Family and labor strategies in migration : family reunification, marital choices and labor participation of immigrants in the host country

Author(s): González Ferrer, Amparo
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Abstract: ANTECEDENTES DE LA CUESTIÓN Y OBJETIVOS PROPUESTOS El objetivo fundamental de la misma es analizar en profundidad el componente familiar de la migración internacional y su impacto sobre la naturaleza y composición de los flujos así como sobre la ulterior integración de los inmigrantes en las sociedades de acogida. En concreto, la tesis pretende: 1) Determinar la importancia numérica y la secuencia temporal de la inmigración de tipo familiar – generada tanto por la reagrupación familiar como por la importación de cónyuges. 2) Examinar qué factores hacen que los inmigrantes aceleren o difieran en el tiempo la reagrupación de sus familiares más cercanos (cónyuge e hijos) en el país de destino 3) Analizar cuáles son las características individuales y las condiciones contextuales que hacen más probable que un(a) inmigrante soltero(a) elija como esposa(o) a un nativo, a otro inmigrante o a un co–nacional que aún reside en el país de origen y que es "importado" al país de destino a raíz del matrimonio. 4) Investigar si el tipo de familia y la secuencia migratoria dentro de la misma tienen algún impacto sobre la estructura del hogar (nuclear vs. extenso) y la participación laboral de las mujeres inmigrantes en el mercado de trabajo receptor. METODOLOGÍA El caso de estudio elegido es el de la migración a Alemania durante el período 1960-2000. La metodología utilizada para el desarrollo de los capítulos de contenido empírico es el análisis estadístico por medio de modelos de regresión logística y de modelos de análisis dinámico comprendidos dentro de lo que se conoce, genéricamente, como técnicas de análisis de historia de acontecimientos o, por su nombre en inglés, "event history analysis". En concreto, se aplican tanto modelos de riesgo acelerado ("Accelarated Failure Time" Models) como modelos de tasa de transición ("Transition Rate Models"). APORTACIONES Los resultados de la tesis ponen en cuestión la descripción más habitual del proceso migratorio hacia Alemania que se inició con los programas de reclutamiento de trabajadores extranjeros a mediados de los años 50 y principios de los 60. En contra de lo que la mayoría de estudios del área mantienen, la tesis demuestra que el proceso de reagrupación familiar, especialmente la reagrupación de las esposas, comenzó mucho antes de que el gobierno alemán decretase el cese de los programas de reclutamiento a finales de 1973. Es decir, que el cierre de fronteras a la inmigración laboral en 1973 no fue el detonante de la reagrupación familiar y el establecimiento permanente

en Alemania, pues este proceso había comenzado desde el momento mismo en que se inició la contratación de trabajadores extranjeros. Además, la medida que más aceleró el proceso de reagrupación de los hijos no fue el cierre de fronteras a la inmigración laboral asociada con el establecimiento permanente de los inmigrantes en Alemania, sino las reformas acometidas en el sistema de ayudas por hijos llevada a cabo en 1975. En relación con lo anterior, la tesis identifica el flujo de "esposas importadas" como el fenómeno característico de la emigración adulta hacia Alemania desde los antiguos países de reclutamiento desde finales de los años setenta y, sobre todo, a partir de los ochenta. La importancia de este tipo de nueva inmigración vinculada a las decisiones matrimoniales de, especialmente, los hijos de los originales "trabajadores invitados" queda puesta de manifiesto no sólo por su magnitud dentro de los flujos actuales de inmigración, sino también por las implicaciones que la misma pueda tener de cara al proceso global de integración de los inmigrantes en Alemania. Las parejas en que uno de los cónyuges fue importado por el otro son más proclives que el resto a vivir en hogares extensos; además las esposas importadas revelan una vinculación más débil con el mercado de trabajo alemán que otras mujeres inmigrantes, lo que se relaciona en gran medida con su concentración en trabajos a tiempo parcial peor retribuidos que el resto. Por último, la tesis demuestra que el efecto de las medidas restrictivas adoptadas a mediados de los setenta no fue tanto el de acelerar la reagrupación familiar sino el de alterar la selección de los nuevos inmigrantes que llegaron desde entonces y, sobre todo, dificultar enormemente su integración laboral, en especial la de las mujeres en edad adulta.

Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones

AMPARO GONZÁLEZ FERRER

FAMILY AND LABOR STRATEGIES IN MIGRATION: FAMILY REUNIFICATION, MARITAL CHOICES AND LABOR PARTICIPATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE HOST COUNTRY

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Esta obra se presentó como tesis doctoral en el Departamento de Ciencia Política de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, el 19 de mayo de 2006. El Tribunal, compuesto por los profesores doctores D. José Ramón Montero Gibert (Presidente), D. José María Maravall Herrero, D. Joaquín Arango Vila-Belda, D. Gøsta Esping-Andersen y D. Fabrizio Bernardi, le otorgó la calificación de Sobresaliente "cum laude".

Amparo González Ferrer es licenciada en Ciencias Políticas y Sociología y en Derecho por la Universidad de Granada y Doctora en Ciencia Política por la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Formó parte de la duodécima promoción de estudiantes del Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales del Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, donde obtuve el título de *Master* en 2001. En el propio Centro elaboró su tesis doctoral bajo la dirección de la profesora Yasemin Soysal. Actualmente trabaja como Profesora Visitante en el Departamento de Ciencia Política y Sociología de la Universidad Pompeu Fabra.

CONTENTS

List of Figures

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

List of Tables

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Immigration policies ultimately result in the selection of households rather than individuals. However, receiving countries rarely explicitly adopt a household approach when designing and implementing their immigration policies. The formation and settlement of immigrant families and the consequent development of "permanent" immigrant communities in their territories is usually presented by politicians as an unforeseen and unwanted outcome of their original decisions to admit foreign workers as a remedy for temporary labor shortages. Politicians often argue that their country has to accept further immigration because of international commitments to the protection of fundamental human rights which includes, among others, the right to family life. In fact, family-linked migration has effectively become the major source of new immigration to developed countries and, thus, also one of the fundamental sticking points of the debate about how liberal democracies should manage increasing ethnic diversity in their territories.

This dissertation is precisely devoted to the study of the family dimension in international migration and how it relates to the integration of immigrants in their host societies. In particular, it focuses on the analysis of two main aspects of international migration:

1) The structure of family-induced chain migration in its twofold form of family reunification and family formation through the importation of spouses.

2) The relation between different patterns of family-linked migration, the structure of immigrant households at destination and the post-migration labor behavior of immigrant women.

The study of these issues requires taking the household as unit of analysis. In addition, especial attention must be paid to the role of women within immigrant households and to the interactions between the wife and the husband. Finally, gender differences in the impact that the family life cycle impose on the migration of men and women has to be taken in account as well. Accordingly, in the two next sections, I will briefly review the previous studies on these topics within the field of international migration. Then, I formulate the main research questions that this dissertation aims at answering, present the case study, the data and the method utilized in the empirical analysis. Finally, I conclude with the dissertation outline.

1.1. Families and women in migration theory

Immigrant communities are the result of immigration flows that that are caused by many different factors. International differentials in wages and employment conditions, capital constraints that make it difficult for families in developing countries to protect themselves against a variety of market failures, structural requirements of the demand for labor in industrial and service economies, the penetration of capitalist modes of production and labor relations into developing countries and, in general, globalization, have been some of the causes cited for explaining the initiation of immigration flows from less developed to developed countries.

Traditionally, the dominant approach in studying international migration was founded on neoclassical economics, which conceives migration to be a consequence of the disequilibria in the international market caused by geographical differences in the supply of and demand for labor and the resulting wage differentials across countries. At the individual level, such

employment and wage differentials lead people to make a cost-benefit calculus by comparing present income and expected earnings at destination over a certain time horizon; if expected earnings are higher than present income after discounting the costs of migration, individual rational actors will migrate (Sjaastadt, 1962; Harris and Todaro, 1970).

Although economic motivations play a key role in shaping individual migration decisions, the standard individual cost-benefit approach - still prevailing in many economic accounts of migration- offers an excessively atomistic view of the migration process that largely overlooks the wider socio-economic context in which individuals make their decisions, as has been highlighted by the macro-structural approach since the late seventies (Piore, 1979). In order to avoid both the atomistic view prevailing in micro-economic models of migration and the risks of an over-socialized view implicit in the studies inspired by economic dependency theories and the world system approach, authors from a variety of disciplines including anthropologists (Wood, 1981; Pessar, 1982), economists (Mincer, 1978; Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark, 1984; Stark and Bloom, 1985), and sociologists (Findley, 1987; Massey et al., 1987) insisted that families rather than isolated individuals are the principal agents of migration decision-making. In their article "The New Economics of Labor Migration" (1985), Oded Stark and David E. Bloom put it as bluntly as follows:

> "Just as it is clear that neither a brick nor a bottle of wine can decide to move between markets, so should it be equally clear that a migrant is not necessarily the decision-making entity accountable for his or her migration. Migration decisions are often made jointly by the migrant and some group of non-migrants." (174)

Consequently, they argued, important issues related to migration would be better addressed by focusing on more intermediate units of analysis such as the household. A central tenet in the "New Economics of Migration" - which is not new anymore - is that families develop economic strategies not only to

maximize earnings but also to minimize risk: the household buys insurance by placing different household's members in different markets whose outcomes are not positively correlated. If this is the case, individuals would engage in international migration even in the absence of wage differentials, which challenges the principal assumption of the neoclassical approach. Neoclassical economics assumes that people move abroad permanently to maximize life-time earnings and, thus, remittances are viewed as anomalous behavior. On the other hand, the New Economics of Labor Migration assumes that migrants are target-earners who only leave temporarily in order to overcome market deficiencies in their home countries. Within this framework, remittances appear therefore as the logical mechanism to assure the redistribution of the gains derived from the household's migration strategy (Stark and Lucas, 1985; Stark and Lucas, 1988; Galor and Stark, 1990; Durand et al., 1996). Not only is the issue of migrants' remitting behavior better addressed by the New Economics of Labor Migration, but the new approach appeared also better equipped for explaining other migration-related phenomena such as the non-migration of part of the household and the eventual return of the member(s) who left. All these topics received the attention of migration scholars in the early eighties in relation to the unexpected developments of migration flows in Europe and the political reactions of many receiving countries to those developments.

However, one of the most important issues related to contemporary international migration that the New Economics of Labor Migration could not account for in a satisfactory way was the maintenance of the migratory flow even when the original causes for its initiation have lessened or disappeared. Network analysis and the idea of "cumulative causation", applied to the field of migration studies by Douglas Massey in 1987, came to fill this void. Due to the development of social networks that progressively reduce the costs of international movement and alter individual motivations, argued Massey, household strategies for

survival and community structures evolve in ways that lead to more migration.

Although migrants' networks are not restricted to those of kin, the centrality of family ties in easing and promoting international migration is well-established. Households that have relatives living in destination areas, or that have members with experience in those areas, are more likely to send migrants than those who do not (Massey, 1987; Massey and España, 1987; Massey, 1990; Massey and Espinosa, 1997). The causal mechanism commonly argued to account for the correlation of migration risks across members of a social group is a social capital effect: family ties across borders function as a channel for information transmission that lowers the costs of migration to create further links in the migration chain.

The role of networks, however, and of family networks in particular has hardly been studied outside the Mexican-US immigration experience. Several reviewers of the subject have remarked that the immigration literature in Europe, in contrast to North America, yields little in the way of quantitative analysis documenting the effect of network ties in promoting and sustaining international movements (King, 1993; Massey et al., 1998). Moreover, attempts to distinguish the supposed family-based network effect and competing hypothesis are still rare even in the US literature. As Spittel (1999) and Palloni et al. (2001) have noted recently the migration of several members of the household might be the result of joint decision making and household's strategies of risk diversification, that is, the sequential migration of relatives is linked to the purpose of family reunification and settlement rather to a social capital effect (see Spittel, 1999 and Palloni, Massey et al., 2001). But the process of family reunification as such remains a topic largely overlooked in the specialized literature of migration. Boyd (1989), in her assessment of the immigration literature in the late eighties, stated that the three major areas of research for the next decade would be: 1) to specify further the process of chain migration in relation to immigration law, 2) to more deeply analyze the structure of

family induced chain migration and, 3) the nature of sponsorship and its effects. However, there has been little progress in this direction.

There are several reasons why such a relevant research line has not been fully developed so far. The lack of adequate statistical information has consistently been found to be a major obstacle. Official statistics on reasons to migrate or even admission category are quite limited, and survey data on the household structure and the sequence of migration within the household are far less frequent (Kofman, 1999, 2004; Coleman, 2004). It is not clear, however, whether this is a cause or a consequence of the lack of attention paid to this issue (Zlotnik, 1995: 230). Family-linked migration has traditionally been seen as a secondary form of migration subordinate to and divorced from labor markets, usually equated with permanent settlement. In part because of the legal distinctions made by the host country's regulations, and in part because it mostly involves women and minors, family-related migration is often labeled as "non-economic". Actually, women have also been widely assumed to migrate first and foremost for "family reasons". Terms like "trailing spouse" or "tied mover", which are commonly applied describe the women's experience of migration, largely respond to this view. But such characterizations are facile if not inaccurate, as I demonstrate in this dissertation.

Since the mid-eighties, a growing body of literature has challenged the neglect of women in migration studies. Under the influence of feminist scholarship, various studies have criticized the view of the household as a migratory unit governed by the principles of reciprocity, solidarity, consensus and altruism, which had prevailed up to that point in migration research. In their rush to rescue immigrant women from invisibility, they focused on "women only". Moreover, trying to discredit the aforementioned idea that women migrate mainly for family reasons, a myriad of monographs and case studies have reproduced women's histories of migration; preferably, those of unmarried or divorced women who had migrated independently of men. Unfortunately, these

studies often focus on migration patterns that still remain a minority within overall female migration and, consequently, they unintentionally enhanced the traditional exclusion of women from the mainstream study of immigration and also retarded our understanding of how gender as a contextualizes immigration for all immigrants, not only for women (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1999; Pessar, 1999). In fact, the actual "engendering" of international migration studies has occurred much more recently and, largely, thanks to the joint analyses of men's and women's migration experiences and the insertion of such experiences within the (family) life-cycle.

1.2. Migration from a life-course approach

Migration commonly entails changes in parallel careers. Migration is often connected to changes of status in the labor force or changes of marital status. But there are also effects in the opposite direction: changes in family or occupational careers can trigger (or inhibit) migration. This complexity of effects calls for a theory and examination of migration from a whole life-span perspective. In fact, over the last two decades a growing number of studies have tried to integrate migration within the wider context of a life-span and disentangle the connection between migration and other crucial events in individuals' lives.

Sandefur and Scott demonstrated as early as 1981 that the decline in migration propensity with advancing age predicted by the human capital model of migration tends to disappear when differences in the family life-cycle are taken into account. Since then, two facts have been repeatedly asserted in this regard. First, that international migration is closely associated with other life course transitions related to the family cycle (Harbison 1981; Chant and Radcliff 1992; Massey et al. 1987). Second, that such association exists not only for women, as had been traditionally stated, but also for men. This is true even though the direction in which reciprocal influences operate may vary by gender (Parrado,

2003). In other words, it can be said that the consideration of the linkages between family-life cycle and migration allows for an appropriate introduction of the idea of "household strategies" and "gender" into immigration studies.

Marriage and child-bearing embody different household demands for men and women over the family-life cycle, which are likely to considerably affect their respective motivations, propensity and timing to migrate, as well as migrants' labor behavior at destination. Evidence for Mexican migration to the US suggests, for instance, that men more often migrate in response to the economic necessities of a growing family: young children and a larger number of children seem to increase men's odds of migrating (Massey et al., 1987; Espinosa and Massey, 1997). In contrast, the rate of movement among women remains quite low throughout the early years of having a family (Brettell 1986; Kanaiaupuni 1995, 1998; Hoodar 1992). In particular children of pre-school age appear the biggest deterrent to women's migration, whereas older children and extended family members enhance females' mobility (Escobar et al. 1987; Casillas Moreno 1985; Young 1978; Stier and Tienda 1992; Kanaiaupuni 1995).

While the effect of children on male or female migration is fairly well understood in the Mexican-US case, the evidence concerning the different impact of marriage on men's and women's propensity to migrate, and the timing of their migration, remains controversial. Stark (1988) suggested a couple of decades ago that "marriage, migration and related phenomena such as marital stability, fertility and investment in human capital may be better explained by studying marriage and migration jointly". However, empirical studies aimed at disentangling the reciprocal influences between marriage and migration, are still limited and inconclusive. While Kanaiaupuni (1995) found a significantly higher likelihood of migration among cohabitating women and no effect on men's propensity to migrate, Donato and Kanaiaupuni (2000) concluded that marriage reduced women's odds of migration. In the case of men, Massey et al. (1987) stated that never-married men were never the most likely to migrate, whereas

newly married husbands and fathers of older children appeared the least likely to migrate to the US. However, Kanaiaupuni (1995) concluded that marriage displayed no effect on men's propensity to migrate. A recent study by Parrado (2004) helps greater understand the complex link between men's international migration and marriage in Western Mexico. As the author shows, international migration has both positive and negative effects on men's marriage and, thus, the net association will vary according to the particular migration experiences. The likelihood of marriage is lower for Mexican men while they are residing in the US, but upon returning to their home communities they are in a better position to form a union. The main motor behind the positive association between migration experience and marriage for men is the effect of labor migration on men's transition into adult economic roles. By facilitating access to home ownership, land acquisition, and business formation, a period of migration to the U.S. provides Mexican men with the necessary capital and financial resources to start a family.

Trying to take research on these lines a bit further, Cerruti and Massey (2001) studied the relationship between the timing of marriage and migration, the stage in the family-life cycle and its relationship to post-migration labor force behavior, for both men and women. Although their results tended to support the conventional wisdom that among women the decision to move stems more from family than from work considerations, the authors admitted that this fact does not exclude the possibility that participation in the workforce may ensue after migration. Furthermore, in the case of women, it is possible to note significant differences across generations: for women whose mothers were also immigrants, migration appears in many cases to be part of a broader labor market strategy and they remain more likely to migrate and participate in the labor force even after getting married.

All these studies, although very innovative, limit their analyses to the Mexican-US immigration experience. In Europe, the connection between migration, family formation -both nuptiality

and fertility- and changes in female labor force participation has been extensively examined in the context of internal migration (Courgeau, 1985; Mulder and Wagner, 1993; Boyle, Halfacree and Smith, 1999; Boyle, Cooke et al., 2001). Yet, the scarcity of similar studies for immigrants of foreign origin living in European countries remains astonishing, with the exception of the Netherlands, where fertility and marriage patterns of both Turkish and Moroccan women has been closely studied (Schoorl, 1990; Hooghiemstra and Manting, 1997; Hooghiemstra, 2001; Lievens, 1998, 1999; Reiners, 1998).

1.3. The research questions and their relevance

Bearing in mind the current state of migration research, as has been shown in previous sections, what this dissertation aims to do is to clarify the link between the family-life cycle of individuals, the timing of their migration and their post-migration behavior in several areas of their socio-economic life such as their marital choices, structure of the households and labor behavior, which are relevant for the general process of integration of immigrants in their host societies.

I will analyze this triple linkage (family-migration-integration) in the specific case of postwar immigrants in Germany. By doing this, some evidence about the European experience could be added to the academic discussion on these issues, which has been very US-biased to date.

Family ties in migration are, therefore, the focus of this research. I first analyze the importance of family ties in generating chain migration through two main channels: 1) the reunification of spouses and children left behind by migrants who were already married at the date of migration and, 2) the "importation" of spouses –actual or intended- by migrants who were still single at migration, that is the so-called 'family-forming migration' or 'marriage migration'. Secondly, I examine whether and how different patterns in the process of family reunification and/or

formation affect the post-migration behavior of immigrants with regard to their living arrangements and labor performance.

The distinction between family reunification and family-forming migration is a very basic but important one. Because both types of family-linked immigration are commonly seen as "unwanted chain migration", politicians, journalists, statisticians and researchers tend to include them within the same general category of "family reunification", which has favored the blurring the proper understanding of the family component in European immigration inflows during the last decades (Kofman, 1999; 2004). Family reunification can only be accomplished by adult first generation immigrants who were already married at the time of their arrival to the host country and, therefore it is likely to die out relatively soon after the flow started. On the other hand, family-forming migration or the importation of prospective spouses from the sending countries can be prolonged much longer in time, depending on whether the middle, second and further immigrant generations decide to bring their partners from their parents' home country or to marry someone else at destination. In fact, spouse migration has begun to replace family re-union of existing spouses and of other dependants as a major migration stream in many receiving European countries. However, in most countries no numbers can be put upon this phenomenon, which feeds stereotypes and distorts the political debate around the issue.

Beyond the fact that it encourages the growth of ethnic minorities and, therefore represents a clear threat for the restrictionist admission policies currently in vogue within the European context, family-linked migration and, especially, the importation of (new) spouses is also seen by the receiving countries as a serious threat to the integration process as a whole. Family reunification is generally interpreted as the logical consequence of the failure of labor importing countries in enforcing the rotation principle underlying most programs of temporary recruitment. In contrast, family-forming migration or importation of spouses from other countries tends to be conceived as an indicator that integration is failing in that youths of

immigrant origin show a preference for marrying within their own group.

In order to shed some light on the issues raised in the previous paragraphs, the first part of this dissertation is aimed at answering the following research questions:

Which is the numerical significance of the two main forms of family-linked migration? Do they affect different genders and ethnic groups symmetrically? Do they co-exist or rather, does one precede the other?

When and why does labor migration turn into family reunification? How is the process of family reunification organized: in a staggered way or all at once? Are there variations by ethnic origin? Do some groups tend to bring their relatives to the immigration country faster than others? If so, why? Do these variations in the pattern of family reunification reflect differences in the migration strategy, the household structure and the socio-economic conditions in the sending area or in the context of reception? Do some immigration policies trigger (or delay) the process of family reunification?

Has the practice of importing spouses evolved as a way of circumventing increasing restrictions to entry in Western European countries or does it rather reflect the survival of traditional forms of marriage among immigrant communities? Who are the immigrants who "import" their spouses, and why do they not marry natives or other immigrants within their own national group? Is it to do with family pressures and traditionalism? Or is it rather a mechanism developed by single immigrants to cope with sex imbalances within their own immigrant community? Does the propensity to import partners, mix-marry or marry within their own community vary across generations? Why?

In the second part of the dissertation, I try to deepen our knowledge of the connections between family ties and immigrants' integration. Towards this aim, I have chosen two spheres of socio-economic life relevant for measuring integration and upon which family ties may have important effects: living

arrangements and labor participation. A long debate exists about whether the availability of a dense network of family support in the country of destination favors or hampers the integration of immigrants in their host societies. Some argue that family (reunification) actually facilitates integration and serves to promote economic and social cohesion; while others, on the contrary, argue that individuals who receive aid upon arrival become dependent upon their kin for support and are, consequently, less aggressive in confronting new social situations.

With regard to living arrangements, the main question is whether the type of partner who immigrants marry influences the structure of the new households resulting from different types of immigrants' unions. Nuclear families are the dominant arrangement at present time in Western societies. Accordingly, extended households are seen as potentially more problematic for integration as they involve more traditional forms of family relationships. The main question leading this analysis is whether immigrants who import their partner from their (parents') country of origin are also more likely to live in extended households. If so, this would confirm the dominant view that the importation of spouses is strongly associated with arranged marriages and, thus, diminished freedom of choice for individual immigrants in family decisions.

Secondly, I will also analyze the impact that different patterns of family formation have on the labor behavior of immigrant women during their stay abroad. Participation in the labor force is commonly seen as a motive for migration but also, especially in the case of women coming from less developed countries, as an integration marker. It seems, therefore recommendable to analyze whether family reasons for migration exclude labor participation, as has been widely assumed in the past, or not. And more generally, how do differences in the sequence and pattern of marriage, migration and child-bearing affect the labor behavior of immigrant women? In this part of the dissertation, therefore, I will try to answer the following questions:

Are wives who are reunited with their husbands less likely to work than their non-reunited counterparts? If so, is it due to a more family-oriented orientation in their migration project, or rather to differences in their socio-demographic characteristics such as educational skills that render their employability more difficult and less profitable? Does the context of reception make any difference in this regard?

Are imported brides the most reluctant to participate in the paid labor force? If so, is "traditionalism" the main reason for this? Or, on the other hand, is it differences in the family-life cycle the main factor that accounts for their behavior?

How are the labor decisions of immigrant wives related to their husbands' characteristics? Do immigrant women work exclusively to finance the human capital investment of their husbands? Or to complement household income when their husbands are unemployed?

1.4. The German case

A large proportion of the current immigrant population in Germany originated in the massive recruitment of foreign labor begun in the late fifties. The ultimate goal of the recruitment scheme was to satisfy the increasing demand for labor, which could not be filled with native workers, in the cheapest and quickest way. Although other European countries like France or Switzerland also implemented measures of this type at some point after the II World War, nowhere did it reach either the magnitude or level of administrative organization as it did in the German case. Germany, unlike their neighbors, lacked past colonies to rely on as a source of cheap labor, which lead to an active involvement of the state in the recruitment system as the best strategy to cope with labor shortages and facilitate economic growth. The guiding principles established in the bilateral treaties that established the process of the selection and hiring of foreign workers were "temporariness" and "rotation". Both these principles aimed at

avoiding the permanent settlement of foreigners in the territory of the Federal Republic. Yet, neither rotation nor temporariness was strictly enforced by the German authorities as it became clear that such principles were not in the interest of either immigrant workers or their employers. On the contrary, foreign workers progressively prolonged their stay and strengthened their legal status. This development, however, took place for the most part against the will of the German authorities and public opinion.

The admission of foreign workers to Germany had been systematically justified and accepted, from its very beginning, on the basis of economic considerations. Accordingly, when growth rates declined and unemployment started to rise in the early seventies, labor migration was called to a halt. The recruitment freeze was intended to prevent the number of foreigners in Germany from rising. It did not. According to conventional accounts of postwar migration, migrant workers feared that they could not return to Germany if they went home and, instead, decided to stay and bring their families, who had been left behind, to Germany (Martin, 1998; Werner, 2000). The halt on recruitment is usually seen, therefore, as the triggering event for family reunification and the consequential transition from a guest-worker system to an immigration system. Such transition is traditionally characterized by a growing number of wives and children in foreign entries and parallel increases in the foreigners' dependency ratio (number of foreigners to number of foreign workers), which grew from 1.7 in 1973 to 2.3 in 1980. In words of Constant and Massey (2002):

> "The first guest workers were generally young men unaccompanied by wives or children. […] The situation changed dramatically in late 1973. […] In November of that year Germany suspended guest-worker recruitment. Authorities expected the migrant population to dwindle slowly as visas expired and the guests rotated out. They were surprised to discover, however, that neither employer nor guestworkers behaved according to plan (Mark and Miller, 1980). Employers wished to avoid the costs of recruitment and retraining, and thus sought to extend the visas of the foreign workers they

> already had. The migrants, meanwhile, did not want to give up their good jobs and steady income, so they stayed put. Rather than leaving they sought to sponsor the entry of their wives and children. After dipping slightly in 1974, the foreign population of Germany rose and its composition shifted increasingly from workers to dependents. Since 1974 most immigrants to Germany have come through family reunification." (6)

These transformations forced the German authorities to redesign progressively their policy towards aliens and start considering the need to integrate those who, despite official attempts to promote their return, decided to stay with their families. While 1973 certainly constitutes a critical turning point in government immigration policy, it is questionable whether it was also the crucial turning point for the migrant's decisions to bring their families and settle permanently in Germany. The effect of this policy change on migration patterns, and those on women in particular, was probably more complex than generally assumed; it rarely occurs that migrants adjust their plans and behavior in accordance with the policy statements of the authorities of the host country. However, the absence of studies that systematically analyze the changes in sex and age composition of inflows, in reasons for migration and in the labor market behavior of immigrant women, among others, has to date hampered a more detailed account of the historical development of the immigration process to Germany. This dissertation aims to offer a more comprehensive analysis of the aforementioned issues, which help our understanding of when and why temporary labor migration turns into permanent immigration.

The exceptionality of the German case should not be considered an obstacle in achieving this goal, but rather an opportunity. What is unusual in the German case is the active involvement of the state bureaucracy in the entire recruitment process, along with a lingering reluctance towards migrants' permanent settlement and promotion of their integration (Soysal, 1994). These features make Germany the ideal case study to critically test the current feasibility of immigration policies that

ignore the family dimension of individuals' migration. In fact, the alien's right to reunify the family is said to have revolutionized the underlying conception of German immigration policy, based to that point on the "gastarbeiter" scheme (Marzal, 2006). Therefore, it can be said that the German case and its experience with the recruitment of foreign labor offers a great opportunity to analyze the impact of state regulations on the features of immigration, its volume and composition, and on the migrants' behavioral patterns during their stay abroad. In particular, it provides a great opportunity to analyze the impact of state policies on migrants' patterns of family formation and/or reunification and how they relate to the economic strategies of immigrant families.

1.5. A Quantitative approach. Data and categories of analysis

Family-linked migration is not homogeneous but encompasses several different forms, with fluid and interacting categories, making it difficult to construct a simple and unambiguous typology. The different types of movements that occur in relation with family aspects of migrants' life are not necessarily reflected in statistical data, which remain very crude and do not allow for the tracing of the (re)composition of family groups across space and time. In fact, the distinction between migration for the purpose of family reunification and family-forming migration has remained largely overlooked in the specialized European migration literature due, basically, to data limitations (Kofman, 1999, 2004; Coleman, 2004). Moreover, within the European context official statistical classifications often reflect state regulations concerning different types of entry permits rather than self-reported reasons for migration or actual family links among newcomers and current-residents. As a result, in order to analyze all the aforementioned issues, we are usually reliant on small-scale ethnographies and autobiographical narratives of migrant families' and women's histories (for Germany see Goodman, 1984, 1987; Yuecel, 1987; Inowlocki and Lutz 2000; Erel 2002; Erel and

Kofman 2002; Treichel and Schwelling, 2003). This type of studies, even though they provide us with rich detailed information on the every-day life of immigrants that are tremendously helpful in formulating hypotheses and articulating detailed explanations of aggregate patterns, often make the drawing of conclusions about changes over time or across generations or groups of origin very difficult. Therefore, they suffer from an inherent limited capacity for generalization, which can only be overcome by utilizing larger sample sizes and appropriate specialized techniques of statistical analyses.

In order to deal with these issues in the most appropriate manner, the empirical analyses carried out in this dissertation are based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study of private households living in Germany since 1984. Unlike other large-scale surveys of this type, GSOEP offers the advantage of including a special sub-sample made of households whose head was a national of one of the five largest recruitment countries that sent foreign labor to Germany between 1960 and 1973 (i.e. Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain and Greece). Three major features make GSOEP particularly fitted for the aim of this dissertation: 1) it includes information on all household members, which permits the reconstruction of the family migration pattern; 2) it includes retrospective information on family and work biographies since the age of 16, which allows us to analyze how events in each of these two parallel careers relate to each other; 3) it is longitudinal, which means that the same private households have been surveyed annually since 1984 and, therefore, it is possible to follow the same individual and his (changing) family circumstances during his entire stay in the host country.

In sum, the structure and range of information contained in GSOEP permits us to take "women within households" as the unit of analysis and examine issues such as marriage, child-bearing and decisions about participation in the labor force within a dynamic framework. Moreover, differences between different generations of immigrants' and distinct national origin groups can also be

analyzed. The central variables that structure the empirical analysis carried out in this dissertation are, therefore, age at migration and marital status at migration. By separating out individuals who were single at their time of arrival in Germany from those who had married before migrating, I am able to distinguish the process of family reunification -which only affects those individuals who already had a family at origin before migrating- and the process of family formation -which affects those individuals who were still unmarried at the time of arrival and got married during their stay in Germany, regardless of their generation. By taking into account the age at arrival, on the other hand, I am able to separate first, middle and second generations, and examine how behavioral patterns in different fields of the individuals' socio-economic life have changed over time.

The inherently dynamic dimension of migration and of the integration process into the host societies will be taken into account not only by comparing the behavior of different generations, but also by applying statistical techniques of event history analysis. Although the application of these techniques has been relatively common in the study of Mexican migration to the US, in Europe the few migration studies that have utilized event history analysis are almost exclusively concerned with internal migration and housing relocation (Courgeau, 1990; Wagner and Mulder, 1993). In this dissertation, the application of dynamic models will enable us to disentangle the overlapping effects of assimilation, cohort and period effects. In addition, its application is also key to understand the role of the halt on recruitment and other restrictive measures approved in the mid-seventies on the pace of family-linked migration.

1.6. Structure of the dissertation and chapters' outline

This dissertation comprises three main parts. The first describes 'the case-study' and the dataset that I will employ in the following empirical analyses. In the second part, I will analyze the

family dimension involved in immigration to Germany, in its twofold modality of family-reunification and family-formation. Finally, in the third part, I examine the employment cycles of female immigrants in Germany and how they relate to women's migration and family careers as well as to changes in the context of reception.

Part One is divided into two separate chapters:

Chapter 2 describes the process of international migration to Germany between 1955 and 2000. For the sake of brevity and consistency with the issues dealt with in the following chapters, three aspects are paid particular attention: 1) the recruitment experience, 2) the presence of immigrant women in immigrant inflows from different sending countries and its variations throughout the entire process and, 3) the policy measures dealing with family reunification and marriage migration over a period of almost fifty years. Apart from providing a general overview of the whole immigration process, which will be examined later in the dissertation, the aim of this chapter is to challenge the dominant periodization of the process made by most conventional accounts, according to which temporary labor migration of single, young men was followed by a family reunification and settlement period, dominated by wives and children of established guest-workers.

Chapter 3 presents the dataset that will be utilized in the statistical analyses carried out in the following chapters, which is the German Socio-Economic Panel (1984-2002). Here, I deal with technical issues such as the selection of my sample, identification of the second generation and reconstruction of families and their migration and labor biographies over time, and I assess the advantages and limitations of GSOEP dataset to the study of international migration. In the final part of the chapter I carry out a preliminary description of the sample paying attention to central variables for my analysis such as gender, period of arrival and marital status at migration. This description provides the basis for the subsequent analysis of family reunification and family formation processes among immigrants in Germany.

Part Two is divided into two chapters:

Chapter 4 examines the process of family reunification undertaken by those (male) immigrants who had already constituted their own (nuclear) family before migrating to Germany. First of all, I compare the picture of the process of family reunification drawn from the information available in the German official statistics, on the one hand, and the individual data of GSOEP, on the other. Next, I utilize GSOEP to separate out spouse's and children's reunification and then analyze the factors that delay or accelerate the occurrence of each of these related processes. One of the key questions to be answered by these analyses is the extent to which family reunification was the response of immigrants to the recruitment stop in 1973 or, rather, an ongoing process that reflected variegated family migration strategies.

Chapter 5 turns the focus on those immigrants who were unmarried at migration and examines their marital choices while living in Germany and how these marital choices are associated with the formation of nuclear vs. extended households after marriage. The analysis of marital choices made by single immigrants allows me to explore the importance of family-forming migration and the factors underlying this particular type of endogamous partner choice among immigrants. The comparison between "importers", on the one hand, and immigrant men and women who either mix-marry or marry other co-national immigrants already in Germany, on the other, provides a great opportunity to understand better the forces driving this type of new immigration to Europe. In addition, towards the end of the chapter I also explore the connection between marital choices and the structure of newly formed immigrant households (nuclear vs. extended), which can be taken as a relevant marker of immigrants' integration.

Part Three is divided into two chapters:

Chapter 6 analyzes entries into the German labor force of first generation immigrant women. The main goal in this chapter is to test the idea that adult women migrated to Germany mainly for family reasons and, therefore became economically dependent of

their husbands. Accordingly, I examine the importance of the effect that being a "reunited wife" might have had, on the one hand, and changes in the immigration policy and in the macro-economic conditions in the German labor market, on the other, taking into account differences in women's participation in the labor market.

Chapter 7 extends the analysis in the previous chapter by examining also the determinants of women's exits from the labor force and their subsequent re-entry. In order to investigate whether exits were voluntary or not, I separate exits to inactivity from exits to unemployment and compare the factors explaining each type of transition out of employment.

The dissertation ends with a concluding chapter, Chapter 8, where the main findings and implications of the study are presented and discussed.

CHAPTER 2. THE GERMAN CASE

2.1. Introduction

In May 2004, the number of foreigners in Germany amounted to 6,717,115, which represented approximately 9% of its total population (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, 2005). About a quarter of these seven million foreigners are second-generation immigrants, that is, people born in Germany to immigrant parents.[1] These figures clearly indicate that, despite the official discourse, Germany has become an immigration country. In fact, Germany is the country with the largest proportion of foreigners within the EU and one of the most influential states in the design of the incipient immigration and asylum policy at EU level.

In this chapter, I will describe the process of migration to Germany that has generated such a large immigrant population over the last fifty years, focusing on the changes in the immigration policy and how it affected the demographic profile of the immigrant population and the family dimension of the process.

[1] The reason why most second-generation immigrants remain foreigners despite being born in Germany has to do with the German notion of citizenship, which represents the paramount paradigm of restrictive naturalization policies based on the "ius sanguinis" or descent, instead of the "ius solis" or birth right (Brubaker, 1992).

2.2. A brief historical account of postwar migration to Germany

During the Nazi regime, the German industrial capacity expanded tremendously and the consequent labor demand was easily satisfied with prisoners of war and forced labor, amounting to almost 8 million in 1944 (Mehrländer and Schultze, 1992:7). Although the war severely damaged the transports' network, it did not dramatically affect German industrial capacity. In fact, the main economic problem at the end of the conflict was not the reconstruction of factories and industrial machinery but rather capital and labor shortages. While capital needs were more or less resolved through the Marshall Plan and the currency reform in 1948, labor shortages appeared more difficult to solve.[2] They emerged first in agriculture, a sector often rejected by the "Vertriebene" population who were mostly of urban origin and relatively well educated.[3] As early as 1953, farmers in the Southwestern regions had articulated demands for importing foreign workers in order to satisfy their demand for labor (Herbert, 1990: 204). But the unemployment rate was still high in many other regions of the country and the German government initially rejected their demands. The Ministries of Economy and Nutrition, however, had overtly supported the idea of recruitment, arguing that labor shortages may generate serious inflationary pressures. Barely two years later, the Government modified its initial position about the issue and signed a bilateral recruitment agreement with Italy (22 December 1955).

During the first few years of implementation of the agreement, the number of Italian workers who entered Germany annually

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[2] The Federal Republic of Germany received 1,390.6 million of dollars between April 3, 1948 to June 30, 1952, according to the Statistics and Reports division of the Agency for International Development in 1975.

[3] Vertriebene population is expellees from the former German territories in the east, annexed by Poland or the Soviet Union after 1945. In 1960, they made up 25% of the total population in Germany.

stayed at rather low levels. This satisfied the demands of the trade unions, who were still quite reluctant accept to the idea of foreign labor as the right strategy to cope with labor shortages. Besides, the unions did not feel so threatened because most of these recruited workers were effectively employed in agriculture. However, conditions in the German labor market gradually improved and labor shortages expanded beyond the agricultural sector. In 1960, the number of job vacancies surpassed the number of unemployed people for the first time since 1945, which intensified the fear of recession, especially if labor shortages continued growing.

The labor supply from Italy was clearly insufficient, despite the fact that the number of Italian workers tripled between 1959 and 1960 (from 50,000 to 144,200, approximately). In response, two new bilateral recruitment agreements, following the Italian model, were signed with Greece and Spain in 1960. This was, however, a short-lived solution. In 1961, the stream of refugees from East Germany, which had alleviated the labor needs of the German economy up to that moment, was abruptly stopped by the construction of the Berlin Wall. Pressures to find countries willing to send their citizens to work in Germany increased and, in October, a fourth recruitment agreement was signed with Turkey. Other three minor agreements followed with Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964) and Tunisia (1965). Although a sudden recession interrupted recruitment in 1966, the rapid economic upsurge permitted the reactivation of the hiring of foreign workers with renewed enthusiasm. In fact, the German government signed one more agreement with Yugoslavia in 1968 and, over the next five years, the annual average surplus of foreign immigrants was 387,000 (Münz and Ulrich, 1997).

Figure 2.1. Total inflows, outflows and net migration, 1962-1978 (only five largest nationalities)



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland. Several years. Own elaboration.

In 1973, the number of foreign workers peaked at 2,595,000. Such an impressive growth was accompanied by other important transformations in the composition of the foreign population. Up until 1970, most foreigners (workers or not) came from Italy and Yugoslavia, but after 1972 the major source was Turkey. In addition, the length of stay of foreign workers was increasing, in spite of the non-permanency assumption, which indicated that the capacity of foreign labor to function as an effective economic buffer was reducing.[4]

Aware of these transformations, the government started to modify its view on the advantages of recruitment, which had been presented as the most efficient way of dealing with labor shortages up to that moment. When the oil crisis exploded in late 1973, the government indefinitely prohibited further recruitment and

[4] The rate of return to the country of origin dropped from 30% prior to the crisis in 1966 to 16% in 1972.

adopted complementary restrictive measures in order to reduce the number of foreign residents. However, the foreign population continued to grow from approximately 4 million in 1974 to 4,453,300 in 1980. This implies that at least 450,000 new entries took place in the six years following the halt on recruitment.[5] Moreover, political instability in Turkey, which culminated in the military coup of September 1980, substantially increased the number of Turkish citizens seeking asylum in Germany. The German authorities responded with additional restrictions on asylum which, along with the deep recession in the early eighties and the Voluntary Repatriation Program implemented in 1984, was finally successful in curbing the growth of the foreign population: in eight years the number of foreigners augmented by barely 40,000 individuals (from 4,453,300 in 1980 to 4,489,100 in 1988).

However, the so-called asylum crisis was just about to begin. Since the late eighties, thousands of asylum seekers and ethnic Germans had sought to be admitted into Germany. First, the civil war in Sri Lanka and the persecution of the Tamil minority provoked a considerable growth in the number of asylum seekers in 1986 (almost 100,000 applications). Just a few years later, the demise of communism and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia paved the way for a new rise in the number of applications, which doubled from 103,100 in 1988 to 193,100 in 1990 and to 438,200 in 1992. The CSU/CDU-FDP coalition in office at that time claimed that the only lasting solution lay in the reform of the article 16 of the Basic Law and its open-ended clause "persons persecuted for political reasons shall enjoy the right of asylum". The SPD and the Green Party initially opposed the reform but a final agreement was reached in November of

[5] This was a time of high foreigner turnover: some left Germany forever but others replaced them and stayed more or less permanently. However, it is not possible to identify whether the proportion of these years' growth in the foreign resident population was actually due to new entries because the German official figures registered entries instead of individuals.

1992. The reform consisted of introducing an amendment that allowed people who entered Germany through a "safe country" to be turned back without a hearing application. By including Poland and Hungary in the list of "safe countries", the reform was clearly effective in its goals: the number of applications fell to 322,600 in 1993, 127,200 in 1994 and hovered around the same figure in 1995 and 1996, with a further reduction to 104,000 in 1997. Not only the inflows of asylum seekers shrank, but also the proportion they represented of the total stock of foreigners from 28% in 1993 to only 16.3% in 1999.[6]

The other group responsible for the large increase in total immigration to Germany in the last decade was "ethnic Germans" or "*Aussiedler*", that is, people whose German parents or grandparents lived in the German Reich in December 1937. Under article 116 of the German Basic Law and German Naturalization Law, they and their children remained German citizens even though many became Polish or Soviet citizens when some German territories were occupied after World War II. Although millions of ethnic Germans had moved west after the war, an estimated 4 million remained in 1950 (Mehrländer and Schultze, 1992). In 1988 the number of ethnic Germans resettling in Germany rose sharply to 200,000 and it approached 400,000 in 1989 and 1990. Many came initially from Poland, but within a few years Romania and, above all, newly independent states of the USSR became the

[6] According to the official statistics published by the Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigners in 2000, refugees living in Germany were classified as follows: 185,500 were entitled to asylum, 44,000 were Convention refugees, an estimated 130,000 were relatives of recognized refugees and 9,500 were quota refugees; 120,000 were Jewish migrants from the states of the ex-Soviet Union, other 120,000 were foreigners with a residency permit for exceptional purposes under the Aliens Act, 13,500 were homeless foreigners, 255,000 were de facto refugees, 264,000 were asylum seekers and about 50,000 were refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina with a temporary suspension of deportation (roughly 46,000) or with a residency permit for exceptional purposes (roughly 6,300).

largest sending areas. The total number of ethnic Germans resettled in Germany since 1989 amounted to approximately to 2.3 million of persons (Dietz, 1999: 1). Note, however, that these 2.3 million "*Aussiedler*" are immigrants but not foreigners; they are German nationals and, thus, excluded from official figures that relate to foreign population.

This description of postwar immigration to Germany clearly suggests that the current immigrant population in the country is made up of people who arrived during different periods and from different countries of origin.

Figure 2.2. Year of Immigration of 1995 Stock First Generation Immigrants



Source: Mikrozensus, 1995 (Fertig and Schmidt, 2001: 47).

Figure 2.2 shows that approximately 65% of the total stock of the first generation residing in Germany in 1995 had arrived prior to 1985. They do not belong, therefore, to the massive wave of asylum seekers who arrived in the nineties, but are linked somehow to the previous recruitment experience. This is the immigrant population who will constitute the focus of analysis in this dissertation, along with in some cases their descendants born in Germany. Accordingly, in the next section I will examine in detail the recruitment system, the changes it experienced over time and the consequences of these changes for the demographic profile of the foreign population who arrived between 1955 and 1985.

2.3. The guestworkers' experience and the recruitment system

The conclusion of the recruitment agreement with Italy in 1955 was not viewed as a fundamental decision in the definition of a national strategy for development. On the contrary, it was presented as a temporary solution for a sector and region-specific problem. But geographical disparities in the needs for labor progressively disappeared and full employment was reached in 1960. At that time, many defended the recruitment of foreign workers as the most convenient approach in solving the increasing labor shortages that threatened German economic recovery.

Two additional bilateral treaties for recruitment were signed with Spain and Greece in 1960, after the Italian model. These three agreements established first the practical details for organizing the recruitment process and also distributed tasks and responsibilities between the labor authorities of the sending and receiving country. Next, the agreement regulated the legal and working conditions of recruited workers in Germany. Finally, it introduced a clause that allowed the possibility of family reunification as long as the worker could prove the availability of adequate housing.

A recruitment office was set up in one or several cities of the sending country. The "Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und

Arbeitslosenversicherung" collected requests for foreign workers from German employers and sent them to their colleagues in the sending areas, after having checked that national preference in employment had been respected. Job offers had to include requirements about skills, characteristics of the post and its intended duration. In addition, job offers also had to specify wage and working conditions, which could not be worse than those than those of a German worker with equivalent qualification within the same firm. The contract model included in the Annex of the Spanish-German agreement, signed on the 29th of March 1960, established:

> "En lo referente a retribución, condiciones de trabajo y protección laboral, el trabajador español tiene derecho a un trato que no podrá ser, en ningún caso, menos favorable que el de un trabajador alemán –de la misma empresa- cuyo grado de cualificación sea equiparable." (BOE, 5 de Mayo 1960, Num. 108, 5967)

This type of clause was one of main requirements that the German trade-unions imposed as a necessary condition for supporting the governmental decision of recruiting foreign labor. Priority for German workers and equal wages for natives and foreigners assured that German workers would benefit the most from recruitment: there would be no displacement effect or downward pressures. Moreover, recruitment of foreigners might be a cheap strategy for obtaining a reduction in the working hours of German employees. Recruitment also benefited employers since they were supplied with unskilled flexible labor, which had become scarcer and scarcer among natives.

In this manner, the German government was able to equally satisfy workers and employers and, simultaneously, avoid the inflationary pressures that would be a consequence of firms competing for scarce labor. In addition, the government was also aware of the strong political symbolism of recruitment, which was presented as a way of enhancing ties between Europeans at a time when the EEC was a promising project (Herbert, 1990). Sending countries were alleged to benefit from recruitment because

emigration relieved pressures in local labor markets, remittances would help families left behind and work experience abroad would provide foreign workers with new skills, which would contribute to the economic development of their own countries.

Bearing in mind the advantages that recruitment had for each of the actors involved in the process, it is not surprising that very few voices opposed the idea of hiring foreign workers during the initial period.

Once the list of job offers was sent to the recruitment offices, the employment authorities of the sending country pre-selected potential candidates that matched the requests made by the German employers. Then, the representatives of the "Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung" in the sending countries screened for health and skills (including a criminal record screen), and issued work contracts along with a work permit valid for one year for each of the recruited workers (Martin, 1994: 200, Werner, 2000; Bendix, 1990). Finally, collective transport to Germany was arranged and after a long trip, workers were sent to their respective firms and began work one or two days after arrival. Some employers also paid for housing at destination and the cost of the return trip. However, this was optional and German trade unions rarely monitored this closely because poor housing for foreigners did not affect native workers in any way (Bendix, 1990).

It is important to highlight the fact that the process of recruitment was highly selective. In addition to the self-selection inherent in labor migration, the German authorities further selected from the pool of those available the most suitable candidates to meet German employers' demands. Health tests carried out by the German authorities at the recruitment offices have been repeatedly described as particularly strict and humiliating. A prospective worker could be rejected for having a bad tooth (Goodman, 1984; Inowlocki and Lutz, 2000).

In 1961, the construction of the Berlin Wall made labor shortages even more severe. The number of unemployed people in

Germany was only 94,856, against 572,758 vacant jobs. The number of workers supplied by Italy, Greece and Spain remained totally inadequate to meet the number of annual requests made by German employers who, in response, started to personally recruit workers from Turkey. In October of that year, the German and Turkish governments intervened to regulate recruitment, which had already informally begun (Ansay, 1991). The signing of a bilateral agreement with Turkey in 1961 transformed both the magnitude and, progressively, the conception and implementation of the recruitment process itself. First of all, the availability of thousands of Turks wanting to work in Germany made the recruitment system even more selective, because selectivity is the more intense the larger the pool of applicants. As Philip Martin put it "[…] With ten Turks wanting to work in Germany for each one needed, the Germans could be selective, and they were" (1994: 200).[7] As in the case of the other sending countries, the government of Ankara also had its own reasons for wanting to sign such an agreement. However, it seems that the Turkish officials did not impose themselves during the negotiations and its input into the final text was minimal. The agreement clearly reflected German preferences. First of all, the Turkish agreement contained a rotation stipulation limiting the period of residence to a maximum of two years. This provision was not included in the agreements previously signed with Italy, Greece and Spain, which only established that foreign workers would be issued a residence and work permit for one year. This permit could be renewed at a later date by the German authorities if the work contract had been

[7] Ermes and Mattes (2003) stated that "[…] for the recruitment of assembly workers doing delicate work in the electronics industry and some branches of metal processing there were special vision tests. […] The job candidates also had to prove agility of their hands and fingers. […] And many Turkish female employees of Siemens attended courses organized by the company in Istanbul, which served the purpose of testing the suitability of the job candidates prior to the official tests by the official agency." (171)

extended and if there was no apparent harm for the German national interest.

Secondly, the medical examinations carried out by the German authorities at the Istanbul Recruitment Office were conducted to ensure for securing the best candidate for the employers, but also on "epidemic-hygienic grounds" (*seuchen-hygienische Gründe*), a term which was also utilized in the agreement signed with Morocco in 1964 (Inowlocki and Lutz, 2000). Moreover, the medical and skills tests in the recruitment offices set up in Spain, for instance, were carried out by Spanish officials of the Instituto Español de Emigración, whereas in Turkey these tests were carried out by Germans.[8]

Finally, the possibility of family reunion which, although officially discouraged, appeared in the agreements with the other countries was conspicuously absent from the Turkish one.[9] As Bendix (1990) has remarked, the most effective manner of discouraging -without banning- family reunion was by introducing the requirement of "adequate housing". Trade-unions exerted a strict surveillance on employers to secure that wage conditions were fulfilled but housing, as it was a "foreigners' specific" issue, was usually neglected (Herbert, 1990).

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[8] See more on the recruitment of Spanish workers in Babiano and Fernández Asperilla (2002).

[9] In the German-Spanish Agreement, article 17 established:

"1) Los trabajadores españoles que deseen que sus familias se reúnan con ellos en la República Federal de Alemania y presenten un certificado oficial acreditando que disponen de vivienda suficiente al efecto, podrán solicitar de la Policía de Extranjeros competente el necesario permiso de residencia. La Policía de extranjeros examinará benevolentemente (cursive is mine) la solicitud y la resolverá lo antes posible. La Comisión Alemana comunicará al Instituto los nombres de los familiares a los que se conceda el permiso de residencia.

2) La ayuda para la reagrupación familiar, bien facilitando vivienda, bien participando en los gastos de traslado de las familias, serán objeto de regulación en los correspondientes contratos de trabajo o en acuerdos posteriores concertados entre el empresario y el trabajador."

The particularities of the German-Turkish agreement clearly reveal greater a bigger effort on behalf the German officials to prevent extended stays and immigration of the Turkish population.[10] German officials were increasingly aware of the risks involved in the massive recruitment of foreign workers. They wanted to limit the possibility of permanent settlement and guarantee that foreign labor would fulfill its intended buffer function in case of recession; and the rotation system was viewed as the best instrument to meet this objective. Yet, on the other hand, in the context of the incipient economic boom, the German demand for labor kept growing and the recruitment agencies abroad found it more and more difficult to meet it. The pressures of the Federation of German Employers' Associations ("Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände") to speed up the workers' selection process multiplied. Employers repeatedly voiced their satisfaction with Turkish workers, stressed the disadvantages of the rotation principle and, as a result, asked for a revision of the German-Turkish agreement that would suppress the rotation clause (Erylmaz, 2002). These demands were actively supported by the Ministry of Economy and the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Germany, but opposed by the Ministry of Interior.

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[10] Eryilmaz (2002) interprets these particularities as proving that the Turkish agreement was a second class agreement, similar to agreements with Morocco (1964) and Tunisia (1965), due to the Muslim factor. He says "… German bureaucrats were quite reserved towards the Turkish proposal to send workers to Germany because in their eyes Muslim Turkey was comparable only with Arabic countries, although Turkey had a secular state." Oswald et al. (2003), in contrast, states that "rather than a negative or racist view of the Turks, the motive behind this act of discrimination –i.e. the explicit rotation mechanism of the agreement with Turkey- was the intensified attempt to erect barriers against immigration at a time when the extension of migration seemed unstoppable." (p. 23, foot note 11) These authors note the inclusion of a similar clause in the agreement with Portugal (concluded in 1964) as supporting their view.

Employers asked to increase not only the number of male recruits but also female. Some sectors of the German economy traditionally considered "female" such as the textile and food processing industries, were also experiencing acute labor shortages in the early sixties; but the German authorities refused to solve them by promoting the labor participation of (married) German women because of "family policy considerations". In fact, in 1961, the Federal Employment Service ("Bundesansalt für Arbeit") stated in its annual report:

> "[…] There is a large demand for foreign female employees in the German economy, half of which could not be met through successful placements that actually take place." (Erfahrungsbericht Bundesansalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslossenversicherung, 1961, p. 14; cited in Erdem and Mattes, 2003: 169)

The influence of the Catholic Church on family policy and gender ideologies in countries like Italy made it particularly difficult at that time to recruit the number of women required by German firms. In addition, German employers usually requested mostly single childless literate young women, who were in short supply in the sending countries.[11]

As a result, the waiting period for filling "female" vacancies extended and German employers had no choice but to accept the option they had initially discarded: the recruitment of Turkish women.[12] It had initially begun in an informal way; employers

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[11] Italy, the oldest and largest supplier of foreign immigration to Germany until 1971, had consistently sent to Germany a very low proportion of women. In 1962, only 11.6% of total Italian entries were women. The corresponding percentage of Turkish total entries was 14.6%, 30% of Spanish entries, and 34.2% of Greek entries. Although Yugoslavia had not yet signed its Recruitment Agreement, the flow from this country was already substantial at that time and the proportion of women was approximately 24.5%.

[12] Erdem and Mattes (2003) cited correspondence between the food processing firm "Gifhorn" and officials from the Ministry of Labor on the 27th of July and 10th of August 1964 where these type of difficulties,

with Turkish male workers in their firms asked them about their female relatives in Turkey willing to work in Germany. The employers then asked for them formally by name, following the traditional visa procedure instead of the system of anonymous recruitment. Increasingly aware of the demand for female labor, the German authorities adopted several measures aimed at promoting Turkish labor migration in those years. First of all, they established an open contingent for processing the applications of female (suitable) Turkish emigrants: Turkish job centers forwarded applications to the German recruitment agencies directly, without waiting for older applications to be processed. Secondly, age and education restrictions by which illiterate men or men over 35 were automatically excluded from the recruitment process, did not apply to women (Erdem and Mattes, 2003). Finally, in 1964, the Federal Employment Service launched an initiative to recruit married couples in Turkey; the recruitment offices offered "preferential treatment", which meant inapplicability of the "queuing principle" (Reihenprinzip), for Turkish men willing to emigrate if they brought their working wives with them. Such an initiative was in overt contradiction to the official position concerning family reunification, which was not even considered in the Turkish agreement.

Although family reunification was discouraged in the official discourse on recruitment, the idea that the separation of families was unacceptable was an argument frequently raised by catholic associations, activists for the defense of migrants' rights, home countries' officials and even by the German employers. Many German employers did actually favor "de facto" family reunification by requesting a work visa for wives and other female adult relatives of their foreign workers, as I mentioned above. By doing this, they not only obtained the female labor they needed but, at the same time, they guaranteed that their experienced and

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relating to the excessive delays in filling "female" vacancies through the recruitment offices placed in Spain or Greece, were discussed (169 and footnote 11).

trained male foreign workers would remain, which implied savings on the cost of recruiting and training new workers (Werner, 2000).[13]

The standard recruitment process was anonymous and, therefore, did not allow employers to request a specific worker but only a worker who fulfilled the job requirements. This is the reason why they often utilized the traditional visa system for female recruitment, in which the employer stated his interest in hiring a specific foreign worker and ordered her visa from the German consulate at her country of origin. The consulate, after obtaining the approval of the German authorities, issued the visa and the worker traveled to Germany where she was awarded the residence and work permit, usually also valid for only one year but renewable if the work contract got extended.[14] The "visa procedure" offered clear advantages not only for employers but also for those migrants who wished to join their spouses abroad. First of all, workers who were *personally* requested by employers jumped the queue. Secondly, the "visa procedure" also guaranteed that spouses of workers already in Germany would be sent to the same place in Germany where their partners lived, which could

[13] Employers had to pay a 300 DM (approximately a third of a monthly salary) fee for each recruited worker, apart from providing him or her with housing. Werner (2000) also added that by employing wives of their male guestworkers already employed, employers often saved the health insurance on the wives.

[14] The bilateral agreements explicitly recognized this possibility of "nominative recruitment" and established that the same procedure would be applied also in these cases, although the labor authorities could examine the possibilities for making the procedure simpler and quicker. The German-Spanish Agreement, for instance, established in article 8:

"El procedimiento fijado en este Acuerdo para la contratación y colocación de trabajadores se aplicará también en los casos en los que los empresarios alemanes, en sus ofertas de empleo, soliciten nominativamente determinados trabajadores españoles en virtud de relaciones personales. El Instituto y la Comisión alemana examinarán hasta qué punto puede, en este caso, simplificarse y acelerarse el procedimiento."

not be relied upon by anonymous recruitment. In the Turkish case, for instance, Paine (1979) confirmed that workers who were asked for by name or applied for recruitment jointly with their spouses were given priority for acceptance until the reform of the recruitment system in 1972. From that date, priority for workers who were asked for by name was eliminated but the system maintained preferential treatment for applicants with a close family member already abroad.[15]

Therefore, the possibility that a substantial number of spouses and other adult relatives would join their partners in Germany by these means (without being counted as entries under "family reunification") should be considered. A considerable number of women who were defined as "labor" in official statistics because of their admission category (recruitment, either personal or anonymous), certainly had relatives already established in Germany at the time of their arrival. Thus, they reunified their family (or at least their husbands) at the same time they migrated as workers. On the other hand, other women admitted to entry as tourists or even as relatives (i.e. non-labor categories) might not strictly be "dependants", since they could end up working in Germany.[16]

As early as 1962, 22% of annual foreign entries and 16% of annual labor entries were women. Unfortunately, official statistics

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[15] In addition, the reform of 1972 also gave preference to applicants from less developed regions in Turkey, which had clear implications in the profile for more recent Turkish immigrants to Germany.

[16] Some figures suggest that the volume of migrants who entered as tourists was substantial. For instance, the Spanish Catholic Commission of Emigration estimated that approximately 35% of the 444.119 Spaniards who entered Germany between 1960 and 1971 entered as tourists and, therefore, without a signed work contract at origin (Asperilla and Babiano, 2002). Among Turkish migrants, the survey carried out by the Turkish State Planning Organization in February 1971 found that roughly 20% of all migrant workers had not been officially recruited (See Paine, 1979, Appendix 3 for detailed description of the survey).

are too raw to allow us to ascertain how many of these women migrated only for the purpose of family reunification, how many for work purposes and how many for both. But what is quite evident is that there were already a substantial proportion of women entering Germany even in the initial phases of recruitment, and that not all of them were admitted exclusively on economic grounds.[17]

The previous description has sought to highlight two aspects of the process of migration to Germany which are fundamental to the argument of this dissertation, but generally overlooked in conventional accounts. First of all, legal categories of admission do reflect the immigration policy of the receiving states rather than individuals' reasons for migration and/or their post-migration labor behavior. This caveat especially applies to married women, whose migration generally occurred after their husbands.[18] Secondly, in the first years of recruitment, economic and foreign policy considerations were given preference over fears about immigration. Measures for facilitating the recruitment of Turkish women probably constitute an ideal example of this tendency. In fact, in 1964 the German government gave in the employers' pressures and eliminated from the Turkish agreement the clause limiting the stay of Turkish workers to two years and included some provisions for family reunification.[19]

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[17] Note the six percentage points' differential between the percentage of women in total foreign entries (22%) and in total labor entries (16%).

[18] Obviously, I do not ignore the existence of a substantial number of women who migrated single and, therefore, independently of men. My interest here restricts me to highlight the fact that in couples where the husband had migrated first to Germany, wives were very likely to have utilized the visa procedure in order to join their husbands and obtain, in addition, a work contract and a work permit in Germany.

[19] Legally, Turkish workers started to receive equal treatment with immigrant workers coming from European Union countries when child benefits were revised on June 1, 1963. An agreement on social security reached between Germany and Turkey on April 30, 1964 also established legal rights guaranteeing Turkish workers equal treatment with German

That same year the one-millionth guestworker, a Portuguese man called Armando Rodriguez, arrived in Germany. Foreigners amounted to 4.4% of the total work force and the first signs of prolonged settlement started to appear. The President of the Federal Institute for Job Placement and Unemployment Insurance (Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitlossenversicherung) estimated that 10 per cent of the foreign workers would stay permanently in Germany. He went even further and stated that it was time to realize that the employment of foreigners was not merely an economic question and that the separation of families was unacceptable (cited in Oswald et al., 2003: 24, footnote 14). Two years later, he updated his estimate to 15%. The Director of the Liaison Office in Istanbul, Theodor Marquard, stated publicly:

> "[…] Most of them will begin a new life in Germany; they will sprout roots and visit their home countries only as guests." (cited in Eryilmaz, 2003: 1)

Therefore, it is apparent that permanent settlement was perhaps underestimated by the German authorities but never ignored, not even at the beginning of recruitment. With increasing awareness about the risk of permanent settlement, voices against recruitment began to grow. The main arguments for opposing recruitment were that the utilization of cheap foreign labor may delay the rationalization of production in German industries, and that the costs of foreign labor would increase as guestworkers prolonged their period of stay. However, the Social-liberal coalition in office at the time, leaded by Willy Brandt, rejected these and other related arguments and continued supporting recruitment as the optimal strategy for assuring economic growth.

Moreover, the sudden recession of 1966/67 and the reaction of foreign workers in the face of it were interpreted as a proof of the

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workers in other important respects. The revision of the Recruitment Agreement in September 1964 was, therefore, one more step in this direction.

virtues of the system and resulted in enhanced support for it. Not only did a high number of guestworkers return home but there was a virtual end to new recruitments. Net migration substantially reduced from 303,000 in 1965 to 97,000 in 1966; moreover, the migration balance became negative in 1967 (- 198,000).[20]

In the face of these figures and the extraordinarily quick recovery of the German economy (the growth rate was above 8% in 1968), the government reactivated recruitment with renewed enthusiasm and decided to sign one more recruitment agreement with Yugoslavia (1968), which symbolized the beginning of the golden age of recruitment. Between 1968 and 1973, foreign workers in Germany increased from 1,089,000 to 2,595,000; the total foreign population increased from 2 to 4 million residents. The foreign population not only grew but profoundly transformed itself during these years. In 1972, Turks replaced Italians as the largest group both in terms of inflows and stocks, and the number of Spaniards and Greeks reduced substantially in favor of the Yugoslavs. The presence of women steadily increased until it represented 38% of total foreign entries that year. However, the proportion of males to females still varied greatly across countries of origin. According to official statistics, women represented 37% and 41% within the Turkish and Italian communities, respectively; 77% among Greeks (excluding Berlin), 47% of Yugoslavs and 52% of Spaniards.[21] Finally, children represented 20% of the total Italian population in Germany in 1972, 19% of the Greeks, 17% of the Spaniards, 15% of the Turks and only 8% of the Yugoslav

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[20] The same trend can be observed if one focuses on labor entries instead of total entries, although some remarkable differences by gender and nationality appear. Women showed a lower propensity to return to their home countries than men during the recession, which intensified feminization of the foreign population (Booth, 1992; Paine, 1979; Heckman, 1985).

[21] Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, Wirstschaft und Statistik and Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Nürnberg. Cited in Pained (1979), Appendix 2. These divergences across nationalities were even larger when sex ratio is calculated only for the working instead of the total population.

community (Paine, 1979). These children were both children born in Germany to foreign parents, and children born abroad and brought to Germany by their parents.

These figures clearly indicate a progressive demographic "normalization" of the foreign population in Germany. Such a "normalization" process naturally derives from flows consolidation, but it can also be triggered by certain measures in the immigration policy of the host country such as the reform introduced in the Work Permit Ordinance of March 1971. The new regulation established that foreign workers who had been employed in Germany for five years had the right to apply for an unrestricted work permit valid for another five years. The reform substantially enhanced the legal status of foreign workers in Germany, and seriously undermined the discretional powers of the German immigration authorities who were prevented from forcing foreigners to return by denying them their permits renewal. According to Herbert's estimations, just a year after the Ordinance was approved about 40% of total foreign workers in Germany already enjoyed this new privileged legal status (1990: 232).[22]

Increasingly aware of the consequences of this measure, the government started to modify its position with regard to the incalculable advantages of foreign labor. In 1972, the Minister of Labor, Mr. Arendt, publicly embraced each of the arguments that the economist Föhl had put forward as early as 1964:

> "The regional mobility of foreign workers lessens with increasing length of stay and the associated fact that such workers are often joined by family members and dependents. In addition, a continued influx of foreign workers may mean that certain labor-saving

[22] This 40% was made of approximately 400,000 non-EC workers and about 500,000 Italians. Note that, according to official data, in 1972 approximately 30% of the foreign workers had been living in Germany for seven years or longer (Bundesansalt für Arbeit, Repräsentativevuntersuchung'72 über die Beschäftigung ausländicher Arbeitnehmer im Bundesgebiet und ihre Familien- und Levensverhältnisse, 1973: 33).

> investments are not being made. The upshot of this is that the growth rate for labor productivity is sinking. Increasing numbers of foreign nationals and longer periods of stay are, at the same time, leading to increased private and public expenditures for measures of absorption and occupational structuring. Somewhere a point will be reached where the drawbacks outweigh the advantages of growth." (cited in Herbert, 1990: 233)

In the summer of 1973, a series of wildcat strikes at the Ford factory of Cologne made clear the extent to which foreign workers were no longer the flexible and compliant workforce that the German government and employers wanted. O'Brien (1992) described the Cologne's events as follows:

> "[…] Employers realized with dismay that a united and hostile foreign work force could potentially lame the entire economy by disrupting production in key sectors. The strikes equally frightened German unions. For the foreigners embraced radical forms of struggle long eschewed by the unions. In the most dramatic of strikes, in the Ford factory of Cologne, Turkish workers took control of the plant, severed relations with IG Metal and negotiated independently. Germans had long characterized foreigners as quiescent and obedient; they now were the "dynamite", "the time bomb" of social conflict and disorder (118)."

With prolonged length of stay, foreigners had inevitably strengthened their legal status and organized themselves to promote their rights and improve their living conditions in the host country. They were highly concentrated in a few sectors and firms, their level of union membership had increased considerably, and they did not move from one city to another as easily and rapidly as before. Therefore, they were less and less suitable to perform the buffer function they were originally thought for.

In addition, the unemployment rate among Germans had slightly increased and the government knew that public tolerance towards recruitment and foreigners in general heavily depended on its capacity to avoid competition between foreigners and natives in the labor market. In this context, the need to halt recruitment

became evident. Yet, such a controversial decision needed to be made at the right time. In July, the government had already raised the recruitment fee from 300DM to 1000DM. However, the measure proved to be totally insufficient. In November, just a month after the OPEC declared the oil embargo on the US and increased prices by 70% to North America's allies in Europe, a total halt on recruitment was imposed.

2.4. The halt on recruitment and the measures against family reunification

The government presented the ban on recruitment as a mere technical decision aimed at solving a purely economic problem. The decree of the Ministry of Labor stated that the hiring of foreign workers had to be halted because of the unanticipated rise in unemployment. In this manner, the cost-benefit rationale which had been consistently utilized for defending recruitment against their critics since its inception in the late fifties was now employed to suspend it. On occasions, the labor and economic authorities responsible for the measure argued that the ban on recruitment was equivalent to the measures taken to fight the recession in the mid-sixties. Yet, this kind of argument was soon shown to be false since recruitment was not resumed as the German economy showed the first signs of recovery in 1976. On the contrary, further restrictive measures, which suggested the initiation of a totally new phase in the process of postwar migration to Germany, were approved.

The halt on recruitment, contrary to what is generally argued, did actually accomplish its official objective: to stop labor immigration to Germany. Labor entries dropped abruptly in 1974 and net labor migration turned negative (-140,107), until the reactivation of migration from Italy in 1978.[23] However, the ban

[23] Remind here that Italian workers were never subject to the restrictions on recruitment because of its EEC membership.

on recruitment was unable to prevent relatives of the already-established foreign workers from applying for admission through family reunification provisions. The government realized that specific measures had to be passed to achieve this goal and initiated what some authors have called "the war on the alien family" (O'Brien, 1988). On the 13th of November 1974, barely a year after the ban on recruitment was imposed, the Ministry of Labor approved a decree which meant that the Federal Institute of Labor had to deny work permits to all non-ECC citizens who already resided in Germany but who were applying for a permit for the first time (Federal Ministry of interior, 2000: 156 ff.). Only two exceptions were made to this prohibition. The first was for youths who had entered Germany before the 30th of November 1974. The second exception was for people seeking employment in sectors where there was still a special demand for labor such as cleaning services or food processing industries, which took longer to feel the symptoms of the recession.[24] This measure, commonly known as "Stichtagsregelung" or "key date regulations", hampered the labor opportunities of, especially, spouses and working age children who had recently arrived either as tourists or through the official channels for family reunification. The black economy was the only option for them to earn a wage in Germany.[25] Probably key date regulations were aimed at reducing family-linked entries by discouraging the migration of those relatives who intended to work in Germany but, clearly, its primary objective was to protect German workers from further foreign competition in a time of recession.

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[24] In November 1975, this second exception was further restricted to people who had entered the country before November 1974.

[25] Note here that the upper age limit for reuniting children in Germany was 20 until 1978, when the limit was lowered to 17 (Bundesministerium für Arbeit, 1977). This implied that many of the foreigners' offspring between, let's say, 15 and 20 years old, who had joined their parents in Germany and had not a work permit on November 1974, were subjected to the restriction.

The ban on access to the labor market for new arrivals was accompanied by other complementary measures also aimed at limiting the rate of family reunification. In 1974, for instance, another governmental decree prohibited foreigners settling in "overburdened" residential areas (i.e. where the percentage of foreigners was more than 12% of the total resident population). Such a restriction on foreigners' freedom of residential choice was declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1976. Other legal judgements led also the government to approve in June 1977 a partial lifting of the key date regulations for youths that had arrived in Germany prior to 31st December 1976. However, the "Stichtagsregelung" did not totally disappear until April, 1979. Despite its relatively long duration, these tough restrictions are often overlooked by the specialized literature on immigration to Germany.[26]

The other legislative measure that strongly affected the immigration dynamics after the halt on recruitment was the reform of the children's allowances or "Kindergeld" in January 1975. In 1970, the government paid a monthly amount of 25DM for the second child, 60DM for the third and the fourth, and 70DM for the fifth and each additional child, regardless of the place where the child lived. In principle, the entitlement to social benefits depends on territoriality, that is, only people who resided within the territory of the state that provides the benefit can receive that benefit. However, EEC workers living in other EEC countries different to that of their nationality, were eligible to receive the same amount of money per child as German parents even if their children lived in their countries of origin. Owing to special bilateral agreements, this option existed also for Greek, Yugoslav, Portuguese, Spanish and Turkish workers in Germany. The reform

[26] Of the many sources consulted, only four mentioned the key date regulations as an important measure in explaining German immigration policy and immigrants' performance in the seventies (Dohse, 1981; Goodman, 1984; O'Brien, 1988; Erdem and Mattes, 2002). Magnificent works like those by Herbert (1990) or Martin (1994; 1999) omitted any reference to this aspect of German immigration policy.

raised the rates substantially: 50DM for the first child, 70DM for the second and 120DM for the third and each additional child. However, the eligibility criteria was also modified and established that the new rates would only apply to children living in Germany, while the old lower rates would still apply to children of (non-Italian) foreign workers who lived, separated from their parents, in their home countries (Korte, 1985: 37).[27]

Although the modification of the child allowance was integrated into a more general income tax reform, there are some indications that suggest that the reform of this aspect of the legislation was also prompted by the anti-immigration climate at the time. Martin (1999) argued that the measure was actually the response of German politicians to newspaper stories of Turkish parents getting allowances for between six to ten real and fictitious children in Turkey. It seems, therefore, that the intended goal of the reform was probably to save money and, simultaneously, to calm the fears of German voters concerning the alleged abuses from the German welfare state by foreigners at a time of economic crisis. Yet, its actual effects are likely to have been quite different from what the German government intended. If one considers the average size of a Turkish family in 1975, the financial implications of the child allowance reform for foreigners living in Germany and their plans concerning the reunification of their families are evident. For a Turkish man with four children, all residing in Turkey, the reform would imply a loss of more than 200 DM in his monthly income, a substantial loss that he could avoid, however, by bringing his children to Germany.

[27] For them, the only update the reform established was 10DM for the first child.

Table 2.1. Annual entries of foreigners by sex and age, 1968-1982 (thousands)

	Total	Male	Female	% Female	Younger than 18	% Younger than 18 over total entries	% Female of entries < 18
1968	589.6	389.2	200.4	33.99	89.2	0.15	
1969	909.6	620.8	288.8	31.75	123.6	0.14	
1970	976.2	668.3	307.9	31.54	153.6	0.16	
1971	870.7	578.7	292	33.54	174.3	0.20	
1972	787.1	497.3	289.8	36.82	181	0.23	0.41
1973	869.1	554.7	314.4	36.18	200.6	0.23	
1974	538.6	299.4	239.2	44.41	193.6	0.36	0.44
1975	366.9	198.1	168.8	46.01	133.8	0.36	0.45
1976	387.8	214.8	173	44.61	134.9	0.35	0.45
1977	422.8	238	184.8	43.71	142.4	0.34	0.45
1978	456.1	266.4	189.7	41.59	148.7	0.33	0.43
1979	545.2	337.6	207.6	38.08	173	0.32	
1980	631.4	403.1	228.3	36.16	185.1	0.29	
1981	501.1	301	200.1	39.93	127	0.25	
1982	321.7	185.1	136.6	42.46	72.5	0.23	

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, several years. Own elaboration.

Most accounts of foreign immigration to Germany since 1973 commonly argue that the reason why family reunification increased after the border closed is that migrant families feared the permanent separation of family members residing in the Federal Republic (Goodman, 1984: 61). It is assumed that until 1973 male foreign workers had the chance of going back and forth, which made migration-related separation relatively bearable for some families. Men went to Germany to work for a year or two and returned to their countries of origin, which meant that families' separation was not prolonged for too. But the halt on recruitment made this family strategy unfeasible: foreign workers in Germany now feared that if they returned to their home countries, they

would have no further chance to work in Germany. Consequently, many decided to stay and bring their families to Germany instead.

Doubtless, some workers behaved in the manner explained above. In fact, for the most recently arrived at least, it would have been rational to react in this way since they had a weaker legal status and, therefore, also more difficulties to retain their jobs if they left Germany. Turks and Yugoslavs would probably be overrepresented in this group as they were the most recently established flows (in September 1973, 66% of Turks and 60% of Yugoslavs had resided in Germany less than 4 years). Yet, for foreigners who had been residing in Germany 4 years or mores (approximately 58.4 % in 1973, many of whom would have already obtained an unrestricted work permit or even a permanent residence permit), why would they decide to bring their relatives to Germany precisely in response to the halt on recruitment?

Table 2.2. Length of residence of foreign residents in the FRG, 1973

	% of Total	Turkey	Yugoslavia	Italy	Greece	Spain
Less than 1 year	12.2	18.42	11.27	9.95	5.31	10.70
1 to 2	11.5	15.21	10.13	9.79	9.49	10.24
2 to 3	13.5	16.62	14.64	11.29	13.18	12.37
3 to 4	15.2	16.54	24.15	11.53	16.43	13.11
4 to 6	18.5	17.58	25.62	21.22	20.07	16.95
6 to 8	6.4	5.06	5.45	8.41	7.49	7.06
8 to 10	6.6	6.39	2.58	8.05	11.02	11.05
10 and more	16.2	4.17	6.15	19.77	17.01	18.52

Source: Jahrbuch, 1974.

My argument here is quite straightforward. The halt on recruitment cannot be put forward as the main reason underlying the phenomenon of family reunification as a whole. The abrupt

halt on recruitment may have speeded up the decision of some foreign workers to settle in Germany, especially those who had recently arrived. However, it cannot be used to explain the family reunification of those foreign workers who had already resided in Germany five, seven or ten years by the time the halt came. In addition, for those who had most recently arrived, measures such as the reform of the "Kindergeld" are believed to have been more crucial in shaping their decision about family reunification than fear to permanent separation.

A survey carried out by the Job Placement Office in Nuremberg in 1972 found in a sample of 14,000 foreign workers that the percentage of foreign married men *who lived in Germany with their wives* was 71% of Italian workers, 81% of Greeks, 63% of Spaniards, 46% of Turks and 55% of Yugoslavs. These percentages clearly indicate that a substantial fraction of married male migrants in Germany had reunified at least with their wives before the halt was imposed in 1973.[28]

On the other hand, the previous percentages also suggest that wives of Turkish and Yugoslav nationality were over-represented in the flow of reunited spouses who joined their husbands in Germany after the mid-seventies. As a result, it is likely that they were also the most strongly affected by the "Stichtagsregelung", which banned the access to the German labor market to adult relatives who entered Germany after 1975. Several studies carried out when the restrictions were still in force also supported this hypothesis. Brandt (1977), in a study commissioned by the German government to analyze the effects of the restrictive measures approved since the halt on recruitment, concluded that the "Stichtagsregelung" seriously harmed the labor integration of adult foreign women who had arrived recently in Germany. The study stated that the Stichtagsregelung had been strictly enforced to the extent that even women who had entered Germany earlier this legal restriction was approved had been denied their work

[28] Bundesansalt für Arbeit: Repraesentativ-Untersuchung 72. Nuremberg, 1973, p. 19-20.

permits.[29] In 1980, the Repräsentativuntersuchung'80 also offered some interesting data on this issue of the impact that the "key date regulations" had on the labor performance of female immigrants, which are reproduced in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3. Labor force participation of immigrant women by origin and year of arrival, 1980

	Turkey	**Yugoslavia**	**Italy**
1977-79	9.5	12.5	51.4
1975-76	29.2	40	51.4
1974	51.2	80	66.7
1973	59.5	79.2	48.3
1971-72	71.1	79.1	55
1966-70	82	88.4	55.7
1961-65	59.3		66.1

Source: Mehrländer et al., Situation der ausländichen Arbeitnehmer und iher Familienangehörigen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 340.

Table 2.3 shows the percentage of women who had taken employment in Germany at some point in 1980. It differentiates by period of arrival and country of origin. By 1980, the participation rate of Turk and Yugoslavian women who had arrived to Germany in 1975 or 1976 was approximately half of that of their co-nationals who arrived in 1974. In fact, the abrupt decline in the rate of labor participation occurred among women who arrived in

[29] See Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit, Situationsanalyse nichterwerbstätiger Ehefrauen ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1977, cited in Erdem and Mattes (2003: footnote 38 and 40). Dohse (1981) also defended the idea that these restrictions were strictly enforced during the time they were in force. However, other authors like Korte (1985) maintained that these measures either remained ineffective or had to be repealed for legal reasons.

1975 and later, when the "Stichtagsregelung" was already in force. In addition, the differences between Turks and Yugoslavians, on the one hand, and Italians, on the other, appear quite surprising. I have already noted that the flow of Italian female labor to Germany had been traditionally low. Yet, the labor participation rate of Italian women who arrived in Germany in 1974 was approximately 12 percentage points higher than that of Italian women who arrived between 1966 and 1972, and almost 20 points higher than that of women who arrived in 1973. In my opinion, the privileged legal status of Italians which derived from their EEC membership and obliged to apply them exactly the same labor conditions as to German workers, help to explain these differences. Although Italian migrants had enjoyed a legally privileged status since 1968, its effect on women's labor behavior did not become visible until the mid-seventies, when the restrictions imposed on foreign workers of other nationalities further strengthened their comparative advantage.

It is virtually impossible to determine whether the "Stichtagsregelung" did reduce the magnitude of potential adult female flows, as it intended, or not. There is no way to know if, in absence of this restriction, the number of wives joining their husband in Germany between 1975 and 1978 would have been larger than it was. However, it is evident that it hampered the chances of a successful incorporation into the labor market for those who actually migrated. Besides, there is also the possibility that the restriction would have altered the selection mechanisms underlying the migration of wives to Germany. Aware of the new legal restrictions imposed for acquiring a first work permit in Germany, only two types of wives would persist in their intention to migrate: those without a primary interest in working and those willing to work abroad at any cost, even in the black economy without a work permit.

2.5. Policy towards the guestworkers who stayed. The tension between integration and return

During the second half of the seventies, judges and courts, at both the regional and national level, turned into the institution in charge of protecting foreigners' rights against the increasingly restrictive stance of the German immigration authorities. A substantial number of judgments reversed administrative decisions that denied work permits and authorizations for entry and joining foreign relatives established in German cities. The "key date" regulations, partially lifted in 1977, were definitely suppressed in April 1979, once the economy seemed to have been brought under control.

Proposals for developing a comprehensive policy regarding the social and economic status of ofreign residents began to gain ground. In November 1978, Heinz Künh was appointed the first Federal Government Commissioner for the Integration of Foreign Workers and their Families. In March 1980, the Federal Government adopted the preliminary guidelines for the further development of an integration policy for foreign workers and their families, with a focus on the measures aimed at the integration of the second and following generations. In this spirit, a new amendment to the Work Permit Ordinance established in June of that year the legal right to a work permit for foreigners undergoing vocational training, for children having completed German schooling or vocational training, and for people having taken a 10-months vocational preparatory course. Moreover, this right was independent of any waiting periods and even irrespective of the priority placement and employment of Germans and other EEC nationals.[30]

However, the legal changes were less far-reaching than they appeared from official statements. The political discourse concerning immigration became overtly ambivalent and further

[30] Fifth Ordinance Amending the Work Permit Ordinance of 30 May 1980, Federal Law Gazette I, p. 638.

restrictions on foreigners' rights continued to be passed, especially when the economic upsurge revealed became uneven and short-lived.

The halt on recruitment had eliminated the possibility of independent new labor immigration; the "key date" regulations eliminated as well the possibility of legal work for those who entered under the family reunification provisions. Therefore, it is not surprising that people willing to migrate for economic reasons turned to asylum as a more rapid route into the German labor market during the second half of the seventies. In fact, the number of asylum-seekers increased from approximately 10,000 in 1975 to more than 50,000 in 1979 and more than 100,000 in 1980 (Münz and Ulrich, 1997). This situation led the German government to adopt an emergency program to restrict the number of asylum seekers in 1980, almost at the same time as it approved the aforementioned Fifth Ordinance on Work Permits. The package of urgent actions included the imposition of compulsory visas for citizens coming from the main countries of origin of asylum seekers (Turkey included) and measures aimed at speeding up the asylum procedure. In addition, it established a waiting period of one year during which asylum seekers were forbidden to work. In 1981 the number of applications reduced to approximately half of that of the previous year, which was interpreted by the German government as indicating that delaying the authorization to enter the labor market for asylum seekers had effectively lowered the number of "bogus" asylum seekers. However, it is fair to remind also here that the significant rise in the number of asylum applications since 1979 was strongly related to the economic and political instability that culminated in the military coup in Turkey in September 1980.[31]

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[31] In fact, although after the legislative reform the number of new work permits granted reduced by almost 10 times, from more than 29,000 in 1980 to 3,580 in 1981, the number of asylum applicants fell at a much slower rate, from more than 100,000 in 1980 to 50,000 in 1981, 37,500 in 1982 and 20,000 in 1983 (Booth, 1992, Table 12a, p. 169; Münz and Ulrich, 1997).

By early 1981, Schmidt's cabinet faced the worst scenario: the economic growth fell and the unemployment rate rose, but inflation did not abate. In this context, the previous ambivalence towards foreigners and integration was overtly substituted for a new stricter foreigners' policy. The ban on work permits for asylum seekers was extended from one to two years; the waiting-periods regulating the access of spouses and children of foreign workers to the German labor market -four and two years respectively- were passed into law;[32] and the Federal Government urged the Länder to adopt urgent measures to control the subsequent immigration of dependants, (see more below). However, all these restrictions on immigration were not enough to avoid the Schmidt's collapse in the fall of 1982, as the FDP withdrew to join a coalition led by Helmut Kohl, the leader of the CDU/CSU.

Although Kohl had won the elections partially on the grounds that it would "do something" about immigration (Martin, 1994: 203), most of the actions implemented by his cabinet in this field relied upon the restrictive measures that had already been proposed and discussed during the previous SPD legislature.[33] This was clearly the case of the Act to Promote Foreign Workers' Return, approved on the 28th November, 1983. The law established that Yugoslavians, Turks, Spaniards, Portuguese, Moroccans, Tunisians and Koreans returning to their country of origin in the following eleven months (i.e. until November, 1984) could under certain conditions receive a departure bonus of DM 10,500 and an additional DM 1,500 per child. Additionally, the

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[32] See Waiting Periods Act, 3 August 1981, Federal Law Gazzete I, p. 802. By virtue of the Association Agreement with Turkey, the waiting period for Turkish nationals was reduced to three years (Association Council Decision 1/80). Since 15 December 2000, the waiting period for obtaining a first work permit for spouses of foreigners residing in Germany is one year (First Ordinance amending the Work Permit Ordinance).

[33] See the Policy Statement by the Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl before the German Bundestag on the 13th October, 1982.

returning family would be reimbursed the employees' contributions to social security upon their arrival back home, they would have early access to privileged saving deposits without forfeiting tax reductions and could receive repatriation counseling. However, the number of foreigners who ultimately left during the eleven months when the program was implemented was small: 545,068 foreigners left Germany in 1984, which means approximately 120,155 more than the previous year. Moreover, some authors like Philip Martin (1994) argue that most of the foreigners who returned home would have left in any event, so Germany merely bunched normal returns during the nine-months program (204).[34]

Since 1985 the rate of growth of the foreign population began to substantially increase again. In fact, it did not stop until the historic year of 1992, when foreign entries amounted to 1,200,000 people and net migration was about 600,000. Most of these new entrances were citizens from the former communist countries applying for refugee status.

2.6. The battle against chain migration: restricting the right to choose a spouse

As I mentioned before, entries due to family reunification became the primary concern for the German immigration authorities immediately after the halt on recruitment in 1973. However, prior to that date, there was no specific provision in the German legislation regulating the reunification of spouses and children of the guest workers. Some of the bilateral Recruitment Agreements included a clause regarding the possibility of family reunification. This clause established the requirement of sufficient

[34] Unfortunately, none of the studies about return migration from Germany has specifically analyzed the effect of the program on the magnitude of out-migration from Germany and, thus, it is difficult to know exactly who left.

housing and said that the Aliens Police would "kindly" examine the application for a residency permit for relatives willing to join workers in Germany.[35] Apart from this, the Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz) passed in 1965 contained no provisions regarding the entry into the Federal Republic of spouses or children of foreigners lawfully living in the Federal territory. The only relevant provision of applicability to these situations was the one contained in paragraph 2.1, which established that a residency permit "may be issued when the presence of the alien does not interfere with the concerns of the Federal Republic of Germany". However, the Conference of State Ministers of Interior which gathered shortly after the introduction of the law, established in the "Principles of Alien Policy" that the permission to join a worker from a recruiting state was to be made dependent on one year of domestic residency by the worker.

As I have shown in the previous pages, the only measure initially adopted to discourage the reunification of families after the halt on recruitment was the "Stichtagsregelung", which aimed at curbing the family influx by banning their access to the labor market for an open-ended period of time. However, no further restrictions were imposed on the entry of spouses and children of the original guest workers, the so-called first-generation aliens.

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[35] In the bilateral Spain-Germany agreement, article 17 established:

(1) Los trabajadores españoles que deseen que sus familias se reúnan con ellos en la República Federal de Alemania y presenten un certificado oficial acreditando quo disponen de vivienda suficiente al efecto podrán solicitar de la Policía de Extranjeros competente el necesario permiso de residencia. La Policía de Extranjeros examinará benévolamente la solicitud y la resolverá lo antes posible. La Comisión alemana comunicará al Instituto los nombres de lo familiares a los que se conceda el permiso de residencia.

(2) La ayuda para la reagrupación familiar, bien facilitando vivienda, bien participando en los gastos de traslado de las familias será objeto de regulación en los correspondientes contratos de trabajo o en acuerdos posteriores concertados entre el empresario y el trabajador. (BOE, num. 108, de 5 de Mayo de 1960, p. 5968)

The number of foreign residents initially fell a little, from 4,127,000 in 1974 to 3,950,000 in 1976, it stabilized between 1976 and 1978, but began to rise again in 1979. In 1981, the number of foreign residents amounted to 4,630,000, which led the Federal Government to devise a new plan for fighting against further family-related entries that had remained as the only possible way of entering the Federal Republic of Germany, apart from asylum.

In October, the minister of Interior of Baden-Württemberg approved an Aliens Decree by which the permission for foreign spouses to join alien residents in Germany was made dependent on the observance of a three year waiting period beginning from the date of the marriage itself. Bavaria followed this initiative. On the 2nd December of 1981, the Federal Government, in line with the Baden-Württemberg initiative, asked the Länder to pass immediate regulations for the social control of families joining aliens from non-EC states (with the exception of those entitled to seek asylum and quotas of refugees). The general guideline given for such regulations were "*exclude by way of federally uniform state resolutions the following group of persons from entry in order to join aliens: a) young aliens of age 16 and 17; b) alien children, when only one parent resides in the territory of the FRG (exceptions for half-orphans and children of divorced or single persons); c)… ; d) spouses of aliens who entered the FRG as children of aliens or who were born here, when they have not lived here at least eight years without interruption, have not reached the age of 18 and the marriage has not been in existence for one year.*"

It is important to note that the focus of the new restrictions put forward by the Federal Government were adolescents and spouses of the recruited workers' offspring, instead of spouses and minor children of the recruited workers themselves. In fact, the Federal Minister, in his statement submitted to the proceedings on the matter before the Constitutional Court some years later, argued that:

> "[…] A focal point in this decision was the entry of spouses to join aliens who entered the Federal territory as children of alien guest workers or who were born here" but the recommendation did not extend to cases dealing with "the entry of the spouse of an alien who entered the Federal territory as a recruited guest worker for the purpose of employment. […] Measures limiting entry in this area were also not considered by the Federal Government." (Sections IV. 1. a) and IV. aa) of the cited judgment)[36]

The foregoing statements clearly reveal that the German authorities, as early as 1981, were aware of the fact that family formation by the middle and second generations were the true sticking point of the German immigration policy concerning family chain migration, while potential migration due to family reunification was virtually over by that time. This makes eve more striking the fact that no systematic study on the issue of importation of spouses has been conducted over the last two decades.

The Federal Government gave responsibility to the Federal Minister of Interior to urge the ministers of Interior of the Länder about the need for prompt action with regard to the aforementioned recommendations. The Länder approved regulations to implement the Federal Government recommendations during the course of 1982. Most of them chose not to require a marriage period for entry to join first-generation aliens. On the other hand, with regard to the entry of relatives to join second-generation aliens, most states introduced the requirement of a one-year marriage and eight-year residency of the spouse living in Germany. However, some important differences still subsisted, and a federally uniform regulation on this area did not emerge. In Hesse, a minimum residency of five years was

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[36] Note that even though the Resolution included children of aliens when only one parent lived in the FRG, this measure was easy to circumvent by bringing the spouse and the children at the same since no restriction was imposed on the reunification of the spouses of first-generation aliens.

demanded, whereas Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria required three years of previous marriage for second-generation spouses, instead of only one.

In 1983, foreigners affected by the new restrictions, mainly nationals from Turkey and Yugoslavia, began to legally challenge the decisions that administrative authorities made on the basis of the aforementioned decree. Several of them reached the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), which made a key judgment on the issue, on the 17th May 1987 (BVerfGE 76, 1; 2 BvR 1226/83 et al.). This judgment, apart from its transcendental importance from a judicial standpoint, constitutes an extremely valuable document where the political views concerning the issue of family reunification by foreigners residing in Germany made evident. The Federal Minister of Interior at the time, Friedrich Zimmermann, but also the Interior Minister of Baden-Württemberg, of Schleswig-Holstein, the cities of Freiburg, im Breisgau and Sindelfingen, and the President of the Federal Administrative Court submitted "opinions" to the proceedings. Besides, both the Federal and the Länder Governments were requested by the Court to submit information about: a) the development of spousal entries, b) the goal of the restrictions and, c) the reasons why they believed that such restrictions were the most suitable measures in order to attain the intended goal. Accordingly, it is likely that in no other document was the position of the German authorities concerning the issue of family-linked entries dealt with more thoroughly. In the following lines, I will summarize the arguments offered by the cited authorities.

1) General reasons to justify the restrictions

1.a) The parties involved generally justified the restrictive measures under consideration as a necessary means to "overcome the considerable and, in part, practically irresolvable economic and social problems that resulted from the uncontrolled immigration of aliens into the Federal Republic of Germany". In their opinion, the economic and social risks that Germans and aliens themselves would run from massive immigration can only be reduced by restricting family entries, which "has to be

considered as the main cause of the continuing strong growth of aliens since the recruiting stop in 1973". In fact, the restrictions were said to be based on estimations of potential entries of 500,000 non-EC children, 250,000 non-EC spouses and 600,000 future spouses of children and young persons who would marry between 1982 and 2000, plus family entries of EC-aliens and asylum seekers.[37]

1.b) In the Federal Minister's words, "the Federal Government has acknowledged that the FRG had a special responsibility towards workers recruited up to 1973, but it does not see itself obliged to permit immigration of family members for endless generations. The number of alien family members seeking entry can be constantly renewed by way of marriage and birth. The Federal Government does not consider itself constitutionally obliged to accept long-term immigration for family reasons of the children and grandchildren of recruited workers at the expense of the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany" (Section V, 1 of the judgment).[38]

2) Foreseen effectiveness of the restrictions in achieving the goal of avoiding massive and uncontrolled immigration derived from family entries.

The Federal Minister drew a clear distinction between the goal that the requirement of eight years of residence was aimed at, and

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[37] The estimations cited by the Interior Minister of Baden-Württemberg were 430,000 non-EC children, 215,000 non-EC spouses and 300,000 future spouses. The Interior Minister of Schleswig-Holstein estimated that in 1981 there were approximately 80,000-100,000 spouses in the countries of origin and that about 300,000 more would appear during the course of the decade.

[38] The Interior Minister of Baden-Württemberg confirmed this point when he said " […] With regard to the measures enacted, it was assumed that spousal entry to join first-generation aliens living here continues in principle to be permissible considering that they had been recruited to work here and that such measures should be limited to battling specious marriages. Such an obligation was not considered to be called for with regard to second-generation aliens." (Section V, 2)

the intentionality underlying the introduction of the one-year waiting period since marriage. The requirement of uninterrupted residency of at least eight years is based upon the consideration that "the lengthy presence of the alien spouse seeking to be joined guarantees that he has firm roots in the Federal territory – particularly, through the creation of economic and social existence[39]- such that he is able to facilitate the integration of the spouse joining him." [40]

With regard to the marriage-length requirement "the decisive factor was that prior to the restriction on familial entry, the number of cases increased in which aliens married not out of a serious desire to set up a marital relationship but rather solely in

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[39] The Federal Minister pointed out that the goal aimed might not be secured by the possession of an unlimited residency permit because children of guest workers are able to obtain such a permit even when they have lived in the FRG for less than five years and, thus, the minimal required integration cannot be secured.

[40] The Interior Minister of the State of Schleswig-Holstein argued in his opinion submitted to the proceedings that "Spouses of second or subsequent-generation aliens living here have sought to enter the Federal Republic of Germany at an age in which, on the one hand, the desire for employment is self-evident and, on the other, the ability and willingness to integrate, however, is considerably lower as compared with that of school-age children. The expectations entertained with respect to employment have not, or only inadequately, been able to be fulfilled due to unemployment problems in the workforce. Unlimited spousal entry would thus increase even further the already high unemployment figures among aliens and impede adequate integration within the alien population who have lived here for some time and who are prepared to remain here. It must also be taken into consideration that a second- or subsequent-generation alien who has lived here less than eight years is normally not so rooted in the economic and social life of the Federal Republic of Germany and so removed from life in his native country that it cannot be expected of him that he return to his native country when he chooses to marry an alien who is not in possession of residency status in the Federal territory."

order to make it possible for the spouse living abroad to enter the Federal territory and acquire access to the German workforce. This was supposed to be made more difficult through the imposition of a waiting period."

In the states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, the Aliens Decree extended the one-year waiting period recommended by the Federal Ministry to three years. In justifying such a tough measure, the Interior Ministry of Baden-Württemberg mentioned not only the goal of preventing the so-called specious marriages but also -he said – "prompting affected persons (partners) to consider whether they might not wish to establish or continue the marital relationship in the native country. In so doing, account was made for the fact that a second-generation alien, living in the Federal territory, who fulfills all requirements for spousal entry except for the marriage-length requirement, is normally able to be naturalized without difficulty and can then seek entry for his spouse. For humanitarian reasons, it was decided not to impose a total prohibition on spousal entry to join second-generation aliens." Moreover, the Director of the Bavarian State Chancellery added "[…] It was decided not to make an absolute prohibition on spousal entry for second-generation aliens in exchange for relaxing naturalization requirements, since such a relaxation was not considered to be desirable. The main objective of the three-year marriage requirement […] was to prompt the affected young families to consider moving permanently to their native countries. With a significantly shorter waiting period, it is not possible to assure the attainment of the objective." Even more transparent was the reasoning of the High Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg when it argued "[…] it is to be expected that equal application of the regulation would prompt a considerable number of aliens living in the Federal Republic of Germany and willing to marry either to forego marriage with a partner of non-German nationality or to return to their native countries in order to avoid lengthy separation from their spouses." Later, the Court added "The affected parties who solely fail to fulfill the marriage-length requirement would likely decide to accept a temporary separation

with its possible high risks for the existence of the marriage. This does not, however, indicate that the regulation is unconstitutional. Even those second-generation aliens who have resided in the Federal Republic for more that eight years, possess an unlimited residency permit and are able to provide for the common support of the family from their own income can be expected to return to their native countries in order to conduct a marriage with the partner of choice without the threat of deportation or interruption. Aliens in this group were originally granted residency solely for the purpose of being raised in the care of their parents. This purpose was fulfilled once they reached majority age or left their parents' home."

In sum, the main declared objectives of the waiting period and the eight years of previous residency were: first, to avoid specious marriages celebrated only or primarily to get legal admission to the German territory; and secondly, to secure a sufficient degree of integration on the part of the spouse seeking to be joined, which eases the integration of the newcomer. However, the authorities of those states that imposed a three years waiting period -instead of one- admitted a further goal: compelling young aliens to choose between marrying people of German nationality or, alternatively, if they chose to marry partners who still resided in their country of origin, to return and start or continue there their marital relationship. In fact, in these cases the goal of encouraging return migration seemed to prevail over the one of guaranteeing the required level of integration on the part of the alien seeking to be joined by his/her foreign spouse since the possibility of relaxing the naturalization requirements was explicitly deemed undesirable.

2.7. Conclusions

This chapter has demonstrated that the most conventional periodization of the postwar migration process to Germany is organized on the basis of the changes in the official immigration policy announced by the German government, instead of the

actual development of the immigrant population. As a result, the capacity of the German state to define immigrants' lives and decisions has been magnified, and immigrants' behavior has been commonly assumed to have responded almost mechanically to the policy switches. In line with some recent studies like the one by Oswald et al. (2003), the historical account carried out in this chapter along with the statistical figures and graphs presented clearly suggest that female migration was substantial long before the halt on recruitment was passed and that the largest fraction of the post-halt new immigration was due to the entry of minors rather than wives. The German government itself was aware of the fact that the process of family reunification had been largely completed shortly after the halt was decreed. In fact, the population targeted by the new restrictions approved in 1981 was not spouses and children of original guestworkers but the spouses of the guestworkers' offspring. Therefore, it seems evident that the importation of spouses rather than family reunification in strict terms has been the main source of family-linked migration to Germany in the most recent decades.

CHAPTER 3. DATA AND METHODS

3.1. Introduction

The German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP, hereafter) is a long-term project aimed at collecting representative micro-data on individuals and households in Germany. Its main goal consists of analyzing changes in the individuals' living conditions by focusing on a wide range of socio-economic and political variables. The original sample was drawn in 1983. Since then, the dataset has grown every year with new samples, new questions and topical modules and further methodological advancements. One of the main advantages of GSOEP dataset comparing the most standard surveys is that it collects information on every member of the selected households, either through personally interviews or indirectly. This kind of information permits to examine individual behavior within its family context, as well as the reciprocal influences among family members and how they affect the individuals' life chances.

In this chapter, I will describe the content, structure and organization of GSOEP dataset, with special attention to those aspects that are relevant for the study of immigrants from a family and dynamic perspective. After explaining the procedure to select the sample that I will utilize in the empirical analyses of the following chapters, I will describe its main characteristics. Next, I discuss the main methodological issues to deal with in the

empirical analyses of this dissertation, many of which are related to the peculiarities of GSOEP dataset.[1]

3.2. Target population and samples in GSOEP

In the original design, the target population of GSOEP was the residential population of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1983, including West Berlin. Two main groups were distinguished: 1) "residents in the Federal Republic of Germany", which made up the so-called "German Sample" or also Sample A, in GSOEP's terminology and, 2) "foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany", which constitutes the "Foreign Sample" or Sample B. The "Foreign Sample" included persons living in private households with a household head of Turkish, Yugoslav, Italian, Greek or Spanish nationality. Compared to Sample A, the population of Sample B is over-sampled (sampling probabilities were 0.0002 and 0.0008, respectively), in order to allow for stand-alone analyses of this population which was expected to be affected by additional drop-outs, due to return migration. In fact, Sample B consisted of five autonomous samples for each of the five largest foreign groups living in Germany in 1983.

Apart from these two original samples, GSOEP has developed five more new samples since its inception. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990, a new sample that covered the population living in private households where the household head was a GDR citizen, added up 2,179 new individuals to GSOEP ("East German Sample" or Sample C). In 1994/95, a special sample of 522 households in which at least one member had moved from abroad to West Germany after 1984 was initiated ("Immigrants Sample"

[1] Part of this chapter is based on the documentation published by Haisken-Denew and Fick (2003) in Desktop Companion to the German Socio-Economic Panel Study. However, here the emphasis will be put not only on the general traits of the dataset but also on how these traits may potentially empower or limit the statistical analysis of immigration-related issues under research in this dissertation.

or Sample D). In 1998, another sample, "Refreshment Sample" or Sample E, which covered 1,067 new private households in Germany was selected independently of the ongoing panel (Samples A trough D), in order to update original Sample A. In 2000, one more sample called "Innovation Sample" or Sample F was selected independently of the ongoing panel (Samples A to E); it added up 6,052 new households to the existing survey.

Although Sample B was the sample specifically designed for the study of the foreign immigrant population living in Germany in 1983, the other five subsequent samples also included some individuals of foreign and/or immigrant background. In order to maximize the size of my final sample and to slightly update Sample B with immigrants arrived in Germany after 1983, I decided to merge individuals in Sample B with all the individuals in the other five samples, as long as they report either to have been born in Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece or Spain, or to have parents who were born in one of the five selected countries (see more below, section 3.5.1).

3.3. Structure of the dataset

3.3.1. Individual and household information

GSOEP dataset contains information referred not only to individuals but also to households. Within each selected household, individuals are personally interviewed face-to-face as they reach the age of 16. However, information about non-adult members living in the selected households is also collected through questions answered by the head of the households and other adult members. Household questionnaires include mainly questions about the physical characteristics of the place where the household-unit lives (i.e. number of rooms in dwelling) and the costs associated to it (i.e. monthly cost for hot water or support by public loans). This information will not be used in the analyses carried out in this dissertation, with the only exception of the

annually collected information on the type of kin relationship that links each member of the household to the head of the household (variable "$stell").

The core information utilized in this dissertation is the information collected at the individual level, that is, the information collected annually through face-to-face interviews with each of the adult household's members since the date the household was selected as part of the survey. This information includes apart from basic socio-demographic characteristics of the interviewed individuals, marital, reproductive and labor biographical histories, which is central for the analyses in the following chapters.

3.3.2. Cross-sectional and longitudinal data. The development of the longitudinal sample: follow-up rules and attrition

GSOEP was purposely designed for detecting patterns of change and stability in the socio-economic behavior of individuals and their living conditions. To capture this dynamic component of individuals' life, GSOEP questionnaires include questions that collect information referred to a specific point in time, periodical information, calendar-type information and biographical retrospective information. Information referred to a specific point in time is generally contained in the so-called cross-sectional files, which consist of the information collected through each of the annual interviews. As of 2004, there were twenty cross-sectional files available (Waves A to S, in GSOEP terminology). Cross-sectional files contain a set of questions about a specific module topic apart from basic personal information. Each of these twenty waves can be utilized as an independent survey to carry out cross-sectional analyses referred to the year of the wave (1984-2002).

However, the main advantage of using GSOEP for the study of immigration derives from its panel design, which permits longitudinal research. In panel studies, a group of people provides

information on their lives as they unfold over time through repeated rounds of surveys.

Unlike cross-sectional samples, the longitudinal population in GSOEP is not stable. While there is a core group of individuals who have been interviewed each year without interruption since GSOEP started in 1983, other individuals either left or entered the survey at some point in the meantime between 1984 and 2005. This implies that the size of the longitudinal sample in GSOEP shrinks or expands over time depending on these entrances and exits (i.e. unbalanced panel).

A crucial issue when dealing with panel survey designs is the criterion determining which individuals are to be followed over time, the so-called follow-up rule. In GSOEP, the basic sampling units are households (not individuals). Accordingly, it was necessary to decide whether only the household head was to be followed or, by the contrary, the rest of the household's members will be followed as well. In order to assure the data continue being representative of the target population over time, GSOEP has followed all the household's members, even if they move-out from the originally selected household and constitute a new independent household. In addition, young children who moved from a foreign country into a selected household while the panel was in progress were also followed. There are, therefore, several mechanisms by which the GSOEP original sample has grown over time. First of all, GSOEP interviews every person of age 16 or older who belongs to one of the households originally selected to be surveyed. This implies that the next generation is automatically incorporated into the original sample as they reach the age of 16 and stay within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, even if they move-out from their parents' household and constitute a new one. Secondly, persons who entered one of the selected households while the panel was in progress are also incorporated to the GSOEP core sample.[2] Moreover, if an old household splits-

[2] These individuals are followed even if they leave the households since 1989, but not prior to this date.

off, the new resulting households and their members are still kept within the sample although under a new household identifier. Finally, new persons enter the sample every year as a result of births occurred within the originally (or subsequently) selected households.

All the aforementioned mechanisms have resulted in the enlargement of the sample's size over time. However, such a growth has not been large enough to completely offset the continuous reduction in the number of interviewed people due to permanent drop-outs.[3] Permanent drop-outs may be due to survey related causes (i.e. the household declined to reply or the contact failed) or to demographic causes as deaths or migration abroad. This latest cause (move abroad) is likely to particularly affect the development of the sample of foreign immigrants in GSOEP. Permanent drop-outs are a serious problem for panel datasets because they may result in a biased sample. Longitudinal survey samples are designed to be representative of the target population at the particular time-point when they are selected. However, over time the sample ages and its initial size reduces as a result of an increasing rate of non-responses. This phenomenon can present a serious problem for panel surveys if the sample loses its representativeness over time causing estimates to be biased. Successive drop-outs over the life of the panel may result in biased survey estimates if households (or individuals) that abandon the sample are not a random group within the entire original sample.

There are several techniques capable of minimizing the destroying effect of attrition; one of the most common consists of sampling successively new households or individuals, the so-called "refreshment samples", that counterbalance the panel's continuous drain. However, this technique is not problem-free

[3] GSOEP considers a drop-out as permanent when there are two consecutive drop-outs and none member of the household could be contacted and/or there was a final refusal. Temporary drop-outs (i.e. the household filed to be contacted one year but was contacted the next one) are filled by means of a short questionnaire aimed at collecting the missed information concerning the previous year.

because new panel recruits may substantially differ from the ones originally selected and lost. As I said before, GSOEP followed this strategy to update the core "German Sample" or "Sample A" in 1998 ("refreshment Sample" of "Sample E"), but it did not the same with respect to the sample of foreign households contained in Sample B.[4] This decision progressively rendered the original Sample B less and less representative of the current foreign population residing in Germany, which has experienced big transformations since the mid-eighties especially since the asylum crisis and the arrival of substantial numbers of ethnic Germans in the early nineties. Aware of this situation, GSOEP launched a new sample of immigrants who had entered Germany after 1984 in 1994/95, the so-called "Immigrant Sample" or "Sample D".

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the rate of sample's reduction over time in Sample A and Sample B. About 45% of persons originally interviewed by GSOEP in Sample A were still re-interviewed in 2004, whereas the corresponding percentage for Sample B is 40%. On the other hand, losses due to "move abroad" (grey at the top of the figure) are clearly more in Sample B than in Sample A.[5]

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[4] The reason given in GSOEP documentation for such a decision with regard to Sample B is that "[…] at the beginning of the 1980s, the immigration of migrant workers or their family members constituted the bulk of all immigration." (Desktop 2001) However, this is not completely correct. As I will demonstrate in the following chapters of this dissertation, immigration from the original recruitment countries, especially from Turkey, has continued through the reunification of children and the importation of spouses by middle and second-generation immigrants after the early eighties.

[5] The pattern of attrition over time of the 5,139 individuals selected as belonging to my final sample is quite similar to the general attrition pattern showed in Figure 3.2 for Sample B.

Figure 3.1. Number of losses due to panel attrition, Sample A (Waves 1 to 21)

Source: Kroh and Spiess (2004), p. 21.

Figure 3.2. Number of losses due to panel attrition, Sample B (Waves 1 to 21)



Source: Kroh and Spiess (2004), p. 22.

3.4. Survey and retrospective panel data and the reconstruction of entire life histories

As I have said above, panel data measure the same sample of respondents at different points in time. Panel information, also called longitudinal, can be collected prospectively or retrospectively. GSOEP cont ains both types of panel data:

1) Prospective or survey panel data, which are made of the responses given by the same individuals to questions asked to them every year since they entered the survey. Some longitudinal files are constructed by GSOEP personnel and, therefore, are also readily available to GSOEP's users along with raw cross-sectional data for each wave of the panel. This is the case for occupational, marital and reproductive longitudinal information for the period elapsed between each individual's first and last interview. This survey panel data are collected through monthly calendar-type questions asking about, for instance, employment status as of January through December of the previous year. Figure 5 reproduces the monthly calendar-type question included in the personal questionnaire of 1984.

Figure 3.3. Example of occupational calendar-type question in the survey questionnaire (1984)

AP36[1]. **And now please think about the entire year, in other words about 1983**: We have made a sort of calendar. On the left, we have written things that could have happened last year. Please go through the entire list and put a cross by each month, in which for example, you were employed or unemployed, etc. Please make sure you answer for each month.

	1983											
	J	**F**	**M**	**A**	**M**	**J**	**J**	**A**	**S**	**O**	**N**	**D**
[AP3601-12] Full-time employment	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__
[AP3613-24] Part-time or occasionally employed	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__
[AP3625-36] Vocational training	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__
[AP3637-48] Registered unemployed	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__
[AP3649-60] Retired	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__
[AP3661-72] School/college	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__
[AP3673-84] Military/Civilian service	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__
[AP3685-96] Housewife/house-husband	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__
[AP3697-108] Other, fill in here	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__

Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, Questionnaire Wave A, 1984.
[1]AP36 is the resulting code for Wave One (A) in Personal Files (P) and question number 36 (36).

With the information provided by the respondents to this type of calendar questions, GSOEP constructs monthly spell-type files.[6]

[6] In other cases, however, researchers have to build themselves their own longitudinal file linking the responses given by the same individuals

Compared to typical panel data, which are organized in a person-year or person-month structure, spell data have an observation per person per spell (instead of per year/month). The "spell" is the period of time elapsed between the start date and the end date of the episode. In contrast to survey panel data, the retrospective biographical information on occupational, marital and reproductive trajectories in GSOEP is collected on a yearly basis, as it can be seen in Figure 3.4.

---

to the same question in different waves of the survey. GSOEP identifies each individual with a unique personal identifier (i.e. variable "persnr"), which allows the user to follow the trajectory of one person over the entire period of time the individual has remained in the survey. The personal information contained in different waves has to be linked according to this unique personal identifier. The Stata command for carrying out this action of linking individuals' information across waves is "merge". This command joins corresponding observations from the dataset currently in memory (called the master dataset) with those from the Stata-format dataset stored as filename (called the using dataset) into single observations. "merge" can perform both one-to-one and match merges. In either case, the variable _merge, which is automatically generated by Stated, indicates: 1) cases only in the master dataset, 2) cases only in the using dataset and 3) cases in both datasets, which are the one properly linked.

Figure 3.4. Example of occupational calendar-type question in the retrospective questionnaire

We would now like to ask you for some information about your personal history starting at age 15. Please fill out the table below as follows: 1) In the large boxes at the top, please fill in the years in which you turned 15, 20, 25, etc., up to your current age. 2) Please make an X in the appropriate box for each age. Please indicate when you were attending school, in vocational training, working, etc, for each year of your life since age 15. The most important thing is to make sure that at least one box is marked for each age. If more than one of the options applies to you at a particular age, then please mark all those that apply



Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, English Version Supplementary. Biography- Questionnaire.

Merging yearly and monthly spell-type information

Although the content of monthly and yearly biographical files in GSOEP is very similar or even identical in some occasions, to merge these two types of information is not always straightforward and it has methodological implications that need to be bore in mind. In fact, most authors who have analyzed life-course transitions using the GSOEP dataset have limited their analyses to the monthly panel data starting in 1983.[7]

However, to limit the analysis of immigrants' labor or marital transitions to the period starting in 1983 would entail serious limitations, especially for the first generation (i.e. individuals who immigrated at age 16 or older) because most of them arrived in Germany, married and started to work prior to 1983. Consequently, I decided to merge the retrospective yearly information in GSOEP with the monthly survey panel data, by transforming each person-year observation in the retrospective biographical files into 12 different month-person year observations, and assumed that the event of interest (i.e. reunification, entrance into the labor force, exit from the labor force) occurred in January of the corresponding month.

[7] For an exception see Drobnic, Blossfeld and Rohwer (1999). In this article, they analyzed the employment careers of German women by merging yearly and monthly spell information available in GSOEP. However, they did not specify at which month they assumed the transition to occur and did not discuss either the methodological implications of that decision. In order to control for the differences in the time units of the two different parts of the survey and to increase the robustness of the estimates, they added to the models a dummy variable that indicates whether the data come from the yearly scheme or from the monthly one, which performs a strictly controlling function (p. 138).

Overlapping states

Overlapping states, that is, the simultaneous occupancy of different states within the same life-course dimension over the same period of time may result from two different causes. First, a person may truly occupy several different states simultaneously within a particular life dimension when these two states are not mutually exclusive (single and married): a woman may be working part-time and defined herself as a housewife for many years in her life, for instance. In these cases, the researcher would have to decide which of these two states deserves to be considered as "principal", according to the research goals.

In other cases, however, overlapping states do not reflect a true concurrence of positions but they are rather the result of insufficient information about the precise moment at which individuals change from one state (part-time worker) to another (housewife). This happens when a woman A, for instance, worked part-time since January to March, 1983 and left her work at the end of March to become a housewife in April, 1983. Although woman A has never worked part-time and being a housewife simultaneously, the yearly structure of the retrospective dataset would make it appears as if. In these cases, the lack of more precise information would force the researcher to choose only one of these two labor force states as the principal or dominant one for the entire year of 1983. As a result, shorter spells tend to be underrepresented in the final clean (without overlapping spells) dataset.

Retrospective data in the employment biography files in GSOEP (PBIOSPE file) contain both types of overlapping spells (i.e. true overlapping and overlapping derived from imprecise information about the exact moment at which the transition from one state to another state took place).

The decision rules followed to decide which state should be given primary over the rest, have been the following:

1) Unemployment
2) Part-time employment/ short work hours

3) Full-time employment
4) Maternity
5) School, training, apprenticeship
6) Housewife
7) Retired/pensioner
8) Other

Note that this decision rule implies that short spells of unemployment will be given priority over short spells of employment.

3.5. Selection and description of the immigrant sample

3.5.1. Migration-related information in GSOEP and definition of the immigrant sample

The first issue I had to deal with to define my own sample within GSOEP has to do with the distinction between foreigners, immigrants and people of foreign/immigrant origin. Foreigners are persons born in another country than the one where they reside, who have not been naturalized. Immigrants are individuals who come to a country where they were not born in order to settle there temporarily or permanently. Comparing to the two previous ones, the term "people of immigrant origin" is a more inclusive one, which includes not only individuals who effectively immigrated at some point but also their descendants, regardless of they are immigrants or foreigners themselves or not.

In GSOEP, Sample B was selected according to the nationality of the head of the household, whereas Sample D was selected according to the immigrant status of at least one of the members of the household. Individuals in the other samples were selected according to different criteria but they all have information on migration-related issues, which is collected through four different variables:

- The variable "born in Germany" ("germborn"), which indicates whether the individual's place of birth was Germany or a

foreign country, without specifying the name of the foreign country. All individuals who were born abroad but immigrated to Germany prior 1949 are coded as "born in Germany".

- The variable "country of origin" ("corigin"), which indicates the specific country where the individual was born.

- The variable "nationality' ("pnation"), which indicates the nationality of each surveyed individual at the time of the survey. There are also some complementary variables that collect information on second nationality and date of naturalization. However, these variables are not available since the very first wave of GSOEP, which implies that the information is missed for individuals who did not stay in the survey until the year the question was formulated for the first time.

- The variable "year of immigration" ("immiyear"), which records the year of first immigration to Germany of each surveyed individual, as long as the immigration occurred in 1949 or later. Individuals who immigrated earlier than 1949 have no information on the year of immigration and are assumed to be born in Germany.

Any definition of foreign and/or immigrant populations in GSOEP have to be derived from the information contained in these four variables. If the main research interest is on the migration event itself, the sample should include only those people with valid information about the year of immigration. On the contrary, if migration is seen as having far-reaching consequences that would also affect the immigrants' offspring, regardless of whether they have migrated themselves or not, a more extensive definition of the target population including both foreigners and people of immigrant origin must be utilized.

The possibility of defining the immigrant population in such an extensive manner is commonly hampered by data limitations. In GSOEP, first and middle generation immigrants are easy to identify because they are all foreign-born and, thus, they have complete information on their date of immigration and country of

birth.[8] On the contrary, in GSOEP the foreign origin of the second and subsequent generations becomes progressively blurred because they are coded "Germany" in the variable "country of origin" and, in addition, their nationality is not recorded until they reach the age of 16. There are two possibilities to identify their "immigrant origin":

1) By the sample they belong to. As I noted before, Sample B and Sample D were designed explicitly to select households including individuals of foreign and immigrant origin, respectively. Therefore, most individuals in these two samples are of foreign or immigrant origin by definition, even if they were born in Germany. Accordingly, the second generation would be more easily identified if I would restrict my potential sample either to individuals coded as being part of Sample B, which only includes households with a foreign head, or Sample B plus individuals of immigrant origin included in Sample D.[9] Yet, as I have explained above, I decided to select the final sample for the empirical analyses in this dissertation from the six ongoing samples in GSOEP, in order to reduce the impact of attrition over time and to improve the sample's representativeness with regard to immigrants who have entered Germany after 1984.

2) By linking them to their mothers if they are also in GSOEP and to attribute them the country of origin of their parents. This is a hard task in terms of data managing and it is not problem-free, especially in cases of children born to mixed couples where only the father has a foreign origin. However, this is the procedure I

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[8] By first generation I mean foreign-born individuals who immigrated at adult age (16 or older). By middle generation I mean foreign-born individuals who immigrated younger than 16.

[9] Note that households Sample D include, at least, one immigrant member individual. The rest of household's members may be: immigrants, individuals of immigrant origin in a looser sense (depending on their kin relationship to the immigrant member of the household), or German citizens living in a household that includes one or more immigrants.

have utilized it to identify the "country of origin" of the second generation immigrants included in my sample.

Table 3.1. Individuals contacted by GSOEP as of 2002, by sample and place of birth (frequencies and percentage)

	A	**B**	**C**	**D**	**E**	**F**	**Total**
Missing & not applicable	789 5	380 5	208 3	49 3	86 3	573 4	2085 5
Born in Germany	14,494 92	2,608 39	7,016 96	798 42	2,216 89	12,321 86	39,453 81
Immigrant since 1949	422 3	**3,758** 56	104 1	**1,051** 55	191 8	**1,404** 10	6,930 14
Total	15,705 100	6,746 100	7,328 100	1,898 100	2,493 100	14,298 100	48,468 100

Source: GSOEP, Waves A to S (2002). Own construction.

Table 3.1 shows the number of individuals contacted by GSOEP, by sample and place of birth. Although Sample B effectively contains the largest immigrants' sample (3,758), the number of immigrants in Sample D (1,051) and Sample F (1,404) is not negligible. To select my final sample I have first selected only those foreign-born immigrants who came to Germany from on of the following countries: Turkey, Italy, Greece, Spain and the former Yugoslavia.[10] Next, I added to them their second

[10] Individuals for whom the variable "country of origin" was coded as Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina have been merged into the more general category "former Yugoslavia". Of the total number of immigrants interviewed before 1990 and who reported as country of origin "Ex-Yugoslavia", "Croatia" or "Bosnia-Herzegovina" (597 in total), 70 (12%) reported Croatia and 30 (5%) Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within the group of individuals interviewed for the first time after 1989, the proportion from Croatia remained approximately stable but those from Bosnia-Herzegovina increased to 17% of total. As I have no

generation, that is, individuals born in Germany to immigrant mothers from one of these five countries. The resultant sample size is 7,008 persons of immigrant origin, of whom approximately 44% lack information on their date of immigration because they were born in Germany (see Table 3.2). Most of them are children born to immigrant women, and just a few are native German citizens who are included in a foreign household as a result of their marriage to an immigrant partner.

Table 3.2. Individuals of immigrant origin contacted by GSOEP as of 2002, by sample and place of birth

	A	B	C	D	E	F	Total
Immigrant since 1949	34 17.99	**3,522** 57.46	1 25.00	**114** 65.52	38 70.37	**239** 52.18	3,948 56.34
Born in Germany	155 82.01	**2,607** 42.54	3 75.00	**60** 34.48	16 29.63	**219** 47.82	3,060 43.66
Total	189 100	6,129 100	4 100	174 100	54 100	458 100	**7,008** **100**

Source: GSOEP, Waves A to S (2002). Own construction.

Of these 7,008 individuals, 1,869 have been never personally interviewed by GSOEP either because they are still younger than 16 (797) or because they lived in households that left the survey before they reached the age of 16 (843). Therefore, the core of my final sample will be constituted by 5,139 individuals of immigrant origin (first, middle and second generation) have completed at least one interview by GSOEP. Table 3.3 shows their distribution across the six samples.

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possibility of determining the actual ethnic origin of individuals coded to be from the "former Yugoslavia", I have considered better to keep for all of them under the most general label "former Yugoslavia".

Table 3.3. Individuals of immigrant origin from the five selected with at least one interview in GSOEP

	A	B	C	D	E	F	Total
Immigrant since 1949	34 24.11	3,414 75.38	1 25.00	100 88.50	37 86.05	226 73.14	3,812 74.18
Born in Germany	107 75.89	1,115 24.62	3 75.00	13 11.50	6 13.95	83 26.86	1,327 25.82
Total	141 100	4,529 100	4 100	113 100	43 100	309 100	**5,139** 100

Source: GSOEP, Waves A to S (2002). Own construction.

3.5.2. Reconstruction of the immigrant families

One of the major advantages of GSOEP dataset, as I said before, is that it contains information that permits to link each individual to his/her spouse (or cohabiting partner), and to link each couple to their children. Spouses (or cohabiting partners) can be linked one to each other by utilizing the variable "partnr$$", which contains for each interviewed individual the unique personal identifier of his/her spouse (or cohabiting partner) since 1984.

It is also possible to link each couple to their children, regardless of their age and of whether they still live in their parents' household or not, by utilizing the variable "kidpnr[n]" included in the biographical file which documents the birth biography for each woman ever surveyed by GSOEP (BIOBIRTH file). This variable contains a unique personal identifier for each child identified in GSOEP, which permits to link each child to her mother who, in turn, had previously been linked to her spouse.[11]

[11] This procedure to reconstruct nuclear families indirectly assumes that the current husband (or partner) of a mother is the father of her children. However, this is not a major problem for the population and type of analyses carried out in this dissertation.

As I have already pointed out, children born in Germany in households that GSOEP classified as "foreign" or "immigrant" are considered children of immigrant origin, and they are attributed their mother's country of origin. To use the mother's country of birth to determine children's origin does not imply major problems in my sample because most "pure" immigrant couples (i.e. couples where the two spouses are immigrants) are made of partners of the same nationality or from the same country of origin. On the other hand, children born to mixed couples where the foreign parent is the mother do not constitute a problem, since they would be classified as children of immigrant origin in any case. The only difficulty may appear with children born to mixed couples where the foreign parent is the father. These children can be identified in GSOEP as far as they are included as members of households that GSOEP has previously defined as "foreign" or "immigrant", as it is the case if it belongs to Sample B or to Sample D. Children born to German mothers and foreign fathers are more difficult to identify if they belong to Sample A or Sample F. However, some chances to detect them as children of immigrant origin still remain as far as their fathers remained in GSOEP until 2001, when birth biography –up to then only available for women- was also collected from men in the GSOEP sample.

3.5.3. Description of the entire sample[12]

Generation and country of origin

As of 2002, the selected sample of individuals of immigrant origin was made mostly of descendents of the original

[12] The description carried out in this section is based not only on those individuals with at least one interview in GSOEP but it includes also those individuals contacted but never interviewed in order to provide a more complete description of the entire population of immigrant origin that includes the second generation (most of which has not been interviewed yet because their members are younger than 16).

guestworkers, since middle and second generations represented about 60% of the total. By middle generation I mean children born abroad who immigrated at ages between 6 and 16. By second generation I mean children born in Germany to immigrant parents and children born abroad who immigrated younger than 6.

As Table 3.4 shows, citizens of Turkish origin are the most numerous in GSOEP, followed by Italians, people from the former Yugoslavia, Greeks and Spaniards in this order. However, their relative size over the total sample varies by generation. Immigrants from the former Yugoslavia are over-represented within the first generation, which is partially due to the re-activation of immigration coming from that area during the Balkans War. Immigrants from Turkey are over-represented within the middle generation and Italians within the second one, which might be due to higher fertility rates among Italian and Turkish first-generation women comparing to their counterparts from other origins. The relative size of Spanish and Greek groups, on the contrary, has remained more or less stable over generations.[13]

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[13] According to the 1995 Mikrozensus, the population born in Germany to foreign immigrant parents from one of the five selected countries was distributed as follows: 46% of Turkish origin, 22% from the former Yugoslavia and 32% from the remaining European recruitment countries (mainly Italy, Greece and Spain). The corresponding percentages utilized the selected sample in GSOEP as of 2002 are 45%, 16% and 39%. Taking into account that these Mikrozensus figures refer to 1995 and GSOEP to 2002, and that Mikrozensus classified as immigrants only those people who still held their original foreign citizenship in 1995, the similarity of proportions in both sources is remarkable. However, the comparison of the distribution by country of origin of the immigrant population registered in 1995 Mikrozensus and GSOEP as 2002 shows larger differences. While in 1995 Mikrozensus Turks represented 41% of the total immigrants from the five selected countries, immigrants from the former Yugoslavia amounted to 28% and immigrants from the remaining recruitment countries 28%, the corresponding percentages in GSOEP as of 2002 are 40.8%, 20% and 40%. This indicates that GSOEP maybe over-represent

Table 3.4. First, middle and second generations, by country of origin

Generation	Turkey	Former Yug.	Greece	Italy	Spain	Total
First	985	606	356	500	297	2,744
	35.90	22.08	12.97	18.22	10.82	100
Middle	627	170	124	180	103	1,204
	52.08	14.12	10.30	14.95	8.55	100
Second	1,225	427	307	622	298	2,879
	42.55	14.83	10.66	21.60	10.35	100
Total	2,837	1,203	787	1,302	698	6,827
	41.56	17.62	11.53	19.07	10.22	100

Source: GSOEP, Waves 1984-2002. All Samples. Own elaboration.
Note: total sample size is 6,827 instead of 7,008 because information about the parents' country of origin was missed for 181 individuals of second generation.

Age and gender

Both first and middle generations are slightly male-biased (see Table 3.5. However, females outnumber males in the second generation, as it is the rule in non-migrant populations. Within the second generation, individuals are 19.6 years old on average. More than of the second-generation was already of working age as of 2002; 30% were still in school and about 17% were of pre-school age.

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the immigrant population from the older recruitment countries (Italy, Spain and Greece) comparing to those from the former Yugoslavia.

Table 3.5. Sex and age, by generation (average)

	Sex			Average Age	
Generation	**Male**	**Female**	**Total**	**Male**	**Female**
First	1,457	1,289	2,746	56.8	53.8
	53.10	46.90	100	(12.5)	(13.5)
Middle	662	542	1,202	35.4	32.2
	54.98	45.02	100	(7.4)	(7.4)
Second	1,515	1,545	3,060	21.2	22.5
	49.51	50.49	100	(12.5)	(13.6)
Total	3,634	3,374	7,008	38.1	36.5
	51.86	48.14	100	(20.0)	(19.1)

Source: GSOEP, Waves 1984-2002. All samples. Own elaboration.

Period of arrival, sex and marital status at migration

As I exposed in Chapter 2, migration to Germany during the period of recruitment (1955-1973) has been traditionally characterized as being male-dominated. In fact, most accounts of postwar migration to Germany affirm that the typical recruited migrant was a young single man who, in case of being married, left his spouse and children behind. According to this dominant view, flows into Germany prior to 1974 are expected to be strongly male-biased; on the contrary, female immigrants are expected to be much more numerous in foreign inflows since 1974.

GSOEP data confirm these expectations: while men clearly outnumbered women in the total inflows to Germany between 1955 and 1973, women dominated the post-halt inflows. According to the percentages reported in Table 3.6, men represented 58% of total pre-halt inflows but only 46% of total post-halt inflows. On the contrary, women increased their respective proportion from 42% to 54% after the halt on recruitment. Nevertheless, the proportion of female entries during

the recruitment period is still larger than it would be expected (approximately 42% of total).

Table 3.6. Sex of first and middle generation immigrants, by period of arrival

		Period of Arrival		
Sex		**Pre-halt**	**Post-halt**	**Total**
	Male	1,446 58.33	673 45.81	2,119 53.67
	Female	1,033 41.67	796 54.19	1,829 46.33
Total		2,479 100	1,469 100	3,948 100

Source: GSOEP, Waves 1984-2002. All samples. Own elaboration.

Of the total number of foreign-born immigrant women in my sample (1,829), approximately half were younger than 16 at their arrival in Germany (i.e. middle generation) and, therefore, mostly single. Of the other half, who were adult first generation women, 2/3 were married at arrival (see Table 3.7). According to the most common accounts of the postwar migration process to Germany, these immigrant women who were already married at the time of their arrival in Germany would be expected to be "reunited wives" who joined their husbands after they decided to stay permanently in Germany. However, contrary all expectations, Table 3.7 indicates that the distribution of the immigrant population by marital status at migration hardly changed across the two periods: among male immigrants, the proportion of married and single men was approximately the same over the recruitment period and the post-halt period; and among women, the proportion of immigrants single at arrival reduced a little in the post-halt period compared to the pre-halt one (from 34.6% to 31.4%). These percentages do not support, therefore, the idea that most immigrant women who

entered Germany during the recruitment period were single women, neither with the idea that single women were replaced by reunited wives after the halt on recruitment.

Table 3.7. Marital status at migration of first generation immigrants, by sex and period of arrival

	Male			Female		
Marital status at migration	**Pre-halt**	**Post-halt**	**Total**	**Pre-halt**	**Post-halt**	**Total**
Single	566	194	760	256	167	423
	52.46	52.72	52.5	34.59	31.39	33.25
Married	513	174	687	484	365	849
	47.54	**47.28**	47.5	**65.41**	68.61	**66.75**
Total	1,079	368	1,447	740	532	1,272
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: GSOEP, Waves 1984-2002. All Samples. Own elaboration.

As I said before, one of the main advantages of GSOEP is it collects information for all the members of the household, which allows us to know who migrated first and who follows whom in migration within the family. This information is needed in order to distinguish different types of family-linked migration such as spouses' reunification and importation of spouses. By combining the information on date of marriage and date of migration of each spouse within a couple, I have constructed a typology that classifies first generation immigrants –who were adult at arrival- according to their family status at the time of migration.

Let's say D_{marr} denotes the date of marriage, H_{mig} denotes the date of the husband's migration and W_{mig} denotes the date of the wife's migration

I have defined a woman to be a **"first-mover"** if she was married at the time of her arrival in Germany and had preceded her husband in migration; that is, if $D_{marr} < W_{mig} < H_{mig}$

I have defined a woman to be a **"reunited wife"** if she was married to her husband before he migrated to Germany and she took more than one year to migrate herself and join her husband in Germany; that is, if $D_{marr} < H_{mig} < W_{mig}$

I have defined a woman to be an **"imported bride"** if she marries a man who migrated to Germany prior to the date of marriage and she migrates herself after the date of her marriage; that is, if $H_{mig} < D_{marr} \leq W_{mig}$

Finally, migration of women who were married at the time of their arrival in Germany and migrated the same year as their husband did is called **"joint couple migration"**; that is, if $D_{marr} < H_{mig} = W_{mig}$

Note the same classification is applicable to men who were married at arrival by changing W by H in the above expressions.

In Table 3.8 I have classified first-generation immigrants who were married at the time they arrived in Germany, according to the previous typology. The percentages reported confirm wide differences between men's and women's types of migration. Migrant husbands often migrated solo (42.46%) and hardly ever after their wives (6%). In contrast, for migrant wives to follow their husband some time after he left was not uncommon. However, the table bluntly illustrates a considerable diversity in migration strategies within the couple. Joint couple migration, for instance, appears a migration pattern much more common than expected; being imported by the other partner who already resides in Germany is particularly frequent for women, even more than typical reunification.

Table 3.8. Type of family migration of immigrants married at arrival, by sex

	Male	**Female**
First-mover within the couple	262 **42.46**	39 5.01
Reunited spouse	37 6.00	253 **32.52**
Imported spouse	104 16.86	288 **37.02**
Joint Couple Migration	191 **30.96**	182 23.39
Spouse's Missed Info	23 3.73	16 2.06
Total	617 100	778 100

Source: GSOEP, Waves 1984-2002. All samples. Own elaboration.

Table 3.9 focuses only on women and distinguishes type of family migration by period of arrival. The intention here is to explore a little further the change occurred in the composition of immigration inflows to Germany after 1973. The relative proportion of reunited wives over the total female adult immigration during the recruitment period was substantially higher than the corresponding percentage over the post-halt period (39% versus 24%). This suggests that family or, at least, spouses' reunification was already substantial prior to the halt imposed, and that reunification of spouses did not appear to have augmented after 1973 as it is generally assumed. The reason behind these unexpected results relates to the huge increase experienced by the inflow of imported wives during the post-halt period (54% of total female adult inflows). In addition, almost 30% of married women who migrated to Germany during the recruitment period migrated jointly with their husbands (i.e. the same year as him), which

implies that a substantial fraction of original male guestworkers did not migrate solo but with their spouses to Germany.

Table 3.9. Type of family migration of women married at arrival, by period of arrival

	Pre-halt	**Post-halt**
First-mover	28	11
	6.41	3.23
Reunited Wife	170	83
	38.90	**24.34**
Imported bride	104	184
	23.80	**53.96**
Couple migration	128	54
	29.29	15.84
Partner info missed	7	9
	1.60	2.64
Total	437	341
	100	100

Source: GSOEP, Waves 1984-2002. All Samples. Own elaboration.

The preliminary description carried out up to now suggests that:

1) Single women entered Germany approximately in the same proportion before and after the halt on recruitment, which implies that the vast majority of women recruited during the sixties and early seventies were already married by the time they arrived in Germany.

2) Family reunification, in particular the reunification of wives who had initially remained at the country of origin took place much earlier than the halt on recruitment was imposed. In fact, approximately 2/3 of the total number of women who can be considered strictly as “reunited wives” entered Germany prior to that year. Moreover, a substantial part of these women migrated

the same year as their husbands and, consequently, can be considered to participate in joint couple migration rather than family reunification as such.

3) The bulk of female adult immigration to Germany during the post-halt period has been due to the practice of importing spouses from the country of origin by a considerable number of middle and second-generation single immigrants, that is, to family formation rather than family reunification.

These preliminary conclusions are enough to justify a profound revision of the most common accounts of the postwar immigration process to Germany and the dominant interpretation of the halt on recruitment as a measure that encouraged family reunification. In particular, the dominant view according to which the typical migrant in the sixties was a young, single, male migrant that became replaced by dependant wives with their children since the mid-seventies onwards, appears seriously challenged on the basis of the previous statistical description.

3.6. Methods

The empirical analyses carried out in the following chapters of this dissertation are based on multivariate regression techniques, which predict values of one variable (i.e. dependent variable) on the basis of two or more other variables (i.e. independent variables or covariates). Depending on the nature of the phenomenon under study and the specific definition of the dependent variable, I will utilize either static or dynamic models. The main difference between these two types of regression models has to do with the inclusion (or not) of a time dimension in the analysis of the relationship between the dependent variable and the covariates. Among the former, I will use logistic regression models for the analysis of joint couple migration in Chapter 4, the type of partner chosen by single immigrants and the type of households constituted by them after marriage in Chapter 5. On the other hand, I will apply techniques of event history analysis to study the

duration of the process of wives' and children's reunification in Chapter 4, as well as the employment cycles of immigrant women after their arrival in Germany.

In the next two sections, I will deal with the main characteristics of logistic regression models and various models utilized in event history analysis.

3.6.1. Logistic regression models

It is not uncommon that a dependent or response variable is binary in nature, that is, that it can have only two possible values. For example, patients either do or do not recover from an injury; job applicants either succeed or fail at an employment test, subscribers to a journal either do or do not renew a subscription, coupons may or may not be returned, couples may or may not migrate together, etc. In all of these cases, one may be interested in estimating a model that describes the relationship between one or more continuous independent variable(s) to the binary dependent variable.

Of course, one could use standard multiple regression procedures to compute standard regression coefficients for categorical dependent variables. However, it is important to note that in doing so we would violate some of the basic assumptions of the "ordinary least squares" (OLS) regression models. Categorical dependent variables are not normally distributed, as it is required in OLS. In fact, if we would use standard multiple regression procedures to predict the categorical outcomes, we would obtain values of *Y* greater than 1 and smaller than 0, which are obviously not valid. Logistic regression models, in contrast, do accomplish exactly this: they are designed to predict values for the dependent variable that will never be less than 0, or greater than 1, regardless of the values of the independent variables.

This is the most obvious advantage of using logistic instead of standard regression models to predict a categorical outcome. However, logistic models also allows the researcher to overcome

other restrictive assumptions of the OLS models such as the linearity in the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables, the normal distribution of the error terms, the homocedasticity, etc. All these properties make logistic regressions the most adequate models to deal with phenomenon that can be expressed as a categorical outcome.

The most popular logistic regression model is the binary logit regression model, which follows the general form:

$$P(Y=1) = 1/\{1+\exp[-(b_0 + b_1 X_1 + ... + b_n X_n)]\}$$

Where *Y* is the dependent binary variable that takes value 1 when the outcome occurs (i.e. the couple migrates together), and 0 otherwise (i.e. the couple does not migrate together but one spouse precedes the other in migration), and *X* are the independent variables or covariates utilized to predict the value of *Y*.

Logistic regression coefficients are estimated by maximum likelihood method, after transforming the dependent variable into a logit variable, which is the natural log of the probability of occurrence of the outcome divided by the probability of not occurrence.[14] This implies that the parameter estimates provided by logistic regression models, unlike in standard linear regression, are not readily interpretable as the effect that a change in the independent variable has on the value of the dependent variable itself. On the contrary, they compute the effect that a change in the independent variable has on the log odds of the dependent. The most common way of interpreting a logit is to convert it to an odds ratio using the exp() function. Note that an odds ratio above 1

[14] Instead of finding the best fitting line by minimizing the squared residuals, Maximum Likelihood (ML) method of estimation consists of finding the smallest possible deviance between the observed and predicted values by means of derivative calculus. With ML, the computer uses different "iterations" in which it tries different solutions until it gets the smallest possible deviance or best fit. Once it has found the best solution, it provides a final value for the deviance, which is usually referred to as "negative two log likelihood" (shown as "-2 Log Likelihood"). The deviance statistic can be thought of as a chi-square value.

refers to the odds that $Y = 1$ in binary logit regression. The closer the odds ratio is to 1, the more the covariates are independent of the dependent variable, with 1 representing full statistical independence. For instance, if the logit $b_1 = 2.303$, then the corresponding odds ratio (the exponential function, e^b) is 10; in this case, we may say that when the independent variable increases one unit, the odds that $Y = 1$ increases by a factor of 10, *when other variables are controlled*.

It is also possible to calculate the expected probability that $Y = 1$ for a given value of X, by applying the following formula:

$$\hat{p} = \frac{\exp\left(B_0 + B_1 X\right)}{1 + \exp\left(B_0 + B_1 x\right)} = \frac{e^{B_0 + B_1 x}}{1 + e^{B_0 + B_1 x}}$$

Multinomial logistic regression is an extension of binary logistic regression models that allow the simultaneous comparison of more than one contrast. In other words, multinomial regression models are logistic regression in which the dependent variable is not binary but it can takes three or more values. In these cases, the main issue to bear in mind is that the estimated odds ratios do not express anymore the ratio between the probabilities of occurrence and not occurrence of the (binary) outcome. On the contrary, they must be interpreted as the ratio between the probability that the outcome takes value 1 divided by the probability that the outcome takes the value of the category of reference, which can be arbitrarily selected by the researcher. In fact, for the sake of simplicity, multinomial logistic regressions can be read as two or more simultaneous binary logistic regressions.

In this dissertation, I will apply binary logit regression to analyze the propensity of migrant couples to migrate together or separately (Chapter 4), as well as the propensity to form nuclear or extended households among immigrants who marry someone during their stay in Germany (Chapter 5). As can be seen, the dependent variable in these two cases is dichotomical: to migrate together or not, to live in extended households or not. Marital choices, in contrast, will be examined by means of multinomial logit regression models that allows for three possible outcomes in

the dependent variable: a native partner, a co-national immigrant and an imported spouse.

3.6.2. Event history analysis

Introductory notions

As Yamaguchi stated, "event history analysis is concerned with the patterns and correlates of the occurrences of events" (1991: 1). By "event", we mean a qualitative change from one state (j) to another state (k), which occurs at a particular point in time.[15] However, event history analysis does not exclusively focuses on the *type of change* occurred, but also on *when it occurs*. This is precisely its principal characteristic: it permits to incorporate time into the analysis, which substantially enhances the possibility of establishing casual relationships between some variables and the occurrence of a particular event.

The incorporation of time into the analysis is possible thanks to the capability of event history techniques to deal with both censored observations and time-varying covariates. Censoring exists when incomplete information is available about the duration of the risk period because of a limited observation period. Time-varying covariates are explanatory variables whose value changes over time (i.e. number of children).

Event history analysis is particularly well-prepared to deal with right censoring, especially when the reason explaining censoring is independent of the event of interest. Left censoring is generally much less manageable than right censoring. Fully left censoring generates sample selection bias since the data missing from the sample are not missed at random but their absence

[15] Event history analysis can study also changes from one state (j) to more than one new state (k, l, m…). However, the logic underlying these two variations of the problem is the same. Therefore, the description here will limit to the former case (change between two states).

depends on the timing of entry into the risk period. An example based on GSOEP dataset may help. As I said before, GSOEP was launched in 1983. Therefore, its original target population was people residing in Germany at that time. This clearly implies a strong selection bias with regard to the immigrant sample in GSOEP: those immigrants who have a higher propensity to remain in Germany are also more likely to be observed when the panel starts, whereas short-term stayers are missed out. Unfortunately, this type of problem is difficult to fix. However, in the next empirical analysis, I will always discuss the potential role played by this data limitation in my results. In addition, I will always try to complement the GSOEP information for the period before its inception with the available official statistics, in order to check the extent and direction of the bias.

Event history analysis techniques have been utilized to examine propensity to marriage (Blossfeld, 1995), the propensity of transitions between different labor force states (Bernardi, 1999), job mobility (Sorensen and Tuma, 1981), strikes' duration (Kennan, 1985), and many other events of interest for social scientists. In the field of international migration, event history analysis has been profusely utilized in recent times by US scholars to study the propensity to migrate and to return (Massey, 1987; Parrado, 2003). However, the scarcity of longitudinal datasets that collects information on international migrant populations has consistently hampered the application of these techniques in the field of immigration out of the Mexican-US experience.

There multiple types of processes that can be studied by means of event history analysis techniques. However, each of them requires a specific type model depending on whether the event is repeatable or it can occur only once; on whether there are only one or multiple destination states; and on whether the process is continuous or discrete. There are processes that entail only one potential transition between two states and, therefore, one only episode –*episode* is the duration until the event occurs. However, in some occasions there more than one destination state to which the transition from the origin state may occur. In these cases, the

research interest may be on assessing the relative propensity to change from the origin state (j) to each of the two (or more) possible destination states (k, l, m, etc.). In addition, some events or transitions can occur only once (i.e. first marriage); however, other events can occur several times along the individuals' life-course (i.e. marriage, in general). Finally, there are events that can occur at any point in time since the moment the risk period starts (i.e. continuous process); others, in contrast, only take place at specific points in time (discrete-time process).

In order to successfully apply techniques of event history analysis, the researcher must define the process under study according to each of the previous dimensions. Each type of process requires a different type of analysis and data preparation; therefore, the researcher must think of the most effective way of framing her research question, taking into account the type of data she has available.

Among the migration-related phenomena under study in this dissertation, the process of family reunification appears particularly well-fitted to the application of event history analysis. Family reunification may be thought as a particular type of migration, which has to meet two conditions:

1) There must be two individuals linked by a kin relationship (marital or parental, for instance) prior to the migration of both of them (if the kin relationship is established ex-novo in the country of destination, it is obvious that there is no re-unification)

2) One of these two individuals precedes the other in migration

The reunification event occurs when the relative who originally stayed behind joins his (her) relative abroad.[16] The

[16] In order to distinguish "family reunification" from potential successive arrivals to the host country on behalf the joining relative, only fist migration is considered as "family reunification". In addition, family reunification implies some sort of permanency and settlement in the host country; therefore, it would be desirable to require some minimum period of stay abroad after first arrival to consider that family reunification has actually occurred. As I will explain in Chapter 4, all the individuals

origin state in this process is "residence in the country of origin", the destination state is "arrival/settlement in the host country"; the episode or duration of the process in this case would be the time elapsed between the date of migration of the spouse (or parent) who migrated in the first place, and the date of migration of the joining relative. Family reunification is, therefore, a process with a single episode and two states (i.e. non-reunified and reunified).

The key statistical concept of event history analysis to analyze this type of processes (and more complex ones) is the transition (or hazard) rate. Formally:

$$r(t)_{jk} = \lim_{t' \to t} \frac{\Pr(t \leq T < t' \mid T \geq t)}{t' - t}$$

T is the duration before the occurrence of an event, i.e. the time from the origin state *j* (non-employed) to the destination state *k* (employed). The transition rate $r(t)_{jk}$ expresses the instantaneous likelihood (risk) that the event occurs at time *t*, given that the event did not occur before time *t.* The transition rate incorporates, thus, two pieces of information: the *quality* of change (from j to k) and its *timing* (or the duration before it occurred.

Formally, it cannot be interpreted as a probability since its values can be greater than one. However, if the time interval *(t', t)* is small, then $r(t)_{jk}(t' - t)$ can be interpreted as the conditional probability that the event occurs in the time interval *(t', t)* (Blossfeld and Rowher, 2002: 37; Bernardi, 2006).

The size of the time interval *(t', t)* has much to do with the discussion concerning the difference between continuous time and discrete time. Although time is always continuous by definition, some times it cannot be measured as such because the unit of time utilized in the data collection is not precise enough. For instance, we may have information on the year of immigration of a sample of individuals, as it is the case in GSOEP, but lack information on

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included in my sample for the study of spouses and children's reunification resided in Germany at least two years after joining their relatives there.

the exact month and day of arrival. The importance of this type of data limitation depends on the kind of process under study, as well as on the number of ties in the sample. Events are tied when two or more subjects experience the event within the same time interval. Theoretically, two subjects never experience the event exactly at the same time. However, ties can occur in the data because events are measured at discrete time points (note the larger the unit of time utilized to measure the process under study, the more likely to have tied events).

The main problem derived from the presence of multiple ties relates to the possibility (or not) of establishing causal relationships between the events. As Blossfeld has put it "there is always a time order of events in this relationship" (Blossfeld, 1998: 236), there is always a time ordering between causes and effects. It takes some finite amount of time for the cause to cause the effect. The time interval may be very short or very long, but can never be zero or infinity. In other words, there can never be simultaneity of cause and its effect. Yet, apparent simultaneity is often the case in social sciences applications where basic observation intervals are relatively crude such as, for example, yearly data to examine the effect of getting married on women's labor force participation. It is not difficult to imagine a woman who migrates and marries during the same year. In fact, this is a relatively common situation, as I will show later on. If we only have such information and do not know the exact month at which each woman migrates and marries, it turns virtually impossible to establish the direction of causality: does a woman migrate in order to marry a man who lives in the immigration country, or did she marry in order to make possible migration to that country? Although the answer to this question depends on many other circumstances and factors, to know the exact time ordering between migration and marriage would help us in formulating and testing hypothesis about.

Most of the statistical models utilized in event history analysis assume continuous time. If the discrete time interval is small, however, a discrete time model can be used as an approximation

of a continuous time model. Moreover, in many cases discrete-time transition models can be considered an approximation to proportional hazard rate models with continuous time, and the obtained results with both models are substantially identical.[17]

In the empirical analyses included in the following chapters I will make use of both continuous and discrete-time models. In Chapter 4 I apply an accelerated failure time model to investigate the "time until wife's (or children's) reunification". In Chapter 6 and 7 I apply discrete-time logit rate model to study the entries and exits of immigrant women from the labor force. Below I have described the main characteristics of each of these two models.

Logit model for discrete-time data

This model is the most appropriate when events can only occur at regular, discrete points in time, but it has also been frequently employed when ties arise from grouping continuous-time data into intervals (Allison, 1995).[18] This model is generally written as:

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[17] In general, the approximation can be considered to be Clogg and Eliason (1987) show that rate models can be used as an approximation for logit models if the conditional probabilities of the occurrence of the event within each time interval are reasonably small; they exactly said 0.1 or smaller. Hence, logit models can be used as an approximation for rate models under a similar condition. However, as Yamaguchi (1991) states, "it may be too conservative to require the conditional probabilities to be consistently smaller than, say, 0.1 at all discrete time points and for all combinations of covariate values. In fact, we still get very similar results for continuous and discrete-time models for datasets where conditional probabilities exceed 0.1 at many discrete time points. However, we can reasonably expect that the approximation will not be adequate if the aggregate frequency data include a high proportion of situations where conditional probabilities become much larger than 0.1." (42)

[18] This model is very similar to the continuous-time models that estimate the transition rate assuming a piecewise exponential distribution. The main difference is that the piecewise exponential model assumes that you know the exact time of the event within a given

$$\log(P_{it}/1-P_{it}) = h(t) + \beta_1 x_{it1} + ... + \beta_k x_{itk}$$

Where P_{it} is the conditional probability that individual i has an event at time t, given that an event has not already occurred to that individual. The model says that P_{it} is related to the covariates by a logistic regression as the one written above. In this model, it is possible to divide the time scale into intervals and assume that the hazard is constant within each interval but can vary across intervals. Formally, h(t) consists of a series of dummy variables $d_1, d_2, ...d_n$ where d_1=1 in the time interval $t_0 - t_1, d_2 = 1$ in the interval $t_1 - t_2$, etc. The choice of intervals is arbitrary but it has the advantage that the researcher has not to assume any specific form for h(t). In fact, the coefficients estimated for each of the dummy variables that identify the time intervals do allow the researcher to reconstruct how the effect of time on the occurrence of the event changes over the process.

I will utilize this type of model for estimating the probability of entering and exiting the German labor force for immigrant women in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

Accelerated failure time models

Accelerated failure time models, also known as accelerated time models or ln(time) models, which can be written as:

$$\ln(t_j) = x_j \beta_x + \varepsilon_j$$ [19]

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interval. By contrast, the discrete-time procedures presume that you known only that an event occurred within a given interval. This difference aside, the two approaches have the same advantages and disadvantages.

[19] An alternative notation utilized by authors like Bernardi (2006) is $\ln(T) = \beta^* X + z$.

Where $\ln(t_j)$ is the logarithm of the episode duration;[20] β_x are the estimated coefficients for covariates X, which are allowed to be time-varying; and ε is an error term.

The word "accelerated" is used in describing these models because, rather than assuming that failure time t_j is exponential, a Weibull form or some other distribution is instead assumed for

$$\tau_j = \exp(-x_j\beta_x)t_j$$

In Chapter 4 I have assumed a Weibull distribution because it seems reasonable to assume that the hazard of, say, joining the husband in Germany increases as the time since the spouses' separation started increases.

The expression $\exp(-x_j\beta_x)$ is called the acceleration parameter. If the acceleration parameter is equal to 1, time passes at its normal rate; if it is larger than 1, then time passes more quickly for the subject (time is accelerated), and so failure is expected to occur sooner. Finally, if the parameter is smaller than 1, then time passes more slowly for the subject (time is decelerated), and so the failure would be expected to occur later.

Note that a positive β_x in accelerated failure time models indicates the corresponding covariate prolongs the duration of the episode, that is, the ln(time to failure). In the case of the spouses' reunification, a positive coefficient must be taken as an indication that the corresponding covariate increases the time until the wife joins her husband in Germany.

It must be noted that the Accelerated Failure Time metric gives a more prominent role to analysis time. In fact, by means of the previous specification $\ln(t_j) = x_j\beta_x + \varepsilon_j$, one basically is asserting an interest in what happens to $E\{\ln(t_j) \mid x_j\}$ for

[20] As for the log transformation of T, its main purpose is to ensure that predicted values of T are positive.

different values of x_j.[21] In addition, As Cleves et al. (2002) state, there is a second sense in which these models are "accelerated". The effect of a change in one of the X covariates increases with t. In other words, for larger t, we expect a longer delay in failure due to a one-unit increase in any of the covariates.

[21] With such an interest usually comes a desire to predict time to failure (i.e. time until reunification occurs). However, to construct such predictions is a "truly miserable calculation" for which Stata has no automated way to calculate. Therefore, it is not uncommon that the interpretation of the coefficients in these type of models mainly consists of saying whether the covariates delay or accelerate the occurrence of the event under study. For indications about how to calculate predictions of the time to failure in these models see Cleves et. al (2002: 193-194).

CHAPTER 4. THE PROCESS OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION. THE TIMING OF WIVES' AND CHILDREN'S MIGRATION

4.1. Introduction

The issue of family reunification attracted considerable attention in the immigration debate during the eighties in the US, as the number of annual admissions granted on the basis of family reunification was considered excessive by many. Since the Immigration Act (1965) phased out the national origins quota system – established in 1921- and substituted a new system based primarily on family reunification and needed skills, the concerns about the multiplicative effect that family networks may have on the number of foreign residents and their (labor) quality had steadily grown. Academic research aimed at quantifying the so-called "immigration multiplier", which started with the pioneering work of Jasso & Rosenszweig (1986), concluded "that the magnitudes of the actual multipliers associated with family-reunification provisions are substantially lower than the potential multipliers and lower, as well, than previously supposed" (309). In addition, the share of new immigrants admitted under the provisions of family reunification -whether they were immediate relatives of US citizens or were family-sponsored immigrants- decreased in the early nineties, from about 70% of total entries to 50%. This helped calm public concerns about a potentially uncontrolled growth of immigration due to family networks, and

the debate about quantity became a debate about quality: regardless of numbers, what were the characteristics of the sponsored immigrants and what would be their impact on the overall process of assimilation?

Figure 4.1. Percent of total US immigration by category of admission, 1986-2003



Source: Batalova, 2005.

However, the re-formulation of the question did not provide an answer. If researches are unsure about the rate at which immigrants sponsor their relatives' migration, they are even less confident about who bring their families in and why. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989), in their study of the sponsors' characteristics, concluded that foreign immigrants are more likely to sponsor other immigrants than naturalized immigrants, that women are more likely to sponsor their spouses' migration from origin than men, and that the sponsorship of parents appears particularly large among immigrants from Asia residing in the US. In addition, they

stated, immigrants who sponsor their relatives tend to submit their applications as soon as they are permitted to do so under the law.

When it comes to the issue of the impact of admission policies on the labor quality of immigrants and their performance in the host labor markets, George Borjas was one of the first academics to analyze the impact that family composition and the migrant's position in the family migration chain have on immigrants' productivity in the US labor market. Departing from his earlier thesis that selectivity in migration depends on the relative return of skills between the country of origin and the country of destination, he found that people who migrate as part of a family unit are more skilled and have higher earnings than people who migrate on their own. In particular, in his work with Bronars, entitled "Immigration and the Family" (1991), he concluded that the skills and earnings of married immigrants are higher than those of single immigrants and that the skills and earnings of earlier links in the family-migration chain are lower than those of subsequent links. More recently, several studies that compare the earnings and occupational performance of male immigrants on the basis of their admission category into the US, have suggested that kinship-based immigrants often experience lower earnings at entry but higher earnings growth, which would permit them to catch up with employment-based immigrants after twelve to eighteen years in the US (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1995; Duleep and Regets, 1996). It is important to note, however, that women have not been included in these studies, despite the fact that they make up the largest share of immigrants admitted for the reason of family reunification.

In Europe, the scarcity of empirical studies devoted to the analysis of the family reunification process and its impact on the general process of integration of immigrants in their receiving societies is even greater (see King, 1993 and Massey et al., 1998, for reviews). However, the reason underlying this gap in the European literature is not that family-linked inflows are of a smaller size in Europe than in the US. As Figure 4.2 shows, immigrants admitted for the purpose of family reunification represented a substantial proportion of the total in most Western

European countries in 2001. In France, for example, this category accounted for more than 70% of total entries that year (the same as in the US), more than 60% in Sweden and more than 50% in Denmark and Norway. In Switzerland, UK and Portugal, entries for the purpose of family reunion represented about 40% of total entries.

Figure 4.2. Distribution of immigrants by major purpose of migration in selected countries, 2001



Source: OECD (2003).

Official figures, however, are not available on a yearly basis and present various limitations for cross-national comparisons. Among these limitations, one that should be particularly highlighted, as I mentioned in the Introduction, is that many countries do not distinguish between entries for the purpose of family formation and for the purpose of family reunification. A quick look at Figure 4.3, drawn from Dutch statistical data, is one of the few exceptions in this regard, and serves to prove the importance of such a differentiation. According to the Dutch Statistics, "family reunion migration" refers to the reunion of

families who already existed before one or more members migrated to the Netherlands. Family members of labor migrants, for instance, who immigrated in the same year are also considered family reunion immigrants. On the other hand, "family formation immigration" relates to immigrants who settled in the Netherlands to marry or cohabit (Nicolaas and Sprangers, 2004). Figure 4.3 illustrates that while entries due to family reunification stabilized in the second half of the nineties (about 20,000 every year) and declined steadily since then (less than 14,000 in 2003), entries for the purpose of family formation has been growing since the late nineties and outnumbered entries for family reunification in 2002. In 2003, one in four immigrants entered the Netherlands to marry.

Figure 4.3. Annual entries of foreign immigrants to the Netherlands, by reason for migration (thousand)



Source: Nicolaas and Sprangers, 2004.

Official statistics not only fail to distinguish between these two types of family-linked migration but also often provide no information on the type of relationship between the sponsor and the newcomer(s). Family formation figures - by definition- include

only "spouses", while family reunification figures generally merge spouses, children, parents and other relatives, which prevents us from knowing whether spouses and children are brought to the country of immigration at the same time or in a staggered way (some countries like Denmark and the UK distinguish at least spouses/cohabitants from other relatives).

Yet, such poor collection of immigration statistics in most European countries - along with the consequential absence of empirical-based research on family reunification - have not prevented certain beliefs becoming firmly established. First among those beliefs is the widely accepted idea that family reunification and permanent settlement are two sides of the same coin. In accordance with this belief, the postwar immigration experience in Western Europe has been traditionally portrayed as a two-stage process in which a first wave of temporary male workers was followed by the arrival of wives and children and the permanent settlement of immigrant populations in the host countries. Secondly, the assumption that the process of immigration proceeded in the described way along with the fact that the economic performance of immigrants in most Western countries notably worsened from the late seventies, has favored the identification between family reunification and integration problems. At the same time, it has also favored the neglect of other concurrent potential causes such as rising unemployment and economic restructuring in the host economies.

It is important to note that this view is not restricted to the seventies', but continues today, as can be seen by reading the document recently published by the Kirkhope Commission (2004). This document was aimed at reviewing the immigration situation in the UK and proposing a potential plan of action for an incoming Conservative Government and stated:

> "[…] Family reunion immigration is the biggest source of low skilled workers that depress GDP per capita, which is a significant, even if not the sole, contributor to our quality of life. As previously noted, the overall positive fiscal contribution of the immigrant community comes from the high-income, high-skilled workers.

> Immigrants from all over the world who come in on work permits do pay their way. Immigrants who come in through family reunion are usually subsidized by the UK taxpayer." (22)

In line with this view, the Commission proposed to establish a requirement of minimum income, British citizenship and age limits for sponsoring spouses.[1] Moreover – and even in the middle of the riots in France in November 2005 - the Minister of Employment Gérard Larcher and the UMP president of the National Assembly Bernard Accoyer suggested that large, polygamous, African families were one of the main causes of three weeks of rioting in the poorer suburbs and public housing estates in French towns and cities. Just a week later, M. de Villepin announced plans to restrict the re-unification of immigrant families and tougher enforcement of existing French laws against polygamy (see El País, November 30th 2005).

The relevance of carefully studying the determinants and timing of the family reunification process among immigrants seems, therefore, warranted. In the remainder of this Chapter, I will deal thoroughly with the family reunification process led originally by guestworkers in Germany. First, I will identify the major assumptions in the literature with regard to the size and pace of this process in Germany. Then, I propose to examine each of them in the light of data provided by both official statistics and survey information contained in the GSOEP. After summarizing the main theoretical arguments that have been developed so far on the issue of family reunification, I will study the timing of the reunification of spouses and children by male immigrants and its determinants by means of both static and dynamic statistical analyses based on GSOEP data.

[1] Note here also that family reunion and family formation are, again, confused.

4.2. Family reunification in Germany according to official statistics and surveys

The dominant view that postwar immigration to Western Europe can be described as a two-stage process with a first wave of male single workers followed later on by spouses and children, is largely based on the German experience. It is commonly stated in the literature that the recruitment stop, which was intended to prevent the number of foreigners in Germany from rising, unexpectedly caused an increase in the number of foreign residents living in Western countries. The explanation usually offered is that - after the halt was imposed - migrant workers feared that if they went home, they would not be allowed to return to Germany; accordingly, instead of returning to their countries of origin, many decide to stay and brought their families to Germany, which led to a substantial growth in the foreign population, from 4 million in 1973 to 4.5 in 1980 (Martin, 1998: 13).

Some quotations from authors in the field help illustrate these facts. According to Mehrländer (1993):

> "the ban on recruitment of foreign labor has been in effect since 1973, but since the late 70's an increasing number of family members have to come to join the foreign workers already in the Federal Republic." (191)

Massey and Constant (2002), in their study of return migration among immigrants in Germany, also stated that:

> "The first guestworkers were generally young men unaccompanied by wives or children. As the postwar boom went on, however, the temporary shortages proved not temporary but chronic, leading employers to demand more guestworkers and extend the work permits of those already present. The migrants, meanwhile, found that once their initial economic goals had been met, new needs arose, leading to new trips of longer duration (Piore, 1979). Although some of the migrants may indeed have "rotated", they usually returned home only for short visits before coming back to jobs in Germany.

> The situation changed dramatically in late 1973. The Arab Oil Boycott organized in the wake of the Yom Kippur War sent the European economy into a deep recession, and in November of that year Germany suspended guestworker recruitment. Authorities expected the migrant population to dwindle slowly as visas expired and the guests rotated out. They were surprised, however, that neither employers nor guestworkers behaved according to plan (Martin and Miller, 1980). Employers wanted to avoid the costs of recruitment and retraining, and thus sought to extend the visas of the foreign workers they already had. The migrants, meanwhile, did not want to give up their good jobs and steady income, so they stayed put. Rather than leaving, they sought to sponsor the entry of their wives and their children. After dipping slightly in 1974, the foreign population of Germany rose and its composition shifted increasingly from workers to dependents." (6)

Statements of this type, although quite common in the literature, are only partially correct and have led to a misleading view of the migration process to Germany with regard to its female and family component, as I will try to prove in the following pages. Entries of dependants effectively increased after the halt, but only in relative terms. As Booth (1992) pointed out in her demographic description of the migration process to Germany, dependants have formed an increasing proportion of immigrants over time, especially after the halt; however, *fluctuations in this proportion were more the result of changes in the volume of labor migration than of dependant migration itself*. Such a distinction between relative and absolute figures becomes crucial in proving that neither an increasing number of family members have come to join the foreign workers already in the Federal Republic since the late seventies, nor that migrants were primarily young single men who did not bring their families until 1973. In the following pages I will demonstrate that family reunification, on the contrary, started from the very moment that married men migrated to Germany.

4.2.1. Numerical importance and time sequence according to the official statistics

Figure 4.4 illustrates the historical development of non-labor entries into Germany between 1960 and 1981. Since information on the reasons to migrate or admission category is not available in German official statistics, the annual difference between total and labor immigration is taken to proxy "annual family entries" (i.e. non-labor migrants). This measure, however, has one important limitation: it reflects the border control policy of the receiving country rather than the true reasons for migration of the migrants finally admitted. "Non-labor entries" are likely to include the entry of relatives of already-established migrants whose main purpose of migration was economic but who decided to apply for family reunification and once admitted start looking for employment, because they had little chance of being admitted as workers. This situation would be particularly probable in periods of economic recession and restrictive admission policies at destination. Alternatively, in periods of economic growth and labor shortages, "labor entries" would surely include also relatives of other immigrants already established who applied for a job in the destination country - not necessarily because they wished to work, but maybe because in this manner they would be able to join their relatives abroad sooner than following the family-reunification procedure.

Figure 4.4 clearly shows that the absolute number of foreigners annually admitted to Germany under any category other than labor (i.e. "non-labor entries", taken here to be an approximation of family-linked immigration) started to increase not after the ban on labor migration in 1973/74 but much earlier, in 1968, once the recession of late 1966 was over. Since that time, non-labor entries grew without interruption until 1973, when the number of non-labor entries –along with labor entries as well- experienced an abrupt fall, instead of a huge increase as conventional accounts have traditionally argued. In fact, non-labor migration from recruitment countries peaked just before the halt,

and it never resumed its pre-halt levels with the exception of the Turkish second peak in 1980.

Figure 4.4. Non-labor entries to Germany by country of origin, 1962-1981(absolute and percentage)



Source: Booth, 1992 (Table13) and Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Own elaboration.
Note: This data does not distinguish between first and subsequent arrivals since they are based on cases instead of persons. Therefore, they offer an inflated indicator of real migration, not least because of the practice prior to 1974 by some foreigners of de-registering on leaving for vacation in order to draw on their contribution to the national insurance fund. In addition, remigration to the homeland is known to be underestimated because those with no pension rights had no advantage in de-registering.

Moreover, the decline in family entries since 1973 might have been even larger than suggested by Figure 4.4, due to the aforementioned undercounting of relatives of former immigrants who gained admission prior to 1973 on the basis of either anonymous recruitment or the traditional visa system, (which probably benefited relatives of guest-workers already established

more than anybody else.) Actually, it is a well known fact that the German government did not enforce rotation strictly, and many German employers favored "de facto" reunification of wives (and other adult relatives) of the guestworker by providing them with a visa for work in Germany. Under this procedure, the German employer stated that a specific migrant worker was willing to work for him and ordered his visa from the corresponding German consulate abroad. The consulate then had to obtain the approval of the German authorities. The local immigration authorities checked that the legal conditions allowed the residence and work permit to be issued. If approved, the consulate granted the visa, and the foreign worker entered the country for the purpose of working and then obtained the necessary permit, usually valid for one year. By bringing wives, employers not only obtained the additional human resources they needed but also ensured that the experienced and trained migrants remained, consequently saving the cost of recruiting and training new foreign workers (Werner, 2000; Martin, 1982, 1998).

Although we do not know how many relatives did actually gain admission into Germany through this second procedure, it is clear that their inclusion within the category of "labor entries" contributes to the underestimation of the annual number of family entries during the pre-halt period. In their analysis of Turkish female labor migration between 1960 and 1990, Erdem and Mattes (2003) noted that the Federal Employment Service of Germany had acknowledged, as early as 1961, that approximately half of the demand for foreign female employees at the time could not be met through successful placements taking place that year (169, note 10). In this context, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that a considerable number of wives might have seized the chance to join their husbands in Germany by getting a visa for work that had been requested by their husbands' own employers (or other employers in the area where their husbands worked). However, the magnitude of the under-estimation of family-linked entries derived from this is difficult to assess. Eryilmaz argued that approximately 200,000 out of the 850,000 - a quarter of the Turkish labor entries

to Germany between 1961 and 1973- took place through the visa procedure, instead of by anonymous recruitment (2002: 3). Booth (1992), on the other hand, also noticed this problem in the official figures of non-labor entries. However, she considered this under-estimation not to be great (134). Regardless of its actual size, the resulting underestimation in the annual number of family-linked entries is expected to be larger during the pre-halt period since no special effort was made by the German authorities to restrict the number of visas granted for work through their embassies abroad until 1969. Furthermore, such under-estimation is also likely to have affected mainly spouses and other adult relatives, but not children.

This decline in non-labor entries immediately after the ban on recruitment, although rarely mentioned in the literature, is not as surprising as it may appear at first sight. As Jennissen (2004) has recently shown, family-linked migration or dependant migration, as it is also called, is not totally unresponsive to changes in economic conditions at destination. In his analysis, the Dutch rate of unemployment appeared to be an important determinant of Moroccan family migration to Netherlands over the period 1985-1999; the higher the unemployment rates in the Netherlands, the lesser the number of family members who came over to join former Moroccan migrants.[2]

In the case of Germany, the economic slump in 1966 and 1967 had already proved that family immigrants were not irresponsive to economic conditions at destination (Booth, 1992). The drop in family entries from the five largest recruitment countries between 1973 and 1976 is probably the result of who concurrent effects: 1)

[2] The difference in the GDP per capita between Morocco and the Netherlands also display a negative effect on annual family migration from Morocco, although the effect does not reach the level of statistical significance. In his work, Jennissen (2004) also suggested that the effect of economic conditions at both sending and receiving countries may differ for the two main different types of family migration -family reunification and family formation migration. However, he left the analysis of this question for future research.

the discouraging effect that increasing unemployment rates in Germany had on prospective family migrants still in the origin countries by 1973; 2) the increase in return migration among foreign guest-workers, which logically reduces the number of relatives coming to Germany during that period, and also the economic and political changes that took place in some source countries, which put an end to the migration of many Greek and Spanish workers in Germany. Finally, the potential effect of the halt on recruitment itself should not be overlooked either, especially when one takes into account the fact that a substantial number of relatives entered into Germany as workers themselves.

The development of Italian non-labor entries perfectly illustrates the extent to which dependants were also responsive to the changing economic context in Germany. Due to their ECC membership, entry limitations like the ban on recruitment and other discriminatory clauses commonly applied to foreign workers did not apply to Italians from 1968, when the free movement of labor came into full effect. In spite of such privileges, however, the number of entries of Italian dependants plummeted between 1973 and 1975 (from 43,015 to 20,882), which in the case of the Italians can only be explained as a response of potential family migrants to the recession in Germany, since they were not subject to the newly imposed stringent borders' controls.

Within this overall pattern of decline in family entries after the halt on recruitment, specific developments by country of origin deserves comment, especially as regards the length of time during which the process of family reunification seems to have been at work. By calculating the number of years that elapsed between the signature of the bilateral recruitment agreement and the year at which the number of family entries peaked, one can obtain a rough approximation of the length of the process. While Greek and Spanish family inflows peaked ten and twelve years after the signature of their respective bilateral agreements with Germany, non-labor inflows from the former Yugoslavia took only five years to reach their peak level. In contrast, non-labor entries from Italy and Turkey displayed a lengthier pattern. Italian family entries

peaked in 1973; therefore, the overall process of family reunification can be said to have prolonged by approximately thirteen or fourteen years. Turkish non-labor entries peaked twice, in 1974 and in 1980, which implies between thirteen and nineteen years depending on which peak we consider; in any case, it is the lengthiest process of the five national groups under attention here.

However, the more prolonged nature of the family reunification process among Italian and Turkish immigrants in Germany may reflect different causes. Italians have enjoyed the privilege of free movement since 1968, which allowed them -both workers and their families- to plan their trip on a temporary basis. Free movement made it particularly easy for Italian workers to visit their families in Italy and, consequently, their families had fewer incentives to move to Germany, at least in the very first moment.[3] In addition, free movement privileges implied also that Italian labor migration to Germany did not stop in 1973 but rather it re-activated as soon as the German economy showed the first signs of slight recovery. Thus, non-labor entries from Italy registered after the mid-seventies do not exclusively include relatives of immigrants who had immigrated prior to the halt on recruitment, but also relatives of new labor entries that occurred after 1973.

If the possibility of traveling between Germany and Italy without facing the risk of being refused re-admission is argued to have delayed the urgency of family reunification among Italians, the absence of such a possibility for Turks and other national groups should have accelerated their process of family reunification. In fact, this seems to have been the case for immigrants originating in the former Yugoslavia, as I mentioned before, but not for Turkish immigrants. The bilateral agreement

[3] Several demographic indicators support this hypothesis: the large excess of adult males (54% in 1974, 51% in 1978 and 50% in 1981), the high proportion (23%) who had been in Germany less than 4 years in 1981, and the continuing young age structure of the adult Italian population despite it being the first country in signing a recruitment agreement (Booth, 1992: 145).

for recruitment with Turkey had been signed under the strictest conditions, in particular regarding the possibility of family reunion for foreign workers. This clause, which despite having been included in the agreements previously signed with Italy, Spain and Greece, was omitted in the verbal statement that made public the treaty with Turkey in October 1961. Even though the German-Turkey agreement was revised in September 1964, Turkish dependant entries still did not really start until 1968 (Eryilmaz, 2002).[4] Several factors may have played a role in delaying the process of Turkish families' reunification in Germany. First, the larger size of Turkish households and their extended structure must have increased the number of potential candidates for reunification compared with the other four countries.[5] If Turkish workers had, on average, more children and brought them to Germany in a staggered way, the lengthier process of Turkish family reunification suggested by Figure 4.4 becomes more logical. Secondly, unlike primary labor migration from other recruitment countries like Spain, Turkish primary migration had not been exhausted by the time the halt was imposed. On the contrary, asylum was often utilized as an alternative entry-door by prospective emigrants from Turkey after 1974, which resulted in further family entries during the rest of the decade.[6] Finally, an

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[4] It is impossible to ascertain the extent to which this delay in the initiation of Turkish non-labor entries may partially reflect the tightening of the procedure for granting a visa for work, which is known to have been extensively utilized by Turkish women, in 1967.

[5] The average household size in Turkey in 1970 was 5.8 persons and 5.0 in 1980, while the Italian corresponding figure for 1980 was 3.2 persons (Demographic Yearbooks 1973, 1987, 1995). The total fertility rate in Turkey in 1971 was 5.9 children, although it reduced to 2.5 in 2004 (Engender Health's program in Turkey, 2002).

[6] Statistics of asylum applications clearly show that Turks made extensive use of the category of 'asylum seeker' as an alternative means of gaining admission into the German labor market. Aware of this situation, the German authorities imposed compulsory visas for Turkish citizens in 1980 and, in addition, prohibited asylum seekers from

uncertain but perhaps substantial share of Turkish non-labor entries after 1974 would correspond to what I have called the importation of spouses, which is not "family reunification" in the sense I have defined it previously.

Although the statistics drawn on to date do not permit a precise depiction of the historical development of the family reunification process in Germany, it seems to me that they do provide us with enough reasons to question some of the most entrenched ideas on this topic such as the belief that family reunification intensified as a result of the halt on labor migration imposed in 1973. On the other hand, the discussion of the figures presented so far in this section suggests that family and economic reasons were not necessarily mutually exclusive in shaping the migration decisions of many foreigners to move to Germany. Moreover, it seems clear from the previous description that non-labor entries were also responsive to the worsening of the German economy in the mid-seventies. Even though the rate and speed of the process of family reunification seemed to vary across nationalities as a result of a variety of factors (e.g. differences in the historical pattern of the overall migration process, prevailing family structure in the home countries, differences in the legal conditions that regulate admission and residence of foreigners of distinct origin, etc., non-labor entries from all five countries considered in this study reduced substantially the year following the halt on recruitment. In my opinion, these findings strongly suggest that a more thorough analysis should be undertaken which draws on alternative sources, as the German Socio Economic Panel. This would permit a more complete test of the question at stake.

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working in Germany during their first year of residence. In 1981 this waiting period was extended to 2 years. These two combined measures proved highly efficient in reducing the number of newly issued work permits to Turkish people from 29,219 in 1979 to 3,580 in 1981. However, the relatives of those who had been already admitted retained the possibility to join them.

4.2.2 Magnitude, timing and characteristics of family reunification according to individual survey data collected in GSOEP

When studying family reunification, at least three different but related questions may be posed: 1) how many new immigrants are directly brought by an immigrant during his stay in the host country (immigrant sponsorship rate)?, 2) how many are the total number of new immigrants directly or indirectly sponsored by one original immigrant (immigration multiplier)?, 3) and what are the characteristics of the sponsoring and sponsored populations (i.e. who does bring his/her relatives in and whom they bring)?

Most of the political debate on this issue has revolved around the first question concerning the proportion of total immigration in the receiving countries which is due to family reunification. This is particularly true in the case of Europe, where increasing border controls and a restrictionist approach in dealing with immigration issues since the mid-seventies (and earlier in the case of the UK) have favored a negative view on family reunification. Yet, empirical research aimed at establishing the true scale of family-linked immigration flows in Europe has so far not been undertaken. As Jasso & Rosenzweig (1989) pointed out when they researched this aspect of family reunification in the US, the computation of immigrant sponsorship rates and, therefore, of immigration multipliers requires a prospective linkage design in which an immigrant cohort is linked to those future immigrants it sponsors. None of the statistical sources available to date in the EU countries, either register-based or survey, has such as prospective linkage design. Retrospective designs in which a cohort of immigrants is retrospectively linked to its sponsors can provide a picture of the population of sponsors at a given point in time; but it cannot alone be used to compute sponsorship rates since information on the appropriate denominator (the population "at risk" of sponsorship) is unavailable.

In the GSOEP case, the predominantly retrospective nature of the data used prevents not only estimations of the immigration multiplier and sponsorship rates, but also a proper comparison

between migrants who were joined by their relatives and those who were not, due to the cumulative effect and selective impact of return migration.

As I said in Chapter 3, the GSOEP's data of inception was 1983 and its first results published in 1984. By that time, most married foreigners in Germany had already been joined by their spouses. In fact, only 5 % (56) of the total number of married male migrants included in the original sample still had their spouse in their country of origin in 1984; the rest had already brought them to Germany. Furthermore, about half of these 56 men ended up bringing their spouses at some point during the observation period (1984-2000). Thus, the sub-sample of men who never brought their partner to Germany before returning home are too few and unrepresentative of the whole population of those who returned before bringing their spouses to Germany. Furthermore, GSOEP does not provide information on the spouses who never came to Germany but only those who came and were interviewed at least once.

With regard to the reunification of children with their parents, GSOEP provides information on every child in every household surveyed. Yet, adult children who left the parents' household before their parents entered the survey are not separately identified as a part of the family and, as a result, their reunification process cannot be reconstructed.[7] This drawback in the dataset implies that the earlier the parents migrated and the older a child at migration,

[7] To take one example: Antonio and Maria are a Spanish couple who were interviewed by GSOEP in 1984. They and their only son, Daniel, had migrated to Germany ten years previously, in 1974. At that time, Daniel was 15. Four years after arriving in Germany, in 1979, Daniel married Lucia and moved out from his parents' place. This implies that when Antonio and Maria were interviewed for the first time, Daniel did not live with them anymore and, thus, he was never interviewed by GSOEP. We know that Maria had had a son in 1959 because this information is recorded in Maria's retrospective questionnaires. Yet, it is impossible to ascertain whether he was ever taken to Germany and, if so, when it took place.

the more likely that this child would have been missed in GSOEP. The potential bias derived from these missing cases is further discussed in Section 4.5.

Despite the limitations mentioned in the foregoing section, GSOEP data allows us to: 1) separate wives' reunification from the importation of brides; 2) separate wives' and children's reunification; 3) calculate the time it took for the first-mover within each foreign household to bring different members of his/her family to Germany. Before analyzing each of these aspects, I have chosen to compare the aggregated picture of family-linked migration to Germany provided by the official statistics on foreign non-labor entries represented in Figure 4.4 (see previous section) and the picture derived from data in GSOEP.

As can be seen, the overall trend provided by the two sources is quite similar with only one exception: according to GSOEP data, entries of foreigners who had at least one close relative (spouse or parent) in Germany before their own arrival peaked in 1970 and slowed down in 1971 (green line). On the other hand, aggregate data from the Official German Statistics suggests a smoother increase between 1968 and 1973. This divergence might be due to the entry of adult relatives of guest-workers between 1968 and 1970 (included) under the category of "labor migration", either as "anonymous recruitment" or as admitted with visa for work. As explained above, these individuals are not counted as family immigrants even if they have close family ties with other foreign residents in Germany. On the other hand, the GSOEP estimates of family-linked migration are based precisely on the kinship relationship between newcomers and other foreigners established in Germany prior to their arrival. It is important to bear in mind this distinction when interpreting the results of this chapter.

Figure 4.5. Family-linked migration in German Official Statistics and in GSOEP



Sources: GSOEP, 1984-2002 and Booth (1992).
Notes: 1. Family-linked migration calculated with GSOEP data includes those immigrants who, at the year of their arrival, had at least one spouse or parent in Germany, regardless of the fact that they effectively utilized such a family tie with another foreign resident in Germany as a mean to obtain the permission to entry and stay or not. Remind here that figures in official statistics, represented in Figure 4.4, count exclusively those foreigners who obtained admission to Germany under a non-labor reason.
2. See note in Figure 3.2 for official statistics of foreign non-labor entries.

In Figure 4.5 I have drawn a distinction between family-linked migration of spouses and children of previous immigrants in Germany, using GSOEP data. The number of reunited wives who entered Germany annually peaked in 1970 and steadily decreased until 1972 - the two small peaks in 1979/80 and 1993 respectively relate to the reunification of spouses of asylum seekers who fled Turkey in the months prior to the coup d'Etat, and who fled the war in the former Yugoslavia in 1992/93. Thus, figures in GSOEP also support the idea that the halt on recruitment did not intensify

the reunification of wives but their migration roughly followed the pattern of male adult immigration. In fact, the annual entries of reunited wives virtually ceased to exist in 1981; this year the entries of imported wives outnumbered the number of reunited wives.[8] Finally, entries of children peaked systematically one or two years after the inflows of reunited wives did, which suggests that the reunification of children was a lengthier process than the reunification of wives, and was responsible for the largest proportion of foreign entries between 1973 and 1981.

Figure 4.6. Type of kinship relationship in family-linked migration to by year of arrival, 1960-2000



Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002.

In Figure 4.7 I explore whether GSOEP data supports the well established idea that the halt in recruitment accelerated the process of family reunification by male guest-workers who, instead of

[8] It is important to note that it was specifically in December 1981 when the Ministry of Interior approved the Decree aimed at curbing the entrance of this type of spouses (see Chapter 2).

returning to their homelands and risking their chances of later returning to Germany, preferred to settle more permanently with their families there and feel assured that they would not lose their jobs. The graph clearly illustrates the importance of distinguishing - within the process of family reunification - between spouses and children. While between 60% and 75% (depending on whether wives who migrated to Germany the same year as their husbands are considered reunited wives or not, see transparent and yellow areas respectively), of pre-halt male immigrants had brought their wives to Germany in 1973, the corresponding percentage for children is less than 40%. These cumulated percentages indicate, first, that the reunification of children effectively took place slower than the reunification of wives and, secondly, that the majority of foreign men who were in Germany by 1973 had already brought their wives from the country of origin when the halt on recruitment was imposed.

Figure 4.7. Stock of reunited children and wives whose husband (father) migrated to Germany before the halt on recruitment, by year of arrival



Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002.

Finally, differences by country of origin coincide only partially with the picture drawn by official statistics in Figure 4.4. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 represent the stock of wives and children reunified by male immigrants in Germany over time. The graph for wives is restricted to those whose husbands had migrated before the halt on recruitment in order to test the plausibility of the hypothesis that the halt precipitated the family reunification of those who feared losing their possibility of working in Germany forever if they returned to their countries in the new context of restrictive immigration policy. On the other hand, Figure 4.9 shows all immigrant children who arrived between 1960 and 2000.

Figure 4.8. Stock of reunited wives whose husbands had migrated before 1974 by country of origin



Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002

The official figures for non-labor entries suggested that Yugoslavs and Greeks were the groups that reunified faster, whereas Turks appeared to be the slowest. However, we were not able to distinguish to what extent such appearances might be masking differences in the time taken for reunifying spouses and

children, respectively. When we separate both processes with GSOEP data, the picture provided by the aggregate data changes in significant ways. First of all, Greeks (pink line) followed by Spaniards (yellow line) are those who reunified with their wives faster; on the other hand, Yugoslavs (green line) were relatively slow in bringing their wives to Germany, according to GSOEP data. While approximately 80% of Greeks and Spaniards had their wife already in Germany as early as 1970, at the same date the percentage of reunified wives with Yugoslav and Turkish men in Germany were, respectively, 45% and 25%. When the halt was imposed in 1973, 40% of Turkish reunited wives and about 30% of Yugoslav ones were still in their countries of origin.

Children, effectively, took longer to be reunified, among other reasons because their numbers were potentially greater. A similar pattern to the one described for the reunification of wives was reproduced here: a larger fraction of the Spaniard children had been already been brought to Germany in 1973 (75%), while the proportion of Turkish and Yugoslav children by then was between 20% and 30%.

Figure 4.9. Stock of reunified children by country of origin, 1960-1996



Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002.

The following sections are aimed at disentangling the factors that explain the relative speed at which male immigrants from different countries brought their spouses and children to Germany, after briefly reviewing the existing literature and evidence on this issue with a particular focus on the German experience.

4.3. Theoretical ideas on the process of family reunification

The lack of adequate datasets that contain information about the immigrants' relatives and their date of immigration has, to date, severely hampered the empirical research of the reunification process. In addition, the predominance of the neoclassical economic paradigm in the study of the migration decisions (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1976) has favored a strong individualist bias that, in turn, has contributed to obscure the family dimension of the migration process.

Some economists like Sandell (1977) and Mincer (1978) made an effort to shift the focus from the individual to the family as the appropriate unit of analysis for migration studies. However, empirical applications of their theoretical reasoning have largely been restricted to the phenomenon of internal migration, where family reunification is barely an issue. Long-distance internal migration generally involves less family separation than international migration. The so-called 'commuter marriages' - i.e. married couples who set up separate households in different cities because of the geographical locations of their respective jobs (Gerstel and Gross 1982) – have been presented as being most similar to migration-related spouses separation (Gupta, 2003). However, commuter marriages are in principle more individualist since they are a work solution compromise that allows both spouses to pursue their careers while maintaining their marital relationship, whereas migration-related separation is assumed to occur mainly in families where the male bread-winner model applies (i.e. specialized gender roles, in which women expect to

benefit from their husbands' financial support and men expect their wives to have their households and basic needs cared for).

In less developed countries, labor migration of the head of the household is often seen as necessary for the economic survival of the entire family. Accordingly, families are expected to experience some residential separation for at least a period of time. However, we do not know much about either how long separation lasts or about the reasons that lead immigrants to end family separation after a period of separation. Gupta (2003) has recently examined the incidence and duration of spouses' separation among Mexican immigrants in the US. However, she framed the study within the context of circular or repeated migration, focused on visits to the family in the country of origin that interrupt spouses separation and, therefore, excluded from the analysis couples who were separated for all twelve months in the year. Gupta's findings indicate that wives' probability of migrating together with their husband increases as they get older and that more educated women are also more likely to migrate with their husbands than being left behind. Couples where both spouses have a green card are much more likely to migrate together and avoiding migration-related separation. Finally, the likelihood of separation increases with the number of pre-school children, while school-age children neither promotes nor deters couple migration. The sex of the children does not appear to make any difference either. For couples who have experienced at least one spell of separation, separation tends to be longer the older the wife is at the time of the husband's migration, and shorter the more educated the husband is. Children, especially school-aged ones, make separations longer.

Return migration, as a means of definitively ending migration-related separation, has received more attention in the literature. In fact, return migration is often presented as the reverse of family reunification: immigrants who decide to stay permanently are the ones who end up bringing their relatives to the host country. This idea, which is widespread, has led to the question "who reunifies?" being replaced by the question "*who does (not) return to the home country after migration?*

It must be noted, though, that by establishing such a symmetrical relationship between return migration and family reunification, we are assuming indirectly that migration – both emigration and re-migration to the country of origin – is a one shot move: immigrants stay or return, but nothing else happens in between. Yet, if repeat migration is common practice - as some recent pieces of research have suggested not only for Mexicans in the US -see Massey and Constant (2003) for repeated migration of guest-workers in Germany-, the reunification of the family (or at least part of it) and return migration do not need to be mutually exclusive events but may rather occur at different stages of the migration process and, therefore, should be analyzed separately.[9]

Unfortunately, we know very little about how these two processes -family reunification and return migration- relate to each other. In a recent piece of research, Khoo (2003) writes "… *the relation between family sponsorship and permanent settlement (or return migration) is not a simple one for empirical analysis. While it can be hypothesized that immigrants who want to sponsor or have sponsored their close relatives (such as parents and siblings) are more likely to want to settle permanently, it is also possible that those who decide to settle permanently are also more likely to want to sponsor their relatives to join them.*" (180) This author concluded, with data for a recent cohort of immigrants in Australia, that there exists a strong association between immigrants' permanent settlement and family sponsorship decisions. In fact, she found that immigrants who have sponsored their close relatives, particularly parents and siblings, are much more likely to settle permanently than migrants who have not.

[9] It is possible to think, for instance, of a male immigrant who arrives first to the country of migration, goes back to his home country after a year abroad, stay there for several months and then migrates again with his oldest son; later on, he brings his wife and their youngest child, and then stays for several more years until they finally return to their country of origin for good.

Moreover, this relationship appeared to be stronger for skilled and business immigrants than for all migrants.

However, there are no empirical studies that allow us to establish that such a strong connection between permanent settlement and family reunification also holds for relatives other than siblings and parents, in particular for the spouse and children, who are the close relatives most commonly reunified. In spite of this lack of evidence, the belief that immigrant men do not bring their wives and children until they decide to stay put on a more permanent basis in the country of immigration is a widely accepted one. It seems fairly reasonable to hypothesize that parents do not want to take their young children abroad unless they have decided to settle permanently in the country of immigration. But beyond these kind of general statements, the preferences of immigrants for reunifying their spouse and older children are not so easy to identify in advance.

Constant and Massey (2002), in their paper on the return migration of immigrants in Germany, stated that the relationship between the presence of a spouse in the origin (or host) country and immigrants' decision to return to their homeland (or settle at destination) depends basically on the individuals' initial reasons for migration. If migrants are income maximizing individuals who move in response to the higher wages in the receiving nation and will stay abroad as long as there is no reduction in the bi-national wage difference, as the Neoclassical Economic of Migration (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1976) assumes, they are expected to be more willing to endure relatively long separations until proper arrangements can be made for family reunification. On the other hand, if migrants are target earners who return home as soon as they manage to remit or save the amount of money they were looking for, according to the view of the New Economics of Labor Migration (Stark, 1991), having a spouse and children at origin encourages them to work longer hours abroad. However, bringing the spouse and children of working age to the immigration country might increase the chances of meeting the household's savings target faster and, thus, of shortening their stay abroad. It is clear

that these incentives for reunifying the spouse as soon as possible are conditional on leaving non-adult children at origin, since they would detract from the mother's work effort in the host country and would therefore reduce the likelihood of return.

In accordance with the foregoing rationale, only the reunification of children under 16 (working age) appears to be a reliable indicator of intentions of permanent settlement. On the other hand, the reunification of the spouse and/or adult children may reflect the desire to reconstitute the family abroad for the purpose of permanent settlement, but it may also reflect the desire to make as much money as possible in the shortest time, in order to return home sooner. It is possible, though, that couples who plan migration as a means of making money fast are more likely to reunify abroad faster and to leave children at the home country, especially pre-school age children, than couples planning to move permanently to another country.

There is a major problem for testing empirically the hypotheses formulated above with regard to the likelihood of family reunification abroad and the speed at which reunification occurs: the original reasons for migration are not directly observable and, in addition, they can vary both across individuals and over time. In an attempt to avoid this problem, I have followed the following analytical strategy: 1) separating the reunification of spouses from the reunification of children, 2) distinguishing immediate versus delayed reunification of the spouse, 3) analyzing the factors that accelerate or delay the process of partner's reunification within the group of couples that did not migrate the same year and, 4) studying the extent to which reunited wives take their children abroad with them or delay their reunification. The empirical analysis of wife's reunification and its variants is carried out in Section 4.4 and the reunification of children in 4.5.

4.4. The reunification of the wife, immediate or delayed?

4.4.1. Construction of the dependent variable(s) and method of analysis

Due to the various limitations in the dataset, I decided to focus on immigrants who actually brought their spouses to Germany, and analyze why some of them did it much faster than others. In other words, I have changed the question from "who does bring his wife to Germany?" to "when do they bring their wives?". The length of time that elapses before the wife joins her husband abroad may be very informative about immigrants' initial intentions, their reasons to migrate and the choices they make with regard to a wide range of socio-economic issues during their lives in Germany. In the case of Germany, Dustman and Schmidt (2000) affirmed that "*it is typical in labour migration that the husband arrives earlier, and the female partner follows after a stable job is found by the initial migrant. […] If the husband arrives earlier, budgetary considerations may be less binding, and the female partner may abstain from labour force participation.*" (18) Although this hypothesis will be dealt with at length in Chapter 6, what I would like to illustrate with the previous quote is that the timing of spouses' migration has already been assumed to have had some effects on the post-migration behavior of immigrants.

I have identified 434 reunited wives in GSOEP, that is, 434 women who migrated later than their husbands but had married before the husband migrated, according to the definition of reunification I made in Chapter 3.[10]

[10] It is worth noting that "imported brides" (i.e. women who married and joined men in Germany who had migrated at least two years prior to marriage) are not considered "reunited wives" and, thus, are excluded from the analysis in this chapter. On the other hand, married women who preceded their husbands in migration are also excluded. They are only 33 cases in GSOEP, which clearly reveals the extent to which the phenomenon of couples' reunification was a female-dominated

On average, reunited wives in my sample took less than 4 years to join their husband in Germany. Figure 16 shows that a surprising 42.4 % of reunited wives in GSOEP arrived in Germany the same year as their husbands, and an additional 13.7 % arrived the following year to their husbands'. Overall, more than ¾ of the reunited wives *who were still in Germany in 1984* took less than 5 years to join their husbands. By highlighting the expression "still in Germany in 1984", I simply intended to highlight the risk that these figures partially reflect a selection bias effect. Effectively, there is the possibility that wives who reunified quicker also stayed longer and, therefore, are over-represented in GSOEP data. However, this reasoning is rather counterintuitive. If immigrant men are assumed to delay the reunification of their families until they consolidate their economic position and are able to make adequate living arrangements, why should one expect women who reunify later to return earlier and, thus, to be under-represented in GSOEP? The large proportion of women who migrated the same year as their husbands is partially due to the inclusion in the sample of some couples from Turkey and, especially, from the former Yugoslavia, who have probably obtained admission as asylum seekers during the 1980's and 1990's, since the regulation of family reunification applicable to asylum seekers did not impose waiting periods. In fact, 90% of reunited wives whose husbands arrived after 1973 migrated the same year as them. However, if one restricts the sample to wives of immigrant men who had migrated to Germany prior to the halt on recruitment (red bars in Figure 4.10), the proportion of women who joined their husbands the same year that they migrated or the following one is much higher than expected (34% and 15.3% respectively).

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phenomenon, and justifies focusing on couples where it was the wife who followed her husband and not the other way around.

Figure 4.10. Years elapsed until the wife's reunification in GSOEP



Source: GSOEP, own elaboration.

These percentages suggest a faster than expected process of wives' reunification and challenge the well-established ideas that most wives only joined their husbands when they had more or less consolidated their economic position in Germany; and that many immigrant men who had not brought their families to Germany in 1973 decided to do so when the halt on recruitment was imposed. It seems rather that the majority of reunited wives tended to join their husbands sooner rather than later.

One may argue that in cases where the husband and the wife migrate the same year, that it is not so much "reunification" as "joint couple migration". However, the question about how long should separate partners' migration in order to consider that the wife (husband) has been reunified by her husband (his wife) is an empirical one. When should we classify a woman as a reunited wife? A reunited wife is a woman who follows her husband three months after he left? Six months later? Sixteen months later?

In addition, in GSOEP, due to the annually structured data for a substantial part of the observation period (1960-2000), in couples where both partners migrated the same year it is

impossible to determine which partner migrated first (the husband or the wife). In order to determine whether women who migrated the same year as their husband should be considered to have migrated (a few months) earlier than him or not, I carried out a systematic means comparison between the 39 women who preceded their husbands in migration and those women who migrated the same year as their husbands. The former group of women (who preceded their husbands) was found to be significantly more educated, with more work experience and to have fewer children than women who migrated the same year as their husbands. Therefore, I assumed that women who migrated the same year as their husbands had not preceded them. Next, I repeated the same procedure by comparing women who migrated the same year as their husbands and those who migrated the following year to him, and I found that there were no significant differences between these two groups. However, they were significantly different in many socio-economic characteristics from women who followed their husbands two or more years later. Accordingly, I have distinguished two groups of women: 1) women who joined their husbands immediately after they left (from 0 days to several months) and, 2) women who delayed the date of joining their husbands in Germany at least two years from the date their husband left.

In the empirical analysis that follows, I have decided to examine first which factors increase the likelihood of joint couple migration versus delaying the wife's migration; secondly, the factors that lengthen (or shorten) the period of time that spouses live separated from each other until the wife joins her husband in Germany and, finally, the factors that lengthen (or shorten) the number of years until each child in my sample join their parents in Germany.[11]

[11] Most of the time, children joined not only their father but also their mothers in Germany since in most cases children did not migrate to Germany until the mother had done so as well (see Table 4.6).

For the analysis of joint couple migration, I utilize a standard binary logistic regression model, which follows the general form:

$$P(Y=1) = 1/\{\ 1+\exp\left[-\left(b_0 + b_1 X_1 + ... + b_n X_n\right)\right]_{\}}$$

Where *Y* is the dependent binary variable that takes value 1 if the couple migrates together (i.e. during the same year), and 0 if the wife takes more than one year to join her husband abroad.

For the analysis of the reunification of the wife (in those couples that did not migrate together) and of the children, I utilize a parametric accelerated failure time model that permits us to examine the effect of time-varying covariates over the duration of the process,[12] and which can be written as:

$$\ln(t_j) = x_j \beta_x + \varepsilon_j$$ [13]

Where $\ln(t_j)$ is the logarithm of the episode duration,[14] β_x are the estimated coefficients for covariates X , which are allowed to be time-varying; and ε is an error term.

Note that a positive ß in accelerated failure time models indicates the corresponding covariate prolongs the duration of the episode (i.e. a positive coefficient must be taken as an indication that the corresponding covariate increases the number of years elapsed until the wife joins her husband in Germany). I have assumed that T follows a Weibull distribution.

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[12] Time duration models are generally chosen not only because they allow us to analyze the effect of time-varying covariates but also because they can deal with the problem of censoring. In my samples, however, there are no censored data since in GSOEP I only have information for those wives and children that have effectively reunified their husbands and fathers in Germany.

[13] An alternative notation utilized by authors like Bernardi (2006) is $\ln(T) = \beta^{*} X + z$.

[14] As for the log transformation of T, its main purpose is to ensure that the predicted values of T are positive.

4.4.2. Sample's Description

Table 4.1 shows the average characteristics of women in my sample, distinguishing women who joined their husbands immediately and women who did not. The mean values of independent variables are measured at the time of husband's migration, and not at the time when the wife migrated herself. Had women's characteristics been measured at the time they migrated, I would have included the same information twice, both in the dependent and independent variables since the dependent variable is defined as a function of the moment the woman migrated (See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion).

Table 4.1. Characteristics of the reunited wives at the time of their husbands' migration

Variable	Delayed Reunification	Immediate Reunification
Wife's age	28.4	28.8
	(6.1)	(7.6)
Husband's age	31.3	31.6
	(0.4)	(0.5)
Wife's age at marriage	19.9	21.2
	(0.3)	(0.3)
Years of marriage	8.5	7.6
	(0.4)	(0.4)
Wife's Education	7.7	8.4
	(0.1)	(0.1)
Husband's education	8.7	9.5
	(0.1)	(0.1)
Pre-marital work experience (years)	1.3	2.4
	(0.2)	(0.2)
Years of experience	3.6	5.3
	(0.5)	(0.4)
Number of minor kids	2.2	1.4
	(1.4)	(0.8)
% childless at husband's migration	19.3	32.3
% Turks	50 %	29 %
N	226	181

Note: values are measured the year of the husband's migration.

According to the descriptives in Table 4.1, the age of women at the moment their husbands migrated hardly differ across groups (it hovers between 28 and 29 years old). Something similar happens with the husband's own age at migration (around 31 years old). In contrast, what seems to be a more informative indicator is wife's age at marriage: women who reunified later had married at a younger age, which confirms the selective nature of women who marry older than usual.

As a result, the most notable difference appears in "years of marriage" at the moment the husband migrated: women who followed their husbands immediately, had been married on average 7.7 years. In contrast, women who took more than 5 years to reunify with their husbands in Germany had been married about 9 years at the moment their husbands left.

Wives who migrated sooner were also slightly more educated than the rest. In addition, their husbands' education level was also higher. It is important to note, though, that there are no educational differences between couples that reunified after 3, 4 or 8 years but only between those couples who reunified immediately and the rest. Something similar occurs with regard to pre-migration work experience. Women who reunified immediately had, on average, 2 more years of work experience than the others, despite the fact that their age does not differ significantly.

The number of children, especially younger children, is expected to be a major driving force in wives' migration decision. The proportion of childless women is noticeably higher among those wives who reunified immediately (29%), which does not seem to be due to differences in the age profile of these two groups of women.

Finally, there are also differences by country of origin. Turkish women are underrepresented in the group of immediate reunification, whereas Greeks are significantly overrepresented.

4.4.3. Hypotheses and predicted effects of explanatory variables

Wife's age and years since marriage

Age is usually taken as a proxy for other age-related life cycle events like marriage, fertility, work experience, etc. Yet, as far as one is capable of specifying these other life events, age may become irrelevant or even redundant. This is particularly likely in cases where the dependent variable is time itself (i.e. time until wife's migration) or, at least, where it incorporates a temporal dimension (i.e. immediate/delayed migration) and the research design is not a dynamic one.

Propensity to migrate decreases with age, as aging implies an increase in the psychological costs of moving and a reduction in the potential benefits of migration. In principle, the same reasoning would apply to prospective reunited wives. Older women probably have a stronger attachment to their country, their city, their family and so on. Consequently, they may prefer, at least initially, to stay behind. Later on, if the husband prolongs his stay abroad and partners' separation time increases, migration for the purpose of family reunification could turn into a more attractive option.

Following to the previous reasoning, I expect older women to be less likely to follow their husbands immediately after they left.

However, it is necessary to separate the effect of wife's age from the potential effect that "previous time of married life" may have on the wife's decision to migrate. In principle, women in newly married couples are expected to be more reluctant to accept separation immediately after the wedding; therefore, immediate wife's migration for reunification is more likely the shorter the duration of marriage at the time when the husband migrates. Besides, newly married couples would be freer to move as they generally have no children. However, "children effects" will be controlled for separately.

Educational level

Education has been systematically found to influence positively the propensity to migrate. Therefore, education is expected to increase the probability of immediate reunification. Not only the wife's own education level but also her husband's education is likely to show such a positive effect. In the case of women, education is associated with a series of traits that favor migration: lower fertility, better job chances at destination, older age at marriage, etc. The same applies to their husbands; if higher education helps immigrant men in getting more stable and better paid jobs at destination, the potential costs associated with wife's reunification could be easier to afford.

Previous work experience

The effect of this variable is unclear. On the one hand, women who have worked a substantial number of years before their husbands migrate are likely to be willing to migrate as soon as possible, to get a better paid job in the destination country. However, to have a job at origin might also function as a strong incentive to stay. In fact, according to the New Economics of Labor Migration, one of the major reasons driving international migration is to diversify the sources of household income to manage risk in the absence of well-functioning insurance and credit markets in sending nations (Stark, 1991; Massey et al., 1998). Women who are able to gain a wage at origin may prefer to stay and assure or complement household income with remittances sent by their husbands abroad. In the following empirical analysis I will try to find out which of these two effects dominates.

Number of children and their ages

Children are expected to be a major constraint on women's decision to migrate. I would expect a much higher proportion of childless wives to follow the husband immediately for several

reasons. First of all, in absence of children, mutual dependence between partners is likely to be higher and wives are probably less disposed to accept separation.

Besides, the costs associated with wife's migration are likely to be much lower in childless couples, no matter what their intentions are regarding permanent settlement or return. These women do not need to accept the psychological costs of separation from their children, nor the higher economic costs involved in moving two, three or more people to the destination country.

On the other hand, in couples who have children at the time the husband leaves, the mother's decision to migrate is taken simultaneously with the one about leaving the children at origin with other relatives or taking them with her to Germany. Leaving children behind involves higher psychological costs but lower economic costs, as having no children in Germany would increase the mother's chances of working there and obtaining an additional income for the household. And viceversa.

Psychological and economic costs are likely to move in different directions depending on children's age. In order to capture these potential differences, I have included a set of dummy variables that distinguish women who had at least one child below 4 (infant); with no infant child but at least one preschool kid (preschool); with neither infant nor preschool children but at least one kid of school age (school); women with only adult children (older than 16). Emotional costs associated with leaving a child behind are expected to be higher the younger the child is; however, it could be easier to find a close relative willing to look after them. Thus, the effect of children's age on migratory decision is not easy to predict.

Finally, the intensity of the delaying effect that the number of children may have on wives' migration could also vary depending on the children ages. However, these kind of interactive effects are difficult to capture in static designs.

Country of Origin

According to the description in Section 4.2.1, Yugoslav women are expected to be the most likely to follow their husbands shortly after his departure, since Figure 4.4 suggested that the process of family reunification was particularly fast for this national group. On the other hand, Turks seem to take longer to reunify.

Legal privileges granted to Italians with regard to entry and work permits are expected to have some influence on the way couples planned the migration of each household's member. However, it is difficult to anticipate the direction (positive or negative) of that influence on the speed of partners' reunification. On the one hand, Italian wives did not need to get a job to obtain permission to enter in Germany. This fact is expected to have favored immediate couple reunification. However, on the other hand legal privileges also favored Italian families organizing migration to Germany on a more temporary basis and, consequently, Italian wives perhaps experienced a lesser need for joining their husbands in Germany as soon as possible, as the husband was able to visit the family at origin more often.

Year of husband's migration

Finally, it might be important to take into account the historical context at the time the husband migrated. A woman whose husband migrated at a time when, for instance, female labor demand was on the rise might have had stronger incentives to follow him immediately. She would be able to get a job there as well, which would improve the couple's living conditions and reduce the wife's initial isolation. Besides, during periods of economic growth immigration policy usually becomes more flexible and it is easier to get a (nominated) visa for work that would allow *de facto* reunification of immigrant couples.

Historical accounts of immigration to Germany illustrate the increasing demand for female labor in the textile and other

industries, which began in the mid-sixties and developed after the recession in 1967. I have divided the observation period into three sub-periods, before 1968, between 1968 and the halt on recruitment in 1973, and after the halt. Following the previous reasoning, I expect immediate spouses' reunification to be more common after 1968 than earlier. However, it is more difficult to predict how couples in which the husband had entered Germany after 1973, organized their reunification. After the halt on recruitment, very few adult men were able to get admission into Germany as foreign labor was not required anymore. In fact, post-halt entries of foreign adults occurred mainly through the asylum door, which was the only one available for those people that lacked family ties with already established foreign residents in Germany. Asylum legislation immediately eased family reunification and, until the 1980 reform, allowed asylum seekers to work legally in Germany immediately after arrival. In addition, in 1981 Greece became an EEC member, which undoubtedly offered a more stable context for Greek citizens' movement despite the fact that free movement did not fully apply until 1987.[15]

4.4.4. Joint Couple Migration versus Delayed Reunification

Table 4.2 shows the logit estimates of practicing immediate couple reunification versus a delayed one. Six nested models are estimated and results are reported successively in order to show in detail the effect of adding each new variable on the effects of the other variables, as well as the overall fit of the model. It is important to remember that the analysis is carried out at the time of the husband's migration and, therefore, time-varying variables

[15] A similar transition period was imposed on the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986, which delayed the fully application of freedom of movement until 1992.

such as "wife's age" or "duration of marriage" take their values at that specific point in time.

Estimates in Table 4.2 indicate that Italian and Greek couples are much more likely to migrate together than Turkish ones (reference category). Although partners from the former Yugoslavia also show a higher likelihood of joint migration compared to Turks (see Model 1), this difference disappears once variances in partners' level of education are controlled for in Model 2. In contrast, the results for Italians and Greeks remain more or less stable across different model specifications. The higher propensity of Italian couples to migrate together is in line with expectations, because of their legal privileges as EU members. However, the strong inclination for Greek immigrants to migrate with their partners appears a little odd.

The younger the wife is at the time the husband makes the decision to migrate, the more likely it is for her to migrate jointly with him. Similarly, the shorter the period the couple has been married when the husband decides to migrate, the more likely it is for the couple to migrate together (see the negative sign of the coefficient for the variable "years since marriage" in Model 1). Although the effect of these two variables varies depending on the number of controls added to the model, they remain significant at least at the 10% level in the final model specification (see Models 5 and 6).

In line with the findings obtained for migrants to other destinations, the more years of education that the partners have at the time the husband decides to migrate, the more likely it is for the couple to migrate together (see the positive significant coefficients of "W's" and "H's years of education" in Model 2). In addition, spouses also appear more likely to migrate jointly if the wife had some work experience at the time the husband migrates than if she had none (reference category). However, the stronger the attachment to the local labor market, the less likely for the wife to migrate at the same time as her husband (see the negative sign of the coefficient of the variable "W's years of work experience");

although this effect does not reach the level of statistical significance.

As expected, joint couple migration is less likely to happen the larger the number of non-adult children the couple has (see the negative sign of the coefficient in Models 4 to 6). However, only having children of school age strongly increases the odds of migrating together for the couple compared to childless couples (reference category). These two results together can be read as a clear indication that household economic needs play a crucial role in shaping family migration decisions: couples with more children, especially if they are of school age, are much more likely to migrate together than childless couples. The strategy consists probably in the two spouses working abroad in order to save as much money as possible in the shortest period of time. The reason for the variance depending on the children's age is not clear in advance. It might be that children of school age are easier to take abroad because they are less time-demanding than younger children and, therefore, do not restrain the mother's work in the paid labor force. However, it might also be that parents are more willing to temporarily leave their children behind with other relatives if they are of older age. The analysis of the determinants of the process of children's reunification should offer some clues on this (see below).

Finally, in Model 5 I have added a set of dummy variables indicating the time at which the husband migrated to Germany. Clearly, the likelihood of joint couple migration increased during the peak years of recruitment (1968-1973) compared to the previous period (1960-1967). However, the most noticeable result is the extremely high probability of joint migration among couples that migrated after the halt on recruitment (see B = 3.65 in Model 5). This result is probably related to the fact that most male adult foreigners who entered Germany after 1973 were admitted on the basis of asylum and, thus, enjoyed special conditions with regard

Table 4.2. Logit estimates of joint couple migration (ref. delayed reunification)

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	H's mig < 1974
(ref. Turkey)						
Former Yugoslavia	0.78**	0.45	0.35	0.07	-0.02	-0.02
	0.27	0.28	0.29	0.30	0.33	0.34
Greece	1.26**	1.34**	1.18**	1.01**	1.26**	1.31**
	0.34	0.35	0.38	0.40	0.44	0.45
Italy	0.70**	0.84**	0.74**	0.85**	0.90**	1.02**
	0.34	0.35	0.35	0.37	0.41	0.42
Spain	0.02	-0.02	-0.20	-0.26	0.21	0.24
	0.40	0.42	0.43	0.45	0.49	0.49
W's Age	0.06*	0.05*	0.05	0.05	0.07**	0.08**
	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04
H's age	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.00
	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04
Years since Marriage	-0.08**	-0.07*	-0.05	-0.03	-0.07*	-0.08*
	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04
W's Years of Education		0.22**	0.21**	0.21**	0.14	0.15
		0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.11
H's Years of Education		0.17**	0.16**	0.18**	0.14*	0.15**
		0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08
W's Ever worked (ref. never worked)			0.63**	0.62**	0.74**	0.75**
			0.27	0.28	0.30	0.30
W's Years of work Experience			-0.04	-0.06*	-0.05	-0.05
			0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
No. of children< 17				-	-	-0.38**
				0.33**	0.36**	0.15
				0.14	0.15	
(ref. no children < 17)						
Youngest kid < 6				-0.17	-0.00	0.02
				0.39	0.42	0.43
(ref. no children < 17)						
Youngest kid 6-16				1.20**	1.23**	1.26**
				0.49	0.52	0.53
(ref. H's mig. 1960-67)						
H's migration 1968-70					0.89**	0.93**
					0.32	0.33
H's migration 1971-73					0.88**	0.92**
					0.37	0.37
H's migration 1974-97					3.65**	
					0.79	
Constant	-1.53**	-4.56**	-4.63**	-3.94**	-4.68**	-4.96**
	0.73	1.05	1.05	1.12	1.24	1.27
Log-likelihood	-263	-252	-249	-233	-213	-202
N	407	407	407	407	407	353

Source: GSOEP, Unweighted data. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.

to their family reunification.[16] In order to eliminate the potential distortion that migrant couples of this kind (i.e. "refugees") might make to the overall analysis, in Model 6 I restricted the sample to couples where the husband's first migration to Germany occurred prior to 1974 (i.e. "original male guestworkers"). As can be seen in the last column of Table 4.2, results remain mainly unchanged.

4.4.5. The duration of spouses' separation

Table 4.3 shows the effect that several factors have in accelerating (or delaying) the process of spouses' reunification in Germany, among those migrant couples where the husband preceded his wife in migration and he migrated to Germany prior to 1974. It is worth noting here that a negative coefficient in Accelerated Failure Time models implies a shorter duration of the episode until the event occurs, that is, a faster process of reunification.

By origin, Greek couples tend to reunify faster than Turkish ones (reference category). In fact, although the size of the "Greek" coefficient reduces as additional controls are added to the specification, it remains strongly significant (see Models 1 to 7). On the other hand, the tendency among Spanish wives to reunify with their husbands faster than Turkish ones does not become significant until all the control variables are added in Model 7. Neither Yugoslav nor Italian wives reveal significant differences in their pace of reunification with their husbands abroad, compared to Turkish ones.

More educated wives tend to join their husbands quicker. In contrast, the husband's education, which was found to substantially increase the likelihood of joint couple migration, does not appear to shorten significantly the spouses' time of separation in cases where the wife initially stayed behind (see

[16] In fact, only two couples out of all of the couples where the two partners entered Germany after 1973, did not migrate together.

coefficient "W's" and "H's" years of education" in Model 1). In difference to what I found for the joint couple migration decision, wives who had worked at the time their husband left for Germany do not appear to reunify with them quicker than wives who had never worked (see non-significant coefficient for "W's has ever worked" in Models 1 to 7). On the contrary, a stronger attachment to the local labor market appears to significantly delay the wife's migration to Germany in order to join her husband (see positive coefficient in Models 1 to 7 for the variable "years of work experience at the time of husband migration").

However, the effect of wife's labor experience on her pace of reunification with her husband appears to vary depending on when it was acquired. In Model 2 I have included a time-varying variable that indicates whether the woman worked or not the previous year. The large and negative coefficient obtained clearly suggests that working in the country of origin strongly increases the likelihood of joining the husband abroad in the following year, regardless of the total number of years of work experience the woman had at the time the husband had migrated himself. Although the size of the coefficient (B = -1.12 in Model 2) reduces substantially when additional controls are added to the model, it remains strongly significant and one of the largest effects (see B= -0.41 in Model 7).

The rationale underlying the effect of "work previous year" is not immediately evident. There is the possibility that women who are planning to migrate and join their partner abroad, decide to work in order to save money for the trip to be able to cover any unforeseen expenses that may result from migration. This is especially likely if the couple also wish to take their children with them abroad. However, alternatively, it may also occur that women decided to work while they are still at origin in order to meet the greater economic needs of the family during specific periods. Provided that they are already working in the origin country, couples might consider it better for the wife to migrate and work abroad since, this way, she will be able to obtain higher wages and make a greater contribution to the family budget.

The effect of the number and ages of children, added in Model 3, does not become apparent until additional controls are added over the following specifications of the model. As expected, more children extend the duration of the period of spouses' separation as expected (the positive coefficient in Model 3 becomes significant in Model 5, once macro-economic conditions at destination are controlled for).

On the other hand, having at least one child of pre-school age initially appeared to accelerate the migration of the mother (see negative significant coefficient B= -0.71 in Model 3); however, when additional controls were added this effect vanishes (see Model 5).

Model 4 confirms again the importance of period effects. Wives whose husbands migrated in the period 1968-70 and 1971-73 joined their husbands abroad quicker than wives whose husbands had migrated during the period 1960-67 (reference category). In order to investigate whether these "period effects" may reflect the higher demand for female labor in the late sixties and early seventies, in Model 5 I have added the annual rate of female unemployment in Germany as a proxy variable for female labor demand. First of all, the positive coefficient of the variable "rate of female unemployment in Germany" indicates that, in line with my prediction, worsening economic conditions in the host labor market tended to delay the wife's migration to Germany. Secondly, the importance of the period in which the husband had migrated, far from disappearing becomes larger and stronger. Moreover, after adding the variable "female unemployment rate in Germany", the time it takes the wife to join her husband in Germany substantially reduces not only among those whose husbands migrated after 1967 compared to those whose husbands migrated earlier, but also among those whose husbands migrated between 1970-73 and those whose husbands migrated between 1968-70. These results suggest that more recent cohorts of male immigrants tended to bring their wives to Germany in a shorter time than the first immigrant men; this reduction of the spouses' separation period seems to be an effect derived from the

development of wider and stronger support networks at destination that probably lowered the cost of wives' migration.

In contrast, better economic conditions in the country of origin measured through the variable "GDP country of origin" tended to delay the moment of the wife's migration, although the effect is only marginally significant (at 10% level, see Model 6). Note also that controlling for differences in the macro-economic conditions in the country of origin modifies the coefficients of "country of origin": it substantially increases the accelerating effect of being Greek and Spanish compared to Turks.

Finally, in Model 7, I have added to time-varying dummy variables –"halt" and "kindergeld"- that take value 1 in years 1974 and 1975, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The results obtained in Model 7 suggest that there was no accelerating effect on the process of spouses' reunification in 1974 (i.e. the first year after the halt on recruitment was imposed), since the coefficient for "halt" variable is negative but non-significant. On the other hand, the effect of "kindergeld" is strongly significant and negative. This result suggests that the reduction in the amount of money that immigrant families may expect to receive if they kept their children in the country of origin, instead of bringing them to Germany, effectively led some families that had remained separated up to that moment to ultimately reunify in Germany. However, this interpretation must be confirmed by analyzing whether the "kindergeld" reform also displayed an accelerating effect on the pace of children's reunification or not (see below).

Table 4.3. Estimates of the time that elapses until the reunification of the wife (Accelerated Failure Time Model, Weibull link)

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7
(ref. Turkey)							
Former Yug.	0.20 0.20	0.24 0.18	0.17 0.15	0.20 0.15	0.06 0.06	0.07 0.07	0.07 0.06
Greece	-0.84** 0.19	-0.69** 0.18	-0.46** 0.17	-0.65** 0.19	-0.28** 0.08	-0.39** 0.10	-0.39** 0.10
Italy	-0.06 0.25	0.06 0.25	0.00 0.18	-0.07 0.18	0.05 0.10	-0.18 0.17	-0.18 0.17
Spain	-0.26 0.27	-0.10 0.22	-0.03 0.18	-0.22 0.19	-0.08 0.11	-0.26* 0.14	-0.25* 0.14
W's age	-0.00 0.03	0.00 0.02	-0.00 0.02	-0.00 0.02	-0.00 0.01	-0.01 0.01	-0.00 0.01
H's age	-0.02 0.02	-0.01 0.02	-0.02* 0.01	-0.02 0.01	-0.00 0.01	-0.00 0.01	-0.00 0.01
Years since Marriage	0.00 0.02	-0.01 0.02	-0.01 0.01	-0.01 0.01	-0.00 0.01	-0.00 0.01	-0.00 0.01
W's Years of Education	-0.13** 0.06	-0.09* 0.05	-0.09** 0.04	-0.06 0.04	0.00 0.02	0.00 0.02	0.00 0.02
H's Years of Education	0.03 0.06	-0.03 0.05	-0.06 0.04	-0.07* 0.04	-0.02 0.02	-0.02 0.02	-0.02 0.02
(ref. never worked)							
W's has ever worked		-0.05 0.17	-0.06 0.14	-0.02 0.15	0.01 0.06	0.02 0.06	0.01 0.06
W's Years of work Experience		0.08** 0.02	0.07** 0.01	0.06** 0.01	0.02** 0.01	0.02** 0.01	0.02** 0.01
(ref. was not)							
W's worked the previous year		-1.12** 0.20	-1.10** 0.18	-1.09** 0.19	-0.43** 0.09	-0.42** 0.09	-0.41** 0.09
No. of children < 17			0.03 0.03	0.03 0.03	0.04** 0.02	0.04** 0.02	0.04** 0.02
(ref. no child < 17)							
Youngest child < 6			-0.71** 0.21	-0.61** 0.21	-0.12 0.13	-0.13 0.13	-0.12 0.13
(ref. no child < 17)							
Youngest child 6-16			-0.23 0.16	-0.12 0.17	0.07 0.10	0.06 0.11	0.06 0.11

(ref. H's mig. 1960-67)							
Rate of female unemployment					0.18** 0.01	0.18** 0.01	0.18** 0.01
GDP Country of Origin						0.00* 0.00	0.00* 0.00
(ref. year≠ 1974)							
Halt							-0.04 0.06
(ref. year≠ 1975)							
Kindergeld							-0.22** 0.10
Constant	4.19** 0.72	4.49** 0.66	5.44** 0.60	5.32** 0.64	2.50** 0.37	2.41** 0.37	2.36** 0.37
ln_p	0.65** 0.06	0.75** 0.05	0.89** 0.06	0.90** 0.06	1.48** 0.05	1.48** 0.05	1.51** 0.05
P	1.92 0.11	2.10 0.10	2.42 0.14	2.46 0.14	4.37 0.21	4.40 0.21	4.51 0.22
N	179	179	179	179	179	179	179
Log likelihood	-462	-432	-412	-403	-275	-274	-270

Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.

4.5. The timing of children's reunification

In the previous section I showed that children have a negative effect on the probability of couple joint migration to Germany. In addition, some evidence supporting the idea that such a negative effect is conditional on children's ages was also provided:

What remained unanswered was: why? Is it easier for migrant parents to leave school age children at origin because of lower emotional costs of separation, compared to infants and pre-school children? On the other hand, do children of school age display a positive effect on their parents' joint migration because they are taken at the same time to Germany as well and put into school, which permits their mothers to work outside the home and earn a wage? In this section, I intend to respond to these and other related

questions by examining the timing at which children are taken to Germany.

4.5.1. The sample: size, composition by origin and potential bias

This section's analysis is based on the sub-sample of children born to first generation immigrant couples who were married before the husband left for Germany for the first time. Wives in this sample had 942 children before they migrated to Germany,[17] of which I have been able to reconstruct the migration biography of 534 born to 261 reunited wives in my sample.[18] Therefore:

- I have complete information about the migration biography for only 57% of the children born to these immigrant couples. The reasons why the remaining 408 children are missing in GSOEP are primarily twofold: first, GSOEP only collects information on children who were living at their parents' household by the time the household was surveyed (i.e. 1983 in most cases); second, an unknown number of children were never brought to Germany by their parents but rather remained in their home country. In other words, I do not know how many of these children never migrated to Germany or how many did migrate but were not included in GSOEP because they had left their parents' household earlier than 1983.

- As a result of these "missing children", the process of children reunification is completely missed for 76 of 342 immigrant couples, where the mother migrated with or after the father, which represents 22% of my total sample of reunited couples with children.

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[17] Note that children born to reunited wives in Germany cannot be reunified. Note also that 18.5% of wives in these couples were childless at the time they migrated.

[18] 18% (162) of these children were born to immigrant women in the time that elapsed between their husbands' and their own migration to Germany, that is, they were born after their father had migrated to Germany.

These two facts imply that my sample of reunited children may be biased in two directions: children who still lived with their parents in 1984, that is to say younger children, and children from those countries whose migration stream to Germany prolonged until more recent times, are likely to be over-represented. In fact, Table 4.4 shows that in the sub-sample of reunited children available, children from Turkey are over-represented while Spanish children are under-represented. Only in the case of Italian children does the percentage in both samples coincide. Unfortunately, it is impossible to ascertain whether the under-representation of Spanish children is due to the fact that Spaniards were less likely to bring their children to Germany; or to the fact that Spaniards migrants had older children who had formed their own households when they (their parents) entered the survey; or to the fact that Spanish migration died out earlier than migration from other countries and, therefore, more children of Spaniards migrants had already returned to their home country by the time of GSOEP's inception. In any case, the over-representation of Turks might have had some consequences for the following empirical analysis, which will be drawn upon when relevant.

Table 4.4. Potential bias in child-mother's sample compared to total mothers' sample

Mother's Country of Origin	% in Whole Sample of Children	% in Whole Sample of Reunited Children	Percentage Points Differential
Turkey	47.0	57.1	+ 10.1
Former Yugoslavia	19.6	16.7	- 2.9
Greece	12.3	10.3	- 2.0
Italy	12.0	12.0	0
Spain	9.1	4.0	- 5.1
N	942	534	

Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data. Own elaboration.

I restricted the analysis to those children with complete information for all the independent variables included in the analyses and who were below 17 years old at the time of reunification, since German family reunification provisions only allowed the reunification of children below this age (migration of adult children is likely to have been a more independent decision, less influenced by the characteristics of their parents). As a result, the final working sample for the empirical analyses reduces from 534 to 489 children.

Children can also be sent to Germany earlier than their mother if they are of working age or, at least, of school age and there are other relatives at destination willing to look after them. Table 4.5 classifies the 489 children in the sample according to whether they migrated jointly with, later or earlier than their mother.[19]

Table 4.5. Type of child's migration (earlier, joint, later than mother)

Type	Turk	Yugoslav	Greek	Italian	Spanish	Total
Joint	55.8	75.6	49.1	75.4	89.5	62.0
Later	38.1	20.7	45.2	19.3	10.5	32.7
Earlier	6.1	3.7	5.7	5.3	0.00	5.3
Total	278	82	53	57	19	489

Source: GSOEP data. Own elaboration.

[19] I have also run a logistic regression model that examines the determinants of joint mother-child migration (versus "child migrates later"). A multinomial logistic model with triple outcome (joint, later and earlier than the mother) showed that the probability of a child to be sent to Germany earlier than her mother increases with Turkish origin, mother's work experience and the number of siblings. If any brother or sister migrates at the same time, the probability of anticipated child's migration decreases.

According to Table 4.5, approximately 60% of the children in the sample were taken with their mothers to Germany, while one third were brought later on. Only 5% preceded their mothers in migration to Germany (this percentage increased to 8.5% if children older than 16 at migration are included). Similarly to what I found in the case of the reunification of spouses, it is a remarkable fact that the greater number of children migrated simultaneously with their mothers. Moreover, more than half of married male immigrants took their wife and at least one child with them the same year they migrated themselves, which offers grounds to believe that joint family migration to Germany was more frequent than commonly thought. Important differences by country of origin emerge, though. While virtually all Spanish children in the sample were brought to Germany with their mothers (90%), this was the case only for half 50% of Greek children and 56% of Turks. Italian and Yugoslav children occupy an intermediate position between Greeks and Spaniards: 2/3 migrated jointly with the mother and 1/5 later on.

In the previous section, I attributed the divergence between dependants' entry at the aggregated level and the actual behavior revealed by the analysis at the individual level to the different timing in spouses and children's reunification in Germany. In particular, I hypothesized that the more prolonged pattern of dependants' entry among Greek immigrants was due to the delayed reunification of children, rather than delayed partners' reunification. On the other hand, the more compressed pattern family reunification among Yugoslav immigrants did not imply a higher propensity to reunify with the partner immediately but probably to a higher propensity to practice total family reunification (wife's and children's) at once. The next multivariate regression analysis will allow us to ascertain whether percentages in Table 4.5 reflect actual differences in the pattern of father-mother-child(ren) reunification across national groups or differences on other dimensions.

4.5.2. Hypothesis and explanatory variables

I have considered four major sets of factors that may affect the timing of children's reunification: 1) the child's characteristics (country of origin, age, sex) 2) structure of the households and its socio-economic characteristics (parents' age, parents' level of education, number of siblings and their ages), 3) the migration timing of other members of the household, 4) context of reception in the country of destination (unemployment level and legal measures restricting or easing reunification of foreign families).

Child's characteristics

Results obtained in the previous section indicated that mothers were less likely to migrate jointly with their husbands if they had children of pre-school age, which may be interpreted as a sign that separation from younger children entails higher emotional costs for their mothers but also as an indication that taking pre-school age children abroad is more costly than taking children that can be enrolled in school at destination. Thus, I expect the time elapsed since the father migrates until the child is brought to the immigration country to increase during the first years of birth and reduce after. In other words, I expect a bell-shaped effect of child's age on the time until his/her reunification.

With regard to potential gender differences in the timing of children's reunification, it is difficult to anticipate the direction of the effect, if it exists. In patriarchal cultures with a rigid division of gender roles, it might be preferred that daughters stay behind, so as not to be "contaminated" with the "modern" customs of life abroad. However, the same desire of maintain stricter "surveillance" over them might lead their parents to bring them to Germany in the first place. Thus, the effect of gender remains unclear in advance.

Finally, I will also examine differences across countries of origin, which are expected to reflect variations in family migration strategies rather than intrinsic differences between the children

themselves. In the previous section, I found that Greek and Italian mothers were the most likely to migrate with their husbands but, at the same time, official statistics suggested that, at the aggregated level, Italians (and Turks) had the most prolonged process of family reunification over time. Taking into account the fact that Italian immigrant couples faced fewer difficulties in returning periodically or having their children visit to Germany, one could expect Italian children to be reunified in Germany at a slower pace to the rest. Greek families, even though they did not enjoy the same privileges as Italians, are often presented as having the most temporary migration among the five recruitment countries, which would delay children's reunification also. However, all these "country" effects are likely to be strongly dependent on variations in the mother's pattern of reunification.

Structure of the household and its socio-economic characteristics

Previous research has suggested that couples where the two partners migrate together tend to be more educated than those involved in staggered couple migration (Houdagneau-Sotelo, 1994; Gupta, 2002). More precisely, more educated wives were found to be significantly more likely to migrate with their husbands, as my analysis in the previous section also showed. Although the reasons underlying such association are not completely clear yet,[20] I also expect that mother's education will reduce the time that elapses until children's reunification. On the one hand, it seems reasonable to expect, for instance, that more educated women will be more reluctant to rely on their relatives for solving their "own" family "problems" and, therefore, would

[20] Gupta (2002) suggests that more educated women maybe establish a more equalitarian relationship with their husbands and are, therefore, more likely to insist on migrating with their husbands or succeed in convincing them not to migrate at all. Houdagneu-Sotelo (1994), in contrast, found that couples that migrated together in her sample were totally dependent on the wife's family network abroad in their migration decision.

prefer to take their children with them to Germany, instead of leaving them behind with a relative. On the other hand, higher education often implies less fear in facing unknown places and settings, which may encourage mothers to take their children with them at once instead of waiting until they become familiar with the context of destination.

However, more education usually also entails stronger job commitment, which might function as a discouraging factor for taking children to the immigration country immediately, especially those of young age, if women wish to maximize their marketable time there. In order to separate these two potential opposite effects, I have included mother's education along with the mother's years of work experience at her date of migration, which is assumed to be a good predictor of her work intentions upon arrival.

Mother's age is also included as a control variable that may interfere with the net effect of both education and pre-migration work experience since it captures other potential effects of the family-life cycle on women's behavior.

On the other hand, the speed of the children's reunification process and family size are expected to be negatively related. Taking children abroad is a costly enterprise. Thus, the larger the number of siblings each child has to compete with for a trip ticket, the longer will be the time needed until he/she is the chosen one. It is possible, however, that not all the siblings compete on an equal level in the race for migration. Being the youngest or the eldest may affect the chances of being taking to Germany sooner or later, since it is a well-established fact that the order within the siblings affects differently the set of expectations and type of relationship that parents have with their children. Or more generally, siblings of pre-school age are likely to be taken to the immigration country later than their older brothers and sisters. In fact, the analysis in the previous section on wife's reunification, suggested that women who had only school age children were much more likely to migrate with their husband than women who either had no children, or had at least one of preschool age. In line with those

results, I will analyze whether having no sibling of pre-school age does increase or reduce the time that elapses until one's reunification. In principle, siblings of pre-school age are likely to delay the own process of reunification since parents are likely either to delay mother's migration or older siblings' migration in order not to leave young children with more distant relatives.

Migration of other members of the households

In order to find out whether family reunification among guestworkers took place all at once or in a staggered way, it is necessary to take into account the timing of migration of each household member and to analyze whether and how it influences the migration of the remaining members. However, the number of possible combinations grows as does the size of the family, which implies a high degree of difficulty for making predictions.

Since minors cannot work in the destination country, it is not likely for them to precede their mother's migration, especially if they are of a young age. On the contrary, the mother's migration is expected to speed up the children's reunification in the immigration country. This accelerating effect can be understood either as a "period effect" (i.e. children will be more likely to be reunified during the entire period of time after their mother migrated), or as a "year effect" (i.e. children will be more likely to be taken to Germany the same year as their mother migrates). Previous analysis has shown that only a tiny fraction of children in the sample joined their fathers in Germany before their mother migrated, which implies that the introduction of the aforementioned "period-effect" variable would barely improve our understanding of the underlying process, since we already know from the descriptive tables (see above) that about 95% of the children from the sample did actually migrate with or after their mother. It seems more appropriate then to examine the "year-effect" of mother's migration, especially because it will permit us to examine the more general issue of when and why family reunification takes place.

One of the most unexpected findings in the previous section was the large proportion of wives who migrated to Germany the same year as their husband did: what I have called "joint couple migration". This pattern of parents' migration is likely to influence also the subsequent pattern of children's reunification. In families where the mother initially remained in the country of origin when the father left, the reunification of children is likely to be delayed longer than in those cases where both parents had left at once. Note that while in the former case – parents' staggered migration - , the mother would be available to look after the children during the father's absence, while in the case of joint parents' migration she would not. Thus, children would have to stay with some other relatives (e.g. grandparents, older siblings, etc.), which may imply additional costs -such as estrangement- that would increase as separation prolongs. Thus, I expect "joint parents' migration" to shorten the time that elapses until children are brought to Germany.

Along the same lines, it is also important to investigate the effect that the migration of other siblings has on the own propensity to migrate. This effect, however, is likely to vary depending on whether the sibling's migration takes place at the same time as mother's migration or not. If the mother has already migrated, then it is expected that more than one child would have been taken at once to Germany since there is already a person at destination who can taker care of the children or, alternatively, a two-earners household that will be able to support (economically) more than one child at once. Yet, if the mother takes one sibling with her the first time she migrates to Germany, it seems reasonable to expect that the rest of sibling would have to wait some more time until their reunification is arranged since it is expensive and difficult for a first-time migrating mother to take more than one child at once. Thus, I would expect a sibling's migration to increase other siblings' chances of being taken to Germany, conditional on the fact that the second sibling's migration takes place once the mother has already migrated.

One of the most unexpected findings in the previous section was the large proportion of, what I have called, "joint couple migration" (i.e. wives who migrated to Germany the same year as their husband did). It seems reasonable to expect that joint parents' migration also implies a faster reunification of children, compared to children in families where the reunification of the mother and the father in Germany was delayed for several years. This is because in these cases the mother would be available to look after the children during the father's absence, whereas in the case of joint parents' migration she would not. If the mother has left, the children would have to stay with some other relatives (e.g. grandparents, older siblings, etc.), which may imply additional costs such as estrangement that would increase as separation prolongs. Thus, I expect for joint parents' migration to shorten the time elapsed until children are brought to Germany.

Context of Reception

One of main aims of this dissertation is to challenge the widespread view that foreign workers who originally migrated on a temporary basis made up their minds to stay because of the ban on further labor migration imposed by the German authorities in late 1973 (23rd November), and decided to settle permanently in Germany and bring their families. On the contrary, it is my belief that by the time the halt on recruitment was imposed, the large majority of guestworkers had already made their decisions with regard to family reunification. In fact, I have already demonstrated in the foregoing section that many of them had already brought their spouses to Germany prior to 1973 and, for those who had not, the halt on recruitment had only a slight accelerating effect on the decision to bring them. However, it remains to be seen whether migrants' decision about taking their children to Germany, which in principle implies a stronger intention of settling for a longer time or even permanently, was also little affected by the policy change and its implications or, on the contrary, had a more significant impact on this case. Following what I argued in chapter

2, I would rather expect for the change in the regulations of the family allowances, which was passed in January of 1975, to have had a much stronger effect on the migrants' decision to bring their children to Germany. In contrast to the halt on recruitment, the reform of the family allowances was a policy measure with immediate and specific consequences for the immigrant families still separated, which clearly encouraged the reunification of children by those parents who had not yet carried it out.

In any case, the effect of these two policy measures should be measured net of the effect of variations in the macro-economic conditions in Germany. Both measures were taken during a period of rising unemployment and declining growth of the German economy, which was expected to slow down the process of immigrants' permanent establishment there. Accordingly, in the following estimations I will include three time-varying covariates aimed at measuring the impact that changing conditions in the context of reception had on the timing of children's reunification: a dummy variable that takes value 1 in year 1974 and 0 otherwise, to capture the potential effect of the halt on recruitment; a dummy variable that takes value 1 in year 1975 and 0 otherwise, to measure the effect of the "kindergeld" reform; finally, the annual level of unemployment in Germany.

4.5.3. Results and discussion

In Table 4.6, I present the estimates of seven nested models where the effects of several factors hypothesized to affect the duration of child-father migration-related separation are examined. It is worth noting that a negative coefficient in accelerated failure time models must be interpreted as indicating that this covariate accelerates the occurrence of the event of interest or, alternatively, reduces the time elapsed until the event occurs.

According to my expectations, the reunification of children is delayed when they are of young age and increases as they get older (see in Model 1 the estimates of "Child's age" and "Child's

age square", which indicate the relation between child's age and time until his reunification follows a bell-shaped form). Mother's age displays the same kind of effect on the pace of children's reunification, quite probably because children do not migrate until their mother does it herself (see "M's age" and "M's age square" in Model 2). In other words, the mother is likely to wait until her children are of a certain age to migrate herself and take them with her to the immigration country. Although daughters appear to join their parents at the immigration country quicker than sons (see the negative sign of "sex" variable in Models 1, 2 and 3), the effect is only marginally significant and vanishes when additional controls related to the pattern of migration of other household's members are controlled for in Model 4.

On the other hand, the tendency of the more educated to have their family reunified at destination quicker than those with lower educational levels is confirmed here again (see the negative sign of the variable "M's years of education" in Model 2, which remains robust after including all the available controls in Model 7). In contrast, the effect of the father's education does not affect in a significant way the time that elapses before the children are reunified in Germany, although the sign is the expected one in all specifications. Finally, having a mother strongly attached to the paid labor force in her country of origin does not appear to delay her children's migration, as I had hypothesized (although the sign is also positive, this variable never reaches the level of statistical significance). Therefore, these results do not support the idea that those mothers who are more work-oriented would prefer to leave their children behind, for some time at least, in order to maximize their market time and their wages in Germany, which is a little unexpected.

Table 4.6. Estimates of the time that elapses until the reunification of children (Accelerated Failure Time Model, Weibull link)

Variable	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7
(ref. Turkey)							
Former Yug.	0.14* 0.08	0.11 0.08	0.11 0.08	0.04 0.07	0.04 0.07	0.09 0.06	-0.06 0.05
Greece	-0.63** 0.09	-0.64** 0.10	-0.66** 0.11	-0.68** 0.10	-0.62** 0.10	-0.55** 0.08	-0.23** 0.07
Italy	-0.16* 0.08	-0.13 0.08	-0.13 0.09	-0.17** 0.09	-0.18** 0.08	-0.18** 0.07	-0.09 0.06
Spain	-0.25* 0.13	-0.39** 0.13	-0.41** 0.13	-0.28** 0.13	-0.22* 0.13	-0.20** 0.10	-0.09 0.08
Sex (ref. man)	-0.10* 0.05	-0.10* 0.05	-0.10* 0.05	-0.06 0.05	-0.07 0.05	-0.06 0.04	-0.03 0.03
Child's age	0.07** 0.02	0.05** 0.02	0.05** 0.02	0.04* 0.02	0.05** 0.02	0.03* 0.02	0.02 0.02
Child's age sq.	-0.00** 0.00	-0.00** 0.00	-0.00** 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00
M's age		0.10** 0.03	0.10** 0.03	0.04 0.04	0.04 0.04	0.03 0.03	0.04** 0.02
M's age sq.		-0.00** 0.00	-0.00** 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00
M's years of education		-0.06** 0.02	-0.07** 0.03	-0.02 0.02	-0.04* 0.02	-0.03 0.02	-0.07** 0.02
F's years of education		-0.03 0.02	-0.03 0.02	-0.03** 0.02	-0.03* 0.02	-0.02 0.01	-0.01 0.01
M's years of work exp.		0.003 0.004	0.002 0.004	0.007* 0.004	0.005 0.004	0.002 0.003	0.003 0.002
(ref. no child)							
Children			0.00 0.02	0.06** 0.02	0.05** 0.02	0.00 0.02	-0.01 0.02
(ref. no sibling)							
Youngest sibling< 6			-0.10 0.13	0.25** 0.13	0.24** 0.12	0.26** 0.10	0.22** 0.08
Youngest sibling>= 6			-0.07 0.12	0.16 0.12	0.14 0.12	0.17* 0.10	0.04 0.08
(ref. other)							
Eldest			0.06 0.07	-0.04 0.07	-0.04 0.07	-0.01 0.06	-0.02 0.05

(ref. other)							
Youngest			0.03 0.07	0.06 0.07	0.11 0.07	0.12** 0.06	0.10** 0.05
(year≠ M's mig)							
M's migration				-0.70** 0.07	-1.04** 0.08	-0.75** 0.07	-0.55** 0.06
(year≠ S's mig)							
Sibling's migration				-0.56** 0.07	-0.92** 0.08	-0.70** 0.07	-0.57** 0.06
M's mig* Sib's mig					0.69** 0.11	0.43** 0.09	0.22** 0.07
(ref. no joint mig. of parents)							
Parents' Joint Mig						-0.35** 0.07	-0.26** 0.06
M's mig* F's mig						-1.25** 0.11	-1.19** 0.09
(ref. year other than 1974)							
Halt							-0.08 0.06
(ref. year other than 1975)							
Kindergeld							-0.38** 0.07
Rate of female unemployment							0.11** 0.01
Constant	2.60** 0.10	1.23* 0.64	1.23* 0.67	1.99** 0.66	2.07** 0.66	2.21** 0.54	1.85** 0.43
ln_p	0.64** 0.04	0.72** 0.04	0.73** 0.04	0.74** 0.04	0.75** 0.04	0.96** 0.04	1.16** 0.04
P	1.90** 0.07	2.06** 0.07	2.06** 0.08	2.10** 0.08	2.11** 0.08	2.61** 0.09	3.21** 0.11
N	426	426	426	426	426	426	426
Log likelihood	-1066	-1030	-1029	-778	-758	-656	-568

Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.

Model 3 adds to the previous specifications a set of covariates aimed at measuring the effect that variations in the composition of the household might have on the way in which families organize the reunification of their children in the country of immigration: number of siblings, their ages and whether the child is the eldest or the youngest sibling in the family. Quite surprisingly, none of these variables have a significant effect on the timing of children's migration and some of them even present the opposite sign to the one predicted (see Model 3). The picture, however, becomes much clearer as one includes in the model the effect that the migration of other relatives has on children's own migration in Models 4 to 6. Model 4 examines whether children are likely to be taken with their mother or siblings when these relatives migrate to Germany themselves. The variable "M's migration" takes value 1 the year the mother migrated to Germany and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the variable "S's migration" takes value 1 when one (or more) sibling(s) migrate to Germany and 0 otherwise. Therefore, what the large and negative coefficients of these two covariates in Model 4 indicate is that children were frequently taken with their mother or some of their siblings to Germany. However, these results must not be interpreted as an indication of a strong tendency for family joint migration yet. In fact, results in Model 6 rather suggest the opposite since the interaction term between the variables that indicates the date of mother' and sibling's migration (M's migration and S's migration, respectively) appears strongly significant, large in size and with positive sign. Moreover, after adding the interaction term to the model, the two main effects of the variable "year of mother's migration" and "year's of sibling's migration" become substantially larger in size. Put simply, children are likely to migrate either with their mother or with some of their sibling(s). Yet, if the mother decides to take another sibling with her, the rest of the children in the family are likely to see their own migration to Germany delayed.

On the other hand, after taking into consideration the timing of other relatives' migration, the effect of the set covariates accounting for variations in the size and structure of the household

such as the total number of siblings and their ages, turn significant in the direction expected. First of all, having more siblings delay one's own migration (see positive sign of variable "number of siblings" in Models 4 and 5) and, secondly, if there is at least one child of pre-school age in the household, the reunification of their siblings is also likely to be delayed (see the positive significant coefficient of the variable "youngest sibling <6 in Models 5 to 7). Finally, my expectation that children in households where the mother and the father migrated together are likely to be brought to Germany earlier than those whose parents' migration followed a staggered pattern, is also confirmed as the negative sign of the variable "parents' joint migration" in Model 6 indicates. This latest effect, however, may mean either that parents who migrated together tended to take their children with them all at once, or that parents who migrated together took a shorter time to bring their children to Germany, or maybe even both things at the same time. The introduction of the interaction between the variables that indicates the date of each parent's migration, which is strongly significant and very large in size, indicates that both facts accelerate the timing of children reunification, but the latter especially. That is: 1) children whose parents migrated together to Germany were much more likely to be brought there the same year as their parents and 2) children whose parents migrated together waited a shorter time until being reunified than children whose mother migrated some years later than their father. The former of these two effects, which is the largest by far, is quite unexpected since it entails the existence of a number relatively large of immigrant couples that not only migrated together to Germany but took at least one child with them. In order to determine the numerical importance of this pattern of family joint migration in my sample, I examined the data more carefully and found that couples who migrated with at least one child to Germany represent about 18% of the total sample of the families where at least the two spouses and any children reunified in Germany. Families

whose parents and at least two children migrated all at once represent about 10% of the whole sample.[21]

In the last specification included in Table 4.6, I have added three covariates aimed at capturing the effect that changing conditions in the German economy and the immigration legislation might have on explaining differences in the pattern of children's reunification followed by immigrant families in Germany. As I stated earlier, one of the main aims of this chapter and the whole dissertation is to test empirically the widespread idea of the supposed accelerating effect that the halt on recruitment had on the guestworkers' decision to stay permanently in Germany and send for their families left behind. In order to achieve this goal, I have added to Model 6 a time-varying covariate which indicates if the year is the year the halt was imposed or not (i.e. the variable "halt" takes value 1 when year=1974 and 0 otherwise). Note that I have decided to measure the impact of the halt one moth after it was imposed (23 November of 1973) and for a span of one year. In addition, I have also included another dummy time-varying covariate for year 1975, in order to capture the potential accelerating effect that the reform in family allowances introduced in January of that year might have had on the timing of children's reunification by their parents in Germany. Finally, the annual rate of unemployment, which rose substantially over these years, is also included.

In line with my argument and according to the results shown in Table 4.6, the halt apparently had no significant effect on the pace at which immigrant families brought their children to Germany (although the sign is negative, the coefficient is still far from reaching the significance level). On the contrary, the reform

[21] By country of origin, 33% of these couples were Turk, 20% Italian, 20% Greek, 20% from the former Yugoslavia and 5% from Spain, which practically matches the distribution by origin of the sub-sample of women who migrated jointly with their husbands. In addition, it is important to say that approximately 80% of mothers who followed this migration family pattern (i.e. couple+at least one child at once) had 2 or more children by the time they migrated.

of family allowances clearly enhanced the children's likelihood of being taking to Germany by their parents (see the negative sign of the variable "kindergeld" in Model 7). Finally, unemployment at the country of destination appears to have delayed the process of children's reunification which, along with the previous finding, reinforces the idea that immigrant families were very responsive to their current economic situation and prospects in the host country when they organized the order and timing of their members' reunification.

Given the importance of the result concerning the lack of effect of the halt on recruitment on the pattern and timing of family reunification, I have tried to operationalize this variable in several other ways: 1) making the variable "halt" to take value 1 in 1973, instead of 1974; 2) tuning the variable "halt" into a period-effect variable, which takes value in all the years following the halt on recruitment (1974-2000) and 0 in all the years that preceded the measure (1960-1973); 3) turning the variable "halt" into a period effect that takes value 1 in the four years following the halt and 0 in the remaining years. The results for all these alternative estimations are included in Appendix C, where it is shown that the results remained unchanged.

Finally, it is desirable to examine whether differences in the pattern of children's reunification by country of origin still emerge after having controlled for all the aforementioned factors or, better, to examine how the different patterns initially observed between origin groups modify as additional controls are added. At first, children from all the countries considered here (except those from the former Yugoslavia) appeared to have been brought to Germany quicker than their Turkish counterparts. Furthermore, these differences did not seem to be attributable to differences in the size and composition of the families by country of origin, or even to differences in the timing of the parents' migration (see Models 4 to 6); Italian, Spanish and, above all, Greek children systematically appeared to be taken to Germany earlier than their Turkish counterparts. However, this picture changed substantially after controlling for the variation in the German macro-economic

situation and the immigration legislation in Model 7. After adding these controls, only Greek children remained the ones being reunified quickest, even in the size of the coefficient reduced substantially. In contrast, differences between Turks and the other national groups became non-significant. The Greek "exceptionalism" reappears here again, as it did in the analysis of the reunification of spouses.[22]

4.6. Conclusions

In this article I have examined the family reunification of a sample of original male guestworkers in Germany, distinguishing between the process of wife's and children's reunification. With regard to the wife's migration, one of the most striking findings is that approximately half of the immigrant couples in the sample had migrated together (i.e. in the same year) to Germany. Joint couple migration appeared to be common among educated couples, where: the wife had some work experience at the time; less children; if they had no pre-school children and during the peak years of recruitment (1968-1973). When the couple did not migrate together, the wife's reunification tended to happen quicker if the wife had worked the year before, if she had few children, if female unemployment in Germany was low, and if the husband had migrated more recently (i.e. in 1968-1970, or above all in 1970-1973). By country of origin, joint couple migration was much more likely among Greek and Italian immigrants than in the rest of the groups considered in this article, especially compared to Turks. Moreover, Greek husbands also tended to bring their wives quicker than other male immigrants in the sample, in the case that they had not migrated together.

The process of children's reunification in Germany appears to be strongly conditioned by the characteristics of the mother and

[22] In Appendix D, I run the same model only for families of Turkish origin.

the timing of her own migration. Children born to more educated mothers join their parents abroad quicker. In addition, the migration of the mother, especially if it occurred simultaneously with the fathers, greatly accelerates the migration of her children. On the other hand, the migration of other siblings in the family also accelerated one's own migration, unless the sibling migrated along with the mother. In this case, own migration delays. Moreover, children with pre-school age siblings tend to take longer before they join their parents abroad, perhaps because mothers in this situation also delay their own migration. Greek children tended also to join their parents abroad earlier than children of other origins.

The halt on recruitment, contrary to what most conventional accounts would have suggested, does not appear to have accelerated the pace of family reunification, neither the wives' nor the children's, among those immigrant families who still lived apart when the measure was imposed in 1973. According to the results obtained, the reform of the children allowances approved in January of 1975, in contrast, did trigger the process of family reunification. Of course, there is also the possibility that the potential accelerating effect of the halt on recruitment on the process of family reunification was not immediate but it took at least one year for it to manifest itself fully. In this case, the acceleration of the process of reunification observed in 1975 would be due to the cumulated effect of the two measures, the halt and the children's allowances reform.

APPENDIX
CHAPTER 4

Appendix A. The changing effect of independent variables depending on the time at which the analysis is carried out

Logit estimates of joint couple migration (ref. delayed reunification)

	At wife's migration	At husband's migration
(ref. Turkey)		
Former Yugoslavia	-0.13 0.35	-0.02 0.34
Greece	1.32*** 0.46	1.31*** 0.45
Italy	0.96** 0.44	1.02** 0.42
Spain	0.41 0.52	0.24 0.49
W's Age	0.07** 0.04	0.08** 0.04
H's age	0.01 0.04	0.00 0.04
Years since Marriage	**-0.04** **0.04**	**-0.08*** **0.04**
W's Years of Education	0.15 0.11	0.15 0.11
H's Years of Education	0.15** 0.08	0.15** 0.08

(ref. never worked)		
W's Ever worked	0.71** 0.31	0.75** 0.30
W's Years of work Experience	-0.04 0.03	-0.05 0.03
Number of children < 17	-0.51*** 0.13	-0.38** 0.15
(ref. no children < 17)		
Youngest child < 6	0.24 0.45	0.02 0.43
Youngest child 6-16	**-0.91**** **0.44**	**1.26**** **0.53**
(ref. H's mig. 1960-1967)		
H's migration 1968-1970	0.93*** 0.33	0.93*** 0.33
H's migration 1971-1973	0.77** 0.38	0.92** 0.37
Constant	-4.76*** 1.32	-4.96*** 1.27
Pseudo R2	0.2035	0.1711
Observations	353	353

Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data. *Significant at 90%. **Significant at 95%.

Appendix B

Life table of duration of spouses' separation (conditional probabilities)

Interval		Beg. Total	Cum. Failure	Std. Error	Hazard	Std. Error	[95% Conf.	Int.]
2	3	181	0.0276	0.0122	0.0276	0.0124	0.0090	0.0566
3	4	176	0.0497	0.0162	0.0227	0.0114	0.0062	0.0498
4	5	172	0.0773	0.0199	0.0291	0.0130	0.0094	0.0595
5	6	167	0.0939	0.0217	0.0180	0.0104	0.0037	0.0433
6	7	164	0.1602	0.0273	0.0732	0.0211	0.0378	0.1200
7	8	152	0.1823	0.0287	0.0263	0.0132	0.0072	0.0577
8	9	148	0.1989	0.0297	0.0203	0.0117	0.0042	0.0488
9	10	145	0.2376	0.0316	0.0483	0.0182	0.0194	0.0901
10	11	138	0.2928	0.0338	0.0725	0.0229	0.0347	0.1238
11	12	128	0.3315	0.0350	0.0547	0.0207	0.0220	0.1020
12	13	121	0.4033	0.0365	0.1074	0.0298	0.0572	0.1732
13	14	108	0.4530	0.0370	0.0833	0.0278	0.0381	0.1460
14	15	99	0.5304	0.0371	0.1414	0.0378	0.0773	0.2245
15	16	85	0.5856	0.0366	0.1176	0.0372	0.0564	0.2010
16	17	75	0.6077	0.0363	0.0533	0.0267	0.0145	0.1169
17	18	71	0.6519	0.0354	0.1127	0.0398	0.0486	0.2031
18	19	63	0.7072	0.0338	0.1587	0.0502	0.0761	0.2712
19	20	53	0.7293	0.0330	0.0755	0.0377	0.0206	0.1654
20	21	49	0.7514	0.0321	0.0816	0.0408	0.0222	0.1789
21	22	45	0.8011	0.0297	0.2000	0.0667	0.0915	0.3503
22	23	36	0.8287	0.0280	0.1389	0.0621	0.0451	0.2845
23	24	31	0.8619	0.0256	0.1935	0.0790	0.0710	0.3764
24	25	25	0.8895	0.0233	0.2000	0.0894	0.0649	0.4097
25	26	20	0.9061	0.0217	0.1500	0.0866	0.0309	0.3612
26	27	17	0.9337	0.0185	0.2941	0.1315	0.0955	0.6024
27	28	12	0.9503	0.0162	0.2500	0.1443	0.0516	0.6021
28	29	9	0.9613	0.0143	0.2222	0.1571	0.0269	0.6191
29	30	7	0.9779	0.0109	0.4286	0.2474	0.0884	1.0321
31	32	4	0.9890	0.0078	0.5000	0.3536	0.0606	1.3929
36	37	2	0.9945	0.0055	0.5000	0.5000	0.0127	1.8444
39	40	1	1.0000	.	1.0000	1.0000	0.0253	3.6889

Appendix C

Alternative codifications of the "posthalt" variable

Variable	Posthalt =1 if year==1974	Posthalt =1 if year==1973	Posthalt =1 if year>1973
(ref. Turkey)			
Former Yugoslavia	0.07 0.06	0.07 0.06	0.07 0.06
Greece	-0.39** 0.10	-0.34** 0.11	-0.38** 0.10
Italy	-0.18 0.17	-0.15 0.17	-0.16 0.18
Spain	-0.25* 0.14	-0.21 0.14	-0.24* 0.14
Years of marriage	-0.00 0.01	-0.00 0.01	-0.01 0.01
W's age at H's migration	-0.00 0.01	-0.00 0.01	-0.00 0.01
H's age at migration	-0.00 0.01	-0.00 0.01	-0.00 0.01
W's years of education	0.00 0.02	0.00 0.02	0.00 0.02
H's years of education	-0.02 0.02	-0.02 0.02	-0.02 0.02
(ref. never worked)			
W's ever worked	0.01 0.06	0.01 0.06	0.02 0.06
Years of Work experience	0.02** 0.01	0.02** 0.01	0.02** 0.01
(ref. not at work the year prior to H's mig.)			
Work the year prior to H's mig	-0.41** 0.09	-0.40** 0.09	-0.41** 0.09
Number of children	0.04** 0.02	0.04** 0.02	0.04* 0.02

(ref. no children)			
Youngest child<6	-0.12 0.13	-0.11 0.12	-0.12 0.13
Youngest Child 6-16	0.06 0.11	0.07 0.10	0.06 0.10
(ref. H's mig. 1960-65)			
H's mig. 1966-1970	-0.67** 0.06	-0.69** 0.06	-0.67** 0.06
H's mig. 1970-1973	-0.97** 0.08	-0.98** 0.08	-0.97** 0.08
Rate of unemployment	0.18** 0.01	0.19** 0.01	0.18** 0.02
GDP country of origin	0.00* 0.00	0.00* 0.00	0.00* 0.00
(ref. year≠1974)			
Halt	**-0.04** **0.06**		
Kindergeld	-0.26** 0.08	-0.25** 0.08	-0.26** 0.08
(ref. year≠1973)			
Halt		**0.14**** **0.06**	
(ref. year 1960-1973)			
Halt			**0.04** **0.09**
Constant	2.36** 0.37	2.29** 0.36	2.38** 0.37
ln_p	1.51** 0.05	1.52** 0.05	1.51** 0.05
N	353	353	353
Log likelihood			

Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.

Appendix D

Time until child's reunification (all comparing to only for Turks)

Variable	All nationalities	Only Turks
Former Yug. (ref. Turkey)	-0.06	
	0.05	
Greece (ref. Turkey)	-0.23**	
	0.07	
Italy (ref. Turkey)	-0.09	
	0.06	
Spain (ref. Turkey)	-0.09	
	0.08	
Sex (ref. man)	-0.03	-0.00
	0.03	0.04
Child's age	0.02	0.01
	0.02	0.02
Child's age sq.	-0.00	-0.00
	0.00	0.00
M's age	0.04**	0.12**
	0.02	0.03
M's age sq.	-0.00	-0.00**
	0.00	0.00
M's years of education	-0.07**	-0.08**
	0.02	0.02
F's years of education	-0.01	0.03**
	0.01	0.01
M's years of work exp.	0.003	0.00
	0.002	0.00
Children (ref. no child)	-0.01	-0.03*
	0.02	0.02
Youngest sibling< 6 (ref. no sibling)	0.22**	0.33**
	0.08	0.12

Youngest sibling>= 6 (ref. no sibling)	0.04	0.16
	0.08	0.11
Eldest (ref. other)	-0.02	0.09*
	0.05	0.05
Youngest (ref. other)	0.10**	0.02
	0.05	0.05
M's migration (ref. year≠ M's mig)	-0.55**	-0.39**
	0.06	0.08
Sibling's migration (ref. year≠ S's mig)	-0.57**	-0.47**
	0.06	0.06
M's mig* Sib's mig	0.22**	0.16*
	0.07	0.09
Parents' Joint Mig (ref. no joint mig. of parents)	-0.26**	-0.09
	0.06	0.07
M's mig* F's mig	-1.19**	-1.35**
	0.09	0.12
Halt (ref. year other than 1974)	-0.08	-0.05
	0.06	0.07
Kindergeld (ref. year other than 1975)	-0.38**	-0.25**
	0.07	0.07
Rate of female unemployment	0.11**	0.09**
	0.01	0.01
Constant	1.85**	-0.14
	0.43	0.52
ln_p	1.16**	1.31**
	0.04	0.05
P	3.21**	3.70
	0.11	0.17
N	426	256
Log likelihood	-568	-320

Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.

Appendix E

Type of migration by year of arrival (percentage)

Year of Migration	Adult Males	Non-reunited Females	Reunited Females	Children
1956	66.67	0	33.33	0
1957	90	10	0	0
1958	60	20	20	0
1959	76.19	14.29	4.76	4.76
1960	76.36	12.73	9.09	1.82
1961	67.61	16.9	14.08	1.41
1962	60	18.67	10.67	10.67
1963	58.9	26.03	8.22	6.85
1964	57.94	26.17	11.21	4.67
1965	48.94	27.66	14.89	8.51
1966	50	28.57	13.27	8.16
1967	45.28	24.53	13.21	16.98
1968	53.54	25.2	8.66	12.6
1969	56.72	17.54	16.42	9.33
1970	50.18	15.79	16.14	17.89
1971	46.33	24.31	11.47	17.89
1972	44.17	23.79	20.39	11.65
1973	48	20	12.44	19.56
1974	27.27	22.73	21.82	28.18
1975	17.91	32.84	14.93	34.33
1976	23.19	20.29	8.7	47.83
1977	24.36	25.64	20.51	29.49
1978	20.62	26.8	12.37	40.21
1979	33.88	24.79	14.88	26.45
1980	25.66	35.4	12.39	26.55

1981	29.82	36.84	10.53	22.81
1982	27.27	33.33	15.15	24.24
1983	29.17	41.67	8.33	20.83
1984	23.53	47.06	5.88	23.53
1985	22.22	51.85	7.41	18.52
1986	37.93	48.28	13.79	0
1987	35.29	52.94	2.94	8.82
1988	34.48	55.17	3.45	6.9
1989	40.43	31.91	14.89	12.77
1990	28.57	40.82	6.12	24.49
1991	40.74	37.04	7.41	14.81
1992	45.45	34.85	7.58	12.12
1993	48.08	23.08	23.08	5.77
1994	31.25	62.5	6.25	0
1995	37.5	37.5	18.75	6.25
1996	50	33.33	16.67	0
1997	42.86	42.86	0	14.29
1998	30	40	10	20

Source: GSOEP 2002.

CHAPTER 5. THE PROCESS OF FAMILY FORMATION. MARITAL CHOICES AND HOUSEHOLD FORMATION

5.1. Introduction

Most immigrants who migrate as single people are likely to end up marrying someone and eventually having children during their stay abroad, as long as they do not return too soon to their homelands. The importance of studying the process of family formation among immigrants and their marital choices in particular derives from the crucial influence that the type of chosen partner is expected to have on the relations that immigrants maintain with the native population, their own immigrant community and, ultimately, also with their country of origin. As Nauck bluntly put it "[…] *whether the marriage partner is selected among the members of native population, the own immigrant community or the group at the country of origin has extensive consequences for the own integration process and further mobility options, for the socialization and acculturation process of the children coming out from these unions and for the arrangement of the family-related social capital*" (2001).

While there are no clear clues as to how the process of family reunification affects the process of integration, there is widespread consensus around the idea that mixed marriages are the kind of marital choice that are more likely to favor integration. Surveys systematically reveal that family is the sphere where individuals

(immigrants or not) seek less inter-ethnic relations and, accordingly, bi-national couples are seen as indicating the maximum level of integration on behalf of the immigrant partner. On the other hand, endogamous marriages are likely to entail greater difficulties for the integration of the family members into the wider relationship system of the receiving society since they offer a "safer" context for interactions, which renders contacts with the outside group less necessary, and because they are also subjected to stronger social control from their peers.

In principle, marriages within the own immigrant community and marriages with someone from the country of origin are both endogamous marriages.[1] Therefore, one could assume that these two marital choices would make no difference with regard to their potential impact on the immigrants' prospects for integration. However, there are some differences between these two variants of endogamous marriage that may be relevant in this respect. First of all, in couples made up of two co-national immigrants both partners would have similar knowledge about the host country, its language and its customs by the time they meet. In addition, their decisions to migrate were made independently of each other and, therefore, they are likely to have benefited equally from the intense selection process involved in migration. In contrast, in couples where one immigrant has imported his/her partner from their country of origin for the purpose of marriage and family-formation, the importer will have a better knowledge of the receiving society, which may obviously affect the power balance within the couple and perhaps also the integration prospects not only of the imported partner but of the children and the entire family too.

Ultimately, the question about the relation between the type of partner and the level of integration reached by the members of the

[1] I write "in principle" because nationality and ethnic origin do not necessarily coincide in the migration context. A marriage between two Turkish nationals in Germany might not be an endogamous marriage if, for instance, one of the partners is Kurd and the other is not.

families resulting from different kinds of marital choice is an empirical one. This issue has been partly addressed recently in the case of mixed marriages and economic assimilation (Baker and Benjamin, 1997; Meng and Gregory, 2005; Kantarevic, 2004). These studies conclude that there is a positive correlation between inter-ethnic marriage and economic assimilation among immigrants, although in some cases such an intermarriage premium vanishes when selection is controlled for (Kantarevic, 2004).

Aside from this limited evidence of earnings assimilation, there is no study that investigates whether immigrants who mix-marry and their descendants perform differently in other spheres of social and economic life like fertility, human capital investments, housing, etc. Moreover, the absence of empirical studies is total when it comes to the potential differential impact of endogamous marriages depending on whether they result from the union of two co-national immigrants in the host country or, alternatively, from the importation of one partner by the one who resides abroad. This is particularly noteworthy when one takes into account that the phenomenon of the importation of spouses has been paid a lot of attention in the recent political debate about immigration in several European countries such as Netherlands, Denmark and UK.

According to estimates from the Dutch Central Register for non-Dutch nationals, 22% of total immigration corresponded to family formation, versus 17% to family reunion and 6.4% to accompanying family members (arriving the same year as their relatives). In 2002, the Principles of Government Policy noted that 75 percent of the members of two of the three biggest immigrant groups (Turks and Moroccans) seek spouses from their or their parents' country of origin. According to Netherlands Statistics, in the period 1995-2003 family formation migration to the Netherlands rose by more than eight thousand, thus making it the largest category of immigrants (approximately one in four immigrants). On the other hand, since 1996 family reunion migration to the Netherlands has dwindled. Most family formation

immigrants (one in three in 2003) came from Turkey and Morocco and were women between 20 and 30 years old (Han and Sprangers, 2004).

The arrival of people migrating for family formation purposes is seen by the Dutch public and politicians as an indication that integration simply has not happened; otherwise, immigrants and their children would find partners in the Netherlands (van Selm, 2005). Accordingly, the general approach to family formation in Dutch legislation has increasingly hardened in recent years. A legislative reform passed in November 2004 has established that a Dutch national or foreign resident who brings his/her partner from abroad must have an income of at least 120 percent of the minimum salary for the Netherlands (1,319 Euros net per month, excluding holidays allowance) and have an employment contract for at least one year.[2] In addition, a naturalized Dutch citizen, or non-EU national residing in the Netherlands, must be over 21 to be permitted to bring a would-be spouse into the country. The spouse-to-be must also be over 21. By raising the age limit the Minister hopes to prevent a situation in which the person forming the family gives up his studies, thereby hindering his integration into Dutch society and his ability to find employment (Goudsmit, 2004). Furthermore, a new law approved by the lower chamber of parliament in April 2005 would amend the 2000 Aliens Act by introducing language and culture testing prior to the granting of an entry visa for residency purposes, which would primarily affect non-Dutch spouses-to-be. All the aforementioned restrictions seem to have been effective: the number of applicants requesting a temporary stay authorization for family formation or for family

[2] The Directive on the right to family reunification specifies, as an income requirement, that the head of family should be able to maintain his family members without recourse to the social assistance system, for which purpose account may be taken of the level of 'minimum national wage'. It is questionable whether the increase in the income requirement to 120% of the minimum wage is in keeping with this provision of the Directive.

reunification dropped 23 per cent in the first eight months of 2005 compared to the same period for 2004.

In Denmark, some studies estimate that 86% of first generation immigrants from the former Yugoslavia, Turkey and Pakistan and 75% of middle and second generation had an imported partner in 1998 (Celikaksoy et al., 2002).[3] In 2002, a new Aliens Act was passed aimed basically at toughening the legal conditions for the admission of newly married spouses. In fact, the reform suppressed the statutory right to reunification with a spouse since it was established that no reunification of spouses would be granted if one of the spouses is younger than 24. The generally more lenient access to reunification with refugee spouses was also abolished in all cases where the marriage was only entered into after the flight to Denmark. Furthermore, the spouses' aggregate ties with Denmark must be stronger than their aggregate ties with any other country (ties requirement), and the spouse living in Denmark must prove that he or she earns enough to be able to maintain his or her foreign spouse and, additionally, must provide financial security of DKK 50,000 to cover any future public expenses for assistance granted to the foreign spouse.

In Belgium, Lievens' estimates, based on the 1991 Census, suggested that almost 70% of Turks and more than 50% of Moroccans were potential importers (1999: 723). Despite these figures, Belgium has a fairly liberal marriage migration policy, which does not impose either a housing or income requirement on those immigrants willing to bring their marriage partners from origin. A reason why the Belgian legislation continues to be so tolerant concerning immigration for the purpose of family formation is because cascade family migration is forbidden and, therefore, middle generation immigrants cannot import their marriage partners from the country of origin. However, such a

[3] This author defined "middle generation" as children of guestworkers who were born abroad and immigrated to Denmark before the age of eight. Remember that I, in contrast, have defined "middle generation" as children born abroad and who immigrated at age between 6 and 16.

prohibition becomes virtually ineffective because of the bi-lateral agreements still in force between Belgium and Morocco and Turkey, which establish that nationals from these two countries who are employed and have a work contract for more than one month are allowed to bring their partners to Belgium.

In the UK, acceptances for settlement for marriage have comprised between 40-50 per cent of total acceptances or non-asylum inflow, a figure that has not varied much since 1975. If one focuses on entries from the Indian sub-continent, entries for the purpose of marriage have largely surpassed the number of entries due to the reunification of spouses (Coleman, 2004: 16). In the context of the increasing politicization of the immigration debate, three of the fourteen recommendations recently put forward by the Kirkhope Commission, leaded by the head of the conservatives in the EU Parliament, are aimed at curbing the inflow of immigrant spouses. More precisely, the Commission recommended imposing an effective income requirement for those wishing to bring their spouses from abroad or, alternatively, to require them to be a British citizen in order to be allowed to import his/her partner. In addition, it was also recommended to raise to 21 years old the minimum age for any sponsor to be authorized to bring in his/her spouse ("Building a Fair Immigration System for the UK, Sept. 2004).

In contrast to what has been said so far with regard to other European countries, Germany tackled the phenomenon of newly married partners imported by foreign residents who were previously established in the federal territory very early. In Chapter 2 I thoroughly described the decree approved in 1981 in this respect. However, such an early reaction has not been accompanied by a systematic analysis of this particular type of immigration linked to the process of family formation of single immigrants as they reach marriageable age. As Nauck (2001) has emphasized in his extensive review of the literature on families and immigration, the number of studies devoted to the issue of marriage choices among immigrants in Germany is still very limited. On the one hand, most of the studies currently available

have focused on bi-national marriages and are exclusively based on the time series of registered mix-national marriage ceremonies celebrated in Germany and, therefore, counted by the German registers. As he warned, these are only aggregated figures that result from various overlapping processes over time and cannot be taken as an indication of social distance or, alternatively, assimilation. On the other hand, as he also pointed out, empirical analyses concerning the structure of international marriage markets and how they affect immigrants' marital choices are completely absent both in and out of Germany (see Lievens, 1999 for the only exception).

This chapter intends to shed some light on these issues. In particular, I examine the process of family formation among immigrants in Germany and, further, the factors underlying the marital choices of immigrants who marry during their stay in Germany.

5.2. Theoretical explanations for mixed marriages and the importation of spouses

In his review of the literature concerned with the factors underlying intermarriage and homogamy, Kalmijn (1998) identified three types of factors that shape individuals' partner choices: 1) the preferences of the individuals for certain characteristics in a spouse, 2) the influence of the social group of which they are members and, 3) the potential constraints imposed by the structure of the marriage market where they are searching for a spouse.

In the context of immigration, individual preferences (the first set of factors) have been the focus of the analyses inspired by the assimilationist approach, which predicts higher rates of intermarriage for the second and subsequent generations and for more educated individuals within the immigrant group. When they reach marriageable age, second generation immigrants have spent their whole lives in the host country, are fluent in its language and

have only attended its school system. Furthermore, some of them may have even acquired its nationality. All these circumstances, which imply partial or total socialization within the culture of the host country, increase their chances of establishing "normalized" contacts with members of the native population and will probably favor the development of personal values that soften prejudices and stereotypes about their "ideal" partner.

On the other hand, the acquisition of country-specific education by second generation immigrants, in particular of high level degrees, is also expected to increase their opportunities of meeting native potential partners. This is especially applicable in countries like Germany where the strong link between the vocational training system and the labor market produces strong job segmentation between Germans and minority ethnic groups (Granato and Kalter, 2000; Müller et al., 1998; Blossfeld & Mayer, 1988). In addition, higher education is also believed to weaken attachments with the group of origin and, consequently, to blur the cultural barriers against marriage out of their own group (Hwang et al., 1995, cited in Kalmiijn, 1998: 401).

Along with individual characteristics that indicate more or less assimilation into the host society, the structure of the marriage market has also been identified emphasized as a key factor in explaining the marital behavior of minority groups like immigrants (the third set of variables in the Kalmijn's scheme). The "opportunity theory" formulated by Blau (1977) emphasized, among others, the constraints for individuals' marital choices that derive from sex imbalances within the (partial) marriage market where individuals search for a partner, and the size of the own group within the local marriage market. The larger the size of the own group, the more the (statistical) chances of endogamous contacts, and greater the sources of social control as well. Accordingly, a negative relationship between the own group's size and propensity to mix-marry is expected. On the contrary, sex imbalances within the own group are likely to increase intermarriage rates for the minority sex at least, since the less

marriageable women (men) within the same group the more likely they will be to marry a woman (man) from outside.

The empirical evidence available so far has widely confirmed the predictions made by both the "assimilationist" and the "structuralist" approaches with respect to the propensity to mix-marry among immigrants, both in the US (Lieberson & Waters, 1985, 1988; Alba & Golden, 1986; Pagnini & Morgan, 1990; Lee & Yamanaka, 1990; Kalmijn, 1993; Rosenfeld, 2002; Kulczycki & Lobo, 2002) and in Europe (Kane & Stephen, 1988; Lievens, 1998; Klein, 2001; Botelho and Aagaard-Hansen, 2002).

Compared to mixed marriages, the practice of importing partners from the country of origin is generally seen as the type of marital choice that indicates the lowest level of assimilation among immigrants. Individuals who import their partner reveal an intense preference for marrying a particular type of partner within their own ethnic group: one who still lives in the origin country and, therefore, has no contact with the host country. Although sex imbalances within immigrant populations are, at least, partially responsible for male immigrants importing their partners, the few studies available to date on this issue have rather stressed the role of traditional values and the wish for "unspoiled" wives in explaining the practice of importing brides, especially among Turks (Lievens, 1999; Celikaksoy et al., 2003).[4]

The preference for imported partners among immigrant women, though, cannot be interpreted as the logical response to the shortages of marriageable men within the own immigrant group since the numerical predominance of males remains in the middle generation and, sometimes, even in the second generation as well. The existing literature has typically referred to what Kalmijn calls "the influence of the social group of reference" and,

[4] For a complete review of the issue of bi-national marriages and marriage migration among immigrants in Germany see Nauck (2001).

more precisely, to the pressures exerted by the woman's family as the most decisive factor in these cases.[5]

The survival of substantial migratory pressure and the practice of arranged marriages within the own kinship group in some sending countries have made migrant's single daughters a valuable asset for their parents. By arranging a marriage of this type, the bride's parents often obtain higher bride "prices" from the groom's family in exchange for the possibility of legal admittance to Western Europe. In addition, the bride's parents may also express a sense of loyalty to their own origins, especially if the groom comes from the own family at origin. In fact, several authors have highlighted the numerical importance of consanguineous marriages within some immigrant groups in Western European countries (Reiners, 1998, Haugh, 2002).

Apart from these potential benefits for the bride's family, to import a partner may secure the importer woman a better position - in terms of bargaining power- within the couple because she is the one who already knows the country where the couple will settle. In his analysis of the marital choices of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Belgium, Lievens (1999) emphasized this aspect of marriage migration involving female importers and concluded that "women may marry an imported partner in order to satisfy modern goals" (717). However, similar studies carried out for Turkish and other Muslim immigrant communities in the Netherlands and Denmark do not find support for such an hypothesis (Hooghiemstra, 2001; Celikaksoy et al., 2003).

[5] Note that while among men the choice of an imported bride is seen as a voluntary decision motivated by traditionalist considerations, women's decision to import are often considered as decisions imposed by others. In the assimilationist rationale, the logical preference for middle and second generation immigrant women would be co-national immigrants or native partners, rather than imported ones.

5.3. Marital behavior of immigrants in Germany

5.3.1. Mixed marriages and importation of spouses in German Official Statistics

According to the Federal Statistics Office, the annual percentage of mixed marriages celebrated over the total number of marriages in Germany was 17.5% in 2000 and 18.5% in 2001. Approximately 35% were between German women and foreign men, 49% between German men and foreign women, and 16% between both non-German nationals. In other words, every sixth marriage involved at least one foreign partner in 2001. This percentage would become much larger if marriages celebrated abroad by foreigners who usually reside in Germany were also counted, since it is known that a large proportion of foreigners residing in Germany still return to their (or their parent's) country of origin in order to celebrate their marriage ceremonies. Unfortunately, this type of marriage is not statistically collected in Germany unless they were celebrated in the German consulate abroad, which is not often the case.

As Klein (2001) pointed out, the German official statistics have several serious shortcomings for the analysis of marriages in which at least one of the partners is a foreigner (apart from the above mentioned undercounting of marriages involving foreigners living in Germany but who get married abroad). First of all, there is no official counting of cohabitation, despite the fact that this form of living arrangement has become more and more common in Germany (Kopp, 1994).

Secondly, German statistics only consider the current nationality of the partners at the time the survey is conducted; they do not include information on foreign origin or parents' country of birth, which implies a growing risk of undercounting in cases where at least one partner is a middle or second generation immigrant. Nauck (2001) has also stressed this aspect and its implications for the analysis of the marital behavioral patterns of foreigners. As he stated, naturalizations of foreigners living in

Germany will lead to national and ethnic dimensions to fall increasingly apart, which implies that an increase of German-Turkish ceremonies, for instance, does not necessarily have to be an indication of increasing contact between the Turkish minority and the German majority population. On the contrary, it might be the case that naturalization has caused partners of the same ethnic origin to have different passports or, the other way around, partners of different ethnic origin to have the same nationality.[6]

Finally, the fact that official statistics do not allow any sort of socio-demographic characterization of the marriages involving foreigners constitutes a major drawback to utilize official statistics to analyze these issues.

When the focus is on the proportion that bi-national couples represent over the total number of married couples living in Germany –instead of the number of marriages celebrated each year-, mixed couples represented 11 percent of the total in 2002. Out of these, 6 percent were foreign-foreign married couples (1.2 million), and 5 percent (864,000) were German-foreign couples. Out of 1.2 million foreign-foreign married couples living in Germany, 76% were marriages between non-EU nationals, whereas 24% were marriages in which at least one partner had a passport from one of the other EU states. Among 864,000 German-foreign married couples, 33% of foreign spouses were nationals of one of the EU states, whereas 44% of foreign spouses were nationals of a European non-EU state. The women of foreign nationality married to German men originated predominantly from Thailand (14 percent), Poland (11 percent) and Turkey (9 percent). As for foreign men married to German women, they were most often nationals of Turkey (15 percent) and Italy (13 percent), the

[6] Nauck's proposal is to describe as "internal marriages" those marriages that are made up of two partners of the same nationality and "endogamous marriages" those where partners share the same ethnic origin; marriages between partners with different nationalities or different ethnic origin would be denominated external and exogamous, respectively.

third position is share by men from Austria and America with 7 percent (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2003).

Over time, the number of male foreigners marrying German females has experienced severe variations whereas the number of foreign women marrying German men has gradually increased. However, there are notable variations in this pattern depending on the nationality under analysis. The number of marriages between Turkish men and German women increased in the late seventies but dropped abruptly in the early eighties, maybe due to the increasing numbers of single Turkish men who returned to their homeland in the light of worsening economic conditions in Germany. On the other hand, the number of marriages between German men and Philippine and, above all, Thai women steadily increased during the eighties and the nineties, respectively.[7] In fact, the high numbers of bi-national marriages involving a German man and either a Polish or Thai woman underlies the pattern observed in Figure 5.1 since 1986 (compare dark grey and light grey lines).

For the reason previously mentioned, German official statistics do not allow an adequate measurement of marriages involving imported spouses. Marriages between two foreign people that take place in the home country of the individuals or at their consulate in Germany remain uncounted. This means that the transnational dimension involved in a large share of immigrants' marriages is totally absent from official registers (Strassburger, 2000, 2001). The extent to which this flaw in official figures affects marriages between two foreigners that reside both in Germany, and marriages between a German and foreign citizen remains unknown. According to Strassburger (2001), only 3.2% of the total number of weddings involving at least one Turkish partner was celebrated in German registry offices in 1996. This author also reported that in 1996 German Consulates in Turkey issued

[7] See Klein (2001) for a detailed description of the historical variations by nationality.

Figure 5.1. Number of bi-national marriages in Germany since 1955



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2003.

17,662 visas to Turkish citizens in Turkey to join their non-German spouse in Germany. This figure amounted to approximately 61% of total weddings involving at least one Turkish citizen residing in Germany in 1996. Unfortunately we do not know how many of these marriages are of proper second-generation immigrants (children born in Germany to immigrant parents). Taking into account the date of marriage (1996), it is likely that most of the marriages reported in these figures belonged to the middle generation (children born to immigrant parents and that migrated to Germany younger than 16). Furthermore, naturalized foreigners in these statistics are counted as German citizens, as the classification criterion is nationality instead of (parents') country of birth. Thus, the usefulness of official statistics on marriages is even smaller when attempting to study the marriage patterns of the immigrants' descendants. In any case, what becomes evident from these figures –even though they are flawed- is that the importation of spouses by foreigners (or people of foreign origin) also has substantial importance within the German context.

5.3.2. Previous studies

Despite the relatively large size of the foreign population in Germany and the substantial proportion of married couples living in Germany where at least one partner is of foreign nationality, empirical studies on the marital behavior of immigrants are still few and most of them restrict themselves to the analysis of mixed marriages between German citizens and foreigners (Kane and Stephen, 1988; Klein, 2001; Weick, 2001). These studies found a similar pattern over time: a high rate of mix-marriage in the earliest stages of the migration process (between 1959 and 1967, approximately), which then decreases during the seventies, and later increases slightly during the eighties.[8] Such a U-shaped pattern can be explained by the forces of the marriage market in the first phase of the immigration process and the increasing cultural convergence and integration later on.

On the other hand, Klein analyzed in detail how differences in the rate of mix-marrying across nationalities are largely due to differences in group size and sex ratio imbalances rather than persistent cultural distance. In particular, after controlling for group size and sex ratio, the propensity to marry a German partner only differs for Yugoslavs (more likely) and for Greeks (less likely) to marry Germans than for the other foreign guest-workers groups. In contrast, initial differences in the rate of mixed marriages between Italians, Spaniards, Turks and Portuguese vanished after neutralizing differences in the structure of their respective marriage markets.

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[8] This pattern, however, is not totally stable. In the late eighties, for instance, an abrupt drop in the proportion of Turkish mixed marriages can be observed. Such a sudden decrease is explained by the authors as reflecting data shortcomings related to the non-registration of marriages celebrated in the Turkish Consulates in Germany since 1987, which made the proportion of mixed marriages between Turkish and Germans over the total number of marriages involving a Turkish citizen to appear more numerous than they actually were.

Figure 5.2. Proportion of bi-national marriages by nationality



Source: Mikrozensus, 1996 (Graph 1 in Weick, 2001).

Finally, some attention has also been recently paid also to the individual determinants of mix-marrying behavior among immigrants in Germany. In particular, the effect of partners' education and spousal age differential has been examined by Klein (2001) and Weick (2001). The former demonstrated, using data from the Familiensurvey (1988), that the proportion of bi-national marriages is particularly high when the beginning of the partnership took place when individuals were still studying. Besides, he showed that German people who marry foreigners mostly marry up, especially when the German partner is a woman. Weick (2001), using data from the Mikrozensus 1996, confirmed that educational homogamy was particularly high among bi-national couples where the German citizen is the woman. According to his results, Italian men with a school diploma and with secondary education are 57% and 79%, respectively, more likely to marry a German woman than Italian men without diploma. The positive effect of education on the mix-marrying propensity of foreign men is even stronger for Turkish men (42%

more likely with school diploma and 193% with secondary education). In the case of mixed couples, where the foreigner is the wife, education seems to play a minor role while spousal age differences appear substantially larger (9 years versus 3 on average in the Federal Republic of Germany). Moreover, marriages between German men and foreign women often occur later in the life-course, which may indicate second marriages for German men, for instance. In any case, these differences by gender might suggest that the exchange hypothesis commonly utilized for explaining marital choices works differently or at least on different attributes by gender.

In contrast to the recent interest in researching mix-marrying behavior, the analysis of internal marriages (i.e. marriages between people of the same nationality) and endogamous marriages (i.e. marriages between people of the same ethnic origin), following Nauck's terminology (2001), remains an issue largely overlooked in the specialized literature. As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, this is particularly striking when one takes into account that the importation of spouses by members of the middle and second immigrants generations and increasing trends to ethnic closure has been identified as one the most challenging issues in contemporary multicultural democracies. According to the data collected in the Integration Survey of the Federal Institute for Population Research (*Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung– BiB*), which also includes individuals of foreign origin regardless of their current nationality, immigrants in Germany ascribed the arrangement of marriage and mediation of family members and networks of friends as having a relatively high importance in their marriage decisions (Haug 2002: 419). Besides, 19% of married Turkish women and 16% of married Turkish men were kindred (!). Gaby Strassburger (2001) interviewed 11 men and 17 women about their partner choices and the reasons underlying them. She concluded that the decision to bring a partner from the country of origin is often a second rather than a first marital option, and that many immigrants end up deciding to do so after having had unsuccessful relationships with

members of their own community in Germany, or even with Germans.

5.4. The sample of single immigrants and their partners in GSOEP. A brief description

As I have argued in the previous chapters, migratory flows to Germany were initially dominated by males. According to the GSOEP data, about 2/3 of these adult male inflows were married men, of whom roughly a half brought their wives to Germany within a very short time of their arrival. In Chapter 4 I have analyzed the patterns followed by these married male immigrants in reunifying with their spouses and children in Germany. However, the process of family formation (i.e. marriage and childbirth) of those immigrants who got married during their stay in Germany remains to be researched.

I have reconstructed the partner choices of individuals of foreign origin who have married during their stay in Germany. The final working sample is made up of 1,097 individuals.[9] It includes three immigrant generations: first (individuals who immigrated at 16 or older), middle (immigrated at between 6 and 15, both included) and second generation (immigrated younger than 6 or were born in Germany to immigrant parents[10]). First generation represents half of the total sample and middle generation a third, while second generation represents the the

[9] 91% of them belong to Sample B. The remaining 9% of individuals are Turkish, Yugoslav, Italian, Greek and Spanish individuals surveyed in the other five samples (Samples A, C, D, E and F) launched since 1984. By including foreign individuals in newer GSOEP samples, however, I only achieved a very limited update of the original "foreigners' sample", which has narrowed over time due to general panel attrition and considerable return migration.

[10] Individuals born in Germany to immigrant parents were assigned their mother's country of origin, since GSOEP provides no information on ethnic origin for individuals born in Germany.

remaining 17% (see Table 5.1). The small number of individuals of second generation in the sample (189, of which only 89 were born in Germany) calls for caution when interpreting the results from this group. In fact, only 20% of the immigrants' children born in Germany were already married by 2002, indicating that our second-generation sub-sample might be over-representing individuals who marry at younger ages.

Table 5.1. Sample Descriptives

Variable	Mean	S. D.	Min	Max
First Generation	0.50			
Middle Generation	0.33			
Second Generation	0.17			
Sex (1=female)	0.39	0.49	0	1
Years of Education	9.6	1.9	7	18
Sex ratio	0.45	0.19	0	0.92
Group size	737	440	3	1,484
Date of marriage	1982	9.5	1957	2001
N	1,097			

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data.

The average number of "years of education prior to marriage" in the sample is rather low (9.6 over a minimum of 7), which reflects both the non-qualified profile of immigrant labor from the sixties and seventies, and the wide educational gap between native and immigrant youth in Germany (Granato and Kalter, 2001; Riphahn, 2002).[11] 39% of the sample are individuals of Turkish

[11] This variable measures, respectively, the number of years of education completed the year before marriage for those who married after entering GSOEP (46%), and the number of years in education reported in the first interview by those who had married earlier than GSOEP's inception.

origin, 25% are Italians, 12% Spaniards, 12% Greeks and another 12% from the former Yugoslavia.

"Group size" refers to the size of each individual's national group in Germany the year before his/her marriage, and "sex ratio" measures the number of single men (women) older than 15 over the number of single women (men) older than 15 for each individual's nationality and year before her (his) marriage.[12] The five immigrant groups under consideration experienced strong sex imbalances during the observation period (1960-2002), as Figure 5.3 shows. With the exception of the Greeks in the early nineties, males always out-numbered females.

Figure 5.3. Sex Ratio by nationality, 1960-2000



Source: GSOEP 2002, own elaboration.

[12] These two variables, sex ratio and group size, had to be constructed from GSOEP information due to the absence of complete official register figures for the whole period under study here.

The dependent variable "type of partner" is coded 0 if the partner chosen is a native German, 1 if the partner is another co-national immigrant living in Germany at the time of marriage, and 2 if the partner is someone imported from the immigrant's country of origin. Native Germans have been identified by combining the information about place of birth and nationality prior to marriage; imported partners are defined as immigrants who do not live in Germany at the time of their marriage and marry someone who has lived in Germany at least 2 years prior to marriage.

Table 5.2 reveals that the dominant strategy in couple formation, especially for immigrant women, is marrying other co-national immigrant (71.19% of women and 47.16% of men choose this option). Immigrant women marry natives less than their male counterparts (9.6% versus 15.97%). They also import fewer partners from their countries of origin than their male counterparts (19.2% versus 36.87%). By origin, importing partners is typical of Turks but also important for male immigrants from the former Yugoslavia.[13] Mixed marriages, on the other hand, are more common among immigrants from the former Yugoslavia than for any other group.

[13] Arranged marriages may still be widespread (67.8% of marriages were arranged in 1993). In March 1997, Istanbul Bilgi University announced the results of a study involving a sample group of 6,440 married or divorced women in 25 provinces that found 41% to have entered into arranged marriages (Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2004).

Table 5.2. Type of partner by sex and country of origin

	Turkish		Ex-Yugoslavian		Greek		Italian		Spanish		Total	
	M	**W**	**M**	**W**	**M**	**W**	**M**	**W**	**M**	**W**	**M**	**W**
Native	6.72	1.84	22.06	28.07	17.95	5.36	24.44	11.34	21.05	14.81	15.97	9.60
	(18)	(3)	(15)	(16)	(14)	(3)	(44)	(11)	(16)	(8)	(107)	(41)
Co-national	42.16	64.42	39.71	57.89	60.26	75.00	50.00	83.51	51.32	79.63	47.16	71.19
immigrant	(113)	(105)	(27)	(33)	(47)	(42)	(90)	(81)	(39)	(43)	(316)	(304)
Imported	51.12	33.74	38.24	14.04	21.79	19.64	25.56	5.15	27.63	5.56	36.87	19.20
	(137)	(55)	(26)	(8)	(17)	(11)	(46)	(5)	(21)	(3)	(247)	(82)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(268)	(163)	(68)	(57)	(78)	(56)	(180)	(97)	(76)	(54)	(670)	(427)

Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data.

5.5. Results and Discussion

Table 5.3 shows the estimated coefficients of a logistic multinomial regression that examines the effects of the covariates previously described (both individuals' characteristics and structural constraints within the marriage market) on the probability of marrying a native partner versus marrying a co-national immigrant (upper part), and on the probability of importing a partner versus marrying a co-national immigrant in Germany (bottom part of the table). Analytically, the multinomial logit model can be considered as two simultaneously logit models in which two possible outcomes are compared against a third category of reference (Long, 1997: 151). Accordingly, I will comment on the obtained results separately for the outcome "marrying a native" versus marrying a co-national, and for the outcome "importing a partner" versus marrying a co-national. In addition, it is important to remember here that in non-linear regression models such as multinomial logit, no single approach to interpretation can fully describe the relationship between a variable and the outcome probability, since such effect always depends on the value of the remaining covariates (Long, 1997: 61). In order to ease the reading, I will plot the predicted probabilities of each outcome for specific values of the covariates included in the model (see below).

The results showed in the upper part of Table 5.3 widely support the predictions of both the 'assimilationist' and the 'structuralist' approaches concerning intermarriage behavior among immigrant individuals in Germany. When only individual characteristics are considered (Model 1), the propensity to marry native partners appears to have increased over generations; first generation immigrants are less likely to marry a native partner than members of the middle generation, and second-generation individuals are more likely to mix-marry than their middle generation counterparts (the reference category). On the other hand, a positive effect of education on intermarriage behavior is also detected (ß = 0.23, in Model 1). Results are not affected by

the inclusion of a set of three dummy educational variables that indicate low (less than 9), medium (between 9 and 11) and high (11 and more), instead of the continuous variable "years of education" reported in previous tables (results available upon request). However, given the difficulties for establishing skills and degree equivalences across educational systems, and the small variation in this variable, I prefer to keep the continuous variable to control for the effects of education in further estimations.

The propensity to marry native partners versus co-national immigrants varies greatly by country of origin. All ethnic groups in my sample are more likely to marry a German partner than Turks (the reference category). People from the former Yugoslavia appear to be the most likely to become part of mixed couple relationship and Greeks the least so, only slightly more than Turks. Differences in propensities to mix-marry are also found between men and women. In line with some previous results, immigrant women are substantially less likely to marry German partners than men (ß = - 1.17, see Model 1).

However, some of these differences across origin and gender disappear after controlling for structural constraints in the respective marriage market. The effect of the variables "sex ratio" and "group size" also confirm the predictions of the structural opportunity theory (Blau, 1994). The more marriageable people of the opposite sex are within the own community in the host country, the more likely it is to marry another co-national immigrant instead of a German partner. In fact, the effect of the sex ratio indicator is particular large and significant at 95% (ß = -4.57, see Model 2). This effect holds even after controlling for the size of the group which is also inversely related to the propensity to mix-marry (ß = -0.003, see Model 3). The most remarkable finding of Models 2 and 3 is the modification of the previously found differences between sexes and ethnic groups in their propensity to marry a native versus a co-national immigrant. First of all, controlling for sex imbalances eliminates the women's smaller propensity to mix-marry (see the coefficient for "sex" in Model 2, which is not significant).

Table 5.3. Multinomial logit coefficients for type of partner (ref. co-national immigrant)

Native	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**Only Men**	**Only Women**
(ref. middle)							
1st gen.	-0.59**	-0.74**	-1.06**	-0.34	-0.33	-0.59*	0.61
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.54)
2nd gen.	0.82**	0.83**	0.75**	0.59*	0.59*	0.53	1.37**
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.40)	(0.57)
(ref. men)							
Sex	-1.16	0.19	-0.06	0.18	0.56		
	(0.22)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(1.15)		
Educ.	0.23**	0.24**	0.23**	0.20**	0.20**	0.20**	0.17*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)
(ref. Turkey)							
Former Yug.	2.20**	2.36**	0.80	0.21	0.21	0.82	1.40
	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.49)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.72)	(1.13)
Greece	0.89**	0.88**	-0.91	-1.97**	-1.93**	-0.89	-1.52
	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.54)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.74)	(1.39)
Italy	1.53**	1.45**	-0.01	-0.78	-0.78	-0.43	-0.91
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.43)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.56)	(1.04)
Spain	1.50**	1.61**	-0.31	-1.09*	-1.09*	-0.47	-0.81
	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.55)	(0.62)	(0.62)	(0.76)	(1.32)
Sex Ratio		-4.57**	-3.76**	-4.95**	-4.90**	-8.48**	1.98
		(1.04)	(1.01)	(1.08)	(1.07)	(1.83)	(2.93)
Group Size			-0.002**	-0.004**	-0.004**	0.00**	-0.004**
			(0.0000)	(0.0006)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.001)
(ref. 1960-74)							
1974-80				1.13**	1.14**	0.84*	2.55**
				(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.49)	(0.97)
1981-90				2.31**	2.33**	2.38**	3.73**
				(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.55)	(0.99)
1991-02				1.82**	1.85**	1.98**	3.07**
				(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.57)	(0.92)
Sex*Edu					-0.034		
					(0.11)		
Constant	-4.38**	-3.01**	-0.29	0.07	0.005	0.64	-5.66*
	(0.56)	(0.63)	(0.88)	(0.88)	(0.95)	(1.06)	(3.01)

(Table continues)

Imported	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Only Men	Only Women
(ref. middle)							
1st gen.	0.09	-0.04	-0.15	-0.42**	-0.39*	-0.22	-0.97**
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.38)
2nd gen.	-0.21	-0.22	-0.24	-0.21	-0.23	-0.04	-0.56
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.34)	(0.39)
(ref. men)							
Sex	-1.11**	0.39	0.31	0.33	-2.31**		
	(0.16)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.90)		
Years in Educ.	-0.06	-0.05	-0.06	-0.05	-0.14**	-0.13**	0.12
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
(ref. Turkey)							
Former Yug.	-0.40	-0.29	-0.81**	-0.25	-0.22	0.75	-0.77
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.36)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.61)	(0.76)
Greece	-1.09**	-1.09**	-1.72**	-1.02**	-1.04**	-0.88	-0.60
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.58)	(0.83)
Italy	-1.25**	-1.41**	-1.91**	-1.29**	-1.36**	-1.12**	-1.66**
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.44)	(0.73)
Spain	-1.19**	-1.08**	-1.74**	-1.17**	-1.20**	-0.41	-1.98**
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.62)	(0.93)
Sex Ratio		-4.62**	-4.41**	-4.35**	-4.34**	-6.59**	-3.17*
		(0.83)	(0.85)	(0.89)	(0.90)	(1.74)	(1.78)
Group Size			-0.0008**	0.0005	0.0005	0.0009	0.001
			(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0006)	(0.001)
(ref. 1960-74)							
1974-80				-1.24**	-1.27**	-1.20**	-1.67**
				(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.61)
1981-90				-1.18**	-1.17**	-1.06**	-1.28**
				(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.40)	(0.64)
1991-2002				-1.28**	-1.24**	-1.40**	-0.98
				(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.45)	(0.65)
Sex*Educ					0.28**		
					(0.09)		
Constant	0.91**	2.35**	3.31**	2.86**	3.70**	3.62**	1.12
	(0.42)	(0.51)	(0.68)	(0.69)	(0.76)	(0.84)	(1.88)
Log-lik.	-919	-898	-888	-853	-848	-566	-260
N	1,097	1,097	1,097	1,097	1,097	670	427

Source: GSOEP, Unweighted Data.*Significant at 10%.**Significant at 5%.

Secondly, when the group's size control is also added in Model 3, differences between ethnic groups change substantially. Now, it is the Greeks who appear to be the least likely to marry a German partner (significant at 90% level), while the former Yugoslavians, Italians and Spaniards become undistinguishable from Turks (the reference category) in their propensity to engage in mixed marriages (i.e. the coefficients become much smaller in size and not significant at all in Model 3). However, the positive effect of education and the growing tendency to engage in mixed couples over generations remain.

Finally, Model 4 adds a set of dummy variables distinguishing between four marriage cohorts: 1960-1974 (the reference category), 1974-1980, 1981-1990 and 1991-2002. This is clearly a rough way of measuring potential changes in the patterns of partner's choices over time. However, taking into account the long period of time under analysis (40 years), I considered it necessary to include a control for changes across time. The results show an increasing tendency to mix-marry compared to the marriage cohort "1960-1974" (omitted category). In order to find out whether the differences between the three other categories aside from the omitted one were significant or not, I refitted the model after changing the reference category, and confirmed that the increasing trend to mix-marry among immigrants seems to have stopped and almost reversed in the nineties (the sign for the marriage cohort "1990-2002" is negative and almost significant when compared against "1981-1990").

The effects of the individual and structural covariates on the choice for an imported partner versus a co-national immigrant are shown in the bottom part of Table 5.3. Results in Model 1 suggest that the practice of importing partners from the country of origin among people of foreign origin in Germany does not match the predictions of the assimilationist approach. First of all, no significant differences emerge between the first and the second generation compared to the middle one (the reference category), although the sign of the coefficients points in the right direction if the importation of spouses is basically conceived as an expression

of traditional behavior. The sign of "years of education" is negative in line with the assimilationist expectation, but is does not reach statistical significance.

The coefficients in Model 1 also suggest that the practice of importing spouses is more common among men and particularly prevalent in some ethnic groups, especially Turks. Women are much less likely to import than their male counterparts (ß = -1.11, see Model 1) and Turks (the omitted category) are considerably more likely to import than immigrants from Italy, Greece and Spain. Individuals from the former Yugoslavia, however, are not significantly different from Turks in their propensity to import (coefficient ß = -0.4 is not significant). The absence of significant differences between Turks and Ex-Yugoslavians in their propensity to import their spouses from origin may be due to two different factors. On the one hand, a considerable number of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia are Muslims for whom the practice of arranged marriages is relatively common. On the other, Turks and Yugoslavs were the groups that more severely suffered the consequences of the increasingly stringent controls on immigration imposed from the mid-seventies onwards because substantial emigration pressures persisted in these countries during the eighties and nineties, due to several factors. Accordingly, marriage migration among people from these countries has often been argued to be a strategy developed by individuals to circumvent immigration restrictions.

When the statistical chances of finding a partner within an individual's own ethnic group in Germany is controlled for (by inclusion of sex ratio in Model 2), women's lower propensity to import vanishes, which confirms that sex imbalances are partially responsible for the practice of importing partners among men. The propensity to import also drops as the size of the respective immigrant community in Germany increases.

Results in Model 4 show that marriages involving an imported partner were much more likely for the "1960-1974 cohort" (the reference category) than for the more recent ones, which would reject the idea that marriage migration developed mainly after the

halt on labor recruitment in 1973 as a mean to circumvent the increasing controls on further immigration from non-EC countries to Germany. Moreover, no significant differences in the propensity to import (versus marrying a co-national) emerge between the "1974-80", "1981-1990" and "1991-2002" marriage cohorts (I checked this by changing successively the reference category and refitting the model). However, these results are not in contradiction with the statement previously made about marriage migration being today one of the most important sources of adult migration to Germany. New entries of foreigners due to the importation of spouses by residents of immigrant origin have effectively intensified over time but only *in relative terms*, that is, in comparison to other forms of migration such as single adult migration and reunification of wives left behind at the time of husband's migration. Along the same line of reasoning, it is not surprising that the coefficient for the first generation becomes negative and significant at 95% level once the aforementioned differences between the successive marriage cohorts are controlled for (ß = - 0.42, see Model 4).

Finally, Model 5 adds the interaction term "sex*years of education", in order to analyze whether the practice of importing spouses may entail different meanings for men and women. Effectively, the results reported for Model 5 show that the interaction term is positive, which suggest that the impact of education on women's and men's propensity to import differ significantly (see "sex*eduyrs" ß = 0.28 in Model 5, bottom part of Table 5.3). Furthermore, after introducing the interaction term, the negative effect of being a woman (compared to being a man) becomes larger and strongly significant (see "sex" coefficient ß = -2.31, Model 5). The same occurs with the main effect of "years of education", which now captures the effect of "years of education" for men; it also becomes larger, negative and significant (see "eduyrs" coefficient ß = -0.14, Model 5).

In Figures 5.4 and 5.5 I have plotted the cumulated predicted probabilities of marrying a native, a co-national immigrant and an imported partner for different values of the "years of education"

variable for Turkish middle generation immigrants who married in the nineties, in order to illustrate more clearly how marital choices vary depending on the years of education prior to marriage. These probabilities were computed considering all the controls included in Model 5.[14]

Figure 5.4 shows that for middle generation Turkish men with less than 11 years of education marrying a co-national immigrant is the most likely choice (around 50%) and marrying a German woman the least likely one (between 10% ad 15%). For those with 11 years of education, marrying a co-national continues being the most common choice versus importing and mix-marrying, which are approximately equally likely. But when years of education are above 11, the chances of importing a woman from Turkey reduces substantially (less than 15%), while marrying a German woman becomes the most preferred choice, especially for the most educated men (almost 60%).

Partner choices made by middle generation Turkish women are very similar to those of men's at the lowest level of education (7 years): marrying a co-national immigrant is the most likely choice (about 50%), importing a man from Turkey is the second preferred choice (less than 40%) and marrying a German man the least likely option (around 10%). However, for highly educated women, the most likely choice is not a German partner, as it is for

[14] For computing the predicted probabilities, the coefficients estimated in Model 5 were applied to the following covariates' values: "first generation", "second generation", "Ex-Yugoslav", "Greek", "Italian" and "Spanish" were all set to 0; the dummy variables that indicate the marriage cohort of individuals were all set to 0 except the one indicating "1991-2002". Finally, "sex" was set to 0 for computing probabilities in Figure 5.4 (men), and to 1 in Figure 5.5 (women). The value of "years of education" varies from 7 to 9, 11, 15 and 18 (see the horizontal axis) and, consequently, the value of the interaction term is always 0 in Figure 5.4 (because sex =0 and, thus, "sex* eduyrs" is necessarily 0), and it varies from 7 to 9, 11, 15 and 18 in Figure 5.5 that draws the predicted probabilities for women (i.s. "sex*eduyrs" = (1* eduyrs) = eduyrs).

men, but to import a Turkish man from the country of origin (between 42% and 51%). It seems that women face much stronger barriers for marrying outside the own group than men. If German partners are barely considered for middle generation Turkish women, their decision reduces to choosing between a co-national immigrant and an imported partner. However, the reasons why do they mostly prefer an imported partner is something that remains unexplained.

Figure 5.4. Effect of Years of Education on Partner Type for middle generation Turkish males who married in the 90's



Figure 5.5. Effect of Years of Education on Partner Type for first generation Turkish females who married in the 90's



The patterns shown in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 clearly illustrate that the effect of education differs significantly between sexes. In fact, this is precisely what the interaction term in Model 5 implies: that the difference between the effect of "years of education" when sex is 0 (man) and when sex is 1 (woman) is positive and significant at 95% (-0.14 + 0.28 = 0.14). In other words, that the effect of years of education on the propensity to import a partner is more positive for women than for men, which does not imply necessarily that the effect of years of education is positive for women themselves.

In order to estimate the effect of years of education on partner choices of men and women the best strategy would be to run two separated models for each sex. This is what I have done in the last columns of Table 5.3. For men, the positive effect of education on marrying a German woman and the negative one on importing a partner are both confirmed (note, for instance, that the coefficient of "years of education" in Model 5 and in the model fitted only for men is practically the same, ß = -0.14 in Model 5 and ß = -0.13 in

the new model). For women, the positive effect of years of education on mix-marrying remains stable. The effect of education on women's propensity to import keeps the expected sign although it does not reach the significance level.

These results imply we cannot affirm that education increases the probability of an immigrant woman to import her partner from the country of origin but only that, while the practice of importing spouses among men is clearly related to low educational levels, this is not necessarily the case for women. Although apparently surprising, this result can be understood in the light of the different incentives that immigrant parents face when intervening in the marital choices of their daughters and sons, respectively. I have already mentioned that most single people willing to migrate in sending countries like Turkey are men. For many of them, marrying a single Turkish woman who already resides in Germany constitutes nowadays the best way to get legal admittance to the German labor market. As a result, immigrant parents with single daughters in Germany often receive high bride-price offers from more than one male next of kin at origin (Böcker, 1994). Single sons, on the contrary, are not so sought after by female prospective immigrants at origin. Bearing in mind the different set of incentives faced by immigrant parents depending on the sex of their children, it does not come as a surprise that education has a stronger freeing effect on the marital decisions of men than on those of women.

On the other hand, years of education prior to marriage are directly related to the age of entering into first marriage. Single daughters may be allowed by their parents to stay in school until their "arranged" partner is ready for marriage and migration, or until they fulfill the requirements established by the German law to permit their future husband to join them in Germany. These requirements consist basically of having resided in Germany for an uninterrupted period of eight years, which is the period of residency established for issuing a residence permit. Such legal conditions may delay marriage for couples involved in importeing a partner compared to couples made up of two middle generation

immigrants who already reside in Germany at the time of their marriage. If this is the case, the women's decision to import a partner might have been made prior to the decision to stay longer in school and, therefore, the association between the two variables would not imply a causal relation from education to imported partners but rather the other way around.[15]

5.6. Alternative explanations for the importation of spouses. Family influences and post-marriage living arrangements

Certainly there are other possible explanations for the differential effect of education on the propensity to import for men and women. In his interpretation of the positive association between educational level and propensity to import for Turkish women in Belgium, Lievens suggested that by importing their husbands, immigrant women may assume an extra-power within the relationship and increase their chances of living independently of their in-laws -who stayed at origin- and of their own relatives living in the immigration country, because it is not commonly accepted for a man to live with his in-laws. However, Lievens never tested whether his explanation was empirically supported or not.

To do so, I have identified in GSOEP which of the immigrant couples in my sample lived with other relatives, aside fromo their spouse immediately after marriage, and which did not. Then I investigated, first, whether those who import their partner are more likely to live in extended households than others, which would confirm the view that the practice of importing spouses is linked to more traditional forms of living. Second, I will focus on a more specific group on which the Lievens' argument should apply, and analyze whether highly educated Turkish women are

[15] In fact, in my sample, Turkish women from the middle generation who have imported their partners marry, on average, three years later than those who marry co-national immigrants.

effectively more likely to live without other relatives at home than women with non-imported partners, as Lievens hypothesized.

The information for the dependent variable was missing for 64 couples, so the sample size is now reduced to 1,033 individuals. In addition, the information about the kinship relation to the head of the household was collected only from GSOEP's inception in 1984, which implies a certain measurement error for couples that married prior to this date.[16] This is the reason why I estimated the model first for the whole sample (Column 1) and, then, for the sub-sample of immigrants who married after 1982 (Column 2). Sample in Column 3 is restricted to Turks (men and women) and Column 4 to Turkish women.

The results in Table 5.4 strongly support the idea that the practice of importing spouses is related to a more traditional understanding of "family life". After controlling for country of origin, age at migration, age at marriage, years of education, having worked before marriage and gender, the effect of having an imported spouse substantially lowers the probability that the couple lives on its own after marriage (see Column 1 and 3). In addition, this is the case not only for Turks, who are the group most prone to import, but also for other immigrant groups (see Column 3). Therefore, it seems that the proposition that the practices of importing spouses and living in extended households are related is empirically borne out by the data regardless of ethnic particularities.

The expected lower propensity of the second generation immigrants to live in extended households –from an assimilation stand point- only arises when the sample is restricted to people who married after 1982, which eliminates most first generation immigrants from the comparison group and leave mostly middle generation immigrants.

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[16] However, it is difficult to anticipate the direction of error. Newly married couples might be more likely to live with some other relatives at the beginning of their joint lives if they cannot afford their own housing, but couples who live on their own may incorporate new members, like grandparents, as they get older and more vulnerable.

Table 5.4. Logit estimates of living in extended household after marriage

	All	Married after 1982	Non-Turk	Turk Men	Turk Men	Turk Women	Educated Turk Women
(ref. Spanish & Italians)							
Turkish	2.03**	1.73**					
	-0.33	-0.42	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Ex-Yugoslav	0.80*	1.25**	1.11**	-----	-----	-----	-----
	-0.43	-0.54	-0.53				
Greek	1.25**	1.47**	1.28**	-----	-----	-----	-----
	-0.42	-0.55	-0.52				
(ref. first & middle gen.)							
2nd gen.	0.24	-0.47**	-0.28	-0.56*	-0.001	-1.08**	-2.28**
	-0.22	-0.23	-0.45	-0.29	-0.41	-0.45	-1.1
Age at Marriage	-0.24**	-0.25**	-0.31**	-0.21**	-0.30**	-0.14	-0.03
	-0.03	-0.05	-0.08	-0.06	-0.08	-0.08	-0.14
Years of Education	-0.03	-0.04	-0.18	-0.16*	-0.12	-0.31**	-----
	-0.05	-0.06	-0.11	-0.09	-0.12	-0.15	
Work before marriage	0.24	0.51*	-0.04	0.63**	0.92**	0.5	-1.90**
	-0.21	-0.27	-0.5	-0.51	-0.44	-0.46	-0.97
(ref. men)							
Sex	-0.38*	-0.42**	-0.74	-0.41	-----	-----	-----
	-0.17	-0.21	-0.48	-0.25			
(ref. non-imported)							
Imported Partner	1.03**	1.86**	2.53**	1.68**	1.80**	1.54**	1.05
	-0.22	-0.27	-0.51	-0.32	-0.38	-0.5	-0.83
Constant	2.04**	3.53**	2.93	5.62**	5.80**	5.32**	1.49
	-0.85	-1.1	-1.84	-1.32	-1.65	-1.86	-3.24
Log likelihood	-396	-244	-77	-162	-91	-68	-19
N	1,033	549	263	286	169	117	40

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted Data. ** Significant at 95%; * Significant at 90%.

Moreover, it seems that the change in post-marriage living arrangements between the middle (immigrated at age between 6

and 16) and the second generation (immigrated younger than 6 or were born in Germany) has occurred only for Turkish women but not for men. However, gender differences within the Turkish group are not limited to the intensity of the intergenerational change in living arrangements after marriage. Comparing results in column 5 (Turkish men) and column 6 (Turkish women), it can be noted that education has no significant effect on the males' probability of living with other adult relatives asides from their wife, whereas it significantly reduces the women's probability of sharing their household with someone else different from their husband. In addition, having worked prior to marriage increases the probability of living in an extended household for Turkish men but not for women.

Finally, among Turkish women with more than 9 years of education (Column 7), being a second generation immigrant and having worked before marriage strongly reduces the probability of living in an extended household after getting married. Although the effect of having an imported partner for this select group of women remains positive, the coefficient is not statistically significant. Therefore, and notwithstanding the data limitation problems, the Lievens' hypothesis that the more educated Turkish women may import their husband as a mean of freeing themselves from living with other relatives, aside from their husband, does not seem to be supported by our data.

5.7. Does the supply-side matter? Status exchange and status homogamy theories

In this chapter I have examined the partner's choices made by single immigrants by focusing on their own characteristics and the conditions in their respective marriage market by the time of their marriage. However, so far, I have overlooked the effect that the characteristics of the potential partners may have on the marital choices made by single immigrants. Marriage is a two-sided decision, which is assumed to provide some gains for both

partners, even if bargaining power is asymmetrical. Following Becker, "*… since marriage is practically voluntary, either by the persons marrying or their parents, the theory of preferences can be readily applied, and persons marrying (or their parents) can be assumed to expect to raise their utility level above what it would be were they to remain single*." (1974: 814) Some of these utility gains are difficult to identify, though. Physical attraction, for instance, is one of the partner's characteristics that doubtless enter the individuals' utility functions but it remains unobservable for the researcher.

The status-exchange theory, which was originally built upon the cast system of India and applied to inter-racial marriages in the US by Merton (1941), predicts that US blacks with low socio-economic status would hardly ever marry whites with high socio-economic status, but blacks with high socio-economic status might sometimes marry whites with low socio-economic status. According to Merton, marriage between high-status blacks and lower-status whites would represent a kind of informal exchange; that is, the higher socio-economic status of the black spouse would directly compensate the white spouse for the loss of social standing that the white spouse would experience for having "thrown their lot in" with black society.

The status-caste exchange arguments of Merton (1941) contradict the fundamental finding of the mate selection research, which is based upon micro-economic models of individual behavior according to which individuals sort themselves by pecuniary and non-pecuniary assets, trying to maximize future output (Becker, 1973, 1974). This body of research basically concludes that people find mates who are similar to themselves in status, class, education and religion (Kalmijn, 1991, 1993, 1998), as well as race (Lieberson and Waters, 1988). In sum, that married partners tend to be the same on every dimension except gender. By contrast, the 'exchange' theory of Merton (1941) required marriage partners to be different in at least two key dimensions

(other than gender); without differences, the "exchange" cannot take place.[17]

In the case of mixed marriages, the status exchange theory would predict the immigrant partners to have a higher education and/or social status than their native partners. On the contrary, according to the status homogamy theory, spouses in mixed marriages would have similar levels of education and/or socio-economic status. In 'pure' immigrant couples (i.e. made up of two immigrant partners), status homogamy is expected to dominate since there is not a clear trait to be exchanged. By contrast, in imported couples, the opposite thing occurs because the potential importer differs in one crucial aspect: the right of residence in the country of immigration. However, the terms of the exchange are likely to vary by gender of the importer.

Bearing these two different theories in mind, I explored a little further the characteristics of the couples in my sample. My goal was not to actually model marriage as a bilateral decision but just to find out whether patterns of status-exchange or status-homogamy can be traced back in each type of marital choice [(1) immigrant with German, (2) immigrant with immigrant, (3) immigrant with imported partner]. I examined differences in the (mean) age at marriage across couples, spousal age differential, spousal educational differential and differences in the education of the father of the spouses.

The results, however, did not offer clear-cut differences across type of couples. 'Pure' immigrant couples are found to be made up of the most similar partners in the four dimensions previously mentioned. By contrast, partners in mixed marriages are the most different ones to each other. In the case of imported couples, strong differences by gender emerged. Male importers tended to choose women younger and less educated than single immigrant women already in Germany; in contrast, female importers tended to marry younger and more educated women their potential

[17] See Rosenfeld (2005) for a thorough review and critique of the status-exchange theory.

partners within their own group in Germany. Moreover, the results of the means comparisons varied depending on the immigrant generation we focused on.

5.8. Conclusions

The empirical analysis carried out in this chapter confirms the importance of both individual characteristics and structural factors on immigrants' decisions over their type of partner. Marrying a native and importing a partner from the country of origin emerge as alternatives clearly differentiated from one another, on the one hand, and from the most common choice of marrying another immigrant, on the other.

The results obtained generally confirm previous findings in the literature on intermarriage behavior: second generation immigrants and the more educated ones are more likely to marry a native both for men and women. However, the analysis does not support the widespread idea that women are less prone to inter-marrying than men. In fact, the differential propensity to mix-marry between men and women disappears when sex imbalances within the marriageable population of the own ethnic group are controlled for. Moreover, accounting for the structure of the respective ethnic marriage market drastically modifies the differences between national groups. After controlling for sex ratio imbalances, group size differences and marriage cohort, the initial predisposition of Italians, Greeks and Spaniards to marry Germans is completely reversed, and the differences between Turks and immigrants from the former Yugoslavs vanish.

The choice between importing a partner from origin and marrying a co-national immigrant already in Germany is a little more complex. The main tenets from the assimilationist approach are not so clearly confirmed in this case. Middle generation and second generation are more likely to import their partners than their parents' generation. However, differences between the middle and second generation are not significant. The more

balanced the sex composition of the own ethnic group in Germany, the less likely for single immigrants to import their partners from origin. However, the propensity to import instead of marrying other co-national immigrants increases with the size of the own community in Germany. Over time, the tendency to import spouses seems to have declined for marriage cohorts compared to those immigrants who married prior to 1974, which implies that the idea that marriage migration intensified after the halt on recruitment as a means to circumvent restrictive measures at the border must be rejected.

Finally, the differential impact of education on the propensity to import partners depending on whether the immigrant is a man or a woman is one of the most puzzling findings of the chapter. While male importers seem to be the least educated within their own group, women who import are not necessarily the least educated ones. The explanation for this result is far from clear. I explored the hypothesis suggested by Lievens that immigrant women, especially the most assimilated ones, may use a traditional form of marriage such as importation of spouses as a strategy for achieving modern goals like living independently from other relatives after marriage. Yet, the results obtained do not confirm this hypothesis. On the contrary, for both men and women, importing partners and living in extended households after marriage appear to be two facts that are strongly related to each other.

APPENDIX
CHAPTER 5

Appendix A. Education as categorical variable

In order to test the robustness of my results with regard to the differential effect of education, I tried also the possibility of measuring education as a dummy variable that distinguishes between low, medium and high level of education; after re-running the regressions with this alternative codification of education, I obtained basically the same results (see below). However, I preferred the continuous variable "years of education" because it does not requires making assumptions about the comparability of educational system across countries. It is extremely difficult to establish a table of equivalences between degrees obtained in different educational systems. This type of comparisons remains difficult and risky among developed countries but is even more "dangerous" when we intend to compare degrees obtained in developed and developing countries. Note that I have to deal with education credentials from 6 different countries: Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany (note that immigrants who arrived younger than 16 had to attend the German school system for a while, at least).

In addition, as it can be noted in the table below, there is little variability in the variable "years of education", which makes even more difficult to define three levels of education (low, medium and high) that would actually correspond to truly distinct degrees in reality.

Frequencies of the variable "years of education"

	All			Men			Women		
Years of Education	**Freq**	**Percent**	**Cum. Percent**	**Freq**	**Percent**	**Cum**	**Freq**	**Percent**	**Cum Percent**
7	208	18.9	18.9	118	17.6	17.6	90	21.1	21.1
8.5	16	1.4	20.4	11	1.6	19.2	5	1.2	22.2
9	412	37.5	57.9	234	34.9	54.2	178	41.7	63.9
10	62	5.6	63.6	36	5.4	59.5	26	6.1	70.0
10.5	121	11.0	74.6	88	13.1	72.7	33	7.7	77.7
11	133	12.1	86.8	96	14.3	87.0	37	8.7	86.4
11.5	31	2.8	89.6	17	2.5	89.5	14	3.3	89.7
12	50	4.5	94.2	28	4.2	93.7	22	5.1	94.8
13	12	1.1	95.3	8	1.2	94.9	4	0.9	95.8
13.5	8	0.7	96.0	7	1.0	96.0	1	0.2	96.0
14	3	0.3	96.3	2	0.3	96.3	1	0.2	96.2
14.5	3	0.3	96.5	1	0.1	96.4	2	0.5	96.7
15	28	2.5	99.1	18	2.7	99.1	10	2.3	99.1
16	4	0.4	99.4	2	0.3	99.4	2	0.5	99.5
17	1	0.1	99.5	1	0.1	99.5	0	0	99.5
18	5	0.5	100	3	0.4	100	2	0.47	100
Total	1,097	100		670	100		427	100	

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data.

Despite of all the aforementioned limitations, I tried a dummy variable for education in which I took into consideration the typical average number of years required to achieve a particular degree or certificate in Germany (according to the GSOEP technical documentation, see Desktop Companion to the GSOEP, 2001: 60 ff.), but also the number of observations in my sample at each educational level. Immigrants with less than 9 years of education were considered to have low level of education; those people who had between 9 (included) and 11 (not included) years of education were classified as having "medium education level", and those with 11 or more as having "high level of education". The table below shows the number of observation and percentages within each of these three educational categories, by sex.

Recodification of the variable "years of education" into 3 levels

	Total		**Men**		**Women**	
	Freq.	**%**	**Freq.**	**%**	**Freq.**	**%**
Low level (Less than 9 years)	224	20.42	129	19.25	95	22.25
Medium Level [9 to 11)	595	54.24	358	53.43	237	55.5
High Level [11 and more]	278	25.34	183	27.31	95	22.25
Total	1,097	100	670	100	427	100

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data.

Then, I run a logit regression with only two possible outcomes (1= imported partner and 0= non-imported partner), which includes education as a set of dummy variables. Model 1 includes only the main effect of education. Model 2 adds to the baseline model two interaction terms between sex, on the one hand, and medium and high level of education, on the other.

In Model 1, no significant differences emerge between people with different level of education. Although medium and high

education coefficients are negative (reference category is low education), which indicates that education reduces the propensity to import a partner, none of the two coefficients is significant at 95%. "Sex" is not significant either.

In Model 2, the introduction of the two interaction terms between "sex" and "medium education" and "high education" are positive and significant, while the main effect of medium and high educational level, which indicate the effect of having medium and high (versus having low education, ref. cat.), become significant and negative.

Therefore, the results with regard to the effect of education on the propensity to import are basically the same, no matter whether I measure education as a continuous variable ("years in education") or as a dummy variable (low, medium and high educational level). There is, however, one exception: the variable "sex" in the model specification which utilizes the dummy variable for education is not significant, whereas it was negative and significant when education is measured as a continuous variable.

Logit coefficients of importing a partner (ref. non-imported partner)

Variable	M1	M2
First Generation (Ref. Middle)	-0.38* 0.20	-0.35* 0.21
(Ref. Middle) Second Generation	-0.31 0.25	-0.33 0.25
Sex (Ref. Men)	0.24 0.32	-0.46 0.45
(Ref. Low education) Medium Education	-0.26 0.19	-0.51** 0.24
(Ref. Low Education) High Education	-0.20 0.22	-0.62** 0.27
(Ref. Turkish) Former Yugoslavia	-0.15 0.37	-0.12 0.37
Greece	-0.55 0.41	-0.56 0.41
Italy	-1.01** 0.34	-1.06** 0.34
Spain	-0.83** 0.42	-0.85** 0.42
Sex Ratio	-3.60** 0.85	-3.62** 0.85
Group size	0.001** 0.0004	0.001** 0.0004
(Ref. 1960-1973)		
Marriage Cohort 1974-1980	-1.53** 0.27	-1.51** 0.27
Marriage Cohort 1981-1990	-1.61** 0.30	-1.58** 0.30
Marriage Cohort 1991-2002	-1.68** 0.33	-1.66** 0.33
(Ref. Low education) Women*Medium Education		0.73* 0.41
(Ref. Low Education) Women*High Education		1.29** 0.48
Constant	1.55** 0.52	1.77** 0.53
Log likelihood	-571	-567
N	1097	1097

CHAPTER 6. LINKING PROCESSES: MIGRATION, FAMILY AND WORK (I). ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST ENTRY INTO THE GERMAN LABOR FORCE

6.1. Introduction

In the previous chapters I presented a detailed portray of the female international migration from the five largest sending countries to Germany during the postwar period. First, I analyzed the patterns of family reunification followed by female married immigrants and showed that more than half of the "reunited wives" who resided in Germany in 1984 had joined their husbands in a very short time after he left. Moreover, I found that the bulk of wives' reunification took place before the halt on recruitment, contrary to what is usually stated: only 15% of reunited wives whose husbands migrated prior to 1974 did join their husbands after the halt. Next, I examined the process of family formation among immigrants who were single at arrival and married someone during their stay in Germany. This analysis allowed me to illustrate that a large proportion of the flow of adult female immigrants who entered Germany after the halt on recruitment were not "reunited wives", as commonly assumed, but imported brides. The main characteristics that distinguish these two groups of married migrant women relate to the different stage of the family life cycle at which they migrated, the characteristics of

their husbands and distinct period at which most of them arrived to Germany.

Bearing all these results in mind, in the present chapter I will examine the labor behavior of immigrant women and how it relates to different patterns of family migration and differences in the context of reception. As far as female migration into Germany has been largely assumed to be exclusively linked to family reasons, immigrant women are generally considered passive dependant migrants who moved to Germany because of their husbands' economic prospects. As a result, their labor behavior has been rarely analyzed with the exception of a couple of empirical studies carried out by economists who have generally focused on wage assimilation rather than on participation issues. By contrast, the main purpose of the analyses carried out in this and the following chapters is, precisely, to analyze the employment cycles of first generation immigrant women in the German labor market. First I will only examine the first entry into the German labor force, which appears to be the most crucial labor decision in order to classify immigrant women as house or career-oriented. Then, I will complement the analysis of the first entry with that of exits and subsequent re-entries, making some important distinctions between full-time and part-time employment, on the one hand, and between inactivity and unemployment, on the other.

6.2. What we already know about the labor performance of female immigrants

6.2.1. Internal Migration and the concept of tied-mover wife

Much of the empirical research concerned with the impact of family migration on the labor performance of women has focused on internal migration (i.e. moves across counties, provinces, states or metropolitan areas within the same country). Most of these studies are based upon the human capital theory -extended from

the individual to the family- and suggest that families migrate when the expected long-term economic returns derived from migration benefit the family as a collective, even if it is detrimental to the wage gains of one of the family members (Sandell, 1977). Due to their usually discontinuous attachment to the labor force, the returns (or looses) to migration that immigrant women experience tend to be smaller than those of their husbands. This would make wives more likely to be tied-movers in family migration decisions (Mincer, 1978).[1] This is not to say that migration is involuntary for wives, neither the economic consequences of migration for them are disregarded in migration decisions within the family; but rather the opposite. In fact, one of the main predictions of the model of family migration formulated by Sandell (1977) and Mincer (1978) is that families where the two spouses are employed are expected to be less geographically mobile than other families. The reason underlying this expectation is precisely that the potential reduction in the wife's earnings as a consequence of migration will be considered a cost of the husband's geographical job change, which would constraint his search behavior and, ultimately, actual family migration.

On the other hand, the family migration models inspired in the human capital theory predicts wives to suffer from higher unemployment and lower participation rates immediately after migration because of "the higher value that the family attaches to her market time in order to set up the new household at destination". In other words, it is argued that reservation wages of migrant wives rises immediately after arrival at destination.

Most empirical research has supported, up to date, this disruption hypothesis as regarding the effects of family migration on the labor market performance of wives (for the US see, among others, Sandell, 1977; Mincer, 1978; Lichter, 1983; Jenssen, 1990;

[1] Tied-movers participate in moves that result in a loss for themselves, but their loss is exceeded by the family gain. Tied-stayers forgo moves that would result in positive net returns for the individual, but would be exceeded by the expected losses of other family members.

Polachek and Horvath, 1977; Morrison and Lichter, 1988, Jacobsen and Levin, 1997; LeClere and McLaughlin, 1997; for Europe see Smits 1999; Kalter 1998; Nilsson 2001; Smits, Mulder and Hooimeijer, 2004). However, some of the most recent studies in the area have concluded that internal migration has a positive effect on the probability of employment for immigrant women compared to non-migrant women; although such a positive effect remains insufficient to overcome differences in participation between men and women (Cooke and Bailey, 1996). Moreover, these authors also concluded that migration has not a positive effect on men's employment for men, which is probably related to men's reason for migration -career advancement, instead of unemployment at origin. This is an important distinction to made since the effects of family migration on women's employment is very likely to vary depending on whether their husbands migrate to escape from unemployment in the area of origin or as a result of upward job mobility (Cooke and Bailey, 1996; Cooke, 2001; Clark and Withers, 2002). In addition, it is very likely that the employment outcomes of tied-mover wives change over time. However, the studies previously cited do not make any distinction between short and long-term effects.

6.2.2. International Migration: from the assimilation hypothesis to the family investment model

The employment-related consequences of migration for women have been far less explored in the context of international migration. The assumption that women's migration is linked to family rather than economic motives has probably favored this omission in the specialized literature. However, the main reason for such gap in the literature may be related to the inherent difficulties in studying female labor behavior (career interruptions, family-life cycle factors, occupational sex-segregation, etc.), as well as to the scarcity of adequate datasets. On the other hand, in the case of international migration, studies concerned with the

impact of migration on the labor outcomes of women have based upon the previous research on earnings assimilation for immigrant men. As a result, wages instead of participation have been the primary focus of interest up to date in the few studies that analyze the labor market performance of immigrant women.

In his seminal work *"Americanization and the earnings of foreign-born men" (1978),* Chiswick investigated the earnings adjustment of immigrant men in the US in comparison to their native counterparts. The author added the variable "years since migration" to standard earnings regressions and interpreted that a large positive coefficient on this variable indicates a rapid convergence of immigrants' wages to those of the natives' ones. His explanation for this result builds upon the human capital theory and the difficulties for international transferability of skills. Differences across countries with regard to the content of educational credentials and labor market structure are argued to explain why immigrant workers tend to obtain low economic rewards during the first years after arrival. However, additional time of residence in the host country entails the opportunity to acquire host country-specific knowledge, which would improve the immigrants' position in the labor market and, therefore, also their wages.

With the purpose of providing additional support to his explanatory framework of the immigrants' performance in the US labor market, Chiswick (1980) replicated his analysis for immigrant women. But the obtained results suggested disassimilation, rather than convergence, between the wages of immigrant and native female workers. Upon arrival immigrant women are better paid than their native counterparts but their wage level declines as their time of residence in the host country increases. There seems to be, thus, a negative assimilation in earnings between immigrant and native women.

The interpretation given by Chiswick to these unexpected results was that "*[…] employers are discouraged from financing firm-specific training for male immigrants because they are likely to have less information about the productivity and background of*

recent immigrants. Consequently, wives in immigrant families that have recently entered the US may have to work to help finance their husbands' initial investments in schooling or job skills required in the US labor markets." In other words, Chiswick argued that immigrant wives would display higher participation rates in the labor force during their first years in the host country in order to finance their husbands' investments in country-specific human capital. However, their wage contribution to the family budget becomes less needed as their husbands get better paid job s and, accordingly, they progressively reduce their market time and relocate it to homework. Even when they decide to remain active in the labor market, the type of jobs they initially had taken up – short-end jobs with low earnings and limited chances for promotion- often do not permit substantial earnings gains and this fact explains that no assimilation with native women's wages occurs (see also Long, 1980).

The previous reasoning constitutes the core idea of the "Family Investment Model" formulated by Long (1980) to explain the labor performance of immigrant women in their host country. In their recent revision of the empirical evidence available regarding the "Family Investment Model", Duleep and Regets (2002) identify three main predictions of the model:

1. A positive relationship between husbands' investments in host-country specific skills and their wives' work, in terms of both participation and hours.

2. A declining propensity to work among wives with time of residence as their husbands bring to an end their investment

activities,[2] consolidate their labor position and experience earnings' gains.[3]

3. A flatter wage profile among immigrant women than otherwise would be the case, as a consequence of their first occupational choices aimed at maximizing their salaries during the initial years following migration. Jobs with high entry earnings help financing the household consumption during their husbands' investment period but they offer less career prospects, which severely hampers women's wage assimilation in the next future.

The evidence available up to date remains contradictory. Most of the empirical studies aimed at testing the validity of the "Family

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[2] Available evidence indicates that post-migration human capital investment (education, job search, etc.) increases with pre-migration skill level, permanency intentions and language difficulties; on the contrary, it decreases with age, years since migration and transferability of skills. The relationship between post-migration investments and other variables like sex or migrant status remains unclear (Coob-Clark, 2001a).

[3] Note here that the Model of Family Migration formulated by Sandell (1977) and Mincer (1978) for internal migration predicted lower participation of migrants wives immediately after the move, whereas the "Family Investment Model" predicts exactly the opposite for international female migrants –higher participation rates at arrival that decline over time. The difficulties experienced by (male) foreign immigrants for transferring their pre-migration skills to the host country, along with their financial constraints for financing these investments, appear as the main reason underlying such a different prediction for otherwise similar situations. However, the problem of skills transferability is not exclusive of foreign migrants but it may affect also internal migrants. In fact, skills transferability varies with educational level, occupation and reasons for migration (Friedberg, 1991). When push factors were more important than pull factors in explaining migration, pre-migration skills are expected to be less readily transferable. On the contrary, when pull factors dominate –i.e. a work contract was already arranged in advance- a better match between the migrant's skills and the job at the destination is expected (see Jenssen, 1997).

Investment Model" conclude that previous analyses underestimated the assimilation effect in the immigrant women's labor participation because of the omission of the variable "husband's years since migration" in the estimations. According to with their results, the husband's and the wife's time of residence in the host country have countervailing effects on the wife's labor force participation (Duleep and Sanders, 1993; Beach and Worswick, 1993; Baker and Benjamin, 1997). Although some authors rather suggest the opposite: 1) that wages assimilation is steeper for immigrant women than for immigrant men (Worswick, 1996), 2) that inter-group differences in worked hours persist over time and, 3) that the earnings profile of the immigrant women married to men with better earnings prospects are steeper, instead of flatter, than those married to men with worse earnings profiles (Duleep, 1998; Duleep, Regets and Sanders, 1999).

The diverging nature of these results, however, is largely due to data limitations. An adequate formal test of the three cited predictions would require individual longitudinal data that follow the two partners in immigrant couples since their arrival. Yet, most of the aforementioned studies have utilized either cross-sectional or synthetic-cohort analyses (see Duleep & Dowhan, 2002; Coob-Clark et al. 1999, 2001, for exceptions).[4]

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[4] The lack of longitudinal data frequently implies that assimilation, cohort and period effects cannot be separately identified, which constitutes a major limitation for the study of women's participation. The distinction of these three separated effects has attracted much of the researchers' efforts in the field of immigrants' economic assimilation since Borjas published his first work on the issue in 1985. As Borjas argued, because of changes in country composition of immigration flows and changes in the self-selection mechanisms operating within the pool of immigrants from a particular country, immigrants are not drawn from the same population over time. Therefore, the reason why an earlier cohort may perform better may be that the members of this cohort have had more time to integrate into the labor market, but also that they arrived to the host country with better observable (or unobservable) skills than more recent cohorts or in a period of better employment

The principal merit of the "Family Investment Model" is to "familiarize" the analysis of immigrants' labor performance, by bringing couples to the forefront and connecting women's earnings with their participation behavior. However, the "Family Investment Model" entails also two serious limitations. First of all, it is applicable only to one specific type of immigrant couples (those where the two partners arrive to the host country together or almost) to explain only the labor behavior of immigrant wives during the first years after their arrival. Note that the predictions of the model are not helpful to explain either the labor decisions of adult migrant women who were single at arrival, or that of immigrant wives who arrived to the host country a couple of years after their husbands. Yet, many of the previous studies have overlooked these limitations in their empirical test.[5]

Secondly, the "Family Investment Model" is clearly US-biased and, as a result, earnings instead of employment and participation remain its primary subject of concern. The assumption that wages are the best indicator of productivity, because human capital acquisition is also assumed to be accessible for everyone, leaves no room for labor market segmentation in the explanation of the obtained results.

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opportunities. Differences in labor performance of immigrants due to their different period of arrival are commonly called "cohort effects", whereas differences related to the additional time spent in the receiving country are commonly called "assimilation effects". When these two effects are separated, the earnings assimilation rate often appears to be much smaller and slower than initially thought (Borjas, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995).

[5] Duleep & Dowhan (2002), for instance, did not even restrict their sample to married women, but took married and single women altogether.

6.2.3. The labor market performance of immigrant women in regulated and segmented labor Markets

In countries with flexible labor markets and low minimum wages, immigrants are likely to find employment without major difficulties, especially under good macro-economic conditions, since they can compensate their initial disadvantage in terms of host country-specific human capital by offering labor at lower prices than the native-born. In this type of context, the question about how well do immigrants adjust to the new labor market can be adequately addressed by analyzing their earnings profile over time.

However, in labor markets with high minimum wages and unemployment insurance such as Australia and most Western European countries, empirical studies have usually rejected the assimilation hypothesis (for Germany see Dustmann, 1993; Pischke, 1992; Schmidt, 1992; Schmidt, 1994; Litch and Steiner, 1994; Constant, 1998; Constant and Massey, 2005).[6] In this type of labor markets, immigrants often suffer higher unemployment rates than natives, which may imply that human capital is not automatically accumulated by spending a given number of years in the host country. If the immigrant has not been able to get a firm attachment to the labor market and hence acquire host country-specific labor experience, additional years of residence in the receiving country might reduce their earnings capacity, instead of enhancing it.

These circumstances make earnings to lose their capacity to faithfully reflect the overall labor market performance of immigrants in regulated labor markets, where the described process of wage assimilation is rather transformed into a process of employment assimilation. In Scandinavian countries, several

[6] For the UK, see Chiswick (1980), Bell (1993), Shields & Wheatley (1998), Blackaby et al. (2002). For Sweden, see Ekberg (1994), Aguilar & Gustafsson (1994); Edin, Lalonde & Åslund (2000); le Grand & Szulkin (2002); Österberg (2000). For the Netherlands, see Kee (1993).

studies have shown that the wage gap between immigrants and natives practically disappears when the effects of the gap in employment levels between these two groups are neutralized (Bevelander and Nielsen, 2001; Arai & Vilhemsson, 2001; Husted et al., 2001; Blackaby et al., 2002).

This is partially generated by the segmentation of the labor market and the concentration of immigrant workers in the secondary segment, where "bad jobs" with low chances of upward mobility dominate (Piore, 1979). In Germany in particular, the existence of a well-established system of vocational training controlled by the state in collaboration with the chambers of industry, commerce and trade, has favored the division of the labor market into craft-specific labor markets where each occupation requires specific qualifications acquired in the German educational system. Empirical studies have confirmed the importance of qualifications in determining the chances of entry into the various segments of the West German labor market, not only for the initial entry into the employment system but also for subsequent occupational careers (Blossfeld and Mayer, 1988). According to the predictions of the theses of the labor market segmentation, mobility within the secondary segment can be attributed to the mechanism of statistical discrimination, while in the primary sector both qualifications and tenure (i.e. job-specific experience) are found to be the main predictors of mobility.

These circumstances affect the labor performance of women even more strongly than men, since female labor decisions are known to be heavily influenced by the institutional arrangements of their respective labor markets. Despite of the general trend of increasing female participation in paid employment over time in developed countries, it is a well established finding that women's attachment to the labor force widely varies across countries. These cross-national differences are strongly linked to the different levels of equalization of the educational opportunities between men and women, and to the dominant family ideology underlying the organization of welfare provision (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999). In particular, the impact that child-bearing has on mothers'

work has been found to widely vary depending on the structure of labor markets and the availability of child-care services. Women with children tend to participate in the labor force less and fewer hours than childless women (Dekker, Muffels and Stancanelli, 2000: Drobnic, 1999; Stier, Lewin-Epstein and Braun, 2001; Lippe, 2001). However, this 'child penalty' is not equally strong in Western industrialized countries: in the United Kingdom women whose youngest child is under age 5 work on average 24 hours fewer than women without young children, while in Denmark this difference is only 5 hours (Lippe, 2001).

The labor behavior of immigrant women and their labor participation in particular is also affected by the structure of the host labor market and the family policy in their receiving countries. However, such effects may differ from those on the labor behavior of native women, due to intervening effects of the migration experience, group-specific factors such as transferability of their skills and gender ideologies, and immigration policies among others. In the following pages, I will revise the evidence available concerning the labor performance of immigrant women in the German case, with especial emphasis on those results that contradict the previous evidence found in the US.

German Evidence

Seifert (1996), Dustmann (1997), Constant (1998, 1999) and Dustmann and Schmidt (2000) are some of the few authors who have studied the labor market performance of immigrant women in Germany. Although their main focus of interest was on wages, their results systematically pointed to differences in participation as the main factor explaining the differential wage profile of immigrant and native women. However, a comprehensive analysis of the employment cycles of immigrant women in Germany is still lacked.

Constant (1998, 1999) has found some earnings assimilation for immigrant women during the period 1984-1993. However, she stated that this assimilation "is rather illusionary and related to the

poor labor market performance of the reference group, German women" (1998: 78). In fact, in the light of her results, she concluded that human capital theory fails to explain why immigrant women, despite of their lower endowments, obtain higher wages than native German women. In the view of these results, she concludes that theories of segmentation and discrimination constitute a more adequate framework for explaining the economic fate of female migrants in Germany. Departing from this conclusion, she has recently attempted to weight the separate value of human capital and segmented labor market theories in explaining both the process of occupational allocation and earnings attainment Constant and Massey, 2005). In this study, the authors confirmed the existence of a high degree of initial occupational segmentation and very low rates of occupational mobility. Despite of these disadvantaged conditions, they experienced considerable earnings mobility *within occupations*. The explanation of these results seems to lie on the longer work experience and higher number of hours worked of immigrants compared to natives, rather than to returns to education. In fact, they also found that foreigners achieved lower returns to technical or vocational training than natives.

One of the most striking results in this study is that "foreign males hold (initial) jobs that were of significantly lower status compared with foreign females, a gender differential that did not exist among natives". In other words, Constant and Massey's results would indicate that foreign females have experienced larger occupation mobility than their male counterparts. They also state that the occupational gap is wider between natives and children of immigrants born in Germany than between natives and first generation immigrants. Unfortunately additional tests of potential interaction effects between gender and generation are lacked and, consequently, no explanation is offered for such an odd finding.

In 1997, Dustmann was one of the first authors that have utilized GSOEP to explore differences in the labor force participation of immigrant women. The focus of his research in

this article was on the differential effect that return intentions had on the labor participation of immigrant women from different countries of origin. Contrary to what Duleep and Sanders (1993) had argued to explain the labor participation of immigrant women in the US,[7] Dustmann argued that temporary migrants who anticipate earnings loses back home could choose to shift demand for leisure (not working) from the present to the future, which reduces their reservation wage and increases their labor force participation at present. His findings supported this hypothesis with regard to the labor behavior of female migrants in Germany.[8]

More recently, Dustmann and Schmidt (2000) have deepened the previous analyses concerned with the labor performance of immigrant women in Germany. Namely, they have investigated also the reasons that may explain the wage advantage of immigrant women compared to natives, which was found by Constant (1998, 1999).

One of the most remarkable contributions in this study is the inclusion of the husbands' characteristics (e.g. husband's year of arrival, the husband's return plans and other household income, which mainly account for the husband's wages) as explanatory variable of the labor performance of immigrant women. Regarding the potential effect of the variable that measures the husband's

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[7] These authors concluded that "permanent" female immigrants in the US tend to assimilate in their labor participation behavior to that of native women (note that in the US, immigrant women usually have lower rates of labor participation than native women and, therefore, convergence with natives means to participate more). Although they lacked direct information on permanency/return intentions, the authors assumed that women married to foreign-born men who had acquired US citizenship were permanent settlers, and carried out their analyses only for this selected sample.

[8] The impact of "return intentions" variable on the baseline model is significantly positive, although it should be noted that the effect of the other variables included in the model (education, experience, children, other income and nationality) remained stable and the overall model fitness only changed slightly.

years since migration (i.e. the husband's length of residence in Germany), the authors correctly acknowledge that "conditional on wife's years since migration, husband's years since migration only picks up the difference in years since migration between the couple's members". Therefore, the inclusion of these two variables in their estimations is aimed at detecting potential differences in the participation and wage performance of reunited wives compared to others type of female immigrants. In fact, they found that the labor participation of immigrant women increases with their own years since migration but decreases with their husbands' length of residence. They do not interpret this finding, however, as supporting the idea that women work to finance their husbands' investment in host country-specific human capital as the "Family Investment Model" proposes. On the contrary, they interpreted this result as a confirmation of what "it is typical for labor migration": that the husband arrives earlier, and the female partner follows after a stable job is found by the initial migrant. They exactly say:

> "One explanation we gave for this finding is that if the wife arrives later, the husband may have accumulated sufficient resources; this allows the migrant family unit to adopt a more traditional pattern of labor market behavior, with the wife abstaining from labor force participation. This may also affect the human capital accumulation of the wife in the labor market: if participating, these women may have lower incentives to invest in human capital." (26)

With regard to the negative effect that additional years of residence in the host country has been found to display on the wages of immigrant women, Dustmann and Schmidt argued that the solution of this puzzle may lie in the way the underlying participation process is taking into account and, in particular, in the distinction between part-time and full-time jobs. In fact, when they estimate the effect of "years since migration" separately on the wages of full-time and part-time workers, they found that the results change dramatically. While the effect on part-time workers is significant and negative (approximately 2 percent per year of

residence), the effect for full-time workers is positive and significant (nearly 0.5 percent per year). Therefore, they conclude that a large fraction of the wage advantage previously found for immigrant women compared to native women is due to the fact that immigrant women are systematically more likely to work full-time than native women.

Doubtless, the two main merits of the paper by Dustmann and Schmidt are, first of all, to study the labor performance of immigrant women within the household context and, secondly, to depart from the human capital framework and the rationale of the "Family Investment Model" –which strongly US biased, as I said before-, and introduce into the analysis the particularities of regulated labor markets like the German one. However, the study also has some important weak points that I would like to mention briefly. First of all, the selection of the sample; only married women of age 24 or older are included in the analysis. This implies that the impact of the initial stages of the family formation process (i.e. marriage and first childbirth) are completely missed from the study since most immigrant women still marry substantially younger than their native counterparts.

Secondly, age at migration is not included in the estimations, neither as a continuous independent variable nor in the form of "dummy generations". This implies that no distinction is made between women who arrived in Germany at young age and attended the German educational system, and women who were adult at arrival.[9] The importance of this omission must be highlighted in the light of the results obtained in the previous chapters of this dissertation, which have demonstrated that the migratory experience of first and middle generation, as well as their marital choices and household formation process have been marked by very distinct circumstances. In addition, the potential

[9] This sort of women might amount about 20% of the sample (my own calculations). Age at immigration is used to capture the effect of local education on employment probabilities as well as important language and cultural skills that may more readily and proficiently be acquired if immigration occurs at a young age.

implications of not distinguishing between first, middle and second generation immigrants are making bigger because the authors do not distinguish between education acquired in the home country and education acquired in Germany, and because they do not take into consideration the effect of previous work experience on participation.[10]

Thirdly, reunited and imported wives are not distinguished and, consequently, all the results obtained for women who arrived to Germany after their husbands are assumed to reflect the widely assumed negative selection of reunited wives with regard to their labor characteristics.

Finally, no distinction is made between different immigrant cohorts according to their date of arrival to Germany, neither between different nationalities, despite of the great importance that the context of reception and national origin is likely to have on the labor performance of immigrant women.

[10] The selection equation (i.e. the equations aimed at detecting the main determinants of working or not, and working part-time or full-time) includes age as an explanatory variable but not experience. Although the authors say "when we add additional variables to the wage equation, we add the same regressors to the participation equation", the effect of previous work experience is commented nowhere. Taking into account the well-known endogeneity between previous work history and labor force participation for women, this omission represents a major drawback, especially for women who were single at migration and worked in Germany as single workers for some time about a third of the sample). Note that for these women the mechanism underlying the negative effect of the husband's earlier arrival is not clear at all since they are not reunited wives.

6.3. Dynamic analysis of immigrant women's career over the life-course

As it has been repeatedly stated, cross-sectional data are unable to explain adequately changes in the aggregated rates of women's labor participation. In order to determine whether increases in the aggregate rate of female labor participation within the same country over time are either the result of less women interrupting their careers because of marriage and child-care or, alternatively, the result of a trend to return faster to employment after interruptions, longitudinal data are needed. Moreover, cross-sectional data do not allow us to understand how changes over the life-course cycle relate to women's labor behavior, that is, for instance, whether women who abandon their jobs at child-birth are likely to re-enter later and, if so, when and how.

Although some of the studies previously cited for the case of Germany have made use of the longitudinal dimension of the GSOEP data, none of them has examined in detail the employment cycles of immigrant women. In the following pages, I will carry out this type of analysis by applying event history analysis as described in Chapter 3. In particular, I will analyze the first entry in the German labor force by first generation immigrant women (i.e. women who immigrated at 16 or older to Germany), their exits from labor activity and their re-entries into the labor force.

By restricting my analysis to first generation immigrant women, I will avoid some of the drawbacks in the article by Dustmann and Schmidt (2001). In addition, I will be able to study the potential impact that differences in the timing of migration within couples have on the labor behavior of women, as well as distinguish these effects from the potential impact of changes in the context of reception found by different cohorts of immigrant women.

Studies of women's labor activity have generally limited their analyses to married (and cohabitating) women because the primary research interest lays on the effects of the family structure and the husband's characteristics on women's labor decisions.

Family constraints are almost negligible for most single women (with the exception of lone mothers). The most common strategy is to begin the empirical analysis of labor transitions at the moment of the first marriage. However, some authors like Bernasco (1994) and Bernardi (1999) started their analyses one year prior to first marriage in order to obtain a full view of the effect that the process of family formation has on the employment outcomes of women.[11]

In the following analyses of the labor transitions of immigrant women in Germany, I have followed the same strategy, i.e. to start the analysis at the time of first marriage, in order to neutralize the impact that marriage is likely to have on women's labor decisions. However, the inclusion of a time-constant covariate that indicates whether the woman was married or unmarried at migration, will allow me to separate the potential effect of "marriage" from the effect of "marital status at migration". Note that this definition of the analysis time implies that women married prior to migration will enter the analysis from the very first moment of their arrival in Germany, while women who migrated unmarried will not enter the analysis until they marry someone in the host country.[12]

On the other hand, I have decided to separate the analysis of the first and subsequent entries into the Germany labor force because the first entry is likely to be affected by many factors whose effect will attenuate or even disappear over time. Bearing in mind the well-established endogeneity between women's present and past labor behavior, the decision to enter the German labor

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[11] For an exception see Drobnic, Blossfeld and Rowher (1999). These authors examine married and unmarried women altogether but included a time-varying covariate for marital status that allows to identify the effect of marriage itself on different employment transitions.

[12] Duleep and Sanders (1993) adopted a similar strategy to analyze the labor participation of Asian immigrant women in the US. In contrast, in their study of the participation and wages of immigrant women in Germany, Dustmann and Schmidt (2000) selected only married women of 24 and older but neglected the potential differences derived from marital status at migration.

force for the first time will strongly depend on factors like the age at migration, the timing of migration within the couple and, especially, pre-migration labor experience. But the influence of these pre-migration factors is expected to decline over time; after the first episode of employment in Germany, immigrants' performance in the German labor market will hinge on post-migration factors rather than on their pre-migration characteristics and the characteristics of the migration process. Thus, if the main interest lays on determining how different migration trajectories influence the labor decisions of women upon arrival, it seems much more adequate to focus on the first decision to enter the paid labor force.

Additionally, the high job stability in Germany reinforces the previous reasoning. In contrast to the US where the average number of jobs a worker holds over his work life-time is about 10, in Germany the corresponding figure is only four jobs (Wilkelmann, 1997). Moreover, job mobility in Germany, instead of increasing as a result of the adjustment pressures, seems to have decreased between 1974 and 1994 (Winkelmann and Zimermann, 1998). As Blossfelfd and Rohwer (1999) stated, the smaller number of jobs over the life time makes each job change and each transition in and out of the labor force particularly meaningful (Blossfeld and Rowher, 1002; Yamaguchi, 1990).

However, the down-side of this decision relates to the small number of employment episodes which can be used to study labor participation as a multi-episode (i.e. the smaller the number of transitions, the more likely is to obtain coefficient statistically insignificant). Moreover, in the case of immigrant women in Germany, Constant and Massey (2002) found that a weak attachment to employment –defined by the authors as marginal employment, unemployment or non-involvement in the labor force- doubles the odds of return migration. Therefore, the risk of loosing observations after the first exit from the labor force is especially high in our immigrant sample and the extent to which the remaining group of women who stayed in Germany a

relatively long time after leaving their fist job might not be representative of the whole original sample.

6.4. Sample's description

Table 6.1 describes the main characteristics of first generation immigrant women who arrived in Germany in the period 1960-2000, which constitute the focus of the following empirical analyses. The average profile of first generation immigrant women (i.e. who arrived at 16 or older) in Germany indicates a low educational level and less pre-migration work experience (approximately 2/3 of the sample had not worked in their country of origin). Most of them (60%) arrived in Germany prior to the halt on recruitment, and were already married at that time (80%) with husbands more educated than them.

Reunited wives and imported brides make the largest part of the sample. However, these two groups are widely dissimilar in many of their characteristics. Reunited wives are, on average, the group of immigrant women who immigrated at older ages, with more children and less years of education. In contrast, imported brides are more educated, have arrived recently and were childless at arrival. In addition the distribution by origin is not homogenous across these two groups. While Turks are clearly over-represented within the group of imported brides, reunited wives are more evenly distributed across nationalities (compare the distribution by origin for the whole sample and across categories). Yugoslav women are largely over-represented in the group of first-movers (i.e. wives who preceded their husbands in migration) and under-represented among imported brides. Spaniards and Italians are over-represented in the group of single migrants, and Greeks both within single migrants and first-mover wives.

Table 6.1. Descriptives of the sample for the analysis of employment cycles

	All	Unmarried at migration	Married at migration		
			First-mover Wives	Reunited Wives	Imported Brides
Age at migration	26.1 (7.9)	20.2 (4.1)	28.2 (5.8)	31.2 (7.6)	21.9 (5.0)
Years in Germany (at last interview)	20.9 (9.3)	23.1 (9.7)	24.3 (9.2)	21.8 (8.6)	17.7 (9.3)
Year of immigration	1975 (9.0)	1973 (9.0)	1972 (7.1)	1973 (7.4)	1980 (9.6)
Arrived before the halt	60 %	66 %	80 %	70.5 %	38 %
Years of Education	8.7 (1.9)	9.3 (2.0)	9.3 (2.1)	8.2 (1.7)	9.1 (1.8)
No pre-migration work exp.	62.6 %	55 %	40 %	59.7 %	75.9 %
Number of kids (at arrival in Germany)	1.3 (1.7)	0.5 (0.9)	1.3 (1.0)	2.3 (1.8)	0.35 (0.9)
H's age at migration	25.6 (8.9)	21.1 (7.4)	32 (6.4)	31.2 (6.2)	18.2 (6.7)
H's years of education	9.65 (2.1)	9.9 (2.3)	9.7 (2.0)	9.3 (2.1)	9.9 (1.9)
Turkey	39 %	23 %	34 %	38 %	52 %
Former Yugoslavia	22 %	25 %	37 %	25 %	14 %
Greece	13 %	17 %	14 %	15 %	7 %
Italy	16 %	20 %	9 %	13 %	18 %
Spain	10 %	15 %	6 %	9 %	9 %
N	851	169 (19.8 %)	35 (4.1 %)	390 (45.7 %)	257 (30.4 %)

Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002.

The effect of migration on women's work

With some exceptions, international migration is associated less strongly with work among women than among men. However, it usually occurs also that the labor force participation of immigrant women in their host countries is significantly higher than that of their non-migrant counterparts in their respective countries of origin during the same periods. In Table 6.2 I have compared the labor force status of immigrant women immediately before and after migration to Germany. This comparison gives us an idea about how important job opportunities might have been in promoting women's migration, although it still remains difficult to determine when work was the primary motivation for women to migrate and when it "just happened" after migration.

Table 6.2. Labor participation of adult immigrants before and after migration

	All	**Single**	**First**	**Reunited**	**Imported**	**Pre-halt**	**Post-halt**
Leave their job	3.3%	3.4%	0%	2.6%	4.6%	2.1%	4.9%
Entry into a new job	13.5%	18.8%	14.3%	14.6%	8.1%	19.1%	5.2%
Continue in empl.	27.2%	43.7%	45.7%	24.9%	17.0%	36.3%	13.8%
Continue out of employm.	56.0%	34.1%	40%	57.9%	70.2%	42.3%	76.1%
N	860	176	35	390	259	512	348

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002.

The percentages in the previous table indicate that approximately 40% (13.5% + 27.2%) first generation immigrant women worked in Germany from the very first moment since their

arrival. This can be read as an indication of work being an important factor in motivating migration. In particular, the 13.5% women who were out of the labor force in the months prior to migration and entered the paid labor force in Germany right after arrival, it seems undeniable that economic reasons played an important role their migration decision. On the contrary, migration had a disruptive effect on women's work just for a tiny proportion of adult women (3.3% of total were employed before migration but were not upon arrival). When the marital status at migration and the period of arrival are taken into account, noticeable differences across groups emerge. Although continuity, either in employment or out-of-employment, is the dominant pattern, migration appears to be particularly connected to the intention of working in the host country among women who were unmarried at migration (18 % of them moved from non-employment in the country of origin to employment immediately upon arrival). It is important to test whether this initial difference holds in the medium and long run or, by contrast, it disappears when unmarried migrants marry someone in Germany.

On the other hand, the weakest link between migration and work does not emerge among reunited wives but imported brides. While 14% of the reunited wives in the sample entered into the labor force after migration, only 8.5% of the imported brides experienced this type of transition. Moreover, imported brides are also the group most likely to abandon their economic activity after migration, and the most likely to have been out from the economic activity both before and after moving to Germany.

In the last two columns, I have explored to what extent the described differences between women unmarried at migration, imported by their new partners and reunited with their husbands do reflect differences intrinsic differences across these three groups of immigrant women or, on the contrary, they are the result of the differences in their time of arrival to Germany. While 20% of the pre-halt female immigrants moved from non-employment to employment short after migration, only 5% of post-halt immigrants experienced the same transition. In addition, the

percentage of women who were out of employment before migrating to Germany was much larger within the group of post-halt female immigrants than in the earlier cohort.

In order to determine the separated effects of period of arrival, marital status at migration and country of origin, among others, it is necessary to carry out a multivariate regression analysis.

6.5. Hypotheses

Duration dependence

In general, the longer time a woman stays out of the labor force, the less likely it is for her to (re-)enter employment. The reasoning underlying such statement has to do with the main tenets of the human capital theory: employment is the only way of accumulating work experience and other resources that increase career prospects, strengthen the attachment to the labor market and, ultimately, increase the opportunity costs of leaving jobs. For women, in particular, time spent at work implies not only a lost opportunity to acquire additional human capital but also a likely depreciation of their previous skills (Mincer and Ofek, 1982). Accordingly, the prediction is that the longer time a woman stays out of employment, the worse become her prospects of getting a (good) job. Does this reasoning apply to the labor behavior of immigrant women as well? In principle, it should do. However, the process leading to entry the labor force at the destination country for the first time might not adjust to this pattern due to the aforementioned difficulties for the international transferability of skills, which may require a transitory period of adaptation to the new environment.

Country of origin

National or ethnic origin is commonly considered a key factor underlying inter-groups differences in the labor participation of

immigrant women. In fact, the country of origin is often utilized a proxy variable for gender ideologies and family values, which widely vary across cultures. In the German experience, Turkish women have the lowest rate of participation compared to both EU-immigrants and immigrants for the former Yugoslavia, where the socialist regime has been assumed to favor high levels of labor participation among women.

A considerable number of ethnographic studies have tried to discredit the male-biased culturalist approach that traditionally dominated immigration research in Germany (see Lutz, 1991; Lutz and Huth-Hildebrant, 1998; Erdem and Mattes, 2003 for a critical review). These qualitative studies have often exclusively focused on Turkish women, especially Turkish women who were unmarried at migration and who entered Germany during the recruitment period (Inowlocki and Lutz, 2000; Munscher, 1984). Precisely because of the type of women chosen, the conclusions obtained in these studies are usually difficult to generalize to the bulk of the female immigrant population from other sending countries and even from Turkey. A notable exception in this regard is the study carried out by Goodman (1984, 1987) among Spanish immigrant women in Germany in the early eighties. In this study, the author paid especially attention to the effect that the restrictive measures approved by the German government to protect native (female) workers from immigrants' competition in the mid-seventies had on the labor performance of Spanish migrant women (see more below). Morokvasic (1975, 1984) also provided abundant information on the migration experience of Yugoslav women in Germany and other Western European countries like France and Sweden. However, the migration of women to Germany from Italy and Greece has received much less attention in the specialized literature.

In relation to the potential effect of the country of origin in explaining inter-group differences in the labor behavior of immigrant women, it is important to remind here that the migration flows from each of the five largest recruitment countries have follow quite different developments over time. If such

differences are not explicitly taken into account, their effects are very likely to be interpreted as the effect of "cultural differences".[13]

Human capital

The existence of a strong positive relationship between women's education and vocational participation, on the one hand, and employment and occupational attainment on the other is a well established fact. However, women have been traditionally unable to translate their education into the same financial and status benefits that are available to men. The explanation for such gender differences in the labor and economic returns to human capital has to do with the greater sensitivity of women interferences derived from variations in the conditions of labor demand (Brinton, Lee and Parish, 1995; Cotter, Hermsen and Vanneman, 2001), the structure of the labor market (Blossfeld, 1987), and their husbands' characteristics (Bernasco, 1994; Bernardi, 1999). In Germany, high sex-occupational segregation and the predominance of part-time work for women have been found to distort the expected relation between education and experience and female employment (Drobnic et al., 1999).

In the case of immigrants, the difficulties for the transfer of educational skills acquired abroad add to the aforementioned particularities concerning the link between education and

[13] The separated effects of these two dimensions of the migration experience might be assessed by limiting the analysis to unmarried migrants. Women who are single and adult at the time of migration are expected to be a very selective group within their group of reference, much less subjected to the dominant gender ideologies in their respective countries of origin and mainly economic motivated in their migration decision –in fact, their own migration can be interpreted as a sign of this "selectivity". Therefore, potential differences between single female migrants from different countries of origin in their propensity to work after migration are likely to be due to differences in the overall migratory pattern from each of those countries rather than to "cultural differences".

employment among women. In fact, various studies have suggested that primary education is most portable, which might result in higher levels of employment among the least educated immigrants (Friedberg, 2000; Cobb-Clark et al., 2001). On the other hand, difficulties in the international transferability of skills also affect the potential effect of previous work experience on the employability of immigrant women in the host country. While host country-specific work experience is likely to enhance the employment prospects of immigrant women at destination, the effect of pre-migration experience is expected to affect positively the first entry into the host labor market, as far as previous work experience reveals tastes for work. However, its potential positive effect will probably vanish progressively over time (Duleep and Sanders, 1993).

Finally, it is also important to bear in mind that returns to education usually change depending on the macro-economic conditions in the host country. In Germany, for instance, during the recruitment period foreign workers were generally hired to work in low-skilled manual jobs. Although the recruitment offices set up in the sending countries valued skills and experience in the candidates' selection procedure, it is well documented that the urgency for filling vacancies often prevailed over a perfect matching between the employer's request and the worker's characteristics (see more in Chapter 2). Therefore, education is not expected to be a great predictor of employment for immigrant women who arrived before the halt on recruitment. But this situation substantially modified in the mid-seventies. Increasing unemployment rates coincided with the progressive incorporation of the youths that benefited from the educational expansion into the German labor force (Blossfeld and Jaenichen, 1992). In this context of growing and more qualified labor supply, the German employers began to reward more and more education credentials.[14]

[14] When unemployment is on the rise, the queue of people searching for jobs gets bigger and competition between workers intensifies. In this

On the other hand, since the late seventies the structure of labor demand in Germany began to shift progressively from industrial to the so-called post-industrial services economy, a transformation that intensified over the eighties and nineties. Labor demand has been shifting not only from the industrial to the service sector but firms have also increased their qualification requirements when hiring employees (Berthold and Fehn, 2003; Annesley, 2004). All these changes are likely to have made more difficult the entry into employment for immigrants with low-skill level since the mid-seventies (Klopp, 2002).

Family-life Cycle and Reasons to Migrate

Marital Status at Migration

The effect of marital status at migration on the post-migration labor behavior of immigrant women has been scarcely analyzed and, to date, all the available studies that have paid attention to this issue have focused on the US immigration experience. Chiswick (1980) found that women unmarried at arrival were more likely to work than the rest of female immigrants. He interpreted this result within the human capital framework, according to which women who migrate single are more likely to have skills more easily transferable to the destination labor market. Duleep and Regets (1993) in their study of the labor participation of Asian immigrant women in the US confirmed this result but only for some national groups such as Filipino, Chinese and Japanese. More recently, Cerruti and Massey (2001) have also found that among Mexican wives who began migrating prior to marriage, two out of three participated in the US labor market on their last trip, while the participation rate was only 50% among those who began migrating after their husbands (195). These authors, however, interpret these results as an indication of

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situation, employers can demand higher qualifications than usual even for jobs that do not require many skills.

different reasons for migration between the two groups, rather than as a sign of higher transferability of the skills of single migrants. In fact, women who migrate from developing countries prior to marriage - especially if they did it two or three decades ago, as it is the case of part of the women studied in this chapter-, are very likely to constitute a selective group within their own groups of reference in their countries of origin, less subject to the dominant gender and family ideologies there. In addition, if adult women who are single at migration are more likely to work upon arrival, they are also more likely to acquire host country-specific experience, which would enhance also their employment prospects in the long run, even if they marry.

First-mover Wives, Reunited Wives and Imported Brides

Following the typology I constructed in Chapter 2 (see Section 3.5.3), in the following empirical analyses I will examine the potential effect that different timing of migration within the couple has on the labor behavior of immigrant women.

As I explained in the previous chapters, imported brides are women brought to Germany to live with their newly married husbands, who are generally men who migrated much earlier than them, in many cases as children of previous immigrants. In fact, previous research has demonstrated that the importation of spouses is often linked to the practice of family- arranged marriages in some countries of origin and, therefore, it is relatively common that the partners have not met each other until a few days or months before the wedding. This circumstance has favored the image of "imported brides" as a group of female immigrants likely to be particularly dependent on their husbands upon arrival and strongly oriented to the family. In Chapter 5, I additionally demonstrated that male importers are not a random group within the larger pool of single male immigrants in Germany; on the contrary, low educated single men from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia are the most likely group to import their wives from their countries of origin, instead of marrying a co-national

immigrant or a native partner. Moreover, I also found evidence that the post-marital living arrangements of couples where the wife had been imported to Germany by her husband tend to be more traditional (i.e. extended household) than among other couples, which adds support to the idea of stronger "traditionalism" involved in the practice of importing wives.[15]

In line with these results I expect imported wives to be the group of immigrant women least likely to work in Germany. On the contrary, first-mover wives (i.e. wives who preceded their husbands in migration) and women who were single at migration are expected to be the most likely to participate in the host labor market.

According to the most common view, the labor behavior of reunited wives would be expected to be very similar to that of imported wives as long as they are also married women who migrate to join their husbands in the immigration country and, therefore, traditionally assumed to have migrated because of

[15] A caveat is in order regarding the category of "imported brides". Wagner and Mulder (1993) demonstrated that the larger propensity to migrate usually found among unmarried people compared to married ones, considerably reduces if one separates the in-between category of "marrying migrants" (i.e. women who marry and migrate within the same time interval) from the other two groups (married and unmarried women). Most imported brides are also "marrying migrants", although they are not only that. As I have showed in previous chapters, imported brides also tend to marry less educated men, tend to be from specific countries of origin and tend to live in extend households. In order to separate the two potentially distinct effects of being a "marrying migrant" and being an "imported wife", I will add to one of the model specifications both variables at once (see below). Moreover, in my sample 10% of reunited wives and 15% of first-movers married their husbands the same year they migrated to Germany. Therefore, they must be considered marrying migrants as well. Conversely, there are some imported wives that did not join their husbands the same year they married but a long time after. These figures clearly illustrate that the concept of marrying migrants and the one of imported bride define to different phenomena.

family reasons. To my knowledge, these two groups of married migrant women have been never separated in earlier studies aimed at examining the labor performance of immigrant women. In fact, the previously cited paper by Dustmann and Schmidt (2000) did not distinguish these two groups of women. Consequently, the authors interpreted the results obtained for the group of women who arrived to Germany later than their husbands as supporting the idea that in labor migration, the husband typically arrives earlier, and the female partner follows when he found a stable job and the budgetary constraints are less binding, which "allows the migrant family unit to adopt a more traditional pattern of labor market behavior, with the wife abstaining from labor force participation" (26).[16]

However, in the two previous chapters I have demonstrated than more than half of the "reunited wives" in GSOEP dataset arrived to Germany the same or the following year as their husbands, and that the large majority of women who arrived in Germany later than their husbands were "imported brides" instead of "reunited wives". In accordance with these results, I hypothesized that reunited wives are a group of female migrants that probably combine economic and family reasons to migrate and, therefore, I expect for them to have a higher propensity to work in Germany than imported brides.

[16] This problem is actually a little more complex in the paper by Dustmann and Schmidt (2000) since they did not take into consideration the date of marriage in the construction of their typology. This implies that women who were unmarried at migration and married a male immigrant who had arrived to Germany earlier than them, are merged together with "reunited wives" and "imported wives". In other words, their dummy variables (migration earlier, later or at the same time as the husband) capture at the same time the effect of the timing of migration within the couple and the effect of marital status at migration, in a way that is not possible to anticipate.

Children

Children are known to be a major constraint for women's employment decisions because are women in general who assume the primary responsibility for child-care, even in dual-earner couples. Pre-school children are found to display a strong depressing effect on mother's participation in absolute terms and also in terms of worked hours. However, the effect of children and household size on the labor participation of immigrant women has appeared a little puzzling in previous studies on the issue. A considerable number of studies for different immigrant groups in different countries have found that the negative effect of young children on the labor participation of immigrant women is significantly smaller than for native women (Stier and Tienda, 1992; Long 1980; Beach and Worswick 1993; Baker and Benjamin 1996; Dustmann 2000). Most of the authors have argued that such an unexpected result probably relate to the availability of more flexible household arrangements for helping women in child-care activities: in extended households, the presence of non-working adult members is argued to help immigrant women in combining family and work in ways which are not accessible to most native women, who in two-earner nuclear households much more frequently than their immigrant counterparts. Unfortunately, this hypothesis has not been adequately tested to date. In addition, there is also the possibility that a substantial number of fist generation women either left their young children behind for several years until bringing them to the host country, or did not migrate until their children are of school age. In these two cases, the reason for the absence of a negative effect of young children on immigrant mother's work would be different to the one commonly proposed. In fact, some of the results found in Chapter 4 pointed in this direction (e.g. joint couple migration is much more likely for childless women and mothers who only have children of school age, than for mothers with young children). Unfortunately, I have not complete information on the date of immigration of every child for all the women in my sample, as I

already noted in the analysis of children's reunification. I have run some analyses utilizing only the sample of women for which I had at least partial information on this aspect, and the results appeared to support my hypothesis.

Context of reception: macro-economic conditions and discriminatory labor market policies

In his article of 1989, entitled "Contemporary immigration: theoretical perspectives on its determinants and modes of incorporation", Portes and Böröcz defined the "context of reception" as the conditions jointly defined by the interaction between governmental policy, public opinion, labor demand and pre-existing ethnic communities, that channel individuals of similar endowments into very different paths (618-620). The authors stated:

> "[…] although it is possible and useful for analytical purposes to separate the economic, political, legal and other aspects of contexts of reception, in reality these conditions tend to form more or less coherent patterns organizing the life chances of newcomers. The stance of host governments, employers, the surrounding native population and the characteristics of the pre-existing ethnic community, if any, are important aspects of the situation confronting new immigrants. Newcomers face these realities as a fait accompli which alters their aspirations and plans and can channel individuals of similar background into widely different directions." (618)

In Chapter 2, I have described the main transformations in German immigration policy during the period 1960-2000, and given special attention to the halt on recruitment and the accompanying measures approved in the mid-seventies and early eighties, which were aimed at limiting family-linked migration. Among those measures, the "key date" regulations, which were enforced during four years (November 1974-April 1979), are expected to have severely reduced the labor participation of immigrant women, especially of those who arrived during those

years and who were not Italian nationals (excluded from the application of these measures due to their EC membership).

On the other hand, during the recruitment period, prospective female migrants had the possibility of arranging a work contract in advance with a German employer; however, after the halt, this possibility vanished. Moreover, the macro-economic conditions faced by these two cohorts of immigrant women during their stay in Germany widely diverged: while the recruitment period was characterized by high rates of economic growth and low rates of female unemployment (with the only exception of the short economic recession in 1966/7), the rate of female unemployment jumped to 3% in 1973, hovered around 6% until 1982 and increased again during the recession in the mid-eighties. Since then, unemployment has maintained at high levels, especially after the reunification took place in 1990.

Therefore, it can be said that the context of reception dramatically worsened in the mid-seventies. In fact, this change could be characterized as a transition from the most favorable ideal-type described by Portes and Borocz (1989), in which foreigners receive active legal as well as material assistance from the host governments and meet with a favorable public reception, to the most unfavorable one, in which the governmental apparatus take a dim view of the inflow and attempt to reduce or suppress it altogether. In this unfavorable context -continued the authors-, immigrants are negatively typified by employers, either as unsuitable labor or suitable only for menial jobs, and a general negative prejudice about immigrant spread out in the native population. However, newcomers still come because of the availability of some economic opportunities under the sponsorship of kinship networks.

The previous description leads one to expect that women who arrived after 1973 would be less likely to enter the labor force in Germany, take longer time to obtain a first job after arrival and also, perhaps, to have a weaker attachment to the German labor force during their entire stay in Germany. In any case, it is important to note that my expectation of lower participation rates

among post-halt immigrant women is not based on the idea that women who arrived after the ban on recruitment were mainly reunited wives who migrated for family reasons, but rather on the effect of the much tougher context of reception that this cohort of women encountered upon arrival.

Survival Functions

To have a first idea about the relationship between some of the key independent variables identified in the hypotheses formulated above, and the dependent variable of the analysis (i.e. first entry into the German labor force), I have included below some graphs of the survival function. The survival function is the cumulative proportion of cases surviving up to the respective time interval. Since the probabilities of survival are assumed to be independent across the intervals, this probability is computed by multiplying out the probabilities of survival across all previous intervals.

In the graphical representation of the survival function, the vertical axis measures the proportion of individuals who have not experienced the event (i.e. entry into the labor force) yet, and the horizontal axis measures the analysis time. In this case, the time of analysis starts at the date of arrival and ends either at the time the woman enters the labor force or at the time she leaves the survey.[17] Obviously, the survival function only gives us information about the timing of the process but not about the factors explaining why individuals in the sample experience the event at a particular point in time.

As can be seen in Figure 6.1, approximately 85% of women in my sample ended up entering the German labor force at some point during their stay in Germany. Moreover, a large fraction of

[17] Note that women who were unmarried at migration do not enter the analysis until the date of their marriage since, as I said before, the analysis restrict to married first generation immigrant women.

them (about 35%) entered the labor force right after arriving (see the severe drop in the first month of analysis).[18]

Figure 6.1. Survival function of first entry into the German labor force for first generation women



In Figure 6.2, I compare the survival functions corresponding to women who were unmarried and married at migration, respectively. In Figure 24, I compare the survival functions corresponding to women who entered Germany before and after the halt on recruitment. These two graphs offer a preliminary insight about the proportion of women within each group who

[18] Given that many women started to work in Germany immediately upon arrival, I have many ties (i.e. many events occurring within the same time interval) in the first time interval when I focus exclusively on the first entry to the labor force, as can be seen in the Life Table 1 included in the Appendix A. This problem, however, disappears when both the first and subsequent re-entries into the labor force are analyzed all together (see Life Table 2 in the Appendix A) and when only re-entries are considered.

entered the German labor market at some point, and about the moment at which they did.

Figure 6.2 shows that almost ¾ of women who were unmarried at their arrival in Germany, entered the labor force the same month they arrived. On the contrary, the corresponding proportion within the group of married migrants was only 35%, approximately. The participation differential between the two groups of female immigrants progressively narrowed over time (note that the two lines get closer to each other as time passes). However, after spending twenty years (240 months) in the host country, women who migrated unmarried still had a higher rate of participation in the German labor market.

Figure 6.2. Survival function of first entry into the German labor force, by marital status at migration



Something similar happens in Figure 6.3, which shows the survival function corresponding to the pre-halt and post-halt female immigrant cohorts. Approximately half women who entered Germany prior to 1974 entered the labor force the same

month they arrived, against only 25% of women who arrived in Germany after that date. In addition, this difference has not disappeared twenty years later.

Figure 6.3. Survival function of first entry into the German labor force, by period of arrival



However, these differences across these two cohorts of women are not equal for women from all countries. In fact, as I suggested in the previous section, Italian women (who were exempted from the application of the restrictions imposed in the mid-seventies on the access to employment of immigrant women) do not experience such a difference, as Figure 6.4 illustrates. The two survival functions overlap over the entire time of analysis. Approximately half of both pre-halt and post-halt Italian women entered the German labor force in the first month after arriving in Germany.

Figure 6.4. Survival function of first entry into the German labor force of Italian women, by period of arrival



This is clearly not the case for Turk women and, especially, women from the former Yugoslavia, as Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show (see below).

Figure 6.5. Survival function of first entry into the German labor force of Turk women, by period of arrival



Figure 6.6. Survival function of first entry into the German labor force of Yugoslavian women, by period of arrival



In the following section, I will examine whether the described differences across cohorts, country of origin and marital status remain when observed differences in these and other characteristics are controlled for.

6.6. Results and discussion

No assimilation into employment

The baseline model (Model 1) estimates the effect of time spent out-of-employment in Germany on the likelihood of entering the labor force for the first time, controlling only for age at migration and age at marriage. The dummy variables to measure the effect of time indicate that the hazard follows a declining pattern, which means that women who do not enter the labor force in the first 18 months after their arrival in Germany (reference category) become more and more unlikely to work. In other words, there is no assimilation into employment for adult first generation immigrant women,[19] and the human capital approach that predicts that immigrants will behave similarly to comparable natives after an initial period of adaptation is not supported by these results. Moreover, as can be seen, this declining pattern of employability over time holds not matter which controls are added to the model (see coefficients for the dummy variables indicating the time spent out of employment in Model 1 to Model 10).

The control variables "age at migration" and "age at marriage" show the expected signs. The chances of working in Germany

[19] Note that the variable "duration spent out-of-employment since arrival' in the model equals to years since migration for all women in the sample but women who arrived single, who were in Germany some time prior to their date of marriage (i.e the starting time analysis for them). The declining shape of the hazard rate, however, remains even after excluding women unmarried at migration from my sample (see Appendix B).

decrease the older the woman was at arrival and increase the older she married.

Country of Origin

Results obtained in Model 2 indicate that first generation women from all nationalities, in particular Greeks and Spaniards, are more likely to work in Germany than Turks (reference category). If we take into account here the results obtained in Chapter 4, which indicated that Greek women were the most likely to migrate jointly with their husbands and to leave their children behind for a while, it seems that Greek women were the most strongly work oriented among female immigrants from the five recruitment countries. However, these results might change once additional variables that are known to widely vary across national groups are added to the model.

Human Capital

Results in Model 3 indicate that, contrary to what the human capital theory would predict, the propensity of immigrant women to work in Germany does not increase with education, which reinforces the previous finding that employability does not increase either with time of residence in the country of immigration. The well-established ethnic and sex-segmentation within the German occupational structure may be important in explaining these two results.

On the contrary, years of previous work experience substantially increase the likelihood of participating in the German labor force for immigrant women (see the positive coefficient of this variable in Model 4, as well as the improvement in the overall fit of the model).[20] The inclusion of this variable, in addition,

[20] It is important to remark that this variable measures actual experience, instead of potential work experience, which was the variable utilized by Dustman and Schmidt (2000) in their analysis of wage

reduces the size of the differences across national groups, which suggest that the higher propensity to work among Greek and Spanish women (compared to Turks) is partially due to the fact that they had more work experience at arrival.

A caveat is in order with regard to the variable "years of previous work experience". Although for most women in the sample it measures exclusively pre-migration work experience, for the group of women who were unmarried at migration this variable measures jointly "years of pre-migration experience" plus "pre-marital work experience acquired in Germany", since they enter into the analysis at the date of their marriage. However, the strong effect of "previous experience" does not disappear when I ran the model only for women married at migration, nor when I include only pre-migration experience (see Appendix B).

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performance. This entails a noticeable advantage since potential work experience is known to be a very bad approximation for women, who often have careers with several and relatively prolonged interruptions. In fact, when I ran the models with potential experience, instead of actual experience, the variable was not even significant.

Table 6.3. First entry into the German labor market since the date of marriage

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10
18-35 months	-2.35**	-2.30**	-2.30**	-2.25**	-2.24**	-2.21**	-2.21**	-2.14**	-2.15**	-2.13**
	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
36-72 months	-2.64**	-2.59**	-2.59**	-2.56**	-2.56**	-2.52**	-2.57**	-2.43**	-2.48**	-2.42**
	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
73-120 months	-2.65**	-2.61**	-2.61**	-2.56**	-2.57**	-2.54**	-2.64**	-2.46**	-2.55**	-2.48**
	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.19
121 + months	-2.85**	-2.81**	-2.81**	-2.78**	-2.79**	-2.77**	-3.13**	-2.76**	-2.98**	-2.87**
	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.21	0.21
Age at Migr.	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.07**	-0.05**	-0.07**	-0.09**	-0.10**	-0.09**	-0.10**
	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Age at Marr.	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Former Yug.		0.76**	0.77**	0.72**	0.67**	0.56**	0.55**	0.45**	0.43**	0.45**
		0.12	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Greece		1.23**	1.23**	0.77**	0.73**	0.69**	0.70**	0.45**	0.46**	0.45**
		0.17	0.17	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21
Italy		0.75**	0.74**	0.78**	0.72**	0.71**	0.69**	0.41**	0.41**	0.35*
		0.14	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.18
Spain		0.91**	0.91**	0.82**	0.77**	0.78**	0.75**	0.36	0.33	0.32
		0.19	0.19	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.23
Years of Educ.			-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	-0.03
			0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05

Work Exp.				0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
				0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Single At mig.					0.70**	0.28	0.28	0.50**	0.52**	0.55**
					0.19	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.24
First-Mover						0.60**	0.57**	0.49	0.48	0.47
						0.28	0.29	0.3	0.3	0.3
Imported Bride						-0.58**	-0.53**	-0.32**	-0.29*	-0.28*
						0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Pregnancy							-0.82**	-0.92**	-0.93**	-0.94**
							0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Number of Kids							0.01	0.08	0.07	0.07
							0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Youngest is under 6							-0.11	-0.2	-0.2	-0.25
							0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
Youngest is 6-16							0.58**	0.58**	0.58**	0.54**
							0.18	0.19	0.18	0.18
Female Unemp. Rate								-0.10**	-0.07**	-0.08**
								0.02	0.03	0.03
Post-halt Arrival									-0.36*	-1.71**
									0.22	0.61
Post-halt*Years in Educ.										0.16**
										0.07
Constant	-2.89**	-2.90**	-2.85**	-1.68**	-1.80**	-1.37**	-1.04**	-0.81*	-0.78	-0.16
	0.25	0.28	0.37	0.45	0.44	0.46	0.45	0.48	0.48	0.56
Log-likel.	-2,953	-2,894	-2,894	-2,779	-2,762	-2,745	-2,713	-2,682	-2,679	-2,674
Events	649	649	649	649	649	649	649	649	649	649

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. ** Significant at 95%. * Significant at 90%.

Family-Life Cycle

Marital status at migration and the timing of migration within the couple

Model 5 shows that the coefficient for the variable "unmarried at migration" is positive (ß= 0.70) and significant, which confirm the idea that adult women who migrated unmarried are more likely to work in the country of immigration than their married counterparts, even after getting married themselves.[21] Note that the introduction of the variable "unmarried", however, does not eliminate differences across nationalities (only the positive coefficients of Yugoslav and Spanish women reduce slightly).

In Model 6, first-mover wives, imported brides and reunited wives (reference category) are separated, in order to examine whether the timing of migration within the couple can be taken as an indicator revealing different preferences for work and, ultimately, different reasons for migration. My expectations in this regard are confirmed. The coefficient of "first-mover" is positive and significant (ß=0.60), which implies that women who preceded their husbands in migration are more likely to work in Germany than reunited wives (reference category). By contrast, imported brides appeared to be the least prone to participate in the German labor force (ß=-0.58), even when they are compared to reunited wives which are the omitted group in this model. Note that, after controlling for these differences in the timing of migration within the women's couples, the higher propensity to work of the Yugoslavian women compared to the Turks reduce a little, indicating that part of the previous differences were due to both the larger number of imported wives among Turks and the larger number of first-movers among Yugoslavian women.

[21] On this point, it is important to remind that the sample is restricted to women who arrived in Germany at working age (i.e. first adult generation), which assures that the coefficient for "marital status at arrival" is uncontaminated by other effects like being of middle or second generation.

However, the differences found across the four groups of women identified (i.e. unmarried at migration, first-mover wives, reunited wives and imported brides) and, especially, between imported and reunited wives may have to do with the differences in the number of children they had and their ages. In fact, in the previous chapters I have showed that women in these two groups migrated, on average, at different stages of their family life cycle. Most reunited wives had married long before migration and usually had children at the time their husband left. In contrast, most imported brides arrived in Germany as newly married childless women. Therefore, while most reunited wives only had children of school age by the time they arrived to Germany, most imported wives were newly married and began to have children immediately after.

In order to test this possibility, in Model 7 I have added four time-varying variables that indicate whether the woman is pregnant or not, the total number of kids, and whether the youngest child is under 6 or between 6 and 16. Pregnancy has a strong negative impact on work propensity (ß=-0.82). In addition, women who only have children of school age are significantly more likely to work than childless women (reference category, see ß=0.58). The absence of effect of the total number of children and, above all, of having at least one child of pre-school age on the propensity to work of immigrant women is in line with the previous findings in the literature, which suggested that children usually constitute a smaller obstacle for immigrant women than for native women (Stier and Tienda, 1992; Long 1980; Beach and Worswick, 1993; Baker and Benjamin, 1996; Dustmann, 2000). In fact, the available studies of the employment cycles of German women's usually conclude that both pre-school children have a severe negative effect on their mother's entry into employment, regardless of it is part or full-time (Blossfeld, Drobnic and Rowher, 2001: 69-70; Drobnic, Blossfeld and Rowher, 1999: 140). However, the reason for such a differential effect of children for immigrant and native women remains unclear. The hypotheses that immigrant women have at disposal more flexible child-care

arrangements, thanks to the help provided by other adult members of the family cannot be tested since the entire composition of the households included in GSOEP can be reconstructed only since 1984, but not for the entire period under analysis here (1960-2002). Something similar happens with regard to my idea that first generation immigrant women often left their pre-school children behind if they intended to work in Germany.

Finally, it is important to highlight that the positive effect of being a woman wife who preceded her husband in migration, as well as the negative effect of being an imported bride do not disappear –actually, hardly reduce- after controlling by children responsibilities. Therefore, even after controlling for differences in their length of residence in Germany, age at migration, age at marriage, country of origin, education, previous experience and children responsibilities, imported wives are significantly less likely to work in the host country than reunited wives (reference category). On the contrary, once differences in the birth biography and child-bearing are taken into account, differences between first-mover wives and reunited ones in their propensity to work vanish.

In the light of these results, the idea that the timing of migration within the couple may be helpful in predicting women's preferences with regard to labor participation in the host labor market and, more generally, their reasons for migration seems justified. It remains to see, however, if these results are robust to the introduction of one last set of controls that capture the differences in the context of reception that each of these group of women had found in the host country.

Changes in the context of reception: macro-economic conditions, immigration policy and their differential impact by nationality

In order to explore the effect that the changing conditions in the context of reception have had on the labor participation of immigrant women in Germany, Models 8, 9 and 10 add to the previous specifications two variables. First of all, Model 8

includes a continuous time-varying covariate that measures the annual female unemployment rate. The effect is clearly negative and significant as expected (ß= -0.10), which indicates that a higher rate of female unemployment in Germany reduces the likelihood of entering the German labor force for immigrant women.

Moreover, note that these differences in the macro-economic context are partially responsible for the differential work propensity previously found between our four types of immigrant women (unmarried at migration, first-movers, reunited and imported). First of all, the higher propensity to work of the first-mover wives compared to the reunited ones, vanish after controlling for variations in the rate of female unemployment during the period these women were "searching" their first job in Germany. Secondly, the lower propensity of imported wives to participate in the German labor force compared to their reunited counterparts substantially reduces when the different macro-economic context that each of these two groups of women encountered are taken into account (from ß= -0.53 in Model 7 to ß= - 0.32 in Model 8).

These results do not imply that the timing of migration within the couple cannot be taken as a proxy for reasons to migrate but rather the opposite. In fact, first-mover wives probably migrated in larger numbers in years when their chances of getting a job in Germany were high, precisely because their main reason to migrate was economic. On the other hand, imported brides continued migrating in years of recession and despite of high levels of female unemployment because their primary motivation for migration was not work but marriage and family formation.

As I said earlier, a bad macroeconomic context was probably not the only cause of the lower participation rate of women who arrived in the mid-seventies and after. The restrictive immigration policy implemented since the first oil shock in 1973, especially measures aimed at limiting the number of new foreign workers that entered the German labor forces as a mean to protect employment and wages of native workers, are likely to have

played an important role in explaining the poor performance of post-halt immigrant women. The ban on access to the "regular" labor market imposed by the "key date" regulations to foreigners admitted on the basis of family reunification provisions between 1974 and 1979 are the paramount example of this. However, even after the "key date" rule was lifted in April 1979, long waiting periods (of up to four years after arrival) remained for issuing a work permit to spouses of foreign residents.

I have investigated the effect of these restrictive measures on the access of immigrant women to the German labor market by means of two different variables: "keydate2" and "posthalt". The first variable ("keydate2") identifies those women who arrived in Germany during the time the "key date" regulations were enforced, and compare them to the rest of women. The second variable ("posthalt") separates the cohort of women who arrived during the recruitment period from the cohort who arrived after the end of recruitment. The results obtained for these two different operationalizations of the effect of the described restrictive policies are very similar. Therefore, in Table 6.3 I have included only the results for the second of them. However, the results obtained with the variable "keydate2" can be found in Appendix C, at the end of this chapter.

Model 9 shows that women who arrived after the halt on recruitment ("posthalt") are less likely to enter the German labor force than their pre-halt counterparts (see ß= - 0.36), although the coefficient is significant only at 90%.

In addition, in Model 10, I added an interaction term between the variable "post-halt" and the variable "years of education" to examine if, as I hypothesized, the structural change occurred in the German economy did actually modified the conditions governing the employability of immigrant women. I expect for education to be better rewarded in terms of access to employment and wages after the halt on recruitment than earlier. The reason for such expectation is straightforward: during the fifties and the sixties, foreign labor was needed to alleviate the labor shortages in low-skilled jobs at the manufacturing industries. In contrast, the oil

shock and the ensuing transformation of the world economy implied a necessary rationalization of the production system through the industrial upgrading and the elimination of redundancies. Employers became much more selective in their hiring behavior, especially taking into account that they had at their disposal a growing cohort of German young workers who had benefit from the recent educational expansion.

The coefficient for the interaction term is positive and significant, which means that education did improve the employability of post-halt women (see ß=0.16, significant at 95%). On the contrary, education did not affect the labor participation of immigrant women who arrived during the recruitment period (see coefficient for the variable "years of education" in Model 10), which is absolutely consistent with the type of jobs foreign workers were recruited for. Finally, after adding the interaction term, the main effect of "post-halt" (i.e. arrival to Germany after 1973) becomes much larger and robust than before, which confirm my expectation that the restrictive measures imposed by the German authorities on the labor integration of immigrants (and of female immigrants in particular) had a strong negative impact on their labor performance.[22]

These results contradicts the conclusions achieved by Goodman (1984, 1987), in her study of the labor performance of Spanish and Turkish women in Germany. Based on their 17 in-depth interviews with Spanish immigrant women living in a medium-size German town, she concluded that the main effect of the restrictive measures was not to lower the participation rate of immigrant women but rather to confine them to the "irregular" labor market. Unfortunately, the author did not explain the strategy followed to select these 17 immigrant women, although she explicitly admitted that the survey "clearly is not to be considered representative of all Spanish women in the FGR" (34).

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[22] The results do not vary if I utilize the variable "keydate2", as can be seen in Appendix C.

Unfortunately, I cannot ascertain how many of the women who reported to be working in my sample, did it illegally.[23]

In order to better understand the changes occurred in the participation behavior of immigrant women before and after the halt on recruitment, I decided to run separate regressions for each of these two groups of women. The results are showed in Table 6.4.

As it can be seen, there are substantial differences in the way that several factors such as "time spent out of employment", "country of origin", "number of children", "imported bride" status and "unemployment rate at arrival", have affected the entry into the German labor force for these two cohorts of immigrant women. These separated regression models reveal that women who entered Germany after the halt on recruitment were not only substantially less likely to work than their pre-halt counterparts but, in addition, those who ultimately worked took much longer to find a job. It is interesting to note that although time spent out of employment did reduce the likelihood of entering the labor force for women who migrated to Germany during the recruitment period, it did increase the employability of post-halt women (compare the coefficients of the four dummy variables measuring time out of employment since arrival in Germany in Model 4 for each group of women). More exactly, the rate of entry into the labor force for post-halt immigrant women increases over time (smaller negative coefficients), and it falls only for women who have been out of employment for more than 10 years without interruption.

These results suggest that human-capital arguments that predict a decreasing entry rate into employment as time out of it

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[23] There is no specific question about this dimension of the immigration experience in the GSOEP questionnaire. However, the retrospective nature of the data collection for this period of time may have helped in this regard: women who worked illegally during those years might be more prone to admit they did work (without having to say explicitly whether it was legal or illegal job) when they were asked about 7 or 10 years later.

extends do not apply female immigrants who arrived during the recruitment phase but they do to their post-halt counterparts. In fact, the validity of the human capital approach to explain the fate of post-halt women in the German labor market gains grounds when one looks at the differential effect of education across these two cohorts. The level of education was irrelevant in predicting differences in first entry into the German labor force among pre-halt immigrant women, whereas its effect was positive and significant for the employment chances of the post-halt immigrant cohort.

Secondly, I would like to highlight the fact that the set of variables that measure the effect of marital status at migration and the timing of migration within the couple do not have a significant effect in predicting the likelihood of labor participation of post-halt women. Therefore, the lower rate of activity of the post-halt cohort compared to their pre-halt counterparts is not related to the larger number of reunited and imported wives that arrived in Germany since the mid-seventies.

Finally, one of the most remarkable findings achieved by running these two separated regression models is the differential propensity to work across nationalities and how it changed across the two cohorts. Within the pre-halt cohort, Yugoslav and Greek women were significantly more likely to work than Turks (reference category). On the contrary, within the post-halt cohort, Italian women are by far the most likely to work; in fact, differences between the other four groups are not significant. This result bluntly illustrates the discriminatory effect that the ban on recruitment and its accompanying measures, which were not applied to Italians because of their EC-membership, had on the integration of immigrant women into the German labor market.[24]

[24] In Appendix D, I re-ran the model after restricting the sample to those women who arrived to Germany between 1975 and 1980 (the period when the key date regulations were strictly enforced). In this case, Italians also remain the only group more likely to work than Turks.

Table 6.4. First entry into the German labor force by period of arrival

	WOMEN WHO ARRIVED EARLIER THAN 1974				**WOMEN WHO ARRIVED IN 1974 OR LATER**			
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
18-35 months	-2.55**	-2.49**	-2.37**	**-2.39****	-1.77**	-1.73**	-1.62**	**-1.61****
	0.17	0.17	0.18	**0.18**	0.23	0.23	0.24	**0.23**
36-72 months	-3.08**	-3.01**	-2.89**	**-3.04****	-1.79**	-1.72**	-1.58**	**-1.57****
	0.24	0.24	0.25	**0.25**	0.26	0.26	0.27	**0.28**
73-120 months	-3.77**	-3.71**	-3.58**	**-3.89****	-1.33**	-1.23**	-1.12**	**-1.09****
	0.3	0.31	0.33	**0.34**	0.21	0.22	0.24	**0.25**
121 + months	-3.52**	-3.41**	-3.30**	**-4.01****	-1.64**	-1.49**	-1.65**	**-1.61****
	0.16	0.17	0.26	**0.33**	0.23	0.22	0.27	**0.29**
Age at Migration	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.08**	-0.12**	-0.04**	-0.05**	-0.06**	-0.06**
	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
Age at Marriage	0.00**	0.00**	0	0	0.01**	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Former Yug.		0.79**	0.62**	**0.57****		0.21	0.17	0.17
		0.2	0.2	**0.2**		0.23	0.25	0.25
Greece		1.10**	0.65**	**0.61****		0.01	0.06	0.04
		0.27	0.27	**0.26**		0.42	0.39	0.4
Italy		0.3	0.25	0.18		1.17**	1.08**	**1.06****
		0.22	0.24	0.23		0.24	0.26	**0.26**
Spain		0.59**	0.46*	0.33		1.11**	0.91	0.89
		0.26	0.26	0.25		0.53	0.61	0.61

Years of Education		-0.04 0.05	-0.05 0.05	**-0.06** **0.05**		0.13** 0.05	0.12** 0.05	**0.12**** **0.05**
Work Experience		0.01** 0	0.01** 0	0.01** 0		0.01** 0	0.01** 0	0.01** 0
Unmarried At Migration			0.53* 0.31	0.57* 0.31			0.38 0.4	0.39 0.4
First-Mover Wife			0.38 0.35	0.36 0.35			0.28 0.63	0.29 0.64
Imported Bride			-0.37* 0.21	**-0.38*** **0.21**			-0.29 0.29	-0.27 0.29
Pregnancy			-1.07** 0.24	-1.07** 0.24			-0.82** 0.34	-0.83** 0.34
Number of Kids			0.11 0.07	0.14* 0.07			-0.04 0.08	-0.04 0.08
Youngest is under 6			-0.24 0.2	-0.28 0.2			-0.38 0.24	-0.39 0.24
Youngest is 6-16			0.67** 0.22	0.66** 0.23			0.49* 0.28	0.48* 0.28
Female Unemp. Rate				-0.07 0.04				-0.02 0.04
Constant	-1.89** 0.35	-1.77** 0.65	0.08 0.66	0.57 0.66	-4.02** 0.4	-4.53** 0.53	-3.75** 0.61	-3.66** 0.63
Log-likelihood	-1778	-1659	-1605	-1603	-1065	-1022	-1003	-1003
Events	453	453	453	453	196	196	196	196

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. *Significant at 90%.

In Appendix E, I re-ran the same models for each cohort but excluding women who were single at migration, in order to eliminate possible distortions derived from the selective nature of this type of female migration. Most results remain unchanged, with the only two exceptions: 1) the negative effect of being an imported wife (compared to reunited wife) within the pre-halt cohort becomes larger and more robust and, 2) pre-halt Italian women were slightly more likely to work than Turks, which underlies the highly selective nature of single female Turkish immigrants.

Husband's characteristics

The inclusion of two variables that measure the husband's years of education and his length of residence in Germany did not modify the results commented so far. In fact, none of these two variables is significant. However, it is important to remind that in this chapter I have analyzed only first entry into the labor force. There is a possibility that these variables do affect exits from the labor force and/or re-entries. I will test this possibility in the next chapter.

6.7. Conclusions

In the present chapter I have analyzed the main determinants of the first entry into the German labor force among first generation immigrant women (i.e. women who immigrated at 16 or older). In other words, I have examined the reasons why some immigrant women have worked in Germany, whereas others have never entered the German labor force. The obtained results suggest there is a main underlying the differences in the labor behavior of immigrant women: the context of reception they encountered at their arrival in Germany. In fact, a higher level of female unemployment in the host economy and having arrived during the post-halt period were two of the factors that most

negatively affected the labor participation of women who were of working age at their arrival in Germany. Conversely, the idea that women who arrived after the halt on recruitment were less likely to work in Germany because they mostly were women who followed their husbands in migration and, therefore, migrated for family instead of economic reasons, do not receive support from the data. In fact, the negative effect of having entered in Germany after the halt on recruitment remain even after neutralizing the differences in the marital status and the timing of migration within the couple between the two cohorts of women. Moreover, within the pre-halt cohort, women who were single at migration did participate more than reunited wives. However, in the post-halt period there is no significant difference in the likelihood of participating between unmarried migrants, women who preceded their husbands in migration, imported brides and reunited wives.

In sum, the analyses carried out in this chapter have demonstrated that the halt on recruitment and its accompanying measures, along with the differences in the economic situation in Germany, implied a genuine structural change in the context of reception that immigrants encountered at their arrival to Germany. And that this change had, at least in the case of adult women, a long-lasting impact in the life of immigrants.

APPENDIX
CHAPTER 6

Appendix A

Life Table 1. First entry into the German labor force (since the date of marriage)

Interval		Beg. Total	Cum. Failure	Std. Error	Hazard	Std. Error	[95% Conf.	Int.]
1	**2**	**850**	**0.4141**	**0.0169**	**0.4141**	**0.0221**	**0.3720**	**0.4585**
2	3	498	0.4165	0.0169	0.0040	0.0028	0.0005	0.0112
3	4	496	0.4176	0.0169	0.0020	0.0020	0.0001	0.0074
4	5	495	0.4200	0.0169	0.0040	0.0029	0.0005	0.0113
5	6	493	0.4224	0.0169	0.0041	0.0029	0.0005	0.0113
7	8	491	0.4282	0.0170	0.0102	0.0046	0.0033	0.0209
9	10	486	0.4306	0.0170	0.0041	0.0029	0.0005	0.0115
12	13	484	0.4859	0.0171	0.0971	0.0142	0.0714	0.1268
13	14	436	0.4871	0.0171	0.0023	0.0023	0.0001	0.0085
15	16	435	0.4882	0.0171	0.0023	0.0023	0.0001	0.0085
16	17	434	0.4906	0.0171	0.0046	0.0033	0.0006	0.0128
17	18	432	0.4918	0.0171	0.0023	0.0023	0.0001	0.0085
18	19	431	0.4930	0.0171	0.0023	0.0023	0.0001	0.0086
19	20	430	0.4953	0.0171	0.0047	0.0033	0.0006	0.0130
20	21	427	0.4965	0.0172	0.0023	0.0023	0.0001	0.0086
24	25	426	0.5249	0.0171	0.0563	0.0115	0.0361	0.0810
25	26	394	0.5273	0.0171	0.0051	0.0036	0.0006	0.0141
27	28	392	0.5297	0.0171	0.0051	0.0036	0.0006	0.0142
28	29	390	0.5309	0.0171	0.0026	0.0026	0.0001	0.0095
30	31	389	0.5309	0.0171	0.0000	.	.	.
31	32	388	0.5321	0.0171	0.0026	0.0026	0.0001	0.0095
32	33	385	0.5333	0.0171	0.0026	0.0026	0.0001	0.0096
34	35	384	0.5345	0.0171	0.0026	0.0026	0.0001	0.0096
36	37	383	0.5637	0.0171	0.0627	0.0128	0.0401	0.0901
42	43	329	0.5664	0.0171	0.0061	0.0043	0.0007	0.0169
43	44	327	0.5690	0.0171	0.0061	0.0043	0.0007	0.0170
44	45	324	0.5703	0.0171	0.0031	0.0031	0.0001	0.0114
46	47	323	0.5717	0.0170	0.0031	0.0031	0.0001	0.0114
48	49	322	0.5863	0.0170	0.0342	0.0103	0.0171	0.0571
55	56	307	0.5890	0.0170	0.0065	0.0046	0.0008	0.0181
57	58	304	0.5903	0.0170	0.0033	0.0033	0.0001	0.0121
58	59	303	0.5917	0.0170	0.0033	0.0033	0.0001	0.0122
59	60	302	0.5944	0.0170	0.0066	0.0047	0.0008	0.0184
60	61	300	0.6133	0.0170	0.0467	0.0125	0.0255	0.0741

	.							
	.							
	.							
	.							
136	137	167	0.7108	0.0165	0.0060	0.0060	0.0002	0.0221
140	141	166	0.7125	0.0165	0.0060	0.0060	0.0002	0.0222
141	142	165	0.7142	0.0165	0.0061	0.0061	0.0002	0.0224
142	143	164	0.7195	0.0164	0.0183	0.0106	0.0038	0.0441
144	145	161	0.7282	0.0164	0.0311	0.0139	0.0101	0.0636
148	149	152	0.7300	0.0164	0.0066	0.0066	0.0002	0.0243
151	152	151	0.7300	0.0164	0.0000	.	.	.
155	156	150	0.7336	0.0164	0.0133	0.0094	0.0016	0.0371
156	157	148	0.7390	0.0163	0.0203	0.0117	0.0042	0.0488
157	158	141	0.7408	0.0163	0.0071	0.0071	0.0002	0.0262
158	159	140	0.7427	0.0163	0.0071	0.0071	0.0002	0.0263
159	160	139	0.7445	0.0163	0.0072	0.0072	0.0002	0.0265
160	161	138	0.7464	0.0163	0.0072	0.0072	0.0002	0.0267
163	164	137	0.7482	0.0163	0.0073	0.0073	0.0002	0.0269
165	166	136	0.7519	0.0162	0.0147	0.0104	0.0018	0.0410
168	169	134	0.7575	0.0162	0.0224	0.0129	0.0046	0.0539
171	172	121	0.7595	0.0162	0.0083	0.0083	0.0002	0.0305
173	174	120	0.7615	0.0162	0.0083	0.0083	0.0002	0.0307
175	176	119	0.7635	0.0161	0.0084	0.0084	0.0002	0.0310
180	181	117	0.7675	0.0161	0.0171	0.0121	0.0021	0.0476
187	188	106	0.7719	0.0161	0.0189	0.0133	0.0023	0.0526
190	191	104	0.7741	0.0161	0.0096	0.0096	0.0002	0.0355
192	193	103	0.7763	0.0161	0.0097	0.0097	0.0002	0.0358
199	200	96	0.7833	0.0161	0.0313	0.0180	0.0064	0.0753
200	201	92	0.7857	0.0161	0.0109	0.0109	0.0003	0.0401
204	205	91	0.7951	0.0161	0.0440	0.0220	0.0120	0.0963
206	207	85	0.7975	0.0160	0.0118	0.0118	0.0003	0.0434
208	209	84	0.7999	0.0160	0.0119	0.0119	0.0003	0.0439
212	213	83	0.8023	0.0160	0.0120	0.0120	0.0003	0.0444
216	217	82	0.8047	0.0160	0.0122	0.0122	0.0003	0.0450
218	219	76	0.8073	0.0160	0.0132	0.0132	0.0003	0.0485
219	220	75	0.8099	0.0160	0.0133	0.0133	0.0003	0.0492
223	224	74	0.8124	0.0160	0.0135	0.0135	0.0003	0.0498
225	226	73	0.8150	0.0160	0.0137	0.0137	0.0003	0.0505
226	227	72	0.8176	0.0160	0.0139	0.0139	0.0004	0.0512
228	229	71	0.8176	0.0160	0.0000	.	.	.
230	231	65	0.8204	0.0160	0.0154	0.0154	0.0004	0.0568
231	232	64	0.8232	0.0159	0.0156	0.0156	0.0004	0.0576
232	233	63	0.8288	0.0159	0.0317	0.0224	0.0038	0.0884
235	236	61	0.8288	0.0159	0.0000	.	.	.
240	241	60	0.8316	0.0159	0.0167	0.0167	0.0004	0.0615
244	245	56	0.8347	0.0159	0.0179	0.0179	0.0005	0.0659
247	248	55	0.8347	0.0159	0.0000	.	.	.
252	253	54	0.8377	0.0159	0.0185	0.0185	0.0005	0.0683
255	256	50	0.8410	0.0159	0.0200	0.0200	0.0005	0.0738
259	260	49	0.8442	0.0159	0.0204	0.0204	0.0005	0.0753
264	265	47	0.8442	0.0159	0.0000	.	.	.
276	277	43	0.8442	0.0159	0.0000	.	.	.
288	289	37	0.8442	0.0159	0.0000	.	.	.
299	300	33	0.8489	0.0161	0.0303	0.0303	0.0008	0.1118
300	301	32	0.8489	0.0161	0.0000	.	.	.
312	313	27	0.8489	0.0161	0.0000	.	.	.
324	325	26	0.8489	0.0161	0.0000	.	.	.
336	337	25	0.8489	0.0161	0.0000	.	.	.
348	349	21	0.8489	0.0161	0.0000	.	.	.
360	361	17	0.8489	0.0161	0.0000	.	.	.
372	373	11	0.8489	0.0161	0.0000	.	.	.
384	385	10	0.8489	0.0161	0.0000	.	.	.
396	397	8	0.8489	0.0161	0.0000	.	.	.
403	404	4	0.8489	0.0161	0.0000	.	.	.
408	409	3	0.8489	0.0161	0.0000	.	.	.
456	457	1	0.8489	0.0161	0.0000	.	.	.

Life Table 2. All entries into the German labor force (since the date of marriage)

Interval		Beg. Total	Cum. Failure	Std. Error	Hazard	Std. Error	[95% Conf.	Int.]
1	**2**	**853**	**0.0950**	**0.0100**	**0.0950**	**0.0106**	**0.0754**	**0.1167**
2	3	772	0.0961	0.0101	0.0013	0.0013	0.0000	0.0048
3	4	771	0.0996	0.0103	0.0039	0.0022	0.0008	0.0094
4	5	768	0.1008	0.0103	0.0013	0.0013	0.0000	0.0048
5	6	767	0.1043	0.0105	0.0039	0.0023	0.0008	0.0094
6	7	763	0.1079	0.0106	0.0039	0.0023	0.0008	0.0095
7	8	759	0.1137	0.0109	0.0066	0.0029	0.0021	0.0135
8	9	753	0.1149	0.0109	0.0013	0.0013	0.0000	0.0049
9	10	752	0.1208	0.0112	0.0066	0.0030	0.0022	0.0136
11	12	746	0.1208	0.0112	0.0000	.	.	.
12	13	744	0.1669	0.0128	0.0524	0.0084	0.0373	0.0701
13	14	700	0.1716	0.0129	0.0057	0.0029	0.0016	0.0125
14	15	696	0.1728	0.0130	0.0014	0.0014	0.0000	0.0053
15	16	695	0.1740	0.0130	0.0014	0.0014	0.0000	0.0053
16	17	693	0.1764	0.0131	0.0029	0.0020	0.0003	0.0080
17	18	690	0.1800	0.0132	0.0043	0.0025	0.0009	0.0105
18	19	685	0.1824	0.0133	0.0029	0.0021	0.0004	0.0081
19	20	683	0.1848	0.0133	0.0029	0.0021	0.0004	0.0082
20	21	680	0.1872	0.0134	0.0029	0.0021	0.0004	0.0082
22	23	676	0.1872	0.0134	0.0000	.	.	.
23	24	672	0.1872	0.0134	0.0000	.	.	.
24	25	671	0.2029	0.0138	0.0194	0.0054	0.0103	0.0312
25	26	646	0.2054	0.0139	0.0031	0.0022	0.0004	0.0086
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	.							
	.							
51	52	523	0.2805	0.0157	0.0038	0.0027	0.0005	0.0107
52	53	521	0.2805	0.0157	0.0000	.	.	.
53	54	520	0.2832	0.0158	0.0038	0.0027	0.0005	0.0107
54	55	517	0.2860	0.0158	0.0039	0.0027	0.0005	0.0108
55	56	514	0.2888	0.0159	0.0039	0.0028	0.0005	0.0108
56	57	510	0.2930	0.0160	0.0059	0.0034	0.0012	0.0142
57	58	507	0.2944	0.0160	0.0020	0.0020	0.0000	0.0073
58	59	503	0.2958	0.0160	0.0020	0.0020	0.0001	0.0073
59	60	501	0.2986	0.0161	0.0040	0.0028	0.0005	0.0111
60	61	498	0.3239	0.0166	0.0361	0.0085	0.0214	0.0547
62	63	461	0.3269	0.0166	0.0043	0.0031	0.0005	0.0121
	.							
	.							
77	78	415	0.3672	0.0174	0.0024	0.0024	0.0001	0.0089
78	79	413	0.3703	0.0174	0.0048	0.0034	0.0006	0.0135
79	80	411	0.3703	0.0174	0.0000	.	.	.
80	81	410	0.3734	0.0175	0.0049	0.0034	0.0006	0.0136
81	82	405	0.3749	0.0175	0.0025	0.0025	0.0001	0.0091
82	83	402	0.3765	0.0175	0.0025	0.0025	0.0001	0.0092
84	85	401	0.3967	0.0178	0.0324	0.0090	0.0173	0.0523
85	86	372	0.3983	0.0178	0.0027	0.0027	0.0001	0.0099
86	87	371	0.3983	0.0178	0.0000	.	.	.
87	88	369	0.3999	0.0179	0.0027	0.0027	0.0001	0.0100
89	90	367	0.3999	0.0179	0.0000	.	.	.
90	91	365	0.4032	0.0179	0.0055	0.0039	0.0007	0.0153
91	92	362	0.4032	0.0179	0.0000	.	.	.
92	93	360	0.4065	0.0180	0.0056	0.0039	0.0007	0.0155
93	94	358	0.4099	0.0180	0.0056	0.0040	0.0007	0.0156
94	95	356	0.4099	0.0180	0.0000	.	.	.
95	96	355	0.4099	0.0180	0.0000	.	.	.
96	97	354	0.4232	0.0182	0.0226	0.0080	0.0098	0.0407
	.							
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	.							

220	221	94	0.6607	0.0217	0.0000	.	.	.
223	224	92	0.6680	0.0219	0.0217	0.0154	0.0026	0.0606
225	226	90	0.6717	0.0219	0.0111	0.0111	0.0003	0.0410
226	227	89	0.6754	0.0220	0.0112	0.0112	0.0003	0.0414
228	229	88	0.6754	0.0220	0.0000	.	.	.
229	230	81	0.6794	0.0221	0.0123	0.0123	0.0003	0.0455
230	231	80	0.6834	0.0222	0.0125	0.0125	0.0003	0.0461
231	232	79	0.6874	0.0223	0.0127	0.0127	0.0003	0.0467
311	312	34	0.7386	0.0242	0.0294	0.0294	0.0007	0.1085
312	313	33	0.7386	0.0242	0.0000	.	.	.
324	325	30	0.7386	0.0242	0.0000	.	.	.
336	337	29	0.7477	0.0250	0.0345	0.0345	0.0009	0.1272
348	349	23	0.7477	0.0250	0.0000	.	.	.
360	361	19	0.7477	0.0250	0.0000	.	.	.
372	373	13	0.7477	0.0250	0.0000	.	.	.
384	385	11	0.7477	0.0250	0.0000	.	.	.
396	397	9	0.7477	0.0250	0.0000	.	.	.
403	404	5	0.7477	0.0250	0.0000	.	.	.
408	409	4	0.7477	0.0250	0.0000	.	.	.
456	457	1	0.7477	0.0250	0.0000	.	.	.

Appendix B

First entry WITHOUT WOMEN UNMARRIED AT MIGRATION

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(ref. less than 18 months)							
18-35 months	-2.02**	-1.99**	-1.97**	-1.97**	-1.98**	-1.92**	-1.95**
	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
36-72 months	-2.43**	-2.39**	-2.39**	-2.37**	-2.40**	-2.24**	-2.31**
	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.2	0.21
73-120 months	-2.43**	-2.38**	-2.43**	-2.41**	-2.44**	-2.19**	-2.23**
	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.21	0.21
121 + months	-2.82**	-2.77**	-2.94**	-2.92**	-2.96**	-2.42**	-2.43**
	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.26	0.27
Age at migration	-0.07**	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.09**	-0.09**
	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
(ref. Turkey)							
Ex-Yugoslav	0.68**	0.58**	0.53**	0.54**	0.50**	0.52**	0.49**
	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
Greek	0.92**	0.86**	0.74**	0.75**	0.67**	0.62**	0.60**
	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.23
Italian	0.80**	0.80**	0.66**	0.63**	0.57**	0.56**	0.57**
	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18

Spanish	0.70**	0.74**	0.50*	0.52**	0.48*	0.44*	0.37
	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25
Years of Education	0.01	0.02	0.04	0	-0.01	0	0
	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Previous Work Experience (in years)	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pregnancy	-0.55**	-0.49**	-0.52**	-0.53**	-0.55**	-0.56**	-0.57**
	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.2
Number of children	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.03
	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
(ref, no children)							
Youngest Child 0-5	0.18	0.18	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.06	0.09
	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.17
Youngest Child 6-16	0.82**	0.80**	0.79**	0.77**	0.79**	0.78**	0.82**
	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.19
Marrying at migration	-0.28*	0					
	0.15	0.16					
(ref. reunited)							
First-Mover		0.63**	0.58**	0.56*	0.53*	0.52*	0.51
		0.28	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.31
Imported		-0.53**	-0.37**	-0.38**	-0.31**	-0.31**	-0.34**
		0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
(ref. Pre-halt)							
Post-halt arrival			-0.62**	-1.59**	-1.40**	-1.48**	-1.56**
			0.13	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.62

Posthalt*Years of Education				0.11 0.07	0.17** 0.07	0.17** 0.07	0.17** 0.08
Female Unemp. Rate at arrival					-0.12** 0.05	-0.03 0.06	-0.01 0.06
Female Unemp. Rate						-0.09** 0.04	-0.09** 0.04
H's Years of Education							0.01 0.04
Constant	-1.86** 0.45	-1.57** 0.47	-1.41** 0.48	-1.02* 0.57	-0.8 0.58	-0.71 0.58	-0.83 0.62

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. *Significant at 90%.

Appendix C

Replication of the regression in Table 24 including "keydate" instead of "post-halt"

	Model 1	Model 2
18-35 months	-2.13** 0.14	-2.12** 0.14
36-72 months	-2.42** 0.18	-2.41** 0.18
73-120 months	-2.46** 0.19	-2.45** 0.19
121 + months	-2.81** 0.19	-2.80** 0.19
Age at Migration	-0.10** 0.01	-0.10** 0.01
Age at Marriage	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00
Former Yug.	0.47** 0.15	0.47** 0.15
Greece	0.47** 0.21	0.48** 0.21
Italy	0.41** 0.18	0.38** 0.18
Spain	0.34 0.23	0.33 0.23
Years of Education	0.03 0.04	0.01 0.04

Work Experience	0.01** 0.00	0.01** 0.00
Unmarried At Migration	0.50** 0.24	0.54** 0.23
First-Mover Wife	0.49 0.31	0.50* 0.30
Imported Bride	-0.32** 0.16	-0.31* 0.16
Pregnancy	-0.92** 0.19	-0.92** 0.19
Number of Kids	0.09* 0.05	0.10** 0.05
Youngest is under 6	-0.23 0.15	-0.24 0.15
Youngest is 6-16	0.56** 0.18	0.56** 0.18
Female Unemp. Rate	-0.10** 0.02	-0.10** 0.02
Keydate	**-0.41**** **0.19**	**-2.32**** **0.90**
Keydate * Eduyrs		**0.22**** **0.10**
Constant	-0.67 0.48	-0.49 0.50
Log-likelihood	-2677	-2673
Events	649	649

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. *Significant at 90%.

Appendix D

First entry of women who arrived between 1974-1979 (key date regulations)

Variable	
(ref. less than 18 months)	
18-35 months	-2.74**
	0.60
36-72 months	-1.28**
	0.46
73-120 months	-0.25
	0.52
121 + months	-0.16
	0.62
Age at migration	-0.03
	0.04
Age at first marriage	0.00
	0.01
(ref. Turkey)	
Ex-Yugoslav	-0.54
	0.48
Greek	-0.55
	0.71
Italian	**1.39****
	0.47
Spanish	0.65
	0.92
Years of Education	**0.32****
	0.10
Previous Work Experience (in years)	0.01**
	0.00
Pregnancy	0.54
	0.75

(ref. no children)	
Number of children	-0.40
	1.10
Youngest Child 0-5	0.02
	0.49
Youngest Child 6-16	-0.59
	0.58
Marrying at migration	-0.04
	0.13
(ref. reunited)	
First-Mover	-0.41
	0.39
Imported	0.25
	0.45
Rate of female unemployment	-0.27**
	0.10
Constant	-4.62**
	1.26
Log likelihood	-365
Events	73

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. *Significant at 90%.

Appendix E

First Entry by period of arrival, EXCLUDING WOMEN UNMARRIED AT MIGRATION

	Prehalt			Posthalt		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
18-35 months	-2.12** 0.18	-2.11** 0.18	-2.11** 0.18	-1.41** 0.27	-1.41** 0.27	-1.40** 0.27
36-72 months	-2.95** 0.27	-2.93** 0.27	-2.93** 0.28	-1.24** 0.29	-1.26** 0.3	-1.21** 0.3
73-120 months	-3.61** 0.33	-3.59** 0.32	-3.59** 0.36	-0.69** 0.26	-0.71** 0.27	-0.59** 0.29
121 + months	-3.58** 0.21	-3.57** 0.21	-3.57** 0.35	-1.20** 0.29	-1.24** 0.3	-1.07** 0.35
Age at migration	-0.11** 0.02	-0.11** 0.02	-0.11** 0.02	-0.04** 0.02	-0.04** 0.02	-0.04** 0.02
Ex-Yugoslav	0.67** 0.21	0.66** 0.21	**0.66**** **0.21**	0.09 0.31	0.08 0.31	0.09 0.31
Greek	0.86** 0.28	0.75** 0.28	**0.75**** **0.28**	0.23 0.38	0.19 0.39	0.2 0.38
Italian	0.53** 0.23	0.45** 0.23	**0.45**** **0.23**	1.14** 0.27	1.12** 0.27	**1.10**** **0.27**
Spanish	0.46* 0.27	0.4 0.27	0.4 0.26	1.50** 0.56	1.47** 0.56	**1.46**** **0.56**

Years of Education	-0.02 0.05	-0.03 0.05	**-0.03** **0.05**	0.17** 0.05	0.18** 0.06	**0.18**** **0.06**
Previous Work Experience (in years)	0.01** 0	0.01** 0	0.01** 0	0.01** 0	0.01** 0	0.01** 0
Pregnancy	-0.50** 0.24	-0.52** 0.24	-0.52** 0.24	-0.69* 0.38	-0.70* 0.38	-0.72* 0.38
Number of children	0.07 0.06	0.07 0.06	0.07 0.06	-0.1 0.09	-0.1 0.09	-0.09 0.09
Child 0-5	0.03 0.21	0.04 0.21	0.04 0.21	0.04 0.29	0.03 0.29	0 0.29
Child 6-16	0.86** 0.23	0.87** 0.23	0.87** 0.23	0.78** 0.3	0.77** 0.3	0.76** 0.3
First-Mover	0.46 0.33	0.39 0.33	0.39 0.33	0.23 0.7	0.23 0.71	0.26 0.71
Imported	-0.41** 0.2	-0.37* 0.2	-0.37* 0.2	-0.3 0.28	-0.24 0.29	-0.24 0.29
Female Unemp. Rate at arrival		-0.27** 0.1	-0.27** 0.11		-0.04 0.06	0.01 0.07
Female Unemp. Rate			0 0.05			-0.06 0.06
Constant	-0.18 0.65	0.25 0.66	0.25 0.67	-4.69** 0.66	-4.56** 0.71	-4.41** 0.7
Log likelihood	-1388	-1384	-1384	-805	-805	-805
Events	453	453	453	196	196	196

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. *Significant at 90%.

CHAPTER 7. LINKING PROCESSES: MIGRATION, FAMILY AND WORK (II). ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT CYCLES: EXITS AND RE-ENTRIES

7.1. Employment cycles. A brief description

Percentages in Table 7.1 show that approximately 2/3 of first generation immigrant women have either had one spell of employment, or none at all, during their stay in Germany; barely a quarter re-entered the labor market after having exited from the labor force once and only 14% have had more than two spells of employment during the observation period.

First-mover and reunited wives are the groups most likely to experience one spell of employment in Germany, whereas women who migrated single and imported brides are the most likely to have experienced more than two. This might be related to the different stage of their family life cycle when these four groups of women migrated. Most women in the first two groups (unmarried at migration and imported brides) were young and childless when they arrived in Germany. In contrast, both first-mover and reunited wives were older and had, on average, more than one child at the time of their migration. These circumstances clearly favored the occurrence of more interruptions in the work careers of those women who migrated single and who were imported for the purpose of family formation.

Table 7.1. Employment Cycles of Immigrant Women

	All	Unmarried	First	Reunited	Imported	Prehalt	Posthalt
Never worked	24.3	10.8	8.6	24.9	34.4	11.7	42.5
Only one spell employment	40.3	40.3	54.3	45.1	31.3	46.7	31
Two spells of employment	21.5	29.5	22.9	19.5	18.9	25.6	15.2
More than two spells	13.9	19.3	14.3	10.5	15.4	16	10.9
N	860	175	35	390	259	512	348

Source: GSOEP, 2002.

In any case, the percentages in Table 7.1 suggest high employment stability and low chances of re-entering the labor force after an interruption.

In the previous chapter I focused the analysis on the first entry into the German labor force, in order to separate out immigrant women who have worked in Germany from those who have never done it. Although this decision seemed justified both for substantive and methodological reasons, it is necessary to analyze both exits and re-entries to obtain a complete picture of the labor performance of immigrant women in their host country. This is the primary aim of the following pages.

7.2. Re-entries into the labor force

Only 485 women in my sample experienced a second entry into the German labor force. Therefore, the number of transitions utilized to estimate the coefficients reported in Table 7.2 was substantially lower than in the previous chapter. This may explain why just a few variables show statistically significant effects on the likelihood of re-entry into the labor force after having exiting.

Time spent out of employment decreases the chances that the woman will obtain a second job, which is in line with the predictions of human capital theory. Women from the former Yugoslavia are the only group more likely to re-enter the labor force than Turks (reference category). Preceding the husband in migration also increases the likelihood of re-entering the labor force after an exit, while pregnancy severely reduces the likelihood of such a transition. Finally, the coefficient of the variable that measures the rate of female unemployment in Germany is positive and significant, which is a little surprising and difficult to interpret.

In these estimations I have also introduced a new variable that measures the number of years a woman has been living in

Germany.[1] Although the sign of the coefficient is positive, it does not reach the level of statistical significance. Therefore, there not exists "assimilation" into employment. Moreover, the time previously employed in Germany (i.e. "years of work experience in Germany") does not affect the likelihood of experiencing the transition either.

Table 7.2. Logit estimates of re-entering the German labor force, conditional on previous exit

Variable	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7
(ref. < =12 months)							
13-36 months	-0.97** 0.12	-0.99** 0.12	-0.98** 0.12	-0.97** 0.12	-0.97** 0.12	-0.97** 0.12	-0.94** 0.14
37-60 months	-1.56** 0.17	-1.61** 0.17	-1.57** 0.17	-1.57** 0.17	-1.56** 0.17	-1.55** 0.17	-1.59** 0.20
61-96 months	-1.75** 0.18	-1.84** 0.18	-1.83** 0.18	-1.82** 0.18	-1.81** 0.18	-1.79** 0.18	-1.69** 0.21
97 or more	-1.90** 0.16	-2.10** 0.19	-2.11** 0.19	-2.09** 0.19	-2.09** 0.19	-2.08** 0.19	-2.11** 0.23
Years since Migration	0.02** 0.01	0.04** 0.01	0.03** 0.01	0.03** 0.01	0.03** 0.01	0.01 0.02	0.01 0.02
Age	0.01** 0.00	0.01** 0.00	0.01** 0.00	0.01** 0.00	0.01** 0.00	0.01** 0.00	0.01** 0.00

[1] Note that in this new specification of the model, the dummy variables that measure "time spent out of employment" after exiting the first job in Germany do not overlap with "years since migration", as occurred in the estimated models in the previous chapter. Imagine a woman who arrived in Germany in 1967 and started to work the same year of her arrival. In 1973 she quit her job to take care of her first child. By 1975, when she is still at home as a housewife, she has spent 2 years out of employment but 8 years in Germany. Therefore, both variables can be introduced simultaneously into the model to measure two different effects. In this case, the time spent in Germany without working, however, does not improve the likelihood of re-entering the labor force.

Age square	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
(ref. Turkey)							
Former Yugoslavia	0.23*	0.28**	0.26**	0.33**	0.34**	0.33**	0.32**
	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.16
Greece	-0.16	-0.09	-0.08	-0.02	-0.02	0.10	-0.05
	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.20
Italy	0.07	0.11	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.22	0.06
	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.18
Spain	-0.29	-0.24	-0.20	-0.14	-0.13	-0.02	-0.29
	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.26
Years of Education		0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.04
		0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Work Exp. in Germany		-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00
		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pregnancy			-0.98**	-0.97**	-0.97**	-0.93**	-1.03**
			0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.39
Number of children			0.01	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.03
			0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
(ref. no child)							
Youngest child < 6			-0.19	-0.17	-0.23	-0.20	-0.16
			0.18	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.24
Youngest child 6-16			0.20	0.21	0.19	0.19	0.22
			0.15	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.18
(ref. Pre-halt arrival)							
Post-halt arrival				0.23*	0.22*	-0.04	-0.06
				0.12	0.12	0.15	0.18
(ref. unmarried at mig.)							
First-mover					0.42*	0.44*	0.62**
					0.25	0.25	0.31
Reunited					-0.17	-0.16	0.02
					0.14	0.14	0.18
Imported					-0.11	-0.11	
					0.14	0.14	
Rate Female Unemp.						0.07**	0.06**
						0.02	0.03
H's educ. Years							-0.04
							0.04

H's years since mig.							0.01 0.01
Constant	-5.97** 0.76	-6.16** 0.77	-4.94** 0.80	-5.33** 0.81	-5.19** 0.83	-5.71** 0.86	-5.84** 1.03
Log likelihood	-2631	-2624	-2622	-2608	-2600	-2565	-2554
Events	532	532	532	532	532	532	532

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. *Significant at 90%.

On the other hand, the characteristics of the husband do not show a significant effect on their wives' propensity to re-enter the labor force after the first exit.

Previously, I found significant differences between women who were single at migration, first-movers, imported brides and reunited wives in their likelihood of entering the labor force upon arrival. However, these differences do not re-appear in the analysis of re-entries, which implies that marital status at migration and timing of migration within the couple can be taken as an indicator of the propensity to enter the labor force in the host country for the first time; but the subsequent decisions to participate of immigrant women who have already had some work experience in the host country, are not affected anymore by their particular mode of migration.

Table 7.3 shows the estimates for all the entries together, without making the distinction between first entry and subsequent re-entries. Note that the obtained results largely reflect what I found in the analysis of the first employment. However, in these estimations the effect of additional time spent in Germany does increase the likelihood to work, while the length of residence of the husband continues to be non-significant and close to zero. In these estimations the negative effect of previous work experience in Germany re-appears. This result may be a consequence of the fact that a large proportion of women who have had one long spell of employment never re-entered the labor force after exiting their

first job. On the other hand, the negative effects of belonging to the post-halt cohort and of unemployment remain.

Table 7.3. Logit estimates of the likelihood of entering the German labor force, with all entries together

Variable	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7
(ref. < =12 months)							
13-36 months	-1.61** 0.09	-1.61** 0.09	-1.55** 0.09	-1.54** 0.09	-1.52** 0.09	-1.52** 0.09	-1.47** 0.1
37-60 months	-2.10** 0.12	-2.11** 0.12	-2.01** 0.12	-2.01** 0.12	-1.98** 0.12	-1.97** 0.12	-2.01** 0.14
61-96 months	-2.19** 0.12	-2.21** 0.13	-2.14** 0.13	-2.14** 0.13	-2.11** 0.13	-2.10** 0.13	-2.04** 0.14
97 or more	-2.24** 0.1	-2.31** 0.13	-2.31** 0.14	-2.36** 0.14	-2.33** 0.14	-2.32** 0.14	-2.34** 0.15
Years since Migration	0.01 0.01	0.03** 0.01	0.02** 0.01	0.02** 0.01	0.02* 0.01	0.03** 0.01	0.05** 0.01
Age	0.01** 0	0.01** 0	0.01** 0	0.00** 0	0 0	0 0	0.00* 0
Age square	-0.00** 0	-0.00** 0	-0.00** 0	-0.00** 0	-0.00** 0	-0.00** 0	-0.00** 0
(Ref. Turkey)							
Former Yugoslavia	0.54** 0.09	0.48** 0.09	0.44** 0.09	0.34** 0.09	0.30** 0.09	0.31** 0.1	0.31** 0.11
Greece	0.61** 0.1	0.42** 0.11	0.41** 0.11	0.29** 0.11	0.22** 0.11	0.18 0.11	0.23* 0.13
Italy	0.45** 0.09	0.41** 0.09	0.40** 0.09	0.31** 0.1	0.29** 0.1	0.26** 0.1	0.23** 0.11
Spain	0.41** 0.11	0.32** 0.12	0.32** 0.12	0.16 0.13	0.09 0.13	0.05 0.13	0 0.16
Years of Education		0.02 0.02	0.01 0.02	0.03 0.02	0.02 0.02	0.02 0.02	0.04** 0.02
Years of pre-mig work exp		0.00** 0	0.00** 0	0.00** 0	0.00** 0	0.00** 0	0.00** 0
Years work exp. in Germ.		0 0	0 0	-0.00** 0	-0.00** 0	-0.00** 0	-0.00** 0
Pregnancy			-0.92** 0.16	-0.94** 0.16	-0.95** 0.16	-0.97** 0.16	-0.69** 0.17

Number of Children			-0.03 0.03	-0.01 0.03	0.01 0.03	0.01 0.03	-0.01 0.03
(Ref. no child)							
Youngest child<6			-0.35** 0.11	-0.39** 0.11	-0.46** 0.11	-0.45** 0.11	-0.16 0.13
Youngest child 6-16			0.13 0.11	0.12 0.11	0.11 0.11	0.12 0.11	0.35** 0.13
(ref. Pre-halt)							
Post-halt arrival				-0.47** 0.09	-0.48** 0.09	-0.30** 0.12	-0.26** 0.13
(ref. single at migration)							
First-mover					0.02 0.2	0.02 0.2	
Reunited					-0.47** 0.11	-0.48** 0.11	-0.56** 0.2
Imported					-0.58** 0.11	-0.57** 0.11	-0.69** 0.22
Rate Female Unemp.						-0.04** 0.02	-0.04** 0.02
H's educ.							-0.03 0.02
H's years since mig.							0 0.01
Constant	-4.29** 0.34	-4.33** 0.38	-3.74** 0.41	-3.17** 0.43	-2.51** 0.45	-2.40** 0.46	-2.69** 0.57
Events	1181	1181	1181	1181	1181	1181	875
Log pseudo-likelihood	-5616	-5582	-5537	-5516	-5490	-5487	-4165

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. ** Significant at 95%. * Significant at 90%.

7.3. Exits from employment. The importance of separating exits to inactivity and exits to unemployment

7.3.1. Exits from employment

In this section I present the results for three sets of models that examine which are the factors that increase (or decrease) the

likelihood of immigrant women to exit their jobs in Germany. I first analyze all exits from employment; secondly, I distinguish between exits from employment to unemployment and exits from employment to housework, because these two types of transitions out of employment for women have been found to be affected in different ways by human capital and family-related factors (see Bernardi, 1999).

The covariates utilized in the following models are the same that I used in the previous chapter and, thus, a detailed description of the meaning of each variable can be found there. There is only one new variable ("part-time"), which takes value 1 when the woman is in part-time employment and 0 when she is in full-time employment. In addition, these models add the variable "age" in a quadratic form and the variable "years since migration", as well as information concerning the husband's years of education and length of residence (as I did in the analyses of re-entries). By contrast, the variable "pre-migration experience" is excluded because I assume that, for women who have already found their first job in the host country, their permanency in that job will depend exclusively on host country-specific human capital (i.e. experience acquired in Germany). Therefore, the variable "previous work experience" in these models measures exclusively work experience acquired in Germany.

Finally I have run models for all exits together because I have no theoretical reason to expect that factors that explain exits from the first spell of employment in Germany would be different from those that explain exits from subsequent jobs.

Table 7.4. Logit estimates of the likelihood of existing from employment to non-employment

Variable	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7
(ref. < =12 months)							
13-36 months	-0.58** 0.10	-0.63** 0.10	-0.62** 0.10	-0.55** 0.10	-0.52** 0.10	-0.52** 0.10	-0.51** 0.10
37-60 months	-1.01** 0.13	-1.04** 0.13	-1.03** 0.13	-0.92** 0.13	-0.88** 0.13	-0.88** 0.13	-0.86** 0.13
61-96 months	-1.13** 0.12	-1.16** 0.12	-1.15** 0.12	-1.02** 0.12	-1.00** 0.12	-1.00** 0.12	-0.99** 0.12
97 or more	-1.28** 0.11	-1.28** 0.11	-1.26** 0.11	-1.11** 0.11	-1.12** 0.11	-1.12** 0.12	-1.10** 0.12
Years since Migration	0.03** 0.01	0.04** 0.01	0.03** 0.01	0.04** 0.01	-0.01 0.01	-0.01 0.01	-0.01 0.01
Age	-0.01** 0.00	-0.01** 0.00	-0.01** 0.00	-0.01** 0.00	-0.01** 0.00	-0.01** 0.00	-0.01** 0.00
Age square	0.00** 0.00	0.00** 0.00	0.00** 0.00	0.00** 0.00	0.00** 0.00	0.00** 0.00	0.00** 0.00
Age at marriage	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00
(ref. Turkey)							
Former Yugoslavia	-0.66** 0.10	-0.61** 0.11	-0.60** 0.11	-0.47** 0.11	-0.47** 0.10	-0.47** 0.10	-0.51** 0.11
Greece	-0.70** 0.11	-0.67** 0.11	-0.68** 0.12	-0.56** 0.11	-0.41** 0.11	-0.41** 0.11	-0.41** 0.12
Italy	-0.23** 0.11	-0.20* 0.11	-0.22** 0.11	-0.18* 0.11	-0.12 0.11	-0.12 0.11	-0.11 0.11
Spain	-0.65** 0.15	-0.61** 0.15	-0.65** 0.15	-0.50** 0.15	-0.39** 0.15	-0.39** 0.15	-0.40** 0.16
Years of Education	0.02 0.02	0.03 0.02	0.03 0.02	0.00 0.02	-0.00 0.02	-0.00 0.02	-0.01 0.02
Years work exp. in Germ.	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00	-0.00 0.00
Pregnancy		0.77** 0.13	0.75** 0.13	0.83** 0.13	0.91** 0.13	0.91** 0.13	0.91** 0.14
Num children		0.04 0.03	0.04 0.04	0.03 0.03	0.03 0.03	0.03 0.03	0.03 0.04
(Ref. no child)							
Youngest child< 6		0.17 0.12	0.15 0.12	0.24** 0.12	0.27** 0.12	0.27** 0.12	0.24** 0.12

Youngest child 6-16		-0.06 0.11	-0.07 0.11	-0.10 0.11	-0.12 0.11	-0.12 0.11	-0.13 0.11
(ref. single at migration)							
Reunited			0.13 0.13	0.07 0.13	0.04 0.13	0.04 0.13	0.01 0.13
First			-0.48** 0.19	-0.46** 0.21	-0.42** 0.20	-0.42** 0.20	-0.50** 0.22
Imported			0.17 0.11	0.03 0.11	-0.01 0.11	-0.01 0.11	-0.01 0.12
(ref. pre-halt)							
Posthalt arrival				0.79** 0.09	0.23* 0.12	0.22* 0.12	0.22* 0.12
Rate Female Unemp.					0.14** 0.02	0.14** 0.02	0.14** 0.02
(ref. full-time)							
Part-time						0.02 0.09	0.04 0.10
H's educ.							0.03 0.02
H's years since migration							0.00 0.01
Constant	-1.45** 0.47	-2.13** 0.50	-2.31** 0.50	-2.87** 0.48	-3.41** 0.47	-3.41** 0.47	-3.73** 0.50
Log likelihood	-4865	-4846	-4838	-4799	-4764	-4764	-4687
Events	375	375	375	375	375	375	374

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. *Significant at 90%.

Results in Table 7.4 indicate that duration in employment clearly reduces the risk of exiting from employment, in accordance with the predictions of the human capital approach. However, education and previous experience in Germany do not seem to reduce the risk of exiting employment, in contradiction with what the human capital theorists would predict.

In contrast to the lack of effect of the human capital variables, factors related to the family life cycle reveal important effects in

explaining the transition out of employment. Pregnancy significantly increases the exit risk (see Model 3 to Model 8). Besides, women who have at least one child of pre-school age are more likely to experience an exit from employment than childless women (reference category). On the other hand, women who only have children over 6 do not differ in their propensity to exit employment compared to childless women. Note, however, that the positive effect of "youngest child <6" becomes significant only after controlling for period of arrival ("post-halt"), in Model 4. The reason for this is that women who entered Germany after the halt on recruitment are more likely to have pre-school children during the analysis time than their pre-halt counterparts, due to the differences in the stage of the family life cycle at which they migrated.

By origin, all women appear less likely to exit from employment than Turks (reference category). However, these differences substantially reduce in size after controlling for the differences in the period of arrival of women of each nationality (compare the "origin" coefficients in Model 3 and 4). Moreover, the difference between Italians and Turks, which as small, completely disappears after introducing the variable "posthalt arrival" (see Model 4 to Model 9).

In line with the results found in the analyses of entries, women who belong to the post-halt cohort have a higher risk of exiting the labor force (see Model 4), which confirm their weaker attachment to the labor force, even when the comparison is restricted only to women who worked. Furthermore, this differences across the two cohorts does not disappear neither reduces in size when potential differences in the type of family-migration are added to the model (see Model 5 and 6). In fact, no significant differences in the propensity to exit from employment emerge across the four groups of women previously defined, with the only exception being the first-movers who again are shown to be the most strongly attached to employment in the host country.

A higher rate of female unemployment logically increases the risk of exiting employment among immigrant women. In addition,

the inclusion of this variable halved the effect of having entered Germany in the post-halt cohort (compare the effect of "post-halt" in Models 6 and 7).

Finally, neither the husband's length of residence in Germany nor his level of education affects the exit patterns of immigrant women in a significant manner (see Model 8).

7.3.2. Exits to Inactivity and Exits to Unemployment. An important distinction

It seems important to distinguish these two types of transitions out of employment, because the decision to leave employment and become a housewife appears to be a voluntary decision, whereas exiting employment to unemployment is largely an involuntary decision. In principle, women with a more traditional view of their role as wives and mothers are expected to be more likely to leave their employment in periods when the demand for family time increases. On the other hand, work-oriented women would be more reluctant to abandon their jobs voluntarily. However, it is well established that there are many other factors -aside from differences in women's own tastes for work- that also constrain women's choices concerning their labor behavior.

In Table 7.5 I present the results for the estimation of the risk of exiting employment (voluntarily) and becoming a housewife. In Table 7.6 I estimate the same model for the transition from employment to unemployment. The only covariate in Table 7.6 that is excluded from the estimations in Table 7.5 is the "rate of female unemployment", since there is no theoretical reason to expect women to be more (or less) willing to leave their employment voluntarily in periods of recession. If they actually leave their jobs voluntarily, the macro-economic conditions in the host country should be irrelevant in their decision to become a housewife.

There are noticeable differences in the factors that influence each of these two transitions out of employment. While time spent

in employment reduces the risk of leaving the labor force voluntary (see the "time" coefficients in Model 1 to Model 6 in Table 7.5), there is not a clear pattern of change in the risk of becoming unemployed depending on the time previously spent in employment. In fact, the risk of unemployment decreases when the woman is able to remain employed more than one year, but it increases for women who have been employed more than 5 years and it decreases again among women who managed to remain continuously in employment for more than 8 years (see Model 1 to Model 7 in Table 7.6). Similarly, the risk of unemployment does not vary significantly over the life cycle (the age coefficients are not significant at all in Table 7.6), whereas the risk of (voluntarily) leaving employment decreases initially and increases later on, as the woman ages (see Models 1 to 6 in Table 7.5).

Table 7.5. Exits from employment to inactivity

Variable	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
(ref. <=12 months)						
13-36 months	-0.82**	-0.87**	-0.86**	-0.78**	-0.74**	-0.73**
	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
37-60 months	-1.22**	-1.27**	-1.24**	-1.09**	-0.99**	-0.97**
	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
61-96 months	-1.48**	-1.52**	-1.49**	-1.31**	-1.19**	-1.20**
	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.19
97 or more	-1.87**	-1.88**	-1.81**	-1.56**	-1.35**	-1.37**
	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
Years since	0.03**	0.03**	0.02	0.02*	0.01	0.01
Migration	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Age	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01*	-0.01**	-0.01*
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Age square	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**	0.00*	0.00*	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Age at marriage	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

(ref. Turkey)						
Former Yugoslavia	-0.66**	-0.61**	-0.54**	-0.37**	-0.35**	-0.37**
	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.16
Greece	-0.56**	-0.52**	-0.51**	-0.33*	-0.29*	-0.29
	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18
Italy	-0.15	-0.11	-0.13	-0.06	-0.00	-0.01
	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.16
Spain	-0.35*	-0.30	-0.35*	-0.13	-0.17	-0.18
	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.20
Years of Education	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.00	0.01	-0.01
	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Years of Pre-migration Work Exp.	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pregnancy		0.69**	0.65**	0.76**	0.78**	0.75**
		0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.18
Number of Children		0.05	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.05
		0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
(Ref. no children)						
Youngest child < 6		0.18	0.15	0.25	0.21	0.15
		0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
Youngest child 6-16		-0.13	-0.14	-0.19	-0.25	-0.27*
		0.15	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.15
(ref. reunited wife)						
Single at migration			0.30	0.14	0.06	0.06
			0.22	0.21	0.21	0.21
First-mover			-1.26**	-1.22**	-1.20**	-1.51**
			0.40	0.40	0.40	0.49
Imported			0.41**	0.24	0.14	0.07
			0.15	0.16	0.16	0.17
(ref. pre-halt)						
Post-halt arrival				0.96**	0.84**	0.80**
				0.13	0.13	0.14

(ref. full-time)						
Part-time					0.59**	0.57**
					0.13	0.13
H's educ.						0.02
						0.03
H's years since migration						0.01
						0.01
Constant	-2.51**	-3.19**	-3.61**	-4.18**	-4.15**	-4.24**
	0.64	0.68	0.69	0.70	0.67	0.70
Log likelihood	-2491	-2481	-2467	-2436	-2423	-2389
Events	404	404	404	404	404	404

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. *Significant at 90%.

By nationality, women from the former Yugoslavia are the only group significantly less likely to abandon their employment to be a housewife than Turks (see Model 1 to Model 6 in Table 7.5). However, differences found between the other nationalities in the women's likelihood to experience a transition from employment to inactivity disappeared once differences in the number and ages of children and differences between arrival cohorts are taking into account. In particular, the initial lower risk of leaving employment of Spanish women compared to Turkish women was entirely due to differences in child-bearing responsibilities, while the difference between Greek and Turkish women substantially reduced when differences in the period of arrival of these two nationalities were controlled for.

On the contrary, the risk of becoming unemployed is consistently higher for Turkish women than for immigrant women of other nationalities. In fact, these differences do not disappear even after controlling for differences in all the other dimensions considered in the analysis (see the "country of origin" coefficients in Model 1 to Model 7 in Table 7.6). This clearly suggests the existence of a stronger occupational segmentation in the case of Turkish female workers and, also, the possibility of discrimination.

Neither education nor experience previously acquired in Germany affect the risk of leaving employment, whether voluntary or not. Therefore, the human capital tenets are once again rejected for the case of female immigrants in Germany. Family-related factors appear important in explaining the transition from employment to housewife but, in contrast, they barely affect the transition to unemployment. The number of children and their ages do not have a significant effect on the risk of becoming unemployed. In contrast, pregnant women are substantially more likely than non-pregnant women to leave their employment, and women who only have children of school-age appear less likely to leave their jobs than mothers with children of pre-school age.

These results reinforce the idea that the transition to unemployment is largely involuntary. In fact, differences in the timing of migration within couples (i.e. differences between first-movers, reunited wives and imported wives) are irrelevant in predicting the risk of unemployment, as can be seen in Model 3 in Table 7.6. By contrast, noticeable differences across these groups emerge when analyzing the risk of experiencing a transition out of the labor force. Wives who preceded their husbands in migration (i.e. first-movers) are strongly less likely to abandon their jobs than reunited wives (reference category), which confirms the stronger attachment of first-mover wives to the German labor market. Imported brides, in contrast, are more likely to leave employment than reunited wives (see the "imported" coefficient in Model 3 in Table 7.5). This result supports the view that describes imported brides as a type of immigrant women who are particularly "difficult" to integrate.

Table 7.6. Exits from employment to unemployment

Variable	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7
(Ref. < =12 months)							
13-36 months	-0.86**	-0.86**	-0.86**	-0.84**	-0.82**	-0.84**	-0.84**
	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
37-60 months	-1.47**	-1.44**	-1.44**	-1.41**	-1.40**	-1.44**	-1.47**
	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25
61-96 months	-0.85**	-0.81**	-0.81**	-0.78**	-0.79**	-0.84**	-0.85**
	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
97 or more	-1.38**	-1.35**	-1.35**	-1.29**	-1.32**	-1.45**	-1.46**
	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.2	0.19	0.2	0.2
Years since mig.	0.04**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
Age	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Age square	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Age at marriage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(Ref. Turkey)							
Former Yugoslavia	-0.45**	-0.46**	-0.46**	-0.43**	-0.43**	-0.45**	-0.54**
	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.16
Greece	-0.71**	-0.71**	-0.72**	-0.68**	-0.50**	-0.52**	-0.53**
	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.19
Italy	-0.37**	-0.37**	-0.39**	-0.37**	-0.29	-0.34*	-0.35*
	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19
Spain	-0.96**	-0.97**	-0.99**	-0.94**	-0.82**	-0.78**	-0.80**
	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.29
Years of Education	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.08*
	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04
Work exp. in Germ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pregnancy		0.39	0.38	0.41*	0.49**	0.46*	0.48*
		0.24	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.25
Num children		0.03	0.02	0.01	0	0.01	0
		0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
(ref. no child)							
Youngest child<6		-0.32*	-0.32	-0.27	-0.22	-0.18	-0.2
		0.19	0.19	0.2	0.19	0.19	0.2

Youngest child 6-16		-0.23 0.17	-0.23 0.17	-0.23 0.17	-0.25 0.17	-0.2 0.17	-0.21 0.17
(ref. reunited)							
Unmarried at migration			0.02 0.21	-0.01 0.21	-0.02 0.21	0.03 0.21	-0.01 0.22
First			-0.4 0.27	-0.39 0.27	-0.37 0.26	-0.39 0.26	-0.47 0.29
Imported			0.01 0.18	-0.06 0.19	-0.11 0.19	-0.03 0.19	-0.02 0.2
(ref. pre-halt)							
Post-halt Arrival				0.34** 0.15	-0.24 0.19	-0.15 0.19	-0.17 0.2
Rate Female Unemp					0.15** 0.03	0.16** 0.03	0.16** 0.03
(ref. Full-time)							
Part-time						-0.68** 0.18	-0.64** 0.18
H's educ. Years							0.06* 0.03
H's years since mig.							0 0.01
Constant	-3.15** 0.82	-3.41** 0.84	-3.45** 0.85	-3.68** 0.84	-4.25** 0.85	-4.22** 0.85	-4.90** 0.88
Log likelihood	-2265	-2262	-2260	-2258	-2243	-2232	-2189
Events	351	351	351	351	351	351	351

Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. *Significant at 90%

However, although the stronger attachment to employment among first-mover wives remain no matter which other factors are controlled for (see Models 3 to 6 in Table 7.5), the higher likelihood of imported brides to leave their employment compared to reunited wives is largely explained by differences in the context of reception and the types of jobs (i.e. part-time versus full-time) where they concentrated. As can be seen in Models 4 and 5 in Table 7.5, the negative coefficient of the variable "imported"

reduces in size and becomes non-significant when the variables "period of arrival" and "part-time" are added to the model specification,. These results suggest, first of all, that immigrant women are more likely to leave part-time employment than full-time jobs. The reason for explaining this might be that the economic cost of quitting a part-time job is not as high for the immigrant family as it is to quit a full-time job, due to the substantial wage differences between these two segments of the labor market. Secondly, the results indicate that imported brides make up a greater proportion of part-timers compared to reunited wives, which explains their higher risk of exiting employment to inactivity.

The variable "part-time" also shows a significant effect on the risk of unemployment. However, in this case the effect is negative (see B= -0.68 in Model 6, in Table 7.6), which indicates that full-time employment increases the likelihood of becoming unemployed because most of the dismissals that took place during the eighties occurred in manufacturing industries, where work was mainly full-time. Therefore, the effect of part-time employment on the labor performance of immigrant women is twofold: it increases the likelihood of voluntary exists from the labor force but, at the same time, it reduces the risk of unemployment. This differential effect is likely to be related to differences in the type of occupations available in these two segments of the labor market. However, we lack complete information on occupation for the time period under study.

Finally, it is important to note that the characteristics of the husband –his education and his length of residence in Germany- do not change the results described so far. This is consistent with previous evidence that denies the existence of wage assimilation between immigrant and native men in Germany.

7.4. Conclusions

In this Chapter I have analyzed the determinants of the transition out of the labor force, as well as the factors that favor (or not) the transition back into employment for those immigrant women who experienced more than one spell of employment during their stay in Germany.

The likelihood of exiting employment is found to decrease as the time spent in employment increases, as expected. However, longer time of residence in Germany does not reduce the likelihood of exiting if the woman was not at work during that time. Therefore, there is no evidence of "assimilation" into employment for first generation immigrant women in Germany. Moreover, neither (years of) education nor (years of) work experience in Germany reduce significantly the probability of experiencing a transition out of the labor force, which confirms previous findings that rejected human capital as the adequate framework to explain the labor market performance of immigrants in Germany.

On the other hand, family-related factors do affect significantly the labor behavior of working immigrant women. Pregnant immigrant women and women who have children of pre-school age are more likely to exit the labor market than the rest of women. In addition, pregnancy also reduces the likelihood of re-entering the labor market after experiencing an exit.

First-mover wives (i.e. wives who preceded their husbands in migration) reveal as a very selective group of women with regard to their labor performance. They are not only more likely to re-enter into employment but also less likely to exit and more likely to re-enter, in case an exit occurs. These results clearly indicate a very strong attachment to the labor force in the host country among this group of women.

By country of origin, women from the former Yugoslavia, from Greece and from Spain are found to be less likely to exit employment than Turks and Italians. However, these differences across national groups widely vary if exits to inactivity are

distinguished from exits to unemployment. In fact, in line with previous results for non-immigrant women, these two transitions are found to be affected in different ways by the same factors.

While women from the former Yugoslavia are the only group less likely then Turks to exit the labor force "voluntary", women from all the nationalities included in the analyses are less likely to experience unemployment than their Turk counterparts. Therefore, within the group of female immigrant workers, the worse performance of Turks in terms of employment is related to their higher risk of unemployment rather to their –supposedly- stronger family-orientation. This suggests the existence of both high occupational segregation and discrimination against Turkish women in the labor market.

On the other hand, family-related factors do not affect significantly the risk of unemployment, but they affect the risk of exiting employment to housewife. These results confirm the involuntary/voluntary character of these two transitions. Moreover, the timing of migration within the couple is irrelevant also to explain the transition to unemployment but not the transition to inactivity. As I said before, wives who preceded their husbands are significantly less likely to exit the labor force "voluntarily" than other women. Imported brides, in contrast, appeared more likely to experience voluntary exists from the labor force than women who had reunified with their husbands in Germany shortly after he left. However, this result mainly reflected differences in the macroeconomic conditions in the host country as well as in the structure of the labor market. Women who arrived after the halt on recruitment and who are in part-time employment are more likely to exit the labor force, although part-time employment reduced the risk of unemployment.

CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS

8.1. Introduction

As was stated in the Introduction, the general aim of this dissertation was to answer two broad and interrelated questions: when and why do immigrants bring their relatives to the host country? And, how do family ties affect immigrants' integration into their host societies? The immigrant population chosen for the analysis of these interrelated questions has been the original guestworker population in Germany and their descendents over the period from 1960 to 2002.

After having analyzed the structure of family-induced chain migration, three main conclusions can be drawn with regard to the first question about when and why immigrants sponsor the migration of their closest relatives (spouse and children) to their host country. First of all, family chain migration takes different forms over time and across generations. While family reunification, in strict terms, is exclusive of adult first generation immigrants who had constituted their own families prior to migration, middle and second generations may induce further family-chain immigration through the importation of spouses. These two phenomena must be neatly distinguished for the clarity of immigration research and the efficacy of immigration policies. Secondly, the reunification of spouses and older children often starts taking place from the very first moment the flow initiates, as part of a household strategy for maximizing income in the shortest possible time. Thirdly, immigrants and prospective migrants react

strategically to changes in immigration policies and are particularly responsive to the macro-economic situation in the country of destination, which often distorts the real effects of those policies.

With regard to the second question concerning the relationship between family ties and the integration of immigrants into their host societies, the analyses undertaken in this dissertation suggest that the importation of spouses from the country of origin is a traditional form of marriage generally associated with more traditional forms of family life such as living in extended households. On the other hand, the idea that imported wives are women with more traditional family values and, therefore, less likely to participate in the host labor market is only partially confirmed. In fact, this conclusion is largely dependent upon the comparison group selected and the period of migration. Specifically, one of the main findings of this dissertation with regard to the integration of immigrant women into the host labor market is that their labor performance is strongly influenced by the context of reception they encountered at their arrival, as well as by the varying macro-economic conditions at destination.

In the following pages I will develop each of these conclusions in more detail, as well as their implications for both immigration research and immigration policies.

8.2. Substantive results

One of the main major findings in this dissertation is that family reunification and, in particular, the reunification of wives took place for the most part prior to the halt on recruitment imposed in November 1973. According to the immigrant sample contained in GSOEP, approximately half of the total number of married male guest workers who arrived in Germany between 1960 and 1973 migrated jointly with their wives. Moreover, only 15% of the reunited wives included in GSOEP did not join their

husband in Germany until after 1973 despite having had the possibility to do so earlier.

These results strongly challenge the widely accepted idea that postwar migration to Germany mainly comprised single male migrant workers until the early seventies and turned into family migration after the ban on labor migration in 1973. Obviously, the family migration sequence of some immigrant households fits this image. However, they represented a minor fraction of total guest workers. In fact, both joint couple migration and reunification of the wife in a short period are the two much more frequent migration patterns.

A major concern, however, is the possibility that the selection bias of GSOEP's immigrant sample is behind the previously described results. GSOEP started in 1984, which means that it only surveyed immigrants who had continued to reside in Germany until that time. In other words, long stayers are over-represented in my immigrant sub-sample. If for any reason, individuals who migrated jointly with their spouses and who tended to bring their spouses to the host country shortly after they migrated themselves are also more likely to stay longer periods of time, I may have overstated the relative importance of these two types of family migration. Even though this possibility cannot be completely ruled out, there seem to be good reasons that support the reliability of my results. First of all, wives who took longer to join their husbands abroad would have arrived in Germany more recently and, therefore, they would be more likely to be included in my sample. Secondly, the common argument regarding family reunification in the context of traditional labor migration is that the husband arrives earlier and the female partner follows after a stable job is found by the male first-mover. If the process actually works like this, why should reunited wives who took longer to join their husbands abroad be expected to have returned earlier to their home countries than those who joined their husbands immediately?

Notwithstanding some uncertainty about the exact scale of the joint couple migration phenomenon, the results of this dissertation

seem sufficient to at least call for a revision of the conventional periodization of the process of postwar migration to Germany. Not only did a large proportion of wives join their husbands in Germany long before 1973, but the majority of adult women who were admitted since were imported brides, rather than reunited wives. In other words, the greater part of adult female immigration to Germany since the mid-seventies were not made up of wives who decided to join their husbands out of fear of even longer periods of separation but rather newly married brides imported by middle-generation young males.

The empirical distinction between these two forms of adult female migration is another of the key findings of this research. Entries due to the importation of spouses by middle and second generation single immigrants constitute a large proportion of total current immigration to Germany. This form of family-induced chain migration is more common among middle generation immigrants than it was for their parents' generation. However, a middle generation single immigrant who married someone is more likely to import a spouse from the country of origin if he married during the seventies than if he married during the eighties. Therefore, there is no evidence that the practice of importing spouses is increasing over time, although its numerical magnitude has increased recently in relative terms due to the reduction of other types of migration such as single independent migration or migration for the purpose of family reunification.

Data limitations do not allow us to yet ascertain whether the practice of importing spouses is declining or not among the second generation compared to the middle one. However, what clearly emerged from the empirical analyses carried out in the previous chapters is that the propensity to mix-marry has clearly increased for children born to immigrant parents in Germany compared to their first and middle generation counterparts. Similarly, one of the most striking results concerning immigrants' marital choices were the differences found depending on gender. While the practice of importing spouses is clearly related to low educational levels among men, this is not the case among women. The reasons why

education does not symmetrically affect the marital choices of immigrant men and women remain difficult to understand.

What is clear from my results, however, is that the practice of importing spouses is strongly linked to traditional family arrangements such as living in extended households after marriage: individuals who have imported their spouse from origin are more likely to live with other relatives apart from their spouse and children after marriage, compared to those who either marry a native or a co-national immigrant. This result may be seen as supporting the idea that the importation of spouses often reflects the practice of arranged marriages within the extended own family in the countries of origin.

Finally, the analysis of the employment cycles of immigrant women reveals that women who preceded their husbands in migration are definitely the most positively selected with regard to their labor characteristics. In fact, they are even more likely to participate than women who were single at migration and have married during their stay in Germany. In addition, their attachment to the labor force is notably stronger than that of other immigrant women. However, there are not clear-cut differences between other types of women, especially between imported brides and reunited wives. The apparently stronger attachment to the German labor market among reunited wives compared to imported brides disappears once differences in period of arrival and unemployment level in the country of immigration are controlled for. While reunited wives entered Germany for the most part during the recruitment period, most imported brides have arrived in Germany after 1974, and this seems to be a key factor in explaining their different post-migration labor performance. Alongside the dramatic increase in inflation rates and unemployment after the fist oil crisis, the labor measures adopted by the German government to protect native workers from immigrants' competition particularly hampered adult female immigrants that arrived in those years. In addition, the structure of the female labor market profoundly changed since the early eighties with a huge expansion of part-time semi-skilled

occupations, which seems to have greatly restricted the labor prospects of imported wives, who had generally arrived more recently than reunited wives.

Moreover, the "Family Investment Hypothesis" is not supported as a valid explanation of the labor behavior of first generation immigrant women in Germany. In fact, predictions based on the human capital theory are generally rejected by the obtained results, especially for the cohort of women who arrived prior to the halt on recruitment. On the contrary, the theory of labor market segmentation and, above all, the different context of reception encountered by older and more recent cohorts of immigrant women seem to be the main factors underlying the wide differences in their labor outcomes. Not only the higher levels of female unemployment since the mid-seventies onwards, but also the restrictive measures approved by the German government in order to protect native workers from the foreign competition seem to have severely damaged the economic prospects of more recent female immigrants to Germany. The "Italian exception" is paradigmatic in illustrating this point: Italian immigrant women who, due to their EC membership, were exempted from the restrictions imposed on the entry and labor rights of other immigrants, do not experienced any decline in their rate of labor participation before and after the halt, despite of having traditionally being one of the groups least likely to work in Germany.

8.3. Methodological results

Three main points must be made in relation to the methodological aspects of this dissertation. The first two relate to basic issues that must be taken into account in order to obtain a proper understanding of the demographic dynamics of immigrant populations. First of all, the fundamental need to distinguish not only between first and second generation but also the intermediate category "middle generation", whose special experience of

migration also involves particularities in their demographic behavior, as has been shown with regard to the practice of importing spouses. The second recommendation suggested by the results consists in avoiding the confusion between category of admission and reasons for migration. The strategies developed by migrant families are commonly much more varied than reception policies; as a result, statistics based on official registers often merge within the same category migrants of a very different kind. The large number of "reunited spouses" that joined their husbands in Germany under the rubric of "recruited workers" during the pre-halt period constitutes a paramount example of this problem that often distorts the interpretation of immigration statistics in most countries. In fact, this limitation in official statistics has led us to assume that economic and family reasons for migration are mutually exclusive, instead of mutually reinforcing as some findings in this dissertation suggest.

Finally, the main methodological contribution made by this dissertation has to do with the application of dynamic techniques of analysis to the study of the family and labor aspects of international immigration. The availability of longitudinal data over a long period of time has allowed me to examine changes in the demographic and labor behavior of immigrants across generations, and to also examine the effect that changes in the immigration policies and the labor market conditions have on the behavior of immigrants concerning marital decisions, household formation and labor market participation. In this regard, the analysis of the effect that the halt on recruitment and the reform of the children allowances had on the pace of the family reunification process would have been impossible without longitudinal data. The utilization of time failure accelerated models, which takes the duration of the process under investigation as the dependent variable, has permitted me to test empirically the widespread but controversial idea that the halt on recruitment speeded up the process of family reunification. Although some delayed effect of the halt on recruitment cannot be completely ruled out, the hypothesis that it was the reform of the system of child allowances

that truly accelerated the process of family reunification appears more convincing and supported by the results.

On the other hand, the application of transition rate models to the analysis of employment cycles has also permitted a proper test of the "family investment hypothesis", which was originally developed for explaining the wage and labor performance of immigrant women in the US context. The obtained results suggested no empirical support of this hypothesis for explaining the labor behavior of married immigrant women in Germany. The reason for this, however, is not that most immigrant women only followed their husbands once they had secured a stable job in Germany and, therefore, they never entered the labor force in the host country, as it has been argued by previous studies in the area. On the contrary, a large majority of first generation immigrant women have worked in Germany and the characteristics of the length of residence of their husband in Germany does not appear to affect them labor behavior significantly, once the period of arrival and the type of employment (i.e. full-time or part-time employment) is taking into account.

8.4. Limitations and future lines for research

One of the major limitations in this dissertation relates to the absence of a non-migrant sample, which would have allowed us to draw conclusions not only about the migration strategies of those who came and stayed, but also about the selection mechanisms underlying the migration decision. This make difficult to fully understand the connection between border control policies, selection and integration and, therefore, the possibility of evaluating past immigration policies as a whole.

Alongside the lack of information about the non-migrant population, the utilized dataset included very little information about the community level in the host country. Although I tried to minimize the impact of this by adding some indicators at the national level (e.g. within-group sex imbalances), they are clearly

too rough to approximate some dimensions of the processes under examination.

On the other hand, differences across groups of origin (e.g. the tendency of Greek couples to migrate together and to reunify in Germany faster than the rest of immigrants) remain largely unexplained. The lack of information about the origin communities and the immigrants' own purposes constituted a major limitation in this regard. This omission affects particularly the gender dimension of the family migration process. Although I can discern behavioral differences between men and women and some of the factors related to those differences, on many occasions a clear interpretation of the results is not easy (e.g. the differential effect of education on the propensity to import partners from the origin country revealed). Complementary research utilizing more qualitative techniques could have extremely helpful with regard to these issues.

Finally, the intrinsically dynamic nature of immigration and the changes in the immigrants' own strategies over time are somehow neglected along this study. The reunification of spouses, for instance, is assumed to occur once and for ever and, consequently, the phenomenon of "transnational immigrant families" remains unexplored. In this regard, it is imperative in policy terms to clarify the link between family reunification, permanent settlement and remittance behavior. Additionally, the impact that the separation of spouses and separation of parents and child children have on a wide range of aspects of the children's life, should definitely be investigated.

On the other hand, with regard to the practice of importing spouses, its impact on the integration of the individuals involved must be better analyzed. This would include not only the spouses themselves but also their children and other members of the extended family who often live with in the same household. For instance, it would be important to analyze whether imported wives have higher fertility rates than other immigrant women and, if so, whether this is due to differences in their family life cycle at the time of migration or to their "more traditional" values concerning

gender roles and family life. Another possibility in this area would be to analyze differences in the educational results of immigrant children depending on whether one of their parents had been imported or not.

Continuing with the practice of importing spouses, the impact that recent restrictive measures introduced in countries like Denmark or the Netherlands have, not only on the overall level of newly admitted imported spouses, but also on the marital behavior of the immigrant population at marriageable age who reside in these countries, should be paid attention as well. In particular, it would be interesting to research how this practice evolves across generations, since evidence relating to the second generation is still at a very basic level.

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