlled for. I used the second method because I am interested in the distribution of vote within localities, which is not affected by the computations that are relevant for cross-province comparative analysis.

political parties in the ideological spectrum was obtained from varied sources, including Arrué (1969; 1974), Martínez Cuadrado (1969), Linz and De Miguel (1977), Tusell (1971), and Linz *et al.* (2005).[77]

Other Variables

Data on *direct violence* has been obtained from extremely reliable secondary sources (listed above). In the places where I visited local archives during fieldwork, I could double-check the data with primary sources. I did likewise with many cases that I did not visit, but for which I read local histories. When there were discrepancies between sources, which was rarely the case, I trusted the source that seemed overall more founded.

As I mentioned, the method used by the most respected historians of violence during the SCW is the triangulation of sources. This method was applied for the first time by Josep Maria Solé i Sabaté in order to obtain actual figures of Francoist repression in Catalonia (given that he could not access military archives as a consequence of the censorship in the Francoist regime), and it became a template for local historians working on violence during the SCW. Following this methodology, oral testimonies and similar sources would be considered reliable only when corroborated by local cemetery and death registers (Solé i Sabaté 2000; Ruiz 2009).

For Catalonia, I have obtained data on direct violence from the books by SSV (1989) and Solé i Sabaté (2000). These authors have put together data on number of executions at the municipal level —classifying victims by place of residence. Again, the triangulation method implies that they have collected the data from local civil registers (death certificates), which they have

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[77] Before using the data, I made sure that votes had been aggregated consistently. For all localities except one, the total % of the left and the right bloc added to 100%; the outlier as the municipality of *Alcoi*, for which a number of candidates had no identifiable political affiliation. I excluded this case from the empirical analyses.

double-checked with data in different historical archives (i.e. national, regional, local), and which they have also checked with available oral sources. For leftist violence, they have also relied on *La Causa General*, a section of the Spanish National Historical Archive where the Francoist authorities meticulously documented the wartime crimes presumably carried out by leftist forces during the SCW. The data in this archive is upwardly biased, making leftists responsible for more crimes than those they actually committed, so these historians have not relied on it blindly.

The same types of sources and methodology have been used by the authors whose data I have used to build the Aragon dataset (Casanova *et al*. 2001; Ledesma 2009b). With regard to irregular Nationalist violence the collection of the data has been complicated by the lack of a general register such as the "Causa General"; Casanova *et al*. (2001) argue that they base their figures on the death certificates in the civil registers of the localities; they do not count non-registered killings because they cannot make sure that they were really assassinated (228-229). In contrast to SSV, they do not classify people by place of residence, but by place of execution (these two should not be that different given the local character of violence against non-combatants).

For Valencia, the books by Gabarda (1993; 1996) are my main source of data on violence. Again, for leftist violence, this author uses the "Causa General" and the Civil Registers. As for Francoist violence, Gabarda used the data in the Civil Register (Third Section and "Deaths") of National and Regional Courts, complemented with newspapers and oral sources.[78] For Malaga, the main source of data on violence is the book by Nadal (1984), who uses similar procedures to the authors above: namely, he has complemented the data of the "Causa General" with oral sources and data in local archives and civil registers.

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[78] He also uses the "Causa General" to find the names of people accused of being responsible for acts of violence against rightist citizens during leftist control, and who were presumably more likely to be targeted afterwards.

Following the most respected historians, the data on **population** that was not available from secondary sources (i.e. Vilanova 2005) has been acquired from the official 1930 census (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística*). Gabarda (1993), among many others, emphasizes the convenience of using this census as a proxy for the population of Spanish localities at the beginning of the civil war, especially given the fact that the Municipal Census of 1936 (*el Padrón*) has been in most cases destroyed. Using the 1940 census, on the other hand, would be futile.

Appendix Chapter 4 (IV). Assessment of Fit of the Regression Models (Selected)

In this Appendix, I present an assessment of fit of the main econometric models (i.e. ZINB). This consists upon plotting the predicted number of executions (at the local level) with the actual figures. Here I include the assessment of fit for Catalonia. While I have done the same tests for the remaining regions, I do not include them for they do not provide added value to these results. (These are nonetheless available upon request.)

Fit of ZINB Model for Executed Left

The graph in the left has a number of outliers, which do not allow us to see the fit model very well. These outliers are the cases for which the regression model overestimates the number of executions, which turn out to be localities with a relative greater number of inhabitants (i.e. urban locations). The graph in the right excludes these locations.

Fit of ZINB Model for Executed Right

Here again the model overpredicts the number of executions in urban settings (i.e. the graph at the left). I take these localities out, and the fit graph (at the right) becomes clearer.

Appendix Chapter 4 (V). Tables and Figures for Spatial Analyses

Figure A4.9. Moran Scatterplot for Executed Left. Catalonia

Figure A4.10. Moran Scatterplot for Executed Right. Catalonia

Table A4.8. Spatial Lag Regression for Executed Left. Catalonia

Dependent Variable : **KILLED_LEF** Number of Observations: 875
Mean dependent var : 8.89486 Number of Variables : 10
S.D. dependent var : 81.0284 Degrees of Freedom : 865
Lag coeff. (Rho) : -0.0114297

R-squared : 0.981806 Log likelihood : -3334.11
Sq. Correlation : - Akaike info criterion : 6688.22
Sigma-square : 119.455 Schwarz criterion : 6735.96
S.E of regression : 10.9295

Variable	Coefficient	Std.Error	z-value	Probability
W_KILLED_LEF	-0.01142971	0.02125815	-0.5376624	0.5908101
CONSTANT	-0.43451	2.349503	-0.184937	0.8532785
CENSUS	0.003487916	1.876611e-005	185.8625	0.0000000
CNTAFFILIA	0.1927704	0.1036399	1.860002	0.0628852
UGTAFFILIA	0.6846866	0.3338258	2.05103	0.0402639
DUMSEA	-2.065506	0.9817167	-2.103974	0.0353806
DUMBORDER	-0.7748169	1.045147	-0.7413475	0.4584826
CATHOLICCE	105.9902	4.228108	25.068	0.0000000
ALTITUDE	-0.0006540907	0.0004536538	-1.441828	0.1493510
COMPETITION	3.573244	2.40895	1.48332	0.1379894

REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS
DIAGNOSTICS FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY
RANDOM COEFFICIENTS

TEST	DF	VALUE	PROB
Breusch-Pagan test	8	13426.75	0.0000000

DIAGNOSTICS FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCE
SPATIAL LAG DEPENDENCE FOR WEIGHT MATRIX : **weights1.GWT**

TEST	DF	VALUE	PROB
Likelihood Ratio Test	1	0.2830526	0.5947074

Table A4.9. Spatial Error Regression Model. Executed Left. Catalonia

Dependent Variable : **KILLED_LEF** Number of Observations: 875
Mean dependent var : 8.894857 Number of Variables : 9
S.D. dependent var : 81.028392 Degree of Freedom : 866
Lag coeff. (Lambda) : 0.003635

R-squared : 0.981800 R-squared (BUSE) : -
Sq. Correlation : - Log likelihood :-3334.251974
Sigma-square : 119.494381 Akaike info criterion : 6686.5
S.E of regression : 10.9313 Schwarz criterion : 6729.471964

Variable	Coefficient	Std.Error	z-value	Probability
CONSTANT	-0.5060481	2.344641	-0.2158318	0.8291189
CNTAFFILIA	0.1927885	0.1036606	1.859805	0.0629129
UGTAFFILIA	0.6807001	0.3337173	2.039751	0.0413750
ALTITUDE	-0.0006740479	0.0004525319	-1.489504	0.1363549
POLARIZATI	3.567204	2.409175	1.480674	0.1386934
CENSUS	0.003488003	1.876889e-005	185.8396	0.0000000
DUMSEA	-2.091733	0.9801011	-2.134201	0.0328262
DUMBORDER	-0.7334017	1.044223	-0.7023422	0.4824656
CATHOLICCE	106.0093	4.228101	25.07255	0.0000000
LAMBDA	0.003634692	0.08683124	0.04185926	0.9666108

REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS
DIAGNOSTICS FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY
RANDOM COEFFICIENTS

TEST	DF	VALUE	PROB
Breusch-Pagan test	8	13423.33	0.0000000

SPATIAL ERROR DEPENDENCE FOR WEIGHT MATRIX : **weights1.GWT**

TEST	DF	VALUE	PROB
Likelihood Ratio Test	1	0.001523345	0.9688664

CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL TEST (II). DETERMINANTS OF INDIRECT VIOLENCE

"I heard an old man saying that the fighter planes had bombed the most central points of the city in a very meticulous way, as if they had calculated it millimeter by millimeter."

Montserrat Roig, *Ramona, Adéu*

5.1. Introduction

In chapter 2, I introduced a set of hypotheses on the determinants of indirect violence during CCW. In general terms, I have argued that —in addition to foreseeing military advantages– armed groups are likely to indirectly target places politically dominated by their enemy in order to maximize the likelihood of eliminating strong enemies. Furthermore, I have tentatively argued that, as the war develops, emotional factors related to the need to satisfy "domestic audiences" gain relevance in explaining bombings; this makes the localities where civilians have been victimized (i.e. A's supporters) more likely to be targeted (i.e. by A). These types of factors come into play once the civil war has been going on for some time, that is, once direct violence and war-related displacement —among other forms of victimization– have already taken place in a territory.

In this chapter, I perform an empirical test on the determinants of indirect violence with data from Catalonia. This is the only

Spanish region for which I have been able to collect fine-grained (i.e. municipal-level) data on bombings, as well as on number of casualties as a consequence of these strikes.[1] Nonetheless, bombings were perpetrated by both armed groups across the entire Spanish territory, as well as in the Moroccan cities where the coup originated (*Ceuta*, *Larache*, *Melilla*, *Tetuán*), which were targeted by the Republican army on 17 and 18 July 1936.[2] Aragon was one of the regions most affected by the bombardments; in particular, Republican Aragon, which —as explained– was battlefield zone during most of the civil war.[3]

In Catalonia, bombings were perpetrated by the Nationalist army, helped by Fascist air forces of Italy and Germany (SSV 1986; Balfour and Preston 1999). While the Republican army also bombed localities within the territory of Catalonia, this happened almost exclusively in places located on the war frontline, or in places affected by battles at the end of the military struggle, during or after the battles of Ebro and Segre (SSV 1987).[4] In the analyses here, these Republican bombings will not be taken into account. While I do not test for them, I make the analytical assumption that the pattern of bombings is the same for the Nationals as for the

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[1] SSV (1986) have collected local level data on number of bombings (disaggregated by date), as well as on number of lethal casualties directly linked to these attacks. There are no similar sources of data for the other regions of Spain. While Maldonado (2006) provides us with some data on bombings in Aragon, which amounted to circa 2,000 strikes (Cenarro 2006), the data is not collected systematically enough to be able to perform reliable statistical tests on it.

[2] According to SSV (2003), these bombardments angered the Moroccan population, who then sided with the Rebels.

[3] The dynamics of bombings were slightly different in battlefield territories, as compared to rearguard ones. Maldonado (2006a) says that targeted places in Aragon were mainly: a) Positions in the battle frontline; b) Strategic rearguard points; c) Besieged cities (the three capitals of the province). Yet, he also argues that, later on (in May 1937), more attacks took place in places further from the frontline.

[4] Specifically, these locations were: *Gandesa, Horta de Sant Joan, Móra d'Ebre, Valls, Serós, Sort* (SSV 1986).

Republicans. Actually, the pattern should apply to bombings by any group fighting a CCW.

In chapter 2, I argued that indirect violence in the rear territory of a CCW is likely to be determined by a combination of factors: "military", "political", and "emotional". For the sake of operationalization, and because I lack better indicators, I will use geo-referencing variables (i.e. latitude, longitude, altitude) to measure the "military value" of the localities. Since the military value of a place is usually associated with its geographical location and terrain (i.e. altitude), these should be suitable indicators. Also, I will include size of the locality (proxied with population and, in some analyses, with a dummy for urban centers) in order to account for the presence of industrial resources in a location. I will include different measures of the political characteristics of the municipalities —including competition, trade union affiliation, or percentage of support for the political blocs. According to my theoretical framework, measures of political domination —but not of political competition– should be significant in explaining indirect violence (that is the opposite prediction as that for direct violence). As far as emotional factors are concerned, I will use number of executions by the rival group (i.e. the left) in a locality in order to proxy retaliation desires (i.e. by the right).

The hypotheses will be tested through the estimation of logit, Negative Binomial (NB) and Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) regressions. Again, NB and ZINB are the most appropriate models for this event count type of data (i.e. number of bombardments); logit regressions allow for the estimation of the probability of a locality being targeted. Since the distribution of the variable measuring number of bombings has a large number of zeros and a significant number of ones (see Table A5.1 in the Appendix for the distribution of values of this variable), I will use logit models for the main set of analyses –recoding the dependent variable into a dummy.

In the next section, I present some descriptive evidence on indirect violence in Catalonia, including a number of maps

depicting temporal and spatial variation in Nationalist bombings (both aerial and naval) across Catalan municipalities.[5] In the second section, I present the results of a variety of confirmatory tests, namely the multivariate regression analyses, which are displayed in two parts: a first set of analyses include military and political variables as the main explanatory variables in the models; a second set of analyses include so-called emotional variables (i.e. killings by the left) in the regression models. In the third section, I present the results of a set of robustness tests; these consist mostly of spatial analyses that allow me to check if there are any patterns of spatial autocorrelation that could potentially bias the results of the ordinary multivariate regressions (see chapter 4). The spatial analyses are helpful insofar as they can also inform us on the existence of dynamics of contagion in indirect violence, which would emerge if localities were targeted only because of their proximity to targeted locations, independently of their individual characteristics. Although from a theoretical perspective I do not expect these spatial contagion dynamics to take place, checking for them will provide further robustness to the results.

5.2. Descriptive Analyses

Map 5.1 depicts the distribution of people killed by Nationalist bombings in Catalonia, during the totality of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), in ‰ of inhabitants of the locality.[6]

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[5] Data sources are listed in the Appendix III of this chapter.

[6] It must be noted that, since most young men were fighting in the army, children and women comprised a disproportionate share of these victims (SSV 1986).

Map 5.1. Deaths in Bombings, Catalonia (1936-1939)

In Map 5.1, we can observe that the places with more lethal casualties were predominantly urban locations on the coastline,[7] locations close to the French border, or locations close to the Ebro's frontline (in the West) where battalions of soldiers or spare troops were positioned during the Battle of the Ebro (July-December 1938). In particular, people living in the areas surrounding urban places such as Barcelona and Tarragona were the most victimized by these bombardments. These figures are probably the result of the greater degree of population density in

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[7] Sea positions were largely attacked by the navy for strategic reasons (e.g. to impede communications, transportations through sea, and similar) (SSV 1986; 2003b). "All the operations of maritime and naval bombardment were intensified since October 1936 as a result of Franco's desire to slow the military aid that the governmental side was receiving by sea" (SSV 2004: 41).

these municipalities, which made aerial strikes more deadly. Nonetheless, if we look at total number of strikes (Map 5.2) — instead of casualties– we observe very similar patterns of spatial variation: the Nationalists targeted mostly coastal locations, and places on the French border, as well as those close to the frontline of the Ebro (in the West). Also, the logic of bombings is likely to be influenced by population density for it pays more (in terms of number of people killed) to attack densely populated locations than others. There were also several strikes that took place in localities of the interior territory (i.e. the highlands), which do not match these geostrategic type of variables (they affected localities that did not have major military or energy industries).

Map 5.2. Total Bombings, Catalonia (1936-1939)

Hypothesis 2.3 claims a negative relationship between indirect targeting and political domination of a group. We can check the plausibility of this hypothesis by comparing Map 5.2 to Map 5.3, which shows the distribution of Leftist support in the 1936 elections (by municipalities). We can observe that there is indeed some degree of overlap between dominance (by the left) and number of bombings (by the right), at the local level.[8]

Map 5.3. % Support Left in 1936 Elections, Catalonia

Map 5.4 shows the distribution of affiliation with the anarchist trade union CNT in the years preceding the civil war, by municipalities (in percentage levels). Since CNT affiliation was

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[8] The observation of a spatial correlation is not conclusive for it does not control for the impact of other (omitted) variables. The multivariate regressions (further below) will allow us to do this.

quite uncommon, and the municipality is a rather small administrative unit, spatial variation cannot be observed very adequately in this map. By aggregating CNT affiliation by counties, we can observe this spatial distribution slightly better (Map 5.5).[9] We can again observe that there is some overlap between Maps 5.4 and 5.5 and Map 5.2. Yet, the correlation is not perfect: for instance, while the county of *El Berguedà* (in the center of the region) had the highest rate of CNT affiliation (Serra 1989), it is also one of the least affected by Francoist bombings.

Map 5.4. CNT Affiliation (%) (by Municipalities), Catalonia

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
[9] The Appendix of chapter 3 includes a map of the counties of Catalonia, to be used for contextual purposes.

Map 5.5. CNT Affiliation (‰) (by Counties), Catalonia [10]

CNT Affiliation in 1936 (‰)

0<permil<1	
1<permil<2	
2<permil<5	
>5	

If we plot the number of Nationalist bombings with the distribution of % support for the right in the 1936 elections, at the local level (Figure 5.1), we can observe that there is a negative monotonic relationship between these two variables.[11] Hence, while not confirmatory, the hypothesis that bombings are negatively related to the relative number of supporters in a locality seems very plausible in light of these data.

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[10] In this map, the blank legend indicates no affiliation.

[11] In this graph, I have taken out four outliers, which are places that had more than 20 bombings. These were major urban locations along the coastal line (*Barcelona, Tarragona, Reus*) and the border location of *Portbou*.

Figure 5.1. % Support Right and Bombings (1936-1939)

Maps 5.6 – 5.8 depict bombings as disaggregated by each of the civil war years (except for 1936, where there were almost no attacks in Catalonia).[12] These maps allow us to observe that, as the war went by, bombings spread from coastal and urban places toward areas that were less relevant militarily. In 1937 and 1938, most of the bombings took place in nearby urban settings along the coastal line (in cities such as *Tortosa, Barcelona, Tarragona, Sant Feliu de Guíxols*);[13] in locations near the French border (e.g. *Portbou*, which was a major crossroad); in places close to the Aragon war frontline in the province of Lleida (where battles were taking place during the battle of the Segre); in the western counties of the province of Tarragona soldiers of the battle of the Ebro (including members of the International Brigades) were settled

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[12] SSV (1986) explain that in 1936 bombings predominantly targeted coastal locations, as well as border locations (with the aim of cutting communications with France).

[13] SSV (2004: 308) argue that sea localities with harbours were more likely to be targeted.

(Jackson 2008). By 1939, however, bombings started to take place in inland counties, which were not relevant militarily, and in localities that were not particularly large (that is, not industrial centers). These patterns seem to indicate that non-military factors (i.e. political, emotional) may have played a greater role during the late stages of the war than during the early stages. The multivariate regression analyses will allow us to extract more refined conclusions in this regard.

Map 5.6. Bombings, Catalonia (1937)

Map 5.7. Bombings, Catalonia (1938)

Map 5.8. Bombings, Catalonia (1939)

5.3. Main Test

5.3.1. Econometric Models

The descriptive data above support the hypothesis that bombings may be explained not only by strategic, but also by political and emotional factors. In this section, I will test this by means of multivariate regression techniques using a cross-sectional database on bombings in all 1,062 Catalan municipalities. A first general econometric model that will permit us to test hypothesis 2.3 is as follows:

Econometric Model 5.1. Indirect Violence (Political factors)
Bombing$_i$= α + ωSupportRight $_i$ + βX$_i$ + μ_i

I will use different versions of the dependent variable (e.g. number of deaths; number of bombings during the totality of the civil war; bombings disaggregated by years; a dummy measuring whether the locality was bombed or not). Depending on the nature of the dependent variable, I will estimate logit, OLS, NB or ZINB regression models (note that the specification of the ZINB models will be as in the econometric models 4.2 and 4.4, in chapter 4).

In a first model, *Bombdum* is a dummy with value 1 if the locality suffered a strike *that resulted in at least one civilian death* and 0 otherwise. By taking out bombings that involved no civilian deaths, I eliminate those attacks that were purely aimed at infrastructures, roads and harbors, and thus I "clean" the dependent variable.[14] *Support Right* measures % support for the right-wing bloc in the 1936 elections. Following my theory, this variable is expected to have a negative effect on bombings that were perpetrated by Nationalist forces.[15]

X_i includes a number of independent and control variables that have a theoretical justification: as explained above, *Longitude* and *Latitude* are included as proxies of military and geostrategic value of a locality —we however do not have theoretical priors on the direction of their effect. Regarding Longitude, I would expect bombings to increase with proximity to the French border due to the strategic relevance of cross-border locations; yet, as the Ebro's battle affected mostly Southern territories, it is not clear that bombings should decrease with Longitude (note that longitude increases as we go towards the South). Something similar happens with Latitude because, on the one hand, in Catalonia greater latitude implies greater proximity to the sea (and, as we have seen, greater proximity to the sea implies both a greater interest and further opportunities for indirect targeting). Yet, lesser latitude

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[14] I will however also test for the determinants of any type of bombing —including those that did not generate any deaths.

[15] Figure 5A.1 in the Appendix shows the Kernel density estimate of this variable. The distribution is close to "normal" although it is slightly skewed: the median is at a 46.5% and not at the mean level, which is 47.72%.

also implies greater proximity to the war frontline, and this should also enhance bombardments. In reference to Altitude, I expect higher (and therefore more mountainous) locations to be less relevant from a militaristic perspective, and therefore less prone to be targeted. That is because more mountainous locations are more isolated, and less likely to be crucial communication nodes or industrial centers.[16] Population permits us to control for size or degree of urbanization of a locality, which should have a positive effect on bombings. CNT Affiliation, UGT Affiliation and Catholic Center are included as additional proxies for the presence of strong supporters of either the left or the right in the locality. In this sense, I expect CNT and UGT affiliation to have a positive effect on bombings, and Catholic Center to have a negative effect.

I will test for the alternative hypothesis that political parity — and not political domination− is explaining the likelihood of a locality being bombed. For this purpose, I will include Competition in a second regression model (M2). Compabs (Competition index measured with absolute values) will be included in a third model (M3). Furthermore, I will run a fourth model including Support right in the 1933 elections (M4), which should provide further robustness to the results.

In a second econometric model, I will take into account not only strategic or political factors, but also factors endogenous to war, which should allow us to capture the so-called emotional factors. Specifically, killings by the left in a locality are included in the vector of independent variables: I expect these to generate reprisals by the Nationalist army. Since the majority of direct leftist violence took place during the first months of the civil war —from August 1936 to October 1936 (SSV 1989)–, bombings by the right took place after these executions (by the left) had already taken place. Hence, retaliatory attacks are theoretically plausible: Nationalist leaders could get information on the places where their

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[16] As before, the inclusion of the variable "altitude" leads us to lose a significant number of cases. If we run this same regression without this variable (i.e. with a total of 1,052 cases) the results do not change.

supporters had been victimized (via local informants, internal refugees on the Nationalist side, and information conveyed in the press), and punish them.

Econometric Model 5.2. Indirect violence (Political and Emotional Factors)
Bombing$_i$ = ωSupportRight$_i$ + δExecuted Left + βX_i + μ_i

As beforehand, I will test this model with different dependent variables: a dummy variable for targeted locations (vis-à-vis non-targeted ones), total number of bombings, and bombings in particular years of the civil war (i.e. 1937, 1938 and 1939).

5.3.2. Results

Military and Political Variables

To test for the causes of indirect violence at the local level, I first explore the determinants of a locality being lethally targeted anytime during the conflict. I estimate econometric model 5.1 (in its different variations) on the dependent variable *Bombdum*.[17] The results are depicted in Table 5.1.

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[17] Again, this is a dummy that has value 1 if the locality suffered from any deathly bombardment during the civil war and 0 if not. Bombings that did not cause any death are not captured by this variable.

Table 5.1. Logit on Lethal Bombing (Bombdum)

	M1	M2	M3	M4
Population (*1000)	0.370 (0.23)	0.392* (0.23)	0.393* (0.23)	0.396* (0.24)
CNT Affiliation	0.049* (0.03)	0.047* (0.03)	0.047* (0.03)	0.049* (0.03)
UGT Affiliation	0.161** (0.07)	0.171** (0.07)	0.171** (0.07)	0.171** (0.07)
Catholic Center	2.224 (1.56)	1.891 (1.55)	1.909 (1.55)	1.949 (1.52)
Latitude (*1000)	-0.005** (0.00)	-0.006*** (0.00)	-0.006*** (0.00)	-0.006*** (0.00)
Longitude (*1000)	0.004 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)
Altitude (*1000)	-1.410*** (0.54)	-1.654*** (0.56)	-1.663*** (0.56)	-1.610*** (0.56)
Support Right 1936	**-0.016** (0.01)			
Competition		**0.862** (0.73)		
Competition (Abs)			**0.482** (0.53)	
Support Right 1933				**-0.002** (0.01)
Constant	-15.691 (15.87)	-24.234 (15.60)	-23.637 (15.66)	-22.873 (15.75)
Observations	870	870	870	866
Chi2	61.282	49.795	49.015	48.163
Aic	633.651	637.249	637.641	634.226

Robust standard errors in brackets.
Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .001

The results in M1 of Table 5.1 show that, controlling for all other variables in the model, % support for the right in the 1936

elections has a significant negative effect on the likelihood of a locality suffering from a lethal bombardment. CNT affiliation and UGT affiliation take both positive and significant signs, thus indicating that the right was more likely to indirectly attack places with a greater proportion of leftist militants. Also, as expected, Altitude has a negative effect on the likelihood of bombings, as predicted. Catholic center is not statistically significant, thus not supporting the hypothesis that enclaves of the right such as religious centers were less likely to be targeted than other localities. Latitude takes a negative significant sign, indicating that Eastern locations were more likely to be targeted: this is consistent with the fact that seashore localities were more relevant strategically, as well as that they could be more easily targeted due to the use of maritime artillery; Longitude, in contrast, has no significant effect on bombings.

Figure 5.2 depicts the predicted likelihood of bombing by levels of support for the right (all other variables in the regression are set at their mean level). We can observe that the marginal impact of this variable is substantially non-negligible.

Figure 5.2. Predicted Likelihood of Lethal Bombing by % Support Right

[Key: grey lines depict 95% confidence interval]

In Table 5.1, none of the alternative independent variables (in models M2, M3 and M4) shows as significant to explain bombings. Importantly, the non-significance of Competition (calculated with either the quadratic or the absolute index) allows us to rule out the hypothesis that indirect violence is explained by the same factors that account for direct violence, and this is consistent with my theoretical model. The results of M4 indicate that 1933 political alignments are not significant in explaining wartime indirect violence.

In Table 5.2, I present the results of a set of OLS regressions with total number of people killed (per thousand inhabitants) as the dependent variable. In this regression, in addition to the usual variables in X_i, I introduce a dummy for Urban locations in order to control for the disproportional effect of bombs on number of casualties in urban centers (due to their population density).

Table 5.2. OLS on ‰ Killed in Bombings

	M1	M2	M3	M4
Population	-0.005*	-0.005*	-0.005*	-0.006*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban	4.387*	4.531*	4.527*	4.573*
	(2.43)	(2.43)	(2.43)	(2.44)
CNT Affiliation	0.064**	0.067**	0.068**	0.067**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
UGT Affiliation	0.319*	0.328*	0.329*	0.331*
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Catholic Center	-0.296	-0.484	-0.470	-0.088
	(1.98)	(1.98)	(1.98)	(1.96)
Latitude (*1000)	-0.003*	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Longitude (*1000)	0.005	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Altitude (*1000)	-0.783**	-0.988**	-1.009**	-0.966**
	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.40)
Support Right 1936	-0.014***			
	(0.00)			
Polarization		0.238		
		(0.43)		
Compabs			-0.085	
			(0.37)	
Support Right 1933				-0.005*
				(0.00)
Constant	-18.099	-24.702*	-24.311*	-24.671*
	(14.46)	(14.50)	(14.48)	(14.62)
Observations	870	870	870	866
Aic	4279.320	4284.812	4284.923	4263.391

Robust standard errors in brackets.
Sig Level: *.1, **.05, *** .001

Consistent with the results in Table 5.1, the coefficient of Support Right is negative and significant. As expected, Urban is

also positively related to lethal casualties; yet, the inclusion of this dummy makes the coefficient of Population to be negative. The remaining variables take similar signs and statistical significance as in the previous table. Interestingly, support right in the 1933 elections does show itself to be significant in this model, providing additional robustness to the results.

With an NB specification, I regress number of bombings in a locality during the totality of the civil war (*Total Bombings*) on the same set of independent and control variables (Table 5.3). The results are consistent with those in Table 5.1, and they support the hypothesis that domination (and not competition) accounts for indirect targeting of localities.

Table 5.3 NB on Total Bombings

	M1	**M2**	**M3**	**M4**
Population (*1000)	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
CNT Affiliation	0.068	0.087*	0.086*	0.086*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
UGT Affiliation	0.194*	0.236**	0.236**	0.232**
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Catholic Center	1.246**	1.088*	1.096*	1.204*
	(0.60)	(0.65)	(0.65)	(0.64)
Latitude (*1000)	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Longitude (*1000)	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Altitude (*1000)	-2.747***	-3.519***	-3.491***	-3.480***
	(0.60)	(0.65)	(0.65)	(0.67)
Support Right 1936	**-0.029***			
	(0.01)			
Competition		**-0.432**		
		(0.90)		
Competition (Abs)			**-0.533**	
			(0.63)	
Support Right 1933				**-0.004**
				(0.01)
Constant	-6.188	-22.475	-21.482	-24.245
	(17.21)	(18.32)	(18.27)	(18.95)
Lnalpha	1.522***	1.635***	1.628***	1.652***
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Observations	870	870	870	866
Chi2	234.098	217.641	218.966	217.044
Aic	1079.142	1093.141	1092.602	1076.231

Robust Standard Errors in Brackets.
Sig Level: *.1, **.05, *** .001

The results of the ZINB models, which should account for the excess of zeros in the dependent variable Total Bombings, are depicted in Table 5.4. The expectation would be that we attain similar results to those in Table 5.3; yet, the estimation of models 2 and 3 convey some non-consistent results: on the one hand, model 3 (with the independent variable *Compabs*) cannot be optimized; on the other hand, the results for the variable *Competition* are contradictory —as this variable shows itself to be significant and negative in explaining levels of violence (in the NB part of the ZINB model), as well as in the non-occurrence of bombings.

It seems very plausible to assess that the ZINB results are conditioned by the fact that CNT affiliation, which proves to be a significant variable in explaining the likelihood of aerial strikes, cannot be included in the logit part of the ZINB regression (the standard errors are too large). Nonetheless, it must be said that the results of Table 5.3 are consistent with the previous results indicating that Support Right has a negative effect on number of bombings. I will bracket the non-results of these regressions here, as they seem mostly driven by issues related to the econometric specification.

Table 5.4. ZINB on Total Bombings

	M1	M2	M3	M4
Population (*1000)	0.086*	0.081*	0.081*	0.104**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
CNT Affiliation	-0.009	-0.004	-0.004	-0.006
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
UGT Affiliation	0.073	0.077	0.077	0.093
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Catholic Center	1.180*	1.232*	1.219*	1.184
	(0.67)	(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.76)
Latitude (*1000)	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Longitude (*1000)	0.007	0.006	0.007	0.012**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Altitude (*1000)	-1.924**	-1.796**	-1.968***	-2.640***
	(0.77)	(0.75)	(0.73)	(0.74)
Support Right 1936	**-0.022****			
	(0.01)			
Competition		-3.128***		
		(1.19)		
Competition (Abs)			-1.911***	
			(0.74)	
Support Right 1933				0.002
				(0.01)
Constant	-31.416	-24.571	-30.088	-52.707**
	(21.20)	(21.34)	(20.78)	(21.28)
INFLATE				
Population (*1000)	-3.880***	-3.778***	-3.812***	-3.948***
	(0.85)	(0.78)	(0.82)	(0.88)
UGT Affiliation	-0.000	0.004	0.011	0.011
	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.26)
Catholic Center	8.225	8.072	8.062	8.279
	(6.05)	(5.38)	(5.42)	(6.03)
Latitude (*1000)	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.002
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Longitude (*1000)	-0.002	-0.006	-0.004	0.000
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Altitude (*1000)	0.579	1.000	0.797	0.209
	(1.29)	(1.23)	(1.21)	(1.31)

Support Right 1936	**-0.004** (0.02)			
Competition		-3.796** (1.90)		
Competition (Abs)			-2.089 (1.31)	
Support Right 1933				0.004 (0.01)
Constant	13.402 (36.39)	31.246 (35.65)	23.610 (35.09)	0.867 (36.48)
Lnalpha	0.363 0.22	0.323 0.22	0.325 0.22	0.436** 0.22
Observations	869	869	869	865
chi2	106.875	108.967	108.787	102.867
aic	955.808	954.097	954.933	946.687

Standard Errors in Brackets.
Sig Level: *.1, **.05, *** .001

All in all, the results in this sub-section indicate that bombings are explained by both military and political factors, as hypothesized. On the one hand, the geography of a location (e.g. proximity to the sea, proximity to the French border or to the frontline, altitude) is clearly relevant in targeting. Size of the locality, which is connected to urbanization and industrialization, and –during wartime- with weapon fabrication and storage, also has a positive impact on bombings. With regard to political factors, not only can we observe a monotonic negative relationship between % support for the right in the elections and the likelihood of bombing (as well as number of bombings), but also those places with greater levels of CNT and UGT affiliation are more likely to suffer lethal bombardments. I have argued that this is probably due to an interest in attacking the strongholds of the enemy from the perspective of the group perpetrating the violence (in this case, the right).

Emotional Variables

I now turn to the exploration of the hypothetical effect of what I called emotional variables — or variables endogenous to the civil war (econometric model 5.2). As I have argued, bombing civilians could have been a way to punish localities where the anarchists and other militiamen had been severe against the rightists, namely in a form of collective retaliation. Armed groups may be interested in satisfying domestic audiences (i.e. in their own rearguards), and that they may be willing to be compliant with their emotions, including those of revenge or retaliation.[18]

I run four different NB models, with four different dependent variables: number of bombings in each of the years (1937; 1938; 1939), and total number of bombings received by a locality during the whole civil war. In addition to the independent and control variables in the models above, Executed Left is included in the vector of explanatory variables.[19] As before, I include a measure of Urban in order to control for the greater ratio of bombings that are likely to occur in bigger locations –and that are otherwise likely to be captured by the dummy Catholic Center.

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[18] Abellà argues that in the rearguard territories of Spain, astonishment was the predominant feeling among the population, but that this feeling progressively got more violent (Abellà 1973: 58).

[19] Note that, as I have proved in chapter 4, support for the left (right) has no effect on leftist (rightist) killings, so there are no potential endogeneity issues when including executed left and support right in the same regression model.

Table 5.5. NB on Total Bombings, with Executed Left

	1937	1938	1939	Total Bombs
Population (*1000)	-0.013	-0.073*	-0.122**	-0.086**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Executed Left	**0.004**	**0.022***	**0.035***	**0.026****
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
CNT Affiliation	0.001	0.019	0.052***	0.050*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
UGT Affiliation	0.027	0.149	0.113***	0.14*
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.03))	(0.08)
Catholic Center	0.776	-1.230	-2.391*	-1.414
	(1.49)	(1.34)	(1.3)	(1.07)
Latitude (*1000)	-0.005	-0.005	0.014***	0.000
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Longitude (*1000)	0.009	0.003	-0.006	0.002
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Altitude (*1000)	-16.305***	-3.512***	-0.035	-2.805***
	(4.27)	(0.86)	(0.75)	(0.60)
Support Right 1936	**-0.039***	**-0.031***	**-0.023***	**-0.032****
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-40.059	-11.111	21.362	-6.710
	(41.87)	(20.09)	(27.17)	(17.43)
Lnalpha	0.966	1.800	1.210	1.486
	(0.38)	(0.24)	(0.36)	(0.18)
Observations	870	870	870	870
chi2	323.337	212.911	614.426	291.229
aic	333.861	760.990	478.691	1074.160

Robust Standard Errors in Brackets.
Sig Level: *.1, **.05, *** .001

In Table 5.5, we can observe that Executed Left has a positive effect on the likelihood of bombings taking place from 1938

onwards.[20] The effect of retaliation does not rule out the effect of Support Right, which remains substantively and statistically significant in all models. These results indicate that the bombing count in a particular locality increases with the number of executions by the left.

To sum up, the results with data on bombings in Catalonia are overall supportive of the hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework (chapter 2). They indicate that political factors, in addition to geostrategic factors, are playing a role in explaining indirect violence in the early stages of a civil war. Emotional factors —which I have operationalized with previous direct violence by the rival group in a locality– also play an increased role, and their substantial impact increases as the war develops. This is consistent with a framework combining exogenous and endogenous variables in explaining wartime victimization of civilians, which —as we have seen in chapter 4– also accounts for direct violence.

5.4. Spatial Analyses

Also drawing on the database of bombings in Catalonia, I undertake a number of analyses in order to check if there are patterns of spatial dependence in the data, which could be biasing the results obtained with ordinary regression techniques. Here I am using "point based data", so I use Euclidean distances to generate weights. I estimate Moran's I for the set of dependent variables I have used in the multivariate analyses above, in order to check for spatial autocorrelation. This statistic indicates the level of association between the values of this variable and the lagged version of the variable (i.e. the weighted averages of the

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[20] Note that the number of executed is not disaggregated by years – that is, the same figures are counting for each of the years. In this sense, it is interesting to see that the relative effect of direct killings is lagged, as it increases with the years.

values for neighboring localities). The interpretation of the Moran's I (which goes from 0 to 1) is as explained in chapter 4: when close to 0, the correlation between the spatially lagged variable (e.g. w_totalbombs) and the variable (e.g. bombs) is inexistent; when close to 1, this is very strong. The results (in Table 5.6) and the various Moran's scatterplots displayed in the Appendix indicate that we should not be concerned by patterns of autocorrelation in the dependent variables, and thus that the ordinary multivariate regression results are reliable. Indeed, in Table 5.6, all the values of Moran's I are close to 0; and all the Moran's scatterplots display a flat line.

Table 5.6. Moran's I for Autocorrelation

DV	Moran's I	Global Autocorrelation?
Total Bombs	0.0159	No
Total Deaths (by bombs)	0.0057	No
Bombings 1937	0.036	No
Bombings 1938	0.013	No
Bombings 1939	0.015	No

The results of the spatial error model, which I do not display here, are also supportive of the idea that the technology of indirect violence is not vulnerable to contagion effects in the independent variables (e.g. that degree of competition in one locality was affecting bombing in another locality).

5.5. Test of Implications and Extensions

As explained in chapter 2, an implication of my theoretical framework is that indirect violence will target places hosting IDPs —i.e. people having left one's control area and who thereby show

strong loyalties with the rival group. Although not bounded to indirect violence, research on massacres in Colombia (Steele 2008) has provided some evidence in this direction.[21] For the particular case of Spain, some historians have pointed out that places with larger numbers of internally displaced people were more intensively victimized by the right (e.g. Guernica, as argued by Vidal 1997). A written testimony (in a magazine of the period: *Sembrador*) of a woman who left the city of Malaga, recounts how the Francoist army prosecuted people as they left the city, bombing them: "In the midst of a shrapnel rain, we took the flight. Everyone in the city looked for salvation because nobody in Malaga wanted the Fascism. The roads and fields were black, full of people. . . . At least, 150,000 were fleeing toward Almeria. . . . we were prosecuted by a squad of fighter planes that discharged shrapnel on us, who were defenseless".

From a theoretical perspective patterns of prosecution of groups of individuals are less plausible regarding direct violence than regarding indirect violence; that is because the dynamics of local collaboration that we have argued to be driving patterns of direct violence are somewhat impermeable to out-of-town individuals. From an empirical perspective, in Catalonia it is also less plausible to observe these patterns regarding direct violence because most of these IDPs left their host towns when the Francoist army was approaching the territory (Pujol 2003), and thus they could not be directly victimized by the Nationalists. To test the implication that locations with larger number of IDPs will be more likely targeted with indirect violence, I collected data on the total number of internally displaced that were living in a

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[21] Steele's refers to an irregular civil war, and not a CCW. From a theoretical perspective, we should not expect differences as a consequence of type of warfare, as armed groups in both types of war will be equally interested in eliminating those that have fled from their controlled territories due to ideological attachments. Yet, as explained, the difference is that while in irregular civil war frontlines are fluid and permeable —and therefore displacement is a more plausible option for individuals–, in CCW they are not.

locality during different stages of the civil war.[22] With these data I can test, using the same empirical models above, the impact of the presence of these IDPs (measured with % of the population of the locality) on the likelihood of a locality being bombed. I run a logit regression on Bombdum, and a NB model on Bombings (both total and disaggregated by years, following the example in Table 5.5). I include different specifications of the independent variable: lagged IDPs (% IDPs in the previous year), or IDPs of the same year. Yet, in none of the cases did this variable show to be statistically significant, thus allowing us to reject this observable implication. Since the inclusion of this variable does not change any of the results reported in the models above, I do not include the non-results these analyses here, but they are available upon request.

In this chapter, I have argued that executions by leftist militias may have led to selective retaliation by Nationalist air forces against localities where rightist supporters were more strongly victimized. A caveat: one could argue that the relationship was in fact the reverse; that direct killings were a consequence and not a cause of indirect violence. In several historical accounts, e.g. Preston (1986: 248) and SSV (1989; 2003), it is argued that aerial bombardments affecting one's rearguard sometimes made the groups perpetrate increased levels of direct violence against civilians. These cases of retaliation implied very often the execution of prisoners (in the so-called *sacas*). This is what happened for example on the ship *Aragon*, where prisoners were being held by the Republican navy: "As a result of a bombardment of the Nationalist air force over Mahón, all the prisoners in the ship, even the doctors, were executed in reprisal" (Moreno de Alborán and Moreno de Alborán 1998: 239).[23]

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[22] Source: Serrallonga (2004).

[23] On some occasions, it looks like these retaliations were not even well founded; for example, in a report of the General Security Direction (Police) of Toledo, we can read "around 80 people were taken out from the provincial prison during the night of 23 August 1936, and they were killed as a reprisal for the bombardment of the Red air force, which

Following these historian's insights, Herreros and Criado (2009) analyze the effect of bombings on leftist violence in Catalonia. They find a positive impact of bombings on executions. However, it must be noted that the number of massacres issuing as a reprisal from aerial and naval bombardments in Catalonia, as reported by historians, is quite limited, and concentrated on very specific dates: 30 October 1936, after the incursion of a war boat in the harbor of *Roses*, which led to a wave of assassinations across the territory; 16 November 1936 in *Palamós*; 13 February 1937 in Barcelona (SSV 2003).[24] Also, as I have explained, most of the bombardments in Catalonia took place in 1937, after the largest share of leftist violence had already taken place. In fact, if I run the same regressions in chapter 4 with Bombings as an independent variable (either total bombings or disaggregated by years), I also obtain a significant "effect" of bombings (on number of executions. (The estimates of the remaining independent variables do not change substantively). However, simply because the coefficient is significant does not mean that this is capturing a causal relationship; in this case, in fact, this causal relationship seems questionable given the historical sequence of events. Also, when looking at bombings disaggregated by years, only those taking place after 1938 show to be statistically significant in explaining leftist executions. This again goes in the direction of indicating that the relationship between bombings and direct violence is such that the latter affected the former, and not the reverse.

In summary, both the historical accounts (including primary sources) and the descriptive and confirmatory analyses in this chapter suggest that Herreros and Criado (2009) got the story upside down. The type of test they perform could be in fact more

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accidentally targeted the Red barricades" (Informe 4741, *Causa General*, Pieza 4, Checas, 1049/1).

[24] SSV (2003: 64-73) detail all the cases of reprisal after bombardments in Spain, which took place in the following locations: *Gijón; Malaga; Cartagena; Menorca; Ibiza; Alicante; Guadalajara; Santander; Irún; Bilbao; San Sebastián.*

plausible regarding regions such as Mallorca or Huesca and Zaragoza, in Aragon, where historical accounts are more supportive of the existence of these retaliatory executions, and where the timing of the bombings and the executions would be more coherent with this type of account (see SSV 2003 or Ledesma 2009b for more details on retaliatory executions).

5.6. Conclusions

This chapter has presented a set of descriptive data and confirmatory analyses on the determinants of indirect violence in the rear territories of a CCW. The results, drawn from data on Nationalist bombings in Catalonia during the SCW, support the hypothesis that political dominance by the enemy group has an effect on levels of indirect violence at the local level. Competition, in contrast, does not appear to be explanatory of indirect violence, and this is because —contrary to face to face violence–, civilian agency is irrelevant for bombings and similar indirect attacks.

The results are relevant insofar as they demonstrate that political variables are still crucial in the context of CCW (versus what is argued by Kocher *et al.* 2008), and they are consistent with a theoretical framework that emphasizes the will of armed groups to cleanse the rearguard territories of enemies, by all possible means —namely, direct or indirect violence. The findings in this chapter are also important from a theoretical perspective, as they shed light on the idea that the concept of indiscriminate violence may be too blurred, and that selective violence can be taking place at the level of a community, as well as the level of the group (Steele 2009). Anecdotal evidence from the SCW supports this insight: for example, regarding Nationalist bombings in Madrid (autumn-winter 1936), "the neighborhood least affected by the bombs in Madrid was that of Salamanca, which was the one inhabited by many of the supporters of the rebellion. Franco ordered not to bomb it" (SSV 2003: 56).

Taken together, the results in this chapter also illustrate that, in addition to exogenous factors, bombings are influenced by the dynamics of the war (namely direct assassinations perpetrated by the opposite group at the local level). This is consistent with the "rivalry and revenge" framework outlined in chapter 2.

Appendix Chapter 5 (I). Additional Tables and Figures

Table A5.1. Distribution of Bombings in the Sample

Total Bombings	Frequency	Percent
0	915	86.16
1	84	7.91
2	22	2.07
3	9	0.85
4	12	1.13
5	2	0.19
7	5	0.47
9	3	0.28
11	1	0.09
12	1	0.09
13	2	0.19
14	1	0.09
15	1	0.09
21	1	0.09
39	1	0.09
89	1	0.09
212	1	0.09
Total	1,062	100

Figure A5.1. Kernel Density Estimate for Support Right 1936

Appendix Chapter 5 (II). Tables and Figures for Spatial Analyses

Figure A5.2. Moran Scatterplot. Total Bombings

Figure A5.3. Moran Scatterplot. Total Deaths in Bombings

Figure A5.4. Moran Scatterplot. Bombings 1937

Figure A5.5. Moran Scatterplot. Bombings 1938

Figure A5.6. Moran Scatterplot. Bombings 1939

Appendix Chapter 5 (III). Notes on Sources and Coding

SSV (1986) is the only source of data used in this chapter. These authors have collected data on number of bombings, and number of victims of bombings, using different primary sources, namely: all the civil registers in Catalonia; documentation in the Defense Council of Catalonia (*Junta de Defensa Pasiva de Cataluña* —located in the National Archive of the Spanish Civil War in Salamanca); local archives and press of the time. Thus, as with the data on executions (chapter 4), the triangulation method pursued by these historians offers us a great deal of reliability in the data.

Note that I have coded bombardments or bombings such that each event may include a whole military operation; this may imply the throwing of more than one bomb.

CHAPTER 6. MECHANISMS

6.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide additional qualitative and quantitative evidence supporting the mechanisms detailed in the theory section of this dissertation, and only partially validated by the large-n analyses performed in chapters 4 and 5. Even though the substantive and statistical significance of the regression coefficients have substantively backed my hypotheses, further evidence is required to assure us that these coefficients are capturing the hypothesized mechanisms —and not alternative mechanisms. With the inclusion of these additional qualitative data, which I have collected from primary and secondary sources —including semi-structured interviews conducted with civil war survivors– I should be able to acquire some degree of confidence in the hypothesized theoretical micro-foundations.[1] All the qualitative evidence presented in this chapter also comes from the Spanish Civil War.

The evidence has been assembled and organized by "topics". I start by introducing micro-evidence on the way prewar political identities and local political dynamics influenced direct and indirect violence during the first stage of the civil war (i.e. t_1). The two pathways by which political identities are hypothesized to

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[1] Details on the semi-structured interviews, including the sampling methodology, the interview protocol, and an anonymous list of the subjects are provided in chapter 7.

have an impact on violence are: 1) targeting (by armed groups); and 2) collaboration (by civilians) on the perpetration of direct violence. I address each of these two pathways separately. I then introduce micro-evidence on the mechanisms by which violence of a first stage (i.e. t_1) had an incidence on violence of subsequent stages (i.e. t_2). In addition, this chapter also contains a set of multivariate regression analyses that contribute toward the understanding of violence of non-initial periods (i.e. t_2). In chapter 2, I have argued that revenge is the driving mechanism of violence in t_2 but that this is complementary to prewar political competition, which should also be affecting violence in this period. Here, I provide some evidence on the joint effect of "rivalry" (i.e. prewar competition) and "revenge" (i.e. retaliation) on violence taking place in t_2. In addition, I explore the idea that retaliation in t_2 does not issue only from the experience of lethal violence in t_1 but also from other types of victimization —for example, private property expropriations.

The different pieces of evidence in this chapter do not come from a single locality, but from a variety of them. Also, while some of the qualitative evidence comes from territories that were considered in the large-*n* analyses of the previous chapters (those in Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia, and the province of Malaga), some of it comes from other regions. Thus, the multi-method research employed here does not qualify as "nested analysis" (Lieberman 2005), albeit it maintains a close connection with this method; like the small-n analyses in nested analysis, the aim here is no other than "to gain contextually based evidence that a particular causal model or theory actually 'worked' in the manner specified by the model" (Lieberman 2005: 442).

6.2. Violence in t$_1$

6.2.1. Targeting

a. Targeting Based on Political Identities

Indirect Violence

A great number of primary and secondary sources suggest that targeting during the SCW was highly based on the political loyalties of individuals. There is however more qualitative evidence concerning direct rather than indirect violence: indeed, I have not found any official military files with explicit resolutions on the bombing of locations based on the political identities of their citizens.[2] Yet, there is some secondary historical evidence sustaining the hypothesis that political alignments were crucial to the perpetration of indirect violence. For example, as mentioned in chapter 5, in the city of Madrid, no bombs were dropped on the "conservative" neighborhood of Salamanca as a result of explicit orders from Franco (SSV 2003: 56). Something similar happened in the city of Barcelona, as reported in a novel by Montserrat Roig (2007).[3] More indirectly, Llaó reports a conversation with a man who learned about the bombing of the locality of *El Perelló* by Fascist forces, which seemed somewhat "puzzling" because the location was not strategic from a military point of view. "The man asked, 'Who won the elections of 16 February 1936?' When we answered that the left had won, he replied, 'Then, well bombed it is'" (Llaó 2006: 9).

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[2] Although, following Neely (2007), if we aim at understanding the causes of violence, it is more helpful to look at actual violence rather than to examine archives on "grand military strategy", which may misreport real violence.

[3] See initial quotation in chapter 5.

Direct Violence

Regarding direct violence, even if it was not always the case that those executed were affiliated with political parties or trade unions, it is certainly the case that people with these types of affiliations were overwhelmingly targeted —in contrast to other citizens. Some of the evidence in chapter 3, as well as detailed and systematic evidence on the militancy of the victims —as listed in secondary[4] or primary[5] sources– is supportive of this.[6] For example, in Table 3.2 (in chapter 3) we have seen that 80% of those killed by the left in the city of Teruel were members of right-wing parties.[7] In Catalonia, of the total of 8,009 individuals executed by the left, 1,521 have been identified as affiliated with right-wing political parties (e.g. TYRE, LlR, CEDA, *Acció Ciutadana*, FE, RE, *Unión Patriótica de la Dictadura*) (SSV 1989). In reference to leftist violence in the province of Santander, Gutiérrez Flores argues that "The age group with the largest number of victims is 25-29 years old, that is, the most dynamic sector of the population, the one that includes the youth leaders of the rightist political parties and components of the youth cadres" (2006: 71). In Aragon, ". . . . among the assassinated [by the fascists], we find Republican bourgeois, political authorities, trade union leaders, workers, peasants, women and many citizens that during the Republic had openly shown hostility against the holders of a social order that they deemed unfair" (Casanova *et al*. 2001:

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[4] E.g. SSV (1989); Gabarda (1993; 1996); Casanova (2001); Cenarro (2002b); Ledesma (2003); Juliá (2004); Cifuentes and Maluenda (2006); Gutiérrez Flores (2006); Rodrigo (2008).

[5] E.g. *La Causa General* for leftist violence.

[6] Note however that the quantitative evidence we have available is on executed people; in other words, we do not have evidence on people who were targeted but not killed.

[7] In the region of Teruel, victims were distributed as follows: 80.23% were sympathizers or militants of right-wing parties; 7.85% were sympathizers or militants of left-wing parties; 2.92% had an unclear political affiliation (Casanova 2008).

221). Also regarding Nationalist violence in Aragon, Cenarro (2002b) argues that "among the first to fall we find the military loyal to the Republic, some worker's leaders who opposed the coup more energetically, and the Republican and Socialist politicians who occupied important positions in the local institutions" (Cenarro 2002b).

The following three excerpts —taken from the *Causa General* archive– refer to assassinations that took place in the province of Toledo during the period of leftist control. They support the idea that those primarily targeted (either detained or executed) were prominent rightists (i.e. strong supporters of the right):

> In the *Torre de Esteban Hambrán* (Toledo) the "reds" found in July 1936 Juan Aguadó López and Casimiro Escudero Piñero, who were the leaders of the *Falange* and of the [right wing] militias, respectively, and took them out of their homes, riding them around the village. They were then tied to a street light, where they were physically and verbally harassed by a mob. The same men and women who lynched them then brought them to the jail of the City Hall until the dawn of August 2nd, when they were led to the *Alamin* hill, together with other neighbors of the locality, Telesforo López López and Martín López Aguadó. After committing all types of violations against them, they tied them to a holm oak, where they were assassinated. But, before killing Juan Aguadó Lopez, they cut his penis and testicles, and put them in his mouth. (*Causa General*, 1049.2, Toledo)

> In a place called Muni they found a person who had fled from Dos-Barrios (Toledo), a right-winger and an honest person. He was captured by the Marxists, and was stoned him to death in the public streets, in front of the so-called Authority (*Causa General*, 1049.1, pieza 21)

> The committee, which was formed by the most distinguished Marxists, ordered the organization of the militias into groups, who were commanded to start detaining right-wing people, who were then led to designated locations such as the Municipal warehouse or prison, the chapel of Sant Antó or the local church, which had been

habilitated for these purposes (*Causa General*, 1049.1, Toledo, pieza 61).

Written memoirs of militiamen and soldiers provide insights on the motivations of those who were assassinating in the rear territories. See, for example, what the anarchist militiaman Eduardo de Guzmán wrote in 1938 about the executions perpetrated by anarchist militiamen in Madrid:

> In Madrid, Fascism has been squashed. Yet, there is still danger. There are hundreds, or even thousands, who are affiliated with the *Falange Española*, to the *TYRE*, or to the *UME*. There are people who ambush with weapons, who hold meetings and conspire to take advantage of any moment of weakness. We must remain alert and vigilant . . . . As much as we pay attention to the frontlines, we must not overlook Madrid. To patrol Madrid, no rifles are needed. Guns are enough. Rifles have been sent to the trenches. Short arms provide a good service to the city. One thousand fellows are guarding Madrid. They chase out hidden fascists, they exterminate the *pacos*, they patrol the roads, they meticulously cleanse the city of all the enemies (De Guzmán 1938/2004: 88).

In this passage, De Guzmán is making reference to the early stages of the war; at that time, killing was perceived as even more *vital* to secure the rear territories of potential enemies. Interestingly, this militiaman explains that rifles are not necessary in this rearguard city —"short weapons" (e.g. handguns) are enough. This is illustrative of the way warfare differs across areas (i.e. frontline versus rearguard) —in a CCW. (This type of division of weaponry would be unthinkable in the context of an irregular civil war.) In another passage, De Guzmán also provides interesting evidence on the lack of information held by militiamen who were patrolling the territory —and who would therefore need to rely on local collaboration in order to kill strong supporters of the enemy. Regarding the conquest of the province of Guadalajara, in the early stages of the civil war, he says:

The men are divided into several groups. Three, four or five cars, full of men, are thrown to the adventure, to keep on conquering fascist villages. They never know if the village they are approaching is ours, or of the enemy (De Guzmán 1938/2004: 79).

In order to gain security, not only military personnel or armed ambushers (*emboscados*) were targeted: members of right-wing political parties were targeted too:

Foreseeing a future fight against socialists and communists after the victory of the Popular Front, the anarcho-syndicalists took care to stockpile weapons and munitions for the "final fight" and to "clean" the capital of the Republic from fascists, in first place, and Republicans and even Marxists, in second place (Campoamor 2005: 98).

The anarchist militiawoman Clara Campoamor makes reference not only to violence against right-wingers (i.e. fascists), but also to violence that took place within the left bloc in Madrid, which is also reported in other locations (e.g. in Catalonia — Orwell 1938; in Aragon —Gil 2006). It must however be noted that this violence constituted only a small share of the totality of violence that took place in the Republican zone.[8]

b. Targeting Based on Other Factors

There are obviously many "grey areas" in the degree of selectivity in targeting.[9] For example, many testimonies report the assassination of individuals who were not involved in politics. That is the case of the elders or adolescents who were assassinated by the troops led by General Tella in the county of *El Pallars*

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[8] For example, in Catalonia, only a total of 139 victims of leftist violence (1.7% of the total) are identified as victims of intra-leftist conflict. These are militants of leftist political parties or trade unions (ERC, POUM, CNT-FAI, UGT) (SSV 1989).

[9] Again, as explained in chapter 2, direct violence does not necessarily correspond with selective violence.

(Gimeno 1989; Barbal 1996; *Testimonies 53, 54, 55, 56, 57*),[10] or by General Yagüe —and the *Falangist* militias– in Badajoz (Espinosa 2005). Also, the identification of political enemies was sometimes based on very weak evidence (if any); Chaves (1995) reports the case of a couple of men who were killed by the Nationalists only because they were seen greeting with the sign of Marxism. *Testimony 42* told me that she was detained because two of her classmates accused her of being a "red", despite the fact that she came from a right-wing family.

Members of particular *labor groups* (a proxy for social class) were also targeted on a selective basis. As Paul Preston explains, sometimes the "guilt" of the individuals was manifested in their profession; he cites the Nationalist Captain Gonzalo de Aguilera, who argued that the working class had to be exterminated: "Any individual who will go down on his knees to clean your shoes in a coffee house or on the street is a Communist, so why not just kill him immediately?" (cited in Preston 1986: 233). Violence by the Nationalists disproportionally targeted industrial workers, peasants, professors, or members of liberal professions who were associated to the left, as well as members of significantly unionized sectors of the tertiary service (e.g. railroad workers).[11] Conversely, members of the clergy, landowners, industrial owners, and members of "upper class" professional corps such as lawyers, engineers, traders, or doctors were disproportionally targeted by the left.[12] As explained, anticlerical violence was severe throughout the territory. In Catalonia, 26% of the victims of the left were members of the clergy (SSV 1989). In Aragon, "In many places, the priest was the only victim of violence" (Casanova 2004: 164).

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[10] In *El Pallars*, those executed by Francoist forces were mostly people over 70 years old, teenagers of around 16 years old, and some pregnant women (Gimeno 1989).

[11] E.g. Gabarda (1994); Casanova (2001); Casanova (2007).

[12] E.g. SSV (1989); Gabarda (1995); Casanova (2007); Ledesma (2009b); Herreros and Criado (2009).

In other cases, the victimization was determined by the *wartime behavior* of individuals (e.g. collaboration or non-collaboration with the armed group controlling a territory): "The individualist peasant who showed disagreement with the behavior of the local council or militias, like the tavern owner of *Castelnou* did, was considered a non-sympathizer of the regime (*desafecto al régimen*)" (Casanova, 2007: 92). In his memoirs, Plácido Gil recounts how a girl from the CNT, who sold the anarchist newspaper (*Solidaridad Obrera*) on the streets kept a good record of who bought the newspaper and who did not (2006: 91); she was an informant to the anarchists on who were sympathizers of this group, and who were not. According to the memoirs of a citizen from the village of *Ascó* collected in Sánchez (1999), collaborative behavior vis-à-vis the group partially determined the fate of the people in the locality: some people who "collaborated with the anarchists" could have their lives spared, despite the fact that they had been right wingers (e.g. members of the political group *Acció Ciutadana*). Note that while "hidden" non-collaboration is very relevant in explaining outcomes in my theoretical framework, open or pubic non-collaborative behavior is "off the equilibrium path" in the context of full control of territories by armed groups, and little exit options for dissident civilians. We can therefore expect this to be very uncommon. Referring to the most affluent districts of Barcelona during the early stages of the civil war — when Barcelona was undergoing a revolutionary process— although there was "relative calm," Kaminsky argues that this calm "uncovered fear and distrust toward the 'Revolution'" (Kaminsky 1937/2002: 37). Regarding the bourgeois living in these areas of the city, he says, "They will be shut up while everything goes well, but if things changed, they would immediately become active. It is very easy to guess that a whole social class lives and hates [the revolution] in these districts" (Kaminsky 1937/2002 37). He also explains how women had stopped wearing hats, as this was a distinctive sign of being part of the "enemy class" (this would thereby endanger them) (35). Regarding the Francoist control period, Ventura explains that in

the town of Valls "it seemed like a miracle to see *Falangists* who some days earlier had been affiliated with the leftist political parties PSUC, ERC, UGT, CNT, FAI" (1993: 33). In his memoirs, Pablo Uriel recounts that "in the Francoist zone, everybody makes sure to come across as a supporter of the rebels" (2005: 377).

c. Local political competition and revelation of strong political identities

One of the mechanisms by which I have argued that prewar political competition affects violence at the local level is by promoting the revelation of strong political identities. The latter promotes a greater willingness to kill by armed groups.[13] On this issue, first-hand qualitative evidence is quite fragmented. Historians refer mostly to prewar mobilization and polarization — but not necessarily to competition– as a trigger for an identity revelation process at the local level.

> The 30s were years of intense ideologization, development and advancement of leftist political parties, as well as trade unionism, which was monopolized by the CNT in this zone [province of Huesca, Aragon]. Out of the 67 localities, at least in 30 of them, leftists would meet in a Republican center or —in its absence– in one of the bars. In many localities there were two bars: in one the leftists met; in the other, the rightists. Many cafeteria-bar owners were executed by both sides accused of having the ideology of the clients!" . . . In some villages, polarization was so deep that even the

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[13] I have assumed that groups receive the input of local civilians in order to build their "priors" on the nature of local supporters. But they can potentially get the information from other sources (i.e prewar political records). Again, groups are interested in eliminating "strong supporters" of the rival, as "weak supporters" are more malleable and do not constitute that much of a threat. And given the structure of incentives of civilians in the context of a CCW, no civilians will display strong loyalties to the enemy group during wartime; the identification of these "strong supporters" of the rival will thus depend on the behavior of individuals during the prewar period.

festivities were divided: there were parties for rightists and parties for leftists (Azpíroz 2007: 372).

Raguer (2007) and Lison-Tolosana (1983, cited in Kalyvas 2006: 66) —among others– provide evidence along the same lines. As explained in chapter 3, the events of the October insurrection have been considered as a trigger for confrontation at the local level, and for the revelation of intense loyalties before the war. In the town of Berga, "the repression following the sixth of October contributed to radicalization, to irritate the spirits, to divide the society in two big blocs" (Serra 1989: 17). Also, in *Torrecilla de Alcañiz*, there was a riot confronting people from left and right six days before the military coup: "There were insults, threats, blows, and risk of imminent bloodshed . . ." (Burgués 1999: 127). In Extremadura, there were daily clashes between people due to political differences: "Physical aggressions between supporters of the left and the right were frequent in the majority of localities" (Chaves 2000: 86).

While most published sources refer to prewar polarization — and not to competition– as a trigger for the revelation of strong political identities, evidence drawn from case studies is supportive of this. For example, in the two neighboring villages of *Rupit* and *Tavertet*, in the area of *Collsacabra* (in Catalonia), which share economic and geographic characteristics, and which are of similar size (they both had around 420 inhabitants at that time), more people were killed by the left in *Rupit* (i.e. 6) than in *Tavertet* (i.e.4). Interestingly, while the former was a leftist locality (the left obtained 62% of the vote in the 1936 elections), the latter was a rightist locality (the right obtained 74.6% of the votes). Yet, in the former, confrontations had already taken place before the war (during the October revolution) (Crosas 2004) and therefore strong identities had been revealed to a greater extent than in the latter. The greater parity of political power in *Rupit* was probably underlying these prewar disputes and tensions (the distribution of economic power and property was very similar to that in *Tavertet*).

In addition, there is also secondary evidence suggesting that the people that were targeted in a greater extent were those who were more mobilized politically —supporting the conjecture that mobilization and violence are interconnected, and that mobilization is a "necessary" condition for civilian targeting in the context of CCW. In this sense, Abellà (1973; 1975) —among others– explains that the local political authorities were those more heavily targeted, on both sides. Or, for example, among those killed in the town of *Puigcerdà,* all of them were people who had voted in the elections; none of the people who were from out of town (e.g. who were in the town for their holidays) were assassinated.[14]

6.2.2. Civilian Collaboration

a. Civilian Agency

With regard to the perpetration of indirect attacks, it is beyond discussion that agency corresponded to the main commanders of each of the armies. Despite the alliance with the Italian and German armies, Franco kept close control over the actions of these foreign armed forces.[15] The General would decide on whether to bomb rearguard cities (full of civilians) or not: "During the years 1937 and 1938, Franco gave the order not to bomb any urban center without his explicit consent" (SSV 2003: 78). No civilian agency is attributed to these attacks, although some testimonies mentioned the existence of rumors on the role of local "fifth columnists" in giving crucial instructions to military commanders on the time of the day and the location where most civilians would

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[14] Josep Pous. Personal communication, February 2007.

[15] I shall not enter here into the debate on the attribution of responsibilities for specific attacks, e.g. the slaughter committed in Guernica by the Condor Legion. For a detailed account of this attack, see, among others, SSV (2003:82-92) or Vidal (1997).

be congregated.[16] The degree to which local civilians can —in general terms– influence the perpetration of indirect violence is very marginal.

Agency is by definition much more fragmented in the case of direct violence. Several secondary and primary accounts provide evidence on the effect that civilian collaboration (or —conversely– resistance) had on executions in a given locality. Esther Casanova's research on the province of Teruel (2007) provides us with several examples:

> The relationship between militias and the committees determined the fate of many right-wing people. In some places, members of the committee did not inform, and this may explain why violence did not take place; in others, detentions occurred in spite of the committee. The committee of *Azaila* managed to return home some neighbors who had been displaced to *Caspe*; its intervention saved many lives. In some villages such as *Vinaceite*, the neighbors reached an agreement according to which, no matter which group entered the locality, nobody would be killed (Casanova 2007: 41).

Casanova (2007) also provides evidence on several cases in which individuals decided to risk their lives in order to alert other neighbors who were included on the "black list"; this allowed these people to escape and to avoid being killed. An oral testimony collected in Sánchez (1999) recounts, along similar lines:

> [In September 1936] some murderers of the FAI of *Casp* came to the village [*Móra d'Ebre*] and brought a list of more than 40 people who had to be assassinated. Those in the local committee stopped them and offered them a big lunch while the father [the priest] left by car to Barcelona to see *Rouret*, who sent the "*Mossos d'Esquadra*" [the police]. The people of the FAI left without killing anyone. However,

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[16] For example, *Testimony 11* mentioned this rumour regarding the bombing of the town of *Granollers*, which took place early morning on the farmer market's day, when hundreds of people were gathered in the city's downtown.

they then went to *Gandesa* and perpetrated the atrocities of 13 September in the midst of the local festivities.

The same oral testimony recalls resistance by the mayor of another village in the province of Tarragona (*Benifallet*):

Armed militiamen came from *Pinell de Brai* with a list that included the name of my father, supposedly, but the representative of the local committee, *Armengol*, and other men from the Republican Center, told them to leave or they would not survive. And they left. That is why nobody was killed in the village.

In his published memoirs, Gil (2006) explains that he — together with some other religious pupils in Barbastro– survived thanks to the intervention of the members of the city council, who told them to leave the religious community and in this way save their lives. He then argues, "I noticed that those who decided about who should die were members of the anarchist committee, although they had the acquiescence of the city council. By saving our lives the city council showed some humanity" (Gil 2006: 42).

Several interviewees offered evidence in a similar direction. That is the case, for example, of *Testimony 38*, who was sixteen years old when the war started and he was living in the village of *Alba de Tormes* (in Castile), which had been controlled by the Nationalists since the beginning of the war. He explains that lists of "suspects" were given to the *Falange* militiamen (led by a man named Pepón), who would patrol across localities killing the people on the list. He argues that, in his town, only 3 out of a list of 8 people were killed because the other 5 "had been protected by some other neighbors."

Chaves's historical research in the province of Caceres furnishes additional examples of the key role of civilian agency regarding violence perpetrated on the Nationalist side. The "veto" was sometimes exerted by the priest of the locality, as in the case

of *Valverde del Fresno* (Chaves 1995: 121).[17] In the town of *Quicena*, in Huesca, the *Falangist* militias wanted to take members of the local council with them (presumably, to execute them). Yet, the newly designated mayor, Ramón Pardo, opposed it: "I am as fascist as you are; nobody is going to leave Quicena" (Azpíroz 2007: 385). This case illustrates that the veto was sometimes exerted by a single individual. On other occasions this was exerted by groups of organized individuals who would talk to the militiamen and convince them not to kill the detainees. And on other occasions, the neighbors would make pacts before the militias entered the localities, committing themselves not to denounce anyone —whomever arrived; "some mayors complied with the pact and impeded deaths taking place" (Azpíroz 2007: 386). In *Talaveruela*, in the province of Caceres, even though the priest and local members of the *Falange* had agreed on not perpetrating executions or *paseos*, two men were killed by militiamen coming from a neighboring locality (Junquera 2009).[18] One of the *Falangists* of the locality led them to where the would-be targets were lurking.

In the Republican rearguard, cases of people hiding priests, nuns and other members of the clergy are numerous. *Testimony 26* explained that the priest of the town was not only hidden in her family's house during the whole period of leftist control, but also celebrated clandestine mass in there. Gutiérrez Flores explains that in the rightist county of *Campoo*, in the province of Santander, people "protected the clergy. . . . In some localities they hid them, they helped them to flee or they refused to deliver them [to the

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[17] Though, on other occasions, the priest would be the main denouncer of suspected leftists, as in the case of Badajoz (Vila Izquierdo 1984).

[18] One of these men (Anastasio) was a politician, a member of the Socialist party. The other (Pedro) was a flamenco singer, and he would accompany the former in the political rallies. People in the village recall Anastasio as having rivalries with the oligarch of the locality.

armed group]" (2000:78).[19] Yet, at the same time, in places such as *Tarragona*, we find examples of the opposite: the archbishop was killed by two peasants who recognized him in his disguise, while he was attempting to flee with the acquiescence of the local Republican authorities (Kaminsky 1937/2002: 145).

Of course, and coherent with my theoretical framework, civilian agency was not only exerted in the direction of "vetoing" violence, but also in the direction of promoting it. In a report of *La Causa General* regarding a village in the province of Toledo (*Escalona*), it is explained that the local Committee had imprisoned the members of the clergy of the locality. Some militiamen from Toledo came into the village to confiscate hens, and, when they were leaving, a prominent member of the local left "went running toward one of the cars and told them to take 'some birds' with them, signaling the two priests of the locality. Immediately after, accompanied by this man, the militiamen proceed to detain them and to take them to the road that goes from *Maqueda* to Toledo, and they killed them in the proximities of the cemetery of this town" (*Causa General*, 1049.2, Toledo).[20]

The veto power of local civilians to the actions of the groups concerned not only lethal violence but also other forms of victimization such as expropriations, or destruction/desecration of

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[19] This author argues that violence was less intense in rural areas because family kin networks worked as a protective net for those who were in danger or targeted. Many of those assassinated were those who were not originally from the place and thus did not have these protection networks (Gutiérrez Flores 2000: 84); in many parts of Spain, this was precisely the case of religious people.

[20] According to this report, in addition to these priests, the left killed in this locality, in chronological order: 1) a "distinguished" rightist of the locality; 2) the vet of the locality; 3) the landlord (who was tortured by a mob of men and women before being killed); 4) a non-identified individual who came into the locality asking for help and who was accused of being a spy.

religious buildings (in the Republican-controlled areas).[21] The cases of the Catalan villages of *Bellver de Cerdanya* (Pous and Solé i Sabaté 1988) or *La Fatarella* (Termes 2005) are examples of the former. In these two locations, moderate leftists (Republicans) organized armed resistance against the actions of the radicals or revolutionaries (members of the anarchist/communist trade unions) who intended to confiscate lands and provisions, as well as to assassinate some rightist leaders.[22] The confrontations led to the death of 3 anarchist militiamen in the first case, and to a total of 34 deaths of local civilians and militiamen in the second case.[23] "In the village of *San Vicente de Alcántara*, in the province of Badajoz, no priest was attacked and the local church was not desecrated because the mayor of the Popular Front kept the keys under requisition" (Casanova 2004: 209). The Francoist army could not establish martial law in *Albalate del Arzobispo*, in Aragon, due to the resistance of labor organizations (Casanova 2007:24). Again, there was significant variation in these types of civilian actions at municipal level; very often, neighbouring locations underwent very different fates: "In the village of *Creixell*, the burning of religious objects was ordered by decree of the mayor; in the [neighbouring] village of *Tamarit*, the mayor decided instead to

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[21] Interestingly, Casanova (2004) argues that there was a profound respect toward religious images among common people, and that the population often more strongly rejected attacks against symbols than against religious people.

[22] As explained, internal divisions in the left bloc were a source of conflict during the civil war; and decisions relating to the economic and political organization of the localities were very often underlying the confrontations between groups. For example, in many cases, the CNT-FAI imposed collectivization without respecting the rights of tenants who worked the land of big owners. This provoked a strong opposition to the collectivization campaigns, which in Catalonia even led to the creation of an "anti-collectivization" bloc with ERC, PSUC, UGT, and Unió de Rabassaires (UR)" (Segura 1999).

[23] *La Fatarella* had at that time 1,426 inhabitants.

locate the religious objects in different houses, in order to preserve them" (Piqué 1998: 129).

b. Local Prewar Political Configurations and Civilian Collaboration

First-hand evidence on civilian collaboration being determined by local political configurations is generally unavailable: I have not found any reports —by neither perpetrators of violence nor their collaborators– explicitly arguing that their actions were driven by strategic motivations (i.e. in order to change the balance of power in the locality). On this, the evidence is mostly indirect: for example, Adolfo Bueso, a former *cenetist*, mentions in his memoirs that revolutionary militiamen were interested in achieving political positions and this is why they collaborated, at the local level, with other politicians —including members of "bourgeois" parties such as ERC or *Acció Catalana*. In his research on the civil war dynamics in Extremadura, Chaves argues that "The *Falangist* leaders and influential people that belonged to this organization decided who had to be executed, and they were led not only by political criteria, but also by professional, economic and personal interests. . . .*With these criminal acts, the murderer assured that his power advanced in the area*" (Chaves 1995: 102; emphasis mine). Serra explains that, in the Catalan town of *Berga*, the imprisonment of leftist leaders after the October insurrection "allowed the right to regain the political dominion" (Serra 1989). Hence, the elimination of the political opposition by means of violence — not necessarily lethal (e.g. imprisonment)– were highly instrumental for local political leaders, even before the onset of the civil war.

Evidence coming from case studies also indirectly backs up this mechanism: in the locality of *Torrecilla de Alcañiz*, which was highly competitive and polarized (see above), three rightists were executed with the consent of the local leaders: "It seems that the members of the Committee were aware of the decision [of the militia] to execute them three days before, but they did nothing to

prevent them" (Burgués 1999: 139). In contrast, in *El Perelló*, in the province of Tarragona, the majority did not kill members of the minority, but rather chose to defend them. *Testimony 58* explained to me that the mayor of this locality (*El Perelló*) — where the Popular Front received 84.5% support in the February elections (thus where political parity between left and right blocs was extremely low)– defended the right-wing people of the locality who were threatened by the militiamen. The only person who was killed in this locality was the priest for, even though he was hidden by the Republicans of the locality, the militiamen managed to find and kill him.[24] Several localities of Cantabria exemplify this converse scenario: these places were politically dominated by the right in the prewar period, and yet they were not victimized by the left because local leftist authorities did not promote violence against their co-villagers; in fact, they even constrained the perpetration of violence. In the county of *Campoo*, in Cantabria, Gutiérrez Flores reports several instances of assassinations that were avoided due to the actions of the local governmental authorities, such as the mayor of the town of *Campoo*, who challenged the police and avoided detentions and executions (Gutiérrez Flores 2000: 102). According to my theoretical framework, local leftist authorities did not promote killings in these localities because only genocidal levels of violence would have resulted in a change in the balance of power. And they were not interested in promoting this type of violence.

The mechanism of "strategic collaboration" of civilians willing to change the balance of power in their localities is also backed up by evidence of selected case studies in Catalonia. For example, if we look at different localities in the county of *El Ripollès*, we see the following patterns: in the village of *Campelles* the right was in a position of majority before the war; this village

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[24] A written testimony from this same village argues, referring to the civil war, "What I remember most from these events, in addition to the fear and sadness felt by most of the people in the village, is that thanks to the Committee of ERC, the parish archive was saved and the church was not burned" (Llaó 2006: 6).

had a strong Carlist and Traditionalist history (Sitjar 2000: 138), and the left only obtained 35.1% of the vote in the elections. Despite this domination by the right, the left only killed one individual in the locality (the priest), supposedly with some acquiescence of the mayor, who did not stop the militiamen who came into the village (Sitjar 2000: 140). Given the overwhelming domination by this political bloc, violence was unlikely to change the state of affairs in the locality; that is probably why local leftists did not promote executions when the militias came in. If only the killing of the priest generated such a strong reaction against leftists (as described by Sitjar 2000), one might wonder what would have happened if the violence had been greater —yet not sufficient to eliminate all the rightists in the locality; this would have definitely put the leftists in a place of uncertainty and insecurity. In contrast, violence was, in relative terms, much greater in the capital of this county, *Ripoll*, where the left had won the elections with 67.3% of the vote.[25] In this town, since confrontations had taken place in the prewar period,[26] strong supporters of the right were probably easily identified by the leftist militants. At the same time, the assassination of rightists contributed to a change in the state of affairs in this locality (versus the case of *Campelles*). Finally, in relative terms, violence was in *Ribes de Freser* (also a neighboring town) slightly lesser than in *Ripoll*, although greater than in *Campelles*. In this town, the right (LlR) had won the elections in 1936 and 1933, although not overwhelmingly (in 1936, the LlR obtained 63.6% of the vote); while there was a significant share of workers in the locality,[27] there had been a smaller degree of political and social conflict in the prewar period (Sitjar 1994). Strong supporters of the right were thus less easily identified than

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[25] A total of 36 individuals (4.8 ‰ of the population) were killed in this location.

[26] Social conflict between workers and landlords, which was enhanced by the economic crisis, were at the bottom of these political confrontations (Castillo 1994).

[27] In fact, the rate of CNT affiliation was larger than in Ripoll (20% vs. 12%).

in *Ripoll*, and that is probably why violence was slightly smaller in this town.[28]

6.3. Violence in t_2

6.3.1. Revenge

Indirect Violence

Regarding the "revenge" or "retaliation" dimension of indirect violence (e.g. bombings), the qualitative evidence is, again, rather scarce —mostly because of the absence of official reports making explicit these types of motives. Nonetheless, I have found some illustrative evidence in secondary sources. For example, in the county of *La Cerdanya*, the localities of *Puigcerdà* and *Alp* were targets of bombardments that turned out to be very deadly —in those localities the left had been brutal against rightists. On the other hand, indirect violence did not affect much the town of *Bellver*, where the anarchist militiamen had not killed anyone. According to a local historian, "The bombs were falling into the river. Maybe they [the Nationalists] did not have much interest in killing people."[29]

Direct Violence

The role of revenge in the perpetration of direct violence in non-initial stages of the war is better supported by qualitative evidence, both from historical accounts and oral testimonies.[30] In

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[28] Interestingly strategic motivations should have led to greater levels of violence in this location than in Ripoll, as electoral parity was slightly greater than in this locality.

[29] Josep Pous, Personal communication, February 2007.

[30] Some published sources that provide evidence on this are: Martín Rubio (1997); Garriga (1986; 2004); Gimeno (1989); Gabarda (1993); Ventura i Solé (1993); Ors (1995); Gavaldà (1997); Solé i Sabaté (2000);

Extremadura, Espinosa argues that the people victimized by fascist repression in the western zone (i.e. *Almendralejo*, *Fuente de Maestre*, *Mérida*, *Badajoz*) were those that led the repression in the eastern part; the refugees that went to the Republican zones of Extremadura (fleeing from the Nationalists) "wanted to kill rightist detainees" (Espinosa 2003: 253). In the village of Villacañas, in the province of Toledo, fifteen detainees were executed after the son of one of the leftist leaders was found death after combat against the Nationalists (*Causa General* 1049.2, Toledo). The motives behind this massacre seem to be mostly emotional, to avenge the death of the boy.[31]

Different accounts indicate that the primary nuclear family was the main agent of retaliatory actions (Casanova 2007; Linz 1996), following patterns that have been observed in other settings (Gould 1999, 2000). Family was significant because relatives of people who had been victimized in the previous period were those who had the most active role in the denunciation process. For example, referring to the Francoist period in Aragon, Azpíroz (2008) argues that the official documents of the War Courts include declarations of testimonies and relatives of people who had been executed "who had asked for blood and more blood" (450). And, at the same time, relatives of those who were allegedly responsible for crimes were often targeted when these individuals could not be found in the locality. This is the case, for example, of many women whose leftist husbands had fled the localities, and who were victimized by the *Falangist* or Nationalist soldiers (e.g. having their hair cut or being publicly humiliated, raped, tortured, and/or expropriated) when the soldiers came in and could not find the men. A notable example of this is the case of Amparo Barayón, wife of the left-wing writer Ramón Sender, who was killed in Zamora; her husband managed to flee to France

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Gutiérrez Flores (2000); Espinosa (2003); Crosas (2004); Casanova (2007); Dueñas (2007); Ledesma (2009).

[31] The report of *La Causa General* indicates that these men had their eyes taken out while they were still alive, and that they were stabbed to death.

and then to Mexico (Sender Barayón 1986). Thus, although perpetrators of violence in the first period had very often left the locality when the rival armed forces entered it, this did not impede retaliation from taking place. The official "lists of suspects" had a wide margin for the inclusion of people with any kind of link with the events of the previous war period. Neighbors of the locality — and especially, rightist leaders with a high degree of agency in the elaboration of these lists– could make people "would-be targets" by merely saying that they were members of leftist political parties or trade unions, that they were "collaborators", or by simply arguing that that they sympathized with the left (they were of *ideología izquierdista*).

The Appendix of this chapter includes a reproduction of the "list of suspects" that was elaborated by the Nationalist army (specifically, by the subsection "*Ejército del Norte*") in the Catalan town of *Ripoll*, soon after its occupation. The different categories of suspects that we can read in this file are as follows: "Members of the CNT trade union" (*Relación de los individuos pertenecientes al sindicato de la C.N.T. de los pueblos de esta comarca)*; "Members of the Revolutionary Committee" (during the civil war) (*Comité Revolucionario)*; "Council that substituted the Committee" (during the war) (*Ayuntamiento que sustituyó al Comité*); "Committee of Militias and Militiamen" (during the war) (*Comité de Milicias y Milicianos)*; "Alleged murderers" (*Presuntos Asesinos)*; "Leaders and Collaborators" (*Dirigentes y Colaboradores*); "People with a leftist ideology'' (*Personas de ideología izquierdista*). As is obvious, anybody could potentially be included in one of these categories. A sentence that was commonly used at that time to refer to individuals who collaborated or pursued "revolutionary" actions was "s/he distinguished her/himself during the war" (*se distinguió durante la guerra*). [32]

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[32] The same types of categories were elaborated in other provinces, with perhaps some minor differences in their naming/phrasing. For example, for the province of Toledo, "Committee of Execution" is

A local historian of the town of *Valls* —also in Catalonia– explains the following regarding postwar violence:

> At the Information Office they accepted denunciations against any action made during the Republican period, whether it was due to political or trade union militancy, being a member of a significant leftist family or having had a position in a public or private institution. The charges could be exaggerated with oral denunciations related to crime, robberies or expropriations. (Ventura i Solé 1993: 41).

Azpíroz (2007), on his end, explains the following with regard to the province of Huesca:

> When the Nationalists occupied the province of Huesca, most peasants were denounced by their landlords. Hundreds of people who had been incarcerated since 1938 and 1939 were submitted to unilateral military trials when the war ended. . . . In the war trials, the attestation of the mayors (a lot of them, middle owners), priests, civil guards and neighbors "of order" were horrific and they were almost never proved or sufficiently verified. These were directed against those who had led the local committees and the collectivities, or against those who had sympathized or supported the revolutionary process (380).

Dynamics of retaliation seem to have been especially severe in battlefield areas such as zones of Aragon that were first controlled by Nationalists and then regained by the anarchist militias. Revenge marked very often the decisions taken by local leaders, and the consequent levels of repression: "The deaths by the Fascists had to be avenged" (Casanova 2007: 43). Retaliatory dynamics, which accumulated deaths with every occupation, led to an important number of casualties over the course of the conflict.

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distinguished from "Revolutionary Committee" or "Committee of Information, Classification and Execution." In the *Causa General*, they even detail things such as "He was suspect for the death of X person" (*Causa General*, Caja 1049/2 Toledo).

For example, in the town of *Calanda*, in the province of *Teruel*, a total of 75 people (18.5 ‰ of the population) were killed by the anarchist militias who conquered the locality (initially under Nationalist control) on their way to Zaragoza. The Nationalist army re-occupied the locality in March 1938, when retaliatory dynamics triggered further violence against leftists (Cenarro 2002). A total of 23 people (5.67‰) were executed by the right. In Huesca, the "visits" of *Falangist* militias at the beginning of the war, in areas that the anarchist militias managed to gain control later on, "left a bad memory because they executed *in situ* and they took leftist neighbors who never came back. They propelled in this way the revenge of the villagers who then felt sheltered by the arrival of the (leftist) militiamen" (Azpíroz 2007: 383).

6.3.2. Rivalry and Revenge

Revenge was not the only driving motive for violence in non-initial periods of the war; as we saw in chapter 4, at the econometric level, "rivalry" and "revenge" seem to have independent effects on violence taking place in the non-initial periods of the civil war. The qualitative evidence is also supportive of the hypothesis that violence was a combination of wartime factors and political motivations. For example, according to the historian Jordi Font, who studied postwar attitudes in the province of Girona, "The denunciations made by many citizens (once the Francoist regime was installed) were not only against those who were supposedly responsible for previous acts of violence; they were also driven by personal hatreds that usually matched political and ideological rivalries" (Font 2001: 118). According to the historian of the county of *El Pallars*, Manuel Gimeno, people who were forcedly displaced by the Francoists in the early stages of the occupation of this territory were denounced by "old enemies and potential economic and professional competitors" (1989: 88). Linz argues that places that were controlled by different armed groups/blocs during the course of

the civil war witnessed the most severe slaughters because every arrival of a new group at a locality was accompanied by the "cleansing" of enemies, in which local inhabitants were providing information on who had to be targeted, either for their *political ideology* or for their *actions* during the previous period of the war (Linz 1996).

If the revenge mechanism is in place, we would expect this to be related not only to previous violence, but also to other forms of victimization (e.g. imprisonment, forced displacement, torture, and forced conscription, to name but a few). In the case of the SCW, due to the revolutionary nature of the processes that took place in most of the Republican rearguard, a quite important form of victimization consisted of what can be called "economic victimization". I refer to collectivization campaigns, which consisted upon expropriations of private properties to be collectivized, i.e. used by communities guided by either socialist or anarchist principles. (The latter would depend on the political orientation of the group governing the community or having a greater degree of influence on the local committee.) Collectivization campaigns were a widespread phenomenon in the Republican zone during the war; according to Casanova (1985), there were more than 200 collectivizations in the Republican zone of Aragon.[33] Many survivors of the SCW recall the collectivization campaigns that took place in their localities, which suggests that these were processes that left an imprint on individuals.[34]

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[33] On collectivization campaigns, much has been said by authors such as Casanova (1985), Bosch (1983), Casanova *et al.* (1988) or, more specifically, by Termes (2005) —for La Fatarella– or Blanchon (1987) —for the county of La Cerdanya (1987). In his memoirs, Kaminsky (1937/2002) described the revolutionary process in Catalonia first hand, including these collectivization campaigns. Something similar was done by Orwell (1938).

[34] That is the case, for example, of *Testimonies 6, 7*, who were children during the war, a survivor interviewed by Castillo (1989), and many survivors interviewed by Fraser (2001).

In general, we would expect that people who had their properties taken in the revolutionary period of the war would be willing to denounce leftists (i.e. those responsible for these actions) when the Nationalists entered the locality —driven by revenge motivations.[35] The following passage is illustrative of the type of feelings that were awakened by these expropriations:

> The expropriation of goods of rightist neighbors who were killed or displaced affected the widows and families who remained in the village. They were frightened, isolated and divested of any privilege. Some understood it as a necessity, but the great majority of them remember it as a theft, a punishment they had to put up with and that they hoped would be temporary, until everything returned to be like it was beforehand (Casanova 2007: 205).

Several historical accounts make reference to the leading role of landowners in generating the lists of suspects that were to be used by the *Falangist* militiamen (Garriga 2004). This could obviously be related to prewar political dynamics, but, everything else being equal, we would expect these individuals to have a greater "spirit of revenge" whenever they had their land or properties expropriated. Thus, *ceteris paribus*, we would expect violence in t_2 to be greater in places where economic victimization had taken place during t_1, where revenge motives would be driving this violence.

Bosch (1983) provides us with data (at the local level) on agrarian collectivities that were established in the region of Valencia during the revolutionary phase of the conflict.[36] These collectivities are a fine proxy for economic victimization, as they were accompanied by a large number of land expropriations,

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[35] Note that I am referring here to leftist collectivization campaigns. Yet, expropriations were not only undertaken in leftist areas; they took place on the Nationalist side, as well.

[36] She distinguishes between UGT, CNT, and UGT-CNT collectivities —depending on the leading organization.

which not only affected big landlords but also middle owners.[37] Bosch explains that these collectivities and collectivization campaigns were not part of a governmental plan or anything similar, and that they were in fact opposed by trade union leaders and politicians of the Popular Front (e.g. Juan Negrín); that is, these were driven mostly by local factors.

I have digitalized the data provided by this historian, and I have generated the variable *Collectivities*, which measures the existence of a collectivity in a municipality.[38] I have taken M2 in Tables 4.14 and 4.15 (in chapter 4), and I have plugged this additional variable into it. By doing this, I can measure the extent to which economic victimization in t_1 is explanatory of violence perpetrated by the right in t_2, controlling for all the other factors that explain violence in t_2 (i.e. those included in tables 4.14 and 4.15). The results of NB and ZINB models on "executed right" in t_2 (in Valencia and Alicante) are depicted in Table 6.1.

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[37] According to data collected by this author, only 13.18% of the cultivable land of the Valencian region was collectivized. This is much lower than the proportion of land collectivized in areas such as the province of Jaen (65%), Ciudad Real (56.69%), or Albacete (33.35%) (Bosch 1983).

[38] Collectivities is a dummy variable, which has value 1 if there was a collectivity in the locality, 0 if not. The original variable, as coded from Bosch, measured the total number of collectivities in a locality, and it had values 0 – 3. Yet, the proportion of localities with more than one collectivity was so small that I decided to pull them all together.

Table 6.1. Leftist (t₁) and Rightist (t₂) violence in Valencia and Alicante, with Collectivities

	NB. Killed Right	ZINB. Killed Right (NB: Number of deaths)	ZINB. Killed Right (Logit: Non-violence)
Competition	-0.039	0.214	0.675
	(0.56)	(0.43)	(1.26)
Executed Left	0.017*	0.006	-1.043***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.30)
CNT Affiliation	0.021	0.057*	0.102
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.18)
UGT Affiliation	0.054**	0.038	-0.623
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.38)
Population	0.000	0.000	-0.001***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Latitude	0.174	-0.158	-1.265***
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.45)
Longitude	0.331	0.799**	1.340
	(0.45)	(0.32)	(0.88)
Altitude	-0.000*	-0.000*	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Collectivities	**0.936****	**0.756****	**-0.667**
	(0.40)	(0.21)	(0.51)
Constant	-5.832	8.370	52.385***
	(7.01)	(6.51)	(17.92)
Lnalpha	*1.215****	*0.176*	*0.176*
	(0.15)	*(0.13)*	*(0.13)*
Observations	280	163	280
Chi2	60.555	72.334	72.334
Aic	1426.367	1304.239	1304.239

Robust Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig: * p<.1 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

As in Table 4.15, Executed Left shows to be significant in explaining the occurrence of rightist violence; this is consistent with hypothesis 2.2 and with the results obtained for the region of Catalonia. Importantly, Collectivities has a positive and significant effect on levels of Nationalist violence in these two provinces. This variable is however not significant in explaining the *occurrence* of Nationalist violence, as is indicated by the results in the logit part of the ZINB model. Thus, it is particularly interesting to observe that while leftist violence (in t_1) has a strong incidence on the *occurrence* of rightist violence (in t_2), collectivities have an effect on *levels* of violence (but not on the occurrence of it). The variation in these victimization indicators may be pinpointing to different ways in which revenge operates in conflict environments.

Importantly, Table 6.1 is supportive of the hypothesis that victimization does not necessarily have to be lethal in order to trigger revenge feelings. In those places where people had previously had their land or properties expropriated, willingness to collaborate with the Nationalists in order to punish the leaders of the left (and their families) was greater than in places where no collectivities had been established, and therefore no expropriations had taken place.

The evidence on collectivization campaigns in Valencia and Alicante is also relevant with regard to the isolation of the "rivalry" and the "revenge" mechanisms. Indeed, even though Competition is not significant in Table 6.1, the results in Table 6.2 provide further evidence supporting the idea that revenge is a mechanism that operates independently from rivalry (i.e. competition). That is because Competition is a variable that does not explain the establishment of collectivities at the local level. Table 6.2 depicts the results of different logit regression models on the establishment of collectivities in Valencia and Alicante, which include the usual covariates in models of violence. Model 1 incorporates a number of potential explanatory factors on the establishment of a collectivity in a locality: CNT affiliation, UGT affiliation, Population, and geographical variables such as Longitude, Latitude (to control for location) and Altitude (to

control for "rough terrain" or isolationism). Model 2 includes Competition as explanatory variable; Model 3 includes the variable Competition in absolute values (i.e. Compabs); Model 4 includes leftist executions (even if these executions were likely contemporary to the collectivization campaigns).

Table 6.2. Logit Regressions on Collectivities

	M1	**M2**	**M3**	**M4**
CNT Affiliation	-0.007	-0.009	-0.010	-0.005
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
UGT Affiliation	-0.066	0.003	0.003	-0.063
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Population	0.000***	0.001***	0.001***	0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Latitude	-0.008	-0.218	-0.206	-0.006
	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.20)
Longitude	-0.618	-0.915*	-0.912*	-0.612
	(0.39)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.39)
Altitude	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Competition		**-0.765**		
		(0.60)		
CompAbs			**-0.427**	
			(0.57)	
Killed Left				**-0.008**
				(0.01)
Constant	-1.446	7.120	6.308	-1.525
	(7.90)	(9.65)	(9.59)	(7.89)
Observations	383	280	280	382
chi2	35.676	32.515	32.280	35.916
Aic	446.429	314.425	315.315	445.973

Robust Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig: * p<.1 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

In Table 6.2, we can observe that almost none of the covariates is significant in explaining the establishment of collectivities at the local level. Only Population and Longitude have a positive and significant effect —more populated and more southern localities being more likely to undergo collectivization processes. This non-finding is consistent with Casanova (1985), who argues that the rising of collectivities or collectivist action programs were often determined by the presence of charismatic leaders in the localities, more than by clear-cut systematic factors. Concerning my argument, the finding that leftist executions are not explaining collectivities (Model 4 in Table 6.2) implies that the effect of collectivities on rightist violence in t_2 (table 6.1) is independent from violence in t_1. Also, since the remaining variables are not statistically significant, these results indicate the covariates of violence in t_1 —and, in particular, Competition– are not intervening on the effect of Collectivities on violence in t_2.

6.4. Conclusions

This chapter has put together different pieces of qualitative and quantitative evidence from primary and secondary historical sources on the Spanish Civil War aimed at supporting the theoretical mechanisms that have been outlined in chapter 2, and which have only been partially confirmed by the regression results in chapters 4 and 5. Qualitative evidence is scarce regarding the strategic mechanism linking competition and violence, for people were not explicit in their intentions to change the balance of power at the local level. Nonetheless, evidence from secondary sources, as well as from selected case studies, has backed this hypothesis indirectly. The evidence is somewhat more supportive of the hypothesis that prewar political dynamics may have had an impact on the degree of disclosure of intense loyalties toward the groups. Secondary evidence usually highlights the role of polarization; yet, we have observed that conflict dynamics may be more likely related to a balance of power between two major political blocs

(following Gould 2003) than to the mere existence of two blocs (i.e. to the mere existence of polarization in localities).

In general, I have found a considerable amount of evidence supporting the idea that political identities were relevant in terms of influencing the targeting decisions of the armed groups and that political dynamics at the local level had an incidence on civilian collaboration, which was in turn crucial for the perpetration of direct violence. I have also found qualitative evidence emphasizing that, while targeting was made on the basis of public identities in the early stages of the civil war, revenge motives were underlying acts of violence in the subsequent stages. Furthermore, retaliation took place on the basis of previous lethal victimization, but not exclusively so: "economic victimization" (i.e. expropriations) also triggered denunciations that led to executions in subsequent periods of the war.

Appendix Chapter 6

List of "Suspects" Elaborated by Ejército del Norte in The Town of Ripoll (Catalonia)


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                        Comité Revolucionario.

Bertrán          José          Bazar del o '95
Boixeda          Jose          Buñolero.Comercio de churros.
Más Tió          Jose          Obrero Tornero
Minguell         N.            Electricista.
Ordeix           Francisco     Ferroviario.  (Alcalde)
Planas           Antonio       Empleado de Oficinas.
Solanich         Juan          Obrero mecanico
Torner           Jose          Albañil

            Ayuntamiento que sustituyo al Comite.

Augé             Pablo         Albañil
Caba             Francisco     Empleado de Notaria
Fornaguera       Victoriano    Ferroviario
Franquesa        Juan          Agricultor    (Miranda)
Oliveras         Ramon         Comerciante
Salvans          N.            Comerciante(hijo del comerciante Jose R
Sanjuan          N.            Ferroviario(Juez Municipal)
Sirvent          Francisco     Maleante(Hijo del comerciante Ramon)
Turon            Buenaventura  Auxiliar de Fabrica
N.               N.            Agricultor9((Volánt)
Puig             Ramon.

            Comite de Milicias y Milicianos.

Canal            N.            Obrero textil.
Casamitjana      N.            Maetro particular. Agitador
Costa            Rafael.
N.               N.            Obrero textil(Cristus)
N.               N.            Obrero textil(Gallina)
Martinez         N.            Peon albañil
N.               N.            Peon.Ctª de Vallfogona(Mallorqui)
Perez            N.            Metalurgico.(Hispano Suiza)
N.               N.            Obrero textil.(Pobla)
N.               N.            (Sardina enfarinada)

                    Presuntos Asesinos.

Barquero         N.            Ferroviario(Actuacion en Puigcerda)
Cubell           N.            Corneta de Carabineros.
Diego            Jose          Peon de albañil
Faro             Joaquin       Ferroviario
Font             Pedro         Chofer(hijo del Guarda Consumos)
Forner           Joaquin       Peon albañil(Moreno)
Gonzalez         N.            Ferroviario(Paisano)
Llagostera       Juan          Obrero textil.(Xampi)
N.               N.            Chofer(Mari)
Miralles         Jorge
Prat             Fernando      (Nandu)
Triadú           N.            (General Bum-Bum)
Vila             Eudaldo       (Rellama)
Vila Boix                      Relampago

            Dirigentes y Colaboradores.

Bassa aña        Jose          Maetro particular
Bassa aña        Juan          Oficial Ayuntamiento
Busquets         N.            (hij carbonero) (Ceuta)
Casas            Juan          Ferroviario( y esposa Claudia)
Estevanez        Justiniano    Ferroviario
Fajardo          Vicente       Ferroviario
herrero          Rosendo       Marmolista
Illanes          Jose          Director Escuela Graduada (Plaza Miranda. 21-1°,1°)
Mauri            Alfonso       Fografia
N.               N.            (yerno de Rafael Diaz)(Pastor)
Peralta          Mariano       Ferroviario
Prat             Juan          Carnhosria
Pujol            N.            Empdª Agⁱ. Pio Catalá.(Cojo)
Segura           N.            Obrero textil
Soler            N.            Maestro particular(Caganés)
Soler            Ramon A.      Escribiente fabrica
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Personas de ideología izquierdista.

Alsina	Jose	Hotel Continental
N.	N.	Panadero(Antich)
N.	Pedro	Comestibles,arrabal Barcelona(Calama)
Coma	N.	Talleres del Norte(Ferrer)
Capdevila	N.	Guarnicionero.Plaza Nueva.
Catala	Jose	Representante.
Botivill	Angel	Maestro particular
Fontanet	Juan	Comerciante(Fruitós)
Guardiola	N.	
Guell	Juan	Cargador de vagones
N.	Victor	Mozo almacen(Los amigos)
Mas	N.	
Maristany	N.	Empleado Banca Suñer
N.	Matias	Mecanico(Calle Ter)
N.	Meliton	Carretero.Fabrica J.Camee
Munell	Pedro	Oficial Ayuntamiento
Mora	Jose	Comerciante
N.	N.	Trapero(Peixo)
Poch	Pedro	Transportista(Morru negre)
Portabella	Nicolás	Comerciante(ex-Juez Municipal)
Pous	Juan	Comerciante(ex-Alcalde)
Riba	Jose	Agencia de transportes
Sala	Antonio	Peluquería de Señoras
Sanchez	Maximo	Chofer
Serra	Narciso	Comerciante
Taron	Guillermo	Industrial(Trill)
Torallas	Federico	Represntante
Torrent	N.	Electricista
N.	N.	Carniceria(Tuta)
Valdeperez	Jacinto	Empleado Estacion del Norte

CHAPTER 7. THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE ON POLITICAL IDENTITIES

"His name was Eugenio Paz, he was sixteen years old and he was born in Brunete. His uncle was the owner of the only bar in the village, where his mother used to work. Even though she was the sister of the owner, she used to receive humiliating treatment, despite her devotion to the kitchen and to the cleaning of the place. . . . .When the war started, he waited for his uncle to take a side, in order to take the opposite side. This is how he proclaimed loyalty to the Republic"

Alberto Méndez, *Los Girasoles Ciegos*

"Among the people of my generation, there is an intense flow of blood and deaths"

Mercè Rodoreda, *Quanta, Quanta Guerra* [1]

7.1. Introduction. Civil War as a Transformative Process

In 2002 David Mayhew suggested that academics have devoted insufficient time to addressing the following analytical questions: "How do civil wars intersect with elections? Is there a trademark breakdown dynamic? Are party identifications

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[1] Mercè Rodoreda (1909-1983) was a Catalan novelist. *Quanta, Quanta Guerra* (translated *How much war*) was published in 1980.

distinctively hardened by civil wars?" (2002:164). In this chapter, I aim at providing theoretical and empirical insights about patterns of continuity or change of political identities (and electoral alignments) in countries that have experienced civil wars. I will do this by exploring sub-national variation in Spain, focusing on political identities of individuals and electoral alignments of localities before the SCW, and long after it –i.e. in the early democratic period (1977). The research question here logically progresses from the previous chapters in the dissertation. Up to this point, the analytical focus has been on the way in which political identities and alignments affect violence during civil conflict; now the paper turns to whether violence (together with other forms of victimization) has any influence on these identities.

To date, there is very little research on the consequences that events such as civil wars have on political cleavages and political alignments of societies: is there ideological continuity after civil wars? Within the sub-discipline of American Politics, historians and political scientists have outlined the impact of the Civil War in shaping state political cleavages (Key 1984; Levine 1976). Yet, in general, the idea that wars can generate political realignments or even new divisive issues (i.e. new cleavages) has not been thoroughly developed.[2] This neglect contrasts with the burgeoning

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[2] In 1967, Lipset and Rokkan developed the well-known "freezing hypothesis", which has become a reference point in any study of political cleavages. One of the main implications of their theory that there is long-term stability of electoral behavior: the political system is subject to rare, yet fundamental reorganizations, which take place under very specific circumstances, or as a consequence of "critical junctures". Lipset and Rokkan refer to these critical junctures as very exceptional and transformative moments of history (e.g. the industrial revolution). They predominantly analyze the formation of Western party systems and the different types of systems emerging from the various ways in which the labor class was incorporated into politics (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lipset 1970). Collier and Collier, in a similar vein, analyze how periods of incorporation of the labor movement into the state are critical junctures that have shaped the political arena in Latin America (1991:

research on political continuity under autocratic regimes (Maravall 1978; Wittenberg 2006; Stokes and Lupu 2006), and it overlooks the causal force of events such as civil wars:

> We tend to assume that interests or preferences are the basic building blocks of an analytic political science. That is sensible, yet it risks analysis that is either unhelpfully truistic or unhelpfully abstract. Where do interests or preferences –or the agendas, programs, ideologies, movements or parties that ordinarily accompany them in the real world of politics- come from? *One answer is events, of which wars and their aftermaths supply spectacular, although of course not the only, kinds of instance* (Mayhew 2005: 486, emphasis mine).

The aim of this chapter is to empirically explore a set of hypotheses on the way civil wars affect political identities. I do not present a fully-developed theory; instead I seek to provide a comprehensive inductive examination of these issues by drawing on original data from Spain. The research question has two main levels of analysis: the first is the individual level (in this case, the question is probably better expressed as: "How do individuals change as a result of a civil war?"). The second is an aggregate level (in this case, the question can be better phrased as: "How do communities and organizations change as a result of a civil war?"). These questions have implications for several literatures, e.g. the literature on civil wars, the literature on political system formation, or the literature on party identification.

My interest lays in understanding the long-term effects of civil wars, as opposed to the short-term effects. Data availability has led researchers to focus on short-term effects at the individual level (e,g Bellows and Miguel 2008; Blattman 2009; Shewfelt 2009); yet, we do not know for how long do these effects persist

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29). Luebbert (1987) says that the resolution of the working class cleavage had a crucial effect on the shape of the political arena of European countries. It could be argued that civil wars can represent a sort of (lower key) critical junctures, provoking political reorganizations.

—and therefore if they have any implications for political systems. We do not know if they are just artifacts of the implementation of survey instruments in postwar settings (where particular feelings —e.g. revenge, anger− may be more prevalent), or of the application of these instruments in quite idiosyncratic postwar conflict settings (e.g. Uganda, a country that received an overwhelming attention by international organizations, as compared to other postwar countries). For example, Bellow and Miguel (2008) and Blattman's (2009) finding that victimization increases political participation is at odds with qualitative evidence from Spain (see below, also Hansen 1977; Fraser 2001), Argentina (Lira and Castillo 1991) or Guatemala (Seligson 2005), where political apathy seems to be widespread among victimized people. As Costa and Kahn (2008) put it, "by examining the past we can determine whether a phenomenon is transient or long-lasting" (2008: xxi). Thus, it is only by analyzing civil wars that have taken place in the distant past, and by using a multi-method approach —allowing us to overcome measurement issues–, that we can make a real attempt to answer the question of the effects of violence on political identities.

Also, because it is based on countries that did not have elections in the prewar period (e.g. Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Liberia), most of this recent research can barely help us understand the transformative effect of civil wars at the political level (i.e. we cannot compare postwar identities or alignments to prewar ones). Ideally, it would be convenient to analyze countries that, while having a tradition of democratic politics, suffered the 'shock" of a civil war, and they resumed democratic politics, after the war was over. Yet, we lack fine-grained data on the few cases with these characteristics.[3]

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[3] The case of the American Civil War complies with these standards, although I could not find fine-grained data on wartime violence against civilians for this civil war.

7.2. Theoretical Framework. The Long-Term Effects of Violence

The idea that civil wars have long-term political effects may sound self-evident at first glance. At a pure anecdotal level, there is a significant amount of evidence on the endurance of political identities that were forged in conflicts that took place long in the past. For example, in the states of Missouri and Kansas, US Civil War identities were given expression in a college football match more than 150 years afterwards (Thompson 2007); in Ireland, political families still identify with partisans of the Treaty of the Union and its enemies, who fought in 1922-1923 (Hart 2003).[4] Some evidence on Holocaust survivors and their offspring indicates that they have different political attitudes and world-views than people who did not experience the holocaust —making them more moderate (Sigal 1973). In Japan, Allinson (1997) argues that the experiences during the 1930s and 1940s affected how people responded to the political changes and economic opportunities that appeared in the 1950s, and afterwards. Something similar is argued by Shale Horowitz (2003) regarding post-communist states having undergone civil wars, where she argues that people have a lesser predisposition towards political and economic reforms than elsewhere. Nonetheless, we can wonder if it is at all possible to find systematic political effects of civil wars, either at the individual or at the community level.

Civil wars can be defined as "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign unit between parties subject to a common authority" (Kalyvas 2006). We can think of civil wars as having four different (core) elements: 1) direct physical violence; 2) socialization, indoctrination; 3) indirect violence (displacement and migration; recruitment); 4) social and economic change. Each of these components can have an effect on the

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[4] In fact, in contemporary Ireland, a number of politicians have generational connections with the leaders of the parties that fought in the 1920s (Paul Staniland, personal communication, May 2007).

political identities of individuals who have experienced a civil war. Among them, direct physical violence has the most striking impact on survivors, and since this is also the one conveying the least measurement issues (see chapter 2), it is the one that is focused on here.[5]

The psychological effects of different types of violence (e.g. being tortured, experiencing sexual violence, etc.) on individuals have been widely researched (e.g. with the study of the well-known "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder" or PTSD). Yet, the specific effects of these specific types of traumatic experiences on individuals's political identities and political behavior have been generally overlooked (Balcells 2007b; Kalyvas 2008). The exception has been research on attitudes towards justice and reconciliation (Pham *et al*. 2004; Gibson 2004; Nalepa 2010). Yet, since civil wars have an intrinsic political dimension,[6] it is plausible to believe that wartime experiences will have political consequences. At the individual level, being a victim or a witness to violence can lead to a number of feelings or psychological reactions towards the perpetrator: e.g. rage, resentment, terror, fear, sadness —to name but a few. These feelings may lead

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[5] At the individual level, we will take into consideration other sources of victimization such as displacement, labor repression, imprisonment, and similar. However, at the community level, we will focus on violence because data on other types of victimization is not available for a sufficient number of cases. The study of the political effects of displacement is still underdeveloped, with only some recent contributions (e.g. Steele 2009; Balcells 2010b). The implications of social and economic change taking place during war has become a field of study in itself (e.g. Microcon, Households in Conflict Network, see for example Justino 2008); yet, I am unaware of any contributions linking wartime related economic and social change to political identities.

[6] "Civil wars are typically described, classified, and understood on the basis of what is perceived to be their overarching cleavage dimension: thus, we speak of ideological, ethnic, religious, or class wars and we designate political actors in ethnic civil wars as ethnic actors, the violence of ethnic wars as ethnic violence, and so on" (Kalyvas 2006: 366).

towards the development of new political identities, or to the redefinition of previous identities. For example, Lira and Castillo (1991) point out that fear has an influence on the perception of reality by individuals suffering from it, including the political reality.[7] Yet, it is very hard to conceptualize all the ways in which fear, as well as other feelings (such as resentment or revenge, for example), can "influence the perception of the political reality" of the subjects. Some would even argue that this is an idiosyncratic process, particular to each individual, which cannot be understood systematically.[8]

I would argue that the effects of civil war violence can be boiled down to three alternative attitudinal and behavioral responses vis-à-vis the perpetrators and their political identities:

1) **Rejection** of the identity represented by this armed group (due to revenge, resentment, or moral outrage, for example). At the behavioral level, this should lead toward non support for the political group(s) holding this political identity (or label) in the elections, or toward support for groups holding a rival identity.

2) **Acceptance** of the identity represented by this armed group (due to terror or fear, for example). At the behavioral level, this should lead toward support for group(s) holding this political identity, or at non support for groups holding a rival identity.

3) **Demobilization** or **apathy,** leading towards a rejection of the identities represented by all groups/parties (due to a combination of revenge, resentment, terror, and fear, for

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[7] "Fear is likely to have a traumatic effect on human subjects; having an effect on both their bodies and their identities. The impact at the psychological level can be understood in the light of Erikson´s theory of the development of identity. The existence of somatic, personal and social dimensions of the human being allows a relationship to be established between the impact of the political threat and the subjects, influencing their perception of reality, consciousness and conduct" (Lira and Castillo 1991: 59).

[8] For example, Pham *et al*. (2004), who analyze the impact of PTSD on attitudes towards reconciliation, argue that "openness to reconciliation is related to multiple other personal and environmental factors" (611).

example).[9] This should lead towards decreased political interest and, at the behavioral level, to non political participation.[10]

These responses or effects can be taken as alternative hypotheses, which we may explore with existing data on individual attitudes towards groups having fought or fighting in a conflict. Of course, a fourth option, which is "no effect", should also be considered. Also, it must be noted that "radicalization" or "polarization" of political opinions, which has been analyzed in some conflicts (e.g. Israel-Palestine, Jaeger *et al*. 2008; in Indonesia, Shewfelt 2009) can be integrated in the first hypothesis (i.e. rejection). In the case of conflicts in which there are very clear boundaries between groups, acceptance will rarely take place (by definition), and we can think that attitudes of the victims will swing between "no effect", "demobilization", "mild rejection", and 'strong rejection". The latter would be what has been conceptualized as radicalization or "polarization" (Jaeger *et al* 2008; Shewfelt 2009).

Do we have any priors on the likelihood of each of these effects, that is, on whether one of them is more likely than the other, or under which conditions one is more likely than the other? Drawing on existing research that emphasizes the counterproductive effect of indiscriminate violence —it leads towards greater support for the enemy group (see, among others, Kalyvas 2006: 146-172)[11]— it could be hypothesized that rejection is more likely to occur when violence is indiscriminate than when it is selective. Drawing on recent research on "armed group governance" (Arjona 2009a; Mampilly 2009) it could be hypothesized that acceptance of the identity of the perpetrator is

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[9] Demobilization or apathy has been very commonly observed in victims of sexual violence during war (Bernard 1994; Wood 2006; Theidon 2007).

[10] By *political interest* is usually meant "the degree to which politics arouses a citizen's curiosity" *(*van Deth 1989: 278).

[11] Although Lyall's (2009) recent research on Chechnya partially contradicts this hypothesis: he finds that indiscriminate violence by the state does suppress insurgent attacks.

more likely when this has exerted governance over communities over a significant period of time. Yet, I would argue that both of these hypotheses probably apply better to wartime than to postwar identities: during war, individuals are largely driven by a narrow set of incentives (e.g. survival), which are likely to blur all other considerations –including rational behavior (Elster 2008), as it is commonly understood−. It is not clear why people would not reject the identities of a selective perpetrator who is no longer operating in an area, to whom they do not need to demonstrate loyalty to maximize chances of survival. And the same applies to wartime governance: there is no reason to assume that individuals will develop long-term attachments with the groups that have governed them during war, once they are no longer exerting authority over them.

In a nutshell, I have no theoretical priors on the determinants of each of the effects of violence above depicted. Given this, the research here is inductive: I explore the empirical evidence from Spain, from which I try to generate theoretical insights regarding these effects. Before proceeding to the empirical analyses, two methodological considerations regarding the study of post-civil war political identities have to be made:

Long-term versus short term effects

At the psychological level, victimization experiences are likely to have an impact not only on the individuals suffering from them, but also on their offspring (Sigal 1973). While the first generation is affected through the direct encounter with the event, the second generation is affected through the process of socialization (Carmil and Breznitz 1991). Thus, if it is the case that partisanship options and political views issue from traumatic experiences (which we are not able to confirm at this point), we should expect these to be transmitted across generations through socialization.[12] When

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[12] Jennings and Niemi argue that family of origin plays a major role in determining the initial political direction of their offspring; its

analyzing the long-term effects of violence, family historical memory and intergenerational transmission of victimization experiences will have to be taken into consideration (Maravall 1982; Wittenberg 2006; Aguilar *et al.* 2011). In any case, among all generations, we can expect those individuals having experienced the events first-hand will be those most influenced by it.[13]

Community versus individual level

The aforementioned individual level effects can also be conceptualized as aggregated at a locality or community level, in which political identities can be conceived as political alignments and can be proxied —for example– as the average support for a political party in the elections. We can think that, at a local level, when an armed group victimizes a population, this can also produce either rejection or acceptance of the political identity represented by the group, if not overall demobilization.[14] These

influence is reduced during adulthood, but it continues to play a significant role in the partisan development of their adult children over time (Jennings and Niemi 1981: 987). Indeed, despite popular beliefs that in adolescence children will turn away from their parents in search of alternative guidance for value orientation, most empirical research reveals a striking concordance between worldviews of parents and those of their (adult) children (Acock and Bengtson 1980; Dalhouse and Frideres 1996; Miller and Glass 1989). Percheron and Jennings (1981) find this concordance to be greater regarding left-right identities than regarding others.

[13] Some existing anthropological research in the county of *Alt Penadès*, in Catalonia, indicates that those whose political thinking was influenced the most by the civil war were young adults by the time of the civil war (Hansen 1977: 141).

[14] In Puigcerdà, because of the civil war victimization actions by the anarchists, tendencies towards Francoism were radicalized after the civil war (Bosom 1993: 71). According to Fernando del Rey (2007), in the province of Ciudad Real, wartime violence polarized individuals towards the extreme right.

effects can concern all the population, and only a share of it, having a polarizing impact on communities, for example.[15] In addition to this, the community can be conceived as an agent that has an explanatory role in the evolution of political alignments over time. For example, both Maravall (1982) and Wittenberg (2006) argue that in Spain and Hungary, respectively, local level institutions facilitated the transmission of partisan attachments "which were in opposition to the dominant set of values" (Wittenberg 2006: 256). Maravall (1982) argues that political parties and clandestine trade union organizations allowed the transmission of leftist partisan attachments in Spain;[16] Wittenberg (2006), on his end, argues that church institutions were crucial for the transmission of anti-communist loyalties in Hungary.

The empirical analyses at the level of the community are likely to be accompanied by much more measurement challenges than those at the level of the individual: for example, population movements (e.g. through displacement) have an obvious incidence in patterns of change or continuity of political alignments (if supporters of a political group are eliminated, the political composition of the locality will naturally change). The same happens if a group of people are forcibly displaced in order to "gerrymander" the electoral districts by moving people (Klott 2001; Kasara 2009; Steele 2009). For this reason, in my empirical exploration, I will predominantly focus on understanding the effect of victimization on individuals. I will also perform some municipal level analyses, albeit these will be less reliable due to the existence of these methodological issues.

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[15] A testimony of the SCW from the village of *Pla de Cabra* argues, for example: "before the war, ideology did not influence in the relationships between people, there was peace and calm. All the problems arose after it" (Alejandro Soberano, in *La Planenca* 2006).

[16] These organizations were more prevalent in some regions (e.g. Asturias, Vizcaya), where continuity in leftist political identities was much stronger.

7.3. Empirical Exploration

The empirical analysis in this chapter will consist of a multi-method exploration of data from the SCW and its aftermath. In section 7.3.1, I present evidence from semi-structured interviews that I conducted on survivors of the Spanish Civil War. In Section 7.3.2, I present evidence from a survey of a representative sample of the Spanish population, which was implemented in April 2008 by the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, and which I co-designed. In section 7.3.3, I present evidence on the political alignments of all municipalities of Catalonia in two different elections that took place before (in 1936) and after (in 1977) the civil war.

As explained, we cannot analyze the political identities and alignments of the immediate postwar because in Spain the civil war was followed by a dictatorship. Some research has been done by historians on immediate postwar attitudes and identities: for example, Font (2001) provides us with biographical narratives of people who had different attitudes vis-à-vis the Francoist dictatorship during the early postwar years, and he classifies them in the different categories depending on their degree of adhesion to the regime.[17] Molinero (2001), on her end, argues that the attitudes of rejection toward the Francoist regime were widespread —across social classes− in Catalonia during the postwar; yet, these were kept at the intimate level because of fear, as well as a consequence of the destruction of public spaces. This type of research, which has to be praised because it delves into political attitudes in a dictatorship regime, is nevertheless limited because of the constraints in the repertoire of available political options and their public expression in the context of an authoritarian

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[17] These categories are: 1) adhesion without conditions; 2) adhesion with political and moral divergences; 3) condescending passivity or approving indifference; 4) political and social demobilization. internalization of the fear and culpability complex; 5) political and moral condemnation to accommodation; 6) dissent: between fear and reclusion in the private sphere.

regime. For this reason, and because my interest is on long-term effects of civil war experiences, I will only look into political attitudes and identities in the post-dictatorship period (i.e. after 1977), when they can be adequately measured.

7.3.1. Qualitative Research

In order to explore the long-term effects of violence on political identities, I conducted a set of semi-structured interviews on testimonies of the Spanish Civil War. The target population included only individuals born any time before 1930 and that thereby could have a direct memory of the conflict.[18] The interviewees were selected through "snowball techniques" in two different waves: a first sample of subjects (17) was interviewed in a pilot process in April 2007; a second sample of subjects (38) was interviewed during the period May-August 2007, in the context of more extended fieldwork, which included visits to archives of selected localities/counties.[19] The same interview protocol (see Appendix II) was implemented on all 55 subjects. The individuals were interviewed in localities throughout the Spanish territory

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[18] People born in 1930 were 6 years old when the war started, and 9 when it finished. I took the decision to make 1930 the cutoff year, and not to interview people born after that year, in order to avoid interviewing people that were too young during the conflict and could not possibly have memories of it.

[19] In the first wave, I contacted people through acquaintances, friends and relatives, and I conducted the interviews mostly in Madrid and Barcelona (capital cities). In the second wave, the selection process was more focused at the level of the community: I interviewed people that I managed to contact in the municipalities/counties where I was conducting fieldwork. However, because of the constraints in finding elders in these localities, I also included in this wave people from additional locations, whom I contacted through snowball techniques.

(mostly in the regions of Madrid, Catalonia and *Castilla León*).[20] They were coming from a wide range of social and economic positions, and they reported very diverse wartime experiences: some of the interviewees lived in the Nationalist side during the war, others lived in the Republican side; some of them lived in battlefield zones, others lived in pure rearguard localities; some of them were combatants, others were refugees; some were directly victimized (i.e. through displacement, physical violence, etc.), others did not directly experience any traumatic experience.

A total of 30 men and 25 women were interviewed; the average age of the testimonies was 84 years old.[21] A summary of the main characteristics of the interviewees (gender, age, province during the war, victimization experiences, political identity pre and postwar) is provided in Table 7.1. (I will refer to these testimonies with their assigned identification number, which assures anonymity.) [22] While the results of these interviews are not representative and they thereby do not allow for generalizations,[23] I would argue that they nevertheless provide useful insights. The advantage of the semi-structured interviews versus survey data (see section 3.2 below) is that they allow the researcher to engage in deep conversations with the respondents. In this particular case, the interviews put me in a key position to ask about sensitive issues such as political loyalties, wartime experiences, and similar. In other words, qualitative research conveyed comparative

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[20] The regions of origin and where they lived during the war were more varied (e.g. Canary Islands, the Basque Country, Castile, and Andalusia).

[21] The average year of birth in the sample is 1923. Calculating the age of the individuals in 2007, this makes the average age 84 years old.

[22] Table 7.1 has 60 id numbers, and not 55 because 5 individuals with whom I had scheduled interviews, and to whom I had given id numbers, could not be interviewed due to logistical issues (e.g. health, unavailability, eventual unwillingness to talk, etc.).

[23] Obviously, there is no intention to perform statistical analyses with these data.

advantages versus other methods, which would not have allowed for the measurement of feelings, sensations or attitudes that well.[24]

The interviews were accompanied by the expression of a myriad of feelings by the subjects: some of them were initially reluctant to talk about that period, some expressed deep emotions while explaining their experiences (e.g. they cried), and some did not let me record their words due to shame or fear over reprisals. In general, one thing that became clear over the course of this qualitative research is that a conflict that occurred 70 years ago was deeply felt by its survivors, and that it had an influence on the way they perceived the world, including politics. Also, fear was quite a common feeling among the interviewees;[25] interestingly, I noticed that this was in fact more prevalent among people that underwent the civil war in Nationalist territory than among those that lived in the Republican zone.[26]

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[24] For example, while some people would be reluctant to openly report their political identity (e.g. where they locate themselves on the left-right scale, for which party they vote), this could be inferred from comments or attitudes displayed over a long conversation. Insider knowledge of Spanish political culture was an invaluable asset for doing this.

[25] Fear showed as more or less generalized: that is, either about a possible return to civil war, or about potential reprisals at the individual level.

[26] I had more obstacles for recording the interviews among the testimonies of Nationalist territories than those of the Republican zone. Some of them even mentioned that they had not talked about the civil war events with anyone else before me (i.e. not even the members of their family).

Table 7.1. Testimonies of the Civil War. Summary of Semi-Structured Interviews

Id	Year Birth	Gender	Province during war	Side during War	Combatant	Victimization	Prewar ID	Postwar ID	InterestPolitics	Voting
1	1908	Female	Barcelona	Republican	No	No	--	cat. nat.	No	No
2	1929	Female	Tarragona	Republican	No	Uncle disappeared	leftist family	leftist	Yes	Yes
3	1926	Male	Tarragona	Republican	No	No	leftist family	leftist	Yes	Yes
4	1917	Male	Barcelona	Republican	Yes (conscripted)	No	---	rightist cat. nat.	No	Yes
5	1930	Female	Barcelona	Republican	No	Sister killed bomb (Nat)	--	rightist cat. nat.	No	Yes
6	1930	Male	Barcelona	Republican	No	No	leftist family	leftist cat. nat.	Yes	Yes
7	1930	Female	Girona	Republican	No	Father killed in combat (Nat)	rightist family	rightist cat. nat.	Yes	Yes
8	1930	Male	Barcelona	Republican	No	Father exiled & killed Mathausen	leftist family	leftist cat. nat.	Yes	Yes
9	1917	Male	Canarias, Sevilla, others	Nationalist	Yes (volunt)	No	rightist	rightist (extreme)	Yes	Yes
10	1928	Female	Barcelona	Republican	No	Two uncles killed (Left)	rightist family	rightist cat. nat.	Yes	Yes
11	1921	Male	Barcelona	Republican	No	No	leftist (extreme)	leftist	Yes	Yes
12	1928	Male	Barcelona	Republican	No	No	leftist family	leftist	Yes	Yes
13	1924	Male	Madrid	Republican	No	No	apolitical	rightist	No	No
14	1929	Female	Madrid	Republican	No	No	apolitical	rightist	No	No
15	1914	Male	Morroco, Sevilla, others	Nationalist	Yes	No	leftist (republican)	apolitical	No	No
16	1920	Female	Madrid	Republican	No	No	leftist	leftist	Yes	Yes
17	1929	Female	Barcelona	Republican	No	No	----	right wing cat. nat.	Yes	Yes
18	1919	Male	Guipuzcoa, others	Republican/Nationalist	Yes	Yes	leftist	leftist	Yes	Yes
19	1923	Female	Girona	Republican	No	No	------	right wing	No	No
20	1920	Female	Zaragoza	Republican	Yes	Yes (mutilated)	------	leftist	Yes	No
21	1924	Female	Girona	Republican/France	No	No	------	leftist	No	No
22	1914	Male	Barcelona	Republican	No	No (brother wounded in combat)	------	right wing cat. nat.	No	Yes
23	1926	Female	Tarragona	Republican	No	Yes (Rep killed brother in law)	rightist	right wing cat.nat.	Yes	Yes
24	1924	Male	Tarragona	Republican	No	No	leftist	unclear	No	Yes
25	1920	Male	Tarragona	Republican	Yes	No	leftist	leftist	Yes	Yes
26	1920	Female	Tarragona	Republican	No	No	rightist	right wing cat. nat.	Yes	Yes
27	1923	Male	Tarragona/France	Republican	No	Yes (exiled in France 10 years)	leftist family	leftist cat. nat.	Yes	Yes
30	1926	Female	Tarragona/Barcelona	Republican	No	No	republican	unclear	Yes	unclear
31	1928	Male	Tarragona	Republican	No	No	leftist family	leftist	Yes	Yes
32	1922	Male	Barcelona	Republican	No	Yes (brother killed in combat)	----	leftist	No	Yes
36	1917	Male	Lleida	Republican/Nationalist	Yes	No	leftist family	leftist	No	unclear
37	1926	Female	Lleida	Republican/Nationalist	No	Yes (brothers had to hide)	leftist family	leftist cat. nat.	Yes	Yes
38	1923	Male	Castilla Leon	Nationalist	No	No	leftist family	unclear (fear)	unclear	unclear
39	1920	Male	Salamanca	Nationalist	Yes	No	rightist family	rightist	Yes	Yes
40	1929	Female	Salamanca	Nationalist	No	No	rightist family	rightist	No	Yes
41	1919	Female	Zamora	Nationalist	No	No	rightist family	rightist	No	Yes
42	1919	Female	Bilbao	Republican/Nationalist	No	No (they had to hide from Left)	rightist family	rightist	Yes	Yes
43	1922	Male	Pinto	Republican	No	No	leftist	leftist	Yes	Yes
44	1923	Female	Madrid	Republican	No	No (brother wounded in combat)	leftist	leftist	Yes	Yes
45	1918	Male	Madrid	Republican	Yes	Yes (concentration camps)	leftist	leftist	Yes	Yes
46	1911	Female	Madrid	Republican	No	No	rightist family	leftist	No	Yes
47	1919	Male	Castilla Leon, others	Republican/Nationalist	Yes	No	republican	rightist	Yes	Yes
48	1923	Female	Barcelona	Republican	No	No	leftist family	leftist	Yes	Yes
49	1926	Male	Barcelona	Republican	No	No	rightist family	rightist	No	Yes
50	1930	Female	Barcelona	Republican	No	Father killed (left)	rightist family	leftist cat. nat.	Yes	Yes
51	1926	Male	Valencia	Republican	No	No	leftist	leftist	Yes	Yes
52	1923	Female	Barcelona	Republican	No	No	rightist family	rightist	No	No
53	1922	Male	Lleida	Rep->Nat (switched sides)	No	No	rightist family	apolitical	No	No
54	1923	Male	Lleida	Republican/Nationalist	No	No	unclear	unclear	No	Yes
55	1923	Male	Lleida	Republican/Nationalist	No	Father exiled in France	unclear	unclear	No	unclear
56	1923	Male	Lleida	Republican/Nationalist	No	No	rightist family	unclear	No	unclear
57	1918	Male	Lleida	Republican/Nationalist	No	brother mutilated in combat	unclear	unclear	No	unclear
58	1925	Male	Tarragona	Republican	No	Yes, uncle and aunt killed (bombs)	-----	leftist	Yes	Yes
59	1928	Female	Tarragona	Republican	No	No	mixed family	leftist	Yes	Yes
60	1925	Male	Lleida	Republican/Nationalist	No	Father imprisoned (Nat)	leftist family	leftist	Yes	Yes

The results of the semi-structured interviews are not overwhelmingly conclusive with regard to the directionality of the effects of violence and other victimization experiences on political identities. Among my sample of interviewees, I observed mixed patterns, which can be summarized as follows:

Some of the individuals strongly identified with one side of the conflict right before the start of the civil war, and their wartime experiences seem to merely have reinforced their ideological position. For example, testimonies 24, 11 or 12 identified with the left to the extent that they volunteered to be combatants in the Republican army, and they remained strongly identified with the left after the war –and for the remainder of their lives. Likewise, *Testimony 9* was conservative before the war, and he volunteered for the Nationalists; and he still displays a strong right-wing ideology. *Testimony 26* came from a very conservative family and, after being victimized by the left (one of her family members was assassinated), she remained highly conservative. *Testimony 44* argued that all her family was leftist, and that the war "only made us more leftist"; several of her relatives were victimized by the Nationalist army through forced displacement because of their political leanings. *Testimony 31* argues that "he has never switched of shirt", referring to the fact that he is as leftist as he used to be before the civil war (his father was a miner member of the CNT union). A similar account was given by *Testimony 36*, who remained leftist after having fought with the Republican army, and throughout his life.

In some cases, continuity of political identities took place independently of wartime experiences: *Testimony 43*, for example, told me: "I was a leftist before the war, and nothing that happened during the war influenced my political standings."

Among those people who were directly victimized by one of the armed groups, *rejection* seems to be more common than *acceptance* of the political identity of the perpetrators. Examples of this are *Testimony 10* (see citation above); *Testimony 8*, whose father was killed by the Nazis after he was exiled from Spain, and who is now identified with the political left; *Testimony 2,* who is anti-Francoist and whose uncle was displaced to France and disappeared after that.[27]

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[27] Note that these people are different from those mentioned in a) in that they did not have ideological standpoints before the war. They seem

Yet, as we mentioned above, there are some cases of *acceptance* of the political identity of the perpetrators (Testimonies 7, 13, 14). Acceptance seems to occur less frequently than rejection, and mostly in cases where there are conflicting experiences –so that acceptance could be the result of one rejection effect prevailing over another. For example, *Testimony 7* explains that her father was killed by the Nationalists while he was on duty for the Republican army. Despite this, she shows sympathies with the political right, mostly because her grandfather, who became her mentor after her father's death, was threatened by the anarchists in his locality. Thus, even if they implied quite different outcomes, the victimizing experience of her grandfather (i.e. threats) seems to weigh more heavily than the victimizing experience of her father (i.e. assassination) on her memory and current political identity.

Among those who were *combatants* in the war, there is a strong coherence between their political identities and the side in which they fought, independently of their prewar identities.[28] This implies that recruitment may be a powerful force generating endogenous identities in the context of civil wars. *Testimony 47* explained that despite the fact that his father was a Republican, and that he also was identified as a Republican in the early stages of the civil war, he decided to switch to the Nationalist side because of survival motivations, when it was becoming clear that the Nationalists were winning the war. He remained in the Francoist army thereafter, became a Franco supporter for the rest of his days. A very similar process was described by *Testimony 15*, who was in Morocco doing military service when the war started: even though he was a Republican, he enlisted with the Nationalist army because of survival motivations. This affected his political identity after the war; he was no longer a Republican.

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to have built their political identities on the basis of their personal (and traumatic) experiences during the war, through rejection.

[28] Again, in most cases, recruitment into one or the other side depended on the location of the person.

The evidence from these interviews was slightly more straightforward (or less "mixed") with regard to issues of political participation:

-Among the interviewees, I did not notice greater political involvement of those individuals that had suffered victimization during the civil war, or a greater intensity or "polarization" in their political loyalties. This is the opposite of what has been found by in other settings, e.g. Sierra Leone (Bellows and Miguel 2006, 2008), Uganda (Blattman 2009), Indonesia (Shewfelt 2009), and it suggests that the results that have been obtained in short-term settings might not necessarily apply in long-term contexts.

-Neutrality and political apathy was widespread among the interviewees, at least 22 (40%) individuals displayed negative attitudes towards politics and politicians.[29] Political apathy seems to have been worsened by the experience of the conflict, e.g. Testimony 53 literally told me that he was apolitical as a consequence of the civil war, and something similar was related to me by *Testimonies 1, 4, 5, 15, 13, 14*, and *36*.

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[29] There are several contextual elements of the Spanish case that need to be accounted for: 1) the existence of a long term repressive dictatorship, which not only limited the political options but also promoted a particular view of the civil conflict (making the victimizer only from one side: the left). The dictatorship also had a clear demobilization intent; Hansen (1997) argues that the growth of public apathy is the most profound consequence of Franco's regime. 2) The generational or so-called period effect: those people I interviewed were elders who may have lost their political involvement because of their aging. 3) Because of the "pact of silence" that accompanied the transition to democracy (Aguilar 1996), there may have been an absence of political options satisfying victimized individuals: they may have lost interest in politics because of this (this is in fact the case of *Testimony 20*).

7.3.2. Survey Analysis

In April 2008, the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas* (CIS) implemented a survey on the Spanish population that asked a series of questions related to the civil war, the dictatorship and the Law of Historical Memory that had been approved by the Spanish Parliament in December 2007. The survey, which targeted a representative sample of the Spanish population, comprised 2,936 respondents over 18 years old, who were inquired face-to-face (following the traditional interview methodology of this institution) in 30- minute interviews.[30] The survey included a number of questions on the victimization experiences of the individuals (only for elders, who are defined as people over 65 years old) and/or of the family (for the whole sample). These questions, which were partly based on the questionnaire that I had implemented over the course of my qualitative research (see Appendix), as well as on a previous survey that partially tackled these issues (CIRES 1992), allow for the exploration the relationship between individual/family victimization on individual political alignments. In addition to victimization experiences, respondents were also asked various questions about their historical past, including the ideological side of the family during the civil war. The latter allows measuring (although not perfectly) patterns of change or continuity in the political leanings of the families and the potential effect of victimizing experiences on these patterns.[31]

Figure 7.1 and Table 7.2 depict the correlation between family identification with the sides of the civil war and current individual

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[30] The Basque Country and Catalonia are over-represented, with 699 and 683 respondents, respectively.

[31] The measurement of these effects is not perfect because there may be a projection of one's own political identity in the responses about the ideology of the family. Hence, there may be unavoidable issues of endogeneity.

identification with these sides.[32] The correlation is quite high (the Pearson coefficient is significant at the 99% level. The Kendall Tau and Crammer's V are also significant at the 95% level), but that they do not match perfectly, in other words, not everybody identifies with the same side as their family.

Figure 7.1. Individual and Family Identification with Sides in the Civil War

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
[32] The exact formulation of the questions is phrased in the Appendix (III).

Table 7.2. Individual and Family Identification with Sides in the Civil War

		Individual Identification			
		Nationalists	Republicans	None/Both	DK/DA[Ψ]
Family Identification	**Nationalists**	68.49%	5.51%	15.83%	6.75%
	Republicans	7.98%	65.27%	16.89%	14.29%
	None/Both	12.18%	18.42	36.30%	20.52%
	DK/DA[Ψ]	11.34%	10.81%	30.97%	58.44%

% are column percentages.
[Ψ] Does not Know/Does not Answer.

In Table 7.2, we can see that, among all those who currently identify with the Nationalists, almost 70% say that their family identified with this side. Only 8% says that the family identified with the Republican side. The opposite occurs with those who currently identify with the Republicans: 65.27% say that their family is Republican; only a tiny 5.51% identifies with the Nationalist side. We can also see that there is a greater ratio of non-responses in the question on "family identification", as compared to the question on "individual identification". This indicates that there may not be as much of a "rationalization" of the answers regarding family loyalties (on the basis of individual current identities) as we would initially suspect.

Individual victimization

The survey also included specific questions on individual victimization experiences during the civil war. For people over 65 years old (a total of 597 individuals in the sample), the survey asked about their personal experiences during the civil war; for people under this age, the survey asked about the experiences of members of their family (e.g. ancestors) or "close people". Those

between 65 and 71 years old cannot have any wartime experiences because they were born after 1936. I code as "elders" only those over 71 years old, that is, those who were at least born in the year of the outbreak of the war.[33] Table 7.3 shows the descriptive data on individual victimization experiences that were reported in the sub-sample elders. We can see that those who had these experiences represent a very small share of this sub-sample. Only 54 out of 409 elders (13.2%) report having been victimized by one of the armed groups during the civil war.

Table 7.3. Personal Victimization Experiences (Elders)

	Condemned to Death	**Had to leave Spain**	**Imprisoned**	**Had to hide**	**Was expelled from work**	**Total** (1)
Total	4	11	9	29	1	53
Percentage (over 65+)	0.9%	2.7%	2.2%	7.1%	0.24%	13.2%

% represents the percentage among the population over 71 years old in the sample.
(1) This includes all people who have suffered any type of victimization.

Table 7.4 shows the different types of victimization experiences (the person was condemned to death, she had to leave Spain, she was imprisoned, she had to hide, she was sacked from her job), and their relative frequency within the sub-sample of elders. We can also see the percentage distribution across genders. "Having to hide" is the most frequent type of reported victimization within the sample. "Exile" and "imprisonment" are those immediately following. Being "condemned to death" and 'sacked from work" are much less frequent. Distinguishing by

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[33] I have widened the years frame here (as compared to that in the semi-structured interviews) not to shrink the sample too much.

gender, the main observation is that all victimization experiences are slightly more frequent among men than among women.

Table 7.4. Personal Victimization Experiences, by Types and Gender (Elders)

	Total	Men	Women
Condemned to Death	4	4	0
	0.9%	1.7%	0%
Had to leave Spain	10	7	3
	2.44%	3.1%	1.6%
Imprisoned	9	3	6
	2.2%	1.3%	%
Had to hide	29	14	8
	7.1%	6.2%	3.2%
Expelled from Work	1	1	0
	0.24%	0.4%	0%
Nothing	285	158	127
	69.68%	7%	7%
Does not answer	78	40	38
	19.07%	17.6%	20.7%
Total	409	226	183
	100%	100%	100%

% are column percentages.

For those victimized, we asked who was the one to blame for the events, the Nationalist side, the Republican side, or both of them. The distribution of responses, both in absolute numbers and in column percentages, is shown in Table 7.5. The Nationalist side is reported as the perpetrator of violations to a greater extent than the Republican side –and this is particularly the case for "having to leave Spain" (72.7% of cases), "having to hide" (44.8% of cases) or "was imprisoned" (45.5%). The only respondent who reported having been sacked from work blamed the Nationalist side.

Table 7.5. Side Reported to Be Responsible for Victimization Experiences (Elders)

	Condemned to Death	Had to leave Spain	Imprisoned	Had to hide	Was expelled from work
Republican	1	2	1	8	0
	25%	18.18%	11.11%	27.6%	0%
Nationalist	1	8	5	13	1
	25%	72.7%	45.4%	44.8%	100%
Both sides	0	0	2	2	0
	0%	0%	18.2%	6.9%	0%
Does not know/Does not answer	2	1	1	6	0
	50%	9%	11.11%	20.7%	0%
Total	4	11	9	29	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

% are column percentages.

A major caveat is that the sub-sample of elders involved the use of very few cases (13.93% of the sample), from which we cannot obtain generalizable insights. The small numbers also imply that we cannot run appropriate multivariate analyses.[34] Because of this, I proceed to analyze the profiles of each of these groups of victims at a descriptive level; in this way, I can check whether there are any meaningful connections between their experiences and their political identities. I observe the following patterns:

-Among those who report having been condemned to death (a total of 4), only 2 of them voted in the last national elections (of 9

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[34] In fact, since I do not have information on the pre-war identities of the individuals (I could not ask this in the survey –as opposed to in the semi-structured interviews), I would not be able to estimate the exact effect of victimization on changes/continuity of political identities.

March 2008), and only one of them reports her vote. This person voted for the main Spanish social-democratic party (PSOE).

-Among those who had to leave Spain (a total of 11), all voted in the last elections. 4 voted for the PSOE, 1 voted for the Basque nationalist party PNV and the other 6 do not report their vote in the survey.

-Among those who were imprisoned (a total of 9), 7 of them voted in the elections. 2 voted for the PSOE, 2 voted for the conservative party PP, 1 voted for the former communist party ICV, 1 voted for the basque nationalist party PNV. If we distinguish imprisonments by perpetrator, those imprisoned by the Nationalists voted only for leftist parties (PSOE and IU); those imprisoned by the Republicans voted only for the PP; among those imprisoned by both sides, one voted for IU and the other did not report her vote.

-Among those that report that they had to hide (a total of 29), the distribution of votes in the last general elections is as follows: 23 of them went to the polls, 8 voted for PSOE, 5 voted for the PP, 4 voted for PNV, and 6 do not report the party for which they voted. If we distinguish by sides, of the 8 who had to hide from the Republicans, 5 voted PP, 1 voted PSOE (and 1 did not answer); of the 13 who had to hide from the Nationalists, 5 voted for the PSOE, 2 voted for PNV (and 5 did not answer).

-The only person who reports being sacked from work (during the civil war) states that he voted for the PSOE. The responsible of this victimization were the Nationalists.

In a nutshell, while they are not conclusive, these patterns reveal that there is a correlation between patterns of victimization during the civil war and voting behavior: those who were victimized by the Nationalist side are voting either for leftist or nationalist parties (e.g. PNV); those who were victimized by the Republican side are voting for the main right wing party (i.e. the PP). Hence, among the different alternative effects we have presented in section 3.1, rejection is the one effect that seems to be operating in these cases.

We must be aware of the fact that, given their lifetime experiences under a dictatorship, elders in Spain may be less likely to report their vote as compared to other groups of people (i.e. those who have lived under a democratic system for most of their lives). That is because, as a consequence of a life-time of political repression, these people may be fearful of disclosing their vote. However, they may be less reluctant to report other aspects of their political identity such as their location on the ideological scale. Indeed, in the survey, the rate of non response on the voting question, among people over 65 years old, was 28.34%; the rate of non response in the ideological placement question was slightly lower: 24.13%. In Table 7.6, I explore the placement of elders on the ideological scale, as reported in the survey (in our scale, 1 is extreme left and 10 is extreme right). I distinguish between victims (of each of the sides, as well as of any of the sides) and non-victims, in order to check if there are any differences between these sub-groups of people.

Table 7.6. Average on the Ideological Scale (1-10), by Sub-groups of Elders

	Condemned to Death	Had to leave Spain	Imprisoned	Had to hide	Was expelled from work	All *(3)*
Republican	8	7	5	7.28		7.09
Nationalist	2	3.71	3.8	3.63	4	3.7
Both sides			6	4.5		5.25
Does not know/Does not answer						
Not victimized (+65) *(1)*			4.95			
All sample (+65) *(2)*			4.97			

(1)Total is 262 individuals; 2) Total is 302 individuals.
(3)This includes all people who suffered from any type of victimization.

Table 7.6 indicates that, consistent with what we observed above, there are ideological differences between victimized and non-victimized people, and –more specifically- that there are differences between groups of victimized people depending on the side perpetrating the violations. Indeed, we can see that those victimized by the Nationalists are on average much more leftist than the remainder of the sample (3.7, which is more than one point below the sample mean: 4.93); the one individual who was condemned to death is much more leftist than the rest of the sample, scoring 2 on the scale. Conversely, those victimized by the Republican are much more conservative (or rightist) than the average of the sample (7.09, more than two points above the sample mean); again, the one individual who was condemned to death is the one located in the most extreme position (point 8 of the scale). Thus, the evidence in Table 7.6 lends significant support to the rejection hypothesis.[35]

Insofar as political participation is concerned, the data from the survey suggests that voting in the elections is not significantly affected by victimization experiences. Table 7.7 indicates that the rate of participation in the March 2008 elections is 80% among those who were victimized during the civil war (by either of the sides). This is slightly smaller than the rate of participation among elders who were not victimized, which is 80.49% (note that the difference is not statistically significant). Thus, the demobilization/apathy hypothesis is not supported by these data. This, again, challenges the findings in Bellows and Miguel (2008) and Blattman (2009), which I would argue do not hold in long-term settings.

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[35] Again, we have to be cautious with the conclusions because of the small numbers in this sub-sample, and because we are not controlling for identities previous to the war.

Table 7.7. Victimization and Political Participation (Elders)

	Total Elders	**Victimized Elders**	**Non-victimized Elders**
Voted	329	36	293
Did not vote	80	9	71
% Participation	80.44%	80%	80.49%
(Observations)	(329)	(45)	(261)

Family victimization

So far, we have focused on direct victimization experiences of individuals. Yet, it could be the case that victimization affected people indirectly. In order to explore this hypothesis, in the survey we asked interviewees (i.e. everyone in the sample) about the victimization experiences of their relatives and/or friends during the civil war. Table 7.8 shows the distribution of responses across different types of victimization experiences that were listed in the survey, in percentage levels.[36] We asked people about different family members or friends (up to three).

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[36] See Appendix (III) for the exact formulation of the question. The different victimization experiences were: died in combat, died in bombing, executed, condemned to death, disappeared, imprisoned, had to leave Spain, had to hide, expelled from work.

Table 7.8. Family Victimization during the Civil War, by Types (All the Sample)

	Person 1	**Person 2**	**Person 3**
Died in Combat	10.7%	11.2%	6.2%
Died in Bombing	2.4%	4.3%	2.8%
Was Executed	8.6%	14.6%	10.8%
Condemned to Death	1.9%	1.7%	3.9%
Disappeared	2.2%	3.9%	3.8%
Imprisoned	10.7%	24.3%	19.7%
Had to Leave Spain	3.9%	10.4%	14.9%
Had to hide	4.4%	11.6%	11.1%
Expelled from work	0.7%	2.2%	4.5%
Other	6.3%	9.7%	9.9%
Nothing	26.1%	0%	0%
Does not know	14.9%	5.1%	10.9%
Does not answer	7.3%	0.9%	1.7%
(Observations)	(2936)	(656)	(298)

% are column percentages.

While the rate of non-responses was relatively greater among young cohorts (see figure A7.1 in the Appendix for rate of response to this question, by cohort), it is striking the degree to which people responded to this survey question. Only 22.2% of the sample did not answer concerning to a first person (relative or friend).[37] From this group, 52.58% reported victimization of this person, whereas 26.1% said that nothing happened to her.

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[37] For person 2 and person 3, the rate of response was much smaller (only 656 replied regarding person 2, and 298 replied regarding person 3). However, since these items were optional questions for the interviewee, the non-answers are not reported in tables A7.1-A7.3.

Imprisonment and death in combat are the most common form of victimization (10.7%); execution is reported by a slightly lower percentage (8.6%). Having to leave Spain (3.9%) and having to hide (4.4%) are the next most common forms of victimization. The remaining forms are much less frequent.

We also asked about those responsible for these actions, by armed groups. Table 7.9 shows the distribution of responses.

Table 7.9. Side Reported to Be Responsible for Family Victimization (All the Sample)

	Person 1	Person 2	Person 3
Nationalist	56	64	72.6
Republican	21.4	20.8	18.9
Does not know	19.8	14.5	7.1
Does not answer	2.9	.6	1.4
(Observations)	(1519)	(617)	(261)

As can be observed in Table 7.9, of all those reporting victimization of one family member/friend, 56% attributes responsibility to the Nationalist side, while 21.4% attributes responsibility to the Republican side. Similar patterns of victimization and of attribution of responsibilities arise with regard to second and third family members/friends, although it must be noted that a much smaller share of the sample replied to the question concerning these additional people.[38]

I proceeded to run a set of multivariate regressions to check on the effect of wartime family victimization on the political identities of individuals. Again, the interest is in knowing whether victimizing experiences are influencing political identity –broadly

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[38] Tables A7.2-A7.4 in the Appendix, show the distribution of responses on family victimization (for individuals 1, 2 and 3 mentioned by each respondent), in total figures.

defined in terms of political blocs: left and right.[39] In a first set of analyses, I operationalize the dependent variable as a dummy variable measuring "leftist": this has value 1 if the individual is located to the left of the political spectrum (i.e. positions 1-5 on the ideological scale), and 0 if she is located to the right of the political spectrum (i.e. positions 6-10 on the ideological scale). In a second set of analyses, I operationalize the dependent variable as a 1-10 scale variable, with value 10 representing extreme left and 1 representing extreme right.[40] In a third set of analyses, I look at the determinants of voting for peripheral nationalist parties in Catalonia and the Basque country (i.e. ERC and CiU in Catalonia; PNB, Aralar Na-Bai in the Basque country), to see whether family victimization during the civil war has an effect on the vote for these parties, and to control for the existence of a second (nationalist) dimension in specific areas of the Spanish territory. Indeed, one could argue that this second dimension might have an incidence on the effects of civil war violence on identities: as explained, ethnic minorities were heavily victimized by the Nationalists (during the civil war) and the Francoist regime (afterwards), so rejection of the identity of these perpetrators may have led towards identification with the nationalist political parties –both to the left and to the right of the ideological spectrum.[41] In fact, several of the interviewed civil war survivors (see section 3.1) showed strong anti-Francoist positions, while at the same time

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[39] Again, these blocs have a rough correspondence with the sides fighting the SCW –although the right nowadays has a democratic character, which differentiates it to the non-democratic character of the Nationalist bloc.

[40] Note that this variable is constructed by inversing the values of the ideological self-placement variable (see Appendix), which goes from extreme left to extreme right. The inversion is made in order to facilitate the comparison with the first set of analyses.

[41] I will also perform robustness analyses with the variable "Catalan or Basque nationalist identity", which is built into the nationalist scale variable (question 45, see Appendix).

they were supportive of Catalan right-wing nationalist parties (*Testimonies 4, 5 22, 23, 37, 49*).[42]

Family victimization is the main independent variable in the analyses; it is operationalized as a dummy variable with value 1 if the interviewee answers positively to any of the items of victimization (see Appendix III for the exact formulation of the question). A number of sociodemographic controls are also included in the regressions; their selection derives from the main set of variables identified and employed in the political behavior literature, and is inspired by the empirical analyses performed in Aguilar *et al*. (2011), which tackles a similar issue, and use the same survey instrument. Like these authors, I run step-wise regressions, in which different sets of variables are introduced in subsequent stages in order to optimally capture their independent effects.

A first set of variables are the socio-demographic controls: 1) *Age* (in years); 2) *Gender* (dummy with value 1 for men and 0 for women); 3) *Size* of the municipality (a scale variable that takes values from 1 to 7);[43] 4) *Interest in politics*;[44] 5) *Education* (1 for primary education or less, 2 for secondary education, 3 for university degree);[45] 6) *Religiosity*.[46]

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[42] Although there are also people who are Francoist supporters and voters of the Catalan nationalist party CiU, for example (Testimonies 10, 23).

[43] This is a contextual variable more than a sociodemographic one. Yet, I included it here because it operates practically as a sociodemographic control. The categories are the following: 1 = smaller or equal than 2,000 inhabitants; 2 = between 2,001 and 10.000; 3 = between 10,001 and 50.000; 4= between 50,001 and 100,000; 5 = between 100,001 and 400,000; 6 = between 400,001 and 1,000,000; 7 = more than 1,000,000.

[44] We proxy it with the question: "Could you tell me if you are interested in politics in general?" Possible responses are 4= Very Much; 3= Quite a lot; 2= A little bit; 1= Not at all.

[45] "Education and interest in politics are two mandatory controls in our estimation since individuals scoring higher in one of them are much less likely to give a "does not know" sort of answer. Adding these

A second set of variables relate to family socialization, which is crucial when analyzing the effects of particular events over generations who did not experience them directly: 7) *Talked politics*, which measures the extent to which the person was exposed to conversations about politics within the family (this is a scalar variable that goes from 1 to 4).[47] I do not have a prior on the direction over which this variable is going to have an effect on the dependent variable. 8) *Family Nationalist*: 1 if the family sympathized with the Nationalist side during the war, 0 otherwise; 9) *Family Republican*: 1 if the family sympathized with the Republican side during the war, 0 otherwise. These two variables should allow us to control for socialization effects (leading to greater or lower sympathies towards the political left), as well as for endogeneity issues associated with the fact that sympathizers from one side were more likely to be victimized by the enemy side, and vice-versa (see chapters 2, 4 and 5).[48]

A third set of explanatory variables refer to family victimization during the civil war and the dictatorship: 10) *Victim Nationalists*: this has value 1 if the individual reports that at least one member of her family or close friend was victimized by the Nationalist side during the civil war, and value 0 otherwise. 11) *Victim Republicans*: this has value 1 if the individual reports that at least one member of her family or close friend was victimized by the Republican side, and 0 otherwise. 12) *Victim Francoism*: this has value 1 if the individual reports that at least one member of her family or close friend was victimized by the Francoist

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controls helps to avoid these types of sample biases." (Aguilar *et al*. 2009).

[46] This is a scalar variable that goes from 1 to 6, where 1 is non-religious -the respondent identifies herself as atheist or non-religious- and 6 highly religious -the respondent says that she goes to mass several days a week.

[47] This variable is operationalized as follows: "When you were a child or adolescent, how much was politics talked about at home?" The response options are: 4= very much; 3= quite; 2= a little bit; 1= not at all.

[48] The exact formulation of these questions is given in the Appendix.

dictatorship, and 0 otherwise. We include this variable in order to control for a possible counteractive effect of victimization during the dictatorship over a previous victimization during the civil war.

The results of a set of step-wise logit regressions with the dummy dependent variable (*Leftist*) are presented in Table 7.10.

Table 7.10. Logit Regressions for Leftist

	M1	**M2**	**M3**	**M4**	**M5**
Age	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	0.179**	0.199**	0.153**	0.153**	0.194**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Town Size	-0.079***	-0.093***	-0.082***	-0.082***	-0.092***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Interest Politics	0.256***	0.211***	0.176***	0.176***	0.203***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education	0.158**	0.188**	0.135*	0.130*	0.178**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Religion	-0.516***	-0.410***	-0.471***	-0.461***	-0.396***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Talk politics		0.120*	0.131*	0.116*	0.094
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Family Nationalist		-0.734***			-0.623***
		(0.12)			(0.12)
Family Republican		1.524***			1.396***
		(0.13)			(0.13)
Victim Nationalists			0.856***	0.727***	0.266**
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Victim Republicans			-0.413***	-0.488***	-0.305**
			(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Victim Francoism				0.433***	0.339***
				(0.12)	(0.12)
Constant	1.074***	0.492*	0.859***	0.869***	0.518*
	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Observations	2749	2749	2749	2749	2749
Chi2	323.915	607.723	426.987	440.353	630.380

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1, **.05, *** .001

The sociodemographic control variables are broadly very significant, with the exception of Age, which is not significant in any of the models. Being male increases the likelihood of being leftist, as well as it does being interested in politics and having higher levels of education. Living in bigger towns decreases the likelihood of being leftist, as well as it does being a religious person. As regards to the socialization variables, talking about politics has a slightly significant (positive) effect on the likelihood of being leftist. As we would expect, having family from the Nationalist side in the civil war decreases this likelihood, and having family from the Republican side increases it. These two variables are, in fact, highly significant. In Model 3, the effects of victimization are shown to be significant in the direction that we had hypothesized: family victimization by the Nationalist side increases the odds of having a leftist political identity; while the reverse happens with family victimization by the Republican side. In Model 4, we observe that being a victim of Francoism also has a positive effect on leftist identity. None of the socialization and victimization variables change in substantive or statistical significance when we draw them together in the same regression (i.e. Model 5).[49]

In Table 7.11, I present the results of the regressions with the scalar dependent variable (*Left scale*).

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[49] It could be that there are differences in the degree to which victimization experiences affect individuals depending on their proximity in time to the events. For this reason I ran an additional regression, based on model 5 in Table 7.10, which includes the interaction between Age and each of the types of victimization (Nationalist, Republican –during the civil war-, and Francoist –during the dictatorship). The results, which are not included here (they are available upon request), throw up a counter-intuitive finding: the rejection effect of wartime Nationalist victimization diminishes with age (we would expect the rejection effect to intensify with the proximity to the civil war). In contrast, the interaction of Francoist victimization during the dictatorship and age is positive This is consistent with the results in Aguilar *et al* (2011).

Table 7.11. OLS regressions for LeftScale

	M1	**M2**	**M3**	**M4**	**M5**
Age	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	0.188***	0.187***	0.148**	0.148**	0.171***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Town Size	-0.036*	-0.035*	-0.035*	-0.035*	-0.034*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Interest Politics	0.142***	0.130***	0.104**	0.103**	0.123***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education	-0.009	0.040	-0.008	-0.010	0.040
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Religion	-0.525***	-0.366***	-0.460***	-0.454***	-0.352***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Talk politics		-0.002	0.011	0.002	-0.016
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Family Nationalist		-0.965***			-0.864***
		(0.09)			(0.09)
Family Republican		0.904***			0.809***
		(0.07)			(0.08)
Victim Nationalists			0.646***	0.582***	0.229***
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Victim Republicans			-0.551***	-0.586***	-0.320***
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Victim Francoism				0.201**	0.086
				(0.08)	(0.08)
Constant	7.325***	6.790***	7.161***	7.168***	6.787***
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Observations	2318	2318	2318	2318	2318

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1, **.05, *** .001

These results in Table 7.11 are very much consistent with those in Table 7.10. The only difference is that the variable "talking about politics" is not significant in these regressions, while it was significant and positive in Table 7.10.

In Table 7.12, we present the results with the dependent variable nationalist vote, for the sub-sample of individuals in the Basque Country and Catalonia. These regressions include the same set of independent variables as the previous tables.

Table 7.12. Logit Regressions for Nationalist Vote.
Basque Country and Catalonia

	Catalonia	Basque Country
Age	0.013*	-0.010
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	0.051	-0.235
	(0.20)	(0.21)
Town Size	-0.183***	-0.055
	(0.05)	(0.08)
Interest Politics	0.070	0.175
	(0.12)	(0.15)
Education	0.489***	0.184
	(0.17)	(0.17)
Religion	0.144*	0.296***
	(0.08)	(0.09)
Talk politics	0.276**	-0.130
	(0.13)	(0.16)
Family Nationalist	-0.297	0.345
	(0.32)	(0.38)
Family Republican	0.411*	0.378*
	(0.23)	(0.23)
Victim Nationalists	0.285	0.315
	(0.23)	(0.24)
Victim Republicans	0.060	-0.717
	(0.33)	(0.58)
Victim Francoism	0.349	0.326
	(0.23)	(0.23)
Constant	-3.379***	-2.196***
	(0.58)	(0.67)
Observations	649	668
Chi2	54.702	29.463

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .001

These regressions do not convey conclusive results: none of the victimization variables is significant in explaining the nationalist vote. This is supportive of the idea that the major cleavage in the civil war was the left-right cleavage (see chapter 3), and it indicates that the civil war events did not have a major incidence on the center-periphery cleavage (or on identities articulated around the nationalist cleavage). In order to provide robustness to these results, I have run the same regressions with a dependent variable created with the nationalist scale variable, which has value 1 if the individual considers herself Catalan or Basque nationalist (points 6-10 of the scale) and 0 if not (points 1-5 of the scale). The results (in Table A7.5 of the Appendix) resemble very much those in Table 7.12, and thus do not lead to different conclusions.[50]

To wrap up, the multivariate regression analyses are supportive of the "rejection" hypothesis, which seems to have implications for the long-term and to be operating along the main war cleavage (i.e. ideological). As a matter of fact, the evidence in Tables 7.10 and 7.11 is supportive of the existence of some sort of intergenerational transmission of victimization experiences so that the political identities of the offspring of victimized people are affected by them. A major caveat in these results is that reported victimization may be endogenously related to political identity –in other words, leftist people may be more likely to report violations by the Nationalists against members of their family, and vice-versa. Unfortunately, there is no clear way to get around this issue, for we do not have an exogenous source of information on victimization other than the individuals's responses in the survey. To explore this potential problem, I generate Figure 7.2, which depicts the distribution in the ideological scale of four sub-sets of individuals: 1) individuals that report victimization by the Republican side, 2) individuals that report victimization by the

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[50] The only difference is that, in the Basque Country, victimization by the Nationalist side in the civil war is in this case statistically significant in explaining nationalist self-identification.

Nationalist side, 3) individuals that report victimization by the Francoist dictatorship; 4) individuals that do not report any type of victimization at all.[51] This graph shows that there is a relationship between reported family victimization and self-placement on the ideological scale: the distribution of those victimized by the Republicans is skewed to the right, and the distribution of those victimized by the Nationalists is skewed to the left.

Figure 7.2. Reported Victimization and Self-Placement on the Ideological Scale

In a nutshell, the patterns depicted in Figure 7.2 compel us to be cautious about the conclusions obtained in the survey analyses,

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[51] Note that sub-samples 1-3 are not mutually exclusive, they are people who are included in two if not three of these groups; sub-sample 4 is however exclusive with the others.

as there could be a projection bias in the victimization experiences reported by members of different ideological sub-groups.[52]

7.3.3. Large-n Analysis

In a third set of analyses, I study the effect of wartime events on political alignments at the local level using data from elections that took place before and after the SCW. The last general elections of the Republican period took place on 16 February 1936; after the civil war and decades of dictatorship, the founding elections of the democratic period took place on 19 June 1977.[53] Given that there were no democratic elections in the period in-between, I analyze differences in political alignments between these two elections. The unit of analysis is the municipality, with a particular focus on the region of Catalonia.[54]

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[52] This evidence does not necessarily rule out the above findings for we do not know what the direction of causality is (the figure merely shows that there is a correlation).

[53] About these first elections, Gunther explains: "It is not surprising to find that, before the first democratic election, few Spaniards held (or were willing to express) strong attitudes in support of specific political parties or groups. . . . This should not, however, be taken to mean that there was a total absence of political orientation among the Spanish electorate. In spite of the lack of clearly visible and identifiable political organizations, large segments of the Spanish population were able to identify with various political tendencies. *The overwhelming majority of those surveyed in two large-scale studies of the transition to democracy had no difficulty in classifying themselves in left-right terms.* About eight out of ten of those interviewed in July 1976 and in January 1977 were able to place themselves on an ideological scale ranging from one (extreme left) to ten (extreme right)" (Gunther *et al*. 1988: 55, emphasis mine)".

[54] This region has 1,062 municipalities. There were almost no changes in municipalities from 1936 to 1977; where there are changes, I leave them as a "missing case", except when the change consists of an

Previous empirical research has found a great degree of continuity between electoral results in the 1936 and 1977 elections (Linz 1977; Maravall 1978; Tusell 1991; Payne 1985).[55] Yet, these authors have analyzed national, provincial or regional patterns of electoral behavior; as will be shown, at lower levels of analysis, this continuity is not as clear. Also, Wittenberg (2009) explains that the Pearson's correlation coefficient, which is used by these authors, leads to a misleading overstating of electoral continuity. I will return to this further below.

The main dependent variable is the difference in vote to the leftist political bloc, at the local level, between these two elections (1977 and 1936). The variable PercentChange is operationalized as % change in the support to parties in the left bloc (% Support Left 1977-% Support Left 1936) in a particular locality.[56] For 1936, I code as leftist those parties in the Popular Front pre-electoral coalition;[57] for 1977, I code as leftist all left and center-left parties that received votes in the election.[58]

In Spain, leftist parties in the prewar and postwar/post-dictatorship period can be considered members of the same "family" (Martínez Cuadrado 1969, 1980; Maravall 1978). Also, in 1977, there was a persistence of cleavages that had characterized the political arena in earlier democratic experiences (Payne 1985: 77). They are, of course, many discontinuities

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aggregation of municipalities; in that case, I pooled together the data of the previously independent municipalities.

[55] Tusell (1991) argues that there is a very strong correlation between the vote for the CEDA in 1936 and the vote for the UCD in 1977, and between the vote for the PF in 1936 and the PSOE in 1977. Likewise, Maravall (1978) finds a strong correlation between support for the PF in 1936 and support for the PSOE in 1977.

[56] The sources of data on violence at the local level are listed in previous chapters of the dissertation (chapters 4 and 5). The distribution of this variable in the dataset is depicted in Figure A7.2 (Kernel Density Estimate).

[57] Classified in Vilanova (1989).

[58] As classified in Molas (2000).

between these periods. As it is signaled by Linz and Montero (1999), "after 40 years of an authoritarian regime, most of the parties of the Republic had disappeared" (9); also "The absence of an anarcho-syndicalist labor movement and a potential syndicalist party was more complete than predicted, and represented a fundamental break with the political alignments that had existed since the turn of the century and particularly under the Second Republic" (Linz and Montero 1999: 6). All this does not however impede the comparison of families of parties (following Wittenberg 2006). It must be noted that the electoral system was different for each of these periods: in 1936 it consisted of a majoritarian rule system (see chapter 3); while in 1977, it consisted of a proportional rule system with a majoritarian correction (*d'Hondt*). However, the electoral districts are the same in both periods: the administrative unit of the province did not change from one period to another.[59] Since the data I am presenting are at the municipal level, the differences in the electoral law should not produce dramatic effects; also, because I am looking at support for a bloc, and not for a party. The most important difference between both periods is that while in 1936 parties would compete through pre-electoral coalitions (i.e. FP and CEDA, due to the constraints of the electoral system), in 1977 parties would compete individually.

Alternatively, I use the variable Changebloc, which classifies municipalities according to their prewar and postwar political alignments (i.e. left or right).[60] The categories are as follows: 1 if the municipality was leftist in 1936 and it remains leftist in 1977; 2 if the municipality was rightist in 1936 and it remains rightist in 1977; 3 if the municipality switches from right (1936) to left

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[59] The only difference is that some big cities such as Barcelona and Madrid had their own constituency in 1936, while they did not in 1977. Yet, this is not consequential for my analysis.

[60] I classify as leftist municipalities with more than 50% of votes to the left, and rightist those with more than 50% of votes to the right. There are no cases in the sample of municipalities with exactly 50% percent of votes for each of the blocs.

(1977); 4 if the municipality switches from left (1936) to right (1977). The main independent variable will be "DiffViolenceLR", which is an index generated by subtracting all the executions per thousand inhabitants committed by the right in a particular locality to all the executions per thousand inhabitants committed by the left in the same locality. Thus, this variable is positive when the left killed more people than the right, negative when the right killed more people than the left, and is 0 when both armies killed the same amount of people. This variable allows me to have an indicator of relative direct violence for each of my units of analysis.

A set of control variables will be introduced in the analysis: a) Support Left1936: % vote Left in 1936 elections; b) Participation1936: % vote in the 1936 elections (over 1936 census); c) Change in Participation: difference between % of participation between 1936 elections and 1977 elections; d) Census 1936: total number of inhabitants of the locality in 1936; e) Census Change: total difference between the census of the locality in 1977 and 1936. This variable (together with the census for 1936) allows me to have an indicator of population growth during the years between these two elections, and to control for the effect of population size on political behavior.

If we look at the basic descriptive statistics of the dependent variables (see Appendix), we can observe that the vote to the left was on average 18 points lower in 1977 than in 1936. This goes against the belief that, at the aggregate level, Catalonia was more leftist in 1977 than in 1936.[61] Also, when plotting all the municipalities by the support to the left in 1936 and 1977 (Figure 7.3), we observe that these two exhibit a close to linear relationship with a slope greater than one.

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[61] Also, we can see that we lose around 200 observations in 1977. This can be due both to the disappearance of some localities and to the inexistence of data for some of them (this is especially true for very small municipalities).

*Figure 7.3. % Support Left 1936 and 1977. Municipalities of Catalonia*

The Pearson's correlation coefficient of the support for the leftist bloc between these two elections is 0.4184, which is non-negligible. As mentioned, this statistic has recently been challenged as a good indicator for electoral continuity because it measures linearity and not similarity (Wittenberg 2009). In fact, if we use Lin's concordance correlation coefficient, we observe that this is much smaller, 0.239. Also, we can see some interesting variations when looking at "Changebloc": the descriptive statistics of this variable (Table 7.13) indicate that the number of municipalities that were leftist in the 1936 elections and were rightist in the 1977 elections (or vice-versa) is not small: at least 45% of Catalan municipalities changed their political alignment between 1977 and 1936.

Table 7.13. Change and Continuity of Political Alignments.
Municipalities of Catalonia

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Left-> Left	121	14.29
Right -> Right	334	39.43
Right->Left	31	3.66
Left-> Right	361	42.62

Is civil war violence in any way related to these changes? With data on direct leftist and direct rightist violence, I build an index of "relative violence", with three categories (hereafter, "categories of violence"): 1) Localities where the left committed more assassinations than the right; 2) Localities where the right committed more assassinations than the left; 3) Localities where each group committed the exact same number of assassinations. Figure 7.4 shows the relationship between localities in the different categories in Changebloc (hereafter, also categories of realignment) and localities in the different categories of violence. The bars illustrate the relative weight that each of the categories of violence has on the total number of cases within each category of realignment. For instance, among all the localities that were leftist in 1936 and rightist in 1977 (category 4), 80% of them are places where the left exerted more violence than the right, 15% are localities where the right exerted more violence than the left, 5% are localities where the right exerted equal violence than the left.

Figure 7.4. Relative Violence by Categories of Realignment

This figure does not provide conclusive evidence: the distribution of localities is quite similar across categories of realignment. Contrary to what one would expect following the "rejection" hypothesis, greater degrees of leftist violence do not seem to have an effect on changes towards the right (e.g. there are a lot of cases of localities with more leftist violence in categories 1 and 3). Also, rightist violence is higher in categories 1 and 4 than in categories 2 and 3; this is slightly contradictory because with regard to category 4 this might be indicating that violence can be productive in order to gain adepts –following the acceptance hypothesis; yet, with regard to category 1, this might indicate the opposite, namely that violence can be negative in order to gain adepts –following the rejection hypothesis.

In Table 7.14, I present the results of a multivariate regression, which should lead to somewhat more confirmatory results. I run a very simple regression analysis, with the dependent variable "Percentchange" regressed on "DiffLRpermil" and the aforementioned control variables.

Table 7.14. OLS Regression on Percent Change in Left Vote (1977-1936). Municipalities of Catalonia

Variable	M1
DiffViolenceLeftRight	0.013
	(0.07)
Support Left	-0.664***
	(0.03)
% Participation 1936	0.497***
	(0.09)
% Part 1977- % Part 1936	0.242***
	(0.08)
Population 1936	-0.001***
	(0.00)
Population 1977- Population 1936	0.001***
	(0.00)
Constant	-21.137***
	(6.59)
Observations	844

Standard Errors in Brackets.
Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .001

"DiffLRpermil" is non-statistically significant in Table 7.14; this does not allow me to reject neither the rejection nor the acceptance hypotheses. The control variables are quite significant: both an increase in the locality's population and on electoral participation seems to favor leftist improvements from one election to another. This is not surprising given the fact that leftist support is usually greater in urban settings, and that political participation in Spain tends to favor parties in the leftist end (Sánchez-Cuenca and Barreiro 2000).

7.4. Conclusions

This chapter has addressed the question of how civil wars affect political alignments of societies by undertaking a multi-

method analysis of the Spanish case. I have presented a set of alternative hypotheses on the effects of victimization on postwar political identities, and I have inductively explored them with different pieces of empirical evidence. The results of the qualitative research and the survey analysis are broadly indicative that violence, as well as other forms of victimization (e.g. imprisonment, displacement, forced labor, torture), are conducive towards a rejection of the political identity of the perpetrator. Importantly, rejection takes place regardless of the nature of violence (i.e. indiscriminate or selective), which indicates that the differential effects of types of violence that have been observed in wartime settings (Kalyvas 2006; Kocher *et al*. 2008; Lyall 2009) might not be generalizable to postwar contexts.

Furthermore, I have observed that the effects of victimization persist along time: on the one hand, people who were directly victimized during the SCW display strong memories of their experiences, and their political identities seem to be partially influenced by them. On the other hand, people who were not directly victimized during the SCW, but who are aware of victimization experiences of family members or close friends, are also affected by them. Finally, I have observed that the rejection of the identity of the perpetrator operates across the main cleavage along which the civil war was articulated (left-right), but it does not operate in the center-periphery (also called nationalist) cleavage.

A caveat: the results of the municipal (large-*n*) analyses are not conclusive; they do not provide with evidence supporting either the acceptance or the rejection hypothesis. Yet, this is not necessarily problematic, as the analyses with these data are potentially corrupted due omitted variable bias. For example, many sociodemographic and economic changes having taken place in localities in the long period between 1977 and 1936 are likely to be affecting the change in electoral returns between these two elections. Since I am not able to control for these factors (among other reasons, due to data availability) these municipal level results cannot be trusted blindly.

Appendix Chapter 7 (I). Additional Tables and Figures

Figure A7.1. Family Victimization Question. Rate of Non-response, by Age Cohort

Table A7.1. Family Victimization, by Type and Perpetrator (Person 1)

	Combat	Died in Bombing	Assassinated	Condemned to Death	Disappeared	Imprisoned	Had to leave Spain	Had to Hide	Was expelled from work	Other	Total
Nationalist	162	40	153	37	44	231	79	83	14	73	916
Republican	76	14	56	6	11	51	15	29	3	28	289
DK/DA	83	10	47	6	18	48	35	24	1	61	333
Total	321	64	256	49	73	330	129	136	18	162	1538

Table A7.2. Family Victimization, by Type and Perpetrator (Person 2)

	Combat	Died in Bombing	Assassinated	Condemned to Death	Disappeared	Imprisoned	Had to leave Spain	Had to Hide	Was expelled from work	Other	Total
Nationalist	34	18	52	7	21	126	68	54	12	33	425
Republican	19	7	28	1	4	13	4	21	1	16	114
DK/DA	14	6	11	1	7	12	13	8	1	14	87
Total	67	31	91	9	32	151	85	83	14	63	626

Table A7.3. Family Victimization, by Type and Perpetrator (Person 3)

	Combat	Died in Bombing	Assassinated	Condemned to Death	Disappeared	Imprisoned	Had to leave Spain	Had to Hide	Was expelled from work	Other	Total
Nationalist	12	4	24	9	7	40	46	26	11	19	198
Republican	4	4	12	0	7	9	3	4	0	5	43
DK/DA	2	0	1	1	2	2	4	5	0	6	23
Total	18	8	37	10	11	51	53	35	11	30	264

Table A7.4. Descriptive Statistics. Survey Data

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Leftist	2936	0.6488	0.4774	0	1
Leftscale	2435	6.6099	1.745	1	10
Nationalist vote (Cat)	2936	0.0562	0.2303	0	1
Nationalist vote (Basque)	2936	0.0511	0.2202	0	1
Nationalist Scale (Basque/Cat)	1236	0.439	0.496	0	1
Age	2936	47.176	18.158	18	99
Gender	2936	0.5109	0.49	0	1
Town Size	2936	3.877	1.65	1	7
Interest Politics	2919	2.0812	0.889	1	4
Education	2929	1.914	0.7028	1	3
Religion	2868	2.5	1.357	1	6
Talk politics	2854	1.917	0.825	1	4
Victim Francoism	2936	.24	0.427	0	1
Victim Nationalists	2936	.312	0.4634	0	1
Victim Republicans	2936	.098	0.298	0	1
Family Nationalist	2936	.154	0.361	0	1
Family Republican	2936	.323	0.4676	0	1

Table A7.5. Logit Regressions for "Nationalist" Scale.
Basque Country and Catalonia

	Catalonia	Basque country
Age	0.023***	-0.016**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	0.055	0.038
	(0.17)	(0.19)
Town Size	-0.158***	-0.312***
	(0.05)	(0.07)
Interest Politics	-0.118	0.190
	(0.11)	(0.13)
Education	0.440***	0.143
	(0.15)	(0.16)
Religion	0.019	0.076
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Talk politics	0.392***	-0.026
	(0.12)	(0.15)
Family Nationalist	0.076	-0.231
	(0.25)	(0.34)
Family Republican	0.441**	0.096
	(0.20)	(0.21)
Victim Nationalists	0.290	0.127
	(0.21)	(0.21)
Victim Republicans	0.065	0.748***
	(0.20)	(0.22)
Victim Francoism	-0.218	0.204
	(0.29)	(0.44)
Constant	-2.289***	0.344
	(0.51)	(0.61)
Observations	631	555
Chi2	57.007	49.016
Aic	838.588	732.683

Standard Errors in Brackets. Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .001

Table A7.6. Descriptive Statistics. Municipal Dataset (Catalonia).
Dependent Variables

Variable	Observations	Mean	St.Dev.	Min.	Max.
SupportLeft36	1058	52.27	16.94	2.2	100
SupportLeft77	849	33.53	16.67	0	82.08
Changepercentleft	849	-18.43	18.61	-76.73	46.8

Table A7.7. Descriptive Statistics. Municipal Dataset (Catalonia).
Independent and Control Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Participation1936	1,056	69.75	10.64	4.6	100
ParticipationChange	846	7.54	11.99	-81.87	72.85
Census1936	1,058	1,647.56	19,726.11	50	637,841
CensusChange	847	2,715.793	29,042.29	-5,713	801,001
DiffViolenLR	1,062	0.55	2.95	-28.8	44.1

Figure A7.2. Kernel Density Estimate for Change in % Support Left (1977-1936) (Catalonia)

Figure A7.3. Kernel Density Estimate for Difference in Violence (Left-Right) (Catalonia)

Appendix Chapter 7 (II). Protocol for Semi-Structured Interviews

(In Spanish or Catalan): "Hello, my name is Laia Balcells. I am a researcher from Yale University, in the United States. I am currently studying the Spanish Civil War and I am very interested in speaking to people who, like you, experienced the civil war. I think that talking to people like you can help me better understand things that happened during that time.

I know that talking about the civil war is sometimes hard and stressful, but I would very much appreciate any information that you can provide me with. This should be useful for my research about the war, which will have implications not only to understand better what occurred in Spain, but also what happens in other countries that also have experienced or that are currently experiencing a civil war.

Everything that is going to be said in our conversation will only be used for the sake of my research. I will never use your real name in my articles/books, and I will not talk to anybody about what you say to me by using your real name. If you do not mind, I will record our conversation with this digital recorder, so that later on I can go over things that we have talked about. Of course, the digital file with the interview will be securely kept and nobody except for me will be able to listen to it. If you have any questions or concerns about any of these issues during the interview, do not hesitate to stop and ask me. Also, if at any point of the interview you feel tired, under emotional stress or sad, and you want to stop the conversation, let me know and we will either pause or stop it.

If you have any further questions or concerns about the aim of the interview, you can call me at the number XXXXX, or write me an email at the following address: XXXXX. You can also contact my academic advisor XXXXX, or my adviser at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Prof.XXXXX, either by email (XXXXX) or phone (XXXXXX).

Please indicate verbally that you have heard and understood this information, and agree to participate in this interview.

Thank you very much.

I. GENERAL SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

Date of birth
Place of birth
Place of birth of parents
Marital status
Siblings
Children: how many? How old are they? Grandchildren?
Place of residence (today)
Job (in the past)

II. PREWAR PERIOD

[I will ask a general question to locate the person in the past; something like: Where were you living before the war? What was the house like? What did you do? And your parents? What did you like to do in your free time?]

Were you involved in any political party? Were you member of a labor union? What about your parents?

Did you sympathize with any political party? What about your parents?
-Do you remember who your parents voted for in the last general elections (in 1936)? (get more info about previous elections, if possible)

Do you remember for which parties other members of your family voted?
-Siblings
-Uncles
-Cousins
-Grandparents

Do you remember which party won the elections in your village/neighborhood. Do you consider that your village could be considered: 1-mainly leftist; 2-mainly rightist; 3- fifty-fifty.

Do you remember if there were a lot of political disputes in your village before the war? Did the trade unions have power?

What did you think about the CNT/FAI at that point? And, do you remember what your parents thought about them?
-And what about the Falange?

Were you a Catholic? Did you go to church? If yes, how often? What about other members of your family? Did you have religious people among your family? (Priests, nuns, etc)

III. WAR PERIOD (1936-39)

Do you remember where you were on the 18 July 1936? Explain to me how you came to know that a military coup had taken place.

What do you remember from the first week of the war?

Did you volunteer to fight in the war?

1) If yes, on which side?

-Why did you volunteer?

2) If not. Were you ever recruited? By which side? Were you happy about being on this side?

(from now on, C=if combatant; NC=non-combatant; A=all)

C# How old were you at the time you joined the Republican/Francoist army?

C# Did you stayed in this army for the rest of the war or did you switch side?
If yes, when did you switch? Why did you switch?

C# For how long did you fight?

C# Where did you go after deciding to join the group? In which locations did you fight?

C# In which battalion(s) did you fight?

C# Were you single/married at the moment of joining the group?
If married, did you have children?

C# Were there any family members/friends in your army/battalion?
If yes,
Did you join the army before or after them?

C# Were you wounded at any point during the war? Did any of your close friends/relatives get wounded? Did any of them die in combat?

A# What happened in your village/town/city?

-Was this locality under Republican or under Nationalist control when the war started?

-Did the locality stay under control of the same group? and if so, for how long?

-Did the republicans kill anybody in the village/town/city? (if applies) Did they kill anybody you knew?

If yes: -Why do you think they killed him/her?

-Did anybody denounce him/her. Who do you think denounced him/her?

-(In Republican localities): what happened when the Nationals conquered the territory? Did they kill anybody in the village/town/city? Did they kill anybody you knew?

If yes: -Why do you think they killed him/her?

-Did anybody denounce him/her? Who do you think denounced him/her?

A# During the war, were you ever imprisoned/detained?

-If yes, when were you liberated?

A# During the war, were you ever condemned to death?

-If yes, when? What do you think saved you?

(How many people were killed (per day) while you were on the "death corridor"? Who decided who was going to be killed? Who carried out the executions?)

A# Were other members of your family imprisoned?

-If yes, were they liberated? If yes, when?

A# Did other members of your family flee from their villages?

Where did they go?

Why do you think they left?

Did they come back? If yes, when? And, why did they come back?

A# Do you know if in your village there were any deserters? If yes, why do you think they were hiding (political reasons or were they cowards)? What happened to them? What is your opinion of them?

I won't ask this question if the interviewee him or herself was a deserter (I will be able to know this from the previous questions).

A# Did any member of your family and or close friend die during the war? If yes, when? Who killed him/her? Why do you think he/she was killed?

(In case of killing after denunciation): Do you know who denounced him/her? Why do you think he/she was denounced? Did you ever see this person again? Did you talk to him/her? Do you know if she is a rightist/leftist?

NC# Did you stay in your village/town for all the war?
If no, where did you go? Why? Did you return to your village/town? When? Why?
(Enumerate the different locations where she/he was during the whole conflict)

NC# Did any member of your family fight in the war? If yes, who? Why did he/she fight for this side? How did you feel about it?

IV. POSTWAR PERIOD

Where were you immediately after the war ended?

Were you imprisoned? Were you in any concentration camp? For how long did you stay there? When were you liberated? Why? Did somebody help you to get you free?
-When you were in prison, did somebody come to see you and bring you food, supplies?

-Who were the other people that were imprisoned with you? Tell me a little bit about them. What do you remember about them?

When the war was over, did you stay inside the country or did you leave?
-If you fled, where did you go? When did you return?
-If you stayed, where did you live? (Same town/village?)

(In the case of republican villages –most of Catalonia). Do you remember the day the Nationals arrived in your village/town? What do you remember of this day?

What was your feeling about the victory of the Nationals?

Were any members of your family/close friends persecuted by the Nationals? If yes, what happened to them?

Did you/any member of your family (including you) affiliate to the Falange after the war? If yes, why?

V. DEMOCRACY

How did you experience the transition to democracy? Were you scared that another civil war could take place?

Did you vote for the Constitution? What did you vote (yes/no)?

Did you vote in the first general elections? For what party did you vote? And, what did you vote in the following elections? (I can mention some of the parties…)

Do you know if your parents/children voted in the referendum of the Constitution? If yes, what did they vote? And what did they vote in the first general elections?

Do you consider yourself a sympathizer of a particular political party?

Do you think your children (and grandchildren) have the same political views as you have?
-If not, why do you think they think differently?

#Do you feel that the experience of the war changed you in any way? If yes, how?

Appendix Chapter 7 (III). Survey Questions

Note: I present here the translated version of the main questions that have been used in the research. These are extracts of a much more comprehensive questionnaire, which is available from the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (www.cis.es), study number 2760 of April 2008.

-Family identification with the sides fighting in the civil war:

Question 9. As far as you can remember, with which of the sides in the civil war did your family sympathize with the most? With the Nationalists or with the Republicans?
> -With the Nationalists…1
> -With the Republicans…2
> -Some of them with the Nationalists and others with the Republicans…3
> -(DO NOT READ) With none of them…4
> -Does not know (DK)...8
> -Does not answer (DA)...9

-Individual identification with the sides fighting in the civil war:

Question 28. Which of the two sides that fought the civil war are better reflect your current political ideas: the Nationalist, the Republican, in none of them, or in both of them?
> -Nationalists…1
> -Republicans…2
> -In none of them…3
> -In both of them…4
> -Does not know (DK)...8
> -Does not answer (DA)...9

-Individual victimization:

Question 13 (ONLY TO PEOPLE OVER 65 YEARS OLD).
As a consequence of the civil war, you:
>-Were condemned to death…1
>-Had to leave Spain…1
>-Were imprisoned…1
>-Had to hide…1
>-Were expelled from work…1
>-Does not Know…9

Question13a. Which side was responsible?
>-The Nationalist side…1
>-The Republican side…1
>-Both sides…1
>-Does not Know…8
>-Does not Answer…9

-Family victimization:

Question 14. (THIS QUESTION IS ASKED FOR PERSON 1, PERSON 2 and PERSON 3) Do you know if, as a consequence of the civil war, any member of your family or close person…?
>-Died in combat…1
>-Was killed in a bombardment…2
>-Was executed…3
>-Was condemned to death…4
>-Disappeared…5
>-Was imprisoned…6
>-Had to leave Spain…7
>-Had to hide…8
>-Was expelled from work…9
>-Other situation…10
>-Does not Know…98
>-Does not Answer…99

Question14a. Which side was responsible?
-The Nationalist side…1
-The Republican side…2
-Does not Know…8

-Vote (Political identity / Party identification)

Question 38. Could you tell me if in the last general elections of 9 March you…
-Went to the polls and voted….1
-Did not have age to vote…2
-Went to vote but could not do it…3
-Did not go to the polls because you were not able to…4
-Preferred not to vote…5
-Do not remember…8
-Does not answer…9

Question 38a (if replied 1 in 38a): Could you tell me which party or coalition you voted for?

-Ideological scale

Question 41. In politics, the expressions left and right are commonly used. In this card there are a number of boxes that go from left to right. In which box would locate yourself?

Left   Right   K   A

Question 46. With regard to the nationalist feeling, could you please tell me where you would locate yourself on a scale from 1 to 10, in which 1 means "minimum basque/catalan nationalism" and 10 means "maximum basque/nationalism"?

Min.   Max.   K   A

CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS

"The wounds of a civil war penetrate deeply"

Marcus Annaeus Lucanus, *Pharsalia* (1 BC)

"Tristes guerras,
si no es amor la empresa.
Tristes, tristes."

Miguel Hernández, *Cancionero y Romancero de Ausencias*

8.1. Main Findings

This dissertation has sought to explain the dynamics of violence against civilians in a civil war context by extending the analytical focus to civil wars fought conventionally. The conditions characterizing CCW (i.e. stable frontlines, full control of the rearguards by armed groups) have been used as a device to study a particular structure of incentives that, in general terms, is absent in irregular civil wars —the type of civil wars most studied to date by scholars of violence. This has allowed me to make a contribution to the civil wars literature that is not strictly bounded to conventional civil wars: whenever this structure of incentives exists —or whenever this structure of incentives is sharpened by specific warfare conditions– violence should be explained by the same mechanisms highlighted here. This may be for example the case of particular areas of countries that undergo irregular civil

wars (e.g. areas fully controlled by one of the armed groups). The theoretical framework also permits us to derive implications for symmetric non-conventional civil wars, and for wars that share characteristics of conventional with those of other types of wars. I will return to this further below.

At the empirical level, I have analyzed sub-national variation in one single civil war in a way that follows current practice in the field and provides significant leverage. The focus has been on two different types of violence (usually analyzed separately in the literature): what I have called direct or "face to face" violence (i.e. executions and massacres) and indirect violence (i.e. bombings). I have remained agnostic on the degree of selectivity of violence; although indirect violence is by definition more indiscriminate than direct violence (for it is less precise in its production), under my definition, direct violence does not have to be accompanied by a selective process at the individual level; thus, it can be indiscriminate too.

I have argued that political identities are a common denominator in the explanation of these two different types of violence, and that this is because prewar political identities are a cue for the identification of potential threats in the rear territories. Thus, connecting with Clausewitz's (1832/1968) famous saying ("War is a continuation of politics by other means"), political variables have been considered as crucial in explaining variation in intentional violence against civilians. However, because of the existence of diverging constraints, political variables have been hypothesized to affect differently each of these types of violence (i.e. direct and indirect). Overcoming a common bias in the explanation of civil war —the so-called "political bias" (Kalyvas 2006; 2009)– political variables have been hypothesized not to display an automatic connection with violence during war; indeed, the relationship has been deemed as more complex. The main sources of complexity are the joint production of direct violence (by armed groups and civilians), on the one hand, and the endogenous effect of wartime factors, on the other. In a nutshell, while I have argued that wartime violence is related to prewar

politics, this does not constitute a mere continuation of politics by other means.

Several implications follow: first, variation in both types of violence is largely explained by the incentives of armed groups, which —in a CCW— are very much connected to political considerations. Violence against civilians only happens when there has been political mobilization during the prewar period, and political identities have therefore become influential for people's behavior. In consequence, if groups decide to pursue killings in order to "cleanse the rears", they assassinate to a greater or lesser extent in a locality depending on the public identities of the civilians inhabiting it. Specifically, groups seek to eliminate strong supporters of the rival group who may represent a threat in the short term and a future burden for political order.[1]

Insofar as indirect violence is concerned, its spatial variation maintains a close connection with the incentives of the armed groups. The likelihood of indirect attacks increases with the density of supporters of the enemy in a locality because, *ceteris paribus*, this allows the group to maximize the probability of eliminating strong supporters. Indeed, I have found that the likelihood of a locality being bombed decreases monotonically with support for a group (as proxied with electoral returns in the prewar period). Yet, given that indirect violence largely serves military purposes, political factors are only marginal in explaining this variation: proximity to the frontlines, level of urbanization, or proximity to the sea are also crucial variables accounting for the

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[1] Again, while they seek to eliminate them on a selective basis, the identification process may not always be at the individual level. In fact, the latter is clearly the case when the group perpetrates indirect violence (i.e. bombings). I do not expect indiscriminate direct violence to be the norm in this context; following my theory, we should expect "selective" direct violence to be the most common form of direct violence: this is the form of violence that, while being functional for the armed group's objective of cleansing the rear territories of the most dangerous elements, allows for alienating civilians the least.

extent to which locations are attacked by means of indirect violence.

With respect to direct violence, I have argued that its spatial variation not only depends on the incentives of the groups, but also on civilian collaboration, which makes this violence more or less possible. This is especially the case where groups do not have local information (e.g. where the perpetrators are not from the locality), which is assumed to be the case in a civil war. This distinguishes civil war violence from communal violence; in the latter, the perpetrators are co-villagers or neighbors. Thus, the extent to which groups perpetrate violence in those locations where they have an interest in pursuing it (i.e. where strong supporters of the enemy are identified) is constrained by civilian agency. Because in a mobilized context political motives prime the decisions of civilians, and because civilians are rational and strategic, direct violence peaks in places with higher levels of political competition and/or a close balance of power between groups. In places where groups have a distribution of power that approaches parity, local civilians strategically push for killings — in other words, they enhance the lethal actions of the group– for this is likely to generate a change in the local state of affairs (on their benefit), and it does not endanger them. Furthermore, in these localities, political identities are more salient, and local supporters of the group identify a greater share of strong supporters of the rival —as compared to other places–, and this makes the group more willing to kill in these locations.

In places where there is political domination by one of the groups, civilians do not push for killings and/or they constrain the perpetration of violence. The pool of civilians "not pushing for" and/or "constraining" violence differs depending on the configuration of the locality (i.e. if the armed group's supporters are in a majority or a minority position): when the armed group enters a locality where their supporters are in a position of domination (i.e. they constitute a majority), it is likely that locals decide not to promote and to even constrain the lethal actions of the groups. In the Spanish case, that was the case of many

localities where leftist forces were hegemonic and where members of the local committee defended rightist neighbors who were threatened by the actions of the militias (Gaitx 2006; Pous and Solé i Sabaté 1988). Killing would not change the state of affairs —already favorable to the left–, and it would generate unnecessary bloodshed with likely repercussions for the future coexistence in the locality.

The most puzzling outcome is that in non-domination settings: why would violence not take place to a greater extent in places where the perpetrating group constitutes a minority? I have argued that, in these contexts, those linked to the armed group (i.e. the minority) are unlikely to push for killings because —while not changing the state of affairs– this could potentially endanger them in the future. Also, in these settings, those not linked to the armed group (i.e. a majority) are likely to implement forms of resistance against the group (e.g. hiding neighbors, fleeing, etc.) that constrain the perpetration of violence. At the empirical level, we have observed that, in the context of the SCW, right-wing dominated locations did not display the most extreme levels of violence by the left, and vice-versa for violence perpetrated by the right. Indeed, while instances of massacres by leftist groups in rightist localities were reported (e.g. Vic, Solsona, Barbastro) and vice-versa (e.g. Badajoz), the fine-grained empirics that I have presented here indicate that these were not the norm. In both zones of the SCW (i.e. Loyalist and Rebel), the locations most affected by lethal direct violence were places with a balance of power or parity between groups.

While variation in direct violence is connected to these prewar political variables —exogenous to the military dimension of the war– I have argued that this is also determined by factors endogenous to the war (e.g. prior denunciations, executions, revolutionary activities). Empirically, I have shown that in the non-initial stages of a civil war violence is both more likely and more intense where there has been victimization during previous periods. That is the case because, in these locations, there is a greater identification of strong supporters (due to the actions of the

previous period), as well as a higher rate of collaboration among civilians, who are increasingly motivated by emotional factors such as revenge.[2] In chapter 6, I have provided qualitative and quantitative evidence indicating that victimization does not have to be lethal in order to generate retaliation: for example, I have shown that expropriations of private properties in the context of collectivization campaigns (by the left) enhanced the perpetration of violence in the subsequent period (by the right). This finding conveys implications on the over-time relationship between types of violence used by armed groups, or the connection between the various forms of violence in the armed groups's "repertoire" (Hoover 2006; Wood 2009).

In general, the results of this dissertation suggest that the insights of both the first and second generation of scholars of violence (see chapter 1) should be integrated into a single theoretical framework incorporating both prewar politics and wartime dynamics. Indeed, macro-cleavages and processes (e.g. political division along ideological lines) are unlikely to be detached from the reality that people live at the local level, and they are therefore likely to have an impact on levels of violence. Yet, these macro-cleavages lose explanatory power once events such as killings have taken place, when escalation dynamics emerge. At the same time, the results suggest that different forms of lethal violence (i.e. direct and indirect), which are perpetrated by different means and which are usually understood separately, can be explained by a common framework combining prewar and wartime factors.

An additional implication is that micro-level approaches to factors such as political competition or polarization can contribute to the understanding of dynamics of conflict. While macro-level approaches have often been present in the scholarly literature of conflict (e.g. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Reynal Querol

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[2] Elsewhere, I have labeled the framework combining these two types of factors, exogenous and endogenous to the war, "rivalry and revenge" (Balcells 2007a; 2010a).

2002), micro-level approaches have been largely overlooked. The results here support the idea that further research should emphasize these micro-level approaches, which implies applying the insights obtained at macro-level to better understand dynamics of violence on the ground. Also, the study of polarization, which I have contrasted with the concept of political competition or parity, has allowed me to adjudicate between two alternative mechanisms hypothetically linking prewar political configurations to lethal violence at the local level. I have observed that while political parity does have a robust effect on levels of lethal violence, polarization has no significant effect (Table 4.25). Since polarization should be contributing to the unveiling of political identities —as much as political parity does–, the fact that this variable does not have an impact on violence indicates that the mechanism by which parity is affecting violence is most probably one of strategic collaboration of local civilians.

Kaufmann (1996) argues that there are many differences between ethnic and non-ethnic wars. He argues that ideological civil wars are characterized by dynamics of guerrilla warfare, and that ethnic civil wars are characterized by dynamics of conventional warfare. The evidence from the SCW, which we have described as an ideological civil war with conventional features, challenges this conceptualization. This is also the case with the civil wars in Russia, China, the U.S., and in some former Soviet Republics. This idea is also challenged by the early years of the civil war in El Salvador, and by some places and times in the context of the current civil war in Colombia.[3] Also, large-*n* evidence shows the non-existence of a correlation between ethnic/non-ethnic civil war and type of war as defined by technology of rebellion (Kalyvas and Balcells 2008). In consequence, we can expect that the dynamics of targeting in ideological conflict will be very similar to those in ethnic civil wars (e.g. Bosnia, Croatia). That is particularly the case if a

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[3] Elisabeth Wood. Personal communication, October 2009.

society has been mobilized in the prewar period and individuals have strong attachments to political labels. While ascriptive characteristics may make supporters of the enemy easier to identify, and they can be a relevant informational cues, armed groups will have similar identification issues regarding the distinction between "strong" and "weak" supporters of the rival. Hence, unless they are intrinsically interested in committing genocide or "cleansing", the interactions between armed groups, civilians, and local level politicians in ethnic civil wars should very much resemble those described here.[4]

A major methodological caveat in the research presented here has to do with potential endogeneity issues connecting the distribution of political loyalties to a particular unknown variable, which could simultaneously be having an impact on levels of violence. In my research design, I have tackled this potential omitted variable bias by employing several strategies: 1) the use of an additional measure of the independent variable, earlier in time (i.e. Competition calculated with data from the 1933 elections in Catalonia and Aragon); 2) the use of county fixed effects; 3) the inclusion of key control variables in the analyses (e.g. trade union affiliation); and 4) the use of geo-referencing indicators allowing us to measure location with precision. Given the lack of an instrumental variable for Competition, I believe that these were the best methodological strategies available.

Finally, the findings in chapter 7 indicate that political identities are not only exogenous to victimization dynamics during civil war, but also endogenous to them. In the aftermath of civil war, identities of individuals (and political alignments of localities) are very much affected by wartime experiences and — quite especially– by victimization (Bellows and Miguel 2006,

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[4] See, for example, Christia (2008) for the role of local leaders in violence taking place in localities of Bosnia in the context of an ethnic civil war. Also, Augusteijn (1996) provides evidence on similar processes of armed group-local civilian interactions from a war of independence featuring an ethnic cleavage. Additional evidence on this is provided below.

2008; Shewfelt 2009). In my survey analysis and semi-structured interviews, I have observed that endogenous-to- the-war identities are maintained by individuals and likely to be transmitted across generations, thereby leaving a long-term imprint on societies.

All in all, the results here, together with findings in other recent research on attitudes towards transitional justice (Aguilar *et al*. 2011) indicate that —even long after victimization episodes have taken place– political identities of individuals are clearly affected by these experiences. This insight has implications for peace-building and peace-keeping, as well as for democratization policies (e.g. transitional justice). This also has implications for the theoretical relationship between political identities and violence (and other forms of victimization), which are broadly shown to be bidirectional. While prewar identities determine the perpetration of violence during a civil war, new identities may emerge as a result of this violence, as well as other victimization experiences. In fact, the "rejection" effect implies that —in the medium or long run– groups may be losing support as a consequence of their own acts of violence, i.e. by alienating the population from those groups. According to my analyses, this rejection is likely to take place as a result of both selective and indiscriminate violence.[5]

8.2. Lessons about the Spanish Civil War

The SCW has been heavily studied by historians. This dissertation has not aimed at challenging the existing literature but quite the opposite: many of the insights here have been facilitated by this body of research. Much of the quantitative data used in chapters 4 and 5 has been collected from history books; the descriptive inference in chapter 3 has built on the secondary

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[5] Importantly, this calls into question the distinction in the literature —in terms of their effects– between indiscriminate and selective violence.

literature; the study of the mechanisms (in chapter 6) has also been possible thanks to the published sources on the conflict and, very particularly, to local histories. Nonetheless, some of the existing historical research has flaws that I hope have been amended in this dissertation.

Firstly, some historical accounts on violence during the SCW have been affected by a selection bias on the dependent variable; for example, by focusing on the analysis "of executions in municipalities where these were most relevant" (Chaves 1995: 104), some historians have been observing a censored variation (i.e. only places with positive levels of violence), and their inferences have consequently been flawed (King *et al*. 1994). Secondly, the unit of analysis of historians has very often been the country or the region (Linz 1996; Casanova 1985), and this has not allowed for an optimal control of the potential effect of omitted variables. For example, when analyzing provincial level patterns, Linz (1999) argues that violence was larger in provinces with a greater proportion of *latifundios* and social agrarian conflict (e.g. Malaga, Ciudad Real, Cordoba). Yet, he is not controlling for military control patterns and other variables that are likely having a clear-cut effect on levels of violence. (I have incorporated these variables in the empirical analyses at the local level.) Thirdly, and related to this last point, systematic econometric analyses have not usually been employed by these researchers, who thereby generate inferences that are not robust and that are not generalizable. The latter is enhanced by the fact that their insights usually come from a particular area or region. Fourthly, a number of insights inductively generated by historians have later been taken as assumptions on research about the SCW. A clear example of this is the premise that violence was perpetrated, in each of the sides, following to two different logics.[6] This is problematic insofar as these assumptions do not allow for an adequate theorization on the

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[6] For example, Herreros and Criado (2009) consider this a starting point of their research.

determinants of violence, which should depart from an assumption of unit homogeneity (Przeworski 2007).

In summary, while this dissertation is not the work of a historian, I expect to have made a contribution towards a better understanding of the Spanish conflict as a historical event. In fact, further systematic research remains to be done on this civil war (e.g. on dynamics of displacement after the civil war, postwar violence, etc.); hopefully, this will be possible as more fine-grained and reliable data becomes available.

8.3. Competing Explanations

No conclusions of a scientific work should be drawn without serious attention being given to competing explanations (Shapiro and Green 1996) or to alternative theories that are consistent with the same empirical evidence. There are a number of competing explanations for the findings in this dissertation that we should not overlook. In what follows, I address these explanations, some of which correspond to accounts of violence that have usually been given in the specific case of the SCW:

a) *Expressive violence,* or killing as a way to show power to the other side. Some historians argue that violence on one side was motivated by propaganda factors, which would correspond to the aim of satisfying constituent audiences. For example Ors (1995: 297) argues that when there was a demonstration of violence by the rebel side, violence on the Republican side increased.[7] To test for this hypothesis we should collect newspaper data and see whether news on perpetration of violence by one side preceded the perpetration of violence by the other side. This hypothesis is not totally rival to my argument, as it cannot explain spatial variation of violence, which I account for here. In any case, the over-time

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[7] Mimesis has also been considered to be part of the explanation of violence on both sides.

variation in the data that we have available (for Catalonia and Valencia, see chapter 3), as well as the historical accounts on this variation, does not seem to match this hypothesis: in all territories violence peaked at early stages of conquest. In other words, violence therefore does not seem to vary temporally according to retaliation for killings that have taken place on the other side.

b) *Communal violence.* Wanton communal violence is an explanation that has been given to killings on the Republican side, as opposed to killings on the Nationalist side. As I have explained, this hypothesis can be ruled out in the light of the findings that show systematic factors as explanatory of levels of violence perpetrated on both sides (i.e. local level competition). Also, the qualitative evidence I have collected indicates that armed groups (including militias) were those perpetrating lethal violence. While rank-and-file citizens had a crucial role or agency in the perpetration of this violence, they rarely were the perpetrators.[8]

c) *Political domination.* As explained, this hypothesis corresponds to the idea that there is a linear relationship between political support for a group and levels of violence perpetrated by the rival group. This hypothesis is directly or indirectly defended by a number of authors and/or testimonies of the war. For example, in Zaragoza, Casanova *et al*. (2001) argue that repression was greater in counties with a predominance of big property and a highly unequal distribution of wealth, where the Popular Front obtained a larger share of the votes: "In those places where landlord property was more equally distributed and the PF had a smaller share of the electoral results, the terror was less severe" (Casanova *et al*. 2001: 222).[9] The political domination hypothesis

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[8] Also, if violence was the pure outcome of a "security dilemma" (Posen 1993) type of situation, we would not expect prewar political dynamics to matter; the wartime behavior of individuals would instead be more crucial in explaining violent outcomes.

[9] To support their point, these authors explain that "In the judicial parties of Ejea, Sos and La Almunia, the most important *foci* of socialism, republicanism and CNT trade unionism, 37% of the

has been discarded in light of the regression results in chapters 4 of this dissertation.[10]

d) *Military Control.* In a CCW, military control cannot be explanatory of violence in the rearguard territories, as this does not display variation across these areas. Yet, with the inclusion in the explanatory models of the variable measuring proximity to the border, I have observed that military factors have some degree of relevance in these contexts too. Indeed, I have observed that in places where control is more precarious, violence is greater, and so is the effect of local level competition on violence.[11] The former is probably due to the fact that in areas close to the frontline, where control is more precarious, groups have a greater interest in eliminating potential threats among the civilian population; the latter is due to the fact that civilian collaboration is also affected by the degree of control, as explained by Kalyvas (2006). Yet, the interactive analysis indicates that the incentives for collaboration multiply —rather than depress (as one could initially believe)– the effect of political variables on levels of violence. Further research should be undertaken in order to test how prewar political and military variables interact in the context of other types of civil war (irregular and SNC wars) and how they differ with those observed in conventional settings.[12]

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assassinated of the whole province were registered" (Casanova *et al*. 2001: 223).

[10] The divergence between my results and those provided by historians such as Casanova *et al*. (1999), political scientists such as Linz (1996), or testimonies of the period such as Kaminsky (1938/2002) stresses not only the importance of systematic econometric analyses, but also the selection of the "correct" unit of analysis. Using the lowest level of geographic aggregation as the unit of analysis helps to control for sources of unit heterogeneity and provides with greater certainty of having avoided omitted variable bias problems.

[11] This is illustrated with the test of the interaction hypothesis between the variables Border and Competition.

[12] In this regard, I am planning on pursuing research on violence in the civil war in Peru (1980-2000), which had mostly irregular features,

e) *Organizational or principal-agent* explanations on levels of violence have been partially ruled out in light of the econometric results. On the one hand, the dummy variable measuring armed group or zone (i.e. Republican or Nationalist) conveys no significant differences in levels of violence (Table 4.22). On the other hand, within my sample of municipalities, violence seems to be more spread when perpetrated by one side (i.e. left) than when perpetrated by the other (i.e. right), illuminating an aspect of the potential effect of organizational characteristics on human rights violations that, to my knowledge, has not yet been analyzed in the literature. Indeed, while disciplined organizations seem to commit violations and do so at high levels (as much as undisciplined organizations), their violence seems to be more concentrated across the territory as compared to violence perpetrated by organizations with loose structures and weak internal discipline.

f) *Urban* character of the violence. Some theories relate wartime violence to degree of urbanization or to proximity to urban centers (Mkandawire 2002). In the theoretical framework developed here, this variable is not relevant in explaining either occurrence or levels of violence. Empirically, I have found that violence was greater in urban (and therefore more populated) settings, but this seems to be mostly driven by the fact that larger locations had a greater relative number of would-be targets. Also, at the empirical level, it is important to note that not only does the model seem to work better in rural than in urban settings, but also that the effect of competition on killings is greater in rural than in urban areas.[13] While the first finding could be supporting

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but where I expect military variables to interact with political variables. That is because the Shining Path kept stable control of a significant part of the territory during a long share of the civil war, and because prewar mobilization was high.

[13] Indeed, on the one hand, the econometric model overpredicts violence in urban areas. On the other hand, when I test for the interactive effect of competition and size of the locality, I find that the effect of competition decreases with size.

Gutiérrez Flores's conjecture that community resistance is more efficient in rural settings,[14] the second finding indicates that this is not necessarily the case. In other words, the fact that civilian agency matters does not imply that violence will necessarily be lesser where civilians have a greater intervening power. In other words, we should not fall into a somewhat "idealistic" view of civilians; they can be very perverse too (e.g. Seidman 2002; Sender Barayón 1986; Kalyvas 2006). I would argue that the joint production model of direct violence does not work in urban settings as well as in rural ones due to the greater degree of anonymity in cities, which gives civilians lesser agency.[15] Also, we must bear in mind that during the SCW, violence in cities such as Madrid or Barcelona consisted to a very large extent of the assassination of political prisoners that were imprisoned; in other words, this violence was not characterized by the dynamics of violence affecting the remaining locations, as it was slightly more unilateral from the perspective of the armed groups.

8.4. External Validity

Further research is necessary to provide external validity to the theory in this dissertation; in the future, I intend to test the hypotheses here with micro-level data from other countries.[16] In

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[14] Gutiérrez Flores argues that, during the SCW, violence was lower in rural areas because kin networks allowed for a greater degree of "resistance" against the violent actions of the groups.

[15] Although in large cities civilians may have agency at the neighborhood level. For example, Bueso details how committees were established at the level of the district, in Barcelona (1978: 191). And they contributed to the perpetration of violence the same way that municipal committees did it in urban settings.

[16] In particular, I am currently undertaking data collection for two additional cases: one is Ivory Coast, another case of conventional civil war, which —contrary to the case of Spain– displayed very little violence against noncombatants. The other is Peru, an ideological guerrilla war

the meantime, we can compare the results in other relevant works in the literature and check if they are broadly consistent with the theory, as well as with the results here obtained.

First of all, the finding that political competition is relevant to explain violent outcomes, in the context generated by CCW, connects with existing research on civil war and other forms of political violence. In the case of "La Violencia" in Colombia (1948-1958), Chacón *et al.* (2006) also observe that violence is greater in municipalities where electoral support for parties is more evenly balanced. "La Violencia" lays in the blurred boundary between a SNC and a conventional war, but it can overall be coded as a SNC because violence was mostly taking place in the form of raids or incursions into the enemy's territory (Kalyvas and Balcells 2008). A shared feature of this conflict with the SCW, in addition to the historical time period (which puts the two of them in the category of "old" civil wars), is the high levels of political mobilization characterizing the period preceding them. In this sense, these authors's results are consistent with the theory presented here. Yet, these authors refer to other types of mechanisms as they point only to strategic behavior on the side of armed groups, not on the side of local civilians. In other words, they do not conceptualize direct violence as "jointly produced" but as unilateral on the side of the armed group. Also, these authors derive implications for democratic theory,[17] which I do not, as I assume that politics during peacetime are fundamentally different than during wartime.

Elsewhere (Balcells 2006), I have observed that political parity at the local level is explanatory of violence against public servants in the current civil war in Colombia. Yet, this violence seems to be more grounded on the logic of "armed clientelism" (i.e.

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where I expect that some of the conditions here depicted will reproduce at particular moments and places.

[17] In particular, they challenge the idea that a democracy is a self-enforcing equilibrium when groups have an even distribution of power and therefore they all have chances to attain power (Przeworski 2005).

corruption) than to civil war dynamics.[18] For this case, I argued that the more divided is the government in the localities/regions, the higher the likelihood that armed groups will use violence in order to obtain (coerced) support from the parties. On the one hand, if there is a hegemonic party in a certain region/locality, armed groups will not be able to obtain much by coercive means because the party has more "bargaining" power in order to impose its (legitimate) will. On the other hand, if an armed group exerts territorial control of a municipality, and sees no challenge over this control, as well as no challenge over the control of clientelist networks, it will be less inclined to use violence (and ultimately, to kill).

Regarding the occurrence of pogroms against Jews during the early phases of WWII in Poland, Kopstein and Wittenberg (2010) measure distance between Poles and Jews at the local level with the results of interwar national parliamentary results and find that what they call political polarization explains the occurrence of these pogroms. They argue that the mechanism is assimilation, and that the existence of enough "friends" helps the prevention of the riots. Thus, their argument also links the balance of power at the local level and the occurrence of violence; [19] yet, they refer to communal violence, and not to civil war violence. Something along the same lines is defended by De la Calle (2007), who accounts for violent street riots in the Basque country: he finds

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[18] "The increase on the pressures of the armed groups over the municipal governments has led to what some authors have called 'armed clientelism'. This consists on the private appropriation of public goods and resources through the use of violence. The results of this practice are not very different from the traditional corruption; influence in the contracting of positions and public works, appropriation of a percentage of municipal resources and obligation of payments to contractors, among others. In this way, the illegal armed groups have succeeded in fixing the pattern of distribution of public spending and municipal investments" (Rangel 2001).

[19] They use the concept of polarization, but what they refer to is the balance of power between groups.

riots to be more frequent in localities with a greater balance in the distribution of power between ethno-nationalist Basque and Spanish political forces. He makes an argument about the relative presence of supply of protection as well as of would-be targets: he argues that violence peaks in places where the street rioters do not feel threatened by Spanish political forces and where they have both enough would-be targets and a sufficient base of social support to allow them to perpetrate these acts without too much risk of being caught. These turn out to be what he calls "polarized" locations. And parallel type of argument is made by Bundorveat (2009) regarding the October 1993 massacres, which took place in the context of the civil war. He argues that support for the Front Démocratique du Burundi (FRODEBU) had a nonlinear effect on massacres:

> The rationale is that where political support for FRODEBU is low, the grip on the local administrative apparatus is too weak to plan or organize large-scale massacres. At the other end, if local support for FRODEBU is almost universal, there remain very few political (or ethnic) adversaries to be killed. However, in areas where support for FRODEBU is high but not universal, FRODEBU's reach on the local political structures is strong enough to plan and organize a wholesale massacre, and there are many "opponents" to be killed, since support is far from universal (Bundorveat 2009: 372).

Wilkinson (2004), for his part, finds riots in India to be positively associated with level of competitiveness in elections, although violence takes place in the run-up period to the elections, not after them. The crucial actors in his model are not local civilians but national level politicians, who are in charge of the security forces with agency on the prevention of riots and who use these riots strategically to win popular support.

These pieces of research connect with the findings here. Except for the Burundi study, they do not refer to violence taking place in conditions of military competition between groups (i.e. civil war), but rather to communal violence in the context of state collapse or state weakness and where relative demographic control

is crucial for the ability to perpetrate violence at the local level.[20] In my argument, the ability to perpetrate violence on the side of the group is affected by local political dynamics, but only because these dynamics affect the identification of strong supporters, on the one hand, and the incentives of locals to help on the perpetration of violence, on the other. The locus of agency is thus different in my argument than in these authors: it is located both in the armed groups (coming from the outside) and the civilians (who are local), and not only on local actors (as in Bundorvoet, de la Calle, Kopstein, and Wittenberg) or only in armed groups (as in Chacón *et al*). In consequence, while obtaining similar results, the theoretical mechanisms provided in these works are different than those provided here. In general terms, though, these works share my result of violence being the outcome of local political contestation and not of domination by one group vis-à-vis another.

As I have claimed, the hypotheses in this dissertation are not only applicable to ideological civil wars; it should also be possible to extrapolate them to contexts where mobilization has taken place along different lines (e.g. religion, ethnicity). In this sense, fine-grained evidence from the conflict in Bosnia is also supportive of the idea that, even in polarized ethnic settings, domination cannot explain variation in violence, as it could "naively" be thought (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005; Gagnon 2004; Bulutgil 2009). Territorial conflict, as well as alliances between ethnic groups and rival actors, is explanatory of what has been labeled as "ethnic cleansing" (Bulutgil 2009). Kalyvas and Sambanis (2005) find that spatial variation in violence in Bosnia was explained by the strategic and economic importance of the area; but they also argue that at the local level "polarization seems more significant than either fractionalization or dominance" (221) in explaining violence. Gagnon argues that heterogeneous communities in the most ethnically plural parts of Croatia were those more intensively targeted by the elites of Belgrade and Zagreb.

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[20] In the current Colombian civil war, they largely refer to dynamics of corruption, the so-called "armed clientelism."

The results in this dissertation are in concordance with some results from the study of violence in irregular civil wars, which leads us to think that the structure of incentives here described may also be taking place in some specific areas or moments of time, in the context of these other types of war. For example, in the current civil war in Iraq (2003-today), although they draw on not very reliable data on casualties, Condra and Shapiro (2009) argue that violence is greater in mixed areas, as compared to places dominated by either Shia or Sunnies. On the civil war in Guatemala (1960-1996) Gulden finds results consistent with the idea that competition (and not domination) between rival factions leads to more killings. In particular he finds that that there is a non-linear relationship between ethnic mix and killing: "The few municipalities where Mayans make up a large, but not overwhelming, majority were the most consistently dangerous. . . . While we might expect violence to increase monotonically with the percentage of Mayan residents, this proves not to be the case." (Gulden 2002: 6).[21]

The results should be able to explain variation in violence in other conventional civil wars where prewar mobilization has also taken place. As I said, further data collection will allow testing for this. The theory should also be applicable to some international civil wars where populations claiming different "nationhood" share the same territory. For example, in the Irish war of independence, Augusteijn claims that the level of violence directed at the Crown Forces and civilians in different areas depended on the movement's "ability to organize people behind them and the capacity to deal with the opposition it encountered within the community" (Augusteijn 1996: 334). Thus, he also points to local level collaboration (civilians's veto power) as a key

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[21] The mechanism he argues to be in place is, in this case, similar to Kalyvas's (2006) and it has to do with the degree of supply and demand of information at the local level: "A lot of knowledge leads to the assassination of leaders, a little knowledge leads to indiscriminant killing, and no knowledge leads to no action" (Gulden 2002: 7).

for the perpetration of direct violence. Unfortunately, this author does not perform systematic analyses of electoral effects at the local level that would allow for comparison with my results. Yet, he argues that electoral results are a crucial factor accounting for the degree of collaboration at the local level, and he seems to refer to a linear relationship between support for the group and local collaboration (i.e. to a domination hypothesis) rather than to a curvilinear one (in this sense, his predictions are somewhat different than mine).

The following journalistic evidence is provided from the recent war in South Ossetia, between Russia and Georgia (August 2008):

> In a swath of villages in central Georgia, some killings were carried out for revenge, since feuds in this lush farmland go back generations. Some acts were outright cases of theft. And in still other cases, the message seemed to be that the *power balance was shifting, away from ethnic Georgians to the Ossetian separatists and their Russian backers* (NYT, 20 August, 2008, emphasis mine).

This excerpt goes in the direction of attributing violence to a will for change in the balance of power at the local level, and it thus has a connection with a key mechanism in my theory. Furthermore, the excerpt also suggests that violence is a combination of emotional (i.e. revenge) and rational (i.e. tactical) factors.

In a nutshell, regarding direct violence, the findings in this dissertation connect with insights that have been drawn from either ethnic conventional civil wars or non-ethnic irregular civil wars. While the examples above do not necessarily fit the exact scope conditions of my theoretical framework (i.e. CCW with prewar mobilization), they are probably referring to a similar structure of incentives for individuals and armed groups. In irregular civil wars with high levels of prewar mobilization, it could be that displacement followed similar patterns than those observed here —regarding lethal violence− because of the greater fluidity of frontlines (Kalyvas 2006). Yet, military control factors

will play a major role in determining both displacement and killings, so in fact we may find a similar structure of incentives to the one defined here only in zones that are quite isolated from the military struggle. These commonalities should be explored in more detail in further research.

Regarding indirect violence, the results here also have connections with findings in previous research. For example, Kocher *et al*. (2008) emphasize the relevance of political alignments at the local level to explain bombings. They provide evidence from Vietnam, an irregular civil war where what they describe as indiscriminate violence (empirically referring to bombings) tended to occur in political strongholds of one side or the other. These authors argue that, in conventional conflicts, indirect violence will take place only in the most contested zones of the battlefield; the findings here challenge this argument, as they suggest that indirect violence in conventional civil wars can also target rearguard civilian locations on the basis of tactical and strategic motives.

Finally, the endogenous effect of violence —in particular, levels of violence in one stage of a civil war affecting violence in a subsequent stage— has also been found in recent quantitative analyses of other civil wars, for example Iraq (Condra and Shapiro 2009), Algeria (Hagelstein 2008) or Bosnia (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005).[22] There are reasons to think that this finding is generalizable to all types of civil wars and their corresponding structures of incentives, as "revenge" seems to be a universal force driving violence (Jacoby 1976; Fridja 1994; Gould 2000). Insofar

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[22] Kalyvas and Sambanis argue that in Bosnia violence became more "ethnic" as the war went on as a consequence of revenge processes that increased polarization (2005: 213-220); they argue that measures of ethnic polarization must be dynamic rather than static, sensitive to the ways in which a conflict unfolds (223). Also, they find that violence reached a peak in the first months of the war, when the initial phase of territorial consolidation took place. This matches the pattern of temporal variation observed in the SCW (see chapter 3).

as subsequent waves of violence are to some extent automatically affected by these initial patterns, what seems to remain important from an analytical perspective is to account for variations in levels of violence that take place in the early periods of any civil war.

8.5. Caveats

The boundaries between irregular and conventional wars can sometimes be blurred (Duyvestyn 2005); that is the case even in what has been considered a paradigmatic case of a CCW. For example, during the SCW, there were instances of guerrilla activity in the county of *Pallars Sobirà*, in Catalonia; guerrilla activity was quite common in Extremadura (e.g. in Caceres) and especially among peasants who had a "communal past" (Vila Izquierdo 1984).[23]

Also, one can consider that in the very early phase of the war, when there was uncertainty in the whole territory on who was dominating (e.g. De Guzmán 2006), the war was in fact irregular, and not conventional (Ledesma 2008). Yet, the larger share of leftist violence (as well as of rightist violence) took place once frontlines had already been drawn (after August 1936). The largest share of violence against civilians consisted of "revolutionary" or "counterrevolutionary" violence rather than violence aimed at the suppression or backing of the coup. And, at that point, full military control of the territory by the armed groups made the incentives for civilians different from those we would expect in an irregular civil war; again, civilians had incentives to display public collaborative behavior toward the group, and they had few exit options due to the nature of the frontlines.[24] This, again, makes

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[23] Guerrillas were abundant in *Sierra de Monsalud* and *El Potrenque* and on some occasions they generated real challenges to the Nationalist forces that were controlling Extremadura (Vila Izquierdo 1984).

[24] Note that non-collaboration can take place and in fact is a part of my argument. Yet, people have no incentives to display open rejection toward the controlling group. This is different from the context of

violence puzzling from a rationalist perspective that does not take into account political motives of civilians.

In this dissertation, I have not addressed determinants of temporal variation in violence for both theoretical and empirical reasons. In CCW, temporal variation in violence is commonly determined by the evolution of frontlines, which —as we have seen− depend on battlefield developments. I have derived some observable implications on this variation from my theoretical framework, but I have not tested them because of the lack of adequate empirical data (i.e. panel data). I argued that temporal variation in violence is likely to be explained by the degree of "uncertainty about control" that groups have over the territory, which correlate with the early stages of occupation of an area (including the initial stages of the civil war) when "armed groups are not certain of having full control over the territory, and they fear losing it to the other side, which may have large numbers of hidden supporters within the population. As the war goes by, this uncertainty decreases" (Balcells 2007a: 15). The evidence presented in chapter 3 on temporal variation of violence in Catalonia and Valencia (Figures 3.1-3.3) supports this conjecture. This idea is partly in contradiction with accounts that link civilian victimization to switches in the relative power of groups (Vargas 2009), desperation (Downes 2006a), bargaining strategies (Hultman 2008), losses on the battlefield (Ziemke 2008), or length of the war (Valentino, *et al*. 2006; Downes 2006a; Ziemke 2008).

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guerrilla warfare where fluid control also makes public support for the groups more volatile and dependent on dynamics of control (e.g. Augusteijn 1996).

8.6. Avenues of Further Research

The findings in this dissertation emphasize the need to disaggregate civil wars according to the nature of their warfare. The spatial and temporal dynamics of violence in irregular wars, such as the current wars in Colombia or Iraq, are likely to diverge from those in conventional civil wars such as the Spanish one. The micro-level analysis of the relationship between warfare and patterns of civilian victimization is critical to better understand the consequences of war on human security.

It could be argued that conventional civil wars only occur in particular kinds of circumstances, and that the patterns of violence we observe are the consequence of the factors explaining the occurrence of CCW (versus other types of wars). Yet, at the empirical level, there do not seem to be major differences in the causes of conventional versus irregular civil wars, with the exception of the historical time period in which each of these types prevail (i.e. during or after the Cold War, Kalyvas and Balcells 2008). For example, military coups are significant events determining the outbreak of conventional wars as much as irregular civil wars. Other variables that could hypothetically be relevant to explain type of warfare (e.g. regime type) do not appear as significant (Balcells 2009c).[25]

Further research should attempt to untangle the relationship between violence and displacement. In the Spanish case, historians have pointed toward a direct correspondence between violence perpetrated in t_1 and displacement when the other group enters the municipality, that is, in t_2 (e.g. Gaitx 2003, for the municipalities in the Catalan county of the *Empordà*). In an analysis using

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[25] Thus, further research should explore the determinants of different types of civil wars in order to acquire better clear-cut evidence on the existence of an endogeneity problem. This would be the case if patterns of victimization in conventional civil wars are determined by the causes of this type of conflict. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the evidence available to date allows for some degree of methodological comfort in this regard.

Competition as an instrumental variable for leftist violence, I observe that violence in t_1 is indeed explanatory of local level displacement in t_2 (Balcells 2010b). This is relevant because it indicates that violence perpetrated against one's enemies may have the counterproductive effect of promoting cleansing against one's own supporters if /when the control of the territory changes hands.[26] In the case of Catalonia, the fact that exile affected more intensively localities that were more victimized by the left in the first stage of the war, and that they were later also proportionally more heavily targeted by the right (in a second stage of the war), made a subset of localities overall much more "victimized" than others. Since these were places with a greater degree of prewar parity between groups, we expect the war to have generated important changes in their local state of affairs in favor of the right. We cannot test this conjecture because of the lack of electoral data from the immediate postwar period, due to the establishment of a dictatorship that lasted until 1977 (see chapter 7). Yet, the analysis of electoral continuity in municipalities of Catalonia (from 1936 to 1977) indicates that they did indeed experience a switch to the right. While events having taking place during this long period of time had an influence on this (e.g. displacement, socioeconomic change, repression by the dictatorship), wartime events seem to have had some causal power on this realignment (Balcells 2007b). All this indicates that, the study of the relationship between violence and displacement should be coupled with the study of the political consequences of civil wars. This is an additional avenue of research revealed by the findings in this dissertation.

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[26] This seems to be what happened in the Krajina area, in Croatia, where Serbs were expulsed largely as a reprisal for previous violence against Croats in the area.

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