



**Instituto Juan March**

Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (CEACS)

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## Changes in National Identification. The Case of Catalonia

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Abstract: *This dissertation focuses on the study of individual change in national identification and examines the factors that lie behind change in contexts with a center-periphery cleavage. The dissertation starts proposing a conceptual and analytical framework for the study of change along different dimensions of identification (self-categorization, content, salience and intensity). It demarcates as well the structural and individual circumstances that make possible the occurrence of change. From here, the dissertation focuses on the study of change in the category of national identification in the Catalan context. The Catalan context is argued to be a suitable case study because it has two characteristics that render change in the category of national identification possible. These two characteristics are: a repertoire of nations, which derives from the existence of a centerperiphery cleavage, and an immigrant population susceptible to experience a process of identification assimilation. The findings of my research are thus generalizable to other contexts that share these two characteristics with Catalonia. The dissertation offers an alternative explanation that complements the decentralization argument, and provides a better account for the fluctuations that are observed when identification with Spain and Catalonia is tracked over time. The dissertation contends that political parties' activation of the center-periphery cleavage drives individual change in national identification. Although the cleavage structures competition between political parties in a permanent way, there are some periods during which a particular policy or issue sharpens conflict between national and regional parties and exacerbates the cleavage. Individuals react to this conflict by updating their national identification. When individual changes occur in the same direction (or the changes which occur in one direction exceed the changes which occur in the other direction) and are numerically important, then they have large-scale consequences on the aggregate. This explanation is tested making use of longitudinal crosssectional data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas and panel data from the Fundació Jaume Bofill. The*

*empirical*

*analyses show that higher levels of political confrontation have fostered the polarization of the feelings of attachment with Spain and Catalonia of the autochthonous population and second generations over the years. These analyses also show that dual identifiers' exposure to Catalan public broadcasters makes them more prone to switch their identification towards a more Catalan oriented identification in periods in which the levels of political confrontation along the cleavage are high. The mechanism linking the activation of the center-periphery cleavage and individual change is illustrated with qualitative evidence from a number of semi-structured interviews. Individuals' perception that their group identity is being attacked provokes a reaction that is contingent on individuals' prior identification. When individuals feel exclusively Spanish or exclusively Catalan, they react reaffirming these identifications. Conversely, when individuals identify with both Spain and Catalonia, they prioritize their identification with the group they perceive is being mistreated and weaken their identification with the elite group making the negative-framed claim. In this way, confrontation has a polarizing effect on individuals' identification.*

*In addition to this, my dissertation examines the nationalizing role of parents and school. Contrary to what previous research has argued, my analyses of the Fundació Jaume Bofill household data show that the alleged influence exerted by the educational system over individual national identification is more limited than previously thought. The dissertation exploits variation in parents' identification with Spain and Catalonia to tease out these two agents' impact. I show that the omission of relevant family background variables has led to an overestimation of the influence of school. The results of my research show that even though years of schooling can increase the chances that children of immigrants develop a bi-national identification, parents' attachment to Catalonia is the key element that fosters a Catalan oriented identification. Other family characteristics, such as the immigrants' family economic performance or immigrant families' self-selection into neighborhoods in which the share of natives is above a certain threshold are decisive elements in promoting children of immigrants' identification with Catalonia.*



**Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones**

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**MARÍA JOSÉ HIERRO HERNÁNDEZ**

**CHANGES IN NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION.  
THE CASE OF CATALONIA**

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Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales

Esta obra se presentó como tesis doctoral en el Departamento de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, el 13 de septiembre de 2012. El Tribunal estuvo compuesto por los profesores doctores Juan Díez Medrano, Santiago Pérez-Nievas Montiel, Clara Riba Romeva, Eva Anduiza Perea, e Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca.



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*A Dídac, perquè vaig començar aquest camí amb tu  
i vas ser el meu suport durant tot aquest temps*





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## ABSTRACT

*This dissertation focuses on the study of individual change in national identification and examines the factors that lie behind change in contexts with a center-periphery cleavage.*

*The dissertation starts proposing a conceptual and analytical framework for the study of change along different dimensions of identification (self-categorization, content, salience and intensity). It demarcates as well the structural and individual circumstances that make possible the occurrence of change.*

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*The dissertation offers an alternative explanation that complements the decentralization argument, and provides a better account for the fluctuations that are observed when identification with Spain and Catalonia is tracked over time. The dissertation contends that political parties' activation of the center-periphery cleavage drives individual change in national identification.*

*Although the cleavage structures competition between political parties in a permanent way, there are some periods during which a particular policy or issue sharpens conflict between national and regional parties and exacerbates the cleavage. Individuals react to this conflict by updating their national identification. When individual changes occur in the*

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*This explanation is tested making use of longitudinal cross-sectional data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas and panel data from the Fundació Jaume Bofill. The empirical analyses show that higher levels of political confrontation have fostered the polarization of the feelings of attachment with Spain and Catalonia of the autochthonous population and second generations over the years. These analyses also show that dual identifiers' exposure to Catalan public broadcasters makes them more prone to switch their identification towards a more Catalan oriented identification in periods in which the levels of political confrontation along the cleavage are high.*

*The mechanism linking the activation of the center-periphery cleavage and individual change is illustrated with qualitative evidence from a number of semi-structured interviews.*

*Individuals' perception that their group identity is being attacked provokes a reaction that is contingent on individuals' prior identification. When individuals feel exclusively Spanish or exclusively Catalan, they react reaffirming these identifications. Conversely, when individuals identify with both Spain and Catalonia, they prioritize their identification with the group they perceive is being mistreated and weaken their identification with the elite group making the negative-framed claim. In this way, confrontation has a polarizing effect on individuals' identification.*

*In addition to this, my dissertation examines the nationalizing role of parents and school. Contrary to what previous research has argued, my analyses of the Fundació Jaume Bofill household data show that the alleged influence exerted by the educational system over individual national identification is more limited than previously thought. The dissertation exploits variation in parents' identification with Spain and Catalonia to tease out these two agents' impact. I show that the omission of relevant family background variables has led to an overestimation of the influence*

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## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Introduction

This dissertation deals with an issue that, despite certain exceptions, has received little attention so far: change in national identification. In particular, this dissertation seeks to answer a substantive and clearly delimited question: *what lies behind change in national identification in contexts in which there is a center-periphery cleavage?*

Although my main interest is the study of individual change, this dissertation also looks into intergenerational changes occurring within the family context. The analysis of both individual and intergenerational change will allow me to account for aggregate change.<sup>1</sup>

By change in national identification, I refer to the changes that occur in an individual's category of national identification. In this regard, this research leaves aside the study of change in other dimensions of identification (content, saliency, and intensity). Although I will come to this later on, it is worth clarifying here that change in an individual's category of national identification can occur in three distinct ways: first, as the abandonment of the original category of national identification and its replacement by a new category; second, as the acquisition of a new category of

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<sup>1</sup> My focus on the individual level comes from my belief that it is only from understanding how change takes place at the micro level that we can fully comprehend social change.

## 2 / *Change in national identification*

identification that is added to the original one; third, as the reorganization of the categories of national identification.

In order to examine change in national identification, this dissertation focuses on the case of Catalonia.<sup>2</sup> Catalonia presents two characteristics that make possible national identification to become a matter of choice, instead of a self-ascribed characteristic. These two characteristics are the existence of a *repertoire of nations* with which individuals can potentially identify and the presence of an immigrant population arrived from other regions of Spain.<sup>3</sup> As the next chapter will argue, these two

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<sup>2</sup> Because of its peculiarities, Catalonia has attracted a great deal of researchers interested in studying Catalan identity (Barrera 1985; Comas and Pujadas 1991; Pujadas and Comas 1982); the relationship of Catalan identity and Catalan language (Woolard 1989); switches in language practices (Laitin 1989; Laitin, Solé and Kalyvas 1994); Catalan nationalism (Conversi 1997; Díez Medrano 1999; Keating 1996); Spanish immigration in Catalonia (Solé 1981a); as well as other related issues, for example, Catalans' electoral behavior (Aguilar and Sánchez-Cuenca 2007; Balcells 2007; Montero and Font 1991; Padró-Solanet and Colomer 1992; Riba 2000). In this regard, and in order to avoid readers' misperceptions, I would like to make clear here that this dissertation is not about Spanish and Catalan identities, or about Spanish and Catalan nationalism, nor is it about Spanish immigration into Catalonia. Even if these issues shape the context in which individuals' national identification switches occur, as I have just mentioned, this dissertation tackles the study of change in national identification: its occurrence and its causes.

<sup>3</sup> As I will detail below, internal immigration from other regions of Spain into Catalonia was numerically very important between the mid forties and the mid seventies. Although the term migration is currently used to refer to the population movements between countries, it has been also applied in demographic and sociological studies to refer to inter-regional movements of population. Pascual and Cardalús (1987, 1988) and Fernández (2005) have warned against the use of the term immigrant to name those individuals who were born in other regions of Spain but have been living in Catalonia for long periods of time. In this dissertation, I use the term immigrant and second generation in a sociological basis. Moreover, with this decision I seek to avoid the

characteristics render change in individuals' category of identification possible.

The population of reference in this dissertation consists of those individuals who have been born in Spain and whose parents were also born in Spain. This, therefore, excludes from my research the analysis of recent immigrants that have arrived in Catalonia from outside Spain. The reason why this population, which has gained in demographic importance in the last few decades, is not taken into consideration is a practical one. This dissertation examines individuals' changes of identification between two national categories: Spain and Catalonia.<sup>4</sup> These two categories of identification might not be relevant for newcomers; nor are the two of them necessarily contending with immigrant's original national identification.

The timeframe of this dissertation is the period between the downfall of Franco's regime and 2010. Nevertheless, data limitations will force me to restrict the long-term analysis to the period between 1987 and 2010. Within this timeframe, I will pay special attention to the decade from 2000 to 2010. I will analyze intergenerational changes within the family making use of cross-sectional data from 2001, and I will examine individual changes using a panel study which covers the period between 2001 and 2005. In addition, qualitative interviews with citizens of Catalonia from different backgrounds will focus on the period between 2004, when the negotiation of a new Statute of Autonomy for

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alternative use of linguistically inefficient expressions such as the population born in other regions of Spain.

<sup>4</sup> It might be worth mentioning here that even if Spain and Catalonia are presented by political actors as national categories, they are not perceived as such for all individuals in Catalonia. Paraphrasing Linz (2008, 65), it could be said that today Spain is a state for all Catalans, a nation-state for a part of its population and only a state, but not a nation for an increasing minority. At the same time, Catalonia is officially an autonomous community for all Catalans, a stateless nation for a part of its population, and only a region, but not a nation for a decreasing minority.



#### *4 / Change in national identification*

Catalonia was initiated, and 2010, when the Spanish Constitutional Court pronounced on the constitutionality of the new Statute.

In order to understand what lies behind changing patterns in Spanish versus Catalan identification over time, this dissertation employs a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques. It also takes advantage of multiple sources of data: a series of cross-sectional surveys from the Center of Sociological Research (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, CIS), a household panel survey from the Panel of Social Inequalities in Catalonia (Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya, PaD –Fundació Jaume Bofill), and qualitative materials from around forty semi-structured interviews.

Although previous work has traditionally conceived national identity in static terms or has disregarded its analysis, some studies have examined change in the category of national identification, and offer different explanations for its occurrence. Here, we necessarily have to refer to the studies by Laitin (1998), Martínez-Herrera (2002, 2009), Guibernau (2007), Aspachs-Bracons et al (2008a; 2008b) and de la Calle and Miley (2008). Despite the many insights these previous studies offer to my own work, they present either incomplete explanations of change in national identification, or noticeable shortcomings that this dissertation will try to overcome.

At this point, it might be worth advancing this dissertation's main argument. This dissertation argues that in Catalonia, political elites' activation of the center-periphery cleavage leads to individual changes in national identification. These individual level changes are, in turn, driving the fluctuations that can be observed in the identification with Spain and Catalonia at the aggregate level.

The combined analysis of the longitudinal data from the CIS, the panel data from the PaD, and the insights emerged from my qualitative interviews allow me to identify the mechanism linking the activation of the center-periphery cleavage and individual change. Individuals' receive messages regarding the group they

identify with through media exposure. When individuals perceive that elites' claims or actions are an attack on the group they identify with, they respond by re-affirming their identification with the mistreated group and –in the case of dual identifications— by weakening their identification with the elite group making the negative-framed claim. When individual changes occur in the same direction (or the changes which occur in one direction exceed the changes which occur in the other direction) and when they are numerically important, then individual change has large-scale consequences on the aggregate.

In addition to this, my dissertation tests the role of the state's alleged main agent of socialization: the school. Contrary to what previous research has contended, my analyses of the household data from the PaD show that the supposed influence exerted by the educational system over individual national identification is actually quite weak once we control for individuals' social backgrounds and, in particular, for the economic performance of immigrant parents, the immigrant composition of the neighborhood and, above all, parents' self-identification. In other words, my findings suggest that the family is a more efficient agent than schools when forging the second generation's national identification.

Although this dissertation focuses on the case of Catalonia, the findings of my research can be generalized to other settings in which the two aforementioned characteristics (the existence of a center-periphery cleavage that structures political competition and the presence of a population from an immigrant origin) are present. These two characteristics, therefore, constitute the scope conditions of this dissertation's findings.

## **1.2. Why studying change in national identification is worthy?**

From the now commonly accepted constructivist paradigm, identification is understood as situational, constructed and changeable. Individuals can identify with different categories: religion, gender, sexual orientation, occupation, ethnicity, nationality, etc. However, not all of these categories will be equally central and salient for all individuals in any circumstances.<sup>5</sup> The saliency of a particular category of identification over others depends on an individual's socialization and life experiences, as well as on the political context in which individuals are embedded.<sup>6</sup> That said, it is worth noting that there are some contexts (e.g. contexts with deep political cleavages) in which political actors constantly promote the saliency of a specific form of identification over others. Also, and related to this, it is important to say that not all forms of identification are politically consequential in every context. So, for example, even if an individual's gender identification were central to her, it is not clear that this identification would orient her vote if all the political parties participating in the elections stand for greater protection and promotion of women rights, or if gender is not an issue which is present in electoral competition. Therefore, the relevance of a particular category of identification over others is context-specific.

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<sup>5</sup> The distinction between saliency and centrality has not been always made clear. In psychology, saliency is a relative individual characteristic that requires comparability among different identificational categories. Centrality is an absolute characteristic that attributes self-importance to that particular identity (Stryker and Serpe 1984).

<sup>6</sup> Take, for example, the case of black person, for whom his or her racial identification is central. However, the greater saliency of his or her racial identification vis-à-vis other forms of identification will vary depending on the context. So, in a context in which a law on same-sex marriage is being voted, this individual sexual orientation (or perhaps religious beliefs) will become more salient than his or her racial identification.

We can say that studying national identification is worthwhile for two reasons: First, because, as previous research has shown, national identification is socially and politically consequential; and secondly, because even though the consequences of national identification have received significant attention, we do not know that much about how it is shaped, nor do we know that much about what causes it to change.

National identity has been claimed to be the means for legitimizing the authority of the state, and to instill individuals' loyalty to its institutions (Kaplan 1999, 34). In addition, we know that national identification lies behind political preferences, attitudes and behavior. In the last few years, several studies have shown that national identification is related to individuals' preferences regarding redistribution (Amat and Wibbels 2009; Shayo 2009), as well as attitudes towards immigrants (Díez Medrano 2005; Heath and Tilley 2005; Maddens, Billiet, and Beerten 2000; Muñoz 2008). Additionally, a substantial body of research has shown that group identification is related to in-group favoritism and out-group bias (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987). Actually, it has been found that when the salience of an individual's category of identification changes, that individual's emotional reactions to the group change as well (Ray et al. 2008).

More specifically, in contexts where the center-periphery cleavage is highly salient, both national and regional elites are interested in promoting identification with the different ideas of the nation that they stand for. By promoting individuals' identification with the nation-state, the center's government guarantees support for the *status-quo*, while by promoting individuals' identification with the "stateless nation", regional nationalist movements, parties or, regional institutions (in those contexts in which political decentralization has occurred) gather support for their demands for self-government or for secession. Political contestation around this dimension turns identification with the nation-state or the stateless-nation politically relevant.

In the Catalan context, for example, identification with Spain or Catalonia has been found to influence individuals' preferences

over the institutional organization of the state (Liñeira, 2012), as well as electoral behavior (Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a; Bonet, Pérez-Nievas, and Hierro 2010; Fernández i Marín and López 2010; Pérez-Nievas and Bonet 2006; Chernyha and Burg 2012). Bearing in mind the important consequences that national identification has on individuals' political preferences and behavior in contexts in which the center-periphery cleavage structures party competition, the relevance of studying whether political elites and institutions (the school and the media) are able to alter individuals' national identification, and overcome the influence of other socialization agents, such as the family, is clear.

### **1.3. State of the Art**

This dissertation builds on different literatures, which I will refer to in each chapter of the dissertation: the literature on political socialization, the literature on immigration and the literature on political persuasion and attitude change. These fields of research, which move this dissertation away from the nationalism literature, will enrich each chapter, and will provide a better understanding of the determinants of national identification stability and change.

In this section, though, I would like to revisit some of the classical work on the study of national identity, as well as more recent research. The purpose of this section is to frame this dissertation within the literature on nationalism. This revision is necessarily selective. It does not seek to cover all previous contributions on the study of nationalism and national identity, but it does reveal a change of approach in their study. While the study of nationalism was long devoted to explaining the socio-political and economic historical transformations which led to the formation of nations and collective national consciousness, today scholars of nationalism have come to focus on the processes through which individual national identity is shaped and reproduced. My dissertation is embedded in this new approach.

Within this section, I will also review the literature on the study of change in national identification, and I will explain how this dissertation seeks to contribute to this literature and to overcome its limitations.

*1.3.1. Classical approaches to the study of nationalism and national identity*

The formation of national identity has traditionally been associated to the process of nation building. However, historical accounts of the origin of nations have long disagreed on the order of appearance of nationalism and national identity. The primordialism approach has argued that a particular “we-feeling” precedes nationalism and the formation of the nation (Smith 1991). In contrast, the constructivism approach, which gathers major support today, has argued that the emergence of a collective national identity followed or, at least, accompanied the formation of the modern nation-state.<sup>7</sup>

Constructivism has presented nations either as a by-product of the process of socio-cultural modernization and industrialization (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983), or as the intentional creation of state elites (Breuilly 1982; Hobsbawm 1991; Smith 1991). Unlike primordialism, which sees the nation as a natural entity with biological (Van der Berghe 1995) or cultural foundations (Geertz 1973), constructivism has argued that nations are human creations (Anderson 1983; Breuilly 1982; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1991; Weber 1976).

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<sup>7</sup> Smith (2001) refers to four different paradigms in the study of nationalism: modernism, perennialism, primordialism and ethno-symbolism. In my understanding, perennialism can be assimilated into the primordialism paradigm, modernism can be subsumed in the constructivism paradigm, and etho-symbolic approaches can be considered to be midway between primordialism and constructivism.

Gellner's constructivism, however, goes further when he states that "it is the nation which makes the man; which models man's convictions, loyalties and solidarities" (Gellner 1983). In Gellner's view, nationalism does not rely on the previous existence of ethnic or cultural groups, supposedly natural units. On the contrary, nationalism is the ideology which causes new units to crystallize (Gellner 1983). These new units appeared in a centralization process, which was facilitated by the generalization and the homogenization of a culture. Anderson (1983) coincides with Gellner in explaining nations as by-products of structural change. Print capitalism would have facilitated the expansion of vernacular languages among the reading class. Anderson refers to this change as "the philological-lexicographic revolution". This revolution occurred in two different ways. In America, the press provided territorial administrative units with a symbolic meaning (Anderson 1983). In Europe, "imagined communities" were formed through the action of an "official nationalism" set off by "naturalized" dynasties reacting to nineteenth century popular movements.

Gellner (1983) and Anderson's (1983) studies are, however, affected by an important problem: the absence of a theory of action. Gellner's evolutionist (almost teleological) depiction of the origin of nations is void of actors and preferences. A similar problem is found in Anderson, who envisages the "imagined communities" that gave rise to the nations as the unintentional result of print capitalism. This problem, however, is not common to all historical accounts on the origin of nations and national identity. Hobsbawm (1991) and Breuilly (1982), for example, depart from this approach. In these authors' views, nationalism becomes an intentional project of nation-building. According to Breuilly (1982), elites are the instigators of this project; they mobilize individuals, and coordinate their interests in order to legitimize their actions and preserve their power.

Notwithstanding the differences between these two approaches, Hobsbawm shares with Gellner and Anderson the idea that the expansion of literacy and the standardization of the culture is a necessary condition for the development of a collective

national consciousness. As does Weber (1976), all these authors present schooling as the state's main instrument for shaping collective national consciousness.

Defenders of primordialism, however, place themselves in a more demanding position when they claim that national communities necessitate a pre-existent ethnic community. Before the *ethnie* becomes a nation, it is essential that an ethnic community has settled in a territorial homeland, culture has standardized, division of labor has occurred, and a unified legal system has been developed (Smith 1991). Although, according to Smith, ethnic communities are the basis of nations, his idea that nations are historically shaped by different agents (the bureaucracies or the intellectuals) separates him from orthodox primordialism and moves him toward a heterodox constructivist approach, which concedes that a certain kind of "we-feeling" is necessary to establish the basis of a national identity.

Classical studies on nationalism have been affected, in different ways, by four important flaws. One of the problems, to which I have already referred above, is the absence of a theory of agency. This problem, however, has not yet been fully overcome as agents' preferences are very often imputed, rather than known. A second problem, which has been clearly exposed in Brubaker (1996), is the reification of the concept "nation". This problem is not only confined to nationalist ideologues, but it is also present among many scholars of nationalism. Actually, as Brubaker (1996) points out, the reification of the nation is a common problem both among primordialists and constructivists. Yet, the idea that the nation is a substantial and enduring collectivity has been considered a symptom of a more serious and pervasive illness that affects social theory: "methodological nationalism". This illness, which was diagnosed by Martins (1974) and Chernillo (2006), occurs when the limits of the society are made equivalent to the limits of the nation, and when the nation is conceived as a self-sufficient entity, relevant at all social, intellectual and political levels (Smith 1979).



Another flaw of these classical studies on nationalism is their disregard for citizens' preferences, attitudes and attachments (Martínez-Herrera 2009). The omission of individuals' national alignments derives, very possibly, from the lack of historical data on individuals' national attachments. The lack of individual data is also related to the fourth problem, which affects many classical works on nationalism: the idea that collective national identities are uniform. Even if we accept that collective national identities are ideological creations modeled by the elites, uniform understandings of national identity are problematic because they anthropomorphize the nation-as-people and assume that all individuals have and share the same identity. Leaving aside the improbable but plausible circumstance in which an individual does not possess a national identity, the assumption that all individuals within a nation share a monolithic national identity becomes especially problematic in heterogeneous societies.

Finally, I must refer to two additional shortcomings that have been combated by more recent work. First, the works mentioned above have failed to offer an explanation of the process through which collective identities give rise to individuals' identification with the nation and vice versa. Second, this research ends its analysis when the nation and the collective national identity associated to it have been constructed. Such a perspective renders collective national identities as an outcome, and not as a process.

This dissertation departs from the classical literature on nationalism in two ways. First, it abandons the study of collective national identity and it focuses on the study of individual national identification, that is, individuals' self-categorization as members of a particular nation. In doing so, this dissertation presents collective national identities as the aggregation of individual identities, and it avoids anthropomorphizing the nation. Secondly, it rejects the common assumption that identification with the nation and the community that is associated to it, once constructed, is unchangeable. Specifically, it argues that under particular circumstances that I detail in next chapter, national

identification may change not only between generations, but also over individuals' lives.

*1.3.2. A different outlook in the study of nationalism and national identity*

The shift in the social research approach that turned researchers' attention to individuals (Coleman 1986) ended up affecting the study of nationalism and national identity as well. With the exception of Weber's (1976) seminal work "Peasants into Frenchmen", which makes use of a variety of historiographic sources to depict the micro-processes which forge individual national allegiances, the studies mentioned above all focused on the study of the structural developments that gave rise to the formation of nations and collective national identities. However, in the last few decades, a new outlook in the study of nationalism and national identity has come to complement the classical historicist approach. This new approach has focused on the study of how individuals become identified with national categories, and how social identities are shaped.

This approach, which is grounded in methodological individualism, has moved the unit of analysis from collectivities to individuals.<sup>8</sup> This has not meant that the existence of collective identities is denied, but rather, has entailed a turn to individuals in order to understand how these collective identities emerge or change. The movement from collective to individual identities is, however, a back and forth movement: from the macro to the micro level of analysis and, once again, from the micro to the macro level, through aggregation.

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<sup>8</sup> As Coleman (1986) pointed out, this change has been facilitated by the explosion of empiricism in social research. The generation of individual data on individuals' feelings, attitudes and identification with the nation has, in turn, opened up a debate on the issue of measurement, to which I will return later on.

This change of approach has also been parallel to the turn from objectivism to subjectivism (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004). While national groups were seen before as primordial objective entities, today they are seen as constructed subjective social categories. Evidence of this approach is, for example, Seton-Watson's (1977, 5) definition of the nation: "A nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one".

Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-categorization Theory (SCT) assumed these changes (from groups to individuals and from objectivism to subjectivism), and pioneered a cognitive turn (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner et al. 1987). They focused on individuals to learn how social identities were shaped, and envisaged social identities as something subjectively shaped. SIT and SCT offered a cognitive explanation for the origin of social identities. Their explanations were based on individuals' proclivity to organize and classify the world in categories. Individuals' awareness that others possess similar characteristics fosters categorization and gives rise to the group. In addition, Tajfel and Turner showed that these characteristics did not need to be objectively defined, but subjectively perceived. SCT taught us that social categorization is extremely relevant: it informs others' identification, as well as self-identification, and in so doing, it triggers in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination.<sup>9</sup>

Without explicitly engaging in this cognitive turn, recent works have also made use of this approach. Billig (1995), for example, has focused on the way in which nationalism is daily produced and reproduced in individuals' minds. He defines nationalism as cognitive schemas of the world which unnoticeably pervade individuals' daily functioning. In a more explicit way,

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<sup>9</sup> Brubaker (2002) and Brubaker et al (2004) have stated that these "accentuation effects" of categorization can help to explain the resilience of groupism, that is, the inclination to conceive that groups (or nations), and not individuals are the essential elements of social life.

Brubaker et al (2004) have more recently campaigned for a cognitive approach in the study of ethnicity and nationalism.

This cognitive approach is also the basis of Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston and McDermott's (2006) proposal to conceive collective identities as the combination of two elements: the content of this identity, and the degree of acceptance or disapproval that this content generates within the population of reference. Although these authors openly reject Brubaker and Cooper's (2000) idea that the identity concept is useless for the social sciences, their proposal also fits in this cognitive turn. In this regard, we can say that Abdelal et al's proposal for the study of collective identities moves away from a historicist and deterministic approach to explain the origin of collective identities. Nevertheless, and even though the authors are fully committed to a social understanding of identity, their research agenda would require, as well, a move from collectivities to individuals. Ultimately, it is important to acknowledge that we need to understand how power relationships allow particular norms of belonging to become imposed over others, and how individuals' come to accept them.

Another important characteristic of this new outlook in the study of nationalism and national identity is that it breaks with the idea that national identities once shaped, remain the same over time. Today, we know that national identity is produced and reproduced not only in contested nations, but also in established uncontested nations (Barrera 1985; Billig 1995; Brubaker et al. 2008; Johnston 1991; Pérez-Agote 1984). Actually, Abdelal et al (2006) have made explicit the possibility that collective identities change when they have argued that the content of identities can be contested and, therefore, modified.

This dissertation is embedded in these recent developments in the study of national identification. And, as these studies do, it defines national identification as a cognitive and subjective attachment to a (national) group, which is susceptible to change.

*1.3.3. Previous research on change in national identification*

The study of how individual identities, once that they have been formed, change over time has yielded little attention thus far. Social psychology took again the lead in the study of individual change (Burke 1991; Serpe 1987; Stryker and Serpe 1987; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987).<sup>10</sup> More recently, Chandra (2004), for example, has tackled individual identity switches on ethnicity. Nevertheless, the studies which have specifically paid attention to change in national identification are much more limited.

There are, however, a number of comparative works and case studies which have attempted to fill this gap (Argelaguet 2006; Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, Costa-Font, and Masella 2008a; Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 2008b; de la Calle and Miley 2008; Guibernau 2006, 2007; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005, 2009). These studies reveal the occurrence of changes in national identification over time, and also explain the rationality behind these changes.<sup>11</sup>

Laitin (1998), for example, has studied identity change in Russian populations living in the former Republics of the Soviet Union (Lithuania, Latvia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). In his research, Laitin proxies identity switches with changes in the language use arguing that such kind of changes will alter the identity possibilities of the following generations. He contends that at the individual level, individuals make a rational calculus of the cost and benefits of remaining loyal to Russian language versus changing to the titular nations' language. Change is presented as a problem of collective action. In other words,

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<sup>10</sup> However, in these works, the conceptualization of change does not necessarily refer to the process of psychologically passing from one category of identification to another, as it also includes changes in role position, the saliency of identification or its content. I will return to this point in the next chapter.

<sup>11</sup> Here I only refer to research dealing specifically with the study of change in the category of national identification.

individuals' perceptions that others are going to switch to the titular nations' language determines their rational calculus, and pushes them to change. At the aggregate, therefore, change would occur as a cascade process. Now, even though Laitin's explanation is suggestive and connects individual and aggregate changes, it does not explain in detail how language switches become identity changes, and it disregards non-rational explanations of change.

Martínez-Herrera's (2002, 2005, 2009) studies examine change in settings which have experienced a process of political decentralization (Scotland, Quebec, Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country). In these settings, decentralization has implied the transference of the nation's responsibilities for the two main instruments of nation building (education and mass media) to regional governments. According to Martínez-Herrera's explanation, identification with the region is encouraged in two ways. On the one hand, *socialization agencies*, such as the education system or the media, induce individuals' identification with the political community through indoctrination. On the other hand, decentralization also creates new *socialization milieux* in which individuals familiarize and internalize the new structures to conform a new political community. In contexts in which a center-periphery cleavage is present, decentralization facilitates regional governments promoting individuals' identification with the region to the detriment of identification with the nation. Martínez-Herrera's research presents, however, an important shortcoming. Even though the author offers an individual-level explanation of change, his tests are all conducted at the aggregate level, what causes a problem of ecological inference. In addition, while Martínez-Herrera's explanation accounts for long-term trends in aggregate national identification, it pays limited attention to the occurrence of short-term fluctuations.

In line with Martínez-Herrera's argument, Guibernau (2006, 2007) has also argued that political devolution has driven aggregate change in national identification. The author has examined the cases of Canada, the United Kingdom and Spain. Focusing on the Spanish case, Guibernau has suggested that

devolution has strengthened pre-existing regional identities and promoted the emergence of dual (national and regional) identifications in the “non-historical” autonomous communities. The creation of regional parliaments, of regional cultural networks, as well as citizens’ participation in regional elections would be some of the factors behind this change. Guibernau’s research, however, does not provide longitudinal evidence of the occurrence of these *identificational* changes; neither does she go in-depth into the mechanisms linking the creation of new institutions and individual or intergenerational changes.

Centering on the Spanish case, Aspachs-Bracons et al (2008a; 2008b) have compared the Basque Country and Catalonia to learn about the effect that two distinct educational reforms, implemented about the same time (1983), have had on individuals’ identification. While the reform in Catalonia made teaching in Catalan compulsory, in the Basque Country parents were allowed to choose the language in which their children would be eventually educated. From the comparison of these two cases, the authors show that the assimilation setting of Catalonia is more successful than the multicultural setting of the Basque Country when promoting primary identification with the region. These authors’ (2008a) research also shows that compulsory education in Catalan accounts for both between-cohorts and within-cohort differences in the levels of primarily Catalan identification. The more years individuals’ have remained in the education system after the reform was implemented, the greater their exposure to Catalan in school and the more they identify with Catalonia. This effect is, also, present among the children of immigrants as they become more Catalan oriented, the more years they have remained in school after the 1983 reform.

However, although its suggestive argument, these authors’ research has two important shortcomings. First, it omits relevant variables related to family background and, in particular, parents’ identification and the neighborhood in which individuals grow up. In doing so, these studies overestimate the influence of the school. Secondly, it assumes that exposure to Catalan in school forges a

Catalan identification. This idea, which is also present in Martínez-Herrera (2002, 2005), is problematic as it is not so evident that learning the Catalan language automatically causes the children of immigrants to feel primarily Catalan.<sup>12</sup>

Interestingly enough, de la Calle and Miley (2008) have contended, against Aspachs-Bracons et al (2008a, 2008b), that even though linguistic assimilation has been greater in Catalonia, assimilation in the feelings of subjective identification has been lower than in the Basque Country. De la Calle and Miley (2008) explain this apparent contradiction by arguing that language policies in Catalonia have turned immigrant linguistic assimilation into a product of institutional pressures, rather than the expression of a voluntary choice. These pressures would have prevented that greater levels of *identificational* assimilation occur in Catalonia.

Building on this previous research, my dissertation seeks to overcome some of their limitations. First, contrary to Martínez-Herrera's (2002, 2005, 2009) studies, which rely on the analysis of aggregate data, and contrary to Guibernau (2006, 2007) and de la Calle and Miley (2008), which draw on synchronic data, my dissertation employs and examines diachronic individual-level data to separate individual from intergenerational change, and to account for aggregate change over time. This allows solving some problems of ecological inference which are present in some of these studies.

Secondly, the dissertation aims at providing an explanation of short-term fluctuations. In this regard, the dissertation offers an alternative and complementary explanation to that of decentralization which better accounts for this kind of temporal changes.

Third, it employs household and panel data to show the occurrence of both intergenerational changes within the family and switches in individual identification over time. Thus far,

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<sup>12</sup> Actually, as chapter 4 will show, among the second generations, the knowledge of Catalan has lost importance over time as a determinant of individuals' primarily Catalan identification.



evidence on the occurrence of intergenerational change has relied on the comparison of the feelings of attachment to Spain and Catalonia of unrelated individuals (immigrants and second generations or individuals' from different generations). The use of household data will allow me to show that these changes have also occurred within the family, as previous studies assume. Moreover, in the dissertation, I analyze panel data to show the occurrence of individual changes over time; something which is only implicit in the analyses of cross-sectional data.

Forth, I empirically test the hypothesis that the education system and the mass media shape individuals' national identification. Although the idea that the school and the media are the state's main agents of national socialization is pervasive in the literature, as far as I am concerned, previous studies have rarely tested this idea empirically, and making use of individual data.

And finally, the dissertation makes use of qualitative evidence collected in approximately forty semi-structured interviews to depict a non-instrumental explanation of individual change in national identification and to illustrate the mechanism which connects changes in the macro level and changes in the micro level.

#### **1.4. Catalonia as case study**

As previously mention, this dissertation focuses on the case of Catalonia. Catalonia is an appropriate setting for the purposes of this research because it gathers two characteristics which render change in individuals' category of identification possible: the existence of a *repertoire of nations* and immigration. These characteristics, as I will explain in next chapter, can be considered as pre-conditions of change. Although these pre-conditions do not have to exist simultaneously in order for changes in national identification to take place, the concurrence of these two characteristics together increase the chances of observing such identification switches.

In the following pages, I provide readers with some contextual background on the Catalan case. What follows is not intended to be a detailed historical account of the events that have taken place in Catalonia over the twentieth century. This section, which builds on secondary sources to which I refer the reader interested in the recent history of Catalonia, is only a brief summary of the elements which have set the conditions under which change in the category of national identification occurs. Before that, I will explain very briefly why these two characteristics make possible change in individuals' category of national identification.

The existence of a *repertoire of nations* means that there are at least two nations with which individuals can potentially identify. This is found, for example, in multinational settings in which there is a "conflict between the *central nation-building culture* and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct *subject populations* in the provinces and the peripheries" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 14). Although federalism and political decentralization can act as devices that accommodate different understandings of the political community and promote nested compatible identities in democratic states (Lijphart 1977; Linz 1999; Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001),<sup>13</sup> when political parties or political elites make nationalist claims regarding certain territorial units within the state, identification with one or another idea of the nation becomes conflictive. Political parties contribute to crystallizing the resulting cleavage, making conflicting interests salient and pushing people "to ally themselves across structural

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<sup>13</sup> Linz and Stepan (1996) and Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2011) have argued that state-nations' designs can also muffle this type of conflict. Against the model of nation-state, which seeks to match the state's political boundaries with the nation cultural boundaries, the state-nation would seek to incorporate multiple and complementary socio-cultural identities under the overarching identity of the state. State-nation policies would, therefore, aim to instill a "we-feeling" into the inhabitants of the state. This would make it possible for individuals to develop nested identities, and identify with the two territorial (nation and state) realms at the same time.

cleavage lines and to set up priorities among their commitments” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 5).

In the Catalan context, nationalist parties have presented Catalan and Spanish interests as conflicting interests. As a consequence, citizens in Catalonia have been pushed to align themselves with one or the other side and to prioritize one form of identification over the other. Besides, multilevel electoral competition along this dimension has caused that political parties had kept strong incentives to continue promoting and mobilizing one form of identification over the other.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Here it is worth highlighting that, since the transition to democracy, political parties’ mobilization of the Spanish and Catalan identities in Catalonia has been unequal. This can be explained for, at least, two reasons. First, while Catalan identity has always enjoyed of a prestigious status because of the role Catalanism played in the fight against Francoism, Spanish identity was left in a very discredited position after Franco’s downfall. This can be explained by the Franco’s “appropriation” and monopolization of the Spanish nationalist discourse during the dictatorship (Núñez 2001). During the transition, the memories of the Civil War and the lessons learned from the past made possible that a political consensus was achieved to pass the 1978 Spanish Constitution (Aguilar 1996). However, these two elements, and the fears that a backward movement could occur also provoked that political elites did not undertake a deeper reformulation of the Spanish nation symbols. Spanish nationalism, therefore, would remain associated to Franco’s dictatorship for many years (Nuñez 2001). Partially because of this, the left parties have been reluctant to mobilize Spanish identity, have adopted federalist positions and have accepted peripheral nationalist claims (Nuñez 2001; Balfour y Quiroga 2007). The Spanish right, on the other hand, has tried to renovate, recover and encourage the Spanish identity, especially since the mid nineties. However, the Popular Party’s flagging of Spanish identity has been mainly made in reaction against peripheral nationalism.

The other reason behind political parties’ unequal mobilization of the Spanish and Catalan identities is caused by the skewed distribution of political parties along the center-periphery cleavage in Catalonia. This skewed distribution has caused that the means and resources that have been daily employed to stand for the Catalan self-government interests

Under such circumstances, citizens in Catalonia can have opted for identifying with either of the two categories or, still, with both of them.<sup>15</sup> Ultimately, it can be said that the ethno-territorial cleavage has caused and facilitated that different forms of exclusive and inclusive identification with Spain and Catalonia co-exist in Catalonia (Moreno, Arriba and Serrano 1998, 66).

Besides this, Catalonia has another characteristic that facilitates the observance of changes in the category of national identification: Catalonia population is made up of a numerically important immigrant population. Between the mid-fifties and mid-seventies, a significant number of immigrants moved to Catalonia from other regions of Spain. Obviously, when these individuals first came to Catalonia, they lacked any identification with the region.<sup>16</sup>

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and to encourage Catalan identification have been always greater, than the means and resources employed to mobilize the Spanish identification.

<sup>15</sup> Here, it is important to note that when individuals express that they identify with two national categories at the same time, they can have different ideas of what that means. These different ideas derive from the meaning that they attribute to the category of identification. So, for example, when individuals declare that they identify with Catalonia and Spain at the same time, they may mean that they are subjectively attached to Catalonia as a nested part of Spain, or that they are attached to both Spain and Catalonia as separate and distinctive nations (Bonet 2012). In the first case, individuals would be expressing their attachment to a region and a nation. In the second one, they would be expressing their attachment to two distinct nations.

<sup>16</sup> Actually, it is reasonable to think that Spanish identification was not a salient form of identification for many individuals before the migratory process. This would be so because for these individuals Spanish identification was not a contested form of identification, but a superordinated form of territorial identification within which regional forms of identification would be nested. Accordingly, we could assume that Spanish identification became salient when these immigrants first came into contact with Catalan identity. Interestingly, Shafir (1995) has argued that because most immigrants to Catalonia came from regions with a strong regional identification (Andalusia and Extremadura) and a

Immigrants, however, can undertake a process of structural assimilation, which at its late stage would lead to their *identificational assimilation* (Alba and Nee 1997; Gordon 1964)<sup>17</sup>. *Identificational assimilation* is a specific case of change in the category of national identification. In its original formulation (Gordon 1967), *identificational assimilation* entailed the individual's abandonment of his/her original national identification and the development of a national identification with the receiving country. However, such a process is considered to be very demanding because it involves a psychological loss. As a consequence, it is more likely that immigrants end up identifying with the receiving country without renouncing their identification with their country of origin as well. However, as it was pointed out in the first section of this chapter the acquisition of a new category of identification does also qualify as a change in national identification.

#### *1.4.1. The center-periphery cleavage*

Spain has been considered a case of early state-building in which the political, social and cultural integration of its territorial components was never fully achieved (Linz 2008, 3). According to Linz (2008, 65), the Spanish state's failure to build a nation-

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less developed overarching Spanish identification, they should not have experienced an identitarian conflict when they entered into contact with Catalans.

<sup>17</sup> Here, it is worth highlighting that individuals' incorporation into the receiving society is not a linear process. It differs across individuals, and depends on the receiving society's immigration policies (Berry 1984; Bourhis et al. 1997). Second generations can also follow multidirectional tracks in their maturity processes (Portes and Zhou 1993). These different tracks do not necessarily lead to the abandon of individuals' original identification. In fact, dual forms of identification and biculturalism are more likely to emerge in such contexts (Chen, Benet-Martínez, and Bond 2008).

state can be explained by the fact that the process of state building was initiated before the nationalism era, coinciding with a time of fierce ideological conflicts in Spain, and with the distress caused by the loss of overseas colonies.<sup>18</sup> Álvarez-Junco (2001) has stressed this idea and has claimed that the Spanish nationalizing process took place during a political and economic crisis. The explanation that the weaknesses of the state made possible the emergence of national projects in the peripheries complements alternative explanations, which have emphasized the conflict of interests between the laggard economy of the centre and the developed economies of the peripheries.<sup>19</sup>

Over the nineteenth century Catalonia experienced a process of endogenous industrialization based on the production of commodities, which contrasted with the stagnation of a Spanish economy based on agriculture (Díez Medrano 1999). As Díez Medrano explains, this situation provoked a gradual estrangement between the Spanish government, which represented the interests of landowners and Basque financiers, and the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie that demanded a liberalization of cereal prices and industrial protectionism. As the centre controlled the political-administrative structure of the state, the periphery lacked the instruments to develop policies that supported their economic interests. Incongruence between economic development and political leadership provided the basis for tensions between the centre and the periphery (Gourevitch 1979). This fracture deepened due to the loss of the Spanish colonies overseas, what particularly affected Catalonia's commercial interests (Conversi 1997). Altogether, these factors led Catalan industrialists to

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<sup>18</sup> Along these same lines, Moreno (1988, 162) has argued that "the malintegration of the minority nations of Catalonia and Scotland in the Spanish and British state-building processes must be identified as the cause of the revival of 'modern' nationalism in Scotland and Catalonia".

<sup>19</sup> In addition to the economic factors, between 1833 and 1876, the flowering of a cultural movement, the *Renaixença*, led by the Catalan intelligentsia, made Catalan distinctiveness salient.

demand a greater degree of autonomy to defend better their economic interests.<sup>20</sup>

However, the two-party system (the so-called *turnismo*), which had been established after the Spanish Monarchy had been restored in 1875, was not able to respond to the demands of Catalan industrialists and the petty bourgeoisie (Linz 1967, 213). This led to the emergence of a regionalist movement which sought to represent Catalan interests. However, regionalism in Catalonia lacked strong cohesion and local dominance (Linz 1967, 219). A cross-cutting class cleavage divided the emergent Catalan nationalists into two parties: the bourgeois nationalism of the *Lliga Regionalista* and the progressive nationalism of the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC). The *Lliga* represented the industrial and trade bourgeoisie, as well as the rural owners, and aspired to a greater degree of autonomy within Spain. The ERC, on the contrary, represented the interests of professionals and the petit bourgeoisie, and it demanded the right to self-determination, although it would later aspire to creating a confederation of states within Spain (see Díez Medrano 1999, 129 - 30).

Beginning in 1901, the *Lliga* gradually became the hegemonic party in Catalonia and kept its hegemony until the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. Primo de Rivera's dictatorship suppressed Catalan institutions, forbade any expression of Catalan identity, including the Catalan language, and betrayed the *Lliga*'s decentralizing interests. As a consequence, the *Lliga*, which had welcomed the dictatorship hoping it would end the class conflict that had intensified in those years, lost its hegemony (Díez Medrano 1999, 114-128).

In the 1931 municipal elections, the Republican parties won over the monarchist parties in all over Spain. Their victory hastened the proclamation of the Second Republic. In Catalonia,

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<sup>20</sup> For further details on the evolution of Catalan nationalism in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century see Conversi (1997), Díez-Medrano (1999), Linz (1967) and de Riquer (1979).

the ERC won the elections and its leader, Francesc Macià, proclaimed the Catalan Republic. However, Spanish republicanism convinced Macià to maintain Catalonia within Spain. In exchange for this, the medieval institution of Catalan government, the *Generalitat*, was restored. Moreover, in 1932, the first Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia was passed in the Spanish Parliament. The so-called *Estatut de Núria* recognized Catalonia as an autonomous region within the Spanish state and made both Spanish and Catalan official languages within Catalonia.

During the Second Republic, the Catalan party system kept its autonomy from the rest of Spain. Different reasons account for this outcome: First, the strength of the anarcho-syndicalist movement in Catalonia prevented the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) from getting workers' support and, secondly, native Catalans preferred to support regional parties instead of the coalition of right-wing parties, *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* (CEDA) (Linz 1967, 221). Actually, even the Communist Party created an autonomous branch in 1936: the *Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya* (PSUC) (Linz 1967, 221).

In 1933, the inability of Manuel Azaña's leftist Spanish government to tackle the many problems that Spain faced, forced him to call for new elections. The rise to power of the CEDA was accompanied by a series of measures which *de facto* limited Catalan autonomy. In 1934, a general strike organized by leftist forces against the CEDA participation in the government took place. On October 6, the *Estat Català*, a nationalist party which, along with the ERC, was part of the ruling coalition in Catalonia, put pressure on the *Generalitat* President, Lluís Companys, to proclaim a Catalan Republic within the Spanish Federal Republic (Linz 2008, 35, 37). The Catalan Republic only lasted for a few hours and it ended with the imprisonment of Lluís Companys and the *Generalitat* government. In 1936, new elections brought to power the left coalition, *Frente Popular*, which allowed the return of the President of the *Generalitat*. The revolutionary reforms carried out by the *Frente Popular* took place in a context of



increasing political conflict that ended with Franco's *coup d'état* and the emergence of the Spanish Civil war.<sup>21</sup>

The Spanish Civil War, which was presented by the Right as a crusade against the "reds" and the "separatists" (Linz 1967, 263-264), ended with the victory of Franco's side in April 1939. Franco's regime then started "the greatest nationalizing effort of the twentieth century" (Saz 2003, 50). In order to spread national Catholicism, it made use of the main instruments of state nationalism: the educational system and the mass media (see Aguilar 1996, 81-113). National Catholicism was a complex, not clearly shaped, doctrine which defended the idea that the Spanish people were God's "chosen" people, and that Catholicism was the essence of the Spanish nation. National Catholicism defended traditionalism and Spain's unity among other principles (see Muñoz 2008, 49-57). Nationalizing agencies were expected to promote the cultural homogeneity of Spain, and to assimilate the population of linguistically distinct areas (Muñoz 2008, 51). This goal explains why the repression of Franco's regime against Catalonia was especially harsh in the first years of the dictatorship (see Benet 1978, 1995; Marín i Corbera 2006). Franco's regime suppressed the Catalan autonomous institutions and it banned any expression of the Catalan culture and, particularly, the private and public use of the Catalan language.

Despite this, the regime was not able to assimilate Catalans. Different circumstances converged to avoid this assimilation. On the one hand, as Díez Medrano (1999, 191) has noted, the economic structure of Catalonia, based on the commodities industry, made the Catalan bourgeoisie less dependent on the regime's economic support. On the other hand, Catalonia's rich associative tradition made the organization of different focuses of resistance possible. Resistance to Franco's regime developed in every social realm: the family, the intelligentsia, the Church, the university, the scouts, the trade unions and the political parties

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<sup>21</sup> For more details see, for example, Linz (1967, 231-264) and Montero (1977).

(see Guibernau 2003). The quote below reflects this idea that the scout movement, the bourgeoisie and the Church were crucial in keeping alive Catalan history and Catalan culture.

“My political awareness awoke when I got into the scouts. We celebrated San Jordi and then, there were a group of intellectuals from the Catalan bourgeoisie that woke our interest in these issues [...] We sang Catalan songs that were not heard anywhere else. They raised our patriotism for Catalonia. Of course, I had never heard about Jaume I in the history courses I had studied at the school. We knew who José Antonio [Primo de Rivera] was, we learned about the Falange, the Castilian Kings... However, Catalonia’s history had been totally sunk into oblivion. So then, the bourgeoisie: els Figueres, els Sala, els Riera... all these families from the Catalan bourgeoisie acted as sponsors of these groups, which were under the protection of a parish” [Interview # 36, Mari Antonia, autochthonous, born in 1944]

Catalan families also reproduced Catalan identity (Barrera 1985; Johnston 1991). As Pérez-Agote (1984) has reported for the Basque Country, in Catalonia as well, people followed different strategies for resisting the dictatorship’s repression. These strategies ranged from self-imposed silence to disobedience.<sup>22</sup>

“In general, no one said anything because my grandmother was afraid to talk about that. A brother of my grandfather had been forced into exile in France and, I did not know anything about him. There were problems that we did not speak of. The fear was present. My family was a family of farmers and they had the impression that they [Franco’s repressive forces] could still find some things hidden in any corner. The brother of my grandmother, I would say, he was

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<sup>22</sup> In Catalonia, these practices excluded the use of violence. De la Calle (2010) has argued that the dictatorship’s local authorities’ greater responsiveness to nationalist demands in Catalonia vis-à-vis the Basque Country deterred the occurrence of nationalist violence in the former region. Besides, during the Second Republic, Catalan leaders had already mobilized Catalan citizens in favor of nationalism, so they did not need to resort to violence in order to mobilize citizens.

an important “boss”, because when they searched in the house there were typewriters buried, and other things. Then we were afraid, and we did not talk”. [Interview # 17, Clara, autochthonous, born in 1954]

“My father grew up in a village in the interior of Catalonia and there, everyone spoke Catalan. But then, the children were going to the village school and there every lesson was taught in Spanish. Then, what they did..., on Saturdays, there was a priest who was a little more open-minded, a little more left wing than the others, and he taught Catalan on the sly. My father learned to write Catalan with him and other villagers who went there on the sly” [Interview #21, Pere, autochthonous, born in 1974].

In the early forties, intellectuals managed to create or reorganize clandestine and semi-clandestine organizations (e.g., the *Institut d'Estudis Catalans* and the *Omnium Cultural*) (Guibernau 2003). Gradually, different publishing houses started to publish books in Catalan with the goal of preserving vernacular language. The Catalan Church and, in particular, the Abbey of Montserrat also played an important role through the promotion of different initiatives (e.g. the mass organized in 1947 to inaugurate a throne for the Montserrat Virgin, or the publication of the activist journal *Serra d'Or*). These initiatives also came from lay Catholic organizations, such as the *Torrás i Bages* association, and the CC group.<sup>23</sup>

During the sixties, the regime's repression relaxed seeking to clean up its international image (Marín i Corbera 2006). As a result, the opportunities for mobilization increased and flourished, especially in the university. In 1966, the foundational meeting of the Students' Democratic Union was besieged and attacked by Franco police. The *Caputxinada*, named after the Cappuccino convent where it was held, would become the seed of the Assemblea de Catalunya. Also in those years, some spontaneous acts were carried out by leaders of the “movement” against

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<sup>23</sup> CC stands for *Cristians Catalans*, *Catòlics Catalans* or *Crist i Catalunya*.

Franco's regime (e.g. Jordi Pujol, who was at that time one of the leaders of the CC group, and who would later become the president of Catalonia's government, played a part in the 1959 boycott of the *La Vanguardia* newspaper).<sup>24</sup>

Political parties also participated in the resistance against Franco's regime. However, it was the *Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya* (PSUC) which would lead the movement. During the Civil War and in the early years of Franco's regime, the PSUC would become the main underground party. The PSUC was not only organized the union struggle for improving Spanish workers' labor conditions, but it also got Spanish immigrants in Catalonia engaged in the struggle for democratization and the defense of Catalan self-government (Conversi 1997; Díez Medrano 1999). In the latter years of the Franco dictatorship, an alliance between the Catalan nationalist intelligentsia, left organizations, and the local church was crafted (Conversi 1997: 131). This alliance was based on these groups' resistance against Franco's regime, and it was forged in the 1971 *Assemblea de Catalunya*. This coalition became visible in a massive demonstration which took place in Barcelona under the lemma "*Llibertat, Amnistia, Estatut d'Autonomia*" on September 11, 1977.<sup>25</sup> The *Assemblea de Catalunya*, the *Nova Canço* (New Folk Song) movement and acts such as the September 11 demonstration would make popular opposition to Franco's regime and transform Catalan nationalism into a mass movement (Guibernau 2003).

In this way, while trying to contain Catalan nationalism, the dictatorship deepened the center-periphery cleavage, which had already become salient during the Second Republic. As Cambó, the *Lliga's* leader, had foreseen, Franco's repression helped to

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<sup>24</sup> For more details on these acts of resistance to Franco's regime see, for example, Colomer (1976), Crexell (1982,1984) or Marcet (1987, 1-10).

<sup>25</sup> September 11 was proclaimed Catalonia's National Day in 1980. This day commemorates the defeat from the Siege of Barcelona in the War for the Spanish Succession, and the subsequent suppression of Aragon's institutions by the Kingdom of Philip V.

strengthen Catalan nationalism (de Riquer 1996). Moreover, resistance against Franco's National Catholicism provided Catalan identity with new symbols that could be added to the collective imaginary.

The democratization process initiated in Spain after Franco's death in 1975 was accompanied by a process of political decentralization.<sup>26</sup> In 1977, Catalonia's institutions for self-government were re-established and a provisional government headed by Josep Tarradellas (who had been the president of the *Generalitat* in exile between 1945 and 1977) was formed. The Catalan members of the Spanish Parliament, who had been elected in the foundational elections of the democracy, elaborated the Catalan *Estatut d'Autonomia* (Statute of Autonomy).<sup>27</sup> The *Estatut* was passed in the Spanish Parliament and approved in referendum by Catalan citizens in 1979. The 1979 Statute endowed Catalonia with a regional government and a legislative parliament. Both the Spanish Constitution and the Catalan Statute granted regional institutions a wide number of responsibilities in education, health, culture, social services and police matters.

As had occurred during the Second Republic, a Catalan party system developed independently of the Spanish party system. The democratization process resulted in the legalization of those Catalan political parties that had maintained clandestine activity (with different degrees of importance and visibility) during Franco's regime: the *Partit Unificat de Catalunya* (PSUC), the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC) and the *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya* (UDC). New political organizations, as the *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* (CDC), led by Jordi

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<sup>26</sup> As Linz and Stepan (1992) have argued the fact that regional elections occurred after political elites reached a democratic agreement was crucial to avoid that ethnic issues challenged the legitimacy of the state and, questioned the process of democratization.

<sup>27</sup> The Statute of Autonomy is Catalonia's fundamental law. It has a constitutional function that consists of setting the normative framework, established in the 1978 Spanish Constitution, regarding Catalonia's self-government.

Pujol, emerged. Others, like the *Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Congrés*, the *Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Reagrupament* and the Catalan Federation of the PSOE, would merge into the *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (PSC) (Colomé 1989).

Five main political parties would end up configuring the Catalan party system (see Figure A.1.1 in the Appendix for more details): the CDC, which from 1979 on would participate in the elections in coalition with the UDC under the *Convergència I Unió* (CiU) label; the ERC; the PSC; the PSUC, which would evolve into the *Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds* (ICV) in 1987; and the Popular Party (PP).<sup>28</sup> Among these parties, the CiU and the ERC are the only two parties in the Catalan party system which have no relation to Spanish political parties. The PSC and the ICV are in a federal relationship with the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) and the *Izquierda Unida* (IU), respectively. And the PP, which was a re-founded version of the party created by Franco's former ministers (*Alianza Popular*, AP), would become the only Spanish party with representation in the Catalan Parliament.

Political parties in Catalonia aligned along the left-right and the center-periphery axis. However, the distribution of parties along the center-periphery cleavage has always been asymmetrical, and skewed towards the "periphery" side of the cleavage. Thus, while the CiU, the ERC, the PSC and the ICV

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<sup>28</sup> In the first regional elections, the *Partido Socialista Andaluz* (PSA), a political party based in Andalusia that aimed at representing the Andalusian immigrants living in Catalonia, and the *Centristes de Catalunya- Unión de Centro Democrático*, the party led by Adolfo Suárez during the transition, got two and eighteen representatives, respectively. The *Centro Democrático Social*, the centrist party created by Suárez after the UCD's project failed, got three seats in the 1988 regional elections. The CDS would end up being absorbed by the PP. In the 2006 and 2010 regional elections, *Ciutadans-Partit de la Ciutadania* (C's), a political party which is against nationalist identity politics, got 3 seats. In the 2010 regional elections, *Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència* (SI) also entered the Regional Parliament with 4 seats.

represent *Catalanist* positions;<sup>29</sup> the PP has been the only party in the Catalan Parliament which has clearly opposed to move forward Catalan self-government. The presence of Catalan nationalist parties in the Spanish parliament and the PP presence in the Catalan parliament have meant that the center-periphery cleavage has structured political competition both at the national and at the regional level.

Over the years, confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage has become a constant on the Spanish political landscape (Moreno 1997), although the activation of the cleavage has been more important in some periods than in others. The nationalist parties' centrifugal strategies of political competition, the main Catalan parties' aspirations to move the process of decentralization forward, the Popular Party's opposition to these aspirations, Spanish and Catalan party leaders and political commentators' negative-framed stances on cleavage-related issues, and the organization of divisive campaigns intended to oppose Catalan and Spanish identities have all contributed to making the conflict become more salient in some moments of time.

#### *1.4.2. The presence of a population susceptible to change its identification*

Immigration can be also seen as a pre-condition for individuals' experiencing a change in national identification. Therefore, in contexts with an important immigrant population is more probable that we observe *identificational* changes. In this

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<sup>29</sup> The PSC-PSOE federal relationship and internal tensions within the PSC have caused this party to hold more ambivalent positions on the center-periphery cleavage. Within the PSC, the party members who have the support (and votes) of Spanish immigrants are closer to autonomist positions, while the *Catalanist* sectors support further decentralization. In the last few years, the PSC has intensified its demands for further self-government (Pallarés and Verge 2011) and self-determination.

section, I provide the reader with some context on the phenomenon of Spanish immigration to Catalonia.

Starting in the mid of 19th century, a significant number of immigrants arrived to Catalonia from less developed and impoverished regions in Spain. Around 1930, immigration came from Aragón, Valencia, Murcia and Almería. Waves of immigration to Catalonia remained constant over time and only decreased slightly in the postwar period (Cabré and Pujadas 1984). Between the mid-fifties and the mid-seventies, the growth of employment opportunities in Catalonia attracted a steady stream of immigrants. Newcomers came from all regions of Spain, although in this second wave of immigration, the arrival of people from Andalusia, Extremadura and Castile “la Nueva” was noticeably higher (Sancho and Ros 1998, 110). Just before 1975, 52 percent of the immigrants came from Andalusia, 12 percent from Extremadura, 8 percent from Castile “la Nueva”, 7 percent from Castile “la Vieja” and 6 percent from Aragón (Recaño and Solana 1998, 224-225).

Immigration contributed significantly to the growth of Catalonia’s population. In 1950, the population in Catalonia was 3,240,313. Twenty years later it had increased by over two million people (see Table 1.1). Between 1950 and 1975, Catalonia grew at a 2.25 percent annual rate (Sancho and Ros 1998, 109).

*Table 1.1. Evolution of the population in Catalonia*

|           | 1940      | 1950      | 1960      | 1970      |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Barcelona | 1,931,875 | 2,232,119 | 2,877,966 | 3,929,194 |
| Tarragona | 339,299   | 356,811   | 362,679   | 433,094   |
| Girona    | 322,360   | 327,321   | 351,369   | 412,340   |
| Lleida    | 297,440   | 324,062   | 333,765   | 347,091   |
| Total     | 2,890,974 | 3,240,313 | 3,925,779 | 5,121,719 |

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE)



Cabré and Pujadas (1984) have estimated that the net migration balance between Catalonia and the rest of Spain was over one million people between 1951 and 1975. In 1975, the percent of the population which has not been born in Catalonia made up 38 percent of the total population (Cabré 1999, 183). These figures were even higher in the province of Barcelona, where those who have been born outside of Catalonia constituted 42 percent of the population (Cabré 1999, 183). Actually, in some areas of Barcelona's industrial belt, such as Cornellà, the non-native population made up 78.4 percent of the total population in the mid-seventies (Strubell i Trueta 1981, 76)

At the end of the seventies, this kind of inter-regional migration came to an end. Between 1980 and 1985 the balance of migration turned negative for the first time (Bentolila 2001; Cabré 1999, 190; Recaño and Solana 1998) (see Table 1.2). Actually, "following the expansion of the welfare state, the traditionally poor and high unemployment regions (Andalusia and Extremadura) became net immigration regions, while the better-off ones (such as Madrid and Catalonia) became net outmigration regions" (Bóver and Velilla 1999, 10). As Bóver and Velilla (1999) have suggested, different circumstances can possibly account for this change in migratory trends: the process of economic restructuring in the first years of the democracy, changes in individuals' expectations due to the regime change and the expansion of the welfare state. Nevertheless, the return rate among immigrants was significantly low: 5.9 per thousand in the period 1988-1990 and 6.8 per thousand between 1992 and 1994 (Recaño and Solana 1998).

*Table 1.2. Net migration between Catalonia and other Spanish regions between 1941 and 1985*


|           |           |
|-----------|-----------|
| 1941-1950 | 189,913   |
| 1951-1960 | 299,116   |
| 1961-1965 | 270,287   |
| 1966-1970 | 263,451   |
| 1971-1975 | 217,608   |
| 1976-1980 | 114       |
| 1980-1985 | -34,520   |
| Total     | 1,205,969 |

Source: Cabré (1999)

Figure 1.1 shows the population born in other regions of Spain living in Catalan municipalities in 1981 and 2010. The figure shows that immigrant population concentrated in the seaside areas and, in particular, in Barcelona's metropolitan area. It also reveals a change in the percent of population born in other regions of Spain living in the Catalan municipalities. While in 1981 there were municipalities in which the percent of population born in other regions of Spain was over 38 percent; thirty years later the municipalities with the highest percentage of immigrants reached 39 percent, but they were not above it.

Due to the die off of individuals who had been born in other regions of Spain and who have not been replaced by new arrivals, today the percentage of this population is significantly lower than it was in 1975. In 2010, the municipal register showed that, after excluding foreign-born population, this figure had decreased to 25 percent. Despite this decrease, the Spanish born population and their children still account for an important percentage of today's Catalan population.

Figure 1.1. Percent of the population born in other regions of Spain 1981 and 2010



Source: IDESCAT, 1981 census data and 2010 Catalan Municipal registers

Immigration from other Spanish regions in Catalonia altered the socio-economic and demographic structure of the population in Catalonia, and the effects of this phenomenon still prevail today. The great majority of newcomers were low-educated, unskilled or semiskilled Castilian speaking workers. Upon arriving in Catalonia, these immigrants concentrated in the outskirts of Barcelona and in new neighborhoods built out of nothing in the main Catalan cities. These neighborhoods very often lacked any kind of infrastructure, severely affecting the living conditions of a population of a predominantly rural origin (Solé 1981a, 88-89). The lack of infrastructures also affected the children of immigrants' education opportunities:

“At that time, Hospitalet was a typical city of the *desarrollismo* period and, so, many services were missing. My parents had always given great importance to education, especially my father. Therefore, they wanted me to start school at the age of four. However, as schools were missing, I ended up going to a semi-public school. This was a typical school at that time; there were a lot in Hospitalet and there are still some. These schools were created in apartments. Classrooms were separated by any flimsy material, and sometimes schools were created on the ground floor of an apartment building.”  
[Andrés, male, born in 1975, child of mixed couple]

Immigrants gathered in neighborhoods and jobs where Catalan was completely absent. Moreover, the ban against the Catalan language not only prevented the post-war native generations from being educated in Catalan during the Franco dictatorship, but it also reinforced children of immigrants' alienation from the Catalan language (Conversi 1997, 208). In addition, immigrants' low-educational levels pushed them into unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. Immigrants' concentration in these kinds of jobs caused the ethno-linguistic and the social-class divides to overlap. However, differences in immigrants' educational levels avoid that there was a perfect correlation between the ethnic and the class divides (Pinilla de las Heras 1973, 103-107).

As table 1.3 shows, significant differences prevail today in certain occupational groups (“Support Professionals and Technicians”, “Services”, “Skilled workers in Farming and Fishing”, “Skilled workers in industries”, “Unskilled workers”) and the lower occupational echelon is still over-represented by non-natives and their children.<sup>30</sup> Despite this, the percent of autochthonous and immigrants is quite similar in the higher occupational groups (“Companies and Public Administration Managers” or “Scientific Professionals and Technicians”).

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<sup>30</sup> Miley (2008, 13) has noted that the ethnic divide has also translated to political institutions, so today there is a lower percentage of non-native population among the local politicians and the members of the regional parliament. This can be attributed to the fact that the major political party in the regional parliament between 1980 and 2003, *Convergència i Unió*, hardly included immigrants in their lists for the Catalan parliament. The same applies to the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, and to a much lesser extent to the *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* and *Iniciativa per Catalunya*; although the two latter parties have exhibited a variation in the percentage of immigrants who have been included in their electoral lists over time (for more details see Coller, Ferreira, Meissner 2007; Coller and Santana 2009). Differences between elite and social structure have been seen as evidence of the political infra-representation of this sector of the population in the regional parliament, both by researchers and immigrants themselves.

Table 1.3. Distribution of origin groups within by occupational groups (column %)

|   | Autoch-<br>thonous | Children<br>of Mixed<br>couples | Second<br>Genera-<br>tions | Immigra<br>nts |
|---|--------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|
| Companies and Public<br>Administration      | 8.13               | 6.48                            | 6.86                       | 8.37           |
| Managers                                    |                    |                                 |                            |                |
| Scientific Professionals<br>and Technicians | 12.26              | 13.89                           | 16.00                      | 13.69          |
| Support Professionals<br>and Technicians    | 16.45              | 17.59                           | 18.29                      | 9.89           |
| Clerical                                    | 2.73               | 5.86                            | 5.14                       | 2.28           |
| Services                                    | 14.42              | 16.36                           | 14.29                      | 11.03          |
| Skilled workers in<br>Farming and Fishing   | 4.38               | 0.93                            | 0.57                       | 1.52           |
| Skilled workers in<br>industries            | 16.39              | 15.74                           | 15.53                      | 21.67          |
| Machine operators and<br>assemblers         | 15.63              | 15.43                           | 12.00                      | 16.35          |
| Unskilled workers                           | 9.59               | 7.62                            | 11.43                      | 15.21          |

Source: CIS, Study # 2857 (2010)

The phenomenon of Spanish immigration to Catalonia has been an issue of interest for a significant number of studies (Cabr  1999; Cabr  and Pujadas 1984; Candel 2008 [1964]; Cardel s, Oroval, and Pascual 1978; Comas and Pujadas 1991; Cruells 1965; Maluquer i Sostres 1963; Pinilla de las Heras 1973; Sol  1981a, 1981b). Researchers' concern about this issue derives from the numeric importance of the waves of immigration which came to Catalonia from other regions of Spain. Besides the issues of immigrants' residential, occupational and social integration, linguistic assimilation and *catalanizaci n* (ideological assimilation) would become an issue of special relevance for Catalan political elites, as I will argue in chapter 4.

However, when the waves of immigration stopped and foreign immigrants started to come in large numbers to Catalonia (and the whole of Spain, as well), researchers' interest moved to the study of this new phenomenon. This dissertation, however, takes into consideration the so-called "old immigration", and looks into the *identificational* changes experienced by these immigrants, and their children.

## **1.5. Theoretical and Methodological Contribution**

### *1.5.1. Theoretical contribution*

This dissertation makes a threefold theoretical contribution. It offers, first, an analytical framework for the study of change in national identification. Secondly, it contributes to the literature which explains change in national identification as an elite-driven process, and it offers an complementary explanation to that of decentralization, which accounts better for short-term changes in national identification. Thirdly, the dissertation tests empirically the effect that the media and the school have upon individuals' national identification and it contrasts the parents and the school influence.

In order to do so, the next chapter of the dissertation conceptualizes individual national identification. The concepts of ethnicity, nationality, as well as identity and identification are often used interchangeably. Conceptual confusion brings analytical confusion and hinders the study of these issues. To solve this problem, this chapter clarifies previous work on the study of ethnic and national identity, and on the study of change in ethnic identity, and provides an alternative and operational definition of change in national identification. Next, the chapter distinguishes among different dimensions in individual identification (content, self-categorization, saliency and intensity) in which change can occur, and it establishes the preconditions of

change; that is, the structural and individual circumstances under which national identification is susceptible to change.

From here, the dissertation focuses on the study of change in the category of national identification in Catalonia. As has already been argued above, Catalonia is an appropriate case study because it gathers some of the preconditions which render change in the category of national identification possible. The analysis of the Catalan case allows me to sustain empirically the main contention of my dissertation, that is, the idea that political parties' activation of the center-periphery cleavage drive change in individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia.

Thus, the dissertation argues that the activation of the national cleavage makes individuals react (cognitively and emotionally) to political elites' messages channeled by the media, and modify their category of national identification accordingly. However, the effect of the political messages coming from the political elites is heterogeneous; those individuals who have a clearly defined national identification will be immune or will see their prior identification reinforced after receiving these messages, while those individuals who hold dual identifications will be more susceptible to change.

This dissertation contributes to the literature which points to political elites as agents shaping national identity, and it offers an complementary explanation to the one offered by Martínez-Herrera (2002, 2005, 2009) and Guibernau (2006, 2007). Unlike their explanation, here it is claimed that political elites' activation of the cleavage alters individuals' prior-identification, which has been mainly forged by their parents' influence.

The argument that the activation of the political cleavage affects individuals' identification accounts better for short-term fluctuations in aggregate national identification, and it provides a better link to relate individual and aggregate changes. When political confrontation along the cleavage rises, individuals react to the messages stem from the media and, in particular, from the Catalan media. As mentioned above, exposure to negative-framed or identity-framed messages made by political elites or party



leaders causes that exclusive identifiers reaffirm their prior-identification and dual identifiers change it. When the changes occurring in one direction exceed the changes occurring in the other direction, then we observe a change in the aggregate levels of identification with Spain and Catalonia.

Chapter five of the dissertation contrasts, for the first time, the influence of two socialization agents: parents and schools. The results of my analysis question a well-established idea of the literature on nationalism. Thus, they suggest that the school influence on national identification is weaker than what classical works on nationalism, as well as recent empirical research (Martinez-Herrera 2002, 2009, Aspachs-Bracons et al 2008a,b) have claimed. In these regard, my results show that the years of schooling do not foster the children of immigrants' *identificational assimilation* when they live in neighborhoods, and attend to schools in which the number of children of immigrants is sufficiently high. They also suggest that immigrant families' economic performance, their residence in neighborhoods in which the percent of immigrants is low to medium and parents' national identification are more important factors affecting individuals' national identification.

#### *1.5.2. Methodological contribution*

This dissertation also aims to make a methodological contribution in studying national identification change. I have already referred in section 1.3.3 to the ways in which I will try to overcome some of the methodological limitations of previous research.

The main contribution of the dissertation, from a methodological point of view, is the use of a combination of cross-sectional series of surveys, along with household and panel data. The combination of these data, and the employment of appropriate quantitative techniques, will allow me to perform all my analysis at the individual level and to adopt a longitudinal

approach. Previous research has very often referred to the occurrence of cohort or generational *identificational* changes, but they have hardly ever estimated its magnitude. Unlike previous research, in chapter 3 I will make use of aggregate change decomposition techniques to separate generational replacement from individual change, and to estimate their magnitudes.

I have summarized above the mechanism that according to Martínez-Herrera (2002, 2005, 2009), connects decentralization with individual change: individuals become progressively more identified with their regions in decentralized contexts due to their interactions with regional institutions, and due to indoctrination by and exposure to the actions of socialization agents (school and mass media) which are the regional governments' responsibility. However, this author's empirical analyses (2005, 2009), rather than carried out at the individual level, are performed at the aggregate level what raises concerns of ecological inference. To avoid this problem, in my dissertation I have carried out different strategies: first, I have made use of hierarchical techniques to test the effect that contextual variables (e.g. confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage) have on individuals' identification; secondly, I have directly tested the effect of indoctrination and exposure to socialization agents (schools and mass media) on individuals; third, I have conducted approximately forty semi-structured interviews to provide evidence of the mechanism linking political elites' activation of the center-periphery cleavage and individual change.

Previous research has also inferred the occurrence of individual changes by showing within-cohort or within-origin group (native, children of mixed couples, or second generation immigrants) change in national identification. Within-cohort change, however, does not provide full evidence of the occurrence of individual change in national identification, since there is always a risk that sampling effects are in place. This dissertation, however, benefits from the use of panel data to show that individuals' national identification does actually change over time.

Also evidence on the occurrence of intergenerational changes has mainly relied on the comparison of unrelated individuals from different cohorts, or on the comparison of immigrants and second generations. Implicitly, this research assumes that the differences observed among the different cohorts, or between immigrants and second generations are reflecting the changes occurring within the family. However, intergenerational changes can only be tested properly by comparing the identification of parents and their offspring. The use of household data will allow me to compare the national identification of native and immigrant parents' and that of their offspring. By making use of household data, I will also be able to take into consideration important variables (such as parents' identification, the neighborhood composition) which have been omitted in previous research, causing an overestimation of the effect of the school on the shaping of individual national identification (Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, Costa-Font and Masella 2008a; Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 2008b).

## **1.6. Research Strategy**

### *1.6.1.A case study analysis*

As I have detailed above, my research focuses on a single case, Catalonia. Case studies have frequently been misjudged in social research. However, dislike of the case study method derives, in many cases, from a misunderstanding of case study goals. Therefore, it is important to emphasize here that the main interest of single case studies in comparative politics is not to produce generalizations about outcomes, but generalizations about causes and mechanisms (Chandra 2006). This means that the specific case from which one wants to draw explanations on the causes of national identification change, must be selected based on this purpose.

In particular, Catalonia must serve for the purpose of shedding light on the causes and mechanisms that explain the occurrence of national identification changes in contexts in which there is a national cleavage, and in migratory contexts. In this regard, possible inferences derived from this research should be restricted to similar kinds of changes (changes in the category of self-identification) and to these two particular contexts.

Gerring (2004) has classified case studies regarding the observed co-variation of the dependent and independent variables in two distinct dimensions (space and time). According to Gerring's typology, my research could be classified as single unit research in which variation within the unit is observed in the dependent variable (change) both at the aggregate and the individual level diachronically. The heterogeneity of the population under consideration (internal heterogeneity) introduces, moreover, synchronically variation in the independent variables.

Additionally, it should be noted that case studies have an advantage over large-n studies, as the former offer "a better opportunity to gain detailed knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation" (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004, 84). In this regard, the in-depth analysis of the available and produced data for Catalonia will allow me to look into two different sources of aggregate change (individual and intergenerational), and to test in multiple ways whether political elites, the school and the media are able to alter individuals' national identification, and counteract, in this way, parents' national socialization.

#### *1.6.2. Operationalization of the dependent variable*

This dissertation endogenizes national identification, as well as change in the category of self-identification. In what follows, I justify the use of a bi-directional indicator of national identification, and I will detail as well how I have operationalized change.

*1.6.2.1. A measurement for national identification*

This dissertation draws on a bidirectional indicator of national identification that asks respondents to report on their identification with two national categories: Spain and Catalonia. The wording of the question is as follows:

“Which of the following phrases would you say best expresses your sentiments?”

The answer makes use of an anchored scale that presents alternative categories of spatial identification in an exclusive (“only Spanish”, “only Catalan”) or inclusive way (“I feel more ... than ...”, “I feel as ... as ...”).

This bidirectional measure was first included in two surveys conducted in 1979 and 1982.<sup>31</sup> It was subsequently used in a series of studies in which individual’s identification with both Spain and the Basque Country or Catalonia was examined (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1986; Linz 1985, 2008; Linz et al. 1981; Linz and Montero 1986). This indicator or its variants has been later applied to other contexts in which individuals ascribe themselves to national and regional territorial spheres (such as Scotland, Quebec, Belgium, Friuli-Venezia Giulia) (Mendelsohn 2002; Moreno 1988; Segatti, Vezzoni, and Guglielmi 2008), and its use was generalized later on to contrast respondents’ national identification and identification with Europe.

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<sup>31</sup> The 1979 survey for Catalonia was designed by Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad, and its results were presented in Gunther, R., Sani, G. and Shabad, G. (1986). *Spain after Franco: the making of competitive party system*. The 1982 survey was designed by Juan Linz and José Ramón Montero, along with Pilar del Castillo, Richard Gunther, Hans-Jurgen Puhle, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad. The survey results were presented in Linz, J.J. and Montero, J.R (eds.) (1986) *Crisis y cambio: electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta*.

The adequacy of this instrument for measuring Spanish and European identification has, however, been questioned by Sinnot (2005) and Ruiz-Jimenez (2007) arguing that the instrument presents problems of validity.<sup>32</sup> Two main answers could be given to the validity criticisms of this instrument: First, as Moreno, Arriba and Serrano (1998, 70) have noticed, the bi-directional indicator was originally conceived to capture ethno-territorial conflict. More specifically, this measure captures the identity (national vs. regional) trade-off that political parties try to create in those places where there is a center-periphery cleavage.

Second, the bi-directional measure does not seem to present the same validity problems enunciated by Sinnot when applied to the Catalan context (Martínez-Herrera 2005, 89-141). Table A.1.1 and Figures A.1.2, A.1.3 and A.1.4 in the appendix show that the national identification measure is strongly associated to other measures capturing individuals' position on the cleavage (i.e. the nationalism scale, and preferences over the institutional organization of the state).<sup>33</sup> In this regard, we can state that the validity of the measurement is, at the very least, optimal.

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<sup>32</sup>Sinnot (2005) has compared this measure with other unidimensional measures which ask respondents about the intensity of their feelings of identification (using a 0 to 10 scale) or, alternatively, a very attached to not at all attached scale. Sinnot's tests show that the unidirectional measure's predictive power is greater than the bidirectional predictive power. Ruiz Jimenez (2007) has based her discussion on the validity of this measurement instrument on the incoherence of the results of two different sources, the Eurobarometer and the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas' surveys. Yet, the author quickly discards the possibility that differences can be due to "house effects", attributable to different sampling designs, for example.

<sup>33</sup> Results in Table A.1 show that those who identify as "only Spanish" or "more Spanish than Catalan" score high in the Catalan identification unidirectional measurement, while the contrary is not true for those who identify as "only Catalan" or "more Catalan than Spanish" when they answer to the Spanish identification unidirectional measurement. In these groups, the levels of identification with Spain are lower.

This bi-directional measure has been periodically included in the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Center of Sociological Research, CIS) surveys since 1984, and it was also included in the 2001/02, 2004 and 2005 waves of the Panel de Desigualtats (PaD), a survey carried out by the Fundació Jaume Bofill in Catalunya between 2001/02 and 2012. As I will detail below, these are the two sources my quantitative analysis relies on.

With slight changes in wording from one survey to another, the question included in the CIS surveys is the same as the original question above: Which of the following phrases would you say best expresses your sentiments? The question included in the first wave of the PaD is posed as follows: “On which point of the following scale, in which 1 means “only Spanish” and 5 means “only Catalan”, would you place yourself?” In the third, and the fourth waves of the PaD the question regarding national identification is worded as follows “of the following words, I would like you to tell me the one you feel most identified with?” However, these minor changes in the wording should not raise major concerns as the answer categories were kept the same over time.

#### *1.6.2.2. Operationalization of national identification change*

The use of the bidirectional measure of national identification provides an advantage in evaluating change in national identification in a context in which there are two competing territorial entities which are presented to individuals’ as nations. While a change from “only Spanish” to “as Spanish as Catalan” is meaningful and clearly interpretable, we cannot be certain about the meaning and interpretation of a change from 3 to 4 or from 4 to 5, for instance, on a 0 to 10 scale of identification with Spain.

Beyond this, it is important to highlight that I am interested in measuring whether individuals experience a change in their subjective attachment toward two possible categories of

identification (Catalonia and Spain), and not in the intensity of this attachment.

The operationalization of these kinds of changes will differ depending on whether we are referring to changes in the aggregate, intergenerational changes or individual changes.

In the aggregate, change is defined as the differences in the percent of individuals who self-identify as “only Spanish”, more Spanish than Catalan”, “as Spanish as Catalan”, “more Catalan than Spanish” or “only Catalan” in  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ . If the samples in  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  are representative of the population, and we discard the possibility that sampling errors occur, aggregate change in national identification must be the result of generational replacement or within-cohort changes. If the span of time between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  is relatively short, then the occurrence of an aggregate change will not be the result of cohort replacement, but individual change.

Intergenerational change has usually been calculated as the differences in the percent of individuals who self-identify as “only Spanish”, more Spanish than Catalan”, “as Spanish as Catalan”, “more Catalan than Spanish” or “only Catalan” between generations. The availability of intergenerational data from the same family allows me to refine the measurement of these kinds of changes. Therefore, in chapter 5, I assume that an intergenerational change has occurred when parents and children differ in their category of self-identification.

Individual change occurs when a person self-identifies as Spanish in  $t_1$ , and he or she identifies as Catalan in  $t_2$ . These kinds of changes are, however, very demanding because they require a psychological (emotional and cognitive) change: the abandonment of a prior category of identification and its substitution for a different category. Thus, this kind of change will not occur suddenly, but as a result of a process of progressive adaptation. Unfortunately, as I lack panel data which follows individuals’ identification over a long period of time, this kind of process has not been tracked. However, in chapter 6, I examine individual change in national identification by looking at individuals’



placement in the “only Spanish” to “only Catalan” scale over a short period of time. Accordingly, in this chapter, I will measure change in individual’s national identification as every change in an individual’s preferred category of identification between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ .

### *1.6.3. Methodology and data*

Case studies have been usually associated with the use of qualitative methodology. However, as Gerring (2004, 343) has argued “one cannot substitute case study for *qualitative*, *ethnographic*, or *process-tracing* without feeling that something has been lost in translation”. In this research, I adopt a pluralistic methodological approach. This position departs from my conviction that the method must serve the research question and not, the other way round. My research will make use of a mixed methodology that will combine quantitative techniques, and qualitative methods. In the empirical chapters, data-set observation, using Brady and Collier’s terminology (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2006; Collier and Brady 2004), will be examined to test the validity of causal relationships (chapters 4, 5 and 6); while qualitative interviews will be carried out to provide these causal hypothesis with a causal path or mechanism and illustrate the change (chapter 7).

In the following sections I provide the reader with a brief overview of the data and the quantitative or qualitative techniques used in the dissertation. However, each chapter includes a section with a detailed account of the data characteristics, and the analytical techniques employed to examine change in its different dimensions.

*1.6.3.1. Data*

This dissertation benefits from two different data sets to carry out the quantitative analysis: a cross-sectional time series of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Center of Sociological Research, CIS), and a household panel with three waves carried out by the Fundació Jaume Bofill.

The CIS time series cross-sectional data covers a period between 1984 and 2010, with sixteen-year points, and information on the national identification choices of 26,266 individuals. Although cross-sectional data on national identification in Catalonia is available from different sources (Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió, Panel de Desigualtats de Catalunya), the data from the CIS is the most adequate for three reasons: the sample sizes, the information that is provided, and the span of time that the data covers.

The “Panel de Desigualtats a Catalunya (PaD), Fundació Jaume Bofill, onades 1 a 4, 2001-2005”, on the other hand, is a pioneer panel study in the Spanish context. The PaD was originally designed with the objective of providing information on the inequalities that are present in Catalonia and generating information on the mechanisms and social processes that produce these inequalities. However, the data also includes information on the national identification of all household members, and other variables of interest. These data are appropriate for dealing with the study of intergenerational changes in national identification within the family and individual change in national identification over time.

The PaD is representative of the population living in Catalonia. The first wave of the PaD (2001/02) provides information on 1991 households and approximately 5,785 individuals. Data is obtained from computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) in the household of the respondents, and using the language (Spanish or Catalan) chosen by the respondent.

*1.6.3.2. Overview of the quantitative methodology*

Although each chapter of the dissertation includes a section with methodological information, I would like to make here an overview of the techniques that will be used over the different chapters. The first empirical chapter of this dissertation (chapter 3) is a descriptive chapter that traces the evolution of national identification over the period between 1984 and 2010. As I mentioned before, the chapter uses decomposition techniques. These techniques serve to reveal which proportion of the overall change is due to individual changes and which proportion is due to generational replacement.

Chapter four takes advantage of the longitudinal character of the CIS time series cross-sectional data to examine whether the adscriptive (individuals' and their parents' origin) and the semi-adscriptive (knowledge of Catalan) components of national identification have changed over time. Empirical analyses will be also used to examine whether individuals' from different origin groups (immigrants, second generations, children of mixed couples, and natives) have become more similar in their *identificational* choices over time.

Taking into account the nominal character of my dependent variable, national identification will be estimated using a multinomial logistic model. Although multinomial logistic estimation is a less efficient estimation method, it is more informative in terms of the impact that the independent variables have on each category of the dependent variable (individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia.) In these analyses the independent variables will be individuals' adscriptive and semi-adscriptive characteristics, a year factor that will serve to estimate time, and cohort and educational control variables.

In chapter four, I also carry out a hierarchical regression analysis to estimate the effect of contextual variables (e.g., Catalan nationalist parties' incentives to activate the cleavage depending on their bargaining power in the Spanish parliament and levels of confrontation between the national and regional elites) in

individual national identification. In order to do so, data will be structured hierarchically with individuals clustered in year-surveys. However, due to the limited number of units I have at the second level (16), here I am forced to estimate the dependent variable as it was a continuous variable. Thus, the lower values of the dependent variable will mean identification with Spain and the higher values will mean identification with Catalonia.

In the fifth and sixth chapters, I make use of the data from the PaD. In chapter fifth, I will examine congruence between parents and children on their national identification feelings, and I will investigate the determinants of individuals' national identification. The descriptive analysis of children and parents' national identification will illustrate the occurrence of intergenerational changes within the family. In addition, I will contrast the influence of the family against the school in individuals' national identification. In these analyses, individuals' national identification will be treated as a nominal variable and it will be estimated with a multinomial logistic regression. Additionally, to control for the dependence of observations due to the presence of siblings within the household, standard errors will be adjusted for household clusters.

The sixth chapter introduces the analysis of individual changes in the short term. So far, the lack of longitudinal panel data on national identification has forced researches to use cross-sectional data to infer changes in age by years (within-cohort changes). This empirical strategy, however, provides imprecise results. In order to overcome this problem, I examine the data from the first, third and fourth waves of the PaD. In the analysis of individual change, I use all the cases for which complete three-wave data is available. A multinomial logistic analysis will allow comparing the proclivity to change of different groups within the Catalan population (natives, second generation, children of mixed marriages and immigrants) controlling for different socio-demographic characteristics. Additionally, I will test the effect that television and party identification have upon the occurrence and the direction of change in individuals' national identification. To

avoid the problem of reverse causation, exposure to Spanish and Catalan TV and party identification will be measured in t-1, that is, before the change occurs. In this chapter, I also discuss very briefly issues related to the measurement error that are an important concern in panel studies.

#### *1.6.3.3. Overview of the qualitative methodology*

As I have previously mentioned, the quantitative analysis will be complemented with a qualitative analysis of a series of semi-structured interviews.

Fieldwork has been carried out in three stages. In the first stage, I interviewed mainly immigrants and second generations. In the second stage, I established a number of 30 interviews and I generated quotas according to different criteria (age, education and individuals and their parents' origin). Each quota was assigned a number of interviews to assure the variability of the population. Since other variables (e.g. individuals' left-right ideology) were considered to be relevant to ensure the Catalan population variability, ad-hoc corrections were introduced in the selection of the individuals who were finally interviewed. In the third stage, interviews were carried out until I reached theoretical saturation. Due to this, the final number of implemented interviews went up to 38.

The qualitative data gathered in the interviews was transcribed and processed. Qualitative materials have been used to exemplify the occurrence of stability and change over time, to provide support to the causal hypothesis of the quantitative analysis, and to illustrate the mechanism behind short-term individual change in national identification.

### **1.7. A macro to micro analysis of change**

Individual and aggregate changes are intrinsically related. Changes in the aggregate can occur through two kinds of social processes: changes in the composition of the population and individual changes. Unless a population shock (e.g., a war or an epidemic) takes place, or the arrival of immigrants rises significantly within a few years, changes in the composition of the population usually occur very slowly and through a process of generational replacement. Still, it is usually stated that these changes have a high impact on the configuration of the aggregate, as younger generations, who have gone through different socialization experiences, hold beliefs, attitudes and opinions that differ from those of older generations.


Individual changes can imply a temporary alteration of individual's prior opinions, or they can have effects that are permanent in time; so that once that they have occurred, individuals do not change their beliefs, attitudes and opinions again (see figure 1.2 below).

Neither of these individual changes will have important consequences on the aggregate unless two conditions are fulfilled together: first, the number of individuals who change their national identification is numerically important and second, all changes occur in the same direction or the changes that occur in one direction exceed the changes in the other direction. If many individuals change their category of identification at the same time, but change occurs in opposite directions, then the effect of the changes cancels out. However unlikely it may be, the occurrence of contextual changes might facilitate that these two conditions are fulfilled simultaneously.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Other processes of individual change that are associated with time, are life-course or time-variant processes. These kinds of changes are the result of age effects (i.e., individuals' propensity to become more conservative as they get older). Immigrants' assimilation can also be seen as a life-course change.

Figure 1.2. *Permanent and temporal changes in individuals A and B.*



Note: Here the continuous line represents individuals' opinion regarding a particular issue. Individual A has a more positive position regarding this issue, and individual B has a more negative position. Individuals A and B change their opinion at time  $t$ , allegedly due to an external change which impacts their prior opinion. While at time  $t+1$ , A turns to its original opinion, B's opinion has changed permanently and now he clearly holds a negative position regarding the issue. In between, an election occurs. If the issue is relevant for electoral competition, the aggregate individual change of opinion of A plus B might have impacted the result of the election.

Aggregate changes in identification with Spain and Catalonia can be the result of a combination of individual changes and generational replacement processes caused by the substitution of old cohorts (which came of age during Franco's regime) with new cohorts (which came of age in a democratic regime). Individuals can potentially change their category of identification in a temporal or permanent manner. Here, contextual changes and events can be seen as the trigger of individual changes in national identification. However, these triggers are not expected to have a similar impact on every individual; the effect is expected to vary

because of the heterogeneity of the Catalan population.<sup>35</sup> As a consequence, these kinds of individual changes can be cancelled out in the aggregate. Change can also occur gradually, as the result of individuals' process of assimilation or accommodation to a new context in which both Spain and Catalonia are available categories of identification.

Therefore, my work seeks to make a systematic and rigorous analysis of change in these dimensions. In the long run, this thesis examines the evolution of national allegiances making use of time series cross-sectional data organized hierarchically (chapters 3 and 4). It also compares the national identification of parents and children using a household survey (chapter 5). In the short term, the dissertation examines the evolution of individual identification through the exploitation of data from a panel study (chapter 6). In short, this dissertation examines change at the aggregate and the individual level, over long and short periods of time, over individuals' lives and between different generations of the same family. In order to do this, in the empirical chapters of the dissertation I follow a two-step research strategy; I first examine change descriptively, and then I run multivariate analyses.

On the whole, the analyses carried out in chapters three to six are expected to provide the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the occurrence of aggregate and individual changes in national identification.

## **1.8. Plan of the dissertation**

Aside from this introductory chapter, this dissertation consists of seven chapters: a theoretical chapter, five empirical chapters, and the conclusions.

Chapter 2 is the theoretical chapter of the dissertation. This chapter has a threefold purpose: to conceptualize change in national identification; to review the existing literature on identity

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<sup>35</sup> This will be discussed more deeply in chapters 4, 6 and 7.



change; and to offer an analytical framework that facilitates the study of change in national identification. The chapter discusses previous definitions of ethnicity, nationality, identity and identification, and it proposes an operational definition of individual national identification. This definition emphasizes the subjectivity of individual attachment to the nation, and highlights its differences with the concept of ethnic identification.

After offering a definition of individual national identification, the chapter argues that research dealing with the study of change in national identification should distinguish among four kinds of changes: changes in the category of self-identification, changes in the meanings individuals attribute to their national identification, changes in the salience of national identification, and finally changes in the strength of their attachment to the nation.

After this, the chapter reflects on the different circumstances that facilitate the occurrence of change. Two types of conditions are envisaged here: structural and individual ones. In the first case, change is made possible by the occurrence of contextual changes that imply either a redefinition of the national boundaries or a change in the nation's symbolic referents. Colonization (or decolonization), secession (or unification of countries) and regime changes are presented as examples of these kinds of structural changes. Change in national identification can also be motivated by the existence of a repertoire of objects of identification, as happens in multinational countries, or by individuals' participation or witnessing of certain events (wars, catastrophes, terrorist attacks, etc.). Among the individual circumstances that facilitate the occurrence of changes in individuals' identification, immigration and conscription are examined.

All in all, this chapter seeks to offer an analytical framework that contributes to improving our understanding of change in individual national identification, and to help researchers to examine the causes of change. Case studies and historical examples illustrate the chapter's argument, thereby enriching the analytical framework.

As I have said previously, this dissertation focuses on the study of change in the category of national identification in Spain's autonomous region of Catalonia. The empirical part of the dissertation consists of four quantitative chapters and a qualitative chapter that examine change in all the aforementioned dimensions.

The first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) tracks the evolution of aggregate identification with Spain and Catalonia over the past thirty years. The chapter draws on in-depth analysis of the CIS series of surveys that cover the period between 1984 and 2010. The results of the decomposition techniques analyses I carry out show that the decrease in the percent of individuals who self-identify as primarily Spanish in the overall population is the joint result of the generational replacement of the older cohort, and a compensation effect of period changes. This causes the overall decrease in the period under consideration to be lower than previous works have suggested (Martínez-Herrera 2002).

After conducting this descriptive analysis of the changes occurred in the aggregate, the following chapters carry out individual-level analysis. In Chapter 4, I try to account for the patterns observed in the evolution of national identification, as well as for fluctuations. The chapter examines the evolution of national identification of the different origin groups (immigrants, second generations, children of mixed couples and natives), and it checks whether the differences between these groups have decreased over time.

Furthermore, this chapter offers an explanation of period changes in the aggregate levels of national identification and it draws attention to other institutional factors (i.e., Catalan nationalist parties' incentives to activate the cleavage depending on their bargaining power in the Spanish parliament, and levels of confrontation between the national and regional elites) that have not yet been empirically examined. The chapter suggests that when the center-periphery cleavage becomes highly salient, individuals react to these contextual changes and, accordingly, changes in national identification are observed. Ultimately, and as has been already noted, this chapter seeks to contribute to the

literature which explains aggregate changes in national identification as an elite-driven outcome and it tries to improve our understanding of fluctuations in national identification.

The next chapter, chapter 5, focuses on the study of intergenerational changes within the family. The chapter analyzes variation in parents' national identification (which is partly due to the heterogeneous origin of the Catalan population). It also contrasts the effect of both parents and school in crafting individual national identification. The results, which draw on analysis of the *Fundació Jaume Bofill* household data, suggest that although years of schooling can increase the chances that children of immigrants develop a bi-national identification, parents' attachment to Catalonia is the key element fostering a Catalan oriented identification. The results also suggest that both immigrant families' economic progress and immigrant families' self-selection into neighborhoods in which the share of immigrants is low to medium are decisive elements in fostering children of immigrants' identification with Catalonia. Qualitative data is also used to show that native parents sometimes select the school they want to send their children according to the presence of Catalan in school.

Chapter 6 addresses the study of stability and change in individual national identification using individual panel data from the *Fundació Jaume Bofill*. Data covers a highly contested period of time, which started with the *Partido Popular's* absolute majority in the Spanish Parliament and extended over the reform of Catalonia's Statute of Autonomy. The chapter hypothesizes that the activation of the national cleavage channeled by national and regional television broadcasters led those who self-identified as both Spanish and Catalan in  $t_1$  to redefine their identification in  $t_2$ . The chapter also tests an alternative explanation, according to which, when partisan debate on an issue becomes salient, party identification influences individuals' stands on this issue and, by extension, attitudes toward other related issues (or identifications). The logistic analyses show that Catalan television has a significant leverage on those individuals who self-identified as Spanish and

Catalan in  $t_1$ . Conversely, the analyses indicate that the influence of Spanish television is absent. The results give limited support to the alternative explanation. Party identification does not appear to function as a cue orienting individuals' identification when partisan debate centers on cleavage-related issues.

Chapter 7 is the qualitative chapter. It aims at providing a general picture of the phenomenon I have dealt with in the previous chapters: change in the category of national identification. The chapter makes use of the materials gathered in thirty-eight qualitative interviews with three main objectives: to illustrate the occurrence of change (and stability) in individuals' national identification, to provide support to some of the causal hypothesis presented in previous chapters, and to illustrate the mechanism which links political elites' activation of the national cleavage and individual change in national identification.

The last chapter of the dissertation (Chapter 8) is devoted to summarizing the main findings of the dissertation and highlighting the dissertation's main contributions. The chapter also discusses some of the limitations of the research and stresses how the research could be pushed forward.



## **CHAPTER 2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF CHANGE IN NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION**

### **2.1. Introduction**

This chapter has two goals. First, it seeks to conceptualize the object of study of this dissertation (national identification). Secondly, it provides an analytical framework for studying change in national identification comparatively. Precisely for this reason, in this chapter I move away from the Catalan case and I bring in other examples that illustrate the chapter's argument, thereby enriching it.

The departure point of this chapter is the recognition that we lack an appropriate framework for dealing with the study of change in national identification. Despite a broad number of works have dealt obliquely with the object of study of this dissertation, no previous work has taken seriously, nor systematically, its study. This deficiency is both a shortcoming, and a challenge. It is a shortcoming because I lack a theory that helps me to advance the study of the causes of change. But, it is also a worthy challenge because it forces me to dive into many fields of study and different areas of research to incorporate their many insights. The result of this exploration is a new framework of analysis that separates the different dimensions along which change can occur and identifies the pre-conditions for it to happen.

The proposed framework of study departs from the study of collective identities, and focuses instead on the individual. This focus on the individual separates my work from that of Abdelal et al. (2006; 2009). Actually, Abdelal et al. (2009, 30) have explicitly stated their interest in studying inter-subjectively shaped collective identities, rather than subjectively shaped individual identification, which they consider to be an object of study more suitable for social psychology. Whether this is an object of study of social psychology or not is possibly a matter of how rigid we want to make the contours of the different disciplines that conform the social sciences. I, myself, consider that the important consequences that individual national identification has on understanding individuals' political and social attitudes and behavior (preferences regarding redistribution and self-government, attitudes towards immigration, vote choices, etc.) make the case for studying this issue from a political and sociological approach, and not only from a psychological approach. Additionally, as will be shown in this dissertation, both the pre-conditions and the causes of change in individual national identification are mainly related to political and social phenomena.

Besides this introduction, this chapter consists of five more sections. In the second section, I start reviewing a multi-disciplinary literature that has dealt with concepts as complex as ethnicity and nationality, identity and identification, and ethnic and national identity. I justify my focus on individuals' identification for practical reasons: identification is a more tractable concept than identity. However, despite its greater intuitiveness, the concept of identification still presents a high level of complexity. To reduce this complexity, I distinguish between four different dimensions: self-categorization, content, saliency and intensity.

In that section, I also emphasize the importance of analytically separating national from ethnic identification. Different reasons explain this decision. First, the two objects of identification, the nation and the *ethnie*, have a different nature, and are only rarely concurrent. Secondly, the possibilities of change are constrained

by inheritance in the case of ethnicity, while such a constraint is not necessarily present in the case of nationality. Third, many of the preconditions that eventually facilitate the occurrence of change in national identification cannot be considered preconditions for the occurrence of change in ethnic identification.

In the third section I review different works that have previously dealt with the study of identity change. I also contend that researchers dealing with the study of change in national identification should examine separately four different kinds of changes: changes in individuals' category of self-identification, changes in the meanings individuals' attribute to their national identification, changes in saliency and changes in intensity.

From here, I reflect on the pre-conditions of change. Two types of conditions are identified: structural and individual. In the first case, I argue that the existence of a *repertoire of nations* with which individuals can potentially identify (i.e. multinational countries), the *redefinition of the national boundaries* due to processes of colonization (or decolonization), secession (or unification of countries), wars, and *deep institutional-political changes*, such as regime changes, facilitate the occurrence of change in national identification. Among the individual circumstances that facilitate the occurrence of changes, I will refer to immigration and conscription.

Before concluding, in the fifth section, I delimit the domains of analysis of my work. My dissertation focuses on the study of change in the category of national identification. It examines such changes in a context in which there is a *repertoire of nations* with which individuals can potentially identify, and in which massive immigration makes the observance of changes in the category of identification more probable. My work, therefore, leaves aside the study of changes in the category of identification caused by redefinitions of national boundaries, as well as the study of change in other dimensions.

Section five concludes.



## **2.2. From ethnicity to national identification**

This section reviews a multidisciplinary literature that has tried to make sense of concepts such as ethnicity, identity, and ethnic and national identity. The goal of the following pages is to make clear where this dissertation stands in regard to this literature, and to delimit the object of study of this dissertation: individuals' identification with the nation.

### *2.2.1. Ethnicity and ethnic identity*

As the issue of ethnicity and the issue of ethnic identity have gained ground in comparative politics and international relations, the need for a better understanding and measurement of the concepts has become evident. Yet, the attempt to offer a definition of the two concepts has been confronted with two major problems: the confusion of ethnicity and ethnic identity concepts, and the elusive character of the identity concept. These two problems explain why scholars have failed to accurately link ethnicity with individuals' subjective identity.

Despite this failure, some advances have been made. For example, the contours of ethnicity have been clearly depicted in Chandra's (2006) work.<sup>1</sup> According to this author, ethnicity is a category of membership into which individuals are eligible to belong on the basis of descent-based attributes such as language, origin, religion or skin color (Chandra 2006). According to this

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<sup>1</sup> Here, it is worth noting that Chandra's work originally sought to disentangle what ethnic identity is. Nevertheless, her definition of ethnic identity, a category of membership into which individuals are eligible to belong on the basis of descent-based attributes, suits the concept of ethnicity better. Laitin (1998) and Abdelal et al. (2006) also define social identities as social categories. Making identity equivalent to social categories of membership confuses the outcome of the identification process (identity) with the object of identification (ethnicity, nationality, gender, religion).

definition, ethnicity is an externally assigned, objective characteristic.

Yet, while ethnicity can be placed in the objective realm, (ethnic) identity moves us towards the subjective realm. Two additional reasons explain the necessity to analytically separate ethnicity from ethnic identity. First, although every individual has an ethnicity, it is not always the case that individuals have an ethnic identity, at least theoretically speaking. This is so because the ethnic categories into which individuals are eligible for membership do not automatically match with the social categories individuals identify with. In other words, individuals' self-image and self-understanding can be based on their gender, class or ideological characteristics, and not necessarily on their ethnic characteristics. This implies that even though individuals are very often ethnically categorized by others, they might refuse to self-identify in the way others categorize them. This has been extensively documented, for example, in the case of "black" and "dark" skin second generation Puerto Ricans who self-identify as Puerto Ricans, but reject being classified in the conventional US white-black dichotomy in order to escape its negative social connotations (Duany 2002; Landale and Oropesa 2002; Loveman and Muniz 2007; Rodríguez 1994, 2000).

Secondly, the descent-based condition that Chandra imposes on the definition of ethnicity constrains the possibility that individuals' experience identity changes.<sup>2</sup> Following Chandra and Laitin's (2002) logic, a change in individual's ethnic identity would be restricted to those circumstances in which an individual changes his or her category of ethnic self-description, activating a different attribute of his or her repertoire of inherited ethnic attributes. For example, the daughter of a Peruvian mother and a French-speaking Swiss father, who is bilingual in both Spanish and French, and who has been raised Catholic could potentially

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<sup>2</sup> The descent-based condition implies that individuals possess certain attributes that have been inherited from their parents. According to this, individuals can only identify on the basis of those inherited attributes.

identify as Swiss, Peruvian, Spanish-speaking, French-speaking or Catholic. Now, if this woman converts to Evangelism, according to Chandra and Laitin, her change would not qualify as an ethnic identity change because this is not an ethnic attribute inherited from their parents. This approach, therefore, ignores the possibility that this woman's new confession can turn out to be an important part of her life and a key element of her self-image or self-understanding.

At this point, Chandra and Laitins's (2002) understanding of ethnic identity change enters into conflict with the concept of individual identity. In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that while one's switching to another language or one's conversion to a different religion might not alter individuals' ethnicity, his or her self-identification is most likely to be changed on account of this process. Bearing all this in mind, I contend that an individual's voluntary acquisition of an ethnic attribute should qualify as an identity change whenever this individual identifies him or herself with this new ethnic attribute.

#### *2.2.2. Identification along ethnic/national lines must not be taken for granted*

Once we have recognized that individuals' ethnicity should not be confused with individuals' identity, then we have necessarily to state that individuals' identification with their putative ethnicity needs to be proven, instead of taken for granted (Wimmer 2007). Nevertheless, when researchers deal with these issues, they very often forget to make this clear.

For example, ethnic fractionalization databases (Alesina et al. 2003; Fearon 2003) or ethnic group datasets, such as Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009), assume that individuals, on the basis of their ethnic attributes, are embedded in ethnic groups which are internally homogenous and externally bounded. In so doing, these studies assume that individuals' ethnicity and identity are strongly connected; so those

individuals who share certain ethnic characteristics will mobilize for the group interest. This practice, which Brubaker (2002, 2009) defines as *groupism*, relies heavily on the idea that those individuals who possess certain (ethnic) attributes are members of a specific group, identify with other members and share similar interests with them. Nevertheless, social researchers' tendency to classify individuals in groups on the basis of their characteristics can turn out to be an ill-suited practice, one that can cause researchers to mix up the micro-mechanisms that underlie social action.

The assumption that ethnicity/nationality and individuals' identity are equivalent is also a frequent problem in many studies of nationalism.<sup>3</sup> Many of these studies restrict the analysis of individuals' identity to the ethnic/national categories. In doing so, they overlook the fact that ethnic/national identities are not necessarily central, nor salient to all individuals, and that individuals might prefer to identify with other social categories (gender, class), rather than with ethnic or national categories.<sup>4</sup> Certainly, the pervasive presence of banal nationalism in our lives, along with certain individual and contextual circumstances that I will describe in section 2.4, make the national category of identification salient for many individuals. However, scholars working on these issues should be aware that even though the context can contribute to make particular forms of identification (ethnicity or nationality) salient, individuals can still escape from them.<sup>5,6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Some works, such as Kuo and Margalit (2010) and Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010), have avoided binding individuals' identity to the limits of nationality and ethnicity. This approach is, however, quite exceptional.

<sup>4</sup> See note 5 in chapter 1.

<sup>5</sup> This assertion conflicts with the commonplace belief that the nation is self-sufficient and relevant to all dimensions of life (Smith 1979).

<sup>6</sup> Here it is worth making clear that my dissertation examines change in the national identification of those individuals who declare they have a national identification. Therefore, it leaves aside the study of those

### 2.2.3. *Identity and identification*

The study of identity was introduced in the social sciences by Cooley and Mead's work on symbolic interactionism, and evolved towards identity theory (Stryker 1980; Stryker and Serpe 1987), social identity theory (SIT) and self-categorization theory (SCT) (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987). SIT moved the study of identity from its personal to its social dimension. Social identities were defined as categorizations of the self that minimize the uniqueness character of the self and emphasize sameness with others (Brewer 1991, 476). Individuals come to identify with others through a process of categorization, which is at the base of the emergence of groups.

Growing interest in the consequences of social of identity explain scholars' greater efforts in bounding the concept of identity.<sup>7</sup> However, despite these efforts, the concept of individual identity continues to be an *irreducible* concept with little

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individuals who, not having a national identification, come to identify themselves along national lines (formation of a national identity). As readers will notice, in the quantitative chapters, I have excluded from the analysis those individuals who do not know how to answer the identification items. I have assumed that these individuals are, precisely, those who do not possess a national identification or for whom this form of identification is not salient. Alternatively, they can also be individuals who have not reflected enough about their national identification and, consequently, do not have an answer for such kind of survey items "at the top of their heads". This would imply that for these individuals their national identification is neither central, nor salient. In chapter 7, I also devote a section to show that in a context such as Catalonia, in which the national cleavage is highly salient, and individuals' national identification is politically relevant, there are still people who reject thinking about themselves in national terms.

<sup>7</sup> Abdelal et al. (2006) have proposed examining social identity from two elements: content, which refers to the group's identity meanings, and contestation, which refers to the degree of agreement within a group over the content of the identity. Abdelal et al (2006) refer, however, to collective, rather than individual identities.

*analytical* leverage (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Hall 2000). Admitting this problem, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) suggest moving our attention from individuals' identity to individuals' identification.

Identity and identification are distinct but related concepts. While identification does not necessarily presume identity, identity cannot be detached from identification. At this point, it might be useful to consider here the distinction between identifying *with* (affect) and identifying *as* (self-categorization) (Citrin and Sears 2009; Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001). Identifying *with* a group implies that the individual empathizes with the group, with its symbols, values, worldviews and interests. "Identification *with*" a group can occur without the individual identifying *as* member of a group. The contrary can also hold, although much more exceptionally.

Individuals who identify *with* a group can eventually come to identify *as* members of the group. This occurs, for instance, when immigrants' assimilate into the host society. The last step of the assimilation process would imply that immigrants do not only identify with the values, the worldviews or interest of natives, but that they self-categorize themselves *as* members of the host group.

The concept of identification has two important advantages over the concept of identity: first, identification can be operationalized more easily.<sup>8</sup> Secondly, it does not presuppose individual sameness with others (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 14). The fact that identification does not presuppose individuals' sameness derives from the fact that individuals can identify *with* groups to which they might not belong on the basis of objective

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<sup>8</sup> Identification is found at a more superficial layer of the individual, and does not require the introspective analysis of the self that the study of identity would require. The identity concept falls into Blalock's (1990) category of concepts by postulation, that is, primitive and undefined constructs whose meaning can only be deductively understood. Identification, on the contrary, can be considered as a concept by intuition.

relevant characteristics.<sup>9</sup> Actually, identification can occur even in circumstances in which the degree of similarity between an individual and the others is minimal (Brewer 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1979). This is so because similarity is not necessarily defined in objective but rather subjective terms. Ultimately, the necessary condition for identification is not sameness, but psychological attachment (Hyman and Singer 1968).

Bearing all this in mind, identification is defined here as the outcome of a cognitive (evaluative and affective) process through which an individual subjectively attaches him or herself to a group.

#### *2.2.4. Dimensions of individuals' group identification*

Roccas et al. (2008) have recently tried to unify different theoretical perspectives (social identity, individualism-collectivism, nationalism-patriotism and identification with organizations) in order to build a unifying model of identification with groups. According to these authors, identification consists of four elements: first, the importance individuals' attach to the group, that is, how much an individual sees the group as part of his or her self-concept; second, the commitment an individual develops towards the group or how much he or she wants to benefit members of the group; third, the superiority with which an individual sees his or her group; and fourth, the deference an individual feels towards the symbols and leaders of the group.

However, to my understanding, when speaking of different modes of identification, Roccas et al. (2008) are mixing up the

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<sup>9</sup> Making use of survey data from the American National Election Study, Koch (1993) has shown that identification with the elderly or the poor occurs even when individuals do not qualify to be considered as elderly or their income exceeds that of individuals who can be objectively considered as poor. What it is more important here is that, in these cases, individuals share preferences with the people they identify with.

identifying process (how much I see my group as part of who I am), with the consequences that derive from this identifying process (how much I want to benefit my group, how much I see my group as superior to others, how much I honor, revere, and submit to the group's norms, symbols, and leaders), and they are leaving aside other dimensions of the identification process.

Alternatively, I propose that identification should be examined in four different dimensions: self-categorization, content, saliency and intensity.

*Self-categorization* is the basis of individuals' self-concept, self-image or self-understanding and can be considered a prerequisite of individuals' identification *as* member of a group (Brewer 1991; Turner et al. 1987). Yet, as stated above, here I do not assume individuals' identifying *as* member of a group necessarily implies sameness, but rather psychological attachment. As Citrin, Wong and Duff (2001) have noted, individuals' self-categorization as member of a group needs to be affirmed by others' identification. This, for example, affects immigrants' assimilation. When immigrants' are not recognized as members of a society, it is hard to believe that they will still self-categorize as members of this society.

*Content* refers to the cognitive meanings an individual attributes to being a member of a group (Huddy 2001). These meanings are very often constrained by the collective meanings of the group identity: the membership criteria, the group symbols, or the values, interests and aspirations of the group. Although individuals might share these meanings with other members of the group, some degree of contestation often surrounds them (Abdelal et al. 2006). This has been highlighted, for example, in the work of Citrin, Wong, and Duff (2001), which reflects differences in the collective representations of the American national identity among individuals of different ethnic backgrounds.

*Saliency* refers to the importance that an individual's identification as member of a group has in comparison to his/her identification as member of another group. Saliency involves a rank-ordering of individuals' identifications (Stryker 1968;



Stryker and Serpe 1994). The higher an identification is in this hierarchy, the greater its salience. When an identity is highly salient, it becomes the basis for individual behavior and, it very often informs individuals' attitudes and/or stances regarding particular issues.

The last dimension of identification, *intensity*, refers to the strength of individuals' attachment to a category of identification (Citrin and Sears 2009). Although saliency and intensity are empirically related, they are analytically distinct. In this regard, we can anticipate here that even though individuals' group identification can become stronger (or weaker) in certain moments, saliency is not necessarily affected. I will come back to this point later on when I examine change in these dimensions.

As it will be made clear in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, distinguishing these dimensions makes less complex the systematic study of the pre-conditions and the causes of change in national identification.

*Table 2.1. Dimensions of identification*

|                     |  |
|---------------------|--|
| Self-categorization | Do I see myself as member of X group?  |
| Content             | What meanings do I attribute to my being member of X group?                                    |
| Saliency            | How important is me identifying as member of X group over me identifying as member of Y group? |
| Intensity           | How strong is my attachment to the group?  |

Source: Own elaboration.

#### *2.2.5. National and ethnic identification*

In this section, I conceptualize the object of study of this dissertation (national identification), and I distinguish it from ethnic identification. However, in order to clarify what I

understand by identification with the nation, it is necessary to first define the concept of nation.

Nations have been defined as human populations (Smith 1991), communities (Anderson 1983) or groups of people (Hobsbawm 1991) made up by individuals, who share certain relevant characteristics, who self-categorize and self-identify as members of a group, and who are categorized and identified as members of this group by others. According to this definition, nations present three basic characteristics: first, nations have a collective character; second, nations' existence is contingent on individuals' *voluntary* self-categorization and *voluntary* self-identification as members of a group (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1991);<sup>10</sup> and third, its constituent elements (people) share certain relevant characteristics. These relevant characteristics, which are the criteria for membership into the national group, are very often disputed.<sup>11</sup>

All modern states have established boundaries to delimit the acquisition of citizenship (nationality) through the *jus sanguinis* and the *jus soli* rules. Nationalists (and scholars of nationalism, as well) very often set the limits of national membership on certain ethnic characteristics. In general, these rules or characteristics

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<sup>10</sup> Based on this perspective, a nation exists as long as an aggregate of individuals *feel* a particular nation as real. Out-group members' recognition of a nation's existence is not a requisite for the nation to exist, although this external recognition legitimizes it.

<sup>11</sup> Here I purposely avoid resorting to the ethnic/civic dichotomy of nationalism coined by Kohn (1944) to define nations' criteria of membership. This dichotomy has been criticized for being a problematic typological distinction for social-scientific analysis (Miley 2007). Moreover, it is difficult to find such distinction in practice. Nationalist discourses, for example, very often make use of a combination of civic and achieved traits and ethnic or ascribed traits to define national membership (Serrano 1998). Also, Bonet (2011) has compared citizens' views of the nation in twenty-two countries and has found that civic traits are at the base of collective national representations in all countries, while ethnic traits are the items that differentiate these representations among the different countries.

discriminate among individuals and determine who is member of a given nation and who is not.

Certainly, the boundaries that separate ethnic and national groups are blurred, and in many circumstances overlap. In the United States, for example, the original nationalities of first generation immigrants (Mexican, Puerto Rican, Irish, Italian, etc.) become ethnic categories that are passed on to the following generations, and eventually transform into symbolic ethnicities (Gans 1994). However, nationality and ethnicity are seldom concurrent, as most nations are ethnically heterogeneous (i.e., nations with indigenous populations or ethnic minorities) and individuals from different nations very often share ethnic attributes, such as language or skin color.

However, nations present two additional characteristics that distinguish them from other social groups, in general, and from ethnic groups, in particular. These two characteristics are nations' territorial character and their political nature (Breuilly 1982; Etherington 2010; Gellner 1983; Herb 1999; Hobsbawm 1991).<sup>12</sup> These two elements, which also define individuals' cognitive attachment to the nation, are not present when individuals self-categorize as members of an ethnic group. Thus, members of ethnic groups are, on the one hand, linked to each other in the absence of a shared territory and, on the other hand, do not seek to achieve self-government, but most often other specific goals such as voting rights or affirmative action policies (Richmond 1987, 4-5).

Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov (2004) and Brubaker (2009) have recently argued in favor of an integrated approach to study race, ethnicity and nationalism. Brubaker (2009, 24) provides the rationality for this argument: these categories of identification can be all considered "idioms of cultural understanding, modes of social organization, and patterns of political claims making".

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<sup>12</sup> Both elements are, moreover, closely related, as nations aspire to achieve self-government for their territory (Barrington 1997; Kaplan and Herb 1999).

Despite this, the authors have also acknowledged that these categories should be treated as differentiated domains in a series of dimensions (including “criteria of membership”), to which I will add “change”. And this is so because, as I will show below, many of the causes that trigger change in national identification cannot be considered causes of change in ethnic identification.

Therefore, for the analytical purposes of this dissertation, nations can also be defined as categories of identification that are intuitive to individuals, pervasive in their lives, and exogenous to them.<sup>13</sup> And, national identification would be defined, therefore, as individuals’ subjective attachment to a nation.

From a very early age, individuals learn the idea that the world is organized into a system of countries and that every individual is member of a specific nation (Hess and Torney 1967, 36). As happens with values and symbolic attitudes, parents shape their children’s national identification through classical conditioning. The state, through the school curricula, provides cognitive content to individuals’ national allegiances.<sup>14</sup> In the early years of schooling, children learn to categorize themselves and others as members of different countries; they internalize their national affiliation and come to identify as members of a nation. Beyond this, national allegiances are continuously stirred up by both *hot* and *banal* expressions of nationalism that are channeled through the media (Billig 1995). The outcome of this socialization process is individuals’ self-categorization as members of a nation and their identification with it.

Now, here it is worth highlighting that individuals’ subjective self-categorization and identification as member of a nation can

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<sup>13</sup> Of course, as I will argue below, it is possible that, over their lives, individuals witness institutional changes or a redefinition of the nation’s boundaries, which, for example, result in a change in the meanings of the nation. Still, ordinary citizens very rarely participate in the redefinition of the nation’s symbols and values. Instead, elites take on a more active role in the reformulation of the nation’s meanings.

<sup>14</sup> Chapter 5 compares the influence that parents and school have on individuals’ national identification.

conflict with the state's definition of membership. This conflict derives from the fact that state and national boundaries are not always concurrent. Thus, where the limits of the state concur with the limits of the nation, state membership and national identification are observationally equivalent. However, such concurrence is hardly ever achieved; partly due to the fact that the processes of state-building and nation-building have been distinct historical processes, and partly due to the fact that state-led processes of nation-building have very often failed (Linz 2008, b). In multinational countries, or in countries where the center-periphery cleavage is highly salient, state membership and national identification do not necessarily overlap. As a result, even though an individual is assigned a particular citizenship in official registers (e.g., as a Canadian, Spanish or Belgian), he or she can identify as a member of a different nation (e.g., Quebec, Catalonia, the Basque Country or Flanders).

Apart from these circumstances, state membership and national identification can come into conflict in circumstances of migration. For example, before 1999, second and third generation immigrants in Germany were denied German citizenship because the German legislation on citizenship was based on ethnic criteria (the *jus sanguinis* rule). This implied that second generations, who had been born in Germany and who very possibly identified to some extent as Germans, were denied "membership" in the German nation. In contrast, it is also possible that Pakistani or Nigerian immigrants, who have applied and obtained Spanish citizenship to improve their legal status and avoid legal problems, do not necessarily identify as Spanish.

In these two circumstances, that is, in multinational countries and in migratory circumstances, state membership and national identification do not necessarily match. And this is so, because even though states define membership objectively, individuals' national identification is placed in the sphere of the subjective. In these circumstances, national identification becomes, therefore, a matter of choice.

### **2.3. Change in national identification**

In this section, I review of some of the literature that has dealt with the study of identity change. The purpose of this review, which is necessarily selective, is to illustrate that this literature has dealt with different dimensions of change (even though they have not explicitly stated it). From here, I will argue that the study of change in national identification should distinguish among four distinct dimensions: self-categorization, content, saliency and intensity.

#### *2.3.1. Identity change in previous research*

The study of identity change has been approached from different fields of study: social psychology, political science and sociology. In the social psychology field, *social identity theory* (SIT) associates changes in group identification to the status of the group and, in particular, to its perceived fairness. According to SIT, identity change takes place in two ways: as a change in social mobility (individuals “psychologically passing from one group to another”) or as a result of social change (“psychologically changing in the evaluation of group-membership”) (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995, 260). Change, in this case, is motivated by individuals’ preference to identify as members of high-status groups, rather than members of low-status groups. Social mobility occurs when individuals who are members of a legitimate and stable low-status group, attempt to gain psychological entry to high-status groups. Social change, on the contrary, occurs when the group members consider the group to be in an unfair and unstable low-status position, and the group rebels against this situation, demanding a greater status for the group. While social mobility is presented as an individual change in the category of self-identification, social change can be considered a change in the collective meanings of the group (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1986).

Still in the field of social psychology, *identity theory* has focused on the study of role identity change and it has adopted a conservative position regarding the likelihood of this kind of changes occurring. Serpe (1987), for example, has contended that salient identities transcend situations and are, therefore, very stable. Changes in the saliency of role identities would, however, be possible, but only as a result of life course changes (maternity and paternity, for example) (Wells and Stryker 1988). Nevertheless, *identity theory* has not only looked at changes in the salience of role identities, but also at changes in their meanings (Burke 2006). These kinds of changes take place under two circumstances: First, when there are discrepancies between the meanings of the identity and the meanings of the role performance; and secondly, when role identities enter into conflict. Thus, Burke (2006) has shown that when men and women become parents they adapt their gender identities to their father and mother identities, so that men become more masculine and women more feminine as a result of parenthood. In addition, when the meanings of a woman's gender and wife identities conflict, these two identities accommodate each other until discrepancy is reduced. This, for example, would occur when an independent woman marries and allows her husband to take the lead (Burke 2006, 84-85).

Outside of the social psychology field, political scientists have come to agree that identities are not as stable as they were once thought to be. Actually, some representatives of the *constructivist* approach have even argued that identity change is the result of a conscious decision motivated by the expected benefits of the change (Chandra 2004; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Kalyvas 2008; Laitin 1998).

Laitin's research, for example, has provided an explanation of the processes of change in language use among the Russian speaking populations in Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. At the individual level, change is presented as the result of a rational calculus. This calculus would be based on the expected economic returns that are associated with the language change (the

expected benefits of adding a language to the child's repertoire subtracted from the opportunity cost of learning it), the in-group scorn or punishment, the out-group acceptance and the credible threat of the titular group to drop using Russian (Laitin 1998, 56).

The idea that identity change is a process in which individuals redefine rationally their ethnic categories of belonging is also present in Chandra (2004). Chandra's (2004) work, for example, has shown that in patronage democracies, individuals' ethnic choice is contingent on the distribution of ethnic attributes in the population.<sup>15</sup> As a result, in patronage democracies political parties have incentives to unify several previously dissimilar ethnic categories to create a broader ethnic category to increase this category's possibilities of becoming a winning electoral coalition. Chandra illustrates her argument with the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which, between 1984 and 1998, electorally targeted the group of "Scheduled Castes", a category that joined an amalgam of 400 castes previously treated as different groups.

From a sociological approach, Davis (1991), Lind (1995) and Schildkraut (2002) have examined the evolution of collective understandings of racial and national identity in America. In their work, change has been understood as a shift in the meanings that elites and ordinary citizens attribute to blackness (Davis 1991) and Americanness (Lind 1995; Schildkraut 2002). Yet, even if these studies have focused on the analysis of collective meanings, Muñoz (2009) has shown that similar kinds of changes can actually occur at the individual level. Looking at the evolution of the ideological, religious and regional base of Spanishness, Muñoz (2009) has contended that the renewal of elites' nationalizing discourses following Spain's transition to democracy influenced the content of Spanish citizens' national pride, causing its progressive secularization and de-ideologization.

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<sup>15</sup> Patronage democracies are democracies in which elected representatives can distribute the state resources discretionally on individual bases (Chandra 2004).



The study of identity change has also attracted the interest of immigration studies. Although the classical assimilation theory depicted by Gordon (1964) has today been renewed (Alba and Nee 1997), and alternative theories have been proposed to explain the process of immigrants and second generations' incorporation into the receiving society (Berry 1984; Bourhis et al. 1997; Mok, Morris, and Benet-Martínez 2007; Portes and Zhou 1993), the study of identity change has attracted and continues to attract scholars' attention (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2004; Sears et al. 2003; Waters 1990).

Among all these studies, it might be worth referring here to two in particular: Sears et al.'s (2003) and Waters' (1990). Sears and his colleagues examine changes in the strength of Asian and Latino students' ethnic identities during their college years.<sup>16</sup> Waters' (1990) work looks into the ethnic identity options of European descendants in the United States by analyzing their self-categorization choices in the US census. In Waters' work, change adopts two forms: census related changes and identity changes experienced by European descendants over the course of their lives. Changes in the US census happen when an individual chooses, in the census form, a category of identification that differs from the one his or her parents had previously chosen for him or her. This kind of change, however, cannot be considered a real change in identification. Conversely, "real changes" occur when individuals highlight a new ethnic attribute that stems from the repertoire of attributes inherited from their grand-parents attributes and/or through parents' ethnic intermarriage.

The following table classifies the aforementioned studies according to the type of identity they examine, the level of analysis and the dimension of change they deal with. Although the list of studies that have examined identity change is certainly much broader, the ones presented here suffice to illustrate the

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<sup>16</sup> Here, it could be debated whether the indicators these authors use to measure the strength of ethnic identities are properly measuring this concept or, instead, they are only registering changes in the salience of these ethnic identities.

multiple ways in which identity change has been understood in previous research. This diversity in scholars' understandings of identity change highlights the importance of coming up with a common analytical framework that helps us to advance its study.

*Table 2.2. Review of studies dealing with identity change*

| Study  | Type               | Level                   | Dimension           |
|--|--------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| Tajfel (1974) & Tajfel and Turner (1986)       | Social             | Individual              | Self-categorization |
| Laitin (1998) & Chandra (2004)                 | Ethnic             | Individual & aggregate  |                     |
| Gordon (1964)                                  | Ethnic to national | Individual              |                     |
| Waters (1990) & Sears et al (2003)             | Ethnic             | Individual              |                     |
| Tajfel and Turner (1986)                       | Social             | Collective              | Content             |
| Burke (2006)                                   | Role               | Individual              |                     |
| Davis (1991), Lind (1995) & Schildkraut (2002) | Racial & national  | Collective              |                     |
| Citrin, Reingold, & Green (1990)               | Ethnic & national  | Individual & collective |                     |
| Muñoz (2009)                                   | National           | Individual              |                     |
| Serpe (1987) & Wells and Stryker (1988)        | Role               | Individual              | Saliency            |
| Sears et al. (2003)                            | Ethnic             | Individual              | Intensity           |

### *2.3.2. Dimensions of change in national identification*

As the preceding section has shown, previous research has approached the study of identity change in different dimensions.

Bearing this in mind, and in order to clarify the study of change in national identification, I contend here that researchers interested in this topic should study separately the changes which occur along the four dimensions of identification: self-categorization, content, saliency, and intensity. In this section, therefore, I seek to clarify what a change in each of these dimensions of national identification implies.<sup>17</sup>

*Change in individuals' category of national identification*

Change in individuals' category of national identification can be understood in three different ways: first, as the replacement of individuals' original category of national identification by a new national category; secondly, as the adding of a national category of identification; and third, as the rearrangement of individuals' categories of national identifications.<sup>18</sup>

Changes of the first type are psychologically demanding as they require that individuals abandon their original national identification and substitute it for a new category that they did not possess before (e.g., an immigrant's loss of his original identification as Pakistani). The second type of change in the category of national identification is less demanding, as it only requires the acquisition of a new category of identification, which

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<sup>17</sup> The novelty of this and the following section explain the limited number of references in these pages. Although this section is inspired by the literature reviewed in previous section, the following section is based on my own reflections on these issues.

<sup>18</sup> Although these kinds of changes have been mainly reported in circumstances of immigration, as I will argue in the following section, these changes can also be observed when other exogenous changes takes place (colonization, territories' secession, etc). Nevertheless, for the time being, the examples I will use here will mainly refer to migration circumstances.

is added to the original one (e.g., the adding of an English identification to the Pakistani one).<sup>19</sup>

Rearrangements in the category of national identification happen when individuals have two nations with which they can identify. At some point in time, an individual's identification with one of his or her national categories can become more important than the other moment. Think, for example, in the case of the Peruvian-Swiss person, to whom I referred before. Let's imagine that she moves to Peru after having spent her childhood and part of her adulthood in Switzerland. If she stays in Peru for a period of time, her Peruvian identification can come to have greater importance than her Swiss identification. Or, on the contrary, due to the contrast she will possibly experience when interacting with other Peruvians, her identification as a Swiss person can become more important.

*Change in the content of individuals' national identification*

Change can also occur in the content of individuals' national identification. Such changes will take place when the cognitive component of individuals' subjective attachment to the nation is altered. Individuals' cognitive attachment to the nation includes:

1. Criteria of membership. These criteria can be, for example, primordial (ascendancy, origin, mother tongue) or territorial. Although collective definitions of membership constrain individuals' definitions, individuals can choose one or the other criterion to give substantive content to their identification with the nation.
2. Symbols or anchors for identification: the nation's territory, its symbolic and its historical referents (the

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<sup>19</sup> Note that the first two forms of change in the category of national identification are not constrained by an individual's set of inherited categories of national identification.

- anthem, the flag), the group's historical collective achievements, or its ethnic components (the language).
3. The values, interests or goals of the national group (i.e. defense of the nation's language, self-government, self-determination, etc.).

When the criteria of membership, the symbolic referents, or the values individuals' attribute to their identification with the nation are modified, then a change in the content of individuals' identification occurs. Such changes might correlate with similar changes that occur in the nation's collective identity as a result of political transformations, such as regime changes.

*Change in the saliency of individuals' national identification*

Building on Stryker and Serpe (1994), in section 2.2.4 I defined identity salience as a hierarchy of identities. The saliency of national identification over other forms of identification is contingent on the broad context in which individuals are embedded. For example, in contexts where the center-periphery cleavage is present, individuals' national identification can be a highly salient form of identification.

A change in the salience of national identification occurs when, in comparison with other categories of identification (gender, class, religiosity), national identification gains or losses saliency.

*Change in the intensity of individuals' national identification*

Change can also occur in the strength of individuals' feelings of attachment. These kinds of changes occur when the emotional component of individuals' subjective attachment to the nation strengthens or weakens.

Although *saliency* and *intensity* are very often confused due to their observational correlation, they are analytically different. Let

me use an example to clarify this point. Suppose someone identifies herself as women and as Spanish at the same time, although this person's Spanish identification is more salient than her gender identification. Due to certain circumstances, a change in the intensity of her national identification can occur without a change in the salience needing to occur, and viceversa. For example, when Spain won the World Cup in 2010, this person's attachment to Spain possibly intensified. However, since her Spanish identification was already more salient than her identification as a woman, it can be assumed that there has not be a change in the salience of identification.

Now, suppose this person attends a job meeting in which she is the only woman. It might be the case that, under these circumstances, her identification as a woman becomes more salient, compared to her national identification. Now, imagine that she attends a meeting, in which all participants but her are men, but some are Spanish and others are Americans. In this case, as her national identification is more salient than her gender identification, it would be the case that her national identification will remain more salient than her identification as woman. In these two latter cases, however, the intensity of her national identification would not have changed necessarily.

With these examples, I do not imply that saliency and intensity might be empirically related in many circumstances. For example, let's take now the case of a person whose Spanish identification is not highly salient. When the Spanish national team won the World Cup, this event might have caused a change in both the salience and the intensity of this person's national identification. Nevertheless, the possibility that these two dimensions of individuals' social identifications are observationally related does not mean that they do not need to be distinguished analytically.

## **2.4. Preconditions of change in national identification**

Under which circumstances do individuals' identification with the nation change? Are these circumstances similar to those which produce a change in individuals' ethnic identification? This section seeks to answer to these questions and it identifies a number of circumstances that make the occurrence of change in the different dimensions of individuals' national identification possible. Some of the circumstances that affect individuals' national identification are exogenous to the individuals, others, on the contrary, are inherent to their lives. As it will become evident in the following pages, most of the circumstances that facilitate the occurrence of a change in the category of national identification do not affect individuals' ethnic identification.

In all the circumstances that will be described here, individuals' identification with the nation becomes a matter of choice, instead of an ascriptive characteristic. These circumstances must be understood, nevertheless, as necessary but not sufficient conditions for the change to occur. These circumstances act, therefore, as "remote" causes of change. That being said, we have to bear in mind that individuals can either resist the pressures for change and remain attached to their old categories of identification or they can opt for change. There is nothing deterministic here: change is not necessarily the only possible result, nor is stability.

### *2.4.1. Structural circumstances*

By structural circumstances, I refer here to circumstances or events that are exogenous to individuals. These structural circumstances must be seen as pre-conditions for change in national identification. Among these structural circumstances we can think, for example, on the existence of a *repertoire of nations* available for individuals' identification. Other structural circumstances can be: changes in the *territorial boundaries* of the

nation, *institutional-political transformations* and *events*, such as national holidays, wars or world championships.

*Changes related to the existence of a repertoire of nations*

By *repertoire of nations*, I mean a number of nations that are available for individuals' identification. In multinational contexts, in which there is a conflict between the central culture and the distinct populations of the peripheries (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), individuals can either identify with the minority nation (Catalonia, Basque Country, Quebec and Flanders, for example) and/or with the overarching nation (Spain, Canada and Belgium). Federalism and political decentralization can certainly act as devices that accommodate different understandings of the political community and promote nested compatible national and regional identities in democratic states (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Lijphart 1977; Linz 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011).

However, as this dissertation aims to show, political elites' activation of the conflicting interests of the two national groups pushes individuals to perceive these identities as incompatible or opposing. When this occurs individuals usually react giving priority to one identity over the other, or rearranging their dual identifications.

*Changes in the territorial boundaries of the nation and institutional-political transformations*

There are other structural changes that might facilitate the occurrence of change in national identification. We can think, for example, about processes of colonization, decolonization, the separation or unification of countries, democratization and decentralization processes and wars. History offers a number of examples in which changes in the territorial boundaries of the nation or regime changes pushed individuals to face the dilemma of redefining their national allegiances, and the meanings they



attributed to them. To illustrate this, I will briefly recount some of these cases.

The first case I would like to refer to is the case of Alsace. Until 1945, the inhabitants of Alsace were subject to the alternative rule of France and Germany. In this preeminently German-speaking area, the use of the French language progressively gained importance during the decades of German annexation (1870-1918). Language was used as a means of defying German rulers. The stamp of Nazi occupation also led the generations that witnessed Nazis' atrocities to get rid of any connection with Germany (Vassberg 1993, 25-26). In addition, after its reintegration into France in 1918, and again after 1945, French officials rigidly imposed the French language in primary schools in order to promote cultural affiliation and loyalty to France (Boswell 2002).

Another relevant case to support my argument could be the decolonization of Hong-Kong. After the First Opium War, Hong-Kong was placed under British jurisdiction, first as a colony and, later on, as a dependent territory. This form of "occupation" lasted for 156 years. When China regained sovereignty over the island in 1997, a number of significant reforms were implemented in the political and institutional realms. Beyond these changes, other micro-changes, such as the display of the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s flag in public buildings or the establishment of new public holidays such as PRC National Day, replaced former symbolic referents.

An additional example could be the separation of Czechoslovakia. Even though Czechs and Slovaks shared the same state for seventy-five years, they failed to construct a shared sense of nationhood. However, the split of the state of Czechoslovakia into two separate nation-states in 1993 and the redefinition of the national territorial boundaries might have had significant consequences for both the Czech's and the Slovak's national referents.

The fourth example is the reunification of Germany. The 1974 revision of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) Constitution

got rid of any referent to the “German people” and it also eliminated the Constitution’s pledge to seek reunification (Turner 1992). This shift was part of Erich Honecker’s strategy to legitimize East Germany’s separate national character. Although the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to the territorial reunification of East and West Germany, and restrained East German nationalism, twenty years later, the construction of German national identity is still a work in progress.

The fifth example refers to the occurrence of wars. Victimization experiences during wars have been found to impact significantly on the identities of those involved in the war (Balcells 2011). Individuals reject the identity of those who have victimized them. So, wars that developed along ethnic or national lines are expected to influence the ethnic or national identification of the victims. But, beyond this, wars can also alter the configuration of the available categories of identification. Between 1992 and 1995, the war in the Balkans redrew the map of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia disappeared as a category of identification and those individuals, who had self-categorized as Yugoslavs in the 1991 census (Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson 1994), were forced to choose among the new repertoire of available categories of identification.

The sixth example refers to cases of deep political change. Regime changes can also propitiate changes in national identification. In 1975, after Franco’s death, a democratization process was started in Spain. Fears that a democratic regression could occur led *reformers* to keep some of the national symbols of Franco’s dictatorship. In this way, the music of the national anthem, as well as the colors of the dictatorship flag were maintained as symbols of the new democratic regime. Despite this, the new institutional framework managed to foster the emergence of new national referents. As a result, the constitutive elements of Spanish identification during Franco’s regime (Catholicism and Conservatism) have become progressively less important when shaping individuals’ identification with Spain (Muñoz 2009).

Finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 is another example that serves to illustrate how exogenous events might alter individuals' national referents. In his seminal work, *Identity in Formation*, Latin (1998) describes how the Russian-speaking populations of the Baltic countries were forced to assimilate culturally in order to obtain citizenship. While some Russian speakers chose this option, passed exams in the vernacular language and overcame bureaucratic obstacles to get access to citizenship through naturalization, many others chose not to apply for citizenship.

All these cases are examples of deep institutional-political transformations: colonization and decolonization in the cases of Alsace and Hong Kong, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, German reunification, the Balkan war and democratization. These institutional changes have entailed either a redefinition of the territorial boundaries, or the emergence/disappearance of national categories. All these changes have also been accompanied by a redefinition of national referents. For example, regime changes are very often followed by the designation of a new national anthem, the design of a new national flag, the adoption of new names for the streets of cities and towns, and even the designation of a new capital city. The history that children learn in the textbooks is also reformulated and some historical figures recover relevance, while others disappear or are publicly condemned. Although these kinds of political changes are, in most cases, elite-driven, they not only have consequences for the symbolic referents or meanings ordinary people attribute to their national allegiances, but they also alter the categories of national identification which are available to them.

*Changes related to individuals' participation in and witnessing of important events*

Events such as national holidays, the Olympic Games, a country's victory in a world sporting championship, individuals' participation in/witnessing of a war with an external enemy,

terrorist attacks or natural catastrophes can also make people's national identification change along the saliency and intensity dimensions.

Here, we could think, for example, about the victory of the Spanish national soccer team in the World Cup in South Africa in 2010; a victory which led many people to go out in the streets hoisting the Spanish flag for the first time. Or we could think about how the rescue of miners in the San Jose Mine led Chileans to chant "Chi-le" in unison, not only outside the San Jose Mine, but also in the Santiago' streets. In these particular cases, individuals' attachment to their nation may not only become more salient, but individuals' feelings of attachment to the national group may also intensify.

Although our national allegiances are continuously stirred up by banal expressions of nationalism (Billig 1995), events as those mentioned above can foster hot expressions of nationalism. Political and cultural entrepreneurship can take advantage of these events to encourage individuals' identification with the nation. Under these circumstances, individuals' feelings or attachment can intensify. However, expressions of fierce nationalism do not necessarily intensify individuals' attachment to the nation. On the contrary, in multinational contexts, hot expressions of nationalism by the titular nation's elites can also lessen the feelings of attachment with the overarching nation on the part of citizens in the periphery.

#### *2.4.2. Individual circumstances*

Besides the structural circumstances described above, there are other circumstances which are endogenous to individuals' lives and which can also favor the occurrence of change. As referred above, among these two circumstances I would like to highlight two: migration and conscription.

### *Migration*

Migration places individuals before the strain of assimilating or remaining loyal to their original national identification. When individuals migrate they bring with them their original national identification. Exposure to and experience of a new culture can lead them to develop feelings of attachment to the host country and, as a consequence, develop a new national identification. The result of this process is very often the emergence of some form of bicultural identity (Chen, Benet-Martínez, and Bond 2008; Mok, Morris, and Benet-Martínez 2007). The maintenance of links of attachment to the original nation is often facilitated by circular migration or sojourning.

Migration, however, does not necessarily cause individuals to change their category of national identification. Interaction with individuals from other nationalities can also cause an individual's national identification to become more salient. The effect of interacting with persons of other nationalities not only affects immigrants, but natives as well.<sup>20</sup> Actually, the presence of immigrants can have consequences not only on the salience of natives' national identification, but also on the content of their national identification (membership criteria) and the intensity of their national feelings. In the context of immigration, far right political entrepreneurs very often resort to nationalist discourses, which try to spread the idea that the nation is being threatened by the increasing presence of immigrants. These discourses can also cause some natives' national identification to intensify.

### *Conscription and army enrolment*

The indoctrination and ideological training to which individuals are exposed in the army can also strengthen or weaken individuals' identification with the nation. Of course, it can be

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<sup>20</sup> I am grateful to Verónica Benet-Martínez for calling my attention to this point.

argued that, where the military service is not compulsory, those individuals who enroll in the army are already strongly attached to the nation. Nevertheless, even in these cases, it is still possible that enrollment strengthens these individuals' national identification (Peisakhin and Pinto 2009) or that it affects it in the opposite direction. In other words, those individuals who have gone through the harshness of army indoctrination can develop feelings of rejection of the army and of the idea of the nation that it tries to instill in its members.

Table 2.3 summarizes the different types of change I have referred to and it details the circumstances that facilitate change.

*Table 2.3. Analytical framework for studying change in national identification*

| Type of Change  | Grounds for change<br>or<br>Preconditions of<br>change | Causes   |
|---|--|--|
| <b>Category of self-identification</b><br>(Replacement of an old category with a new one)<br>(Adding a new category)<br>(Rearrangement of categories) | Immigration  | Interaction with individuals' from other nationalities                             |
|   | Colonization / Decolonization                          | Emergence or disappearance of the available categories for national identification |
|   | Unification / Separation of countries & Wars           | Activation of the center-periphery cleavage  |
|   | Multinational states                                   | Decentralization processes   |

*Table 2.3. Analytical framework for studying change in national identification (continued)*

| Type of Change  | Grounds for change<br>or<br>Preconditions of<br>change                                 | Causes   |
|---|--|--|
| <b>Content</b><br>(Meanings individuals' attribute to the nation)   | Regime Change  | Transformation of national symbols & nationalizing discourses                      |
|   | Colonization /<br>Decolonization<br>Unification /<br>Separation of<br>countries & Wars | Emergence or disappearance of the available categories for national identification |
|   |  | Transformation of national symbols & nationalizing discourses                      |
| <b>Salience</b><br>(Relevance of this national identification vis à vis other kinds of identification)<br><br><b>&amp;</b><br><br><b>Intensity</b><br>(Strengthening or weakening of individuals' feelings of attachment) | Immigration  | Interaction with individuals' from other nationalities                             |
|   | War<br>Terrorist Attacks<br>Catastrophes<br>International sporting championships       | Mobilization of collective national identities                                     |
|   | Conscription or army enrolment   | Mobilization of collective national identities                                     |

Source: Own elaboration.

Before concluding this section, it is worth mentioning that the preconditions that have been examined in previous chapter are expected to facilitate both the occurrence of changes in

individuals' lives, but also intergenerational changes. We know that a particular event (processes of colonization, decolonization, the separation or unification of countries, democratization and decentralization processes, wars, terrorist attacks, etc) will have a greater impact if experienced when an individual is a child or young adult, than if experienced when he or she is a mature adult. Differences in socialization experiences will, therefore, explain the variability in national identification (category, content, saliency, and meaning) of the different generations.

For example, after the transition to democracy in Spain, the use of the Spanish flag was limited to official acts, and it was only raised on official buildings. The fact that the flag colors had been inherited from the dictatorship meant that those generations which had directly or indirectly experienced the dictatorship's repression saw it as a symbol of the old regime. In recent times, José María Aznar's governments (1996-2004) strove to promote its use and even proposed a monthly tribute to the Spanish flag. Only Popular Party sympathizers supported this proposition. However, after the Spanish national team's victory in the 2010 World Cup, many young people went out on the streets hoisting the Spanish flag, and many flags were hung in the windows and over the balconies of people's apartments. This can be considered evidence that the younger generations have gotten rid of the old connotations that the Spanish flag had, and have redefined its meanings.

## **2.5. How does my dissertation fit in this framework of analysis?**

Although the object of study of my dissertation was already delimited in the introductory chapter; it might be worth recalling here this dissertation's scope, so the reader can understand how my dissertation fits in the comparative framework that has been developed in this chapter.

This dissertation is restricted to the study of individual change in the category of national identification and, in particular: the



replacement of an old category with a new one, the adding (or disappearance) of a category of identification, and the rearrangement of categories. In order to avoid confusion, I would like to make clear that, unless I specify the contrary, from now on, when I refer to change in national identification I am specifically referring to a change that occurs in the category of national identification (in any of these forms).

The dissertation's focus on the Catalan case is not incidental. As argued in the introductory chapter, Catalonia is a suitable setting for the observation of change in the category of national identification. First, it is a place in which there is a repertoire of nations competing for individuals' identification (Spain and Catalonia). Second, it is a place with a high presence of immigrants (arrived from other regions of Spain) for which the Spanish and Catalan identities are relevant categories of identification. Precisely because of this, I exclude from my study those individuals for whom Spain and Catalonia are not the only relevant categories of identification (immigrants from outside of Spain). In other words, I focus only on individuals born in Catalonia or other regions of Spain and of Spanish/Catalan parents. Any of these circumstances could separately make the occurrence of changes in national identification possible, so their combination is expected to increase the chances of observing such changes.

This chapter has paid special attention to the preconditions for change in national identification. It has, however, left open the immediate causes of change. Bearing this in mind, the following chapters will try to unravel what causes individuals to change their category of national identification in context in which a center-periphery cleavage is present, and shed light on the mechanisms that explain change. In this regard, the dissertation will argue that political elites' definitions of membership, on the one hand, and their activation of the center-periphery cleavage, on the other, is behind both individual and aggregate changes in national identification.

Although the main interest of this dissertation is the study of the change that occurs in the category of identification over an individual's life, I will also examine inter-generational changes. The study of inter-generational changes will also lead me to investigate the formation of individuals' national identification in chapter five.<sup>21</sup>

Generally speaking, the following chapters can be seen as an exercise in which I go in-depth into the analysis of changes in the individual category of identification, and in which I seek to study the consequences of political elites' activation of the center-periphery cleavage.

## **2.6. Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have set up a framework to study change in national identification and I have built my research on the insights and recent developments of different areas of research. I have shifted the focus from identity to identification and, more specifically, from collective identities to individuals' identification.

National identification has been defined as the cognitive (evaluative and affective) attachment that links individuals subjectively to a nation, and I have distinguished the dimensions of identification (self-categorization, content, saliency and intensity) along which change can occur. From that starting point, I have looked into the circumstances under which national identification is susceptible to change. Finally, I have explained how my dissertation fits into this analytical framework.

Three additional points should be raised before concluding. First, we have to be aware that not all changes in individuals'

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<sup>21</sup> Here, it is worth highlighting that the formation of individuals' national identification is a different process than that of change in national identification. In order for change to occur, it is a prerequisite that individuals' national identification has been first shaped and crystallized.

national identification are politically or socially consequential. However, some of them are. Thus, for example, the changes that occur in the category of identification after individuals migrate facilitate assimilation in other realms. Changes in the category of identification are also important in multinational contexts where the individuals' national identification informs their preferences for self-government, self-determination and their voting choices. In this regard, research dealing with the study of change in national identification in its different dimensions should specify whether change is political or socially relevant for the particular case being examined, and in which regard.

Secondly, an issue which has not appeared in the previous pages, and which is worth mentioning here is the durability of the changes. We can imagine that changes in the saliency or intensity of national identification are temporary changes, while changes in the category of self-identification and content are more permanent. Besides durability, another aspect worth examining is the feasibility of these kinds of changes. Huddy (2001), for example, has suggested it is much easier to modify the salience of feminist identity than change the collective meanings of the feminist identity. This is, undoubtedly, an issue that also deserves the attention of researchers interested in the study of individual change in national identification.

Finally, the lack of data for tracking individuals' national identification diachronically very often hinders the study of individual change in national identification. This lack of data is a challenge which forces researcher to be imaginative regarding the use of different methodologies, and regarding the use of valid and reliable indicators which measure change over the different dimensions of identification.

## CHAPTER 3. TRACKING THE EVOLUTION OF AGGREGATE IDENTIFICATION IN CATALONIA

### 3.1. Introduction

This first empirical chapter tracks the evolution of identification with Spain and Catalonia over the past thirty years. This is a question that has recently drawn significant attention from case studies (Argelaguet 2006) and comparative studies (Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005). Some of these studies have focused on the analysis of the aggregate level (Argelaguet 2006; Martínez-Herrera 2005). Other studies, in turn, have moved down to the individual level to explain the mechanisms that underlie these aggregate changes (Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 2008b; Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a). Most of these studies recognize that levels of identification with Spain have decreased substantially in the past thirty years (Argelaguet 2006, 434; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 435-36). This decrease could be attributed to the *identificational assimilation* of part of the immigrant population (Solé 1981a) to the process of political decentralization (Guibernau 2006, 2007; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005, 2009), to the introduction of Catalan as the language of instruction in schools (Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 2008b; Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a) or, more generally, to the policies carried out by Catalan elites (Argelaguet 2006; Miley 2006).

However, before moving to the study of the causes that account for observed macro transformations, here I contend that it is necessary to carry out an in-depth diagnostic of the phenomenon under consideration. In order to do this, I examine first, the evolution of national identification; second, the magnitude of the changes; third, the trend pattern; and finally, the generational or period component of the changes. Ultimately, if we want to have a clear picture of the phenomenon, three different questions must be answered: How important are the changes that have occurred in national identification over the past thirty years? Are the changes in the percent of people who identify with Spain and/or Catalonia affecting the mean tendency? How much of the overall change is due to population changes and how much is due to individuals' transformation of their national identification?

Although these seem to be quite basic questions, previous studies have examined them very superficially. Previous studies have merely made a depiction of the evolution of national identification, and they have not conducted any statistical analysis that helps us to solve the questions posed above. Thus, even though Martínez-Herrera (2002) and Argelaguet (2006) have traced the evolution of national identification with Spain and Catalonia, the question regarding the magnitude of the change or the trend pattern remains unanswered. In addition, although Martínez-Herrera (2002, 433) and Aspach-Bracons et al (2008a; 2008b) have referred to the occurrence of between and within generational changes in national identification, we do not yet know how much of the overall change is due to each kind of change. Actually, although Aspach-Bracons et al (2008a; 2008b) have even provided an explanation of the between and within cohorts changes occurred in identification,<sup>1</sup> they have not investigated the magnitude of these changes.

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<sup>1</sup> According to these authors, differential exposure to Catalan in school as a result of the implementation of the 1983 Law of Language Normalization would be the cause behind within and between cohort differences in national identification.

This chapter, therefore, seeks to solve this need for an in-depth descriptive analysis of the evolution of national identification in Catalonia. The chapter draws on cross-sectional data produced by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS, Center of Sociological Research), covering the period between 1984 and 2010. The implementation of trend analyses, cohort analyses and decomposition analyses will help me to answer the questions posed above, and to account for the decrease in the levels of primarily Spanish identification that previous works have reported.

After presenting the data, the following section shows the evolution of national identification in Catalonia and it provides a measure of the changes magnitude. Then, a comparison of the trends among different origin groups is carried out. Here we expect that the evolution of the autochthonous will be different from the evolution of the national identification mean for the children of mixed couples, second generations and immigrants. After analyzing the different groups' trends, a decomposition of the aggregate changes in the levels of primarily Spanish identification is carried out separately for the whole population and for the immigrants group. A decomposition analysis will be carried out to separate within and between cohort changes in the primarily Catalan identification among the autochthonous population.

### **3.2. Data and variables**

As mentioned in the introductory chapter of the dissertation, individuals' national identification will be measured by means of a bi-directional indicator which, as described, takes the following values: 1 when individuals feel "only Spanish", 2 when individuals feel "more Spanish than Catalan", 3 when individuals feel "as Spanish as Catalan", 4 when individuals feel "more Catalan than Spanish", and 5 when individuals feel "only Catalan". In some of the descriptive analysis, the side categories

will be merged, and the resulting variable will take the following values: 1 when individuals feel primarily Spanish, 2 when individuals feel “as Spanish as Catalan” or have a dual identification, and 3 when individuals feel primarily Catalan.

Although data on individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia, measured by this bi-directional indicator, is abundant and other survey houses<sup>2</sup> have been generating series based on this indicator for a long time, the CIS data is possibly the most appropriate when three different aspects are considered together: first and foremost, the span of time covered by the CIS data, secondly, the size of the samples and third, the greater information which is provided in the CIS surveys.

The CIS’ series on individuals’ national identification is left truncated in 1984. This means that we lack information on what happened with individuals’ national identification in the aftermath of Franco’s death. Before that date, a number of nationwide surveys conducted between 1976 and 1982 asked respondents about national identification, then referred to as the “regional consciousness” question.<sup>3</sup> Despite this, only two surveys

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<sup>2</sup> The Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS, Institute of Social and Political Science) and the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (CEO, Center of Public Opinion Studies) have data on identification with Spain and Catalonia from 1992 and 2006, respectively. The ICPS data is collected yearly and the CEO is collected on monthly bases from 2006 on.

<sup>3</sup> See Salustiano del Campo et al (1976), Jiménez Blanco et al (1977), and López-Aranguren (1983). The surveys on which these studies rely were carried out by ICSA-Gallup, DATA S.A. and ALEF Gabinete de Estudios Económicos y Sociales, S.A. The questionnaire designed by Salustiano del Campo included a first item asking respondents “Which part of Spain are you from?”, and a second item asking, “within your region, to what are you more attached: the village, the province or the region?” The surveys coordinated by Jiménez Blanco in 1976 and 1977 also included a question which sought to get spontaneous answers to the question, “where are you from?” None of these surveys included the bi-directional indicator which will be used in this chapter.

conducted by DATA S.A in 1979 and 1982 included the bi-directional item asking about individuals' national identification in Catalonia.<sup>4</sup>

Yet, if we compare the frequencies for the national identification item coming from these two surveys (1979 and 1982) and from the first two surveys of the CIS series (1984 and 1985), we can observe a significant decrease in the percent of individuals who identify as primarily Spanish, that is, as "only Spanish" or as "more Spanish than Catalan". This decrease can be due either to an actual decrease in the percent of individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish at that time, to the occurrence of house effects, or it could be the result of these two joint effects.<sup>5</sup>

*Table 3.1. Identification with Spain and Catalonia (column %) Comparison of DATA and CIS surveys*

|                           | 1979  | 1982  | 1984  | 1986  |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Only Spanish              | 31.30 | 23.10 | 10.08 | 11.80 |
| More Spanish than Catalan | 6.70  | 8.70  | 7.72  | 8.28  |
| As Spanish as Catalan     | 35.40 | 41.20 | 45.48 | 49.95 |
| More Catalan than Spanish | 11.70 | 11.70 | 27.41 | 19.24 |
| Only Catalan              | 14.90 | 9.30  | 9.31  | 10.73 |
| N                         | 1079  | 1176  | 2274  | 2399  |

Source: DATA 1979, 1982 (Shabad 1986) and CIS study # 1412 (1984) and 1527 (1985)

This identification problem is found as well when we compare the data from the CIS and the ICPS (see Figures A.3.1 to A.3.6 in

<sup>4</sup> See note 31 in Chapter 1.

<sup>5</sup> House effects are systematic effects that can be attributed to the differences in question wording, the sampling or the treatment of non-response between the different survey organizations.



the appendix). The small differences we find in the distribution of frequencies of the national identification indicator in these two datasets could be either attributed to actual changes in individuals' identification or to house effects.<sup>6</sup> Due to this identification problem, I will restrict the analyses to the data coming from the CIS, and I will avoid to pool data coming from different sources. Table A.3.1 in the appendix presents the CIS surveys that include information on the main variables of interest: respondents' national identification, respondents' and their parents' place of birth, and respondents' knowledge of Catalan. Information on other variables and on other questions of interest (sample size, month of fieldwork...) is also provided in this table.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Here it should be noted that when the CIS and the ICPS surveyed the Catalan population in the same year, fieldwork was not necessarily carried out in the same month. Differences in the dates of fieldwork could account, therefore, for the small differences in the distribution of frequencies. Yet, the ICPS presents an additional problem related to the mode of survey administration. Between 2003 and 2004, surveys were not conducted by personal interviews, but by telephone interviews. The Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió also uses telephone interviews to collect data on individuals' national identification. Differences in the mode of questionnaire administration among the CIS, ICPS and CEO surveys advise against the pooling of data coming from different sources of data.

<sup>7</sup> When more than one survey with information on these three variables was available for one year, I have selected the first survey implemented that year. In 1984, study number '1412' which includes information on the individuals' and their parents' origin, as well as identification with Catalonia, does not include the age variable, so for those analyses in which national identification is only examined as a function of age, birth cohort or time, study number '1403' will be used instead. Although data on the distribution of respondents' national identification is available for 1985, the data matrix does not exist for that year and, therefore, it will not be used in the empirical analyses. For 1986, the study number with information on individuals' national identification only includes an item on the individuals' origin, but not on his or her parents' origin. The first survey that includes information on all the relevant variables is the 1988 survey, as the 1987 survey does not include children of mixed couples. Information on the respondents' and

Most of the analysis conducted in this chapter will distinguish between four groups of individuals, who are defined according to their parents' and their own place of birth.<sup>8</sup> These groups are "autochthonous", individuals who were born in Catalonia and are descendants of parents who were also born in Catalonia; "mixed", individuals who are children of mixed couples, that is, those individuals who were born in Catalonia, with one of the parents born in Catalonia and the other born in other parts of Spain; "second generations", individuals who were born in Catalonia and whose parents were born outside of Catalonia; and "immigrants", individuals who were born in other regions of Spain and whose parents were also born in other regions of Spain.<sup>9</sup>

Restricting the analyses to the data from the CIS does not free me from comparability problems. As the notes in Table A.3.1 indicate, over the whole period there have been four different wordings for the national identification item. Some of the question wordings make reference to individuals' feelings, while others do not. Nevertheless, the answer categories have remained the same, which guarantees the equivalence of the item from survey to

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their parents' origin is lacking for the 2003 and 2008 surveys. Information on individuals' national identification is unavailable for 1989, 1990, 1994, 1997, 2000 and 2004. In those years, no CIS survey included the national identification indicator.

<sup>8</sup> There are two residual categories: those individuals born outside of Catalonia that currently live in Catalonia and whose parents were born in Catalonia will be considered "autochthonous". Those individuals who were born outside of Catalonia but who have one parent born in Catalonia and one parent born in another part of Spain will be included in the "mixed" category.

<sup>9</sup> I have excluded from my analysis those individuals who were born outside of Spain or whose parents were born outside of Spain. As I argued in chapter 1, Catalonia and Spain might not be their nations of reference, and therefore their answers to this question may be randomly chosen. In fact, among this group of respondents, the levels of *don't know* or *no answer* are significantly higher.

survey.<sup>10</sup> Taking into account these caveats, I will avoid using the comparison between two single points in time to make claims on trends, or on the movement of society in one direction or the other (Firebaugh 1997, 12).

Before concluding this section, I would like to call attention to a problem that can potentially affect variation in the levels of national identification. This problem is sample composition. If fluctuations in the levels of identification with Spain and Catalonia are due to fluctuations in the percent of immigrants in the sample, for example, then the observed changes in the levels of national identification could be actually reporting sample changes, instead of real changes in individuals' identification. Table 3.2 shows the imbalances in the number of immigrants in the population and in the CIS' samples. These imbalances are greater than the sample error in the 1987, 1988, 1991 to 1996 and 1999 samples.

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<sup>10</sup> The sampling design has also changed over time, so the first surveys of the series used socio-economic strata for generating the quota sampling. Nevertheless, the sampling has been always conducted in a multistage and stratified process.

Table 3.2. Comparison of population born in other regions of Spain.  
Population data and CIS data (%)

|      | Population | Sample | Sample Error | Differences between population & sample |
|------|------------|--------|--------------|---|
| 1984 | 33.82 †    | 33.98  | ±2.2         | -0.16                                   |
| 1986 | 32.92      | 40.23  | ±5.00        | -7.31*                                  |
| 1987 | 32.54 †    | 38.61  | ±1.86        | -6.07*                                  |
| 1988 | 32.17 †    | 36.91  | ±1.86        | -4.74*                                  |
| 1991 | 31.04      | 33.73  | ±2.00        | -2.69*                                  |
| 1992 | 30.77 †    | 37.11  | ±2.01        | -6.34*                                  |
| 1993 | 30.49 †    | 39.65  | ±1.70        | -9.16*                                  |
| 1995 | 29.94 †    | 35.88  | ±2.44        | -5.94*                                  |
| 1996 | 29.67      | 33.89  | ±3.65        | 4.22*                                   |
| 1998 | 29.10      | 31.55  | ±3.15        | 2.45                                    |
| 1999 | 28.69      | 33.18  | ±2.70        | 4.49*                                   |
| 2001 | 28.36      | 30.18  | ±1.89        | 1.82                                    |
| 2002 | 27.98      | 28.06  | ±2.97        | 0.08                                    |
| 2005 | 26.36      | 26.09  | ±0.98        | -0.27                                   |
| 2006 | 25.92      | 25.67  | ±2.58        | -0.25                                   |
| 2007 | 25.46      | 26.38  | ±4.00        | 0.92                                    |
| 2009 | 24.49      | 28.11  | (n.a.)       | 3.62                                    |
| 2010 | 24.01      | 24.28  | ±1.80        | 0.27                                    |

Sources: For the population data in Catalonia, INE Census Data (1981, 1991) & Municipal Registers (1986, 1996-2010). For the sample data, CIS. Foreign residents have been excluded from the calculus.

†Imputed: figures have been interpolated making use of the INE data (1981, 1986, 1991, 1996)

\*Differences between the population and the sample are greater than the sample error

(n.a.) non available

This, however, should not be a problem if these differences did not affect variation in the levels of national identification. In order to test for this, I look at the correlation of the changes in the levels of identification between surveys and the changes in the percentage of immigrants between surveys. Table 3.3 reports these correlations. Correlation is significant for changes in the percentage of immigrants and changes in the percentage of respondents who self-identify as primarily Catalan or as “more Catalan than Spanish” between surveys (see below). This result has important implications: It means that the ups and downs in these categories are explained to an important extent by sampling effects. So, in order to correct for this bias, the descriptive analyses in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.3 have been weighted by the percent of immigrants in the population.

*Table 3.3. Correlation: change in percentage of individuals born in other regions of Spain between surveys and changes in percentage of individuals who identify as... between surveys*

|  | Changes in percentage of individuals who identify as |                   |        |              |                   |                   |             |
|--|--|-------------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|
|  | P.Spa.   | Spa.<br>=<br>Cat. | P.Cat. | Only<br>Spa. | Spa.<br>><br>Cat. | Cat.<br>><br>Spa. | Only<br>Cat |
| Changes<br>in percentage<br>of individuals<br>born in other<br>regions | .08  | .29               | -.60*  | .22          | -.21              | -.55*             | -.01        |
| *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05                                       |  |                   |        |              |                   |                   |             |

Source: CIS Cumulative data (1984 to 2010). As data from CIS #2543 (2003) and CIS # 2734 (2008) did not include information on individuals' origin, these two datasets have been excluded from the analysis.

### **3.3. Disentangling aggregate change in the national identification over time**

In this section, three kind of descriptive analyses will be carried out: a first analysis in which I depict the evolution of

aggregate changes and measure the magnitude of the aggregate change occurred between survey-years; a second analysis of the group differences in the mean trends; and a third analysis in which I separate intra-cohort from inter-cohort changes.

### *3.3.1. Depicting the evolution of aggregate change*


I start this section by tracking the evolution of national identification over time. Figure 3.1 depicts identification with Catalonia and Spain after weighting by the levels of immigrants in the population.<sup>11</sup> The figure shows that identification with Spain and Catalonia fluctuates significantly over time. Over the whole period, those who choose the “as Spanish as Catalan” identification are always the highest percentage. The group of those who state they feel “more Catalan than Spanish” is the second largest group. The percentage that chooses the “only Spanish” category has usually remained below the percentage of those who feel “only Catalan”, although the two percentages are about the same in 1987, 1995, 1996 and 1998. Between 1984 and 1987, and since 1991 on, the changes observed in the “as Spanish

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<sup>11</sup> This depiction excludes those respondents who were born outside Spain or whose parents were born outside Spain (see note 9 in this chapter). As information on the respondents’ origin was not available in 2003 or in 2008 and, therefore, national identification frequencies could not be weighted by the percent of immigrants in the population, we have not included these years in the analyses. Differences in the depiction of national identification evolution with Martínez-Herrera (2002, 2005) and Argelaguet (2006) can be explained by our different treatment of the data. As I have just mentioned, I exclude those individuals who were born outside Spain or whose parents were born outside of Spain. I have also weighted the data by the differences in the percentage of immigrants in the population and in the CIS samples. In addition, for methodological reasons, I have avoided both the compilation of data coming from different sources and imputations or interpolations of the dependent variable.

as Catalan” category seem to correlate inversely with the changes observed in the “more Catalan than Spanish” category.


*Figure 3.1. Evolution of National Identification (%)*



Source: CIS (1412), CIS(1527), CIS(1719), CIS(1750), CIS(1978), CIS(1987), CIS(2052), CIS(2137), CIS(2228), CIS(2298), CIS(2374), CIS(2410), CIS(2450), CIS(2610), CIS(2643), CIS(2667), CIS(2799), CIS(2852)

In Figure 3.2, I have merged the side categories to summarize the results presented in Figure 3.1. This figure shows a smooth trend of decrease in the percentage of individuals who primarily identify with Spain. This trend, however, is not linear, nor monotonic. Thus, periods in which the percentage of individuals who self-identify as primarily Spanish increases alternate with periods in which this percentage decreases. In 1987, 2001 and between 1991 and 1998, the percentage of primarily Spanish identifiers is around 20 percent. In the rest of the period, levels are below that figure.

Figure 3.2. Evolution of National Identification (side categories merged) (%)



Source: CIS (1412), CIS(1527), CIS(1719), CIS(1750), CIS(1978), CIS(1987), CIS(2052), CIS(2137), CIS(2228), CIS(2298), CIS(2374), CIS(2410), CIS(2450), CIS(2610), CIS(2643), CIS(2667), CIS(2799), CIS(2852)


Changes in the percentage of dual identifiers and primarily Catalan identifiers are apparently trendless, and they seem to be inversely related. Actually, the correlation between the differences in the percent of dual identifiers and the differences in the percent of primarily Catalan identifiers between one survey and the previous one is  $-.64$ . This high correlation suggests that the causes which explain the increase and the decrease in the levels of dual identifiers and in the levels of primarily Catalan identifiers between one year and the following year are very similar, if not the same.

I am also interested in learning about the magnitude of these changes. Figure 3.3 shows the differences (increase or decrease) in the levels of primarily Spanish identification, dual identification and primarily Catalan identification between one survey and the previous one. The figure shows that the magnitude of most of the changes is below  $\pm 5$  percent, or around that figure. Despite this, changes of a greater magnitude can be observed over the period under consideration.



Although the primarily Catalan identification increased 10 points between 1986 and 1987, the most important changes can be observed in the category of dual identifiers. The percentage of dual identifiers increased 7.7 points between 1998 and 1999. Also, between 1986 and 1987, between 1988 and 1991 and between 1999 and 2001 the percentage of dual identifiers experienced notorious changes and it decreased by 12, 10 and 8 points, respectively.

*Figure 3.3. Magnitude of the changes in national identification between surveys*



Source: CIS (1412), CIS(1750), CIS(1978), CIS(1987), CIS(2052), CIS(2137), CIS(2228), CIS(2298), CIS(2374), CIS(2410), CIS(2450), CIS(2610), CIS(2643), CIS(2667), CIS(2799), CIS(2852)

In any case, the magnitude of change is a relative question. How much change has to occur to consider a change as significantly important? We could consider a change as significant if it is above or below the mean plus or minus a standard deviation (see table 3.4).

*Table 3.4. Mean and Standard Deviation of the change in the level of identification with Spain and Catalonia between surveys*

|  | Mean  | Std.<br>Dev | Mean +<br>Std.Dev. | Mean –<br>Std.Dev |
|--|-------|-------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Differences in the %<br>of Primarily Spanish | -0,20 | 2,82        | 2,62               | -3,02             |
| Differences in the %<br>of Dual              | -0,15 | 5,80        | 5,65               | -5,95             |
| Differences in the %<br>of Primarily Catalan | 0,23  | 4,50        | 4,73               | -4,26             |

Source: CIS Cumulative data (1984 to 2010). As data from CIS #2543 (2003) and CIS # 2734 (2008) did not include information on individuals' origin, these two datasets have been excluded from the analysis.


Based on this, the changes occurred in the percentage of primarily Spanish identifiers between 1986 and 1991, between 1998 and 2001 and between 2007 and 2010 are statistically significant. The changes occurred between 1986 and 1987, between 1988 and 1992, between 1993 and 1995 and between 1998 and 2001 in the percentage of individuals who feel “as Spanish as Catalan” can also be considered significant. Finally, regarding the percentage of individuals who feel primarily Catalan, it can be said that change was significant between 1984 and 1987, between 1993 and 1995 and between 1998 and 2002. The years in which fewer changes occurred were 1993, 2006 and 2007. Nevertheless, in spite of those years stability and, in view of what we have just said, it can be stated that notable fluctuations have occurred over the last twenty-six years, and that some of these fluctuations can be considered of significant importance.

### *3.3.2. Evolution of the mean national identification over time.*

As the previous section has shown, over the twenty-six years the CIS data covers, fluctuations have occurred in the levels of identification with Spain and Catalonia. The question this section

seeks to answer is whether these fluctuations have also affected the mean. Figure 3.4 below plots the evolution of the mean national identification for the whole population and, separately, for the autochthonous, the children of mixed couples, the second generations and the immigrants.

*Figure 3.4. Evolution of the mean national identification (means by origin group)*



Source: CIS (1412), CIS(1719), CIS(1750), CIS(1978), CIS(1987), CIS(2052), CIS(2137), CIS(2228), CIS(2298), CIS(2374), CIS(2410), CIS(2450), CIS(2610), CIS(2643), CIS(2667), CIS(2799), CIS(2852)

At first glance, we can see that there are significant differences in the mean for each of these groups. However, beyond these differences between the groups' means, there seem to be slight differences in the slope of the trend between the groups.

In order to know whether these slight differences in the slope of these four groups' are significant, I estimate four different models. The first model regresses national identification on time to test whether the evolution of the mean national identification is a function of time. In the three other models, I include an interaction between the year variable and each of the groups (children of mixed couples, second generations and immigrants) (Firebaugh 1997). The basis of the comparison will be those individuals who were born in Catalonia, and whose parents were also born in Catalonia<sup>12</sup>:

$$E(NI_{it}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Year}_{it} + \delta_0 \text{Group} + \delta_1 [\text{Group} * \text{Year}]_{it} \quad (3.1)$$

where:  $i = 1, 2, 3, \dots, I_t$ , and  $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots, 25$

In the equation 3.1,  $E(NI)$  is the expected mean value of national identification,  $NI_{it}$  refers to the national identification of individual  $i^{\text{th}}$  in the  $t^{\text{th}}$  survey, and  $I_t$  refers to the sample size of the  $t^{\text{th}}$  survey.<sup>13</sup>

Table 3.5 presents the results of these analyses. I have rescaled the year variable, so the year coefficient values can be interpreted directly. Thus, year 1984 will take a value of 0 and year 2010 will take a value of 26. In this way,  $\beta_0$  can be interpreted as the national identification mean in 1984.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> As long as I am interested in estimating the mean; in this section the analyses performed here treat the dependent variable as a continuous variable. Although mean values for ordinal/nominal variables are not directly interpretable, they convey an idea of the distribution of the variable over time. In the next chapter, I will carry out a similar analysis in which I treat this indicator as a nominal variable.

<sup>13</sup> I would like to make clear here that the models presented in Table 3.5 are not explanatory models of individual national identification. The goal of these analyses is to provide the reader with an idea of the trend in mean national identification for the groups of different origin. This explains why the  $R^2$  in these models is so low.

<sup>14</sup> In this section, I assume that the relationship between time and identification is linear. The depiction of the groups' means in Figure 3.4,

In Model 1,  $\beta_1$  is not statistically significant. This means that the expected value of the national identification does not change as a function of the year. Yet, the observed stability in the aggregate trend can be hiding some change in the mean of the different origin groups. In order to test this, we can now look at models 2 to 4.

In Model 2,  $\beta_0$  is the mean value of the autochthonous group in 1984 (3.821).  $\beta_1$  refers to the slope (the year trend) of the autochthonous group, and the positive sign of this coefficient reflects an upward trend in the mean. However, the small magnitude of the coefficient indicates that the magnitude of the slope is also very small. Despite this, taking into account that the higher values of our indicator reflect a more Catalan oriented identification; we can say that the autochthonous group has on average felt slightly more Catalan as time goes by.  $\beta_0 - \delta_0$  is the mean national identification for the children of mixed couples in 1984. The mean value of this group is lower than in the autochthonous group (3.501).  $\delta_0 + \delta_1 \text{Year}_{it}$  determine whether the trend in the children of mixed couples' mean national identification is significantly different from the native group.

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as well as a dummy analysis of the year indicates that this assumption does not hold for all the years. However, since here I am more interested in the analysis of the trend and the comparison of the groups' trends, I have opted for imposing a linearity constraint to make the group comparison possible.

Table 3.5. Analysis of the national identification' mean trend by origin group (1984-2010)

|   | Model (1)<br>All    | Model (2)<br>Autochtho-<br>nous vs.<br>Mixed | Model (3)<br>Autochtho-<br>nous vs.<br>S. Gen. | Model (4)<br>Autochtho-<br>nous vs.<br>Immigrants |
|---|---------------------|--|--|---|
| Year  | 0.001**<br>(0.001)  | 0.009***<br>(0.001)                          | 0.009***<br>(0.001)                            | 0.009***<br>(0.001)                               |
| Mixed   |                     | -0.333***<br>(0.037)                         |  |   |
| Year X Mixed  |                     | -0.008***<br>(0.002)                         |  |   |
| S. Generation   |                     |  | -0.635***<br>(0.030)                           |   |
| Year X S. Gen   |                     |  | -0.017***<br>(0.002)                           |   |
| Immigrants  |                     |  |  | -1.518***<br>(0.023)                              |
| Year X Imm.   |                     |  |  | -0.006***<br>(0.002)                              |
| Constant  | 3.276***<br>(0.011) | 3.821***<br>(0.013)                          | 3.821***<br>(0.013)                            | 3.821***<br>(0.013)                               |
| Observations  | 31536               | 16253  | 17696  | 21719   |
| R <sup>2</sup>  | 0.000               | 0.038  | 0.152  | 0.409   |
| Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 |                     |  |  |   |

Notes:

<sup>a</sup>Reference category for origin groups' dummies: Autochthonous<sup>b</sup>Mixed refer to children of mixed couples and S. Generation to children of immigrants<sup>c</sup>The "Year" variable refers to the year when the survey was conducted.

Source: CIS Cumulative data (1984 to 2010). As data from CIS #2543 (2003) and CIS # 2734 (2008) did not include information on the individuals and their parents' origin, these two datasets have been excluded from the analysis.

Now, in order to know whether this interactive effect is significant or not, we have to calculate the coefficient and the standard error of this effect. The information on the significance

of the interaction is presented in the first column of Table 3.6. The results indicate that the trend for the children of mixed couples is not statistically significant, and that therefore the mean trend is not a function of time.

The comparison of the second generation and autochthonous groups provides different results. In 1984, the mean value in the second-generation group (3.172) was significantly lower than the mean value in the autochthonous group (3.821). I have also calculated the marginal effect and the standard error of the interaction to test whether the second-generation group has a different trend than the autochthonous. The results presented in Table 3.6 confirm that the trend for the second generations is significantly different than the trend for the autochthonous. Additionally, as  $\delta_0$  and  $\delta_1$  are both non-zero and have opposed signs, we can say that the trends for the autochthonous and the second-generation groups' means have diverged.

*Table 3.6. Marginal effect of time on mean national identification by origin group*

|   | Autochthonous<br>vs.<br>Mixed | Autochthonous<br>vs.<br>S. Generation | Autochthonous<br>vs.<br>Immigrants |
|---|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Autochthonous   | 0.009***<br>(0.001)           | 0.009***<br>(0.001)                   | 0.009***<br>(0.001)                |
| Mixed   | -0.001<br>(0.002)             |                                       |                                    |
| S. Generation   |                               | -0.008***<br>(0.002)                  |                                    |
| Immigrants  |                               |                                       | 0.003**<br>(0.001)                 |
| Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 |                               |                                       |                                    |
| Note: Estimations from results in Table 3.6                     |                               |                                       |                                    |

Model 4 in Table 3.5 compares the immigrant group with the native group. As in previous cases, the positive and significant coefficient for the 'Year' variable indicates that the trend in the national identification of the native population is increasing, although as we saw previously the slope is almost flat. The mean national identification among the immigrants group (2.317) is significantly lower than the mean national identification among the autochthonous group (3.821). The marginal effect and the standard error of the interaction show that the mean for the immigrant group also increases as time goes by (column 3 in Table 3.6). This increasing trend reflects a pattern of assimilation among the immigrant group, which contrasts with the second-generation trend. Nevertheless, the small coefficient of the slope shows that this assimilation process occurs at a very slow pace and that convergence with the native group will not occur.

From these results, two conclusions can be drawn. First, the trend for mean national identification is increasing for the native and the immigrant groups, decreasing for the second generations, and flat for the children of mixed couples. Secondly, the small magnitude of the slope coefficients for each group confirm, as figure 3.4 showed, that the group trends in the means increase or decrease at a very slow pace. Nonetheless, we know that the relative stability in mean national identification can be masking significant changes in the percentage of persons who choose the different response categories in the questionnaire item. The next section deals with this question.

### *3.3.3. Decomposing aggregate change: population and individual changes*

As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, previous studies have reported that primarily identification with Spain decreased significantly in the first years of democracy (Martínez-Herrera 2002, 435). My depiction of the evolution of aggregate identification with Spain and Catalonia also suggests that the



percentage of individuals who identify as primarily Spanish has declined in the last twenty-six years, although this decrease over the whole period under consideration has been smaller than previous studies have claimed (see figure 3.1 and 3.2).<sup>15</sup>

Could it be possible that this decrease was more significant within each origin group? If we look at the evolution of national identification in each origin group (see figures 3.5 to 3.8 below), it can easily be seen that the percentage of primarily Spanish identifiers has remained more or less constant in the autochthonous group. Yet, this percent shows greater fluctuations in the children of mixed couples and the second generations' groups and, above all, in the immigrants' group. Now, due to the stability of the levels of primarily Spanish identifiers among the autochthonous group, changes in the percent of those who feel as Spanish as Catalan and primarily Catalan correlate inversely (-.95). The same occurs in the group of immigrants with the primarily Spanish and dual identification: the correlation of change in these two categories goes up to -.91.

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<sup>15</sup> Here it is worth noting that my depiction of national identification is left truncated in 1984. Since the available data from before 1984 comes from other sources, we cannot be certain on whether the decrease in the levels of primarily Spanish identification comes from actual changes in the levels of national identification, as Martínez-Herrera (2002) suggest, or whether these changes are the result of house effects. Due to this problem of identification, I have avoided the compilation of data from different sources, and so my data does not cover the first years of democracy.

Figure 3.5. Evolution of national identification. Autochthonous (%)




Figure 3.6. Evolution of national identification. Children of mixed couples (%)




Figure 3.7. *Evolution of national identification. Second generations (%)*





Figure 3.8. *Evolution of national identification. Immigrants (%)*



Source: CIS (1412), CIS(1719), CIS(1750), CIS(1978), CIS(1987), CIS(2052), CIS(2137), CIS(2228), CIS(2298), CIS(2374), CIS(2410), CIS(2450), CIS(2610), CIS(2643), CIS(2667), CIS(2799), CIS(2852)

Returning to the whole population, it could be argued that the slight decrease in the levels of primarily Spanish identification reported in figure 3.2 could be related to population changes (replacement of older cohorts and the immigrants) or individuals' gradual abandonment of this form of identification. In contrast, the trendless evolution of dual and primarily Catalan identification suggests that the contribution of generational replacement changes to the overall change is cancelled out by period-effects (see figure 3.2).

However, we do not know how much of the observed aggregate change in the identification with Spain and Catalonia is due to population changes, and how much is due to switches in individuals' identification choices. So, in order to gain some insight on the occurrence of population or individual changes, in the next sections I examine inter-cohort and intra-cohort changes, and I decompose aggregate changes to learn how each type of change contributes to overall change.

#### *3.3.3.1. Population changes*

In Catalonia, population changes can be the result of both the replacement of immigrants who exhibit a more Spanish oriented identification by natives who exhibit a more Catalan oriented identification, and the generational replacement of older cohorts.

In the introductory chapter, I already mentioned that the balance of immigration from other regions of Spain was over one million between 1951 and 1970 (Cabré 1999). The return of these immigrants to their home regions or the die off of the immigrant population, who were not replaced by the arrival of new immigrants coming from other Spanish regions, could have impacted the percentage of individuals who identify as primarily Spanish. Cabré (1999, 181) has estimated that between 1980 and 1985 the balance of immigration in Catalonia was negative for the first time (-86.492). However, immigrants' return rate was significantly low: 5.9 per thousand in the period 1988-1990 and

6.8 per thousand between 1992 and 1994 (Recaño and Solana 1998).

In any event, as individuals with a Spanish origin concentrate in the cohorts born between 1925 and 1954 as table 3.7 shows, it is also possible that generational and immigrant' replacement overlap.

*Table 3.7. Origin by cohort (column %)*

| Origin<br>Group/<br>Cohort   | <1924 | 1925-1934 | 1935-1944 | 1945-1954 | 1955-1964 | 1965-1974 | >1975 | Total |
|------------------------------|-------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|
| Born in<br>Catalonia         | 56    | 54        | 49        | 54        | 69        | 84        | 88    | 64    |
| Born<br>outside<br>Catalonia | 44    | <b>46</b> | <b>51</b> | <b>46</b> | 31        | 16        | 12    | 36    |
| Total                        | 2080  | 2403      | 2776      | 3002      | 3465      | 3166      | 1523  | 18415 |

Source: CIS Cumulative data (1984 to 2010). As data from CIS #1412 (1984) did not include information on individuals' age, I have here used data from CIS #1403 (1984).

It is worth noting that the generational replacement of the older cohorts will only affect aggregate national identification if the percentage of individuals within the younger cohorts who identify as primarily Spanish is smaller than the percentage among the older cohorts they are replacing. In order to test this, here I make use of the cohort classification created by Montero, Gunther, and Torcal (1998) with some slight modifications. These

modifications have been introduced bearing in mind relevant political or social events in recent Spanish and Catalan history.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, the first cohort includes those who were born before 1924 and who were of age at the end of the Alfonso XIII monarchy, the Second Spanish Republic or the civil war. Some individuals in this generation were already adults between 1931 and 1936, and witnessed Lluís Companys' proclamation of the Catalan Republic within the Spanish Federal Republic in 1934. The second cohort includes those who were born between 1925 and 1934. This generation reached political maturity during the harshest years of Franco's repression. In Catalonia, repression meant the prohibition of the public use of the Catalan language and, more generally, of any expression of Catalan identity (Benet 1978). I have divided Montero et al's (1998) third cohort in two different cohorts. The third cohort corresponds to those who were born between 1935 and 1944. This is the cohort that reached political maturity at the end of the isolation period, and during the arrival of the development plans that followed the entrance of the technocrats to power. The fourth cohort includes those born between 1945 and 1955. This latter generation came to age during the dictatorship's economic boom and the regime's liberalization, which also reached Catalonia, and entailed some degree of toleration towards the use and teaching of the Catalan language (Woolard 1989, 29). These three cohorts are the migratory cohorts, that is, the cohorts in which a higher number of immigrants came to Catalonia from other regions of Spain. Cohort five is the transition to democracy cohort and includes those who were born between 1955 and 1964. This generation is, moreover, the generation that experienced the height of the movement for autonomy in Catalonia. Cohort six includes those who were born between 1965 and 1974. This is the generation that came of age when the democratic system had consolidated: after the 1981 coup

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<sup>16</sup> The main reason for modifying Montero, Gunther and Torcal's (1998) classification is the statistical need to have cohorts of the approximate same size when carrying out the decomposition of the change (see next section).

d'état, during the CiU's majority governments in Catalonia, and in the year of the Olympic games in Barcelona. Cohort seven includes those who were born after 1975. This generation is the generation of democracy; it has grown up with Catalan television, and has been educated in an educational system in which Catalan gradually became the main language of instruction.

Taking into account the experiences that the different generations had when they came of age, we can make some hypotheses regarding these generations' identification with Spain and Catalonia. For example, we can hypothesize that the third and fourth cohort, that is, the generations born between 1935 and 1954, are possibly the ones who feel most Spanish. On the one hand, these generations experienced the liberalization of Franco's regime and, on the other hand, these generations concentrate the greatest number of immigrants born in other regions of Spain. Although these immigrants may have developed some degree of fondness towards Catalonia due to assimilation, I expect they have remained attached to Spain to a great extent. Compared to these cohorts, I expect that the oldest cohort will show a more Catalan oriented identification due to their socialization experiences. This expectation holds also for the second generation. This generation's more Catalan oriented identification could be interpreted as a reaction against the harshness of Franco's regime. Finally, I expect that fifth to seventh generations, which have experienced the height of the autonomist movement and the CiU's rule of the regional government, will exhibit a more Catalan identification.

We can very roughly test these hypotheses by estimating the following model of the national identification mean:<sup>17</sup>

$$E(NI_{it}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Cohort}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Period}_{it} \quad (3.2)$$

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<sup>17</sup> Again, it is important to make clear that this is not an explanatory model of individual national identification. This model only seeks to provide the reader with an idea of the differences in the national identification mean for the different cohort groups.

Here, I assume that the effect of age is small enough to be ignored. This strategy solves the identification problem that “exists whenever three or more independent variables need to be included in an analysis and each one is a linear function of the others” (Glenn 2005).<sup>18</sup>

The results of the analysis presented in Table 3.8 show that, contrary to our expectation, the first and the second cohort are not significantly different from the third (1935-1944) and fourth (1945-1954) cohorts together.

The mean value of the third and fourth cohorts is around the midpoint of the national identification scale (3.176) for the whole period under consideration. The fifth to seventh (1955- >1975) cohorts are the most Catalan oriented. For these three generations, their mean values are 3.326, 3.403 and 3.405, respectively.

Yet, here we are more interested in learning whether the replacement of the older cohorts for the younger ones is going to change the distribution of national identification in Catalonia. If there is no difference in the national identification levels of the older and the younger cohorts, then generational replacement should not have any impact on the percentage of individuals who identify as primarily Spanish, as Spanish as Catalan, or as primarily Catalan. Models (2) and (3) in Table 3.8 indicate that there are, in fact, significant differences in the mean values of the national identification between the oldest and the youngest cohorts. While the national identification mean value for the first (born before 1924) and second (1925-1934) generation is 3.230, the sixth (1964-1974) and the seventh (born after 1974) generations have a mean value of 3.404 and 3.406, respectively.

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<sup>18</sup> In any case, this strategy seems to be a plausible hypothesis, as there is not any *a-priori* reason to think that individuals become more Spanish oriented or more Catalan oriented, as they get older.



Table 3.8. Cohort analysis for National Identification<sup>1</sup>

|                      | Model (1)           | Model (2)           | Model (3)            | Model (4)            |
|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Birth Cohorts</i> |                     |                     |                      |                      |
| Before 1924          | 0.067<br>(0.063)    | 0.083<br>(0.063)    |                      |                      |
| 1925 - 1934          | 0.032<br>(0.044)    | 0.038<br>(0.044)    |                      |                      |
| 1935 - 1944          |                     |                     | -0.139***<br>(0.047) | -0.148***<br>(0.047) |
| 1945 -1954           |                     |                     | 0.034<br>(0.045)     | 0.026<br>(0.045)     |
| 1955 -1964           | 0.150***<br>(0.037) | 0.150***<br>(0.037) | 0.107**<br>(0.043)   | 0.097**<br>(0.043)   |
| 1964 - 1974          | 0.229***<br>(0.036) | 0.227***<br>(0.036) | 0.185***<br>(0.041)  | 0.174***<br>(0.042)  |
| After 1975           | 0.241***<br>(0.035) | 0.229***<br>(0.035) | 0.197***<br>(0.041)  | 0.176***<br>(0.042)  |
| Year                 |                     | 0.006**<br>(0.003)  |                      | 0.006**<br>(0.003)   |
| Constant             | 3.298***<br>(0.023) | 3.176***<br>(0.058) | 3.342***<br>(0.031)  | 3.230***<br>(0.058)  |
| Observations         | 13903               | 13903               | 13903                | 13903                |
| R-squared            | 0.005               | 0.005               | 0.006                | 0.006                |

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.10

Note: Categories of Reference: Third and forth cohorts in models (1) and (2) and first and second cohorts in models (3) and (4)

Source: CIS cumulative file (1984 – 2010). As data from CIS #1412 (1984) did not include information on individuals' age, I have used here data from CIS #1403 (1984)

Said this, it is worth noting that the replacement of first and second generations will not be as important as will be the

replacement of the third (1935- 1944) generation, which is the least Catalan oriented (3.082).<sup>19</sup>

From here, it is reasonable to think that if newer cohorts keep being more Catalan oriented, the generational replacement of the third cohort will make the national identification mean value go up for the whole population.

### 3.3.3.2. Individual changes vs. generational changes

As I mentioned above, aggregate change can also be the result of individual changes, that is, changes caused by the alteration of individuals' national identification over time. Individual shifts can be the result of time or period effects. In Catalonia, two kinds of time effects could be present: age or life course effects and immigrants' assimilation. In principle, there is not any *a priori* reason to think that individuals become more Catalan oriented or more Spanish oriented, as they get older. However, among the immigrants, a particular kind of time effect might be present: *identificational assimilation*. The longer immigrants have been living in Catalonia, the more probable it is that they will exhibit a more Catalan oriented identification. Besides these time effects, contextual circumstances might cause individuals to change their national identification. These shifts in individuals' identification are the result of period effects.

Hereafter, I proceed to estimate how much of the overall change in the aggregate levels of primarily Spanish identifiers and primarily Catalan identifiers is due to population changes (generational and immigrant replacement) and how much is due to individual shifts (immigrants' *identificational assimilation* and individuals' alteration of their identification due to period effects). Here, it is worth noting that the following analysis will help us to

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<sup>19</sup> This is reasonable if we take into account that this is the generation with a higher percent of population born in other regions of Spain (see Table 3.7).

learn about the magnitude of population changes *vis-à-vis* individual changes. However, we will not be able to learn how much of the population change has been due to simple generational replacement and how much to immigrants replacement. Neither will they show how much of the individual change has been caused by the immigrants' *identificational assimilation* and how much by individuals' alteration of their identification due to contextual circumstances.

In the following analyses, we first examine the decrease in the levels of primarily Spanish identifiers among the whole population and then we turn to the immigrant group, which is expected to display higher levels of individual change due to assimilation. I will also examine the autochthonous group to learn which proportion of the change in the levels of primarily Catalan identifiers is caused by the replacement of older generations and which proportion is due to period effects.

The strategy that I follow here to estimate the magnitude of these two types of changes consists of separating intra-cohort change from inter-cohort change. Intra-cohort or within-cohort change will account, therefore, for the individual changes (immigrants' *identificational assimilation* and individuals' alteration of their identification due to period effects). Inter-cohort or between-cohort changes, on the other hand, will account for the replacement of the older cohorts for younger cohorts and of the immigrants for natives.

Overall change can be expressed as a function of intra-cohort and inter-cohort change (Firebaugh 1997).

$$\Delta\mu = \sum_j [(p_{j1} + p_{j2})/2] \Delta\mu_j + \sum_j [(\mu_{j1} + \mu_{j2})/2] \Delta p_j \quad (3.3)$$

where  $\Delta$  denotes change over time, 1 and 2 subscripts refer to the yearly surveys, and the  $j$  subscripts refer to the  $j^{\text{th}}$  cohort. In this equation, the first term of the equation refers to within cohort change and the second term refers to inter-cohort change. Within cohort change for the  $j^{\text{th}}$  cohort  $[\Delta\mu_j]$  is weighted by the cohort's average population share in the two surveys  $[(p_{j1} + p_{j2})/2]$ . On the

other hand, change in the population share for the  $j^{\text{th}}$  cohort  $[\Delta p_j]$  is weighted by the cohort's average mean  $[(\mu_{j1} + \mu_{j2})/2]$ .

Although the primarily Spanish category displays a decreasing trend in some moments of time, its trend is non-monotonic (see figure 3.2 above). When a trend is non-monotonic, a comparison of the starting and the ending point of the series cannot be made.

To solve the problem, we can break the trend up into the pieces that are monotonic. Once the primarily Spanish trend is broken up into these monotonic pieces decomposition of overall change can be implemented.<sup>20</sup> Looking at figure 3.2, we can easily see that the primarily Spanish identification displays an increasing trend between 1988 and 1992, 1993 and 1996, 1999 and 2001 and, finally, between 2006 and 2009, while the trend turns decreasing in between these periods.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, in order to decompose the evolution of primarily Spanish identification over this period, we need to break the trend in eight pieces (1988-1991, 1991-1992, 1992-1996, 1996-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2006, 2006-2009 and 2009-2010).

Table 3.9 (Panel A and B) displays the intra-cohort (change within row) and the inter-cohort changes that occurred between 1988 and 2010 in the whole population. However, although we are tracking change in percent of primarily Spanish identifiers over a period of twenty-two years, the oldest generation does not definitely die off over this time. This may explain why the magnitude of generational replacement is not as important as expected.

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<sup>20</sup> I am thankful to Glenn Firebaugh for his advice on the analysis of non-monotonic trends.

<sup>21</sup> I exclude from the analysis the 1984, 1986 and 1987 surveys. As I mentioned above, the 1988 survey is the first survey that has complete information on the respondents' age, and the respondents and their parents' origin.

*Table 3.9 Decomposing (within and between cohort ) aggregate change in the primarily Spanish category (all):  
Panel A: Individuals who self-identify as primarily Spanish within each cohort*

|             | 1988         |     | 1992  |     | 1993  |     | 1996  |     | 1999  |     | 2001  |     | 2006  |     | 2009  |     | 2010  |     |
|-------------|--------------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|
|             | %            | N   | %     | N   | %     | N   | %     | N   | %     | N   | %     | N   | %     | N   | %     | N   | %     | N   |
| 1924        | <b>15.66</b> | 80  | 23.71 | 72  | 28.16 | 72  | 24.58 | 29  | 17.10 | 17  | 30.93 | 41  | 5.09  | 2   | 23.34 | 4   | 22.41 | 8   |
| 1925-1934   | <b>17.18</b> | 72  | 23.46 | 81  | 19.85 | 28  | 18.77 | 17  | 22.26 | 41  | 23.47 | 82  | 11.88 | 16  | 28.26 | 13  | 16.89 | 30  |
| 1935-1944   | <b>19.87</b> | 93  | 22.73 | 90  | 23.30 | 30  | 38.04 | 36  | 23.90 | 38  | 26.6  | 92  | 14.53 | 26  | 22.73 | 22  | 18.56 | 59  |
| 1945-1954   | <b>17.53</b> | 91  | 20.45 | 78  | 21.42 | 36  | 18.19 | 21  | 16.41 | 34  | 20.47 | 80  | 15    | 30  | 17.17 | 19  | 15.71 | 59  |
| 1955-1964   | <b>13.00</b> | 80  | 23.77 | 118 | 16.34 | 31  | 22.11 | 28  | 13.98 | 33  | 15.25 | 70  | 15.74 | 37  | 18.05 | 25  | 15.42 | 74  |
| 1965-1974   | <b>10.51</b> | 38  | 16.03 | 86  | 17.11 | 35  | 19.23 | 30  | 10.50 | 29  | 16.76 | 88  | 12.07 | 38  | 19.38 | 32  | 13.45 | 92  |
| >1975       | <b>0</b>     | 0   | 0     | 0   | 11.41 | 4   | 16.73 | 9   | 14.97 | 27  | 15.4  | 67  | 13.48 | 52  | 13.81 | 37  | 11.63 | 116 |
| All cohorts | <b>16.27</b> | 453 | 21.77 | 525 | 20.69 | 193 | 24.27 | 193 | 17.53 | 219 | 20.87 | 520 | 13.78 | 201 | 18.88 | 152 | 14.69 | 438 |

Note: Column percentages represent the percentage of individuals within each cohort who self-identify as primarily Spanish in each survey year.

The “All-cohorts” percentages are weighted averages of the cohort percentages. For example, in 1988 the “All-cohorts” percentage comes from the following calculation:  $[15.66 \times (80/453)] + [17.18 \times (72/453)] + [19.87 \times (93/453)] + [17.53 \times (91/453)] + [13.00 \times (80/453)] + [10.51 \times (38/453)] = 16.27$

*Panel B: Differences in the percent of individuals who feel primarily Spanish within each cohort between periods*

|   | 1988-<br>1992 | 1992-<br>1993 | 1993-<br>1996 | 1996-<br>1999 | 1999-<br>2001 | 2001-<br>2006 | 2006-<br>2009 | 2009-<br>2010 | Total        |
|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|
| <1924   | <b>8.05</b>   | 4.45          | -3.58         | -7.48         | 13.83         | -25.84        | 18.25         | -0.93         |              |
| 1925-1934   | 6.28          | -3.61         | -1.08         | 3.49          | 1.21          | -11.59        | 16.38         | -11.37        |              |
| 1935-1944   | 2.86          | 0.57          | 14.74         | -14.14        | 2.70          | -12.07        | 8.20          | -4.17         |              |
| 1945-1954   | 2.92          | 0.97          | -3.23         | -1.78         | 4.06          | -5.47         | 2.17          | -1.46         |              |
| 1955-1964   | 10.77         | -7.43         | 5.77          | -8.13         | 1.27          | 0.49          | 2.31          | -2.63         |              |
| 1965-1974   | 5.52          | 1.08          | 2.12          | -8.73         | 6.26          | -4.69         | 7.31          | -5.93         |              |
| >1975   | 0.00          | 11.41         | 5.32          | -1.76         | 0.43          | -1.92         | 0.33          | -2.18         |              |
| Overall change                                      | <b>5.50</b>   | -1.08         | 3.58          | -6.74         | 3.34          | <b>-7.09</b>  | 5.10          | -4.18         | <b>-1.58</b> |
| Average within cohort change<br>(weighted by size)  | 6.14          | -0.77         | 3.29          | -6.17         | 3.57          | -6.33         | 5.05          | -3.91         | <b>0.86</b>  |
| Average between cohort change<br>(weighted by mean) | -0.64         | -0.31         | 0.29          | -0.57         | -0.23         | -0.75         | 0.05          | -0.28         | <b>-2.44</b> |

Note: Change within rows reflects intra-cohort change. Percentages are the differences in the percentage of individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in one survey year and the next one. For example, between 1998 and 1992, the percent of individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in the older cohort (born before 1924) increased in 8.05% [23.71-15.66=8.05%]. On the aggregate, the weighted increase in the primarily Spanish identification between 1998 and 1992 was 5.50%.

Source: CIS(1750), CIS(1987), CIS(2052), CIS(2228), CIS(2374), CIS(2410), CIS(2643), CIS(2799), CIS(2852)

Panel B shows that significant fluctuations have occurred in the period under consideration (see overall change row), although the greater change took place between 2001 and 2006 when the levels of primarily Spanish identification decreased 7.09 percent points.<sup>22</sup> Now, where do these changes come from?

If we pay attention to the variation in between periods, we see that the changes that occurred within-cohorts are significantly greater than the changes that have occurred between-cohorts. This is reasonable because these periods are too short for a generational replacement to have occurred between them. Strikingly, the within-cohort changes occur usually in the same direction and, in particular, this is the case for the 1988 to 1992, 1999 to 2001, 2006 to 2009 and 2009 to 2010 periods. This seems to indicate that all cohorts are reacting to period effects.

Now, to compute the overall change occurred over the period under consideration, we have to sum the percent of change occurred in between periods. Over the whole period, the primarily Spanish identification has experienced an overall decrease of 1.58 percentage points. Yet, while within cohort change has shown a small increase (.86) in the percentage of primarily Spanish identifiers, between-cohort change has shown a decrease of 2.44 percentage points. Taking this into account, it can be argued that inter-generational decrease in the primarily Spanish identification has been slowed down by the within-cohort changes occurred over time.

Certainly, we cannot be sure whether the within-cohort increase in the primarily Spanish identification (.86) comes from life cycle or period effects. Unlike standard cohort tables, in which the row and column categories are the same width and, therefore, cohort-groups can be followed diagonally (Firebaugh 1997: 24), in Table 3.9 cohort-groups cannot be followed diagonally. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the change within rows is mainly the result of period-effects and not life-cycle effects. There

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<sup>22</sup> Chapter 6 examines this period of time in depth making use of individual panel data.

are three reasons which support this argument: first, there is no any *a priori* reason to think that individuals become more Spanish oriented as they get older; second, assimilation (the other form of life-cycle change) should cause a decrease, instead of an increase in the percent of Spanish identifiers; and finally, the changes observed usually occur in the same direction in all cohorts, which seems to suggest that cohorts are reacting to contextual circumstances or period effects.

Yet, if we compare figures 3.5 to 3.8, we can clearly see that immigrants are the main contributors to the primarily Spanish (“only Spanish” and “more Spanish than Catalan”) categories of the national identification indicator. Taking this into account, the same strategy can be followed to decompose the changes observed over time in the immigrants group.

Table 3.10 (panels A and B) examines the overall change in the primarily Spanish identification of the immigrant group between 1988 and 2010. As the evolution of the primarily Spanish identification does not exhibit a monotonic trend, this trend has been broken up into the pieces that are monotonic in order to decompose the change.

The balance of the overall change for the whole period is negative (-2.00). In agreement with the depiction of figure 3.5, the changes occurred within each time period were noticeably important. Most cohorts experienced a change in the same direction between 1988 and 1991, 1999 and 2001, 2001 and 2006, and finally between 2006 and 2009. This seems to indicate that in those periods, contextual circumstances affected all cohorts at the same time. The period that registered the greater within-cohort change was also the 2001 to 2006 period (-22.28).<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Since immigrants are the main contributors to the primarily Spanish category, this group’s fluctuations determine the whole population’s fluctuations.



Table 3.10 Decomposing aggregate (within and between cohort) change in the primarily Spanish category (immigrants)  
 Panel A: Individuals who self-identify as primarily Spanish within each cohort

|             | 1988         | 1991 | 1992         | 1996 | 1999  | 2001 | 2006  | 2009 | 2010  |     |       |     |       |     |       |     |       |     |
|-------------|--------------|------|--------------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|
|             | %            | N    | %            | N    | %     | N    | %     | N    | %     |     |       |     |       |     |       |     |       |     |
| 1924        | <b>36.34</b> | 77   | <b>50.55</b> | 82   | 51.54 | 73   | 55.88 | 19   | 39.58 | 19  | 60.48 | 40  | 18.18 | 2   | 33.33 | 2   | 60.00 | 11  |
| 1925-1934   | <b>39.78</b> | 75   | 61.10        | 112  | 53.79 | 85   | 48.72 | 19   | 52.63 | 40  | 55.68 | 81  | 33.33 | 16  | 52.00 | 13  | 38.81 | 36  |
| 1935-1944   | <b>41.96</b> | 94   | 54.24        | 90   | 46.65 | 87   | 61.90 | 39   | 41.84 | 41  | 56.80 | 91  | 28.57 | 24  | 43.33 | 26  | 38.45 | 72  |
| 1945-1954   | <b>34.99</b> | 83   | 57.62        | 93   | 41.84 | 81   | 48.89 | 22   | 36.00 | 36  | 47.88 | 79  | 28.57 | 24  | 37.04 | 20  | 35.52 | 68  |
| 1955-1964   | <b>35.61</b> | 58   | 50.28        | 55   | 48.57 | 84   | 45.24 | 19   | 36.84 | 28  | 40.81 | 55  | 34.85 | 23  | 38.46 | 15  | 41.91 | 73  |
| 1965-1974   | <b>61.97</b> | 25   | 61.68        | 27   | 64.45 | 40   | 76.47 | 13   | 47.22 | 17  | 60.07 | 54  | 35.19 | 19  | 62.96 | 17  | 26.33 | 38  |
| >1975       | <b>0</b>     | 0    | 0            | 0    | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0    | 60.00 | 6   | 66.58 | 22  | 38.89 | 14  | 46.43 | 13  | 33.92 | 42  |
| All cohorts | <b>39.43</b> | 412  | 55.90        | 459  | 49.87 | 450  | 55.96 | 131  | 43.12 | 187 | 54.11 | 422 | 32.42 | 122 | 45.71 | 106 | 37.43 | 340 |

Note: Column percentages represent the percentage of individuals within each cohort who self-identify as primarily Spanish in each survey year.

The “All-cohorts” percentages are weighted averages of the cohort percentages. For example, in 1988 the “All-cohorts” percentage comes from the following calculation:  $[36.34 \times (77/412)] + [39.78 \times (75/412)] + [41.96 \times (94/412)] + [34.99 \times (83/412)] + [35.61 \times (58/412)] + [61.97 \times (25/412)] = 39.43$

Note: Column percentages represent the percentage of individuals within each cohort who self-identify as primarily Spanish in each survey year.

The “All-cohorts” percentages are weighted averages of the cohort percentages. For example, in 1988 the “All-cohorts” percentage comes from the following calculation:  $[36.34 \times (77/412)] + [39.78 \times (75/412)] + [41.96 \times (94/412)] + [34.99 \times (83/412)] + [35.61 \times (58/412)] + [61.97 \times (25/412)] = 39.43$

Panel B: Differences in the percentage of individuals who feel primarily Spanish within each cohort between periods (immigrants).

|   | 1988-<br>1991 | 1991-<br>1992 | 1992-<br>1996 | 1996-<br>1999 | 1999-<br>2001 | 2001-<br>2006 | 2006-<br>2009 | 2009-<br>2010 | Total        |
|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|
| <1924   | <b>14.21</b>  | 0.99          | 4.34          | -16.30        | 20.90         | -42.30        | 15.15         | 26.67         |              |
| 1925-1934   | 21.32         | -7.31         | -5.07         | 3.91          | 3.05          | -22.35        | 18.67         | -13.19        |              |
| 1935-1944   | 12.28         | -7.59         | 15.25         | -20.06        | 14.96         | -28.23        | 14.76         | -4.88         |              |
| 1945-1954   | 22.63         | -15.78        | 7.05          | -12.89        | 11.88         | -19.31        | 8.47          | -1.52         |              |
| 1955-1964   | 14.67         | -1.71         | -3.33         | -8.40         | 3.97          | -5.96         | 3.61          | 3.45          |              |
| 1965-1974   | -0.29         | 2.77          | 12.02         | -29.25        | 12.85         | -24.88        | 27.77         | -36.63        |              |
| >1975   | 0.00          | 0.00          | 0.00          | 60.00         | 6.58          | -27.69        | 7.54          | -12.51        |              |
| All cohorts   | <b>16.47</b>  | -6.04         | 6.09          | -12.84        | 10.99         | -21.69        | 13.43         | -8.28         | <b>-2.00</b> |
| Average within cohort change<br>(weighted by size)  | 16.21         | -5.97         | 5.37          | -11.87        | 10.42         | <b>-22.28</b> | 13.41         | -8.00         | <b>-2.86</b> |
| Average between cohort change<br>(weighted by mean) | 0.26          | -0.07         | 0.72          | -0.97         | 0.57          | 0.59          | 0.02          | -0.28         | <b>0.86</b>  |

Note: Change within rows reflects intra-cohort change. Percentages are the differences in the percentage of immigrants who self-identified as primarily Spanish in one survey year and the next one. For example, between 1988 and 1991, the percentage of individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in the older cohort (born before 1924) increased in 14.21% [50.55-36.34=14.21%]. On the aggregate, the weighted increase in the primarily Spanish identification between 1988 and 1991 was of 16.47%.

Source: CIS(1750), CIS(1778), CIS(1987), CIS(2228), CIS(2374), CIS(2410), CIS(2643), CIS(2799), CIS(2852)

Contrary to what happened in the analysis of the whole population, here the main source of overall change in the percent of primarily Spanish identifiers is not inter-cohort change (generational replacement), but intra-cohort change. Actually, between-cohort change presents a positive sign (.86), which might be capturing the arrival of new younger immigrants to Catalonia. Within-cohort changes in this group may be either the result of period effects, or life-cycle effects associated with the immigrants' assimilation process.

If within-cohort changes were only due to assimilation, we should observe that in each cohort, (and especially, in the oldest cohorts, who have been living in Catalonia longest) the percentage of primarily Spanish identifiers should have decreased in between all the periods. Nevertheless, if we pay attention to the row changes, we can see that positive changes alternate with negative changes in all the cohorts. This seems to suggest that the within-cohort changes experienced by the immigrant group are more the result of period-effects than the result of assimilation processes.

Before concluding this section, it could also be of interest to look at the evolution of the primarily Catalan identification among the autochthonous group. The decomposition of the aggregate change in the period under consideration will determine whether change in this group is mainly the result of generational changes (the replacement of the older cohorts for new cohorts, supposedly more Catalan oriented), or individual changes.

Again, to decompose aggregate change we have to look at those periods that exhibit a monotonic trend. According to the depiction of primarily Catalan identification in figure 3.5, these periods are 1988 to 1992, 1992 to 1996, 1996 to 1998, 1998 to 1999, 2001 to 2002, 2002 to 2006, 2006 to 2007, 2007 to 2009 and 2009 to 2010. However, instead of representing the percent of autochthonous who self-identify as primarily Catalan within each cohort, in the next table (table 3.11) I only present the differences in the percent of autochthonous who feel primarily Catalan within each cohort between the mentioned periods (panel B).

Table 3.11 Decomposing (within and between cohort) aggregate change in the primarily Catalan category (autochthonous)  
 Panel B: Differences in the % of individuals who feel primarily Catalan within each cohort between periods (autochthonous group).

|   | 1998-<br>1999 | 1999-<br>2001 | 2001-<br>2002 | 2002-<br>2005 | 2005-<br>2006 | 2006-<br>2007 | 2007-<br>2009 | 2009-<br>2010 | Total       |
|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|
| <1924   | 15.38         | 0.32          | -9.49         | 18.46         | 9.37          | -2.38         | -20.45        | -8.29         |             |
| 1925-1934   | -7.42         | -1.06         | 4.07          | -7.87         | 8.82          | 7.20          | -29.86        | 24.63         |             |
| 1935-1944   | 6.96          | -9.38         | 10.74         | -1.82         | -10.28        | -9.15         | 13.34         | 3.74          |             |
| 1945-1954   | 1.35          | 4.30          | -12.10        | 8.82          | -3.28         | -6.51         | 8.95          | -0.95         |             |
| 1955-1964   | -1.58         | 3.78          | -10.35        | 11.59         | -12.67        | 0.97          | 10.25         | -0.38         |             |
| 1965-1974   | -10.61        | 3.96          | -8.96         | 15.61         | -7.68         | 1.90          | -3.26         | 0.92          |             |
| >1975   | -10.38        | 9.55          | -12.57        | 3.17          | 2.31          | 6.01          | -13.92        | 5.27          |             |
| All cohorts   | -3.70         | 3.35          | <b>-6.81</b>  | <b>7.39</b>   | -3.31         | 3.88          | -5.54         | 2.01          | <b>6.53</b> |
| Average within cohort change<br>(weighted by size)  | -3.01         | 2.67          | -6.31         | 6.59          | -3.16         | 1.79          | -5.06         | 3.07          | <b>5.60</b> |
| Average between cohort change<br>(weighted by mean) | -0.70         | 0.68          | -0.50         | 0.80          | -0.15         | 2.09          | -0.48         | -1.06         | <b>0.93</b> |

Note: Differences in the percent of individuals who feel primarily Spanish within each cohort have been calculated from the percentage of autochthonous who self-identify as primarily Catalan within each cohort in 1988, 1992, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010. The results of these calculations are not presented here due to space limitations.  
 Source: CIS(1750), CIS(1978), CIS(1987), CIS(2228), CIS(2374), CIS(2410), CIS(2643), CIS(2799), CIS(2852)

The 1988 to 1992 and the 1992 to 1996 periods exhibit the highest levels of aggregate change. Primarily Catalan identifiers increased 13.65 percentage points between 1988 and 1992, they decreased by about the same magnitude (12.65) between 1992 and 1996, and the percentage recovered again in the following period (8.26).

The magnitude of change is also significant between 2001 and 2002, when the percentage of primarily Catalan identifiers decreased by 6.81 percentage points, and between 2002 and 2005, when this percentage increased by 7.39 points. In the first three periods, 1988 to 1992, 1992 to 1996 and 1996 to 1998, change occurs in the same direction in almost all cohorts. However, from that moment on, within each period, the percentage of primarily Catalan identifiers increases in some cohorts and decreases in others.

The right-handed column in table 3.11 shows the magnitude of the overall change, and the proportion of change that comes from within cohort and between cohort changes. Over the whole period, primarily Catalan identifiers increased by 6.53 percentage points. Yet, the main source of change was not the generational replacement of older cohorts, but within-cohort change. Specifically, within-cohort change makes up to 85 percent of the overall change in the period under consideration. As was mentioned above, we lack any reason to think that the autochthonous become more Catalan oriented as they become older. Therefore, within-cohort change must be the result of period effects and contextual circumstances which have caused that the autochthonous population has become more Catalan over the years.

### **3.4 Conclusions**

This first empirical chapter of the dissertation has examined aggregate change in national identification descriptively and, it has looked into the changes that occurred between 1984 and 2010

from different perspectives. The aim of the chapter was to answer three basic questions that previous studies have left unanswered: How important are the changes that have occurred in national identification over the past thirty years? Are the changes in the percentage of persons who identify with Spain and/or Catalonia affecting the mean tendency? How much of the overall change is due to population changes and how much is due to individuals' alteration of their national identification?

The results of the descriptive analyses that have been carried out in this chapter provide an answer to these questions. Thus, it has been shown that notable fluctuations have occurred in the levels of primarily Spanish, dual and primarily Catalan identifiers over the period under consideration, both in the whole population, and within each origin group. However, even though the magnitude of these changes has been significant, the fluctuations have not affected the national identification mean. In this regard, the analyses presented here have shown that the evolution of the national identification mean in the whole population is not a function of time. However, when each origin group has been examined separately, we have learned that the national identification mean has slightly increased in the native and the immigrant groups, and slightly decreased in the second-generation group.<sup>24</sup>

In this chapter, I have also carried out decomposition analyses of the aggregate change to separate between and within cohort changes, and to learn how much of the aggregate change is due to population changes (generational replacement) and how much is due to individual changes (*identificational assimilation* and individual change in the national identification). Separate analyses have been implemented for the whole population, the immigrants and the autochthonous groups.

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<sup>24</sup> The fact that the second-generation mean has decreased over time is a surprising result, which calls for further research. The next chapter will return to this point.

For the whole population, the aggregate decrease in the percentage of individuals who self-identify as primarily Spanish has been shown to be the joint effect of inter-cohort change and a compensation effect that comes from intra-cohort change. The result of these two joint effects has been a 1.58 percent decrease in the percentage of individuals who self-identify as primarily Spanish in the whole population. As figure 3.2 already suggested, the magnitude of the change in the percentage of primarily Spanish identifiers has been relatively small in the period between 1988 and 2010. This, however, does not exclude the possibility that the levels of primarily Spanish identifiers decreased before 1988.<sup>25</sup>

The decomposition method used here has allowed separating population (between-cohort) changes from individual (within-cohort) changes. However, this method is unable to estimate how much of the between-cohort changes are attributable to the replacement of the old cohorts by new ones and how much are attributable to the replacement of immigrants by natives. Neither is it able to estimate how much of the within-cohort changes are due to age effects, how much are due to *identificational assimilation*, and how much are due to period effects.

Therefore, while between-cohort changes can be considered the compound effect of the replacement of older generations and the replacement of immigrants, within-cohort changes can be attributed to two kind of processes: immigrants' *identificational assimilation* and individuals' alteration of their identification due to contextual circumstances.<sup>26</sup>

In order to distinguish between these two latter effects, I have decomposed aggregate change in the percentage of primarily Spanish identifiers within the immigrant group. Here, the

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<sup>25</sup> Here, it is worth recalling that the CIS data is left-truncated and, therefore, I have not been able to examine whether the levels of Spanish identifiers decreased in the aftermath of Franco's regime.

<sup>26</sup> As argued above, there is not any *a priori* reason to think that individuals become more Spanish (or more Catalan) oriented as they get older. Accordingly, we can discard the presence of age effects.

decrease trend in the levels of primarily Spanish identifiers has also been found to be the joint effect of generational replacement and individual change. In the immigrants group, however, it has been shown that within-cohort (individual) negative change has been greater than between-cohort (generational) positive change, which can be explained by the arrival of younger immigrants from other regions of Spain. That said, as the within-cohort change does not correspond to a pattern of assimilation, this change in the immigrant group could be attributed to immigrants' alteration of their national identification over time due to period effects.

In any event, as happened with the whole population, the magnitude of the change in the percentage of primarily Spanish identifiers among the immigrants group is relatively small. Two reasons could explain the small magnitude of this change. First, immigrants' *identificational assimilation* could have occurred before 1988. This would be consistent with Martínez-Herrera's (2002) analysis, which has shown that the most important changes in this category of identification occurred in the aftermath of Franco's regime. Second, it could be that a floor effect is preventing the percentage of primarily Spanish identifiers to decrease even more.

In addition, it is worth noting that, keeping the balance of immigration between Catalonia and the other Spanish regions constant, a decline in the levels of primarily Spanish identifiers are not expected to occur until the most Spanish oriented cohort, that is, the cohort of those individuals who were born between 1935 and 1944 and who were between 66 and 75 years old in 2010, is replaced.

In the autochthonous group, the decomposition analyses I have carried out have shown a significant increase in the levels of primarily Catalan identification (6.53). Although the replacement of the eldest cohort for the youngest cohort has contributed to the overall change, this change is mainly attributable to individual change. However, contrary to what has been found in the decomposition analyses of the immigrants group, in the



autochthonous group the effects of context do not seem to have affected all the cohorts in the same direction in all the periods.

Now, taking into account that period-effects seem to be essential to explain not only trendless changes in the dual and primarily Catalan identification, but also change in the primarily Spanish identification of immigrants, the next chapter will look for possible explanations for these period effects.

## **CHAPTER 4. CHANGE IN NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION OVER THE LONG-TERM**

### **4.1. Introduction**

The previous chapter has examined the evolution of aggregate identification with Spain and Catalonia from the mid eighties to 2010. This chapter moves down to the individual level to look into individual change. The chapter tries to explain what lies behind these changes, and it argues that individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia is shaped in relation to elites' activation of the center-periphery cleavage.

In line with previous studies (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1986; Linz and Montero 1986; Torcal and Chhibber 1995), here I assume that political elites activate cleavages. Since the arrival of democracy in Spain, party competition has contributed to crystallizing a conflict of interest which had been forged in the ninetieth century and became explicit during the Spanish II Republic. The claims political parties make regarding the cleavage and the stances they adopt regarding the issues that are embedded in it, make salient and activate the cleavage between Spain and Catalonia. In the aggregate, individuals' reactions to political parties' claims explain the movements of society in one or another direction.

In order to test this argument, two strategies will be followed in this chapter. First, I will examine whether the Catalan parties' understandings of Catalan identity and the assimilation policies implemented by the CiU governments, with the support of the

main Catalan parties, have influenced individuals' identification with Catalonia. In particular, in the following pages, I will argue that Catalan parties have long attempted to de-primordialize Catalan identity, that is, to dissociate it from purely ascriptive elements (ancestry and origin) and to build a single Catalan-speaking community. This is an idea already suggested in Woolard (1989), Conversi (1997) and Argelaguet (2006). Qualitative evidence will be provided to show that Catalan elites have presented Catalan identity as an identity that could be voluntarily adopted. In addition, secondary sources will be used to describe the language policies that were promoted by the CiU governments to assimilate non-Catalan speaking population and, the children of immigrants, in particular.<sup>1</sup>

From here, I will examine whether the relative weight of the ascriptive (descent and origin) and acquired elements (knowledge of Catalan language) of identity has evolved over time. Taking into account the strategy of Catalan political parties, I expect to find that the ascriptive elements of Catalan identity have lost weight in favor of the acquired elements. If this expectation is confirmed then we will be able to argue that the strategy implemented by the CiU's governments, with the support of other Catalan parties, has been successful when "converting" Spanish immigrants and their children into Catalans through language assimilation.

Secondly, I will try to relate changes in the political context with change in national identification. Here, two hypotheses will be tested in an attempt to account for both aggregate level and individual level variation. The first hypothesis will refer to the Catalan nationalist parties' greater incentives to activate the cleavage depending on whether they hold a weak position in the regional and the national parliaments, and to the consequences that

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<sup>1</sup> Even though language planning in Catalonia has touched on many aspects of social life, I will pay special attention to language policies in the school realm. In the next chapter I will return to this point, and will examine the impact that the 1983 language reform has had on those generations that have been educated since that year.

the activation of the center-periphery has upon identification with Catalonia. The second hypothesis will refer to the effect that confrontation along the center-periphery at the time the survey is conducted has on respondents' identification. These two hypotheses are presented as alternative and complementary explanations to the hypothesis that decentralization explains change in national identification (Guibernau 2006, 2007; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005, 2009). By looking at political parties' incentives for activating the cleavage and to levels of confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage, I seek to account for short-term changes, instead of long-term patterns in aggregate identification with Spain and Catalonia.

In this chapter, I will make use of the longitudinal data I presented in the previous chapter. The results of the empirical analyses will be mixed. On the one hand, analyses will show that today Spanish immigrants and their children differ more from the autochthonous population in their national identification than twenty years ago. This is a consequence of the autochthonous population's greater likelihood to identify today exclusively with Catalonia. This result is to a great extent contrary to the Catalan political parties' aspiration to build a single community in Catalonia. On the other hand, the results will show that the level of political confrontation along the cleavage contributes to polarizing autochthonous and second generations' identification. However, non-robust results will be shown for the hypothesis that identification with Catalonia decreases when the nationalist parties are in a stronger position in the national and the regional parliament and, therefore, they have greater incentives to deactivate the cleavage.

This chapter is organized in six sections. The next section shows how political elites' have defined national identity in territorial and voluntary terms, and not in primordial ones, and it then looks at the strategy that Catalan elites' have followed to assimilate Spanish immigrants. This section pays attention as well to the period between 2003 and 2010, when the *Tripartit* replaced the CiU in the regional government. Here, it will be argued that

the *Tripartit*'s language policy had a unchanging character. Section three introduces the chapter's hypotheses. Section four briefly describes the data and the variables. Section five presents the results of the analysis and section six concludes.

#### **4.2. A look at the period under consideration (1977 – 2010)**

“Before a diverse society, which was still touched by the effects of Franco's regime, I opted for a policy of dissemination. When one opts for dissemination a less profound degree of adhesion is demanded; however it was better that six million Catalans were or felt a bit or reasonably Catalan or, at least, identified with the country [Catalonia], than that three million of them were very nationalistic and the other three were not at all.” [Jordi Pujol's Memoirs (2009, 48-49)]

Rather than providing a detailed account of what has happened in Catalan politics over the last thirty years,<sup>2</sup> this section looks at certain issues that are relevant to the hypotheses that will be presented in section 4.3. I will first explain how the contemporary definition of Catalan identity was built. In particular, I will focus on the period of the Spanish transition and I will leave aside the genesis of Catalan identity (see Conversi 1997; Díez Medrano 1999; Keating 1996). This decision is motivated by the fact that it was during the transition when political parties in Catalonia structured their electoral constituencies. And this is important because, as I will argue next, the leading Catalan political parties' definition of Catalanness and their choice for assimilation policies

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<sup>2</sup> See Calzada and Llorens (1995) for a review on the fifteen first years of the CiU Government, and Lo Cascio (2008) for the period between 1980 and 2003. For a very complete and detailed review of the language policy in Catalonia see Argelaguet (1999) and Miley (2006). The latter includes, moreover, abundant references to other works. An interesting review of the first Tripartit can be found, for example, in Mercader's (2008) chronicle of Pasqual Maragall's presidency. For a detailed account of the process of reform of the Statute see Ridao (2006).

were strongly influenced by their electoral interests. After depicting elites' definition of Catalanness, in the following pages I will refer very briefly to the language policies that were implemented by the CiU's regional governments (1980-2003). The last part of this section will cover the *Tripartit* governments (2003-2010).

The following pages, therefore, seek to show that Pujol's *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) governments developed a strategy that consisted in combining a definition of Catalanness based on territorial and voluntary criteria, with policies of language assimilation. This strategy was not only expected to get immigrants and their children to learn Catalan language, but also to get them to feel Catalan, as Pujol's quote above suggests. The *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, the *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (PSC), the *Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya* (PSUC), and later on the *Iniciativa per Catalunya-els Verds* (ICV) shared this goal.

#### 4.2.1. Delimiting the boundaries of Catalan identity (1977-1980)

The contemporary definition of Catalan collective identity cannot be understood without making reference to Jordi Pujol's book: *Immigració; esperança i problema de Catalunya*. In this book, Pujol argued against the division of Catalonia into two separate (immigrant and native) communities, and for the integration of the immigrants into Catalan society.<sup>3</sup> This is also the book in which Pujol established the rules for membership in the Catalan group. These rules of membership are made of a combination of territorial and voluntary criteria:

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<sup>3</sup> Here, it is worth noting that even though Pujol avoids using and even dislikes the term "assimilation" (see Pujol 1976, 2009), and he prefers to use instead the terms dissemination or integration, the language policy implemented in Catalonia can be generally considered an assimilation policy.

“The definition [of Catalan] that we like most is that which says: A Catalan is every person who lives and works in Catalonia and, who makes Catalonia his or her home and the country he or she identifies with” (Pujol, 1976).

Pujol’s stances against building two communities in Catalonia and his open definition of Catalanness were electorally beneficial for his political project, the *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* (CDC). In 1977, Catalan political parties, in general, and the CDC, in particular, needed to develop a catch-all party’ strategy which could attract as many voters as possible. Although competition around the left-right dimension meant that Catalan political parties renounced competing for votes of a part of the electorate, political parties could try to widen their electorate by obviating the language division.

Making the boundaries of membership into the Catalan group more permeable allowed the *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* (CDC) to attract the votes of a part of the population that had its origins outside the Catalan nation the nationalist party sought to represent.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the slogan which the CDC used during its launch in 1977, “*A Catalonia valid for everyone*”, “did not only show a willingness to foster inter-class integration, but also a willingness to integrate the different cultural and social communities which lived in Catalonia” (Marcet 1987, 203).

Left-wing parties were also electorally interested in promoting this single community but for different reasons to those of the CDC. Building a single community allowed *Catalanist* left-wing parties, the PSUC and the PSC, to appeal to two types of left-wing

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<sup>4</sup> As Linz (1985) has contended in ethnically heterogeneous contexts, as the Catalan context is, nationalist parties with hegemonic political goals are compelled to abandon their ethnic claims, and to adopt territorial or voluntary criteria for group membership in order to widen their targeted community. The ultimate goal would be to get both in-group and out-group members to assume nationalist parties’ self-government aspirations.

electorates that differ in their origin: *Catalanist* natives and the Spanish immigrant working class.

The victory of the *Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Congrés* (PSC-C) and the Catalan Federation of the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE)'s joint candidacy in the 1977 general elections in Catalonia had already showed that an alliance between two parties, which appealed to two different kinds of electorates, could be electorally successful.<sup>5</sup> So in 1978, the *Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Congrés*, the *Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Reagrupament* and the Catalan Federation of the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) merged and the *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (PSC) was formed (Colomé 1989).<sup>6</sup> Ultimately, the PSC expected to gather the support of all left-wing voters in Catalonia, regardless of their origin.

On the other hand, the *Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya's* (PSUC) claim for building a single community in Catalonia was just a continuation of the underground political action the party had carried out during the dictatorship. This political action had been defined in the Congress that the party had celebrated in 1956 in France. In that Congress, the PSUC had signaled its wish "not to turn a class conflict into an ethnic conflict (between immigrant workers and the native businessmen of the bourgeoisie) and to foster the cultural integration of immigrants into Catalan society" (Díez Medrano 1999, 198). In the latter years of Franco's regime, the PSUC achieved this goal as it got that the Spanish working-class participated as well in the autochthonous' struggle for self-government (Conversi 1997, 213-214).

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<sup>5</sup> Table A.4.1 in the appendix presents the results of the regional elections from 1980 to 2010, the distribution of seats in the Catalan parliament and the type of government.

<sup>6</sup> The relationship between the PSC and the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) has always been complex. Legally the PSC is independent from the PSOE, although it is federated to it (Colomé 1989). The PSC's "strange nature" and the heterogeneous origins of the PSC electoral base explain this party's ambiguity on the issues that are embedded in the center-periphery dimension.



Nevertheless, in the first years of democracy, all these parties' interest in building a single community in Catalonia conflicted with the *Partido Socialista Andaluz* (PSA)'s own electoral interest. The PSA, a political party that was based in Andalusia, set itself up as responsible for defending the identity and the cultural and social interests of Andalusian immigrants living in Catalonia (Rojas Marcos, *El Periódico de Cataluña*, March 15, 1980: 15).

The question of "who is Catalan" became explicitly salient in the first years of the democracy and it was present everyday in the newspapers (Woolard 1989, 36). During the elaboration of the Statute of Autonomy, the CDC made an initial proposal to recognize immigrants' right to decide freely whether they wanted to retain the citizenship of their birthplaces. The socialists and the communists presented an alternative proposal according to which everyone who resided in a Catalan municipality would be granted the Catalan *political status* (Lo Cascio 2008, 64). This latter proposal was accepted unanimously and included as such in the Statute: "[All] Spanish citizens who, in accordance with general Spanish law, are registered as residents of any municipality of Catalonia, will be considered as Catalans for political purposes" (Article 6.1, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 1979).<sup>7</sup>

The PSA, together with the *Partido Socialista Aragonés* and the *Partido Aragonés Regionalist*, fought strongly against this definition of the *political status* of Catalans and defended immigrants exercising their right to vote in their regions of origin. The PSA declared, moreover, "the existence of several communities within Catalonia" (Rojas Marcos, *Diario 16*, August 22, 1979: 1). However, the PSA's attempt to trace a dividing line between the "Catalans" and the "immigrants" was rejected by the main Catalan parties, which accused the PSA of trying to divide

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<sup>7</sup> All the members of the *Comissió dels Vint*, which was responsible for drawing up the Statute, accepted the proposal unanimously. The *Comissió* consisted of representatives of the PSC, the PSUC, the *Centristes de Catalunya- Unión de Centro Democrático* (CC-UCD), the CDC, the ERC and the AP.

Catalonia's inhabitants according to their *racial* characteristics.<sup>8</sup> The controversy moved Catalan political parties to emphasize even more strongly that immigrants were full Catalans.

During the campaign over the Statute of Autonomy, two slogans were used extensively: "Now more than ever, one single people" and "All those who live and work in Catalonia are Catalan" (Woolard 1989, 36), which was a simplification of Pujol's definition of Catalanness. The campaign sought to get immigrants to participate in Catalonia's demands for autonomy, and obviated their ethnic and linguistic differences.

In November 1979, only one month after the Statute of Autonomy had been passed in a referendum, Jordi Pujol (the CDC's leader), Heribert Barrera (the ERC's leader), Gregorio López Raimundo (the PSUC's leader), and Joan Reventós (the PSC's leader) participated in the closing roundtable of the conference "*Catalunya: immigració i reconstrucció nacional*". The conference had been organized to discuss the social and cultural challenge that immigration meant to Catalonia. The speeches delivered by these parties' leaders show that nationalist parties had come to agree on a definition of Catalanness which was based on a voluntary criterion, and that they expected Catalonia to become a single Catalan-speaking community after two generations.

Jordi Pujol and Heribert Barrera emphasized a definition of Catalanness based on individuals' willingness to be Catalan (Barrera, 1980; Pujol, 1980). The two leaders rejected, moreover, any definition of the Catalan identity based on primordial characteristics, either because a definition of the Catalan identity based on primordial characteristics was too demanding:

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<sup>8</sup> Sopena, Enric. "Ofensiva lerrouxista en Catalunya. El voto de los inmigrantes, objetivo fundamental de la campaña". *Informaciones*. March 10, 1977 in Linz, Juan J. Archivo Linz de la Transición Española. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, 2006 [Cited: (August 6, 2008)]. Available at: <http://www.march.es/ceacs/linz/>.

“We do not want to make being Catalan difficult. Or at least, our party does not want to make being Catalan difficult. We do not want to say: “Catalan is everyone who has been here for many generations...Catalan is everyone whose grandparents, and the grandparents of his grandparents descend from the first Catalans, Catalan is everyone who... etc, etc. No! Catalan is everyone who lives and works in Catalonia, and who wants to be Catalan” (Pujol 1980, 220-221).

Or because, it was not a sufficient criterion to show one’s Catalanness:

“It is not enough to have been born in Catalonia. It is possible that there are people who were born in Catalonia, who were born in a family from another culture, and they do not want to be Catalan” (Barrera 1980, 212).

The willingness to be Catalan, however, was not yet clearly associated with language abilities or practices.

“One can be Catalan and speak in Castilian every day or not have achieved the ability to speak in our language, and that has no importance” (Barrera 1980, 212).

“[Being Catalan] is neither a linguistic issue nor a genealogical one” (Pujol, *El Correo Catalán*, May 1st, 1977: 48).<sup>9</sup>

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the immigrants who had arrived in Catalonia between the mid fifties and the mid seventies concentrated in neighborhoods and worked in jobs in which the Catalan language was completely absent. In addition, during Franco’s regime, the teaching of Catalan in school had

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<sup>9</sup> In Linz, Juan J. *Archivo Linz de la Transición Española*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, 2006 [Cited: (August 6, 2008)]. Available at: <http://www.march.es/ceacs/linz/>.

been forbidden. Franco's ban on teaching Catalan in schools had prevented natives from becoming full competent in Catalan, and it had also reinforced the children of immigrants' alienation from the Catalan language. These two circumstances advised against the use of any definition of Catalanness based on the language. Nevertheless, the disassociation between the willingness to be Catalan and the Catalan language did not last for long. Ultimately, Pujol was convinced that language was the only means by which immigrants and their children could become full Catalans:

“(Language is) the decisive factor in the integration of the immigrants in Catalonia. It is the most definitive. A man who speaks Catalan to his children, is a Catalan through and through” (Pujol 1976, 83).

Thus, when he came to power in 1980, the language policies he implemented sought to get immigrants and their children to switch to Catalan. In fact, the two Catalan nationalist leaders envisaged a Catalonia that, in a period of two generations, would be transformed into a single community in which, according to Barrera (1980, 213), Catalan would be the language of daily communication or, in which, according to Pujol (1980, 219), everyone could speak, understand, read and write Catalan.

Left parties' leaders position differed from Pujol and Barrera's on these issues. In the view of the PSUC leader, Gregorio López Raimundo, and the PSC leader, Joan Reventós, Catalonia was already a single community:

“In Catalonia there are not two communities separated by place of origin or the language, but a single community, the Catalan people, that has the peculiarity of including a significant number of immigrants, who are being gradually integrated within it, adopting its language and other national attributes” (López Raimundo 1980, 227)

“Catalonia is a single national community –a single people, as has been recently shouted with different accents–. And this is so not only

because of its history and specific characteristics, but, especially, because we assume that there is an historic necessity to build a national project for working people” (Reventós 1980, 236)

Despite this difference of nuance between the nationalist and the leftist party leaders, it was clear that all they shared the idea that Catalonia could not be divided in two linguistically distinct communities. Gradually, the question of “who is Catalan” faded from public debate, but the simplistic version of Pujol’s definition of Catalanness (“Catalan is everyone who lives and works in Catalonia”) would remain.

Different reasons could explain why the debate over the criteria for Catalanness lost prominence. First, the Statute of Autonomy had granted immigrants and their children the Catalan *political status*. Secondly, both Catalan nationalist parties and left-wing parties subscribed the idea that Catalonia could not be divided into two ethnic and linguistic communities. Third, the only political party that had fiercely advocated for the existence of different communities within Catalonia, the PSA, was only able to get a seat in the Catalan parliament in the first regional elections. After 1984, the party will disappear from Catalan politics.

Building on the idea that the Catalan population should become a single Catalan-speaking community, the CiU governments implemented a language policy that sought to foster the immigrants’ and their children’s linguistic and identificational assimilation. The following sections will describe very briefly the language policies that were approved during the CiU’s governments. It will pay special attention to how these policies affected to the education system, as the school has been considered a key instrument for fostering the children of immigrants’ assimilation.

#### *4.2.2. The CiU governments (1980-2003) and the language policy*

As mentioned in the introduction, the victory of the *Convergència i Unió* (CiU), a coalition made of the CDC and the

*Unió Democràtica de Catalunya* (UDC), in the first regional elections came as a surprise. The PSC had won the 1977 and the 1979 general elections, and so there was widespread conviction that the PSC would also win the regional elections (Lo Cascio 2008, 96). The 1980 regional elections allowed, nevertheless, the CiU became the ruling party in Catalonia, with the support of the ERC. The CiU would also win the 1984 regional elections, and it would continue to rule Catalonia over the next nineteen years, until a coalition of three left-wing parties (the *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya*, the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* and the *Iniciativa per Catalunya-els Verds*) replaced this party in 2003.<sup>10</sup>

On the debate or his investiture, Jordi Pujol established his government's priorities: the development of the regional government's responsibilities, the institutionalization of the regional administration, the recuperation of the productive fabric, and the promotion of Catalan identity (Lo Cascio 2008, 103).

The recuperation of the Catalan language was essential to fostering Catalan identity (Argelaguet 2006; Lo Cascio 2008, 103). With this goal in mind, Catalan government promoted two laws that were intended to increase the levels of knowledge and use of Catalan: the Law on Language Normalization (1983) and the Law that created the Catalan Corporation of Radio and Television (1983). The passing of these laws and, in particular, the

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<sup>10</sup> The 1980-1984 CiU minority government had the support of the ERC and the *Centristes de Catalunya*-UCD. Even though the CiU got an absolute majority in the 1984 regional elections, the ERC renewed its support for the CiU in the second term (1984-1988). In the next two regional elections (1988 and 1992), the CiU got a majority of the votes. So, between 1984 and 1994 the CiU ruled with a majority government. The CiU lost the majority in the fifth (1995-1999) and the sixth terms (1999-2003). The CiU's poor electoral results in 2003 facilitated a change in the regional government. In those elections the PSC got forty-two seats, the CiU, forty-six seats, the ERC, twenty-three, the PP, fifteen, and the ICV, nine seats. For more details, on the coalition governments in Catalonia see Ridao (2006). See also Table A.4.1 in the appendix.

passing of the Law on Language Normalization had been facilitated by the fact that all Catalan parties and, specifically, the main opposition party (the PSC) conceived Catalonia as a single community in which the Catalan language would become Catalonia's "own" language. Raimon Obiols, which was at that time the PSC leader, and who represented the more *Catalanist* wing within the PSC, seem to agree with Pujol's national reconstruction project:

"We (the PSC) have believed that the objective of achieving language normalization, the full recovery of Catalan as Catalonia's own language, was inseparable from the national reconstruction of the country. It must be integrated into the global objective of making Catalonia a single people" (Obiols 1984, vii).

However, despite Catalan political parties agreed on the idea that Catalonia should be a single community, they disagreed on the policies that should be developed to promote this goal. So, for example, the model of school that should be started in Catalonia confronted political parties during the negotiations over the Law on Language Normalization (*Llei de Normalització Lingüística*, LNL, 1983).

Catalan parties were divided in two groups. On the one hand, the CiU, the ERC and the *Centristes de Catalunya*-UCD defended the language separation model. On the other hand, the PSUC and the PSC were against this model, as it was thought to limit the children of immigrants' opportunities of social mobility (Lo Cascio 2008, 121). The PSC and the PSUC managed to impose a model in which children could not be separated in different classes or schools according to their language abilities. The LNL was finally passed with the support of all political parties and the only abstention from a member of the Parliament (which was not ascribed to any political party). The LNL turned Catalan into one of the two languages of instruction in school, along with Spanish; it guaranteed children's right to be initially educated in their mother tongue (whenever parents request it); it forbade the separation of children with different mother tongues in schools or

classes, and it stated that the Catalan language should be increasingly used at school (Argelaguet 1999, 236).

Over the years, the CiU would fully assume this model of school integration. It would also promote that Catalan language' presence increased in schools. So in 1992, the CiU government passed the language immersion decree (*Decret 75/1992*). Progressively, most Catalan political parties agreed on moving the *status quo* from bilingual education to language immersion.<sup>11</sup>

Five years later, in 1997, the CiU started the reform of the Law on Language Normalization. The reform sought to silence the nationalist voters' criticisms to the CiU's support of the PP's minority national government (Miley 2006, 297).<sup>12</sup> Beyond this, the motivation to change the 1983 Law was Catalan language still disadvantaged situation. This disadvantaged situation was caused by the pervasive presence of the Spanish language in the media and in cultural-economic activity. All Catalan parties, with the PP exception, agreed that Catalan language needed to be further protected and promoted; however, they disagreed on the means to achieve this goal. The negotiations on the Law on Language

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<sup>11</sup> On the left-wing parties' view, the Catalan immersion will promote children of immigrants' language assimilation and, consequently, it will improve their employment opportunities in Catalonia. Only the *Partido Popular* (the PP, the former AP) would disagree with this school model and it would defend parents' right to choose their children's language of instruction.

<sup>12</sup> In 1996, the PP won the Spanish elections for the first time. However, the PP was not able to get enough votes to form a majority government and was forced to rely on the Basque and the Catalan nationalist parties' support. In exchange for its support, the CiU got important returns, the most important of which was the revision of the system of regional financing. Thus, the PP pledged to transfer 30% of the revenue from income tax to Catalonia. Despite the importance of this achievement for Catalonia, the agreement placed the CiU in a delicate situation with regard to their voters, who had witnessed how the PP carried out an aggressive campaign against Catalan nationalism during the previous term during which the CiU had also supported the PSOE minority national government.



Policy (*Llei de Política Lingüística*, LPL, 1998) made evident these disagreements.<sup>13</sup>

Actually, the negotiation of the law provoked discrepancies even within the PSC.<sup>14</sup> The internal conflict became clear during the negotiation of the LPL, as some of the PSC leaders argued that the law proposal violated the rights of Spanish-speakers on several points (Miley 2006: 305). Despite this, the PSC would end up supporting the new law after the CiU made some concessions regarding the language obligations of the state's civil servants, and it renounced imposing sanctions on individuals when they failed to use Catalan, even though its use was required.<sup>15</sup> The law adopted a series of measures that regulated the use of Catalan in the state and regional administration, the media, and in cultural-economic activities. In the educational sphere, the law consolidated a model that had been already fully deployed: a model of language immersion in Catalan.

The law would be passed with the support of the CiU, the PSC, the *Iniciativa per Catalunya (IC)*, and the *Partit per la*

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<sup>13</sup> See Argelaguet (1998, 1999) and Miley (2006: 295-358) for a detailed account of the negotiation of the 1998 Language Policy Law, and of the changes this law introduced.

<sup>14</sup> As detailed above, the PSC had been formed by the merging of the PSC-Congrés, the PSC-Reagrupament and the Catalan Federation of the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE). While the first two parties' electoral base was made of leftist *Catalanist* autochthonous, the PSOE's electoral base was made up of Spanish immigrants. This has meant that the PSC's leadership positions had been always divided between the Catalanist branch and the Spanish branch. This has often led to internal conflicts and has meant that the party discourse becomes very often contradictory (Baras and Matas 1999; Martínez, 1999).

<sup>15</sup> After these changes were introduced, the Law recognized citizens' right to be attended in their own language by state institutions' civil servants, but not necessarily to be responded to in their language, as the CiU originally aimed at. The CiU also renounced imposing sanctions on individuals. However, the Law final text allowed for imposing sanctions on businesses that did not obey the norms regarding businesses' signage in Catalan, for example.

*Independència* (PI). However, unlike the 1983 law, this new law was not supported by the ERC. The ERC claimed that the Law made little progress on the promotion of the use of Catalan language. The PP also opposed the Law although, in this case, the PP argued that the norm went too far in imposing sanctions and in regulating the use of Catalan in the private sector.

Confrontation regarding Catalan language policies has been one of the issues that has contributed most prominently to the activation of the center-periphery cleavage. In the Catalan Parliament, opposition to language policies has come mainly from the PP.<sup>16</sup> However the PP minority position in the Catalan parliament has meant that the party's stances regarding the

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<sup>16</sup> Language policies have also been contested by several initiatives promoted by well-known intellectuals. So, for example, the 2300 *Manifesto for the equality of language rights in Catalonia* in 1981, and the *Babel Forum*, in 1997, argued in favor of bilingualism, and against the regulation of the use of Catalan. These initiatives, which got a lot of resonance in the Spanish media, were responded to by acts such as *La Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nació Catalanes* (Call for solidarity in defense of the Catalan language, the Catalan culture and the Catalan Nation), which gathered together 100,000 people in the Camp Nou in 1981. Some professional sectors have also expressed their opposition to those measures of the language policy that affected their interests. Thus, for example, just before responsibilities for the school system were transferred to the Generalitat in 1980, Spanish-speaking teachers, backed by the UGT, protested against language discrimination (Miley 2006, 230-231). Manufacturers and commercial associations also opposed the CiU's attempt to make product labeling in Catalan mandatory because of the cost increases. Movies distributors have also protested against the imposition of a Catalan quota for the dubbing of movies because of the Catalan market's size limitation. In addition, organizations such as *Convivència Cívica Catalana* have carried out campaigns demanding freedom of choice regarding language in the school. Generally, it can be said that the negotiation of language policies has provoked important controversies in and out of Catalonia. These controversies have importantly raised political confrontation.

language policy have not been mirrored in the language legislation. This can explain why the PP has very often resorted to the courts and, specifically, to the Constitutional Court to fight Catalan language policies.<sup>17</sup> This has caused that the Constitutional Court has had to rule very often on the Catalan government's language policies. The confrontation on this issue has not only been a conflict over the division of responsibilities between the national and the regional government, but it has very often been framed as an identity conflict.

#### *4.2.3. The Tripartit governments (2003- 2010) and the reform of the Statute*

In 2003, a three-party left-wing coalition consisting of the PSC, the ERC, and the ICV, replaced the CiU in the regional government. Pasqual Maragall, at that time the PSC leader, became then the *Generalitat*'s president.

The reform of the Catalan Statute will soon become the *Tripartit* government's central issue. Although most political parties in the Catalan Parliament had formally requested a reform of the Statute of Autonomy in 2002 (*La Vanguardia*, 04.10.2002, pp. 13), the CiU's regional government had then decided to delay the reform to the following term.<sup>18</sup> Between 2000 and 2003, the PP majority in the Spanish Parliament had prevented the CiU from continuing to play the key role that the Catalan nationalist coalition had played in the PSOE (1993-1996) and the PP (1996-

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<sup>17</sup> The review of Constitutional Court decisions on this matter is beyond the scope of this chapter. See Argelaguet (1999) and Miley (2006).

<sup>18</sup> Here it should be noted that any statute passed in the Parliament of Catalonia also had to be passed in the Spanish Parliament. In 2002, the Popular Party (*Partido Popular*, PP), a party which was against any reform of the Statute of Catalonia, held office and possessed an absolute majority in the Spanish Parliament. This allowed it to block any reform of the Catalan Statute.

2000) minority governments.<sup>19</sup> The PP's disregard of demands for greater levels of self-government was very possibly behind Catalan parties' interest in reforming the Statute of Autonomy. Actually, the president of the Catalan government also justified the necessity to reform the 1979 Catalan Statute of Autonomy because of the PP's blockage of the decentralization process ("Pujol blames PP for the Statute Reform", *La Vanguardia*, 23.11.2003, pp. 15).

The shift of government at the regional level was followed by a shift in the Spanish government just six months later. In March 2004, the PP lost the general elections. However, the PSOE's poor electoral results forced it to rule with the parliamentary support of the Izquierda Unida (IU) and other regional parties, among which, there was also a Catalan nationalist party, the ERC. The change in the Spanish government and the fact that the new government had barely achieved a sufficient majority had, undoubtedly, important consequences for the reform of the statute. So, in January 2004, the *Tripartit* government started to negotiate a new Statute of Autonomy.

The negotiation of the new statute polarized political parties' positions on the center-periphery dimension. Although, four out of five of the Catalan political parties were for the reform, the *Tripartit* parties and the CiU did not have a common position regarding its content.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, in spite of all the difficulties,

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<sup>19</sup> Between 1993 and 2000, the CiU was key to secure the stability of the PSOE (1993-1996) and the PP (1996-2000) minority national governments. In exchange for this support, the CiU got important returns from the PSOE, first, and from the PP, later on. Possibly, the most important of these was the revision of the system of regional financing. This situation was reversed after the PP won the elections to the Spanish Parliament with an absolute majority in 2000. For more details regarding the participation of the CiU in the PP and PSOE minority governments, see Artés (2008) and León-Alfonso (2006).

<sup>20</sup> The negotiations over the statute led to confrontations among the Catalan parties over several issues. In this regard, it is worth noting that the CiU and the ERC adopted more maximalist positions than the PSC

in September 2005, the new statute was passed in the Catalan Parliament with the support of the PSC, the ERC, the ICV and the CiU.

In October 2005, the new statute project was taken to the Spanish Parliament. The negotiation of the statute in the Spanish Parliament led Spanish parties and Spanish elites to take a position regarding the content of the statute. Apart from the financial issues, the definition of Catalonia as a nation, and the language issues were, very possibly, the issues that catalyzed more importantly the political debate. The PSOE's stance regarding the statute reform in Catalonia was not unanimous. Within the PSOE, different voices argued against the reform ("Maragall confronts Ibarra (Extremadura President) after the latter requests the interruption of the statute proceeding in the Spanish Parliament", *La Vanguardia*, 20.01.06, pp. 13). The PP, on the contrary, held a unique position against the reform. All the PP's regional and national leaders rejected a project that, according to their views, diminished the central government's responsibilities and threatened the unity of Spain.

The Catalan Parliament proposal was passed in the Spanish Parliament in March 2006 after some of its articles were eliminated or modified. These changes led the ERC to oppose the final text. Eventually, the ERC's position against the statute would force Pasqual Maragall to make an early call for elections in November 2006. Before these elections, the Catalan population approved the new Statute of Autonomy in a referendum that took place on June 2006. 73.9 percent of the voters voted in favor of the new statute, although only 48.4 percent of the electorate participated in the referendum and 5.3 percent cast a blank ballot.

The new Statute endorsed many of the advancements that had been made on the protection and promotion of the Catalan language since 1980. The statute also advanced some of the

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and the ICV. Within the PSC, the Catalanist leaders and those leaders who were backed by the population of immigrant origins also held different positions.

measures that had not gathered enough support in the LPL<sup>21</sup>. It also enlarged the Generalitat's responsibilities on educational matters and, in particular, it stipulated its responsibilities regarding the organization of the educational curriculum.<sup>22</sup>

The reform of the statute also gave rise to the emergence of the *Ciutadans- Partit de la Ciutadania*. The Ciutadans participated in the 2006 elections taking a position against Catalan nationalist identity policies. The new party, which sought to respond to a party supply failure in the Catalan electoral market (Lago, Montero, and Torcal 2007), managed to get three seats in the Catalan Parliament.

After the 2006 regional elections, the *Tripartit* government was renewed. José Montilla, a PSC leader with an immigrant origin, would become president of the Catalan government. The new *Tripartit* passed other laws which also sought to strengthen the protection of the Catalan language: i.e. the 2009 Catalan Education Law, the 2010 Law of Cinema, or the 2010 Decree which regulated the accreditation of university professors' linguistic competencies.

The 2009 Catalan Education Law (LEC) consolidated the system of language immersion that had been implemented in Catalonia since 1992. The LEC stated that the curriculum should guarantee that children were fully competent in Catalan and Spanish at the end of compulsory education; it confirmed that

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<sup>21</sup> For example, the Statute reinforced the principle of language availability, according to which state civil servants had to attend and respond citizens in the citizens' own language.

<sup>22</sup> In 2006, the central government had passed a decree that stated that every primary school center had to teach at least three hours of Spanish every week. Against this measure, the Catalan Statute recognized the Catalan government right to organize the school curriculum. In 2007, the Generalitat deployed its responsibilities on this matter. The 142/2007 Decret established that children should be taught at least 420 hours of Spanish language and literature, 420 hours of Catalan language and literature, and 245 hours of common language structures over the primary school courses.

children could not be separated into different classes or schools for reasons of language and it clarified that children's right to get their initial education in their mother tongue referred to pre-school education.

All in all, it can be stated that the change of government did not alter policy regarding Catalan language protection and promotion. On the contrary, the *Tripartit* governments widened its protection, and endorsed the system of language immersion that the CiU government had started in 1992. Now, as I previously said, the negotiation of the Statute and the passage of new legislation on language matters caused that confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage raised importantly during those years. As I will argue below, this had effects on individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia.

#### **4.3. Hypotheses on long-term trends and short-term changes in national identification**

In this section, I present two sets of hypotheses that are derived from the previous section. The first set of hypotheses tries to account for the effect that Catalan elites' understandings of Catalan identity, and the policies of language assimilation have had upon individuals' national identification. The second set of hypotheses refers to the effect that the activation of the center-periphery cleavage has on aggregate and individual national identification variation over time. These two sets of hypotheses try to answer to two different questions: whether elites have been able to foster identification with Catalonia, especially among the population of immigrant origin; and whether the activation of the center-periphery cleavage can account for aggregate and individual fluctuations in national identification over time. In this regard, the hypotheses that I present next seek to contribute to our understanding of long-term processes of assimilation and short-term changes in individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia.

*4.3.1. Accounting for long-term trends: political parties' definition of Catalan identity and the language policy*

The idea that the nation and national consciousness are shaped in a top-down process in which the state and its agents have a leading role is well established in the literature (Lipset 1967; Linz 1973, 1985; Weber 1976; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1991; Guibernau 2003; Muñoz 2008, 2009; Smith 1991; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005, 2009; Miley 2006, 2008). Some of these studies go even further when they claim that political elites do not only contribute to shape collective identities, but individual attachments to the nation (Guibernau 2006, 2007; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005, 2009; Linz 1985; Miley 2006, 2008)

In the previous section, I have argued that between the late seventies and the early eighties, Catalan elites agreed to dissociate Catalan identity from purely primordial characteristics (descent and origin). I also argued that the CiU governments started a policy of language assimilation that was intended to increase the knowledge and use of Catalan among the whole population, but especially among the population of immigrant origin. Now, as the quote from Pujol's memoirs at the beginning of section 4.2 shows, the policies implemented by the CiU governments were also intended to make the immigrants and their children "feel a bit or reasonably Catalan, or at least, identified with the country [Catalonia]" (Pujol 2009, 48-49).

Now, if Catalan political parties had been able to dissociate Catalan identity from purely primordial characteristic, then we should find that the association between origin and Catalan identification should have declined over time (hypothesis 4.1.1). In other words, we should find that over the years immigrants and their descendants have become more similar in their national identification to the native population. Such a result would reveal a process of *identificational* assimilation of the immigrant population and their descendants.



In addition, we know that the levels of knowledge and use of Catalan have significantly increased in the last thirty years. As the data from the 1986 municipal register and the 2001 population census show, this increase has been noticeable among both natives and immigrants. While in 1986 the percentage of natives who declared they spoke Catalan was 81 percent, in 2001 this figure had gone up to 89 percent. Within this group, those who could write Catalan correctly rose 22 points: from 44 percent in 1986 to 66 percent in 2001. At the same time, among those who had been born in other regions of Spain, the percent which was able to speak Catalan increased by 17 percentage points (from 30 to 47 percent) between 1986 and 2001. Within this group, those who could write it correctly increased by 10 percentage points, going from 7 to 17 percent.

*Table 4.1. Knowledge of Catalan among natives and immigrants 1986, 2001 (%)*

|                   | Natives |      | Immigrants |      |
|-------------------|---------|------|------------|------|
|                   | 1986    | 2001 | 1986       | 2001 |
| Can speak Catalan | 81      | 89   | 30         | 47   |
| Can write Catalan | 44      | 66   | 7          | 17   |

Source: 1986 municipal register and the 2001 population census

Language policies also lie behind language switches. Thus, the 1998 CIS survey on the “knowledge and use of languages” shows that among the 54 percent of the respondents whose mother tongue was Spanish, 3 percent had switched to Catalan in 1998 and 9 percent used both Catalan and Spanish (Siguán 1999). The 2008 Idescat Survey on Language Uses shows a similar pattern.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> The 1998 and 2008 data are not comparable. On the one hand, house effects might be present. On the other, the 2008 data includes information regarding the foreign population. Foreign population was excluded from the 1998 sample.

*Table 4.2. Use of language 1998 and 2008 (%)*

|         | 1998 CIS Survey |                                       |        | 2008 IDESCAT Survey |                                       |        |
|---------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|--------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|--------|
|         | Mother tongue   | Today's most frequently used language | Change | Mother tongue       | Today's most frequently used language | Change |
| Catalan | 38              | 41                                    | +3     | 32                  | 36                                    | +4     |
| Spanish | 54              | 43                                    | -11    | 55                  | 46                                    | -9     |
| Both    | 7               | 16                                    | +9     | 4                   | 12                                    | +8     |
| Other   | 1               | -                                     | -1     | 9                   | 6                                     | -3     |

Source: 1998 CIS survey on the "Knowledge and use of languages" in Spain and 2008 IDESCAT Enquesta d'Usos Lingüístics

Besides this, the Idescat Survey also shows that 8 percent of the immigrants and 16 percent of the second generations used Catalan more frequently than Spanish in their daily interactions in 2008, while 9 percent of immigrants and 21 percent of the second generations used Catalan and Spanish equally.<sup>24</sup>

*Table 4.3. Most frequently used language among immigrants and second generations (2008) (%)*

|         | Immigrants | Second Generations |
|---------|------------|--------------------|
| Catalan | 8          | 16                 |
| Spanish | 83         | 63                 |
| Both    | 9          | 21                 |

Source: 2008 IDESCAT Survey on the Linguistic Uses

All these data suggest that language policies have had an important impact on the population's knowledge and use of Catalan. What is doubtful, however, is whether the language policies have also encouraged identification with Catalonia among

<sup>24</sup> In 2003 a *Survey on Language Uses* was carried out for the first time in Catalonia. Five years later, the survey was repeated. The 2003 survey lacked, however, any question on the respondents and their parents' origin.

the population of immigrant origin, as Jordi Pujol and the CiU governments sought to achieve. Now, if language policies have affected identification with Catalonia, then we should find that the association between the knowledge of Catalan and national identification has strengthened over time (hypothesis 4.1.2).

Change in the strength of this association should be observed mainly in the second-generation group for two main reasons. First, because language is for this group an acquired, rather than an ascriptive characteristic and, therefore, we can test whether the learning of Catalan has triggered identification with Catalonia. Secondly, because this group is the one that has been exposed more intensively to the language policies through schooling. Unlike many immigrants who arrived in Catalonia after having gone through compulsory education in their hometowns, second generations have been educated in Catalonia.

If the analyses' results show that the association between origin and identification with Catalonia has weakened, while the association between knowledge of Catalan and identification with Catalonia has strengthened in the second generations, then we could state that the constitutive elements of Catalan identity have experienced a transformation in the period under consideration. This result could be cited as evidence of the Catalan parties' ability to assimilate immigrants and their children in Catalonia through the learning of the Catalan language.

#### *4.3.2. Accounting for short-term changes: political parties' incentives and the activation of the center-periphery cleavage*

Today, there is little doubt that the political context plays a decisive role in determining individuals' political attitudes and political behavior. So, for example, events, such as presidential campaigns have been claimed to affect pre-adult socialization, and generate partisan predispositions that persist over time (Sears and Valentino 1997). However, the political context can also affect other political predispositions beyond partisanship as, for

example, individuals' national identification. I have already mentioned previous studies which have argued that decentralization processes and the transference of responsibilities from the state to regional institutions strengthens individuals' regional identifications, to the detriment of national identifications (Argelaguet 2006; Guibernau 2006, 2007; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005, 2009).

Here, however, I want to examine another aspect of the political context: the activation of the center-periphery cleavage. My argument is that political parties' activation of the center-periphery cleavage accounts for the fluctuations that are observed in identification with Spain and Catalonia, both at the individual and the aggregate level.<sup>25</sup>

To capture the influence of the activation of the cleavage upon individuals' identification here I will look at two distinct aspects: Catalan nationalist parties' incentives to activate the center-periphery cleavage, and the level of confrontation between Catalan and Spanish parties along the center-periphery cleavage.

#### *4.3.2.1. Political parties' incentives to activate the center-periphery cleavage*

In Spain, there are two levels of political competition (the national and the regional) in which both national and regional parties are represented and compete. Since 1982, either the PSOE or the PP has been the majority party in the Spanish Parliament. Yet, when neither of the two parties has been able to get a sufficient number of votes to form a majority government, these two national parties have been pushed to search for parliamentary

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<sup>25</sup> This hypothesis will be also examined more deeply in chapter 6. Making use of data collected in qualitative interviews, chapter 7 will go in depth into the micro-mechanisms linking the mobilization of the cleavage and individuals' identification.

support to create a stable minority government.<sup>26</sup> The prominence of the nationalist parties at the national level, along with the fact that the IU excluded itself during many years from forming a coalition with the PSOE, has meant that nationalist parties' support has been crucial to forging successful parliamentary majorities (Lago and Montero 2010).<sup>27</sup> Now, as Lago and Montero (2010, 403-403) have noted multilevel political competition has had a significant impact on nationalist parties' strategies and their accountability practices. This is also my argument here.

Generally, we can assume that nationalist parties have a strong preference for promoting policies that benefit their regional constituencies. To achieve this goal, nationalist parties very often have to become active members of government coalitions, or alternatively try to impact the legislative production from outside national governments (Kedar 2004). In order to become influential in the legislative process, nationalist parties need to maximize their vote share. However, nationalist parties' strategies to achieve this goal vary depending on their bargaining power.

When nationalist parties are crucial to form national parliamentary majorities, they can influence legislative production. Because of its impact on legislative production, they expect to be evaluated retrospectively (Fearon 1999). In order to

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<sup>26</sup> According to Reniu (2002), four elements have determined the possibilities for forming minority governments in Spain: the Spanish electoral system; the parliamentary mechanisms for investiture and for confidence votes; and the prominence of the regional parties in the Spanish parliament.

<sup>27</sup> Here it must be noted that, rather than parties' ideological or policy distance, situations of "mutual dependence between the party in the national minority government and regional parties that are either in a vulnerable position due to their own minority government status or are in an executive coalition with the national governing party at the regional level" have widened the possibilities to build alliances in Spain (Field 2009). Additionally, the Spanish experience shows that such alliances have also been established between national minority governments and regional parties that were, at the same time, the regional ruling party.

satisfy the re-election threshold, they must get some kind of compensation from the national government to satisfy their voters. Once this compensation is achieved, nationalist parties will have to moderate their nationalist demands in order not to radicalize their voters.

Conversely, when the nationalist parties' vote share is low (and nationalist parties are not politically influential), they have strong incentives to behave in a forward-looking manner. Hence, nationalist parties will strategically activate and agitate the center-periphery cleavage to maximize the nationalist vote in the next election. By mobilizing the cleavage, they seek to activate the selective or prospective mechanisms of voting (Fearon 1999).

However, the bargaining power of nationalist parties is not only a function of their vote share. It also depends on whether there are other smaller parliamentary parties with which national parties can form a coalition.

Taking all this into account, we can think about two scenarios in which the bargaining power of Catalan nationalist parties in the Spanish parliament has been weak and therefore, their incentives to activate the cleavage have been stronger; and one scenario in which the nationalist parties' bargaining power has been stronger, and so nationalist parties have had greater incentives to de-activate the cleavage. When national parties have gotten parliamentary majorities, then nationalist parties have become dispensable. Majority national governments (see table 4.4 below) have limited Catalan nationalist parties and, in particular, the CiU's ability to affect policy and to extract returns for Catalonia. As a consequence, when a national party has had the majority of the seats in the Spanish parliament, the Catalan nationalist parties have had greater incentives to activate the cleavage under the expectation that this activation will bring more nationalist votes in the following general elections.

Incentives to activate the cleavage have also been important when the minority national government has turned to other parties to build legislative majorities and, therefore, Catalan nationalist parties' influence over legislative production has been limited (for

example, during the 2004-2011 PSOE minority governments). In such case, Catalan nationalist parties have also had greater incentives to activate the cleavage.

However, during the PSOE minority government (1993 -1996) and the PP minority government (1996-2000), the CiU support to these governments was of key importance to secure its stability. As Heller (2002, 680) has noted, the PSOE and the PP's need to build legislative majorities gave the CiU significant power to affect policy. This power meant that the CiU was in a better position to achieve its policy goals. As a result of this, the CiU developed a strategy that sought to take credit for the political benefices obtained for Catalonia under the expectation that voters would compensate the party electorally for them. Consequently, the CiU's incentives to activate the cleavage to get more nationalist votes decreased over those years.

All this considered, I hypothesize that identification with Catalonia should go up when the nationalist parties have had greater incentives to activate the cleavage, that is, during the PSOE and the PP majority governments. A similar effect should be observed when the majority national parties were able to gather support from several small parliamentary parties, that is, during the two latter PSOE minority governments (between 2004 and 2011). Conversely, I hypothesize that aggregate identification with Catalonia should decrease when the minority national governments have resorted to the support of a strong nationalist party, that is, between 1993 and 2000 (hypothesis 4.2).

Table 4.4. Majority and minority national governments (1982 – 2011) and expectations regarding the evolution of aggregate identification with Catalonia

|  | PSOE                                    | PP                       | Identification with Catalonia |
|--|---|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Majority governments                                     | 1982 – 1993                             | 2000 – 2004              | ↑                             |
| Minority governments (with the support of CiU)           | 1993 – 1996 <sup>1</sup>                | 1996 – 2000 <sup>2</sup> | ↓                             |
| Minority governments (with other legislative majorities) | 2004 – 2008 <sup>3</sup><br>2008 – 2011 |                          | ↑                             |

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> The PNV also supported the PSOE 1993 -1996 minority government.

<sup>2</sup> The PNV and the CC also supported the PP 1996 - 2000 minority government.

<sup>3</sup> In 2004, the PSOE, the ERC, the *Bloque Nacionalista Galego* (BNG), the *Chunta Aragonesista* (CHA), the IU and the CC supported José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in the investiture session. In 2008, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was invested president in a second round with the only support of the PSOE.

#### 4.3.2.2. Confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage

A more direct way to test the impact that the activation of the center-periphery cleavage has upon individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia consists of looking at the levels of confrontation between national and regional governments, and national and regional parties.

In Catalonia, the center-periphery cleavage pervades daily politics and structures political competition on a permanent way. However, as argued in previous section, when Catalan parties have introduced on the political agenda specific issues, such as the language policies, Spanish and Catalan parties' confrontation has intensified. Negative-framed claims and identity-framed messages made by party leaders make the cleavage salient and activate it. Now, the immediate connectedness of the claims made by political parties regarding those issues and identification with Spain and Catalonia is expected to affect individuals' identification.



Nevertheless, the impact of political parties' stances on individuals' identification should not be the same for all individuals. On the contrary, the effect of these kinds of claims or messages should be contingent on individuals' prior identification. Therefore, it could be hypothesize that when political parties' stances regarding a particular issue harden and, therefore, the level of confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage increases, exclusive identification with Spain and Catalonia should be reaffirmed and dual identifications should lean to one or the other side. In other words, confrontation is expected to polarize individuals' identification, reinforcing the Catalan (or Spanish) identification of those who feel exclusively Catalan (or Spanish), and fostering exclusive identification among those who identify with Spain and Catalonia to some extent. On the aggregate, we should observe that when confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage rises, then the levels of primarily Catalan and primarily Spanish identification should also increase.

The lack of panel data that provide information on individuals' prior identification and cover the period under consideration hinders the proper test of this argument. However, being aware of the relationship between individuals' family origin and national identification, in this chapter I will make use of individuals' descent characteristics as a proxy for prior identification.<sup>28</sup> Accordingly, I hypothesize that when confrontation along the center periphery cleavage increases, then the immigrants and their children's identification with Catalonia should also decrease, and the children of mixed couples and the autochthonous' identification with Catalonia should increase (hypothesis 4.3).

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<sup>28</sup> In chapter 6, I make use of panel data to test the heterogeneous effect that individuals' consumption of news in national and regional media have on individuals who differ in their prior identification with Spain and Catalonia. In chapter 6, I assume that national and regional broadcasters channel confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage, at the time they promote alternative national/regional loyalties.

Table 4.5. Summary of hypotheses

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Hypotheses on the impact that elites' definition of Catalanness and language policies have upon long-term trends in national identification |  |
| <i>Hypothesis 4.1.1</i>   | The association between origin and national identification should have declined over time  |
| <i>Hypothesis 4.1.2</i>   | The association between the knowledge of Catalan and national identification should have strengthened over time  |
| Hypotheses on the activation of the cleavage and its effect over individuals' identification with Catalonia                                 |  |
| <i>Hypothesis 4.2</i>   | Identification with Catalonia should moderate when the PSOE and the PP minority governments had the CiU support<br>Identification with Catalonia should increase when the PSOE and the PP hold majority governments, and when the 2004-2011 PSOE minority governments resorted to alternative legislative majorities |
| <i>Hypothesis 4.3</i>   | When the levels of confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage go up, immigrants and second generations' identification with Catalonia should go down, while the children of mixed couples and the autochthonous' identification with Catalonia should increase  |

#### 4.4. Data and variables

In this chapter I draw on the CIS cross-sectional time series that were presented in the previous chapter. The data consist of a pool of cross-sectional surveys with information on individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia and other variables of

interest.<sup>29</sup> As I detailed in the introduction, national identification is measured by means of a bi-directional indicator that forces respondents to report on their identification with two national categories: Spain and Catalonia.

For the test of the first set of hypothesis on the long-term trends the analysis will include a series of individual characteristics: individuals and their parents' origin and individuals' knowledge of Catalan. While the first two variables are ascriptive characteristics, the knowledge of Catalan is an ascribed characteristic for the autochthonous population and their children, and an acquired characteristic for the immigrants and their children. Respondents' knowledge of Catalan will be proxied with three dummy variables that refer to individuals' ability to understand, speak and write Catalan.<sup>30</sup> Due to Spanish and Catalan language' linguistic closeness, it is relatively easy for Spanish-speakers to come to understand Catalan. This is mainly a passive process. Thus, what it makes a difference is Spanish-speakers' ability to speak Catalan.

Dummy variables for respondents' educational levels and for birth cohort will also be introduced in the analysis as control variables.

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<sup>29</sup> As not all surveys have information on all the variables of interest, the surveys used in each analysis will be reported in each table.

<sup>30</sup> The item that asks about individuals' knowledge of Catalan in the CIS' series has changed over time. In the 1984 to 1992 and 1995 surveys, the answer categories were 1 "speaks and writes", 2 "understands and speaks", 3 "understands but does not speak" and 4 "does not understand". In the 1993 and 1996 to 2010 surveys, respondents were asked separately whether they were able to understand, speak, read and write Catalan. In order to make the series equivalent, those respondents who stated they were able to read Catalan, but not to write Catalan correctly were merged with the group of those who were able to understand and speak Catalan.

For the second set of hypothesis, I will include in the analysis the individual and their parents' origin characteristics, individuals' educational level and the birth cohort dummies.<sup>31</sup>

Generating indicators that allow us to capture the effect of the context on individuals' attitudes is always a challenge. Previous studies have roughly approximated the effect that context has on national identification using dummy variables for certain political events (e.g. Olympic games) (Martínez-Herrera 2005, 2009). Here, I will follow two different strategies to proxy the effect of the institutional context. First, taking into account the argument presented in the hypotheses section regarding Catalan nationalist parties' incentives to activate the cleavage depending on their bargaining power in the Spanish parliament and its potential influence upon individuals' national identification, I have generated a variable with four categories.

This variable will take a value of 1 in those years in which there was a majority government in the Spanish government (1982 – 1993 and 2000 – 2004); a value of 2 in the years during which the PSOE minority government had the support of the CiU (1993 – 1996); a value of 3 in those years in which the PP minority government had the support of the CiU (1996 – 2000) and a value of 4 in those years in which the PSOE minority government had the punctual support of the IU, the ERC or other regional parties (2004 – 2011). Therefore, if a survey from the CIS series was carried out in 1995, for example, then this survey will be assigned a value of 2. The categories of this variable will be introduced in the analysis as dummy variables and the first category will be the reference category.

I am also interested in capturing the influence that the political context surrounding the implementation of the surveys has on individuals' national identification. To proxy the activation of the center-periphery cleavage, I have examined the front pages of “La

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<sup>31</sup> As the number of surveys for which the knowledge of Catalan is available is twelve, and I need to maximize the number of points in time to account for variation at the aggregate level, I have excluded the knowledge of Catalan variable from this second analysis.

Vanguardia” newspaper in the month prior to each survey’s fieldwork, as well as during the fieldwork.<sup>32</sup> Next, I have counted the number of news stories reporting a conflict between the Spanish and the Catalan government, or between Spanish and Catalan parties and the number of news stories reporting a positive relationship, and I have subtracted the two figures for each survey year. So, for example, news such as “Pujol makes his first criticisms of the Spanish Government” (October 31<sup>th</sup>, 1996) or “The PP ratifies in Barcelona its position against the Statute” (May 11<sup>th</sup>, 2005) are considered negative news stories which contribute to intensifying confrontation. On the contrary, news such as “Pujol says that an agreement with Madrid benefits Catalonia” (October 16<sup>th</sup>, 1996) or “Zapatero demands the PP respects Catalonia and its identity” (May 20<sup>th</sup>, 2006) are considered actions that seek to mitigate the cleavage.

The resulting index, which I have named *confrontation index*, takes a negative value when the number of positive news stories outnumbers the negative news stories and vice versa. In the period under consideration, the *confrontation index* ranges between -3 in the 1988-year survey and 13 in the 2005-year survey.

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<sup>32</sup> La Vanguardia is Catalonia’s leading daily newspaper. It has been published in Spanish since 1881 and in Catalan since 2011.

*Table 4.6. Index of Confrontation: Number of positive and negative news stories included on the front page of the Catalan newspaper “La Vanguardia” in the month prior to fieldwork, as well as during the fieldwork*

| <b>Study No.</b> | <i>Fieldwork Period</i>       | <i>Negative News</i> | <i>Positive News</i> | <i>Difference Neg.- Pos.</i> |
|------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|
| <b>1719</b>      | December 1987                 | 3                    | 3                    | 0                            |
| <b>1750</b>      | June 1988                     | 1                    | 3                    | -2                           |
| <b>1978</b>      | October 1991                  | 12                   | 4                    | 8                            |
| <b>1987</b>      | January 1992                  | 4                    | 2                    | 2                            |
| <b>2052</b>      | April 16 - 26, 1993           | 2                    | 0                    | 2                            |
| <b>2137</b>      | February 20 - March 6, 1995   | 2                    | 5                    | -3                           |
| <b>2228</b>      | November 16- December 5, 1996 | 19                   | 4                    | 15                           |
| <b>2298</b>      | October 8-21, 1998            | 8                    | 7                    | 1                            |
| <b>2374</b>      | October 21- November 5, 1999  | 7                    | 1                    | 6                            |
| <b>2410</b>      | March 3 -26, 2001             | 12                   | 8                    | 4                            |
| <b>2450</b>      | March 9 – April 26, 2002      | 7                    | 3                    | 4                            |
| <b>2610</b>      | December 2-31, 2005           | 26                   | 12                   | 14                           |
| <b>2643</b>      | May 22 - 31, 2006             | 2                    | 4                    | -2                           |
| <b>2667</b>      | January 1 - 5, 2007           | 7                    | 4                    | 3                            |
| <b>2799</b>      | April 27- May 3, 2009         | 6                    | 5                    | 1                            |
| <b>2852</b>      | October 15- November 4, 2010  | 6                    | 1                    | 5                            |

Source: Own elaboration.

#### **4.5. Change in the adscriptive and acquired determinants of national identification**

In this section, I examine the evolution of the constitutive elements of identification with Spain and Catalonia over time. Here, it is important to make clear that the analyses that I present

next do not seek to explain individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia, but to show the change in the adscriptive and acquired determinants of identification (respondents' origin and descent and knowledge of Catalan).

To learn about these changing relationships, I compare the evolution of identification with Spain and Catalonia in the different descent groups (natives, children of mixed couples, second generations and immigrants) over the period between 1987 and 2010.<sup>33</sup> Taking into account the nominal character of the national identification indicator, I use a multinomial logistic regression.

In the analysis, the "only Spanish" and "more Spanish than Catalan" categories have been merged into a primarily Spanish category, and the "as Spanish as Catalan" category will be the category of reference.

To assess change in the strength of the association between respondents' origin and identification with Spain and Catalonia, a time variable will be introduced in the analysis. This variable will take the value of the year in which the survey took place. Respondents' education level and his or her birth cohort will be also introduced as control variables.

Table 4.7 reports the estimates and the standard errors of the dummies variables (respondent and their parents' origin), their interaction with the time variable, and the control variables. I will first pay attention to the control variables to focus afterwards in the analysis of the changing relationships.

Looking at the education dummies, it can be seen that education increases the odds that individuals identify as "more Catalan than Spanish" and "only Catalan" and decreases the odds that they identify as primarily Spanish.<sup>34</sup> The sign of the birth cohorts' coefficients is negative for the primarily Spanish category and positive for the "more Catalan than Spanish" category. This

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<sup>33</sup> As it was already mentioned in previous chapter, the first year with information on the variables of interest is 1987.

<sup>34</sup> Chapter 5 will discuss in depth on the relationship between education and national identification in Catalonia.

means that those individuals who were born before 1965 have a lower probability of self-identifying as primarily Spanish and a greater probability of self-identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” than individuals who were born after that year. This result contrasts with the results in Table 3.6 of the previous chapter. However, this apparent contradiction is due to the fact that in previous chapter I had not controlled by individuals’ educational level. Thus, once that individuals’ educational level is taken into consideration, younger cohorts show a lower probability to self identify as more Catalan oriented. A possible explanation for this result could be found on the different socialization experiences of the cohorts who reached political maturity after Franco’s death. Besides this, all the cohorts, but the third one, seem to have a similar probability of identifying as “only Catalan”, and this is coherent with results in the previous chapter.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> This is the cohort that reached political maturity during Franco regime’s development plans and the cohort that has the greatest number of immigrants.



Table 4.7. Estimation of the changing relationship between origin and national identification. Multinomial logistic regression with selected variables (1987-2010)

|                       | Primarily<br>Spanish | More Catalan<br>than Spanish | Only Catalan       |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|
| Year                  | 0.02*<br>(0.02)      | -0.00<br>(0.00)              | 0.02***<br>(0.00)  |
| <i>Descent groups</i> |                      |                              |                    |
| Mixed                 | 0.86***<br>(0.21)    | -0.53***<br>(0.12)           | -0.95***<br>(0.15) |
| S. Generation         | 1.11***<br>(0.15)    | -1.35***<br>(0.10)           | -1.55***<br>(0.14) |
| Immigrants            | 2.70***<br>(0.12)    | -2.25***<br>(0.10)           | -3.16***<br>(0.19) |
| <i>Interactions</i>   |                      |                              |                    |
| Mixed x Year          | -0.02<br>(0.01)      | -0.02*<br>(0.01)             | -0.02*<br>(0.01)   |
| S. Generation x Year  | -0.02<br>(0.01)      | -0.01<br>(0.01)              | -0.06***<br>(0.01) |
| Immigrant x Year      | -0.03***<br>(0.01)   | -0.00<br>(0.01)              | -0.01<br>(0.01)    |
| <i>Education</i>      |                      |                              |                    |
| Vocational Training   | -0.45***<br>(0.07)   | 0.24***<br>(0.05)            | 0.20**<br>(0.06)   |
| Secondary Education   | -0.49***<br>(0.07)   | 0.31***<br>(0.05)            | 0.23***<br>(0.07)  |
| University            | -0.53***<br>(0.07)   | 0.38***<br>(0.05)            | 0.44***<br>(0.06)  |
| <i>Birth Cohorts</i>  |                      |                              |                    |
| < 1924                | -0.47***<br>(0.08)   | 0.26***<br>(0.07)            | -0.02<br>(0.08)    |
| 1925-1934             | -0.46***<br>(0.07)   | 0.28***<br>(0.06)            | -0.03<br>(0.07)    |
| 1935-1944             | -0.52***<br>(0.07)   | 0.22***<br>(0.06)            | -0.18*<br>(0.07)   |
| 1945-1954             | -0.51***<br>(0.07)   | 0.31***<br>(0.06)            | -0.06<br>(0.07)    |
| 1955-1964             | -0.37***<br>(0.06)   | 0.17**<br>(0.05)             | 0.01<br>(0.06)     |

Table 4.7. Estimation of the changing relationship between origin and national identification. Multinomial logistic regression with selected variables (1987-2010) (continued)

|                |                    |                   |                   |
|----------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Constant       | -1.92***<br>(0.12) | 0.27***<br>(0.06) | -0.21**<br>(0.07) |
| Observations   | 26266              |                   |                   |
| Log-Likelihood | -28937.23          |                   |                   |
| LR Chi2        | 11843.38(45)       |                   |                   |
| Adj. Count R2  | 0.15               |                   |                   |

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Notes:

<sup>1</sup>Category of reference: “as Spanish as Catalan”.

<sup>2</sup>Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption not violated.

<sup>3</sup>The native group is the group of reference for the descent dummies.


<sup>4</sup>Primary education is the reference category for education.

<sup>5</sup>The two younger cohorts are the reference category for birth cohort.

Source: CIS cumulative series CIS(1719) 1987, CIS(1750) 1988, CIS(1978) 1991, CIS(1987) 1992, CIS(2052) 1993, CIS(2137) 1995, CIS(2228) 1996, CIS(2298) 1998, CIS(2374) 1999, CIS(2410) 2001, CIS(2450) 2002, CIS(2610) 2005, CIS(2643) 2006, CIS(2667) 2007, CIS(2799) 2009, CIS(2852) 2010

Figure 4.1 represents the evolution of the predicted probabilities of self-identifying as “primarily Spanish”, “as Spanish as Catalan”, as “more Catalan than Spanish” and as “only Catalan” over the period under consideration for the different descent groups. The figure simulates the probability that an individual, who was born between 1964 and 1974 and who has completed secondary education, identifies as “primarily Spanish”, as “as Spanish as Catalan”, as “more Catalan than Spanish” or as “only Catalan”.

Figure 4.1. Evolution of the predicted probabilities of identifying as “primarily Spanish”, as “as Spanish as Catalan”, as “more Catalan than Spanish” or as “only Catalan” by descent group (1987 – 2010).



Note: Estimations from model in Table 4.7

Simulation for an individual who was born between 1964 and 1974 and who had completed secondary education at the time the survey was made.

Two important points can be highlighted from Figure 4.1. First, between group change has been more important than within group change. Second, if we take the native group as the reference category, the assimilation pattern of second generations and immigrants has been very moderate.

Between 1987 and 2010, immigrants' probability of self-identifying as “primarily Spanish” has decreased significantly, while their probability of self-identifying as “as Spanish as Catalan”

Catalan” is greater in 2010 than it was in 1987.<sup>36</sup> Immigrants exhibit a very low probability of identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” or as “only Catalan” and this low probability has remained constant over time.

In the second generations’ group an interesting pattern appears. Individuals’ in this group are today more prone to identify themselves “as Spanish as Catalan”. Now, these individuals’ probability of identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” or “only Catalan” has decreased over time. This is something surprising and it contradicts our expectations regarding the second-generation group’s *identificational* assimilation process.

Children of mixed couples’ probabilities of identifying “as Spanish as Catalan” or as “only Catalan” have increased, while their probability of identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” has decreased.

Between 1987 and 2010, the autochthonous have experienced an almost ten-point increase in the probability of identifying as “only Catalan”. This increase has been in parallel to a decrease in the probability of identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish”.

Increasing differences in the probability of identifying “as Spanish as Catalan” between the autochthonous group and the rest of the groups have caused these groups to diverge over the years. Differences have possibly become more important between the autochthonous and the second-generation groups. This has been due to the fact that the probability of identifying as both Spanish and Catalan has increased in the second-generation group but it has decreased in the autochthonous group. And the contrary trend has been observed with the probability that these two groups identify as “only Catalan”. Thus, if the difference in the probability of identifying as “only Catalan” between these two

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<sup>36</sup> Here, it is worth noting that I am looking only at the trends over time. The overlap in the margins of confidence shows that the change within the group might have been less important.

groups was around 15 points in 1987, in 2010 this difference has gone up to around 35 points.

Altogether, these results show that while the immigrants and the second generations feel both Spanish and Catalan with a greater probability in 2010 than in 1987, the autochthonous group has evolved towards a more exclusive identification with Catalonia. These results contradict *hypothesis 4.1.1.* and show that the association between descent and national identification has grown stronger over the years.

After having shown that the results presented here do not confirm *hypothesis 4.1.1.*, I turn now to the second hypothesis. If language policies have contributed to increasing identification with Catalonia, we should observe that the association between the knowledge of Catalan and national identification has strengthened over time. To check this, I focus on the second-generation group.<sup>37</sup>

Here, I estimate the national identification of second generations as a function of the parents' origin, the respondents' linguistic competences, the respondents' level of education and their birth cohort. In the period between 1987 and 2010, only twelve surveys include information on the respondents' linguistic competences or knowledge of Catalan. I have re-codified the dependent variable into three distinct categories: a category which merges the "only Spanish", "more Spanish than Catalan" and "as Spanish as Catalan" categories, and the "more Catalan than Spanish" and "only Catalan categories".<sup>38</sup> The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4.8.

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<sup>37</sup> Two reasons motivate this decision. First, in this group, language is not an ascriptive characteristic, transmitted by parents, but an acquired characteristic that has been learned at school. Second, second generations have been the targeted group of language policies at school. Contrary to the autochthonous (who had Catalan as its mother tongue) and immigrants (who had very often completed their education at the time they came to Catalonia), second generations have had to learn Catalan at school.

<sup>38</sup> I have opted for this recodification of the dependent variable because what I want to test here is the effect of knowledge of Catalan on

Table 4.8. Estimation of the changing relationship between knowledge of Catalan language and national identification (Second generations). Multinomial logistic regression with selected variables (1987-2010)

|                             | More Catalan than Spanish | Only Catalan      |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|
| Year                        | 0.02<br>(0.03)            | -0.03<br>(0.07)   |
| <i>Knowledge of Catalan</i> |                           |                   |
| Can Speak                   | 1.31***<br>(0.38)         | 0.79<br>(0.68)    |
| Can Write                   | 2.04***<br>(0.37)         | 2.09**<br>(0.67)  |
| <i>Interactions</i>         |                           |                   |
| Year x Can Speak            | -0.03<br>(0.03)           | 0.04<br>(0.07)    |
| Year x Can Write            | -0.04<br>(0.03)           | 0.01<br>(0.07)    |
| <i>Education</i>            |                           |                   |
| Voc. Training               | -0.10<br>(0.13)           | -0.23<br>(0.22)   |
| Secondary                   | 0.22<br>(0.15)            | -0.13<br>(0.27)   |
| University                  | 0.33*<br>(0.15)           | 0.07<br>(0.24)    |
| <i>Birth cohorts</i>        |                           |                   |
| < 1924                      | 1.66***<br>(0.24)         | 2.43***<br>(0.34) |
| 1925-1934                   | 1.24***<br>(0.19)         | 2.54***<br>(0.26) |
| 1935-1944                   | 0.89***<br>(0.20)         | 1.87***<br>(0.29) |
| 1945-1954                   | 0.77***<br>(0.17)         | 1.49***<br>(0.27) |

identification with Catalonia. The knowledge of Catalan is not expected to have any effect on Spanish identification. Although the results are not presented here, I have repeated the analysis with the same recodification that I used in the previous analysis. The results are equivalent.

*Table 4.8. Estimation of the changing relationship between knowledge of Catalan language and national identification (Second generations). Multinomial logistic regression with selected variables (1987-2010) (continued)*

|   |                    |                    |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|
| (continued)   |                    |                    |
| 1955-1964   | 0.54***<br>(0.13)  | 1.20***<br>(0.21)  |
| Constant  | -3.18***<br>(0.36) | -4.57***<br>(0.66) |
| <hr/>   |                    |                    |
| Observations  |                    | 3,101              |
| Log-Likelihood  |                    | -2132.45           |
| LR Chi2   |                    | 321.54(26)         |
| Adj. Count R2   |                    | 0.006              |
| <hr/>   |                    |                    |
| Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 |                    |                    |

Note:

<sup>1</sup>The category of reference is a merged category of the “only Spanish”, “more Spanish than Catalan” and “as Spanish as Catalan” categories

<sup>2</sup> For knowledge of Catalan, the reference is “can understand” or “do not understand”.


Source : CIS(1719) 1987, CIS(1750) 1988, CIS(1978) 1991, CIS(1987) 1992, CIS(2052) 1993, CIS(2137) 1995, CIS(2228) 1996, CIS(2298) 1998, CIS(2374) 1999, CIS(2410) 2001, CIS(2450) 2002, CIS(2667) 2007, CIS(2857) 2010

As in previous analyses, education affects positively the probability that individuals' identify as more Catalan oriented. However, in the case of second generations and once we control by individuals knowledge of Catalan, this effect is limited to university. So, second generations who have completed a university degree have a greater likelihood to self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish”. Interestingly, once we take into consideration individuals' knowledge of Catalan, the probability of identifying as primarily Catalan is also greater in those second generations which were born before 1965. Again, respondents' different socialization experiences can be related with this result.

Now, in order to see whether the second generation's linguistic competences have altered their identificational choices over time, I have represented in figure 4.2 the evolution of the probability of identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” and

“only Catalan” of those individuals who cannot understand Catalan or only understand it, and in those who can speak Catalan. The figure simulates the probabilities of an individual, who was born between 1964 and 1974 and who has completed lower secondary education.

Figure 4.2. Evolution of the predicted probabilities of identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” or “only Catalan” by knowledge of Catalan: second generations (1987-2010).



Note: Estimations from model in Table 4.8

Simulation for an individual who was born between 1964 and 1974 and who had completed secondary education at the time the survey was made.

From the figure, we can see that even though the probability of identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” or as “only Catalan” is greater for those second-generation who can write Catalan, this probability is still significantly low and, it has decreased over the years.



Besides, the figure shows that until 1999 significant differences were present in the probability of identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” between those who could not understand or were only able to understand Catalan and those who were fully competent in Catalan and, therefore, could write it. From that moment on, the differences disappear. In this regard, it is striking that there has been a convergence in the probability of identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” of those who “do not understand or are only able to understand Catalan”, and those who can “speak” and “write” Catalan.

Certainly, these results should be interpreted carefully due to the limited number of second generations in these categories;<sup>39</sup> yet, they suggest that the relationship between being competent in Catalan and Catalan identification has weakened over time. This result could be related to the fact that the proportion of second generations who could speak and write Catalan was lower in 1987 than in 2010. In 1987 those who could speak and write Catalan, within the second-generation group, were also more attached to Catalonia. Today, as knowledge of Catalan has generalized within this group, the impact of knowledge of Catalan upon Catalan identification has weakened.

In view of all these results, some points can be raised. First, it can be stated that immigrants and their children have tended to identify with both Spain and Catalonia over the years. As Jordi Pujol expected (see the quote from his memoirs at the beginning of section 4.2): today the immigrants and their children feel reasonably Catalan and they identify themselves with Catalonia. Yet, this process has run parallel to the autochthonous group trend of abandoning their identificational attachments with Spain, and coming to identify as “only Catalan”.

The results also suggest that the strategy carried out by the Catalan elites, consisting in dissociating Catalan identity from

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<sup>39</sup> The low number of individuals within the second-generation group who self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish” in 2009 and 2010 explains the large confidence intervals of the point estimates.

individuals' and their parents' origin, and assimilating the population from an immigrant origin through language policies, has had only limited effects. Identification with Catalonia continues to be strongly linked to individuals' and their parents' Catalan origin. Moreover, language adaptation has not caused second generations to abandon their Spanish attachment and to identify as exclusively Catalan. This latter result supports de la Calle and Miley's (2008) argument: policies of language assimilation can foster language adaptation, but they do not necessarily lead to individuals' *identificational* assimilation.<sup>40</sup> The results from my analyses also show that language competences have lower leverage today when explaining individuals' identification with Catalonia in the second-generation group.

The fact that second generations identified as primarily Catalan with a lower probability in 2010 than in 1987 is striking. One possible explanation could be that in 1987, the second generations felt a stronger empathy and, consequently, a greater attachment for an identity that had been oppressed during many years; while now, Spanish identity has lost its negative connotations. It could also be the case that the development of Catalan nationalist policies and, in particular, language assimilation policies may have resulted in second generations feeling less Catalan oriented. This is actually an argument that has been raised in some qualitative interviews, as I will show in chapter 7.

Here, nevertheless, two important caveats should be raised. Unlike panel data, longitudinal data from cross-sectional surveys should not be used to make inferences on the evolution of individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia over time. This is so because the individuals that are being compared in 1987 and 2010 are not the same. Additionally, data limitations (e.g. limited number of cases in some categories, unequal number of

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<sup>40</sup> The next chapter will examine more in depth the effect that the implementation of the language policies in the schools has had on the national identification of second generations.

cases in the cross-sectional surveys) and some of the assumptions made in the statistical analysis (e.g. the assumption of linearity in the time effect) can be partially driving the results obtained here. These two caveats mean that the previous statements should be taken very cautiously, and they emphasize the importance of looking at individual data to learn about the micro-mechanisms that lie behind individual change over time.

Chapters five and six are intended to solve this problem. Before that an attempt is made in the following section to account for the effect of the context on individual and aggregate short-term changes using the cross-sectional series of data.

#### **4.6. Accounting for contextual effects on national identification**

The CIS cross-sectional series of surveys (see Table A.1) generates a dataset that is structured in two levels: each year survey (j) being a different group, and individuals (i) clustered in each year survey. The hierarchical structure of the data allows estimating the effect of contextual variables on individuals' national identification. Data limitations at the year-level hinder the proper estimation of the national identification variable. As a consequence, the national identification variable will be treated as a continuous variable and it will be estimated with a multilevel linear model.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Multinomial models, as the ones used in section 4.5, are informative on the influence that the independent variables have on each category of the dependent variable. In exchange, these models are very demanding as they consume many degrees of freedom. In the analysis that I carry out in this section, information on all the variables of interest is only available for 16 survey years. This means that I only have 16 units at the second level. Due to this data limitation, I cannot estimate this national identification with a multinomial model. Therefore, here I assume that national identification is a continuous variable. To facilitate interpretation, readers could think that the dependent variable reports

In estimating group-level regression coefficients, I want to account for both individual and group level variation in national identification. While the treatment is placed at the group level (year survey), national identification is measured on individuals.

Four models will be presented. An empty model with no individual variable, nor group level predictors; a second model with varying intercepts; a third model with varying intercepts and a group level predictor; and a fourth model with a cross-level interaction to capture the moderating effect of the context on the relationship between individual-level factor and national identification.

Two group level predictors will be introduced separately in the third model. A first predictor consisting of four dummy variables aiming at capturing the effect of nationalist parties' incentives to activate the cleavage depending on their bargaining power in the Spanish parliament (i.e. dummies for the period during which the PSOE/PP ruled with a majority government, for the period during which the minority PSOE/PP government resorted to the support of the CiU, and for the period during which the minority PSOE government resorted to alternative supports), and a second predictor consisting of the index of confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage. These two group-level predictors are intended to capture the effect of the changing context upon individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia.

The specification for the four model, that is, the model including the cross-level interaction, is as follows:

$$\text{NID} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} \text{descent}_{ij} + \beta_2 \text{education}_{ij} + \beta_3 \text{cohort}_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (4.1)$$

Where NID is the dependent variable (national identification), descent consists of four dummy variables for the immigrant, the second generation, the children of mixed couples and the natives groups and  $\beta_{0j}$  and  $\beta_{1j}$  are modeled as a function of the group level

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individuals' attachment to Catalonia only, going from 1 (when the respondent does not identify with Catalonia) to 5 (when the respondent only identifies with Catalonia).

predictor or context variable (i.e. the levels of confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage at the time the survey was conducted), so:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\text{context}_j + u_{0j} \quad (4.2)$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}\text{context}_j + u_{1j} \quad (4.3)$$

By substituting in the original equation (4.1), we get:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{NID} = & \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}\text{descent}_{ij} + \gamma_{01}\text{context}_j + \gamma_{11}\text{context}_j \text{descent}_{ij} \quad (4.4) \\ & + \beta_2 \text{education}_{ij} + \beta_3 \text{cohort}_{ij} + u_{0j} + u_{1j}\text{origin}_{ij} + r_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

Where  $\gamma_{00}$  corresponds to the intercept estimate;  $\gamma_{10}$  is the slope coefficient for the relationship between origin and national identification when the context variable equals 0 (i.e. when the index of confrontation takes its minimum value);  $\gamma_{01}$  corresponds to the slope coefficient for the relationship between the index of confrontation and national identification for the native group (the reference group),  $\gamma_{11}$  is the interaction between origin and the confrontation index,  $u_{1j}$  is the disturbance term for the randomly varying slope coefficient  $\gamma_{10}$ ;  $u_{0j}$  is the disturbance term for the random intercept term; and  $r_{ij}$  corresponds to the individual level disturbance term.

Cross-level interactions are included in the analysis to account for the heterogeneous effect that the levels of confrontation along the center-periphery might have on individuals who differ in their descent characteristics.

Table 4.9 reports the results of models 1 to 4. The empty model (1) displays the level of variance in the average national identification over time. The intercept in the empty model is equal to the average national identification, which for this sample is 3.275. The variance component corresponding to the random intercept is .102. The two-variance components can be used to divide the variance across levels. The intra-class correlation coefficient, that is, the percentage of observed variation in the dependent variable attributable to context effects can be calculated

by dividing the variance of the individual level disturbance term ( $\tau_{00}$ ) by the total variance ( $\tau_{00} + \sigma$ ).

According to this, a roughly 8 % of the national identification variance is attributable to context effects.

In the second model, I introduce first level predictors (origin, education and cohort). The effect of these variables is robust with the results presented in Table 4.4. Therefore, being a child of a mixed couple, a child of an immigrant couple or immigrant reduces identification with Catalonia by .45, .85 and 1.58, respectively. Education positively influences identification with Catalonia. Thus, keeping all other variables constant, the difference in the identification with Catalonia between those who have a university degree and those who have only completed the primary school is .316 ( $0.079 \times 4$ ).<sup>42</sup> Finally, as we already saw in Table 4.7, once we control for education, the older cohorts seem to be more Catalan oriented than the younger cohorts (those born after 1965).

In the next model (3.1) I introduce year-survey variables to account for across year variation. Model 3.1 tests *hypothesis 4.2* and introduces the dummy variables for the periods during which the PSOE/PP minority governments got the support of the CiU (PSOE-CiU, 1993 to 1996; and PP-CiU, 1996 to 2000) and the periods during which the PSOE minority government ruled with the alternative support of national and regional parties (2004-2011). Model 3.1 results partially confirm my expectation. Certainly, in the period during which the PSOE minority government had the CiU support (1993-1996), identification with Catalonia moderated in relation to the years when the PSOE and the PP formed majority governments. This result is coherent with the data presented in figure 3.4 in Chapter 3. In this figure, it can be seen that the average identification with Catalonia decreases in 1995. In contrast, the hypothesis that Catalan parties' and the CiU, in particular, had incentives to de-activate the cleavage during the

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<sup>42</sup> Note that education has been introduced in the model as a continuous variable with four categories.

PP minority government and that, accordingly, the average identification with Catalonia should decrease is not confirmed. However, the sign of the coefficient goes in the expected direction.

During the 2004-2011 PSOE minority governments, we expected that identification with Catalonia heightens. As explained in the hypotheses section, when the national government resorts to the support of national and regional minority parties different from the Catalan nationalist parties, the latter parties lose their bargaining power and they have incentives to activate the cleavage in order to trigger nationalist vote in the next elections. As a consequence, reactive identification with Catalonia should activate and average identification with Catalonia should increase. In the model 3.1 of Table 4.9, it can be observed that the coefficient of the dummy variable for the period during which the PSOE minority government ruled with alternative parliamentary majorities is not significantly different from the period in which PSOE and the PP ruled with majority governments.

These results mean that when there is a majority national PSOE/PP government or when the PSOE has ruled with alternative parliamentary majorities the average identification with Catalonia has not been significantly different. However, when the PSOE has formed a minority government with the support of CiU, the average identification with Catalonia has moderated.

The non-significance of the PP minority government dummy could be driven by a short-term effect that will be captured by the *confrontation index*. As it can be seen in Table 4.3, the *confrontation index* has its highest value in 1996. For example, the 1996 survey was conducted during the negotiations that the PP and the CiU held to reach an agreement on the CiU support of the PP minority government.

Table 4.9. Activation of the cleavage' effects on individuals' identification with Catalonia. Hierarchical linear model.

|                                     | Empty<br>Model | Individual<br>Variables | Context<br>Variables I | Context<br>Variables<br>II | Cross-level<br>interac-<br>tions |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|-------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
|                                     | (1)            | (2)                     | (3.1)                  | (3.2)                      | (4)                              |
| <b>Fixed effects</b>                |                |                         |                        |                            |                                  |
| <i>Descent</i>                      |                |                         |                        |                            |                                  |
| <i>groups</i>                       |                |                         |                        |                            |                                  |
| Mixed                               |                | -0.45***<br>(0.02)      | -0.45***<br>(0.02)     | -0.45***<br>(0.02)         | -1.53***<br>(0.06)               |
| S. Generation                       |                | -0.85***<br>(0.02)      | -0.85***<br>(0.02)     | -0.85***<br>(0.02)         | -0.48***<br>(0.04)               |
| Immigrant                           |                | -1.58***<br>(0.01)      | -1.58***<br>(0.01)     | -1.58***<br>(0.01)         | -0.78***<br>(0.04)               |
| <i>Education</i>                    |                |                         |                        |                            |                                  |
|                                     |                | 0.08***<br>(0.00)       | 0.08***<br>(0.00)      | 0.08***<br>(0.00)          | 0.08***<br>(0.00)                |
| <i>Birth cohorts</i>                |                |                         |                        |                            |                                  |
| < 1924                              |                | 0.12***<br>(0.02)       | 0.12***<br>(0.02)      | 0.12***<br>(0.02)          | 0.12***<br>(0.02)                |
| 1925-1934                           |                | 0.12***<br>(0.02)       | 0.12***<br>(0.02)      | 0.12***<br>(0.02)          | 0.11***<br>(0.02)                |
| 1935-1944                           |                | 0.10***<br>(0.02)       | 0.10***<br>(0.02)      | 0.10***<br>(0.02)          | 0.10***<br>(0.02)                |
| 1945-1954                           |                | 0.11***<br>(0.02)       | 0.11***<br>(0.02)      | 0.11***<br>(0.02)          | 0.11***<br>(0.02)                |
| 1955-1964                           |                | 0.08***<br>(0.02)       | 0.08***<br>(0.02)      | 0.08***<br>(0.02)          | 0.07***<br>(0.02)                |
| <i>Context variables</i>            |                |                         |                        |                            |                                  |
| PSOE min gov.<br>(& CiU support)    |                |                         | -0.13***<br>(0.05)     |                            |                                  |
| PP min gov.<br>(& CiU support)      |                |                         | -0.04<br>(0.03)        |                            |                                  |
| PSOE min gov.<br>(& other supports) |                |                         | 0.02<br>(0.04)         |                            |                                  |
| Confrontation<br>Index (CI)         |                |                         |                        | 0.03<br>(0.05)             | 0.10<br>(0.07)                   |



Table 4.9. Activation of the cleavage' effects on individuals' identification with Catalonia. Hierarchical linear model (continued)

|  | Empty<br>Model    | Individual<br>Variables | Context<br>Variables I | Context<br>Variables<br>II | Cross-level<br>interac-<br>tions |
|--|-------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
|  | (1)               | (2)                     | (3.1)                  | (3.2)                      | (4)                              |
| <i>Interactions</i>  |                   |                         |                        |                            |                                  |
| Mixed X CI   |                   |                         |                        |                            | 0.06<br>(0.09)                   |
| S. Gen. X CI   |                   |                         |                        |                            | -0.21**<br>(0.09)                |
| Imm. X CI  |                   |                         |                        |                            | -0.13<br>(0.14)                  |
| Intercept $\gamma_{00}$  | 3.27***<br>(0.03) | 3.73***<br>(0.02)       | 3.74***<br>(0.02)      | 3.72***<br>(0.03)          | 3.70***<br>(0.03)                |
| <i>Random Effects</i>  |                   |                         |                        |                            |                                  |
| Std. Dev.  | .10               | 0.06                    | 0.04                   | 0.05                       | 0.05                             |
| Intercept $\tau_{00}$  |                   |                         |                        |                            |                                  |
| Std. Dev.  | 1.15              | 0.92                    | 0.92                   | 0.92                       | 0.92                             |
| Residual $\sigma$  |                   |                         |                        |                            |                                  |
| Std. Dev. Mixed  |                   |                         |                        |                            | .055                             |
| Std. Dev. S.Gen  |                   |                         |                        |                            | .075                             |
| Std. Dev. Imm.   |                   |                         |                        |                            | .143                             |
| Observations   | 26,477            | 26,266                  | 26,266                 | 26,266                     | 26,266                           |
| No. of Groups  | 16                | 16                      | 16                     | 16                         | 16                               |
| <i>Model Fit</i>   |                   |                         |                        |                            |                                  |
| <i>Measures</i>  |                   |                         |                        |                            |                                  |
| Log-likelihood   | -41344.81         | -35165.99               | -35162.39              | -31561.83                  | -35100.27                        |
| Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 |                   |                         |                        |                            |                                  |

Notes:

<sup>1</sup>Dummy variables for:

- Majority governments (reference): 1987, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993, 2001, 2002
- PSOE minority government with CiU support: 1995 year-survey
- PP minority government with CiU support: 1996, 1998 and 1999 year-surveys
- PSOE minority government with alternative supports: 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009 and 2010 year-surveys

<sup>2</sup>The *confrontation index* has been transformed into a 0 to 1 variable<sup>3</sup>Covariance matrix for the random effects is unstructured<sup>4</sup>Variance reduction between the empty and the cross-level interactions model: 7%<sup>5</sup>The LR test indicates that the Model 5 is significantly different to model 2

Source: CIS(1719) 1987, CIS(1750) 1988, CIS(1978) 1991, CIS(1987) 1992, CIS(2052) 1993, CIS(2137) 1995, CIS(2228) 1996, CIS(2298) 1998, CIS(2374) 1999, CIS(2410) 2001, CIS (2450) 2002, CIS(2667) 2007, CIS(2857) 2010

Taking this into account, we can think that what matters most for explaining variability in individual and aggregate identification over time are the actual levels of the cleavage activation at the time individuals are interviewed.

Thus, in order to test the effect that the activation of the center-periphery cleavage has on national identification, I introduce in the analyses the *confrontation index*. In model 3.2, it can be seen that the *confrontation index* does not have any effect on national identification. This is reasonable because the levels of confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage are expected to produce opposite effects on individuals with different descent characteristics, which causes the variable's joint effect is not significant.

Model 4 tests the hypothesis that the activation of the center-periphery cleavage has a different effect on individuals depending on their descent characteristics.<sup>43</sup> To test this, model 4 specifies a cross-level interaction between the *confrontation index* and the origin group.


In agreement with my expectation, model 4 confirms that the levels of confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage in the month prior to fieldwork, as well as during the fieldwork has an effect of opposite sign on the autochthonous and children of mixed couples' identification, on the one hand, and the immigrant and the children of immigrants' identification, on the other.

Now, to show more clearly the effect that the activation of the center-periphery cleavage has on individuals' identification I depict in figure 4.3 the marginal effect of the *confrontation index* for the autochthonous and second generations, the two groups for which the joint effect of the constitutive and interaction term is significant.

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<sup>43</sup> Due to the lack of panel data, I cannot test whether confrontation has a different impact depending on individuals' prior national identification. Therefore, I will approximate individuals' identification with individuals' origin.

Figure 4.3. *Marginal effect of the level of confrontation on autochthonous and second generations' identification with Catalonia.*



The figure shows that higher values of confrontation make the autochthonous feel more Catalan, while higher values of confrontation make children of immigrants feel less Catalan. This implies that in those periods of time in which the activation of the cleavage is more intense, then the autochthonous have reacted strengthening their feelings of attachment to Catalonia, while second generations have reacted weakening these feelings.

Although far from conclusive, the results presented in this section suggest that the activation of the cleavage can actually affect individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia. In this regard, it must be stated that Catalan parties' incentives to activate or deactivate the cleavage depending on whether they have a key position at the national and the regional level cannot fully account for short-term changes in national identification. However, the actual levels of confrontation along the center-periphery dimension at the time individuals' are interviewed seem to be important when explaining individual variability in identification with Spain and Catalonia over time.

Here, it should be stressed that the effect of confrontation along the center-periphery dimension has a different effect on individuals depending on their descent group. This finding calls for a more in-depth look at the effect that the activation of the cleavage has on individuals' identification at  $t_2$  depending on their identification at  $t_1$ . Chapter 6 will return to this issue.

#### **4.7. Conclusions**

This chapter sought to demonstrate that political elites' strategies and the activation of the center-periphery cleavage affects national identification at the individual level, and can account to some extent for the aggregate and individual identification variation with Spain and Catalonia that is observed over time.

The empirical analyses have shown that the Catalan elites' strategies to build a single community in Catalonia have been only

partially achieved. Immigrants and their children identified in 2010 “as Spanish as Catalan” with a greater probability than in 1987. However, the autochthonous population is today more likely to feel “only Catalan”. In view of these results, it could be said that Catalan governments have been successful in encouraging identification with Catalonia, both among the immigrants and their children, and among the autochthonous population. Yet, in the latter group, the effect seems to have been more intense, as these individuals have tended to also lose their attachments to Spain.

Further research should be done to learn about the heterogeneous influence that the Catalan governments’ policies have on individuals’ identification. In the next chapter, I return to this issue and look in-depth at the effect that the introduction of Catalan as the language of instruction at school has had upon the national identification of children of immigrants and the children of natives.

So far, the results presented here suggest that the learning of the Catalan language has not promoted a more oriented Catalan identification among second generations. These results, which draw on the longitudinal analysis performed in this chapter, confirm that the learning of a language does not necessarily foster *identificational* assimilation, as already suggested de la Calle and Miley’s (2008) synchronic analysis.

In their review of the Assimilation theory, Alba and Nee (1997) stressed that assimilation is a long-term process that occurs mainly inter-generationally. Taking this into account, it seems unrealistic to expect that the immigrants and second generations lose its identification with Spain. Actually, as it will become evident in the qualitative chapter (chapter 7), many immigrants and their children still consider that their Catalan identification is nested to their Spanish identification. Feeling attached to Catalonia does not exclude also feeling attached to Spain, even though some immigrants and second generations recognize both Spain and Catalonia as different nations.

On another matter, the results presented here suggest that elites’ activation of the center-periphery cleavage has a say when

explaining individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia and change at the aggregate and individual level.

Despite the modest results, my analyses suggest that Catalan political parties' incentives to activate the cleavage can, in some cases, have consequences on the aggregate levels of identification with Catalonia. In particular, it has been shown that, as expected, during the period in which the PSOE ruled with CiU support, the levels of identification with Catalonia went down. Although the effects have not been found significant when the PP ruled with CiU support, the sign of the coefficient goes in the expected direction.

Nevertheless, what seems to really matter when explaining short-term changes of identification is the level of confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage at the time individuals are interviewed. The results presented in this chapter have shown that confrontation affects autochthonous and second generations the most. Confrontation strengthens Catalan identification among the autochthonous and weakens it among the second generations. In the rest of the groups, the effect is not significant (immigrants and children of mixed couples), although its sign (positive in the case of children of mixed couples and negative in the case of immigrants) suggest that confrontation contributes to polarizing individuals' identification.

More research should be done to confirm these results. On the one hand, more cross-sectional surveys should be included in the analyses to increase the number of units at the second level. The lack of significance of the cross-level interactions for the immigrant and the children of mixed couples could be due to the limited number of cases (years) at the second level. In addition, data from other Catalan newspaper could be used to check the robustness of these results.

More generally, and before ending this chapter, it should be stressed again that the results obtained from the analyses of these cross-sectional series of data have an important shortcoming: these data do not allow making inferences on the individual level changes occurring over time. Chapter 6 and 7 tackle this problem,

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and make use of panel data, as well as qualitative data from interviews, to learn about the micro-mechanisms that lie behind individual change.

## **CHAPTER 5. PARENTS AND SCHOOL AS AGENTS OF “NATIONAL” SOCIALIZATION**

### **5.1. Introduction**

The two previous chapters (chapter 3 and 4) have examined the evolution of identification with Spain and Catalonia between the late eighties and 2010. These analyses have provided some evidence showing the occurrence of inter-generational changes, on the one hand, and changes between the immigrant and the second generation, on the other. Yet, this evidence has relied on the comparison of unrelated individuals. By comparing the national identification of parents and children within the same family, this chapter seeks to enrich the evidence provided by previous chapters.

Beyond this, this chapter's main goal is to contrast the influence that parents and school have on individuals' national identification. The idea that education has an important influence in the formation of national consciousness is well established in classical studies of nationalism (Anderson 1983; Breuilly 1982; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1991; Smith 1979; Weber 1976). Recent works have also argued that in countries, in which the educational responsibilities have been decentralized to the regions, school can also promote identification with the region, and counteract the nation-state dominant identity (Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, Costa-Font, and Masella 2008a, Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 2008b; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005,



2009). Studies of nationalism have, nevertheless, obviated the parents' role; and in doing so they might have overestimated the influence of the school.

This chapter builds on two recent studies in which the authors find that the 1983 language reform in Catalan schools have had a profound influence on the promotion of individuals' identification with Catalonia (Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, Costa-Font, and Masella 2008a; Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 2008b). These studies argue as well that exposure to Catalan in school has even promoted a more Catalan oriented identification among individuals belonging to families of a Spanish origin (Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008b). This chapter questions Aspachs-Bracons et al.'s findings, and contends that the omission of key variables such as the social composition of the neighborhood in which children grow up and, even more importantly, the parents' national identification, introduces a bias in favor of the school influence.

The chapter draws on data from the "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya, Fundació Jaume Bofill, 2001-2005", which is a household survey that includes information on the national identification of all household members aged 16 or over. The empirical analysis examines the determinants of the national identification of Catalan-born individuals who reached the age of 18 between 1983 and 2005. The empirical analyses consist of a multinomial logistic regression which estimates the influence of parents' identification and years of schooling on the probability that the offspring generation identifies itself as: "primarily Spanish", "as Spanish as Catalan", "more Catalan than Spanish", or "only Catalan".

The influence of peers will be very roughly captured by a variable that provides information on the immediate context of individuals: namely the immigrant composition of the

neighborhood. The influence of other agents of socialization (e.g. the television) is captured by the parents' national identification.<sup>1</sup>

The analysis presented in this chapter suggest that the introduction of education in Catalan in schools helps to explain, on the one hand, differences in the national identification between those individuals who completed their whole education under the new educational system, and those who did not and, on the other, the decrease in the number of primarily Spanish identifiers among the younger generations. However, the results also imply that the years of schooling do not have the degree of impact suggested by previous works.

Two reasons explain the limited influence of school. First, the influence of school years on the promotion of Catalan identification is contingent upon the immediate context in which children live, in which they socialize with other children, and in which they go to school. Therefore, when children go to schools in neighborhoods in which the presence of immigrants is moderate, post-compulsory years of schooling<sup>2</sup> can foster a more Catalan oriented identification. Conversely, when children go to schools in which there are no immigrants, or in which the number of immigrants reaches 35% or over, the years of post-compulsory education do not seem to be related with a greater Catalan identification in the offspring. This finding suggests that it is not only exposure to the Catalan language and to Catalan culture in

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<sup>1</sup> In my sample, individuals' consumption of Catalan or Spanish television correlates very strongly with the mother's national identification.

<sup>2</sup> Here we refer to years of schooling in lower and upper secondary education. We exclude from the analyses the years of higher education for different reasons. First, nationalism studies have emphasized the importance of school, rather than that of university. Second, while individuals at school receive roughly the same kind of contents in the language, literature, geography and history courses, the diversity of university degrees does not allow us to make any assumption regarding the national messages individuals' receive.

school that promotes individuals' Catalan identification, but contact with other Catalan identifiers.

Second, the effect of the school is limited because parents are the key agents that affect their children's Catalan oriented identification. Thus, in those families in which parents identify themselves as primarily Catalan, the school "national socialization" effect is null. Any additional year of schooling beyond compulsory education can increase the probability that children of immigrants feel "as Spanish as Catalan"; however, and contrary to what Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008) have claimed, my results show that school is not able to foster a more Catalan oriented identification among these children, once I control for their parents' national identification.

The chapter is organized as follows. The following section reviews the literature on the formation of political orientations as it relates to national identification. The third section contextualizes the study. The hypotheses are presented in section four. After presenting the data, the dependent and independent variables are introduced. Section six is the descriptive section and it examines the similarity of national identification for parents and children. Section seven contrasts the effect that the school and the parents have in individuals' national identification. Finally, section eight discusses the results and concludes.

## **5.2. Where does individuals' national identification come from?**

"One of the first features of a child's political involvement is his sense of belonging to a political unit. Although it is difficult to obtain evidence on the nature of this early attachment, interview material and early questionnaires indicated that in the United States the young child develops a sense of 'we' in relation to his country and a sense of 'they' with respect to other countries" (Hess and Torney 1967, 31).

Even though this chapter's main concern is to learn about the influence that parents and school have upon individuals' identification, rather than about how national identification is shaped, it may be worth devoting some space to explain how this process is thought to occur.<sup>3</sup> According to Hess and Torney (1967, 33-37), the development of individuals' national identification occurs in three-stages: a first stage in which children learn that national symbols are anchors for attachment, a second in which children add cognitive significance to these symbols, and a final stage in which children become aware of the existence of a system of countries.<sup>4</sup>

Now, where do these affective bonds to the nation and related cognitive substance come from? The literature on political socialization has traditionally pointed to the family and to the school as the main sources of attitude formation. Hence, family and school should also play a leading role in the shaping of children's national identification.

Identification with the nation may be learned through the mechanisms of classical conditioning to which Hess and Torney (1967, 107-111) referred in the "The Development of Political

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<sup>3</sup> As far as I am aware, the few pages that Hess and Torney (1967, 33-37) devote to the formation of individuals' identification with the nation are the only pages in the political socialization literature that deal specifically with the formation of a national identity.

<sup>4</sup> Hess and Torney's (1967) quote indicates that this kind of social identification is developed in early middle childhood. However, the precise moment in which national identity or other kind of group oriented attitudes are formed is disputed. Previous works have examined this question by investigating the formation of ethnic identity among minority group members and second generations. These works have reached different conclusions. So, while Phinney (1989) argues that adolescence is the time during which individuals explore and commit to an ethnic identity, Aboud and Doyle (1993), Akiba et al. (2004) and Marks et al. (2007) have found evidence in favor of the idea that individuals' self-recognition and self-identification with their parents' country of origin occurs earlier in life.

Attitudes in Children”: direct teaching, emulation and adjustment of expectations. At home, parents’ purposive transmission of their national allegiances, the emulation of parents’ cultural practices, and children’s adjustment to family expectations about national loyalty all point to believe that children learn and then internalize their parents’ national identity.

Children’s national allegiances can also be shaped through other indirect mechanisms. According to Jennings and Niemi (1974) and Glass et al. (1986), the inheritance of certain social attributes, such as social status, would cause children to develop the same political preferences as their parents. Although it is unclear how the transmission of social resources impact on the formation of a particular national identification, it could be argued that the inheritance of certain attributes, such as mother tongue, mediates the formation of individuals’ national identification. This is particularly true in the context of minority groups where the transmission of the minority language is connected to the formation and maintenance of an ethnic identity (Phinney et al. 2001a; Rumbaut 1994).

At school, “national socialization” has been thought to take place through exposure and, most importantly, through indoctrination. On the one hand, the displaying of the flag, the singing of the national anthem, the drawing of the national flag or other expressions of hot nationalism would lead children to become familiar with the nation’s symbols. Furthermore, the school curriculum and, in particular, the history, geography, literature and language courses would provide children and adolescents’ attachment to the nation with substantial content.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>The function that education has traditionally had in the promotion of national consciousness is supposed to vary depending on which institution has the education responsibilities. So, while for the state’s agents, secular education and schooling would have been viewed as a key instrument to achieve the political socialization and assimilation of ethno-linguistic minorities –and to secure, therefore, the nation-state’s cultural homogeneity– for ethno-linguistic minorities, education would have been envisaged as a means of achieving political emancipation and

However, and despite the influence that school presumably should have on individuals' national identification, as I mentioned above, the literature on political socialization has not paid much attention to the "national socialization" role of the school. Conversely, this literature has focused on examining the role that civics courses play in shaping adolescents' political knowledge, political interest or political efficacy. Evidence on the influence of school is, however, mixed. On the one hand, Langton and Jennings (1968, 866) and Jennings et al. (1974) have argued that the civics courses' leverage on adolescents' political knowledge, political interest or political efficacy is limited, and mediated by children's background. In particular, these authors have found that school substitutes parents' political socialization in deprived families. Conover and Searing (2000) and Hart and Atkins (2002) are, however, less positive regarding the counteracting influence that school can have among those children who come from underprivileged ethnic enclaves; as the schools these children attend are, with a higher probability, "failing" schools.

At odds with these works, Westholm et al. (1990) and Niemi and Junn (1998) have claimed that the civics courses and history courses do actually have an effect on all teenagers' level of political knowledge. Ultimately, the fact that school makes more use of indoctrination than any of the other mechanisms of political socialization would explain why schools have been found to be more successful in the transmission of political information, than in the shaping of actual political attitudes and beliefs (Ehman 1980, 113).<sup>6</sup>

In this same direction, Percheron (1993) has also contended that the influence that school has upon students' political opinions is considerably less than parents'. According to Percheron (1993, 16-17, 147-148), four reasons would explain the lesser impact of

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promoting their own national identity (Tomiak and Kazamias 1991, 8-10).

<sup>6</sup>Ehman (1980) argues that teaching methods or classroom climate should have a greater impact than the curriculum on the formation of certain political attitudes.

the French school on the political opinions of children. First, the *laïcité* and *neutralité* principles of the French school mean that political training is undertaken outside the school. Second, the teaching method as inculcation is seen as a less successful method of teaching than that of simple emulation which, according to Percheron, is a much more common mechanism of socialization within the family. Third, many students develop distant attitudes, and even hostility, towards their teachers. And finally, the multiplicity and heterogeneity of teachers' political positions.

Nevertheless, even if school had a limited influence on the formation of children's political orientations and in the configuration of children's political opinions, it would still be expected to have a significant influence on the shaping of individuals' national identification. This is, in fact, the position of the literature on nationalism that has linked the expansion of the state's education and the process of language standardization with the formation of a collective national consciousness (Anderson 1983; Hans 1949; Hobsbawm 1991; Miliband 1969; Seton-Watson 1977; Smith 1979; Weber 1976).

Recent works have also argued that beyond the role that education has historically performed in the formation of collective national-state consciousness, school also has a say in the formation of individuals' actual identification with "stateless" nations. Thus, Martínez-Herrera (2002) has argued that education is an instrument through which decentralized regional institutions, with educational responsibilities, shape individuals' identification with the region. Furthermore, according to Martínez-Herrera (2005, 209), in multinational countries, the fostering of individuals' identification with the nation not only occurs through a process of indoctrination, but also through the learning of the vernacular language in school.

In line with this idea, Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008a) have examined the impact that exposure to the vernacular language in school has on individuals' national identification. With this purpose, the authors have compared two settings in which language reforms were implemented at the same time: Catalonia

and the Basque Country. While the reform in Catalonia made teaching in the vernacular language compulsory, in the Basque Country parents were allowed to choose the language in which their children would be eventually educated. From the comparison of these two cases, the authors show that assimilation settings are more successful than multicultural settings when promoting identification with decentralized regions.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, Aspachs-Bracons et al.'s results indicate that compulsory language policies can counter the effect of the family's immigrant origin, while non-compulsory language policies produce a sorting of students in the different school models, thereby canceling out the school effect.

However, while these empirical works have made an important contribution by explaining the role that schooling can eventually have in the shaping of national identification, they have overlooked the role that parents perform in the formation of their offspring's national identification.<sup>8</sup> By focusing on institutions and leaving aside the family, these studies could be playing down the importance of the family as an agent of "national socialization".

Nevertheless, the studies that have looked empirically into the role that parents have when shaping their offspring's national identification is noticeably scant. Two studies deserve attention here. In "La Reproducción del Nacionalismo. El caso Vasco", Pérez-Agote (1984) examined the reproduction of Basque national

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<sup>7</sup>In his comparative study of Irish and Basque Country policies of language recovery in school, Mezo (1996) claims that the voluntary and incentivized schooling in Basque has been more effective than the compulsory schooling in Irish when promoting the recovery of the vernacular language in schools. However, this study does not examine the effectiveness of these policies in promoting the general use of Irish or Basque, nor does it look at the influence of these policies on individuals' identification.

<sup>8</sup> Although Martínez-Herrera (2002) and Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008a,b) introduce family origin as an element influencing national identification, they do not examine the parents' identification influence in the formation of individuals' national identification.



identity within the repressive environment of Franco's dictatorship. Using in-depth interviews, Pérez-Agote explains how Basque parents made use of different strategies to deal with the dictatorship's linguistic, cultural and political repression. As already mentioned in the introduction, Basque citizens' "weapons of the weak" ranged from accommodation strategies, such as self-imposed silence within the family, to the use of violence (Pérez-Agote, 1984, 88-105).

Using the same household data that I employ in this chapter, Rico and Jennings (forthcoming) have also examined the intergenerational transmission of national identification within the Catalan family. By comparing the transmission of national identification with the transmission of other political orientations, Rico and Jennings find that parents in Catalonia are more successful when passing on their national identification to their children, than when transmitting other allegiances (such as social class identification, left-right orientation, or religious practices). The authors' analyses lead them to conclude, in agreement with Jennings and Niemi (1974, 153-178) and Tedin (1980), that parents' national identification concurrence enhances parent-child similarity in their national identification.<sup>9</sup>

The study of how family and education together influence individuals' ethnic and national identification have mainly come from the literature addressing the study of immigrant minorities in the United States. These studies, however, have focused on minorities, and have not contrasted the role of these two agents of socialization on the children of natives.

A number of studies in this field of research have emphasized the decisive role that parents play in shaping their children's ethnic/national identity (Alba 1990; Hurtado, Gurin, and Peng 1994; Knight et al. 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001). Parents transmit ethnic content

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<sup>9</sup> They also find that it is the same-sex parent that seems to be the main agent fostering offspring's identification. And so, mothers have a greater influence on their daughters' national identification, and fathers have a greater impact on their sons' national identification.

to their children through their childrearing practices, and enculturate and socialize children into their own ethnic culture. At the same time, non-familial agents transmit to these ethnic minority children the content of the dominant culture, in this way fostering children's acculturation or re-socialization into the dominant culture (Knight et al. 1993, 108-109). Social learning and the development of different cognitive adaptation mechanisms to multi-ethnic environments would model the minority children's attitudes, values and identification choices (Knight et al. 1993), promoting different forms of bi-cultural identities (Haritatos and Benet-Martínez 2002).

Some of these studies have also shown that education not only favors children's exposure to the host society's values and lifestyles, but it also promotes identification with the host nation, in a direct (Casey and Dustmann 2010; Rogler, Cooney, and Ortiz 1980) or indirect way, through the learning of the receiving society's language (Rogler, Cooney, and Ortiz 1980). Other studies have also argued that the influence that education has on second-generation nation/ethnic identification choices is mediated by the immediate context in which children grow up (Lin, Wu, and Lee 2006; Rico and Jennings forthcoming). When second generations concentrate in a particular type of school, stimuli leading to an acculturation process will be limited. In contrast, when second generation children come into contact with children from the mainstream culture, contact is considered to foster either second generation's openness to the new culture, or children's ethnic awareness (Supple et al. 2006; Umaña-Taylor 2004).

Some authors have argued that biculturalism is more likely to emerge in these multicultural contexts (Phinney and Devich-Navarro 1997). Others, on the contrary, have claimed that second generations can follow multidirectional tracks as they mature (Portes and Zhou 1993). These various tracks have three possible main directions: a path of upward mobility into the white middle-class majority, a path of downward mobility into the underclass, or a path of economic advancement and ethnic awareness. While the first process can lead to what Gordon (1964) referred to as

*identificational* assimilation, it is hard to believe that the other two processes lead to the same result. In fact – and contrary to the idea that the immigrants’ structural assimilation into the receiving society is a linear process– we now know that the process of immigrants and second generations’ incorporation differs among immigrant families, and that it depends on the receiving society’s immigration policies (Berry 1984; Bourhis et al. 1997; Nauck 2001).

Building on this broad discussion and on previous empirical work, this chapter contrasts, for the first time, the impact that family and school have upon children of natives and children of immigrants’ identification with Spain and Catalonia. Although school and family messages regarding the nation are very often consistent; in those polities in which the idea of the nation is contested or in those contexts in which immigrants participate in the mainstream educational system, the messages that family and school deliver about the nation are not necessarily the same. In these circumstances, as I have argued above, schooling should play a significant role in the promotion of individuals’ identification with the nation. Thus, by carrying out this comparison in Catalonia, I will be able to explore various hypotheses regarding the acquisition of Catalan identification among children of immigrants, how immigrants and their children diverge in their feelings toward Catalonia, and the comparison of the influence that parents and school have on individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia.

However, before doing so, in the next section, I provide additional details regarding the circumstances that surrounded the implementation of the 1983 language reform to which I already referred in the previous chapter.

### **5.3. A note on the context**

In previous chapter, I already mentioned that the Convergence and Union (CiU, *Convergència i Unió*) government that emerged

from the first regional elections in 1980 had as one of its first objectives the restoration and promotion of Catalan identity. This objective was based on the normalization of the use of the Catalan language. School was crucial in this endeavor.

However, the promotion of Catalan identification and of the learning of the Catalan language among the Catalan population was not an easy task. On the one hand, the Catalan population comprised a large number of immigrants and second generations, which lack the strong bonds of attachment to Catalonia that the autochthonous population had. Additionally, Franco's legacy had also left its mark. For almost forty years the dictatorship had tried to promote Spanish nationalism. The Catalan language had been forbidden in schools, Catalan writers had sunk into oblivion, and Catalonia's past had been erased from history courses (Benet 1978; Calzada and Llorens 1995).<sup>10</sup>

The relaxing of the prohibition of the use of Catalan in the sixties was followed in 1970 by a new education law (the General Law of Education, LGE) that authorized the teaching of Catalan. However, the implementation of this law was delayed (Woolard 1989, 29). In fact, five years later, in 1975, a new regulation established that the promotion of vernacular languages in schools would only have an experimental and voluntary character (Calzada and Llorens 1995, 221). Even though some of the initial regulations of Josep Tarradellas' transitional government sought to extend the presence of the Catalan language in schools (Argelaguet 1999, 110), by 1980, when responsibility for education was transferred to the CiU's Catalan government, the actual number of schools in which Catalan was taught was very limited.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> It is worth noting that the teaching of Catalan in school had been only allowed and encouraged during the period of the Second Republic (García Garrido 1991)

<sup>11</sup> These schools were the *Col·lectiu d'Escoles per l'Escola Pública Catalana* (Collective for the Catalan Public School), which comprised eighty Catalan oriented and progressive school cooperatives (Lo Cascio, 2008, 194).

In 1983 the Law of Language Normalization was approved by the Catalan Parliament (Lo Cascio, 2008, 126). This law and the 1983 Orders on the implementation of the Language Normalization Law in Primary and Secondary School (*Ordre de 8 de setembre de 1983* and *6 de desembre de 1983*) generalized a bilingual model of school. The new law mandated that, besides the course on Catalan language, one basic subject (either social or natural sciences) should be taught in Catalan in the first stage of primary school. In the second stage, both subjects should be taught in Catalan. In the secondary schools, at least two subjects (among natural sciences, drawing, history or mathematics) should be taught in Catalan. The law aimed at gradually making Catalan the language of instruction in all the educational levels and courses and expanding the knowledge and use of Catalan.<sup>12</sup> Ultimately, the law sought to foster the language assimilation of immigrants and their descendants into Catalonia (Keating 1996).

However, the implementation of the law in Catalan schools had to surmount significant difficulties. First, at the beginning of the eighties, Spanish-speaking students were the majority in 31% of the schools (Linz 2008, 470). The high rates of Spanish-speaking students made teaching in Catalan difficult. First, these children were being taught in a language that was different from their mother tongue, and secondly, they were likely to receive few stimuli from their surrounding environment to motivate them to use Catalan. In fact, the use of the Catalan language in school was strongly related to the social status of the students' families: so, while Spanish-speaking middle class students adopted Catalan quite rapidly, lower class students resisted speaking it (Woolard 2003, 94). After all, even if students perceived that learning Catalan had a "premium" (Linz 2008, 479), Catalan was seen as completely unnecessary for the kinds of jobs the children of the working class aspired to in the future (Woolard, 2003).

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<sup>12</sup> Article 6 of the September 8, 1983 Order on the implementation of the Language Normalization Law in Primary and Secondary School.

A second problem with the implementation of the law in the schools was teachers' limited competence in Catalan. On the one hand, many primary and secondary teachers, who were immigrants, were Spanish-speakers themselves.

"I remember my fourth grade teacher, for example. She was from Lago de Sanabria, near Leon. Because she was responsible for teaching all the subjects, she taught us Catalan while she was learning Catalan herself." [Interview #20, Andrés, child of mixed couple, born in 1975].

On the other hand, many native Catalans who had become teachers during the dictatorship did not have competences in written Catalan. In the 1977-78 school year, 48% of primary school teachers stated that they could not speak Catalan well, and 20% of this group admitted that they could not understand Catalan (Argelaguet 1999, 142-143). The acquisition of competence to teach in Catalan was, on many occasions, a costly process for teachers.

"There were people who suffered with Catalan. That happened when I started to work [as teacher] here [in Catalonia] around 1982 or 1983. I passed the state competitive examination for being a teacher, and I did a test of understanding in Catalan. But, even those [teachers] who had studied here in Catalonia had studied in Castilian. They did not know Catalan; they were less able to write Catalan than I was. They could speak Catalan, but many of them could not write it, because they had never written it." [Interview #22 Milagros, immigrant, born in 1956].

Nevertheless, by the 1986-7 school year, 87.38% of primary school teachers stated that they felt competent in Catalan (Argelaguet 1999, 143).

Progressively, other changes would be introduced in the Catalan educational system. Some of these changes affected to the school curricula, others were sought to enlarge the presence of the Catalan language in school. So, for example, in 1988, the Catalan

government passed a regulation that added new content about Catalan history and Catalan geography to the history and geography courses that were taught in primary and secondary education. In 1990, a national law, the “Ley Orgánica General del Sistema Educativo” (LOGSE), established that the regional governments with educational responsibilities could decide over 45 percent of the contents of the school timetable. In addition, in 1992, the Catalan government passed a series of decrees that transformed the bilingual model of education into a model of language immersion in which Catalan would progressively become the main language of instruction. The model of language immersion would be endorsed by the 1998 language reform and, later on, by the first Catalan Education Law that was passed during the second *Tripartit* government in 2009.

Yet, among all these reforms, the 1983 reform can be considered of special relevance because it made the teaching of Catalan in school compulsory for the first time. Taking this into account, and from what has been discussed in the previous section, I present in the next section a series of hypotheses regarding the influence that parents and school should have in shaping individuals’ national identification.

#### **5.4. Hypotheses**

As mentioned above, this chapter’s main goal is to contrast parents and school influence upon individuals’ national identification. However before presenting this chapter’s hypotheses, I would like to make clear that here I am especially interested in learning about the role of the years of schooling, and not about the role of education. This clarification is relevant as education and identification with Catalonia are strongly correlated. This correlation, however, does not necessarily show the effect of a socialization process, but the effect of a selection process, as the children of natives achieve higher education in a greater proportion than the children of working class immigrants.

Two sets of hypothesis will be presented in this section. The first set of hypotheses relates to family influence and, the second set refers to the school role. The last hypotheses in this section will hypothesize on the separate influence that parents and school have on individuals' identification.

I start, therefore, with a first hypothesis on the family's background and, more specifically, on the impact that the family's economic status has on individual's identification. Although the relationship between certain familial characteristics, such as the parents' identification or the family origin, and offspring's identification with Spain and Catalonia is well known and does not need further elaboration (Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a, 2008b; Rico and Jennings forthcoming), the relationship between the family's economic background and individuals' Spanish or Catalan identity has not yet been established. Rico and Jennings (forthcoming) have examined the influence that family economic background has on an individual's identification. The authors have not found, however, any positive or negative influence.

Here, I am interested in testing the impact that the economic status of immigrant families has on their children's national identification. In agreement with Rumbaut (1994, 756) who has argued that the children of better-off immigrant families remain attached to their parents' national identification, I hypothesize that:

*Hypothesis 5.1.1:* The children of better-off immigrant parents will be more likely to exhibit a stronger identification with Spain.

Conversely, and in line with Hogg et al.'s (1995, 260) idea that social mobility can make members of a low-status group adopt the identity of high-status group members, we can expect that the economic success of working-class immigrants make them feel grateful to the receiving society (external attribution). This gratitude can turn into a positive image towards Catalonia, and can make immigrants more attached to it. Parents' positive feelings towards Catalonia can be passed on to their children. But children



can also feel grateful to Catalonia for their parents' economic progress. If this is the case, we should observe that:

*Hypothesis 5.1.2:* The children of better-off immigrant parents will be more likely to exhibit a stronger identification with Catalonia.

The second set of hypotheses refers to the influence of school. I have already discussed in section 2 of this chapter the idea that school is an agent of "national socialization". Through the teaching of history, geography, literature and language, Catalan schools would provide cognitive content to children's psychological attachment to Catalonia. Moreover, as language not only performs a communicative function, but is also the most distinctive symbol –a "core value" of the Catalan collective identity that carries with it an emotional and affective load (Barrera 1985; Conversi 1997; Woolard 1989) – exposure to the Catalan language should also foster stronger identification with Catalonia (Aspachs-Bracons et al 2008a; Martínez-Herrera 2005). Finally, the greater presence of primarily Catalan identifiers among schoolteachers in Catalonia (Miley 2006) could potentially have a say in the configuration of individuals' identification with Catalonia.

As the Catalan linguistic censuses have reported, the changes introduced in the Catalan school after the Law of Language Normalization was implemented in schools (1983) have undoubtedly had an impact on the spread of Catalan knowledge.<sup>13</sup> However, has the school have a similar impact on the promotion of identification with Catalonia?<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> In addition to this, Woolard and Gahng (1990) have shown that language policies have also influenced the symbolic meanings that people attribute to the Catalan and Spanish languages, and also to the attitudes that individuals attribute to the speakers of each language (status assessments and solidarity values).

<sup>14</sup> In previous chapter, I test whether the knowledge of Catalan has had an impact on second generations likelihood of identifying as more

Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008a; 2008b) have shown that differential exposure to Catalan in school explains differences in the probability of self-identifying with Catalonia.<sup>15</sup> In the empirical analysis of my data, I will also test the impact of the reform following Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008b):

*Hypothesis 5.2.1:* For those children who were educated after the Law of Language Normalization was implemented, school will have a different impact than for those who started their education before that date.

*Hypothesis 5.2.2:* For those children who were educated after the Law of Language Normalization was implemented, each year of additional schooling will positively influence their identification with Catalonia.

However, school is also a general context for socialization and thus, it can also contribute to the fostering of Catalan identification by promoting contact between children of immigrants and children of natives. However, in Catalonia, school composition is heterogeneous and contingent on the composition of the neighborhood in which children live. So even though bilingual education was introduced in Catalonia in all schools after

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Catalan-oriented over time. The results of my analyses show that the impact that the knowledge of Catalan has had on second generations identification with Catalonia has decreased over time. Here, I test, in a more direct way, the effect of the 1983 language reform, focusing on the effect reform among individuals who reached the age of 18 between 1983 and 2005.

<sup>15</sup> Exposure to Catalan in school varies according to the child's year of birth and to the years children remained in school. Thus, those individuals who were born after 1977 would have completed their education in a bilingual educational system. On the contrary, those individuals who were born before 1977 will have had heterogeneous exposure to bilingual education, depending on whether they completed secondary education or whether they dropped out of school before 1983.

1983, in the playgrounds, and even sometimes in the classroom, Spanish continued to be, for some years, the predominant language of communication in those schools where children of immigrants concentrated. Therefore, the influence of school in the promotion of identification with Catalonia should vary according to the composition of the neighborhood where individuals went to school. Thus, I expect that the effect of school will be limited in those neighborhoods where individuals of immigrant origin concentrate. Nor do I expect that the influence of school will be that significant in those neighborhoods in which most of the population was born in Catalonia, as the students who attend those schools already bring to school a Catalan identity that has been fostered by their own families. As a result, I conjecture that:

*Hypothesis 5.3:* the years of schooling will positively affect individuals' identification with Catalonia only in those neighborhoods where the presence of individuals born in other regions of Spain is moderate.

The final hypotheses refer to the joint effect of the school and the parents. In principle, we might assume that in those families, in which parents already have a Catalan identification, the "national socialization" role of the school would be redundant and, therefore, I expect that:

*Hypothesis 5.4:* the influence of the school should diminish once parents' national identification is taken into account.

However, among immigrant families, in which the parents have a predominantly Spanish or dual identification, the school could perform a more significant role in fostering children's identification with Catalonia. Therefore, I expect that:

*Hypothesis 5.5:* the influence of the school will be greater in the children of families with an immigrant background than in the children of native families.

If this was the case, as Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008b; 2008a) results suggest, we could confirm that the Catalan school counteracts immigrant parents as agents of “national socialization”.

*Table 5.1. Summary of hypotheses*

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|---|--|
| Hypotheses on the parents' influence            |  |
| <i>Hypothesis 5.1.1</i>                         | The children of better-off immigrant parents should be more likely to exhibit stronger identification with Spain.  |
| <i>Hypothesis 5.1.2</i>                         | The children of better-off immigrant parents should be more likely to exhibit stronger identification with Catalonia.  |
| Hypotheses on the school's influence            |  |
| <i>Hypothesis 5.2.1</i>                         | For those children who were educated after the Law of Language Normalization was implemented, school will have a different impact than for those who started their education before that date. |
| <i>Hypothesis 5.2.2</i>                         | For those children who were educated after the Law of Language Normalization was implemented, each year of additional schooling will positively influence their identification with Catalonia. |
| <i>Hypothesis 5.3</i>                           | The years of schooling will positively affect individuals' identification with Catalonia only in those neighborhoods where the presence of people born in other regions of Spain is moderate.  |
| Contrast of the parents' and school's influence |  |
| <i>Hypothesis 5.4.1</i>                         | The school's influence diminishes once parents' national identification is taken into account.   |
| <i>Hypothesis 5.4.2</i>                         | The school's influence will be greater in the children of families of an immigrant background than in the children of native families.   |

## 5.5. Data and Variables

### 5.5.1. Data

In this chapter I draw on household data from the “Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya (PaD), of the Fundació Jaume Bofill”, waves 1 to 4, 2001-2005. The 2001 original sample of the PaD is representative of the population living in Catalonia, and includes information on 1,191 households and approximately 5,785 individuals.<sup>16</sup>

For this study, I have selected those households in which parent-child relationships were present. This means that households without children were excluded from the analysis. In order to maximize the number of observations, I have pooled the data from the three waves for which this information was available. Whenever information on the national identification of any member of the family was missing in the first wave, either because the child was not yet eligible to answer in the first wave, or because any member of the household did not reply to that particular issue in that wave, I have used the data from the subsequent wave that included complete information on all the members of the household (parents and children in two-parent households and father/mother and children in single-parent households). In this way, observations regarding parents and children all come from the same wave.

Only individuals born in Catalonia<sup>17</sup> who were aged between 15 and 39 years old when they were interviewed are included in

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<sup>16</sup> Only those individuals who were aged fifteen or over at the time of the interview were eligible to answer the individual questionnaire.

<sup>17</sup> Children of immigrants from other countries are not considered in this analysis as the question we are examining here (identification with Spain vis-à-vis identification with Catalonia) commonly lacks relevance for them. I have also excluded from my analysis first generation Spanish immigrants as most of them did not go to school in Catalonia.

the analysis.<sup>18</sup> Altogether 490 parent-child pairs are present in the study. When only mother-child or father-child pairs are considered, the sample amounts to 588 and 505 cases, respectively. The presence of single-parent families and lack of information on one of the parents explains the differences between these figures. Before excluding the individuals who did not answer this question or answered “don’t know” or “none of them”, parent-child pairs made up 643 cases, mother-child made up 628 and father-child pairs made up 538.<sup>19</sup> In total, the number of cases with information for at least one parent and his or her child goes up to 614, before excluding the “don’t know/don’t answer” cases, and 589 after excluding them.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> There are two reasons behind the decision to exclude from the sample those individuals who are older than 39. The number of individuals aged forty years or more in children-parent pairs was very low. Also, in the households where children are older than 39 years old, the probability that parents live in their children’s home, instead of the reverse, is higher. As this can have consequences on the direction of the causality mechanism that we are studying, I preferred to leave these individuals out of the sample.

<sup>19</sup> In total, the number of individuals who did not answer this question or answered “don’t know” or “none of them” in the offspring and in the parents’ generations amounts between 16 cases in the mothers group and 29 cases in the offspring group.

<sup>20</sup> Although the PaD is a representative sample of the population living in Catalonia, the final sample in this paper is restricted to the cohorts born between 1965 and 1987, aged between 15 and 39 between 2001 and 2005, and within this, to those individuals who were still living with their parents at that time. In this regard, I would like to emphasize that the main goal of this paper is to gain some insights into the influence that parents and school have upon individuals’ national identification.

*Table 5.2. Number of cases with information on the parents and the children national identification*

|  | Parents-<br>Children<br>Pairs | Mother-<br>Child Pairs | Father-<br>Child Pairs | At least<br>one parent |
|--|-------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Including don't<br>know/don't<br>answer  | 643                           | 628                    | 538                    | 614                    |
| Excluding don't<br>know/ don't<br>answer | 490                           | 588                    | 505                    | 589                    |

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya-FJB, 2001-05"

*5.5.2. Dependent and independent variables*

National identification is measured by means of the same bi-directional indicator that I used in the previous sections. The answer categories are 1 "only Spanish", 2 "more Spanish than Catalan", 3 "as Catalan as Spanish", 4 "more Catalan than Spanish" and 5 "only Catalan". The "don't answer", "don't know" and "none of them" responses were excluded from the analysis.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, as the "only Spanish" and "more Spanish than Catalan" categories present very few cases in the offspring group, in the analysis that I carry out in section 5.7 I have merged these two categories into an primarily Spanish category (see Table 5.3).

<sup>21</sup> As I mentioned above, the total number of "don't know/don't answer" and "none of them" responses for the offspring final sample was 29, which limits the scope of any in-depth analysis of this group.

*Table 5.3. National identification in the offspring generation*

| Category                  | Frequencies | Percent (%) |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Only Spanish              | 15          | 2.55        |
| More Spanish than Catalan | 35          | 5.94        |
| As Spanish as Catalan     | 163         | 27.67       |
| More Catalan than Spanish | 204         | 34.63       |
| Only Catalan              | 170         | 28.86       |
| Total                     | 589         | 100         |

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya–FJB, 2001-05"

The models presented in section 5.7 include a series of independent variables that seek to contrast the influence that family and school have upon children's national identification. For the sake of simplicity, I have treated parents' national identification as a continuous variable.<sup>22</sup>

The immigrant family variable takes a value of 1 when at least one of the parents was born outside Catalonia.

Other background characteristics will be included in the analyses to test for other hypothesis. Therefore, I introduce household income as a continuous variable, and I interact this variable with immigrant family origin to test whether the economic status of immigrant parents affects their children's identification with Catalonia.

Following Rico and Jennings (forthcoming), I also include the percentage of the population from other regions of Spain present in the census tract of the respondent's household to control for the effect of the immediate context on children's national identification. After testing its linear form, this variable is introduced in the analysis as a continuous variable. This variable takes a value of 0 when the percentage of individuals who were born in other regions of Spain and live in the same census tract the respondent lives is lower than 5 percent, and a value of 7 when the

<sup>22</sup> The implicit assumption for treating these two variables (mothers' and fathers' national identification) as continuous is satisfied. The coefficients increase by a similar proportion in each category.



percentage of individuals who were born in other regions of Spain and live in the same census tract as the respondent is over 35 percent. The rationale behind this variable is that respondents who live in neighborhoods in which the share of the immigrant population is high, will have fewer opportunities to interact with the native population and to assimilate Catalan identification. This variable will also allow me to check for the heterogeneous impact that years of schooling can have, according to neighborhood composition.

To test the school influence I include a variable that measures years of schooling beyond compulsory education and before university. In my sample, the years of schooling variable ranges between 8 and 12. Individuals who have 8 years of education only completed compulsory education. Conversely, individuals who have 12 years of education completed, at least, secondary school.<sup>23</sup> The influence that school can have in those additional four years is very relevant, as those years correspond to children's adolescence, an age in which ethnic identification is, according to the literature, being formed.

However, as the impact of school is expected to differ for those individuals who went to school before and after the Law of Language Normalization was implemented, I will contrast the different effect that years of schooling have among those individuals who were born before 1977, and those who were born after that year. In order to do this, I have divided the sample into two groups: those who were born between 1965 and 1976 and those who were born between 1977 and 1987.<sup>24</sup> The first group is

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<sup>23</sup> In the logistic analysis, I have rescaled this variable so it includes a zero value. In this way, the years of education variable takes a value of 0 when the individual has completed primary school (8 years of education) and a value of 4 when the individual has completed secondary school (12 years of education).

<sup>24</sup> In the logistic analysis in which I test the influence of school, I have excluded those individuals who were aged 17 or less when they were interviewed. Excluding these individuals leaves me with a more homogeneous sample, in which every individual has had the time to

made up of those who entered school between 1971, after the General Law of Education was passed, and 1982, a year before Catalan was made compulsory in schools. The second group is made up of those who entered school between 1983 and 1993, and who therefore were completely exposed to the reform. Since the Catalan government passed a further regulation in 1988 that added new content to Catalan history courses, all individuals in this group who remained in school after finishing primary education would have also been taught Catalan history in their history courses.

Table 5.4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this chapter.

*Table 5.4. Summary of Statistics*

| Variable  | Mean     | Std. Dev. | Min. | Max.   | N   |
|---|----------|-----------|------|--------|-----|
| Age   | 22.71    | 4.64      | 15   | 39     | 589 |
| Age groups (1 = born between 1977 and 1987)         | 0.72     | 0.43      | 0    | 1      | 589 |
| Years of Education (including university)           | 13.07    | 2.82      | 4    | 18     | 587 |
| Years of Schooling (all)                            | 11.35    | 1.03      | 8    | 12     | 587 |
| Years of Schooling (children of natives)            | 11.46    | 1.00      | 8    | 12     | 376 |
| Years of Schooling (second generations)             | 11.25    | 1.00      | 8    | 12     | 211 |
| Mothers' Origin (1= native)                         | 0.73     | 0.44      | 0    | 1      | 576 |
| Fathers' Origin (1= native)                         | 0.75     | 0.43      | 0    | 1      | 491 |
| Immigrant Family (1= at least one immigrant parent) | 0.36     | 0.48      | 0    | 1      | 589 |
| Neighborhood Composition                            | 3.54     | 2.10      | 0    | 7      | 581 |
| Household Income                                    | 28861.80 | 16492.83  | 4200 | 106000 | 493 |

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya - FJB, 2001-2005"

complete pre-university education. Some of the older respondents, who had four to five years of education, were assimilated into the group of individuals with eight years of education.

### **5.6. Children-parents congruence in native and immigrant families**

In the previous chapter, I have provided evidence on the occurrence of intergenerational changes in identification with Spain and Catalonia. This evidence was based on the comparison of unrelated individuals from different cohorts, and from different origin groups. In order to enrich the previous chapter's findings, this section compares parents and children's national identification. First, I test whether there are significant differences between the parents' and the children's generations – distinguishing between the native and the immigrant parents – to learn about the assimilating process of second generations. Then, I examine the degree of parent-child similarity/dissimilarity. As a basis for comparison, besides self-declared national identification, I include in these descriptive analysis, the use of language in private spheres,<sup>25</sup> which is very often taken as a component of individuals' national identity, and parents-child left-right ideology.

Language use is computed as a summarized scale of four indicators: language spoken in shops, with friends, neighbors and in the household. The scale, which ranges between 0 and 100, includes information on the frequency of Catalan usage over a week. Left-right identification represents individual's positioning on a scale that goes from extreme left to extreme right.<sup>26</sup>

Table 5.5 reflects the intergenerational change that occurred within families in Catalonia. Table 5.5 shows that children's national identification differs significantly from both mothers and fathers' national identification.

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<sup>25</sup> Therefore, I exclude from the analysis the language spoken at work and at school, as in these two public spheres the language spoken is less voluntarily determined.

<sup>26</sup> As the item scale changed between first, second and third waves, this variable has been transformed into a 0=Extreme-Left to 1=Extreme-Right scale.

Table 5.5. Mothers, Fathers and Children Groups Comparison National Identification and Language Usage.

|   | Mean Values |         |          |              | Parents-Child comparison <sup>c</sup> |  | Item No. | Obs. |
|---|-------------|---------|----------|--------------|---------------------------------------|--|----------|------|
|   | Mothers     | Fathers | Children | Mother-Child | Father-Child                          |  |          |      |
| National Identification (all) <sup>a</sup>    | 3.66        | 3.64    | 3.89     | S            | S                                     |  | 1        | 478  |
| National Identif. (Parents born in Catalonia) | 4.02        | 3.98    | 4.21     | S            | S                                     |  | 1        | 306  |
| National Identification (Immigrant Mother)    | 2.78        | –       | 3.23     | S            | –                                     |  | 1        | 154  |
| National Identification (Immigrant Father)    | –           | 2.68    | 3.11     | –            | S                                     |  | 1        | 121  |
| Language Usage <sup>b</sup>                   | 69.99       | 70.97   | 72.3     | NS           | NS                                    |  | 4        | 345  |
| Language Usage (Parents born in Catalonia)    | 90.86       | 92.85   | 89.62    | NS           | S                                     |  | 4        | 210  |
| Language Usage (Immigrant Mother)             | 26.91       | –       | 39.58    | S            | –                                     |  | 4        | 128  |
| Language Usage (Immigrant Father)             | –           | 23.46   | 36.87    | –            | S                                     |  | 4        | 96   |

Note:

<sup>a</sup> Item values: 1= Only Spanish 2= More Spanish than Catalan 3= As Spanish as Catalan 4= More Catalan than Spanish 5= Only Catalan

<sup>b</sup> Item values: 0=Don't use Catalan language at all 100=Use Catalan language always

<sup>c</sup>S= statistically significant at .05 level using paired t-test; NS=not statistically significant.

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume Bofill, 2001-05"

Children exhibit a more Catalan oriented identification than their parents; and this is so not only among the immigrant families where a process of intergenerational assimilation was expected to occur, but also in those families in which both parents were born in Catalonia. A similar pattern is found when immigrants and their children's usage of Catalan are compared. In sum, immigrant children's usage of Catalan is significantly higher than that of their parents.

However, this change is not observed among the children of Catalan-born parents. Strikingly, this group speaks Catalan less often than their parent. Nevertheless, differences are not significant, at least when the mothers and their children are compared.

Significant differences prevail, however, between the children of Catalan-born parents' and the children of immigrant families or mixed couples (see Table 5.6). Differences are quite large when usage of the Catalan language in the children of natives and the children of immigrants is compared.<sup>27</sup> Despite this, children of immigrants are closer to the children of natives in their national identification. This finding provides additional evidence in favor of the idea that subjective identification with Catalonia is not deterministically linked to the language most frequently spoken.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> This implies that even if the children of immigrants have learned to speak Catalan, they do not seem to use it too much in private spheres (with family, friends, neighbors and in shops). A possible explanation for this result is the linguistic separation of the Spanish and Catalan-speaking communities.

<sup>28</sup> Second generations very often consider birthplace as a sufficient criterion to vindicate a Catalan identity (Woolard 1989, 136). Despite this, it is worth noting that, as Woolard (2011) has recently argued, transitions to university, entrance into the job or into the marriage market and parenthood can alter second-generations' language patterns. Unfortunately, data tracking the use of language over time is unavailable, and therefore I am unable to test this hypothesis properly.

Table 5.6. National identification and language usage differences by origin. Mean Values

|                                | Mean<br>Values <sup>a</sup> | 95%<br>Confidence<br>Intervals | N   |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|-----|
| <b>National Identification</b> |                             |                                |     |
| Catalan-Born parents           | 0.80                        | [0.78, 0.83]                   | 306 |
| One immigrant parent           | 0.60                        | [0.56, 0.65]                   | 109 |
| Both parents immigrants        | 0.51                        | [0.46, 0.57]                   | 63  |
| <b>Language usage</b>          |                             |                                |     |
| Catalan-Born parents           | 0.90                        | [0.87, 0.92]                   | 210 |
| One immigrant parent           | 0.57                        | [0.50, 0.65]                   | 82  |
| Both parents immigrants        | 0.27                        | [0.19, 0.34]                   | 53  |

Note: <sup>a</sup>The variables range has been transformed into a 0 to 1 scale for comparability reasons.

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya -FJB, 2001-05"

Tables 5.7 and 5.8 provide detailed information on the degree of parents-child similarity/dissimilarity. At first glance, it can be noted that parents who feel "only Catalan" are the most "successful" in transmitting their national identification to their children. Fifty-eight percent of those mothers who feel "only Catalan" have children who declare the same. For fathers the percentage is only slightly lower 56.

The level of success in the transmission of the parents' national identification is not as high among those individuals who hold a dual identification. Less than half of the mothers and half of the fathers who have a dual identification have transmitted these dual alignments to their children.

*Table 5.7. Offspring national identification by mother's national identification*

| Offspring National Identification |              |              |              |              |              |          |       |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------|-------|
|                                   | Only Spanish | More Spanish | Dual         | More Catalan | Only Catalan | Marginal | N     |
| Only Spanish                      | <b>16.67</b> | 22.22        | 50.00        | 5.56         | 5.56         | 3.13     | (18)  |
| More Spanish                      | 7.89         | <b>23.68</b> | 39.47        | 23.68        | 5.26         | 6.60     | (38)  |
| Dual                              | 2.80         | 7.94         | <b>46.26</b> | 32.24        | 10.75        | 37.15    | (214) |
| More Catalan                      | 0.00         | 2.14         | 14.97        | <b>44.92</b> | 37.97        | 32.47    | (187) |
| Only Catalan                      | 0.84         | 0.84         | 8.40         | 31.93        | <b>57.98</b> | 20.66    | (119) |
| Marginal                          | 2.26         | 6.08         | 27.95        | 34.90        | 28.82        | 100      |       |
| N                                 | (13)         | (35)         | (161)        | (201)        | (166)        |          | (576) |

| Mother National Identification |  |
|--------------------------------|--|
|--------------------------------|--|

Mother National Identification

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya-Fundació Jaume Bofill, 2001-05"

Table 5.8. *Offspring national identification by father's national identification*

| Father National Identification | Offspring National Identification |              |              |              |              |          |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------|
|                                | Only Spanish                      | More Spanish | Dual         | More Catalan | Only Catalan | Marginal |
| Only Spanish                   | <b>15.79</b>                      | 15.79        | 47.37        | 15.79        | 5.26         | 3.87     |
| More Spanish                   | 0.00                              | <b>16.67</b> | 56.67        | 26.67        | 0.00         | 6.11     |
| Dual                           | 3.64                              | 6.67         | <b>47.88</b> | 31.52        | 10.30        | 33.60    |
| More Catalan                   | 0.00                              | 3.51         | 11.70        | <b>42.11</b> | 42.69        | 34.83    |
| Only Catalan                   | 0.00                              | 2.83         | 7.55         | 33.96        | <b>55.66</b> | 21.59    |
| Marginal                       | 1.83                              | 5.70         | 27.09        | 34.83        | 30.55        | 100      |
| N                              | (9)                               | (28)         | (133)        | (171)        | (150)        | (491)    |

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya -Fundació Jaume Bofill, 2001-05"



Those parents who hold a minority position within Catalonia and self-identify as primarily Spanish are the least successful in transmitting their national identification to their children. However, mothers seem to be somehow more influential when transmitting their identification with Spain. This is a result that has been already found in Sabatier's (2008) study of ethnic and national identity among second-generations in France.

Looking at the diagonal, we can say that children seem to be slightly more similar to their mothers than to their fathers; especially, as I have just mentioned, in the case of mothers who self-identify as primarily Spanish. The only exception to this pattern is found in the group of parents who self-identify as "as Spanish as Catalan". In this case, fathers seem to be more successful than mothers in transmitting their dual alignments to their children.

Overall, tables 5.7 and 5.8 confirm the occurrence of an intergenerational change within Catalan families. Children are more Catalan oriented than their mothers and their fathers. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the percentage of those individuals who feel "only Catalan" is significantly higher in the offspring generation than in the parents' generation.

A quick way to test the degree of parent-child similarity/dissimilarity consists in looking at the mother-child and father-child correlations. According to the acculturation hypothesis, I expect that the influence of immigrant parents is lower than that of Catalan-born parents. The results in table 5.9 confirm this expectation. Interestingly, parents and children are much more alike in their language patterns than in their self-declared national identification. Even if parent-child language use' correlations are lower in immigrant families than in families in which both parents were born in Catalonia, correlations are still high in this group, and they are also greater than in the national identification variable.

Compared to these two components of national identity, parent-child resemblance is lower in their left-right positioning; a result which confirms Rico and Jennings' (forthcoming) finding.

Although Rico and Jennings explain this result by the “accessible and less abstract character that territorial identities have, compared with overt political orientations”, my contention is that the accessibility of national identification is in fact context-specific. Therefore, the greater similarity of parents and children’s national identification should not be extrapolated to other contexts. Accordingly, in those contexts in which the left-right cleavage is more salient than the center-periphery cleavage, parent-child continuity on the left-right scale could be larger.

Now, an alternative explanation to this finding could be related with the average age of the offspring generation in the sample (around 22). Differences in the left-right positioning of the offspring generation and their parents could be due to a life-cycle effect, which makes young children more progressive and adult parents more conservative. This life-cycle effect is not believed to be present in national identification.

*Table 5.9. Parents-Children Correlation in national identification and language use*

|                                      | Mother<br>Origin | Mother-<br>Child | Obs. | Father<br>Origin | Father-<br>Child | Obs. |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------|------------------|------------------|------|
| National identification <sup>a</sup> |                  |                  |      |                  |                  |      |
| All                                  |                  | 0.55***          | 588  | All              | 0.55***          | 505  |
| Catalan<br>Born                      |                  | 0.45***          | 423  | Catalan<br>Born  | 0.39***          | 372  |
| Immigrant                            |                  | 0.39***          | 157  | Immigrant        | 0.28**           | 126  |
| Language Use <sup>b</sup>            |                  |                  |      |                  |                  |      |
| All                                  |                  | 0.84***          | 437  | All              | 0.85***          | 367  |
| Catalan<br>Born                      |                  | 0.83***          | 302  | Catalan<br>Born  | 0.81***          | 261  |
| Immigrant                            |                  | 0.68***          | 129  | Immigrant        | 0.65***          | 101  |

Notes:

<sup>a</sup>Spearman Rank Order Correlation (rho).

<sup>b</sup>Pearson Correlation

Source: “Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya –FJB, 2001-05”.

### **5.7. Family and school as determinants of children's national identification**

In this section I examine the role that family and school have as determinants of individuals' national identification. First, I separately examine the effect of family characteristics and the effect of years of schooling on national identification. Next, I look at the interplay of these two sources of "national socialization". Ultimately, I am interested in learning whether school has any effect on individuals' identification, and whether this effect can be separated from the effect that parents have on their children's national identification.

The models that I present next have been estimated using a multinomial logit regression that does not impose the constraint of proportional odds.<sup>29</sup> Although multinomial logit models produce a loss of efficiency in the estimation, they provide more information on the effect that independent variables have on each category of the dependent variable. In order to control for the presence of siblings within the households, which would violate the assumption of the independence of observations, standard errors have been adjusted for household clusters.

Table 5.10 presents two models that examine the influence that family characteristics have on offspring's national identification. The first model includes parents' national identification, family immigrant origin and household income. The second model includes an interaction between household income and parents' immigrant origin to test hypothesis 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.

The results in table 5.10 confirm the fact that parents' national identification has a significant influence on their children's national identification. Mothers are more successful when transmitting to their children their primarily Spanish identification.

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<sup>29</sup> For the multinomial logit, the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives has been tested, and has not been proved to be violated in any of the additive models presented in this section.

Table 5.10. Determinants of Offspring National Identification: Testing the effect of Family Background (Multinomial Logistic Regression)

|                                     | Model (1)         |                    |                    | Model (2)         |                    |                    |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                                     | Primarily Spanish | More Catalan       | Only Catalan       | Primarily Spanish | More Catalan       | Only Catalan       |
| Id_father                           | 0.29<br>(0.34)    | 0.81***<br>(0.21)  | 1.30***<br>(0.25)  | 0.27<br>(0.33)    | 0.81***<br>(0.21)  | 1.30***<br>(0.25)  |
| Id_mother                           | -1.02**<br>(0.45) | 0.43*<br>(0.22)    | 1.00***<br>(0.25)  | -1.04**<br>(0.45) | 0.45**<br>(0.22)   | 1.03***<br>(0.25)  |
| Immigrant Parents (IP) <sup>a</sup> | 0.66<br>(0.60)    | -0.93***<br>(0.35) | -1.10**<br>(0.44)  | 0.74<br>(0.92)    | -2.07***<br>(0.58) | -1.74**<br>(0.85)  |
| Household Income (HI) <sup>b</sup>  | 0.90<br>(1.28)    | 0.49<br>(1.03)     | 0.49<br>(1.11)     | 1.55<br>(1.85)    | -1.22<br>(1.18)    | -0.78<br>(1.28)    |
| IP x HI                             |                   |                    |                    | -0.18<br>(2.43)   | 4.47**<br>(1.84)   | 2.66<br>(2.47)     |
| Age                                 | -0.07<br>(0.05)   | 0.04<br>(0.03)     | 0.02<br>(0.04)     | -0.07<br>(0.05)   | 0.04<br>(0.03)     | 0.02<br>(0.04)     |
| Constant                            | 0.15<br>(1.18)    | -2.10**<br>(0.90)  | -3.85***<br>(1.19) | 0.01<br>(1.24)    | -1.76*<br>(0.92)   | -3.61***<br>(1.19) |
| Obs.                                |                   | 405                |                    |                   | 405                |                    |
| Cluster                             |                   | 279                |                    |                   | 279                |                    |
| ll                                  |                   | -404.40            |                    |                   | -401.12            |                    |
| Wald                                |                   | 105.00             |                    |                   | 108.32             |                    |
| Chi2                                |                   | (15)               |                    |                   | (18)               |                    |
| Adj.Count                           |                   |                    |                    |                   |                    |                    |
| R2                                  |                   | 0.28               |                    |                   | 0.31               |                    |

Standard Errors Adjusted for Household Clusters \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Notes: The reference category is "As Spanish as Catalan"

<sup>a</sup>IP at least one immigrant parent

<sup>b</sup>HI has been transformed into a 0 to 1 variable

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption not violated

Collinearity diagnostics do not detect problems in the additive model. VIF values under 2.5

In fact, fathers' identification does not influence their offspring's primarily Spanish identification at all. This seems to indicate that minority identities are better transmitted by the mother, a finding that is coherent with Sabatier's (2008) results.

Family's immigrant origin has an independent effect on children's identification, and it makes less likely that children self-identify as "more Catalan than Spanish" or as "only Catalan" than "as Spanish as Catalan". In addition, family immigrant origin seems to be related positively with the probability that children self-identify as primarily Spanish, even though the coefficient for this variable is not significant. These results suggest that the children of immigrants and the children of mixed couples are more likely to place themselves in the primarily Spanish and the "as Spanish as Catalan" category than in any of the others categories.

Finally, in coherence with Rico and Jennings's (forthcoming) results, in this model, the economic status of the families does not have any effect upon individuals' identification.

Model 2 includes the interaction between household income and parents' immigrant origin. If we pay attention to the coefficients of the "immigrant parents" term in this second model, we notice that the children of immigrant families, who have the lowest household income in the sample, also have a lower probability of self-identifying as "more Catalan than Spanish" or "only Catalan".<sup>30</sup>

Hypotheses 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 refer to the impact of immigrant families' economic performance on their children's national identification. In order to test if either of the two hypotheses is fulfilled, we can look at table 5.11 that reports the marginal effect and the standard errors of the interaction term. From the results in table 5.11, we can see again that household income does not have any significant impact on the national identification of those children whose parents were born in Catalonia. However, household income does have a significant effect on the probability

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<sup>30</sup> The variable has been rescaled so the 0 value is directly interpretable.

that the children of immigrants identify themselves as being “more Catalan than Spanish”. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that this effect is significantly strong; thus, when household income goes from its lower level to its higher level, the odds ratio that the children of immigrants identify as “more Catalan than Spanish” increases to 3.25.

*Table 5.11. Marginal Effect of Household Income on National Identification by Parents' Origin*

|                               | Coef. | s.e. | p.value | 95% Confidence Intervals |
|-------------------------------|-------|------|---------|--------------------------|
| Primarily Spanish             |       |      |         |                          |
| Catalan-born parents          | 1.55  | 1.85 | 0.403   | [-2.08, 5.19]            |
| At least one immigrant parent | 1.37  | 1.65 | 0.407   | [-1.87, 4.61]            |
| More Catalan than Spanish     |       |      |         |                          |
| Catalan-born parents          | -1.22 | 1.18 | 0.302   | [-3.54, 1.10]            |
| At least one immigrant parent | 3.25  | 1.43 | 0.023   | [0.44, 6.06]             |
| Only Catalan                  |       |      |         |                          |
| Catalan-born parents          | -0.77 | 1.28 | 0.545   | [-3.28, 1.73]            |
| At least one immigrant parent | 1.88  | 2.12 | 0.376   | [-2.28, 6.05]            |

Note: Values estimated from model 2 in Table 5.10

Because of the cross-sectional character of the data, we cannot test the hypothesis of economic mobility, but if we take into account the economic standards of most Spanish immigrants when they arrived to Catalonia, the hypothesis that immigrant families' economic mobility fosters a more Catalan oriented identification among their offspring seems to be a reasonable hypothesis. Of course, it could be argued that better-off immigrants who arrive in Catalonia will be more interested in adapting to Catalan standards, and to promote their children's identification with Catalonia to

preserve the family's high status. However, this possibility would contradict Rumbaut's (1994, 756) claim that the children of better-off immigrant families remain attached to their parents' national identification more strongly.

To test the school influence and, in particular, the effect of the 1983 reform, respondent's national identification is examined as a function of the number of years during which children went to school, and the age group to which children belong (see table 5.12). The age group variable will help us test very roughly the effect that the Law of Language Normalization and the introduction of education in Catalan in schools had in the generation that entered school after 1983.

Model 1 in table 5.12 indicates that years of schooling decrease the likelihood that individuals identify themselves as primarily Spanish and increase the probability that they self-identify as "more Catalan than Spanish" and as "only Catalan".<sup>31</sup> Model 1 also shows that the younger age-group, that is, individuals born after 1977, is less likely than the older group to self-identify as "more Catalan than Spanish".

However, I am especially interested in learning about whether years of schooling had a heterogeneous influence on those children who were completely educated under a system in which education in Catalan was compulsory (after 1983), and those who were not.

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<sup>31</sup> It could be argued that due to the association between origin, social class and national identification in Catalonia, only those who self-identify more with Catalonia finish secondary school. I have checked for this possibility by examining the average years of schooling of the children of natives and second generations. As Table 5.4 shows the years of schooling (before university) of these two groups are quite similar.

Table 5.12. Determinants of Offspring National Identification: Testing the effect of the 1983 Reform (Multinomial Logistic Regression)

|                    | Model 1           |              |              | Model 2           |              |              |
|--------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|
|                    | Primarily Spanish | More Catalan | Only Catalan | Primarily Spanish | More Catalan | Only Catalan |
| Years of Schooling | -.46***           | 0.31**       | 0.24*        | -0.26             | 0.30         | 0.26         |
| (YS)               | (0.14)            | (0.12)       | (0.14)       | (0.23)            | (0.19)       | (0.22)       |
| Younger Generation | 0.44              | -0.46*       | -0.19        | 1.17              | -0.56        | -0.11        |
| (YG)               | (0.46)            | (0.26)       | (0.28)       | (0.91)            | (0.91)       | (0.98)       |
| YS x YG            |                   |              |              | -0.28             | 0.02         | -0.03        |
|                    |                   |              |              | (0.29)            | (0.25)       | (0.27)       |
| Constant           | -0.20             | -0.54        | -0.68        | -0.71             | -0.50        | -0.73        |
|                    | (0.51)            | (0.48)       | (0.53)       | (0.75)            | (0.68)       | (0.79)       |
| Obs.               |                   | 522          |              |                   | 522          |              |
| Cluster            |                   | 379          |              |                   | 379          |              |
| ll                 |                   | -651.20      |              |                   | -650.66      |              |
|                    |                   | 31.63        |              |                   | 34.00        |              |
| Wald Chi2          |                   | (6)          |              |                   | (9)          |              |
| Adj.Count          |                   | 0.03         |              |                   | 0.03         |              |
| R2                 |                   |              |              |                   |              |              |

Standard Errors Adjusted for Household Clusters \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Notes:

The reference category is "As Spanish as Catalan"

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption not violated

Collinearity diagnostics do not detect problems in the additive model. VIF values under 2.5

Model 2 shows that years of schooling do not have any effect among the older age group, that is, the age-group born between 1965 and 1976 and who started school before 1983. However, as shown in table 5.13, the marginal effect of every additional year of education after compulsory education in Catalan (and before university) decreases the likelihood that individuals from the



young generation (born between 1977 and 1987) self-identify as “primarily Spanish”; and increases the likelihood that they self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish”. These results corroborate Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008b)’s results, and prove hypotheses 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 correct. Therefore, we can state that the impact of schooling was different for those who went to school before and after the 1983 implementation of the Law of Language Normalization, and for those who –having gone to school after 1983— remained longer in the educational system.

*Table 5.13. Marginal Effect of Years of Schooling on National Identification by Age Groups*

|   | coef. | s.e. | p.value | 95% Confidence Intervals |
|---|-------|------|---------|--------------------------|
| Primarily Spanish                                 |       |      |         |                          |
| Born between 1965 & 1976                          | -0.26 | 0.23 | 0.267   | [-0.72, 0.20]            |
| Born between 1977 & 1987                          | -0.54 | 0.17 | 0.002   | [-0.88, -0.21]           |
| More Catalan than Spanish                         |       |      |         |                          |
| Born between 1965 & 1976                          | 0.30  | 0.19 | 0.107   | [-0.07, 0.67]            |
| Born between 1977 & 1987                          | 0.33  | 0.16 | 0.046   | [ 0.01, 0.65]            |
| Only Catalan                                      |       |      |         |                          |
| Born between 1965 & 1976                          | 0.26  | 0.22 | 0.231   | [-0.17, 0.69]            |
| Born between 1977 & 1987                          | 0.23  | 0.17 | 0.165   | [-0.10, 0.56]            |
| Note: Values estimated from results in Table 5.12 |       |      |         |                          |

However, as I argued in section 3, the implementation of the law was more difficult in the schools that were in the neighborhoods where the children of immigrants concentrated. In order to test for the direct and indirect influence of the immediate context on individuals’ national identification, and for the heterogeneous effect that the reform may have had, depending on

the composition of the neighborhood in which the children grew up and in which they went to school,<sup>32</sup> I have added the variable neighborhood composition in the next model. Since the years of schooling do not seem to affect the identification choices of those individuals who started school before 1983, I now restrict the analysis to those individuals who started school after that date.

The results in model 1 (table 5.14) are robust and confirm previous analysis. For those individuals who started school after 1983, each additional year of schooling decreases the likelihood that children self-identify as “primarily Spanish” and increases the likelihood that they self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish”. The composition of the neighborhood has a significant impact on children’s national identification. The immigrant composition of the neighborhood reinforces children’s Spanish identification, and lessens the probability that individuals self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish” or “only Catalan”. This result shows the relevance that the immediate context has within a wider context in which Catalan identification is the mainstream identification.

Model 2 shows that in those neighborhoods in which the percentage of the immigrant population is very low (between 0 and 5 per cent), each additional year of schooling after compulsory education decreases the probability that individuals self-identify as primarily Spanish, but does not make children feel more Catalan. The coefficients for neighborhood composition suggest that for children who have only eight years of education, the greater the number of immigrants in the neighborhood, the lower is the likelihood that they self-identify as primarily Catalan.

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<sup>32</sup> In Catalonia, children usually go to the public schools or to the state-aided private schools that are closest to their home. There is the possibility that children go to a school in another neighborhood if their parents opt for a private school, instead of a public or state-aided private school. The PaD data, however, only provides information on the type of school of those children who are still enrolled in school, so I cannot control for this here.

*Table 5.14. Determinants of Offspring National Identification: Testing the effect of the Years of Schooling and the Neighborhood Composition (Multinomial Logistic Regression)*

| <b>Born between 1977 &amp; 1987</b>   |                   |                   |                    |                   |                  |                  |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
|   | <b>Model 1</b>    |                   |                    | <b>Model 2</b>    |                  |                  |
|   | P.<br>Spanish     | More<br>Catalan   | Only<br>Catalan    | P.<br>Spanish     | More<br>Catalan  | Only<br>Catalan  |
| Years of<br>Schooling<br>(YS)   | -0.47**<br>(0.19) | 0.34**<br>(0.16)  | 0.25<br>(0.18)     | -1.15**<br>(0.51) | 0.19<br>(0.33)   | 0.16<br>(0.31)   |
| Neighborhood<br>Composition<br>(NC)   | 0.23*<br>(0.13)   | -0.40**<br>(0.08) | -0.48***<br>(0.08) | -0.12<br>(0.27)   | -0.51*<br>(0.27) | -0.51*<br>(0.27) |
| YS x NC   |                   |                   |                    | 0.13<br>(0.09)    | 0.03<br>(0.07)   | 0.01<br>(0.07)   |
| Constant  | -0.90<br>(0.97)   | 0.355<br>(0.67)   | 0.78<br>(0.71)     | 0.94<br>(1.52)    | 0.87<br>(1.20)   | 1.08<br>(1.13)   |
| Observations  |                   | 373               |                    |                   | 373              |                  |
| Cluster   |                   | 286               |                    |                   | 286              |                  |
| ll  |                   | -435.49           |                    |                   | 434.38           |                  |
| Wald Chi2   |                   | 80.780<br>(6)     |                    |                   | 74.20<br>(9)     |                  |
| Adj.Count R2  |                   | 0.10              |                    |                   | 0.10             |                  |
| Standard Errors Adjusted for Household Clusters   |                   |                   |                    |                   |                  |                  |
| *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  |                   |                   |                    |                   |                  |                  |
| Notes:  |                   |                   |                    |                   |                  |                  |
| The reference category is "As Spanish as Catalan"   |                   |                   |                    |                   |                  |                  |
| Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption not violated                             |                   |                   |                    |                   |                  |                  |
| Collinearity diagnostics do not detect problems in the additive model. VIF values under 2.5 |                   |                   |                    |                   |                  |                  |

Table 5.15 reports the marginal effect that years of schooling have on offspring's national identification, depending on neighborhood composition. In those neighborhoods in which the population born in other regions of Spain is very low to moderate (between 0 and 20 per cent), any additional year of education

decreases the likelihood of individuals self-identifying as primarily Spanish. In addition, and in agreement with hypothesis 5.3, years of schooling positively influence the likelihood that an individual self-identifies as “more Catalan than Spanish” in those neighborhoods in which the percent of immigrants is moderate (between 20 and 25 per cent). However, when the presence of immigrants is over 35 per cent, the school loses again its influence.

*Table 5.15. Marginal Effect of Years of Schooling on National Identification by Neighborhood Composition*

|                                  | Coef. | s.e  | p.value | 95%<br>Confidence<br>Intervals |
|----------------------------------|-------|------|---------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Primarily Spanish</b>         |       |      |         |                                |
| Between 0 and 5% immigrants      | -1.15 | 0.51 | 0.024   | [-2.15, -0.15]                 |
| Between 20 and 25%               | -0.63 | 0.20 | 0.002   | [-1.02,-0.23]                  |
| Over 35%                         | -0.24 | 0.24 | 0.324   | [-0.71, 0.24]                  |
| <b>More Catalan than Spanish</b> |       |      |         |                                |
| Between 0 and 5% immigrants      | 0.19  | 0.33 | 0.571   | [-0.46, 0.83]                  |
| Between 20 and 25%               | 0.32  | 0.17 | 0.068   | [-0.02, 0.66]                  |
| Over 35%                         | 0.42  | 0.30 | 0.167   | [-0.17, 1.01]                  |
| <b>Only Catalan</b>              |       |      |         |                                |
| Between 0 and 5% immigrants      | 0.16  | 0.31 | 0.593   | [-0.44, 0.76]                  |
| Between 20 and 25%               | 0.20  | 0.20 | 0.31    | [-0.19, 0.59]                  |
| Over 35%                         | 0.23  | 0.34 | 0.495   | [-0.43, 0.90]                  |

Note: Values estimated from results in Table 5.14

In order to contrast the joint influence that parents and school have on individuals' national identification, in table 5.16 I add to the previous model parents' identification and parents' origin.

*Table 5.16. Determinants of Offspring National Identification: Testing the effect of family and school (Multinomial Logistic Regression)*

| <b>Born between 1977 &amp; 1987</b>        |                   |                    |                    |                   |                    |                    |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|  | <b>Model 1</b>    |                    |                    | <b>Model 2</b>    |                    |                    |
|  | P.<br>Spanish     | More<br>Catalan    | Only<br>Catalan    | P<br>Spanish      | More<br>Catalan    | Only<br>Catalan    |
| Id_parents <sup>a</sup>                    | -1.01<br>(1.55)   | 4.91***<br>(1.13)  | 9.50***<br>(1.26)  | -1.00<br>(1.56)   | 4.90***<br>(1.24)  | 9.49***<br>(1.26)  |
| Immigrant<br>Family<br>(IF)                | 0.73<br>(0.59)    | -0.34<br>(0.39)    | -0.39<br>(0.48)    | 0.45<br>(1.24)    | -0.34<br>(1.44)    | -0.24<br>(1.71)    |
| Years of<br>Schooling<br>(YS) <sup>a</sup> | -1.96**<br>(0.77) | 0.79<br>(0.68)     | -0.13<br>(0.86)    | -2.25**<br>(1.12) | 0.80<br>(0.79)     | -0.11<br>(1.02)    |
| Neighborhood<br>Composition <sup>a</sup>   | 0.93<br>(0.75)    | -2.04***<br>(0.58) | -2.86***<br>(0.65) | 0.92<br>(0.75)    | -2.04***<br>(0.58) | -2.86***<br>(0.65) |
| IF x YS                                    |                   |                    |                    | 0.42<br>(1.50)    | -0.06<br>(1.56)    | -0.17<br>(1.88)    |
| Constant                                   | -1.01<br>(0.87)   | 0.26<br>(0.69)     | 0.15<br>(0.85)     | -0.82<br>(1.06)   | 0.25<br>(0.76)     | 0.13<br>(0.98)     |
| Observations                               |                   | 373                |                    |                   | 373                |                    |
| Cluster                                    |                   | 286                |                    |                   | 286                |                    |
| ll   |                   | -366.28            |                    |                   | -366.23            |                    |
| Wald Chi2                                  |                   | 126.06<br>(12)     |                    |                   | 27.75<br>(15)      |                    |
| Adj.Count R2                               |                   | 0.30               |                    |                   | 0.30               |                    |

Standard Errors Adjusted for Household Clusters

\*\*\* p&lt;0.001, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \* p&lt;0.05

Notes:

The reference category is "As Spanish as Catalan"

<sup>a</sup>Idparents, HI and NC have been transformed into a 0 to 1 variable

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption not violated

Collinearity diagnostics do not detect problems in the additive model. VIF values under 2.5

Each respondent's identification is now modeled as a function of each individual's parents' characteristics and each individual's schooling characteristics. In this case, I follow a similar strategy to that followed in table 5.14, and I restrict the analysis to that group of individuals who started school after the Law of Language Normalization was implemented. The parents' identification, years of schooling and neighborhood composition variables have been transformed into 0 to 1 range variables, so that the magnitude of the coefficients can be compared.

The results in table 5.16 show that parents and school have separate effects on individuals' national identification: while school prevents children from self-identifying as primarily Catalan, parents' identification seems to be the main variable affecting individuals' identification as such.

However, as proposed in hypothesis 5.4.1, once we control for the parents' national identification, the effect that school has on the probability that individuals identify as "more Catalan than Spanish" vanishes.<sup>33</sup> The immigrant composition of the

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<sup>33</sup> Although the results are not presented here, I have also tested the impact that having a university degree has on individuals' identification. Results show that having a university degree does not affect the probability of self-identifying as "Spanish as Catalan" compared to identifying as primarily Spanish. In other words, the years of schooling continue to be the "only" factor fostering individuals' bi-national identification vis à vis the primarily Spanish identification. On the other hand, having a university degree increases the probability that individuals feel "more Catalan than Spanish", even after controlling for parents' identification. Although, it is possible that the contents of degrees such as Catalan, History or Political Science can contribute to the shaping of individuals' identification with Catalonia, and facilitate the possibility that teachers exhibit their views on the Catalonia/Spain cleavage, there are many other fields in which it is difficult for this to occur. In this regard, it is hard to believe that the positive association between university and national identification has anything to do with the content of the instruction students receive at university. A possible explanation for this positive association could come from the fact that university is a more diverse environment in which students from native

neighborhood continues to have a strong negative effect on the probability that respondents' self-identify as primarily Catalan. Moreover, this variable absorbs the effect of the family's origin, which loses its significance in this specification.

Finally, to test hypothesis 5.4.2, model 2 adds an interaction between family origin and years of schooling. This interaction allows testing for the heterogeneous effect that school might have among the children of natives and the children of immigrants. The school effect is robust to this new specification for the two groups.

*Table 5.17. Marginal Effect of Years of Schooling on National Identification by Family Origin*

|   | coef. | s.e  | p.value | 95% Confidence Intervals |
|---|-------|------|---------|--------------------------|
| Primarily Spanish                                 |       |      |         |                          |
| Catalan-born parents                              | -2.25 | 1.12 | 0.045   | [-4.45,-0.04]            |
| At least one immigrant parent                     | -1.83 | 1.00 | 0.069   | [-3.80, 0.14]            |
| More Catalan than Spanish                         |       |      |         |                          |
| Catalan-born parents                              | 0.80  | 0.79 | 0.314   | [-0.75, 2.35]            |
| At least one immigrant parent                     | 0.73  | 1.34 | 0.585   | [-1.90, 3.36]            |
| Only Catalan                                      |       |      |         |                          |
| Catalan-born parents                              | -0.11 | 1.02 | 0.911   | [-2.12, 1.89]            |
| At least one immigrant parent                     | -0.28 | 1.59 | 0.860   | [-3.39, 2.83]            |
| Note: Values estimated from results in Table 5.16 |       |      |         |                          |

The years of schooling foster a dual identification and prevent individuals identifying themselves as primarily Spanish. However,

and immigrant families come into contact, and an environment in which political mobilization on the center-periphery cleavage encourages students' identification with Catalan identity, or simply to the fact that the children of natives are more likely to go to university.

this variable does not promote a more Catalan oriented identification among the children of immigrants. Actually, these results show that the effect of years of schooling is not very different among the children of natives and the children of immigrants.

In view of these results, we can therefore state that parents' identification continues to be the key factor affecting children's Catalan identification.

The results presented in tables 5.10 to 5.17 qualify Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008a, 2008b)'s results. They indicate that even if the 1983 reform might account for the generational decrease in the proportion of primarily Spanish identifiers in the younger age cohort; what determines that individuals' from the youngest generation feel primarily Catalan (i.e. "more Catalan than Spanish" or "only Catalan") is that their parents feel the same way. Moreover, the results also suggest that the influence that the adoption of Catalan in schools had on fostering individuals' Catalan identification is contingent on the composition of the neighborhood in which children grew up and the school they went to.

The next section discusses these results in detail.

## **5.8. Discussion**

This chapter has touched on many issues related to the influence that parents and school have upon individuals' national identification. The chapter has examined these issues in a context in which the national cleavage, the decentralization of the responsibilities for education to the regional government, and the presence of a population with an immigrant background, affects the concurrence of parents' and school's messages about the nation. Some aspects examined here undoubtedly demand closer analysis; nevertheless, and despite the limitations of the small household sample that I counted on, I believe that I have provided some notable insights into the question that motivates this research.



In this regard, the empirical results presented in this chapter have confirmed that parents are very important determinants of an individual's identification. This finding, which could be considered commonplace, is not that banal if we take into account the fact that nationalism studies, as well as previous empirical research, have argued for the impact of schools' influence on individuals' national identification, and have not taken into consideration parents' national allegiances.

To date, evidence on the occurrence of intergenerational changes in national identification in Catalonia has relied upon the comparison of different age cohorts or different origin groups. By using data from different generations within the same family, this chapter confirms, for the first time, that these changes have also occurred within the same family. As a result, we can say that the offspring generation is more Catalan oriented than their parents' generation.

Beyond this, I have found that mothers are more successful when transmitting their minority primarily Spanish identification to their children, while fathers seem to have a more important role in their offspring's primarily Catalan identification.

In previous pages, we have also learned that parents and children appear more alike in their language patterns than in their national identification. In immigrant families, correlations in language use are also greater than in national identification; a finding that provides additional evidence in favor of the idea that subjective identification with Catalonia is not deterministically linked to the language most frequently spoken, especially among second generations, for whom birthplace seems to be a sufficient criterion to vindicate a Catalan identity (Woolard, 1989).

Returning to the issue of generational change, if parents contribute to the reproduction of national identification, what explains change? The analyses of section 5.7 have provided us with some clues that point to the importance of the social mobility of immigrant families, and to the role of schooling.

Multinomial analyses have shown that, in the better-off immigrant families, children exhibit a more Catalan oriented

identification. Although the lack of longitudinal data does not allow testing what is behind this result, two alternative mechanisms could be envisaged. One possible explanation could be that those immigrant families who moved to Catalonia with a higher economic status were also more interested in adapting to Catalan standards, and in promoting their children's identification with Catalonia to preserve their high status. This mechanism, however, would contradict the hypothesis that the children of high status immigrants feel more attached to their parents' national identification (Rumbaut, 1994, 756). An alternative and possibly more plausible explanation, if we take into account the social origin of the majority of Spanish immigrants, would be that the social mobility of immigrant families is responsible for this association. Thus, the children of those immigrants who have been more successful in economic terms would mirror their parents' gratitude to the host society and, therefore, would become more attached to it.

The 1983 educational reform and schooling in general, has also contributed to explain the decrease in the aggregate levels of "primarily Spanish" identifiers in the youngest generation. According to my results, the years of schooling after compulsory education seem to prevent individuals self-identifying as primarily Spanish. Nevertheless, and contrary to what Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008b) claimed in their work, my results in this chapter do not show that the effect of the years of schooling after compulsory education make individuals more Catalan oriented, once we control for parents' national identification. In other words, although years of schooling can account for the decrease that has occurred in aggregate primarily Spanish identification over time, language policy has not had the impact stressed by previous studies (Martínez-Herrera, 2002; Aspachs-Bracons et al., 2008).

Furthermore, I have found that the influence that years of education have on children who started school after 1983, is contingent on the composition of the neighborhood where they grew up and the school they went to. Therefore, years of schooling only increases the probability that children self-identify as "more

Catalan than Spanish” in neighborhoods where the percentage of the population born in other regions of Spain is moderate. On the other hand, in those neighborhoods where the percentage of the immigrant population is low or very high, school does not have any influence. This is an intuitive result. In schools that are located in neighborhoods with a very low percentage of immigrants, students bring their Catalan identification from home into the schools. Conversely, in those neighborhoods where the percentage of immigrants rises to 35 percent or more, exposure to the Catalan language and Catalan culture in school is limited. In short, these results seem to indicate that students are sorted into different schools according to the neighborhoods in which they live, and that this sorting partially cancels out the influence of school.

The immediate context in which children live has, therefore, a significant influence on their national identification, both directly through contact with neighbors and friends, and indirectly, through the school. Nevertheless, parents can consciously lessen this impact by sending their children to private schools that are not located in the neighborhood where they live. In this case, as the below quotes show, a different kind of sorting, which is determined by parents’ national identification, can occur.

- You tell me that the school you attended was Catalan oriented. Was that your parents’ decision for you to attend that school?
  - Yes. Yes, because it was not a school from our neighborhood, and nor was the school closest to my home.
  - Why do you think that they decided to send you there?
  - One day I asked my mother why and my mother told me that she wanted me to study in Catalan. And, of course, the school that was in my neighborhood was, at that time, full of Spanish-speakers. I do not remember this, eh! That’s what my mother told me. And so they did not want that. Explicitly my parents wanted me to go to a school like the one I went to: “progressive” and Catalan oriented.
- [Interview #19, Anna, child of a mixed couple, born in 1981]

- And your children, what school did they go to?
- I always looked for Catalan schools and schools with an active

pedagogy [...]

- [...] You told me that you looked for Catalan schools with an advanced pedagogy....

- Yes, yes, and I also looked for schools which were not religious.

- And why these three things?

- For me, these questions are a sign of freedom. Children were respected. This was the Rosa Sensat group of schools. Rosa Sensat was a great pedagogue, and so these schools show a great respect for the children [...]

- And Catalan, why was important that the schools your children went where Catalan oriented schools?

- Basically, the school was in Catalan.

- When did your children study? Catalan was introduced in schools in 1983, wasn't it?

- Yes, but it was not always guaranteed. In the religious schools, the teaching was in Castilian. And the environment was Castilian. And in the public schools, it depended. But, I can tell you, the schools we chose used Catalan books.

[Interview #36, Mari Antonia, autochthonous, born in 1944]

Two more points should be made before concluding this chapter. First, the cross-sectional analysis performed here has only provided a snapshot of parents and children's national identification, and of the continuities and discontinuities of families' national identification.<sup>34</sup> However, will parents and children's similarities persist after children move out of their parents' home? In principle, we might think that once children move out, parents lose their influence, while peers' or partner's influence gains leverage. Despite this, there are reasons to think that, in some cases, the similarity between parents and children will continue. On the one hand, if children move out once their national identification is fully crystallized (something which is

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<sup>34</sup> Due to the low number of cases with longitudinal information on the national identification of the children who have moved out of their parents' home, I have not been able to examine the evolution of children's national identification.

expected to be quite common in the Spanish context where children move out of their parents' home quite late), it will be difficult for their national identification to change in any radical and permanent way. On the other hand, we know that an individual's choice of friends and partner is many times endogenous to his/her political orientation (Watson et al. 2004). In Catalonia, where national identity is so salient, friends and mating selection can be also endogenous to individuals' national identity. Therefore, my intuition is that the offspring generation will continue to resemble their parent's identification after moving out. In any case, longitudinal data and further research would be essential in order to confirm this.

Secondly, as specified above, new educational reforms have been carried out since the 1983 reform. These changes could eventually have had an impact on the national identification of younger generations and, perhaps, on the new immigrants and their children arriving from other countries. Nevertheless, as the segregation of native Catalans and immigrants persists, it is hard to believe that schooling will have such a significant impact on individuals' national identification.

## **CHAPTER 6. CHANGE IN NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION IN THE SHORT-TERM**

### **6.1. Introduction**

In previous chapter, I examined intergenerational stability and change. However, as I showed in chapter 3, an important part of the aggregate changes that occurred in the identification with Spain and Catalonia in the last twenty years were the result of individual changes. In chapter 4, I provided some evidence showing that the activation of the center-periphery cleavage around the time the survey was conducted affected individuals' identification and, in particular, the second-generations and the autochthonous. As I highlighted then, the analyses of chapter 4 presented two important shortcomings. First, analyses in chapter 4 were based on the pooling of the CIS cross-sectional series of surveys. Therefore, the findings derived from these analyses did not allow making inferences on the occurrence of individual changes. Secondly, I could not test directly the hypothesis that the activation of the cleavage has a heterogeneous effect depending on individuals' prior identification and I was forced to focus on individuals' origin.

Therefore, this chapter seeks to show that the activation of the center-periphery cleavage leads individuals to rethink their national allegiances and change them. It also seeks to show that the claims made by political parties and political elites will affect differently individuals with different prior identifications. My contention will be that those individuals who feel only Spanish

and only Catalan will see their identification re-affirmed and reinforced when political elites' make claims regarding certain issues. However, those individuals who identify with both Spain and Catalonia will be more susceptible to update their identification in tune with the one-side information they receive from national or regional media.

Although the existence of a center-periphery cleavage refers to a structural situation, as I showed in chapter 4, there are certain moments when a particular issue becomes highly salient in the media, catalyzes public debate and increases confrontation.

In order to test this idea, the present chapter examines the evolution of individual national identification during a highly contested period of time, which started with the Partido Popular gaining an absolute majority in the Spanish Parliament and continued over the reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. However, to show that there is a causal relationship between what happens in "politics" and individuals attitudes is, at the very least, a complicated task. I need therefore to lay out a strategy that helps me to connect the political context and change in national identification. The strategy adopted here consists in looking at the effect that the media, which have been identified in the literature as relevant intermediaries informing individuals' attitudes and behaviors (Gunther, Montero, and Puhle 2007; Richardson and Beck 2007), and party identification have on individuals' national identification.

The present chapter moves away from the analysis of aggregate data to the analysis of individual data and benefits from a dataset that has not been previously used for these purposes. The next section will review the literature that has previously defended that media shapes collective national identification. The section will also argue that, beyond the role this literature attributes to the media, television also has an active role transmitting what happens in the political context. After describing the broadcasting scene in Catalonia and reviewing the political context over those years, different hypothesis on the heterogeneous effect that national and regional television have on individuals' national identification will

be discussed. An alternative hypothesis will be also presented to test for the effect of party identification.

In order to test the hypothesis presented in section 6.4, the longitudinal data of the “Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya (PaD) – Fundació Jaume Bofill, 2001-2005” will be presented. This data will be complemented with cross-sectional data from the Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS). The results derived from the descriptive analysis will show that change in national identification is non-negligible even in a one-year period. On the other hand, the logistic regression analyses will confirm that Catalan television fosters change towards a more Catalan oriented identification in those individuals who self-identified as “as Spanish as Catalan” in 2004. A similar effect will not be found for Spanish television. Additionally, the results will show that the effect of party identification is much more limited.

## **6.2. Television and the collective and individual national identities**

The idea that media shape national identity is broadly extended in the literature (Billig 1995; Cormack 2000; Price 1995; van den Bulck 2001; Volcic 2010). In his seminal work, *Imagined Communities*, Anderson (1983) claimed that print has played a fundamental role on the forging of “imagined political communities”. Later on, the spread of radio and television also facilitated the *banal* broadcasting of symbols and references to a nationwide audience.<sup>1</sup>

In Europe, state ownership of public media and state regulation of the broadcasting system have traditionally sought to secure a market of national bounded loyalties and interests (Price

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<sup>1</sup> Price (1995) contends that globalization, the importation of US broadcasting products and the introduction of satellite and new technologies have somehow diminished the leverage of national broadcasters. Despite this, he argues, the state continues controlling the market for loyalties.



1995). With this aim, public broadcasting was purposively circumscribed to state boundaries and to national sovereignty. Fearing the negative consequences of losing the monopoly over this market, states fiercely opposed the entrance of private networks. However, and despite the state's opposition, satellite and cable technology, European integration and anti-monopolistic regulation made possible the entrance of private television in the media market.

The entrance of new networks made it possible for new identities to gain visibility and significance in their competition with traditional national identities (Price 1995).<sup>2</sup> However, notwithstanding the growth of private networks and the so-called cultural imperialism of American productions, state legislation has continued to preserve national culture by resisting globalizing influences.<sup>3</sup>

In fact, against the globalization thesis, many authors continue to think that television forges the national imaginary through nationally produced fictional series (Castelló 2009)<sup>4</sup>, advertisements (MacGregor 2003; O'Donohoe 1999), and the news (Billig 1995; Collins 1990; Saperas and Casero 2001).

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<sup>2</sup> Antagonistic notions of the good society held by religious or ideological interest groups within the nation can mean that private broadcasters also participate in the competition for national allegiances. In this case, competition for loyalties occurs in terms of whose coalition and which values better represent the true national identity (Price 1995: 16).

<sup>3</sup> French radio musical broadcasters' obligation to broadcast 40 percent of its programming in French and the dubbing of American dramas to Spanish or Catalan could be considered as explicit and implicit examples of how state or regional institutions' regulations on broadcasting protect the national culture against American cultural products.

<sup>4</sup> Collins (1990) has argued that the link between television consumption and political identities is weaker than has usually been argued. Nevertheless, his analysis of the Canadian case has shown that the pervasive presence of US productions on Canadian television has not weakened Canadian national identity.

According to Castelló (2009), the location of the television series, the use of the vernacular language, the representation of cultural elements and the incorporation of references from the present or the past are key elements through which the nation is permanently produced and reproduced. Moreover, companies' brand positioning strategies very often make use of local consumer culture and symbolic resources are successfully employed in advertisements to encourage the consumption of national products (MacGregor 2003).

Above all, news is possibly the most *routine* and *banal* way to remind viewers of their national belonging (Billig 1995). Although Billig's analysis specifically focuses on newspapers, the *deixis* of nation making, the use (and abuse) of the word "nation", the space devoted to national news compared to international news, and the use of maps in the weather section could be equally considered as banal reminders of individuals' national belonging in television news.

Mihelj, Bajt, and Pankov (2009) have examined news reporting on television and have founded that the news made use of two distinct forms of nationalist narratives: routine reporting, and crisis or celebratory reporting. According to Mihelj, Bajt and Pankov (2009, 60-63), the first reporting mode would take place in a daily context, it would show elite dissent on different issues; it would reproduce the world of nations by using banal expressions of nationalism; it would be directed to a wide audience that it is also divided on their stands regarding different issues; and it would make use of open-ended news sequences. In contrast, the celebratory reporting mode would be used in the broadcasting of national celebrations; it would show elite consensus; it would made use of hot expressions of nationalism; it would be directed to a wide and united audience; and it would make use of a continuous narrative.

However, the characteristics attributed to daily and celebratory reporting are not so clearly identified in multinational contexts, where the center-periphery cleavage breaks down elite and audience consensus on the idea of the nation. In fact, the

centralized or decentralized character of the broadcasting system has a decisive importance in these cases. Cormack (2000) has argued that when minority language media is dependent on state funding, minority language networks tends to have a conservative character and contributes to reproducing the majority identity, *vis-à-vis*, alternative notions of national identity. Decentralization, on the contrary, makes the emergence of regional networks possible and facilitates the daily flagging of contested identities on national and regional channels.

In any case, it is worth asking whether the reproduction of national symbols and the references to a collective identity in fictional series, advertisements or the news actually have an impact on individuals' national identification, or whether they only contribute to reinforcing collective national identities. All the studies mentioned thus far have argued that media and, in particular, television shapes collective identities through the use of "messages of who we are, and of which groups we belong to" (Sampedro 2003, 9). They focus, however, on the supply side, and they do not test the alleged leverage that media have on collective identities, nor do they look at the effect that television has on individuals' national identification.

However, if we want to examine the link between media and individuals' positions or attitudes, we need to turn our attention to a completely different literature. In the late eighties and early nineties, a series of studies on public opinion examined the impact that the media and, in particular, television had on individuals' attitudes. Contrary to Lazarsfeld et al's (1944) seminal work, these studies argued that the agenda setting, the prioritizing of certain news over other (Iyengar and Kinder 1987), the way in which news were framed (Cobb and Kuklinski 1997; Chong 1996) or the existence of information gaps (Zaller 1996) influenced not only individuals' priorities (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Miller and Krosnick 1996) and the considerations voters take into account when they evaluated political leaders (Chong 1996; Iyengar and Kinder 1987), but also their opinions and attitudes (Zaller 1992, 1996). Beyond news, other authors have argued that

advertisements, electoral campaigns and entertainment programs' use of symbols, images, and expectations also influence individuals' values and attitudes (Pallarés and Gifreu 1998, 14).

Now, these public opinion studies have all centered on the effect that media have on general political attitudes and orientations. As far as I know, no previous research has directly addressed the study of whether exposure to television does actually shape individuals' national identification. This is, therefore, one of the goals of this chapter.

### **6.3. The broadcasting scene in Catalonia and a look at the period under consideration**

In this section, I would like to describe, first, the broadcasting scene in Catalonia and then introduce, very briefly, the political context surrounding the data that will be analyzed in the empirical section of this chapter. If the activation of the center-periphery cleavage had any impact on individuals' identification with Catalonia and Spain at that time, it is worth devoting some effort to explain what happened during the years being analyzed (2001-2006) and how the activation of the cleavage was channeled through television.

In Spain, regional channels appeared as a by-product of growing regional political autonomy and, to a lesser extent, of economic and cultural factors (Sampedro and Van den Bulck 1995). In 1983, the Convergence and Union (*Convergència i Unió*, CiU) created a Catalan public broadcasting service (TV3) and a Catalan network that secured its independence from the Spanish public network (TVE) (Baget 2003).<sup>5</sup> TV3 was the first

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<sup>5</sup> As Baget (2003) has explained, the creation of this new broadcasting system was not, however, free of problems, due to the Spanish government and Spanish public television's resistance to losing the broadcasting monopoly.

TV channel that broadcasted completely in Catalan, and it very quickly became the hegemonic channel in Catalonia.

Until the law on private television was passed in 1988, the two channels of the Spanish public television (TV1, La 2) and the two channels of the Catalan public television (TV3 and Canal 33) monopolized all the television supply in Catalonia. After the 1988 law was passed, public channels were forced to compete with other national-wide networks (Tele 5, Antena 3, Canal Plus) and later on, with other local and regional television channels. Despite this, the Catalan public television had, for many years, the largest audience in Catalonia.

*Table 6.1. Television Audiences during the years the data used in this chapter covers*

|   | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <i>Catalan Public Television</i>              |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| TV3   | 21.8 | 21.4 | 21.1 | 19.9 | 19.6 | 18.2 |
| K3-33   | 6.1  | 7.0  | 6.8  | 6.2  | 5.3  | 4.3  |
| <i>Spanish Public Television</i>              |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| TV1   | 19.0 | 19.5 | 18.6 | 17.1 | 15.5 | 14.3 |
| La 2  | 6.3  | 6.2  | 5.8  | 5.5  | 4.7  | 3.8  |
| <i>Private Televisions</i>                    |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Tele 5  | 19.6 | 19.1 | 20.3 | 20.9 | 20.8 | 19.3 |
| Antena 3                                      | 19.2 | 18.8 | 18.2 | 19.1 | 20.2 | 18.6 |
| Canal Plus                                    | 2.0  | 2.1  | 2.2  | 2.1  | 2.4  | 6.5  |
| <i>Digital Platforms &amp; other channels</i> | 5    | 5.8  | 7.0  | 9.2  | 11.5 | 14.9 |

Note: Audience distribution, estimation of viewing time for each channel over the course of a year.

Source: Idescat

Beyond its public function, public media have the explicit or implicit objective of reproducing a collective national identity. This objective was present in the origins of the Spanish and

Catalan public broadcasters. So, while the 1980 Spanish Radio and Television (RTVE) Act established amongst its objectives the promotion of Spanish cultural and linguistic diversity, the 1983 Law on the creation of the Catalan public Radio and Television Corporation stated the network's objective to promote the Catalan language and the Catalan culture. Specifically, Catalan television was expected to "reflect the values of the Catalan people, offer a space where the presence of the Catalan language was guaranteed and promote the awareness of belonging to a different national community" (Alexandre 2006, 24).<sup>6</sup>

The daily flagging of Spanish and Catalan identities in Spanish and Catalan networks occurs explicitly through the use of the Spanish and Catalan languages, and implicitly through the banal use of the semantics<sup>7</sup>. Spanish and Catalan television channels are not only Spanish and Catalan-centered,<sup>8</sup> but they also

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<sup>6</sup> In particular, TV3 has been considered to be one of the main instruments in the normalization of the Catalan language use (Calzada and Llorens 1995, Baguet 2003). As Castelló (2009: 302) argues, this has been possible through the representation of a monolingual culture that contrasts with the bilingual Catalan society.

<sup>7</sup> TV3 very often uses the word "country" to refer to Catalonia and "Spanish State" to refer to Spain. Spanish TV broadcasters, on the other hand, make an extensive use of the adjective Spanish when referring, for example, to sportsmen or sport competitions.

<sup>8</sup> The use of Spanish-centered or, more specifically, Madrid-centered frames of reference is not only common in Spanish public television, but also among the private broadcasters that broadcast from Madrid. The following quote from one of my interviews reflects very clearly this framing: "TV1 is very general. They speak to you about the M-30 [a highway which surrounds Madrid] as if this was the most natural thing in the world. And I haven't seen the M-30 in my whole life. I do not think this is intentional, but this is centralism. When something happens there [in Madrid], even though [that news] is absolutely local, from Madrid, it appears on TV. They are the center of Spain." [Interview #25, Angela, immigrant, born in 1958].

News related to Spanish politics are presented daily on Catalan television, although the references to Spanish culture and Spanish

contribute to channeling the cleavage.<sup>9</sup> They reproduce political elites and political parties' claims and stances regarding particular issues, and they take very often a position on cleavage-related issues.

And this was also the case during the period this chapter covers (2001-2005). This period coincided with the PP's absolute majority in the Spanish Parliament (2000-2004) and the first year of the PSOE minority government (2004-2008). Although the levels of political confrontation along the center-periphery dimension were significantly important during the PP's majority government, they went up during the reform of the 1979 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (2004-2006).

Following the *Tripartit* government decision to reform the Statute, this issue catalyzed the political debate. Those who supported the reform of the *Estatut* claimed that it was necessary to adapt the old law to new times, and that it was important that the regional government assume new responsibilities that were previously carried out by the central government. Moreover, reformers agreed that the new Statute should recognize Catalonia's national character. Those who were against the reform claimed that the reform of the Statute had been motivated by Catalan elites' interests, rather than by Catalan citizens' concerns.

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
identity are usually absent. On the other hand, both public and private Spanish television news address a national audience and concentrate on institutional spheres that are shared by all citizens in Spain (Saperas and Casero 2001). In so doing, national channels pay very little attention to regional and, particular, Catalan-centered issues as Saperas and Casero (2001) and Ruiz Collantes et al (2000) studies implicitly complain of. Despite this, it is important to highlight that when Catalan regional elections take place or when some conflictive issues (e.g. the language reforms, the reform of the Statute, or conflicts over competencies) come on the political agenda, Catalan politics receive more attention.

<sup>9</sup> For example, Catalan television often broadcast cuts from programs by national channels in which journalists from other areas of Spain (mainly Madrid), political commentators or the general public' make any comment against Catalonia and Catalan citizens (e.g. *Alguna Pregunta Més*).

The “anti-*Estatut* reform” side, which was led by the PP and was also supported by different spokesmen (i.e. political commentators, regional presidents...) from other areas of Spain, also argued that the new *Estatut* and, specially, the definition of Catalonia as a nation contravened the Spanish Constitution and would lead to the break-up of Spain. Around these two positions, political actors’ discourses and political debate polarized.

As the reform of the new Statute of Autonomy in Catalonia rose on the political agenda (January 2004), significant attention was devoted to the issue by the media. The following figure illustrates the salience of this issue over this period.

Figure 6.1. Number of news stories which contain the word “Estatut” in La Vanguardia Newspaper



Source: La Vanguardia. Hemeroteca



The debate on the content of the reform continued for two years (2004 to 2006), with some peaks of fierce conflict in between. The proceedings of the Statute in the Catalan parliament reinforced Catalan parties' competition for highlighting the allegedly negative relationship between Spain and Catalonia (Lago and Montero 2010, 406).

An issue that had a significant impact on the rise of the conflict was all Catalan parties' (with the exception of the Popular Party) agreement to define Catalonia as a nation and include this definition in the Preliminary Title of the new statute.<sup>10</sup>

The conflict also intensified due to other divisive campaigns that surrounded the negotiations over the statute. For example, in 2004, a boycott against the consumption of Catalan cava was organized in response to a statement by Josep Lluís Carod Rovira, the ERC leader, against Madrid's candidacy for the 2012 Olympic Games. Also, in June 2005, the PP organized a demonstration in Salamanca in favor of the unity of the Spanish Civil War Archive and against the return of a set of documents that had been confiscated by the Franco government to the government of Catalonia and to many Catalan families. Eventually, the PP would deploy a strategy that sought to displace political competition from the left-right dimension to the territorial dimension, under the expectation that this strategy would pay off electorally (Bonet, Pérez-Nievas, and Hierro 2010). This strategy was staged in different acts in support of the Spanish Constitution that, according to the PP, was being threatened by initiatives such as the reform of the Catalan Statute (see, for example, the statement of Mariano Rajoy, the PP leader, on December 3, 2005: "There is only a nation, the Spanish one", *El País*, 04.12.2005, pp.17).

Ultimately, the debate on the reform of the 1979 Statute was a new staging of the center-periphery conflict. Being against the reform was presented by the *Tripartit* parties and by the CiU as a

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<sup>10</sup> The definition of Catalonia as a nation was moved to the Preamble of the Statute during the proceedings on the Statute in the Spanish Parliament.

denial of Catalonia uniqueness within Spain and as a denial of Catalonia's national character. Conversely, being in favor of the reform was understood by the PP as a proof of Catalonia's lack of solidarity toward the rest of Spain and as an attempt to break up Spain.

#### **6.4. Hypotheses on the Causes of Short-Term Changes in National Identification**

Now that I have described the political context that the data I use in this chapter covers, in this section I present the hypotheses that will be tested below.

Previous studies have emphasized that the influence of news on individuals' attitudes is contingent, on the one hand, to individuals' attentiveness and, on the other hand, to individuals' prior beliefs or predispositions (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Miller and Krosnick 1996; Zaller 1992). Selective exposure to national and regional channels also takes place among viewers in Catalonia. Therefore, viewers' exposure and consumption of news from a particular network relies heavily on their original national identification. Hence, Spanish identifiers usually watch news on Spanish television and Catalan identifiers opt primarily for Catalan broadcasters, as Table 6.2 shows.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> The fact that Spanish television broadcasts mainly in Spanish and that Catalan television networks only in Catalan reinforces Spanish-speakers and Catalan-speakers' preference for Spanish and Catalan television, respectively.

*Table 6.2. Consumption of news on Spanish and Catalan television by national identification*

|                | Only<br>Spa. | More<br>Spa.<br>than<br>Cat. | As<br>Spa. as<br>Cat. | More<br>Cat.<br>than<br>Spa. | Only<br>Cat.   | Marg. | N      |
|----------------|--------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------|-------|--------|
| Spanish<br>TVs | 86.27        | 80.26                        | 53.53                 | 16.30                        | 5.84           | 31.17 | (616)  |
| Catalan<br>TVs | 13.73        | 19.74                        | 46.47                 | 83.70                        | 92.62          | 68.83 | (1360) |
| Marginal<br>N  | 2.58<br>(51) | 3.85<br>(76)                 | 34.41<br>(680)        | 34.46<br>(681)               | 24.70<br>(488) | 100   | (1976) |

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya -FJB, 2004"

Taking this endogeneity problem into account, in order to capture the effect that exposure to national and regional television has on national identification<sup>12</sup> I will focus my analyses on those individuals that self-identified as both Spanish as Catalan in  $t_1$ . As it can be observed in table 6.2, this group is more or less evenly divided between those who watched news in Spanish and Catalan television. In addition, this group of individuals feels Spanish and Catalan at the same time, so I can test whether exposure affects this identification, shifting individuals' identification in one or the other direction in  $t_2$ .<sup>13</sup> Therefore, I expect that:

*Hypothesis 6.1.1:* those individuals who self-identified both as Spanish and Catalan in  $t_1$  and watched news in a Spanish channel, due to their continuous exposure to messages that reinforce their Spanish identity and to one-side Spanish information on the Statute, will tend to self identify as more Spanish in  $t_2$ .

<sup>12</sup> Here, I would like to emphasize that the television is considered to channel political parties and political elites' claims on the center-periphery cleavage.

<sup>13</sup> Making use of qualitative interviews, the next chapter (chapter 7) will show with more detail how the media channels the cleavage, and contributes to alter individuals' identification.

*Hypothesis 6.1.2:* On the contrary, those dual identifiers who watched news in the Catalan television and, consequently, were exposed to one-side Catalan information on the Statute, will tend to self identify as more Catalan in  $t_2$ .

In other words, watching the news on any of the Spanish broadcasters should prevent dual identifiers, that is, those individuals who identify both with Spain and Catalonia, from adopting a more Catalan identification in  $t_2$ . In contrast, exposure to Catalan news should prevent dual identifiers from adopting a more Spanish identification in  $t_2$ .

Moreover, if as Zaller (1992) has shown, individuals' prior orientations vaccinate them against those messages that contradict them, then we should find that:

*Hypothesis 6.2.1 and 6.2.2:* those individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in  $t_1$  and despite that, watched news in a Catalan channel, should not change this identification in  $t_2$ . Conversely, those individuals who self-identified as primarily Catalan in  $t_1$  and despite that, watched news in a Spanish channel, should not change this identification in  $t_2$ .<sup>14</sup>

Apart from the influence that the media might eventually have on individuals' identification as an intermediary which channels the center-periphery conflict and elites and political parties' stands regarding conflicting issues, party identification can also orient individuals' national identification.

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<sup>14</sup> As long as holding Catalan identification and watching news in a Spanish channel or holding Spanish identification and watching news in a Catalan channel results in cognitive dissonance and, as a consequence, psychological distress (Festinger 1957), it could happen that the number of individuals that fall in these cells is zero. However, as Table 6.2 shows 14 percent of those who feel only Spanish watch the news in a Catalan channel and 6 percent of those who feel only Catalan watch the news in a Spanish channel.

The relationship between party identification and issue preferences has been extensively studied in the literature. Classical studies have presented party identification as a deeply rooted individual predisposition that cue individuals' attitudes and opinions (Campbell et al. 1964; Converse 1964). In line with these classical studies, Sears (1983) has defined party identification as a *symbolic attitude* that is shaped during the first stages of life, and after crystallizing in early adulthood, remains unchanged, influencing *non-symbolic* attitudes, such as the assessment of political leaders. Other authors such as Jacoby (1988), Green and Palmquist (1994) and Bartels (2002) have also defended the idea that party identification orients individuals' perceptions and attitudes.

At odds with this view, revisionist authors have argued that individuals' party identification is a less stable political orientation, and that it is responsive to government performance, macro-economic changes or the emergence of new issues (Fiorina 1981; Franklin and John 1983; Franklin 1984; Markus 1992; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991).

In between these two approaches, Dancey and Goren (2010) have recently argued that when an issue is partisan contested and this contestation attracts wide attention in the media, then individuals adapt their stands on that issue and their party identification to conform to one another. According to the authors' argument, the media would channel the different parties' stances regarding an issue and then individuals' party identification would cue their issue attitudes accordingly. Ultimately, individuals' shifts in their stand on a particular issue to conform to their party identification would respond to their necessity to be consistent, and reduce cognitive dissonance (Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955).<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Of course, individuals can always make use of chains of reasoning to make apparently conflicting attitudes compatible (Zanjoc 1960, Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991).

As figure 6.1 shows the reform of the Statute received high media coverage. This coverage helped to clarify political parties' stands on the reform. So, despite the differences in the parties' positions regarding specific issues in the Statute text, it was clear that the PSC, the ERC, the ICV and the CiU were in favor of enlarging the Catalan government' self-government. The PP, on the other hand, was against it.

From here, it can be thought that party identification not only oriented individuals' positions regarding the conflict, but also a political predisposition which is strongly connected to it: individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia. Here, it is important to recall that the activation of the cleavage around the Statute issue had important polarizing consequences. One could be in favor of the Statute and, consequently, in favor of Catalonia (or against both things). Or one could be against the Statute and for the Spanish Constitution (or against both things).

Again, if political parties' positions should have an effect on individuals' identification, this effect should be more clearly observed in those individuals who hold a "neutral" position and, consequently, self-identified as both Spanish and Catalan in  $t_1$ . Taking this into account, I expect that:

*Hypothesis 6.3.1:* those individuals that self-identified both with Spain and Catalonia in  $t_1$  and felt close to the political parties that supported the reform (CiU, PSC, ERC and ICV) changed their national identification towards a more Catalan identification in  $t_2$  to be in tune with their parties.

Conversely, I expect that:

*Hypothesis 6.3.2:* a change in the opposite direction should occur among those individuals who identified with Spain and Catalonia in  $t_1$ , but felt close to the PP.

*Table 6.3. Summary of hypotheses*

| Hypotheses on media consumption    |   |
|------------------------------------|---|
| <i>Hypothesis 6.1.1</i>            | Those individuals who self-identified both as Spanish and Catalan in $t_1$ and watched news in a Spanish channel, due to their continuous exposure to messages that reinforce their Spanish identity and to one-side Spanish information on the Statute, will tend to self identify as more Spanish in $t_2$    |
| <i>Hypothesis 6.1.2</i>            | Those dual identifiers who watched news in the Catalan television and, consequently, were exposed to one-side Catalan information on the Statute, will tend to self identify as more Catalan in $t_2$ .   |
| <i>Hypothesis 6.2.1</i>            | Those individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in $t_1$ and despite that, watched news on a Catalan channel, should not change this identification as they are “vaccinated” against messages which contradict this identification   |
| <i>Hypothesis 6.2.2</i>            | Those individuals who self-identified as primarily Catalan in $t_1$ and despite that, watched news in Spanish, should not change this identification as they are “vaccinated” against messages which contradict this identification   |
| Hypothesis on party identification |   |
| <i>Hypothesis 6.3.1</i>            | Those individuals that identified both with Spain and Catalonia in $t_1$ and felt close to the political parties that supported the reform (CiU, PSC, ERC and ICV) changed their national identification towards a more Catalan identification in $t_2$ to be in tune with their parties’ side on the cleavage. |
| <i>Hypothesis 6.3.2</i>            | A change in the opposite direction should occur among those individuals who identified with Spain and Catalonia in $t_1$ , but felt close to the PP   |

If the results of my empirical analysis demonstrate, as I have hypothesized, that the accumulated exposure to television, and party identification make individuals more prone to change their

national identification; then we can agree that the individual changes that were observed in that short period of time were not random, but related to the activation of the center-periphery cleavage.

## **6.5. Methodological Strategy**

### *6.5.1. Data*

To test the hypotheses that I have presented above, I draw on the panel data of the Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya (PaD)- Fundació Jaume Bofill, first, second, third and fourth waves, 2001/2, 2003, 2004, 2005. So far, the national identification question has been asked in four waves, with a two year interval for the first two times that the question was posed (2001/02, 2004), one year interval for the third time (2005) and a four year interval for the last time that the question was asked (2009). The data I make use of here corresponds to the first four waves of the panel, as the eighth wave data was still not available when this chapter's analyses were carried out.

In the first wave, interviews were conducted between September 2001 and June 2002. In the second, third and fourth waves, fieldwork was carried out in two phases, from January to July and from October to November.

Of the 3124 individuals who answered the national identification (NI) item in 2001/02, 2509 answered in 2004 and 2354 in 2005 (see Table 6.4). Attrition and omissions explain the fewer number of respondents in 2004 and 2005. Over 16 percent of the respondents of the national identification item in 2001/02 dropped out between the first and the third wave and 8.35 percent between the third and the fourth wave. Information is omitted also for 3.39 percent of the respondents in 2004. Missing values constitute, therefore, 28.04 percent of the data collected in 2001/02. Non-participation of selected households in the first wave, attrition and omissions affect the representativeness of the



resulting sample.<sup>16</sup> Now, as I am more interested in the analysis of individual change (the patterns and trends of change) than in the representativeness of the data, limited representativeness should not be a problem here.

*Table 6.4. Panel data: Observations, omissions and attrition*

|                          | 2001/02 | 2004  | 2005 |
|--------------------------|---------|-------|------|
| N                        | 3124    | 2509  | 2354 |
| Omissions                |         | 3.39% |      |
| Attrition 2001/02 - 2003 | 16%     |       |      |
| Attrition 2003 - 2004    |         | 8.35% |      |

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya-FJB, 2001, 2004, 2005"

<sup>16</sup> In the analyses that follow, I have performed a listwise deletion, that is, I have deleted from the sample any observation for which data on national identification was not available for all three waves. Although listwise deletion is a common strategy for dealing with missingness, it may yield biased estimates when the missing data is not completely lost at random (MCAR). In order to know whether the attrition problem is biasing my analysis, I have carried out a sensitivity analysis. The results of the analysis show that missingness depends on other variables rather than on the values of my dependent variable; those who are more educated, women, older people and those who live in smaller municipalities have a greater probability of remaining in the sample. Also, compared to natives, immigrants (individuals who were born in Spain but outside of Catalonia) have a greater probability of dropping out. The loss of low educated people and immigrants should reduce the observance of changes as these individuals are expected to have a less crystallized national identification. If, despite this, the coefficients for these variables are still significant, it would mean that the effect of being educated or being immigrant is greater than the coefficients indicate. On the contrary, if the coefficients for these variables are not significant, then it could be related to the distribution of the outcome sample.

6.5.2. *Measurement of national identification and the operationalization of the change*

As I have previously mentioned, the PaD includes a national identification item in the first, third and fourth wave. In the first wave of the PaD, “don’t know” was present. In the third and the fourth wave, the order of the answer categories was inverted. “None of them” (NoT) and “don’t know” (DK) answers were registered, although these two answer choices were not offered to the respondent in the answer categories.

Contrary to other unidirectional measures, the use of this bidirectional measure provides an advantage in evaluating change in a context in which political elites make claims regarding the national character of both Spain and Catalonia. While a change from “only Spanish” to “as Spanish as Catalan” is meaningful and its interpretation is straightforward, we cannot be certain about the meaning and interpretation of what a change from 3 to 4 or from 4 to 6, for instance, would mean on a 0 to 10 unidirectional scale of identification with Spain (or Catalonia). Beyond this, it is important to make clear that here I am not interested in measuring the intensity of the national feelings, but whether individuals experience a change in their identification towards two different *objects of identification*: Catalonia and Spain. In this regard, the “only Catalan” to “only Spanish” scale allows for the evaluation of important issues related to the politics of identity.

Change will be computed by looking at individuals’ self-placement in the “only Spanish” to “only Catalan” scale at  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ . A change in the individual’s identification would occur when the individual changes his/her preferred category of identification between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ .

However, it could be argued that the changes that occur between adjacent categories are not significantly important. To anticipate this possible criticism, in the logistic analysis I will follow a more conservative strategy. Therefore, I will consider that only those changes that imply a jump of the *identification boundary* (i.e. from “primarily Spanish” or “primarily Catalan” to

“as Spanish as Catalan” or from “primarily Spanish” to “primarily Catalan” and vice versa) entail a consequential change. This means that those changes that occur between the side categories of the scale (from “only Catalan” to “more Catalan than Spanish” and from “more Spanish than Catalan” to “only Spanish” and vice versa) will not be considered as substantive changes. The dependent variable, therefore, will take three values, 0 when the response of the individual does not change between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ , -1 when change occurs in the Spanish direction and 1 when change occurs in the Catalan direction.

I would like to emphasize that by making use of this measure of change, the possibilities of the change are significantly constrained. Only those who self-identify “as Catalan as Spanish” in  $t_1$  are faced with three different possibilities: do not change, change in the primarily Catalan direction and change in the primarily Spanish direction. In contrast, those who self-identify as primarily Spanish or as primarily Catalan are only faced with two possibilities: do not change or change in one direction. In this regard, this measure of the change does not allow measuring whether exposure to television or party identification reinforced the feelings of those who self-placed in the extreme positions of the scale in  $t_1$ .

### 6.5.3. *Methodology*

In order to test the hypothesis posed above, in the analysis of the direction of change I have introduced two variables: the Catalan or Spanish origin of the TV channel that individuals use to watch news and party closeness. The first variable captures the effect that exposure to one or another source of information has on the probability of making an identification switch. The second variable accounts for the influence that party identification may have on national identification.

In order to examine the effect that television and party closeness have in the individual changes that we observe, I have run a logistic regression of the direction of the change. The

analysis will examine, on the one hand, the changes that occur in the Spanish direction and, on the other hand, the changes that occur in the Catalan direction.

Here, it is worth mentioning that the distribution of the ones and zeros is unequal in the outcome variable, so that the number of zeros (over 80 per cent) is around eight times higher than the number of ones (around 20 per cent). This unbalanced distribution of the outcome variable causes standard errors to be larger. If despite this, we find that our hypotheses are fulfilled, we will have stronger evidence in favor of them.

The endogenous relationship that exists between identification and television consumption makes difficult to test the influence of television on the probability of making a change. As shown in table 6.2, those individuals that identify more with Spain tend to watch news on any of the Spanish TV broadcasters, while those individuals who identify more with Catalonia tend to watch the news on Catalan television. Besides, a ceiling effect prevents us from testing the effect that exposure to Spanish TV has among those individuals who already identified with Spain in  $t_1$ , or the effect of the exposure to Catalan TV on those individuals who already identified with Catalonia in  $t_1$ . Nevertheless, if the dual identifiers who watched news in the national (or the regional) television, self-identify as more Spanish (or more Catalan) in  $t_2$ , then I will be able to argue that their exposure to the news on Spanish (or Catalan) TV channels has had an impact on their identification.

Therefore, the empirical analysis will center on the analysis of the effect that exposure to national or regional television has on those individuals who self-identified with both Spain and Catalonia in  $t_1$ . If the effect of the television is important at all, this effect should be observed, specifically, in this group of individuals.

In order to test the effect of exposure to television, I need an indicator that precedes temporally the occurrence of the change. Since in the PaD, respondents are only asked in 2004 about their TV consumption, the logistic analysis will be carried out only for

the second time period (2004-2005), where the inverse causality problem is not present.<sup>17</sup>

Exposure to news in a Spanish or Catalan television will be measured by means of a dummy variable that collects information about the origin of the television channel that individuals use most frequently for watching news. Those who do not watch TV news or use a broadcaster whose production center is not identifiable (e.g. satellite) will be excluded from the analysis (9% of the sample).

Respondents are also asked about the political party they feel close to. Here, I am interested in learning whether the position that the different political parties adopted during the negotiation of the Statute had any effect on the national identification of those respondents who felt close to any of the different political parties vis-à-vis those who did not feel close to any political party at all. As the PaD item for party closeness allows multiple answers, I have considered those individuals who feel close to more than one political party as not holding a specific party identification. Party closeness, therefore, will be included in the analysis by means of dummy variables. Not feeling close to any political party will be the reference category.

In the logistic analysis, I will introduce identification in  $t_1$  as a dummy variable. This will allow testing the effect that exposure to news in Spanish or Catalan channels has depending on individuals' prior identification. The reference category will be "primarily Spanish" for the analysis of the change in the Catalan direction and "primarily Catalan" for the analysis of the change in the Spanish direction.

I will also include in the model three different controls that may affect the propensity to change, independently of the direction of the change: origin, education and age. In principle, I

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<sup>17</sup> Ideally, it would have been better to have information on the respondents' television consumption and party identification in all three waves to examine the covariance of the changes. Unfortunately, the data for television consumption and party identification is asked only once in the first four waves of the PaD.

expect that immigrants will show a greater propensity to change. Although immigrants might have remained “loyal” to their original identification, it is very probable that they have also developed an attachment to the place where they have been living for an important part of their lives. The distress caused by making these feelings compatible with their original identification could make their identification more ambivalent and, therefore, more changeable.

Although the children of immigrants have had a very different experience than their parents, their socialization experiences will have been very likely influenced by contradictory identity messages coming from their parents and the context. Children of mixed couples will have suffered a similar experience, although in their case, opposite messages may even come from their parents. Taking all this into account, I expect that both second generation individuals and children of mixed couples will be more prone to change than natives, for whom national identification should be a more stable trait.

Origin characteristics will be introduced in the analysis with four dummy variables that will take the following values: “autochthonous”, “children of mixed couples”, “second generations” and “immigrants”. The autochthonous category will be the reference category in the logistic analysis.

Education should work as an “inhibitor” of change. The role that education plays on the stability of political attitudes has been extensively discussed in the literature (Converse 1964; Feldman 1989; Zaller 1992). Converse (1964, 227-8) has argued that people without education lack articulated attitudes and have more difficulties expressing their political beliefs verbally. Following this argument, it is foreseeable that more educated people have a more articulated and consistent national identification and that, as a consequence, will be less likely to change their identification. The education variable included in the analysis presents three categories (lower secondary or less, upper secondary, and college, M.A. or PhD). The reference category in the analysis will be lower secondary or less.

Finally, in order to test the impressionable years' hypothesis (Alwin and Jon 1991; Sears 1975), I also introduce in the analysis a quadratic function of age. This will allow checking whether individuals are more prone to change their national identification in early adulthood than later on, when political attitudes become fully crystallized.

The descriptive of the variables used in section 6.7 analyses are presented here.

*Table 6.5. Descriptives*

|                            | Wave | N    | % or Mean | Std.Dev | Min | Max |
|----------------------------|------|------|-----------|---------|-----|-----|
| Immigrant                  | 3    | 357  | 17.41     |         | 0   | 1   |
| Second Generation          | 3    | 256  | 12.49     |         | 0   | 1   |
| Children of mixed couples  | 3    | 271  | 13.22     |         | 0   | 1   |
| Autochthonous              | 3    | 884  | 43.12     |         | 0   | 1   |
| Age                        | 3    | 2050 | 50.43     | 16.79   | 18  | 91  |
| Lower Secondary or less    | 3    | 1429 | 69.81     |         | 0   | 1   |
| Upper Secondary            | 3    | 238  | 11.63     |         | 0   | 1   |
| University                 | 3    | 380  | 18.56     |         | 0   | 1   |
| No TV                      | 3    | 180  | 9.00      |         | 0   | 1   |
| Catalan TV                 | 3    | 1285 | 69.05     |         | 0   | 1   |
| Spanish TV                 | 3    | 576  | 30.95     |         | 0   | 1   |
| Feel closer to PSC         | 2    | 247  | 12.65     |         | 0   | 1   |
| Feel closer to PP          | 2    | 60   | 3.07      |         | 0   | 1   |
| Feel closer to CiU         | 2    | 342  | 17.51     |         | 0   | 1   |
| Feel closer to ICV         | 2    | 90   | 4.61      |         | 0   | 1   |
| Feel closer to ERC         | 2    | 283  | 14.49     |         | 0   | 1   |
| No feel close to any party | 2    | 931  | 47.67     |         | 0   | 1   |

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya-FJB, 2004, 2005"

## 6.6. Description of the changes

Before going into the logistic analysis it is worth examining which kind of individual changes took place across these time periods. Table 6.6 shows the distribution of the national identification responses of those individuals who participated in all three waves of the panel.

*Table 6.6. Distribution of the national identification variable 2001/02, 2004 and 2005 (%)*

|                           | 2001-02 | 2004  | 2005  |
|---------------------------|---------|-------|-------|
| Only Spanish              | 4.36    | 2.89  | 3.56  |
| More Spanish than Catalan | 5.69    | 4.00  | 4.23  |
| As Spanish as Catalan     | 33.41   | 34.30 | 31.85 |
| More Catalan than Spanish | 30.07   | 32.43 | 32.56 |
| Only Catalan              | 21.62   | 23.35 | 24.64 |
| None of them              |         | 2.71  | 2.67  |
| Don't know                | 1.56    | 0.22  | 0.31  |
| No answer                 | 3.29    | 0.09  | 0.18  |
| Total                     | 2248    | 2248  | 2248  |

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Only those individuals who participated in the three waves are included in the analyses.

<sup>2</sup> I have excluded from the analyses those individuals whose parents and/or themselves were born outside of Spain, as for these individuals identification with other nations may be at play.

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya -FJB, 2001, 2004, 2005"

Between 2001/2 and 2005, small changes occur in the side categories. The losses in the "more Spanish than Catalan" category correspond with increases in the "more Catalan than Spanish" and "only Catalan" categories. In particular, the "only Catalan" category and the "more Catalan than Spanish" categories increased by 3 percent points over the whole period. However,



important changes were also found in the “none of them” answers in 2004 and 2005.<sup>18</sup>

The aggregate changes that we observe in table 6.6 might seem relatively small if we take into account the high level of political conflict that took place in Catalonia at that time. However, the limited number of changes that we observe at the aggregate level can be hiding significant changes at the individual level. As individual changes in one direction can be counteracted by individual changes in the other direction, it is necessary to dissect these aggregate changes by examining whether individuals changed their national identification during those years.

The following tables (6.7 and 6.8) show the individual changes that took place over this period, and confirm that behind the relatively aggregate stability; an important number of individual changes were hidden.

When we examine the answers of the respondents in 2001/02 and 2004 in more detail, we find that those who self-identified with both Spain and Catalonia in 2001/02 are the most stable. Seventy percent of the 2001/02 dual identifiers continued to declare the same when they were posed the same question in 2004. Interestingly, those who defined themselves as only Catalan at the same time are also very stable. So sixty-six percent of those who self-identified as “only Catalan” in 2001/02 used this same category to describe themselves in 2004. In contrast, those who opted for any of the primarily Spanish (“only Spanish” or “more Spanish than Catalan”) categories in 2001/02 were the less stable. This is a striking finding as one might have thought that those taking an extreme position are quite stable; either because they are more resistant to any kind of persuasion or because of ceiling

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<sup>18</sup> In the analyses that follow, I have excluded those individuals who answered “don’t know” or “none of them” or who did not answer the identification item in any of the three waves. Table A.6.1 in the Appendix presents detailed information on the 2001/02 identification of the “none of them” category in 2004 and 2005. Table A.6.2 displays the trajectories of those who answered “don’t know” or did not answer in 2001/02.

effects.<sup>19</sup> This, however, does not apply to the “only Spanish” identifiers, who are the group with a greater propensity to change its identification from  $t_1$  to  $t_2$ . A possible explanation for this group’s instability could be the socio-political context in Catalonia, which leads people to feel a certain distress when adopting a position that does not match the mainstream.

*Table 6.7. Changes in individual national identification between 2001/02 and 2004 (row percents)*

|                                 |          | National Identification 2004 |              |              |              |              |       | Total  |
|---------------------------------|----------|------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------|--------|
|                                 |          | Only Spa                     | More Spa     | Dual         | More Cat     | Only Cat     | Marg. |        |
| National Identification 2001/02 | Only Spa | <b>27.78</b>                 | 22.22        | 43.33        | 2.22         | 4.44         | 4.39  | (90)   |
|                                 | More Spa | 7.63                         | <b>27.12</b> | 58.47        | 5.93         | 0.85         | 5.76  | (118)  |
|                                 | Dual     | 3.15                         | 3.72         | <b>69.81</b> | 18.60        | 4.72         | 34.10 | (699)  |
|                                 | More Cat | 0.45                         | 0.45         | 16.82        | <b>61.11</b> | 21.17        | 32.49 | (666)  |
|                                 | Only Cat | 0.21                         | 0.00         | 3.77         | 29.56        | <b>66.46</b> | 23.27 | (477)  |
|                                 | Marg.    | 2.93                         | 3.95         | 35.41        | 33.51        | 24.20        | 100   |        |
|                                 | Total    | (60)                         | (81)         | (726)        | (687)        | (496)        |       | (2050) |

Source: “Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya-FJB, 2001, 2004, 2005”

The levels of stability are higher in the following period (2004-2005). This could be due to the fact that the time span is shorter. Nevertheless, the patterns of stability and change are repeated. The middle category continues to be the most stable; seventy-two percent of those who felt both Spanish and Catalan in 2004 continued to feel so in 2005. The “only Catalan” and “more Catalan than Spanish” categories follow the dual category in terms

<sup>19</sup> Note that people who place at any of the endpoints of the scale can only move in one direction.

of stability. However, the percent of change in the primarily Spanish categories is now considerably lower than in the previous period. It is plausible that the limited movement that we observe now on these extreme categories stems from the polarization of the cleavage that followed the start of the negotiations over the reform of the statute. In this sense, it is conceivable that those who already had an extreme position in 2004 reinforced their Spanish identification due to the activation of the cleavage during that period.

*Table 6.8. Changes in individual national identification between 2004 and 2005 (row percentages)*

|                              |          | National Identification 2005 |              |              |              |              |       |        |
|------------------------------|----------|------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------|--------|
|                              |          | Only Spa                     | More Spa     | Dual         | More Cat     | Only Cat     | Marg. | Total  |
| National Identification 2004 | Only Spa | <b>50.00</b>                 | 18.33        | 31.67        | 0.00         | 0.00         | 2.93  | (60)   |
|                              | More Spa | 23.46                        | <b>43.21</b> | 28.40        | 2.47         | 2.47         | 3.95  | (81)   |
|                              | Dual     | 3.17                         | 5.79         | <b>71.63</b> | 14.88        | 4.55         | 35.41 | (726)  |
|                              | More Cat | 0.00                         | 0.29         | 12.81        | <b>63.17</b> | 23.73        | 33.51 | (687)  |
|                              | Only Cat | 0.20                         | 0.00         | 5.24         | 28.63        | <b>65.93</b> | 24.20 | (496)  |
|                              | Marg.    | 3.56                         | 4.39         | 33           | 33.46        | 25.61        | 100   |        |
|                              | Total    | (53                          | (90)         | (676)        | (686)        | (525)        |       | (2050) |

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya-FJB, 2001, 2004, 2005"

In addition, I am interested in knowing the direction of the changes. Table 6.9 shows that, according to the loose measure of change, in the first period, changes in the Catalan direction (23 percent) significantly exceeded changes in the Spanish direction

(16 percent).<sup>20</sup> However, in the following period, differences are not so important. So, in the later period seventeen percent of the changes occurred in the Spanish direction, while the number of changes that took place in the Catalan direction was eighteen percent. On the whole and making use of this loose measure of change, the overall percentage of change was 39 percent between 2001/02 and 2004 and 35 percent between 2004 and 2005.

*Table 6.9. Direction of the changes (column %)*

|                   | Loose Measure  |             | Restricted Measure |             |
|-------------------|----------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
|                   | 2001/02 & 2004 | 2004 & 2005 | 2001/02 & 2004     | 2004 & 2005 |
| Spanish Direction | 16.09          | 16.73       | 9.02               | 8.80        |
| No change         | 60.95          | 65.66       | 76.98              | 82.02       |
| Catalan Direction | 22.96          | 17.61       | 14.00              | 9.18        |
| Overall change    | 39.05          | 34.34       | 23.02              | 17.98       |

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume Bofill, 2001, 2004, 2005"

But how consistent were these changes? Table 6.10 shows the direction of the changes over the two periods of time. Overall, 47 percent of all individuals did not change their national identification over these years. Those who changed only once made up 34 percent. Changes that occurred always in the same direction were significantly low (2 percent). And 18 percent of the

<sup>20</sup> The loose measure of change considers that a shift takes place when the individual changes his/her preferred category of identification between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ . The restricted measure of change considers as a change only those shifts that take place between the primarily Spanish, primarily Catalan and dual categories.

total sample made a switch in opposite directions over the two periods.

*Table 6.10. Consistency of the changes over time (cell percentages)*

|                        |                      | 2004-2005 period     |           |                      | Total |
|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------|----------------------|-------|
| 2001/02-2004<br>period |                      | Spanish<br>Direction | No change | Catalan<br>Direction |       |
|                        | Spanish<br>Direction | 0.44                 | 7.95      | 7.95                 | 335   |
|                        | No change            | 6.78                 | 46.78     | 8.34                 | 1269  |
|                        | Catalan<br>Direction | 9.51                 | 10.93     | 1.32                 | 446   |
|                        | Total                | 343                  | 1346      | 361                  | 2050  |

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya– FJB 2001, 2004, 2005"

When we adopt a more restricted measure of the change and we examine only the changes that took place between the primarily Spanish, primarily Catalan and dual identification, the amount of changes decrease to 23 percent between 2001/02 and 2004 and 18 percent between 2004 and 2005 (see Table 6.9 above). Making use of this measure of change, we observe that 69 percent of all individuals in the sample did not change over the whole period and 22 percent changed only once (see Table 6.11).

*Table 6.11. Consistency of the changes over time. Restricted measure (cell percents)*

|                        |                      | 2004-2005 period     |           |                      | Total |
|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------|----------------------|-------|
| 2001/02-2004<br>period |                      | Spanish<br>Direction | No change | Catalan<br>Direction |       |
|                        | Spanish<br>Direction | 0.05                 | 4.59      | 4.39                 | 185   |
|                        | No change            | 4.05                 | 68.59     | 4.44                 | 1580  |
|                        | Catalan<br>Direction | 4.78                 | 8.83      | 0.29                 | 285   |
|                        | Total                | 182                  | 1681      | 187                  | 2050  |

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya – FJB 2001, 2004, 2005"

From the analysis of these tables, some preliminary conclusions could be drawn. The tables show that more changes occurred in the first period, that is, between 2001 and 2004, than in the second period, between 2004 and 2005.<sup>21</sup> Despite this, the number of changes that occurred in the second period is not negligible.

Changes in the Catalan direction exceeded changes in the Spanish direction in the first period. If we agree with the idea that what happens in national politics has a decisive importance on individuals' attitudes, we might argue that this movement could be a reaction against the Spanish nationalism deployed by the PP national government between 2001 and 2004. Over this period, the PP majority government's hot expressions of Spanish nationalism increased.<sup>22</sup> This seems to be confirmed by the aggregate data presented in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows that primarily Catalan identifiers increased and primarily Spanish identifiers decreased


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<sup>21</sup> Another possible explanation to this difference could be that memory effects are present in the second period. However, it is hard to believe that such kind of effects are present when respondents are asked this question after one year.

<sup>22</sup> Between 2000 and 2004, the PP deployed a discourse of Spanish nationalism both indoors and outdoors. This Spanish nationalism was, for example, staged on a military parade that went along the Diagonal Avenue in Barcelona on Armed Forces Day. The celebration of Armed Forces Day in Barcelona met with the opposition of a significant number of Barcelona citizens (*La Vanguardia*, 28.05.2000, pp. 19-22). Hot expressions of nationalism were possibly more explicit when the government responded to the Moroccan "invasion" of the islet of Perejil, sending the Spanish Army there and placing a flag at the top of the islet ("España recupera el islote de Perejil", *La Vanguardia*, 18/7/2002, p. 11) or when a 14 x 21 meters Spanish flag was hoisted in Madrid's Columbus Square and the government stated that a tribute to the Spanish flag would take place every month to "symbolize the integrity of Spain" (Federico Trillo, then PP Defense ministry, "Tormenta política por la decisión del Gobierno de instaurar un homenaje mensual a la bandera", *La Vanguardia*, 3/10/2002, p. 21).

during the PP majority government, while the trend inverts after the PSOE arrived to the central government.

*Figure 6.2. Evolution of the Identification with Spain and Catalonia (2001-2005) (%)*



Source: ICPS data

In any case, the raw data presented so far does not allow for testing the idea that the activation of the center-periphery cleavage was behind all these changes. The next section goes in depth on this idea by examining the effect that television and party identification have on individual change in national identification.

## 6.7. Results

Tables 6.12 and 6.13 show the results of the logistic analysis.<sup>23</sup> Changes in the Spanish direction (model 1) and changes in the

<sup>23</sup> As I have previously mentioned, I have included in the analysis only those individuals for which complete three-wave data on the dependent variable is available.

Catalan direction (model 2) are estimated separately. Therefore, the analyses exclude individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in 2004 in model 1, and individuals who self-identified as primarily Catalan in 2004 in model 2, as change is constrained for these groups in the Catalan and Spanish direction, respectively. Specification (a) in tables 6.12 and 6.13 presents the simple impact of television and party identification, respectively, on the probability of changing national identification between 2004 and 2005. Specification (b) presents the impact of television (table 6.12) and party identification (table 6.13) conditioned upon the individual's identification in 2004.

Focusing on the first model (column 1a) of Table 6.12, it can be observed that the origin characteristics are related to the probability of making an identification switch in the Spanish direction. Thus, immigrants and the children of mixed couples have a greater likelihood of making a switch in the Spanish direction. The effect seems to be more important among immigrants than among the children of mixed couples. The propensity of immigrants and their children to make a change in the Spanish direction is robust to other specifications of the model (column 1b). These results seem to indicate that immigrants and the children of mixed couples' identification is certainly more ambivalent than the autochthonous population's, although the occurrence of the changes is not independent of the direction in which these changes occur. This also applies to the second generations, although this group's propensity to change is not significantly different than the autochthonous group's propensity to change.

Although the sign of the coefficients indicate that those who completed secondary education and those who possess a university degree are less susceptible to change than those with lower education levels, this effect is not significant.<sup>24</sup> Neither is age related to individuals' propensity to change.

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<sup>24</sup> As I already mentioned in a previous footnote (see footnote 16 in this chapter), the non-significant coefficient for education might be



Table 6.12. Determinants of short-term changes. Accounting for the effect of exposure to news on regional and national television channels on national identification in 2005

|  | Changes in the Spanish Direction |                    | Changes in the Catalan Direction |                    |
|--|----------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------|
|  | (1a)                             | (1b)               | (2a)                             | (2b)               |
| <i>Identification in 2004</i>  |                                  |                    |                                  |                    |
| Dual   | -0.28<br>(0.20)                  | -0.09<br>(0.27)    | 2.10***<br>(0.20)                | -0.28<br>(0.27)    |
| <i>Origin</i>  |                                  |                    |                                  |                    |
| Mixed  | 0.95***<br>(0.26)                | 0.97***<br>(0.26)  | 0.38<br>(0.27)                   | 0.19<br>(0.27)     |
| Second Generation  | 0.44<br>(0.32)                   | 0.47<br>(0.32)     | -0.44<br>(0.31)                  | -0.50<br>(0.31)    |
| Immigrant  | 1.34***<br>(0.25)                | 1.39***<br>(0.25)  | -0.16<br>(0.25)                  | -0.36<br>(0.24)    |
| <i>Education</i>   |                                  |                    |                                  |                    |
| Secondary  | -0.08<br>(0.29)                  | -0.07<br>(0.29)    | -0.43<br>(0.34)                  | -0.54<br>(0.34)    |
| University Degree  | -0.44<br>(0.28)                  | -0.44<br>(0.28)    | -0.39<br>(0.28)                  | -0.42<br>(0.29)    |
| <i>Age</i>   | -0.01<br>(0.03)                  | -0.01<br>(0.03)    | 0.04<br>(0.03)                   | 0.03<br>(0.03)     |
| <i>Age</i> <sup>2</sup>  | 0.00<br>(0.00)                   | 0.00<br>(0.00)     | -0.00<br>(0.00)                  | -0.00<br>(0.00)    |
| <i>News Consumption</i>  |                                  |                    |                                  |                    |
| Catalan TV   | -0.22<br>(0.21)                  | -0.04<br>(0.27)    | 0.12<br>(0.20)                   | -3.13***<br>(0.42) |
| <i>Interaction</i>   |                                  |                    |                                  |                    |
| Dual X Catalan TV  |                                  | -0.46<br>(0.41)    |                                  | 4.33***<br>(0.46)  |
| Constant   | -2.72**<br>(0.85)                | -2.89***<br>(0.87) | -4.72***<br>(0.92)               | -2.60**<br>(0.94)  |
| Observations   | 1686                             | 2,00               | 1,69                             | 1,69               |
| Log-likelihood   | -491.43                          | -490.79            | -464.79                          | -409.91            |
| D.F.   | 9.00                             | 10.00              | 9.00                             | 10.00              |
| Chi-Square   | 70.51                            | 71.79              | 1,69                             | 1,69               |
| Correctly classified   | 90.57%                           | 90.57%             | 90.14%                           | 90.14%             |
| Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 |                                  |                    |                                  |                    |

related with the distribution of the education variable in the outcome sample after performing a listwise deletion.

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Notes:

<sup>1</sup>No change is the reference category in the four models.

<sup>2</sup>As change is constrained in the Spanish direction for those individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in 2004, the analyses exclude these individuals in 1a and 1b. The contrary applies for 2a and 2b. Here change is constrained in the Catalan direction for those individuals who self-identified as primarily Catalan in 2004, so these individuals are excluded from the analyses.

<sup>3</sup>Dual in model 1b refers to the effect that exposure to Spanish television has among those individuals who self-identified as Spanish as Catalan in 2004. The same applies for model 2b.

<sup>4</sup>In model 1b, Catalan TV accounts for the effect that exposure to news on a Catalan television channel has among those individuals who self-identified as primarily Catalan in 2004. In model 2b, it accounts for the effect that exposure to Catalan television has among those individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in 2004.

Those individuals who self-identified as “as Spanish as Catalan” in 2004 are significantly more likely to have made a shift in the Catalan direction than in the Spanish direction in 2005.

Finally, I am interested in learning the effect that exposure to a Catalan or Spanish broadcaster had on respondents’ probability of changing their national identification in the years examined. The non significant coefficients of Catalan TV in columns 1a and 2a indicate that television did not have any direct influence on the likelihood of making a switch either in the Spanish direction, or in the Catalan direction.

We can turn now to the models with the interactions (columns 1b and 2b in Table 6.12). The coefficient for “dual” in 1b and 2b refers to those individuals who self-identified as both Spanish and Catalan in 2004 and watch news on a Spanish channel. However, this coefficient is not significant, which means that the consumption of news from a Spanish channel does not affect the likelihood that dual identifiers changed their national identification between 2004 and 2005. This result contradicts *hypothesis 6.1.1* and indicates that exposure to a Spanish television channel does not foster change in the Spanish direction, neither does it inhibit changes in the Catalan direction among

those individuals who self-identified as Spanish as Catalan in 2004.

The coefficient of “Catalan TV” in column 1b refers to those individuals who self-identified as primarily Catalan in 2004 and watched news on a Catalan channel. The non-significance of this coefficient indicates that, for these individuals, watching the news on Catalan television does not affect their probability of changing. On the contrary, the significant coefficient of “Catalan TV” in column 2b shows that those who self-identified as primarily Spanish and watched TV3 in 2004 were less likely to make a switch in the Catalan direction. This result confirms, in agreement with *hypothesis 6.2.1*, that those individuals’ who felt primarily Spanish in  $t_1$  were vaccinated against those messages coming from Catalan television that contradict their prior orientations or feelings.

To provide a meaningful interpretation of the interaction between self-identifying as both Spanish and Catalan in 2004 and watching the news on Catalan television, it is necessary to calculate the joint effect of the constitutive and interaction terms, as well as its standard error (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Franzese and Kam 2007). Table 6.13 includes the marginal effect of watching the news on a Spanish and a Catalan television channel on those individuals who felt both Spanish and Catalan in 2004. The results (see test 1) show that exposure to Catalan television fostered changes in the Catalan direction between 2004 and 2005 among those who self identified as Spanish and Catalan. Exposure to news in Catalan television also depressed the probability of making a switch in the Spanish direction among these same individuals, although in this latter case the effect is significant only at a very marginal level.

In order to check the robustness of these results, I have repeated the analyses for an alternative measure of exposure to

news. Thus, I have tested this model excluding Spanish and Catalan private broadcasters (see test 2).<sup>25</sup>

*Table 6.13. Marginal effect of watching the news on a Spanish or Catalan television channel among individuals who self-identify as both Spanish and Catalan in 2004*

|                                       | Broadcas-<br>ter | coef. | s.e. | p.value | 95%<br>confidence<br>intervals |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|-------|------|---------|--------------------------------|
| TEST 1                                |                  |       |      |         |                                |
| Change in the<br>Spanish<br>Direction | Catalan<br>TV    | -0.50 | 0.33 | 0.132   | [-1.15, 0.15]                  |
|                                       | Spanish<br>TV    | -0.09 | 0.27 | 0.750   | [-0.61, 0.44]                  |
| Change in the<br>Catalan<br>direction | Catalan<br>TV    | 1.20  | 0.24 | 0.000   | [0.74, 1.67]                   |
|                                       | Spanish<br>TV    | -0.28 | 0.27 | 0.289   | [-0.81, 0.24]                  |
| TEST 2                                |                  |       |      |         |                                |
| Change in the<br>Spanish<br>Direction | TV3              | -0.80 | 0.39 | 0.041   | [-1.56, 0.03]                  |
|                                       | TVE              | 0.45  | 0.42 | 0.283   | [-0.37, 1.28]                  |
| Change in the<br>Catalan<br>direction | TV3              | 0.97  | 0.32 | 0.002   | [0.34, 1.60]                   |
|                                       | TVE              | 0.00  | 0.41 | 0.989   | [-0.80, 0.81]                  |

Notes:

<sup>1</sup>TV3 is the public Catalan television and TVE is the public Spanish television

<sup>2</sup>Values for Test 1 estimated from model 1b and 2b in Table 6.12. Values for Test 2 estimated from the results of a model that is not presented here.

The results confirm that exposure to Spanish public television does not have any leverage on the likelihood of making a switch in the Spanish direction. However, the effect of Catalan public

<sup>25</sup> Bearing in mind that in March 2004, the PSOE won the general elections and the management of Spanish public television changed, I have also run the analysis only for those individuals who were interviewed before the change in the management of Spanish public television took place. The results confirm the results in table 6.13.

television is confirmed: those who felt “as Spanish as Catalan” in 2004 and watched the news on Catalan public television showed a greater propensity to self-identify as primarily Catalan and a lower propensity to self-identify as primarily Spanish in 2005.<sup>26</sup>

I also want to test whether party identification works as a cue that orients individuals’ identification with the nation when partisan debate clarifies political parties’ stands’ regarding the center-periphery cleavage. As in table 6.12, I have run a logistic analysis to test the single effect of party identification (models 1a and 2a) and the effect that party identification had among those individuals who self-identified as Spanish as Catalan in 2004 (models 1b and 2b).<sup>27</sup> The analyses are presented in table 6.14.

The results for the control variables differ in some aspects to the results shown in table 6.12, but they seem to be quite robust for the different specifications of the model (with and without interactions). As in the previous model, being immigrant or the child of mixed couples increased the probability of making a switch in the Spanish direction between 2004 and 2005. This is not confirmed for second-generation individuals, although this group and the immigrant group are less likely than the autochthonous group to make a change in the Catalan direction.

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<sup>26</sup> Although the results are not presented here, I have repeated these analyses for exposure to news on a Catalan or a Spanish radio station. The results confirm that those individuals who felt both Spanish and Catalan in 2004 and listened to the news on a Catalan radio station were more prone to self-identify as primarily Catalan in 2005. This significant effect is not found when the analyses compare those who read Catalan and Spanish newspapers, although the sign of the coefficient goes in the expected direction. Yet, here it is worth noting that the number of individuals who read the newspaper on a daily basis is only 38 percent. In addition newspapers’ readers are very possibly more sophisticated, and this may make them less susceptible to change their prior identifications.

<sup>27</sup> Identification with ERC predicts change in the Catalan direction perfectly, so I have excluded these individuals from the analysis.

Neither individuals' education nor their age has any effect on individuals' propensity to change in any direction. Finally, those who self-identified as Spanish as Catalan in 2004 were less likely to self-identify as primarily Spanish, and more likely to self-identify as primarily Catalan in 2005 (see columns 1a and 2a in Table 6.14).

Columns 1a and 2a also report the effect that feeling close to a party in 2004 had over the likelihood of switching individuals' identification towards a more Spanish or more Catalan oriented identification in 2005. The lack of significance of these coefficients shows that political parties do not perform directly as cues that orientate change in one or the other direction.

In columns 1b and 2b, the coefficient for dual indicates that the dual identifiers who did not feel close to any party in 2004 were less prone to make a switch in the Spanish direction and more prone to make a switch in the Catalan direction. Also, in column 2b, the significant coefficients of closeness to the PSC, the PP and the CiU must be interpreted as follows: those individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in 2004 and felt close to the PSC and the PP were more likely to self-identify as more Catalan oriented in 2005; while those individuals who felt primarily Spanish and declared that they felt close to the CiU seem to be less likely to change. These results, which are counterintuitive, must be taken very cautiously due to the limited number of cases who declared being primarily Spanish in 2004, felt close to any of these parties and changed towards the Catalan direction in 2005.

Table 6.14. *Determinants of short-term changes. Accounting for the effect of exposure to news on regional television on national identification in 2005.*

|                               | Changes in the<br>Spanish Direction |         | Changes in the<br>Catalan Direction |         |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------|-------------------------------------|---------|
|                               | (1a)                                | (1b)    | (2a)                                | (2b)    |
| <i>Identification in 2004</i> |                                     |         |                                     |         |
| Dual                          | -0.46*                              | -0.42+  | 1.69***                             | 1.80*** |
|                               | (0.20)                              | (0.25)  | (0.19)                              | (0.27)  |
| <i>Origin</i>                 |                                     |         |                                     |         |
| Children of mixed couples     | 0.95***                             | 1.00*** | 0.33                                | 0.24    |
|                               | (0.26)                              | (0.26)  | (0.26)                              | (0.26)  |
| Second Generation             | 0.42                                | 0.48    | -0.66*                              | -0.75*  |
|                               | (0.31)                              | (0.31)  | (0.30)                              | (0.30)  |
| Immigrant                     | 1.26***                             | 1.33*** | -0.33                               | -0.39+  |
|                               | (0.23)                              | (0.24)  | (0.23)                              | (0.23)  |
| <i>Education</i>              |                                     |         |                                     |         |
| Secondary                     | -0.12                               | -0.13   | -0.40                               | -0.39   |
|                               | (0.29)                              | (0.29)  | (0.33)                              | (0.33)  |
| University Degree             | -0.37                               | -0.39   | -0.32                               | -0.27   |
|                               | (0.27)                              | (0.27)  | (0.27)                              | (0.27)  |
| <i>Age</i>                    |                                     |         |                                     |         |
|                               | 0.01                                | 0.01    | 0.03                                | 0.02    |
|                               | (0.03)                              | (0.03)  | (0.03)                              | (0.03)  |
| <i>Age2</i>                   |                                     |         |                                     |         |
|                               | -0.00                               | -0.00   | -0.00                               | -0.00   |
|                               | (0.00)                              | (0.00)  | (0.00)                              | (0.00)  |
| <i>Feel close to</i>          |                                     |         |                                     |         |
| PSC                           | -0.12                               | -0.24   | 0.20                                | 1.28*** |
|                               | (0.25)                              | (0.35)  | (0.24)                              | (0.38)  |
| PP                            | 0.28                                | -0.42   | 0.59                                | 1.69**  |
|                               | (0.44)                              | (0.66)  | (0.38)                              | (0.61)  |
| CiU                           | -0.18                               | 0.02    | 0.01                                | -1.26*  |
|                               | (0.24)                              | (0.27)  | (0.23)                              | (0.62)  |
| ICV                           | 0.05                                | 0.28    | 0.27                                | 0.02    |
|                               | (0.40)                              | (0.44)  | (0.40)                              | (0.76)  |
| <i>Interactions</i>           |                                     |         |                                     |         |
| Dual* PSC                     |                                     | 0.16    |                                     | -1.51** |
|                               |                                     | (0.49)  |                                     | (0.47)  |
| Dual * PP                     |                                     | 1.22    |                                     | -1.53*  |
|                               |                                     | (0.84)  |                                     | (0.77)  |
| Dual * CiU                    |                                     | -1.05   |                                     | 1.66*   |
|                               |                                     | (0.68)  |                                     | (0.67)  |
| Dual * ICV                    |                                     | -1.09   |                                     | 0.367   |
|                               |                                     | (1.13)  |                                     | (0.89)  |

*Table 6.14. Determinants of short-term changes. Accounting for the effect of exposure to news on regional television on national identification in 2005 (continued)*

|                      |                    |                    |                    |                    |
|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Constant             | -2.97***<br>(0.86) | -3.06***<br>(0.87) | -4.09***<br>(0.89) | -3.88***<br>(0.90) |
| Observations         | 1,500              | 1,500              | 1,51               | 1,51               |
| Log-likelihood       | -484.43            | -480.87            | -470.76            | -457.01            |
| D.F.                 | 12.00              | 16.00              | 12.00              | 16.00              |
| Chi-Square           | 49.61              | 56.72              | 112.41             | 139.90             |
| Correctly Classified | 89.33              | 89.33              | 88.86              | 88.86              |

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.10

Notes:

<sup>1</sup>No change is the reference category in the four models.

<sup>2</sup>As change is constrained in the Spanish direction for those individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in 2004, the analyses exclude these individuals in 1a and 1b. The contrary applies for 2a and 2b. Here change is constrained in the Catalan direction for those individuals who self-identified as primarily Catalan in 2004, so these individuals are excluded from the analyses.

<sup>3</sup>Dual in model 1b refers to those individuals who self-identified as Spanish as Catalan in 2004 and declared not feeling close to any party. The same applies for model 2b.

<sup>4</sup>In model 1b, Feel close to ... accounts for the effect that party closeness has among those individuals who self-identified as primarily Catalan in 2004. In model 2b, it accounts for the effect that party closeness has among those individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in 2004.

Now, to learn about the effect of the interaction, we cannot only look at the interaction term, as is very often mistakenly done (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Franzese and Kam 2007). We need to see the joint effect of “feeling close to a political party” and the interaction term. These effects are shown in table 6.15.

In view of these results, we can say that party closeness does not perform as a cue that orients the national identification of dual identifiers in those years. These results, therefore, refute *hypothesis 6.3.1* and *6.3.2*.



*Table 6.15. Marginal effect of feeling close to a political party among individuals who self-identify as both Spanish and Catalan in 2004*

|                                       | Feel<br>close to | coef. | s.e. | p.value | 95% confidence<br>intervals |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|-------|------|---------|-----------------------------|
| Change in the<br>Spanish<br>Direction | PSC              | -0.08 | 0.34 | 0.823   | [-0.74, 0.60]               |
|                                       | PP               | 0.80  | 0.51 | 0.120   | [-0.21, 1.81]               |
|                                       | CiU              | -1.03 | 0.62 | 0.100   | [-2.26, 0.20]               |
|                                       | ICV              | -0.81 | 1.05 | 0.437   | [-2.87, 1.24]               |
| Change in the<br>Catalan direction    | PSC              | -0.23 | 0.29 | 0.428   | [-0.81, 0.34]               |
|                                       | PP               | 0.16  | 0.47 | 0.733   | [-0.75, 1.07]               |
|                                       | CiU              | 0.40  | 0.27 | 0.141   | [-0.13, 0.92]               |
|                                       | ICV              | 0.38  | 0.47 | 0.415   | [-0.54, 1.31]               |

Note: Values estimated from model 1b and 2b in Table 6.14

To test the robustness of these results, I have repeated the analyses focusing now on voters to the different political parties in the 2003 regional elections. The results are presented in table 6.16.

*Table 6.16. Marginal effect of voting for a political party among individuals who self-identify as both Spanish and Catalan in 2004*

|                                       | Feel<br>close to | coef. | s.e. | p.value | 95% confidence<br>intervals |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|-------|------|---------|-----------------------------|
| Change in the<br>Spanish<br>Direction | PSC              | -0.32 | 0.36 | 0.374   | [-1.04, 0.39]               |
|                                       | PP               | -0.27 | 0.56 | 0.630   | [-1.37, 0.83]               |
|                                       | CiU              | -0.73 | 0.45 | 0.105   | [-1.61, 0.15]               |
|                                       | ICV              | -0.80 | 0.79 | 0.311   | [-2.34, 0.74]               |
| Change in the<br>Catalan<br>direction | PSC              | -0.26 | 0.34 | 0.441   | [-0.92, 0.40]               |
|                                       | PP               | -1.31 | 0.66 | 0.046   | [-2.59, -0.02]              |
|                                       | CiU              | 0.53  | 0.32 | 0.090   | [-0.08, 1.15]               |
|                                       | ICV              | 0.22  | 0.48 | 0.642   | [-0.72, 1.17]               |

Note: Values estimated from results of an analysis that is not presented here but replicates the analyses performed in Table 6.14, including vote in 2003 regional elections, rather than closeness to parties.

Looking at table 6.16, it can be seen that those who self-identified as both Spanish and Catalan in 2004 and had voted for the CiU in 2003 were less likely to self-identify as primarily Spanish and more likely to self-identify as primarily Catalan in

2005. This effect is marginally significant. Also, those who self-identified as both Spanish and Catalan in 2004 and had voted for the PP in 2003 were less likely to make a switch in the Catalan direction in 2005. These results suggest that the CiU and the PP, which campaigned very strongly in favor and against the reform of the statute, respectively, might have influenced the national identification of their voters.

Generally, it can be stated that these results provide moderate evidence in favor of the idea that party identification in Catalonia orients attitudes and, in particular, individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia at the time the Catalan Statute was being reformed.

We could explain these results, which challenge Dancey and Goren's (2010) argument, by the fact that in the European context, party identification is a looser political allegiance than in the American context (Fleury and Lewis-Beck 2001) and that, therefore, it has a lower impact cueing individuals' position in other issues. Actually, we could even argue the contrary. That is, that individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia orients individuals' sympathy for the different parties in Catalonia. This would be coherent with Carsey and Layman's (2006) idea that when an issue is personally important for an individual, he or she will modify his or her vote or party identification to conform to this issue.

## **6.8. Discussion**

This chapter aimed to show that politics and, in particular, the saliency of the center-periphery cleavage has an effect on individual shifts in national identification. With this objective in mind, the empirical analysis carried out in this chapter has examined the association between the consumption of news in Spanish and Catalan channels, on the one hand, and party identification, on the other hand, and shifts in individual national identification.

The idea that the media shapes individuals' identification with the region or the nation in multinational contexts is not new (Martínez-Herrera 2002); however, in this chapter, I have stressed this idea and examined whether television can actually lead individuals to modify their identification over time. The underlining argument behind this idea is that the media channels political elites' confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage. Individuals news consumption cause that they are exposed to one-sided information on the issues that are embedded in the center-periphery cleavage (the Statute reform, in this case). These messages cause individuals to update their prior identification accordingly.<sup>28</sup>

An alternative mechanism has been proposed in this chapter. According to it, party identification should perform as a cue that orients individuals' stands regarding the center-periphery cleavage and, consequently, national identification. In other words, party sympathizers will try to make their position on the center-periphery cleavage consistent with their party's position, if necessary, changing their national identification.

Ultimately, these two mechanisms refer to individuals' need to make their feelings and stands on a particular issue consistent in order to reduce cognitive dissonance (Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955).

The results presented here partially confirm the hypotheses presented in section 6.4. Exposure to news from a Catalan television channel made those individuals who identified as both Spanish and Catalan in 2004 more susceptible to change towards a

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<sup>28</sup> Although this chapter has not examined the mechanism that connects exposure to one-sided information stemming from the media with the observed individual changes, I will turn to this question in the following chapter (chapter 7). Making use of qualitative evidence, in next chapter I will illustrate how elites' messages make individuals' react, reaffirming their original identification when they feel only Spanish or only Catalan, and changing it when their identification is dual.

primarily Catalan identification in 2005 and reduced the likelihood of making a switch towards a primarily Spanish identification. However, an opposite effect has not been found among those dual identifiers who watched the news in a Spanish television channel in 2004. In the next chapter, I will make use of the qualitative evidence collected in some of the interviews to come up with a possible explanation to this finding.

Moreover, my results provide limited evidence in favor of the heuristic leverage of party identification over individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia. Generally, these results seem to refute Dancey and Goren's (2010) argument and reveal the low influence that party identification has in multiparty contexts.

All in all, the models presented here seem to be more appropriate to explaining changes in the Catalan direction, while changes in the Spanish direction remain under-explained and only determined by the non-autochthonous origin of respondents. This result could be related to the influence of the surrounding context not being captured in these models. In this regard, it is important to highlight that in the Catalan context there is an imbalance between the resources and means employed by the Catalan elites and the Catalan media to mobilize the Catalan identity, and those used to mobilize the Spanish identity.

Some important shortcomings and caveats should be mentioned before concluding. First, this chapter has argued that the activation of the center-periphery cleavage makes individuals susceptible to change. In order to provide comprehensive evidence of this argument, I should replicate the analysis for a period in which the center-periphery cleavage was dormant. The difficulty in finding a period in which the center-periphery cleavage has been completely dormant and the absence of panel data for such period prevents me from testing this counterfactual. Still, it is possible that even when the center-periphery cleavage is not as salient as it was during the period under consideration, exposure to Catalan television would continue to model individuals' national identification. This possibility, of course, would limit the scope of

my findings, but it would not invalidate the fact that television performs as a political intermediary channeling the conflict and orienting national identification in one or the other direction.

Moreover, the analyses performed in this chapter have been carried out under the assumption that the observed instability in individuals' declared national identification is all due to real changes. Despite this, it is possible that the lack of reliability of the measurement instrument confound real changes with changes due to measurement errors. Measurement errors are present when the questionnaire item fails to capture the individual's real attitude or opinion (see Saris and Gallhofer 2007). In this regard, Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall (1965) and Achen (1975) have argued that individuals' true opinions or attitudes can fall in between the response categories offered to the respondents. Measurement errors can be also related to respondent's lack of opinions regarding a particular issue. When survey respondents lack an opinion on a particular issue, then they may pick randomly among the different response categories (Converse, 1964).

Some measures have been taken to respond to the possible presence of measurement error. First, in the empirical analysis, I have adopted a conservative strategy and I have considered as changes only those changes that occur between "primarily Spanish", "as Spanish as Catalan," and "primarily Catalan" categories. In this regard, I have considered that those changes that occurred between the adjacent "only Catalan" and "more Catalan than Spanish" categories, and between the "only Spanish" and the "more Spanish than Catalan" categories are not consequential. Secondly, although the analysis could have computed the changes that occurred between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  (or  $t_2$  and  $t_3$ ) for those individuals who answered in these two waves, I have excluded from the analysis all the individuals who did not answer or answered "don't know" or "none of them" in any of the waves, as these individuals were uncertain about their national identification or did not feel comfortable with the answer categories that were offered to them. Also, against the non-attitudes hypothesis, here I contend that the salience of the center-periphery cleavage and its immediate

connectedness to identity means that most individuals in Catalonia possess a national identification. More importantly, the fact that the hypotheses posed in this chapter are, at least, partially confirmed in the empirical analysis supports the idea that these changes are, with a high probability, true changes and not random changes due to measurement errors.

Finally, I would like to emphasize that this chapter has not only empirical, but also theoretical implications. This chapter has shown that identification with the nation seems to be a less stable and more changeable trait than has usually been thought. In a span of time of one year (2004-2005), around twenty per cent of the PaD sampling changed its previous identification. Therefore, we can say that political elites activation of the center-periphery cleavage has, undoubtedly, an important effect on citizens' national identity.



## **CHAPTER 7. CHANGE IN NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION: QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE.**

### **7.1. Introduction**

In the last few decades, the study of Catalan identity, its political expressions and the issue of emigration from other regions of Spain to Catalonia have received the attention of a significant number of ethnographic and qualitative studies. From the anthropology field, Barrera (1985) has analyzed the symbolic elements of Catalan identity and the arguments individuals use to establish boundaries and to stress the differences between Spanish people and Catalan people through processes of stereotyping. In the same line, Pujadas and Comas (1982) have also examined the political meanings of Catalan identity, and stereotypes about Catalans.

More recently, Béjar (2008) has explored expressions of Spanish and Catalan nationalism, and their interaction with individuals' feelings of belonging. Her research has shown that understandings of Spanish and Catalan nationalism are multiple and contested. The author identifies five different discourses which are present among Spanish citizens: the discourse of the traditional Spanish nationalism; a *neo-españolismo* discourse (which rejects all kind of nationalisms including Spanish nationalism); a discourse which is tolerant with periphery nationalisms; a *Catalanist* discourse (which ranges from naïve



nationalism to asymmetric federalism), and the pro-independence nationalist discourse in the Basque Country.

Beyond this, ethnographic research in Catalonia has also placed special attention on the Catalan language, as the core value of Catalan identity. Woolard (1989), for example, has examined not only the use of the Catalan language but the symbolic value of both the Catalan and Spanish languages, as well as the status that each language confers on its speakers. Her research with Gahng (1990) has also shown that after the 1983 language reform was implemented native Catalan speakers tended to value more positively non-native Catalan speakers. Despite this, the Catalan language has continued to be considered a higher status language among both Catalan speakers, and Spanish speakers.

Moreover, and due to the numeric importance of immigrants in Catalonia, qualitative research on the issue of identity in Catalonia has also focused on the study of immigrants' identity, and on processes of acculturation (Comas and Pujadas 1991; Martín Díez 1991; Solé 1980).

In this chapter, however, I move away from the study of the collective meanings of Catalan and Spanish identity, or from the study of language as the *core value* of these identities. This chapter leaves aside static views' on identity and focuses on the movement and, particularly, on the change in the category of national identification. The chapter focuses on qualitative materials collected in thirty-eight semi-structured interviews with a twofold goal: to exemplify different processes of change (intra-generational and inter-generational *identificational* assimilation and *reactive* changes) and to illustrate the mechanism that lies behind the latter kinds of changes.

Processes of *identificational* stability and *identificational* assimilation will be examined within the immigrant generation, and between the immigrant and the second generation. In the immigrant generation, *identificational* assimilation entails the acquisition of a new category of identification, which can be accompanied by the loss of an old category of identification (individual change). In the second generation, these changes imply

that individuals develop an attachment towards the society in which they were born, and eventually lose the identification inherited from their parents (intergenerational change).

The other kinds of processes to which I will pay attention in this chapter are processes of *reactive reaffirmation* and *reactive change*. These *reactive* processes occur when individuals perceive that their group identification or one of their two forms of identifications (when they identify with two groups) is being attacked or scorned.

Individuals with dual identifications can perceive them as compatible and complementary, or they can understand them as oppositional and contradictory (Benet-Martínez and Haritatos 2005; Haritatos and Benet-Martínez 2002). However, individuals' compatible or incompatible understandings of their national identification choices are determined by the context in which they are embedded.

In the Catalan context, Catalan nationalist parties present very often Catalan and Spanish identifications as incompatible. Moreover, the asymmetric distribution of the political parties along the center periphery cleavage has meant that greater efforts are made and more resources are employed to encourage Catalan identity vis-à-vis Spanish identity. Only the Popular Party and, more recently, the Ciutadans Party have explicitly mobilized Spanish identity. The strategy of the Popular Party has usually consisted of mobilizing Spanish identity against Catalan nationalism. This strategy, however, has had a backlash effect among those individuals who felt attached to Catalonia, as they perceive that the PP was attacking his or her Catalan identification.

In line with my argument in chapters 4 and 6, in this chapter I will argue that changes at the aggregate level are related to individual changes. I will show that political parties' activation of

the center-periphery cleavage causes individuals to re-affirm or modify their prior identification.<sup>1</sup>

Out-group political elites' cleavage-related stances or actions are very often framed as attacks on the group. Individuals' perception that their group is being attacked or mistreated provokes an emotional reaction. However, this emotional reaction is contingent on individuals' prior identification. When individuals have a crystallized, strong, exclusive (Spanish or Catalan) identification, perceived attacks or mistreatments will thicken and reaffirm prior exclusive identifications. On the contrary, when individuals hold dual identifications, such attacks or mistreatments can provoke individuals' reaffirmation of the identity they perceive as being attacked or mistreated, and can cause they alienate from the other identification. In the first case, we should observe the stability of individuals' identification. In the second case, we should observe a change.

In addition, in this chapter I will also argue that the activation of the center-periphery cleavage can also contribute, on the one hand, to reinforcing immigrants and second generations' disaffection towards Catalan-specific issues and, on the other, to strengthening some immigrants' feeling that their national positions are not represented.

Apart from this section, this chapter consists of five more sections. The next section presents the methodological design, and it details the method employed to collect and analyze the

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<sup>1</sup> As I already mentioned in the introduction, the activation of the cleavage is staged in different ways: through the stances political elites make regarding issues which are linked to the cleavage (e.g. language policies, the reform of the Catalan Statute or the Constitutional Court Ruling on the Catalan Statute), through the organization of divisive campaigns, such as the ones I referred to in previous chapter (e.g. the boycott of Catalan cava and the PP gathering of signatures against the Catalan Statute in other regions of Spain) or through initiatives which mobilize Catalan and Spanish identities (e.g. the organization of unofficial referendums on independence from Spain, or the acts organized to make a tribute to the Spanish flag).

qualitative materials on which this chapter is built. The third section reflects on the mechanisms that lie behind *identificational assimilation*, and it incorporates some of the findings of the dissertation. This section also illustrates individual and inter-generational processes of *identificational assimilation*. The fourth section focuses on the analysis of *reactive reaffirmation* and *reactive change*. In fourth section, I include some excerpts from the interviews to show the occurrence of these types of reactions and to illustrate that the activation of the national cleavage provokes short-term changes in the national identification. Before ending, this chapter tackles the issue of the salience of national identification. This dissertation began with the idea that in a context such as the Catalan one, national identification should be a salient identification for most individuals. In this section, however, I will show that this is not always the case. The final section concludes.

## 7.2. Methodology

This chapter builds on thirty-eight semi-structured qualitative interviews that I conducted in Catalonia with individuals of different origins, ages and educational levels. In this section, I detail briefly the characteristics of my qualitative research, from its origin to the analytical phase. I also discuss some problems I have encountered in the analysis of the interviews and, in particular, interviewees' evasion strategies and social desirability problems. For the design of the fieldwork, the interviews, and in the analysis of the data, I have followed Kvale (1996) and Vallés (1997).

### 7.2.1. Timing and location

The interviews were conducted in three phases: the summer of 2008, the fall of 2010 and the winter of 2012. The fieldwork was

preceded and surrounded by different events: the victory of the Spanish national team in the European Cup, the re-negotiation of the financial model of inter-territorial redistribution and the beginning of the current economic crisis, in the first case; the Ruling of the Constitutional Court on the 2006 Catalan Statute, which cancelled some of the 2006 Statute's articles and re-interpreted others, the demonstration *Som una nació, nosaltres decidim*, the victory of the Spanish national team in the World Cup, the celebration of unofficial referendums on the independence of Catalonia from Spain, the 29 September general strike and the economic crisis, in the second phase. In the third phase, the Popular Party's arrival to the national government and the economic crisis surrounded the interviews. Some of these events were brought up during the course of the conversations to learn about respondents' stands; the respondents themselves brought other issues up.

*Table 7.1. Timing of the interviews*

| <i>Fieldwork phase</i> | <i>Number</i> |
|------------------------|---------------|
| 2008 Summer            | 15            |
| 2010 Fall              | 17            |
| 2012 Winter            | 6             |

All the interviews took place in the province of Barcelona, although some of my interviewees had spent part of their lives or do live in other provinces. The province, nevertheless, was not considered to be a relevant variable influencing my dependent variable: change in national identification. Other contextual variables (e.g. the percent of Spanish immigrants in the neighborhood or the municipality where the respondent live) were considered more relevant to guarantee the diversity of the outcome sample, and therefore were taken into consideration when selecting the interviewees.

Some of the interviews took place in the city of Barcelona, others in the metropolitan area and others in different municipalities of the province.

#### 7.2.2. Sampling issues and search for respondents

In the first phase, the interviews were mainly addressed to individuals born in other regions of Spain, and individuals who had at least one parent born outside of Catalonia. At this stage of my research, I was mainly interested in studying immigrants' processes of *identificational assimilation*, and learning how parents' identification influenced children's identification. Therefore, the search for respondents and the content of the interviews were oriented by this interest. Fifteen interviews were carried out between July 2008 and August 2008. In five cases (ten interviews), the interviews' were carried out with children and one of their parents.

Over the course of my doctoral research, I became interested as well in processes of *identificational* change in the population with Catalan familial origins. The decision to include this population in my research was motivated by the findings of my quantitative analyses. The decomposition analysis of the CIS data had shown that aggregate changes had also occurred in this group of the population between 1988 and 2010. These changes have meant an overall increase in the percent of individuals who self-identify as "only Catalan" (see chapter 3, table 3.11). Although part of the aggregate change could be attributed to inter-generational changes, the greater part of the change derived from intra-cohort changes and, therefore, individual changes. Bearing this in mind, the interviews were re-oriented to account for these changes too.

In a more systematic way, I proceeded to make a quota sampling design in which the criteria of the quota were: the respondents' and their parents' origin, their birth cohort, and their

educational levels.<sup>2</sup> These criteria were aimed at guaranteeing the typological representation of Catalan society.<sup>3</sup>

The search for respondents was, therefore, based on these three criteria, and potential respondents were reached through contacts of contacts. Very soon, I realized that these criteria were insufficient to guarantee the heterogeneity of the outcome sample, in particular, regarding respondents' ideological leanings. Moreover, this appeared to be a very relevant criterion and leaving this criterion aside would have biased the outcome sample. Therefore, the initial quota sampling design evolved to a sequential, more flexible, sampling design (Valles 2007), and I put more efforts on reaching respondents who had been inaccessible at first and, specifically, interviewees with right-wing leanings.

The outcome sample consists of eight autochthonous, seventeen second-generations and children of mixed couples, and thirteen immigrants. Table 7.2 presents the outcome sample and

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<sup>2</sup> Change in the category of national identification is examined for three groups: immigrants, second generations or children of mixed couples and the autochthonous population. The processes of change that these three groups may eventually experience are significantly different, and this is so because their identification options have been built on different bases. In this regard, we can argue that immigrants can consciously decide whether they want to keep their adscriptive identification, or acquire a new category of identification. In this regard, we can assume that behind immigrants' processes of *identificational* change or *identificational* stability, there is a more or less deliberate choice. Unlike immigrants, second generations have in principle two adscriptive identifications: the one they inherit from their parents and the one they acquire by birth. Children of mixed couples also have two adscribed identifications, although in their case, both forms of identification have been inherited from their parents. Finally, in the Catalan context, natives also have two identificational options and so, they can identify with Catalonia or they can identify with Catalonia and Spain at the same time.

<sup>3</sup> Quotes were established according to the 2009 ICPS data (see Annex Table A.7.1).

the socio-demographic (cohort and educational) characteristics of the respondents.

*Table 7.2. Outcome Sample: Origin, cohort and educational characteristics*

| Autochthons   |                       |            |           |
|---|-----------------------|------------|-----------|
|   | Secondary<br>or lower | University | Total     |
| After 1980  | 0                     | 2          | 2         |
| Between 1960 and 1979                               | 1                     | 1          | 2         |
| Before 1959   | 2                     | 2          | 4         |
| Total   | 3                     | 4          | <b>8</b>  |
| Second Generations and<br>Children of mixed couples |                       |            |           |
|   | Secondary<br>or lower | University | Total     |
| After 1980  | 2                     | 3          | 5         |
| Between 1960 and 1979                               | 2                     | 5          | 7         |
| Before 1959   | 2                     | 3          | 5         |
| Total   | 5                     | 11         | <b>17</b> |
| Immigrants  |                       |            |           |
|   | Secondary<br>or lower | University | Total     |
| After 1980  | 0                     | 0          | 0         |
| Between 1960 and 1979                               | 0                     | 0          | 0         |
| Before 1959   | 9                     | 4          | 13        |
| Total   | 9                     | 4          | <b>13</b> |

Table 7.3 and 7.4 present the respondents' national identification and respondents' recall of their vote in the most recent regional elections before the interview took place. Here, it is worth mentioning that the outcome sample does not reproduce the distribution of Catalan society regarding these two variables,



but it does reproduce its diversity. In any event, these tables reflect the range of respondents' national identification and respondents' ideological leanings.

*Table 7.3. National identification by origin in the outcome sample*

|   | Only<br>Spa. | More<br>Spa<br>than<br>Cat | As<br>Spa<br>as<br>Cat | More<br>Cat<br>than<br>Spa | Only<br>Cat | Total |
|---|--------------|----------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|-------|
| Autochthonous   | 0            | 0                          | 1                      | 3                          | 4           | 8     |
| Second<br>Generations and<br>children of<br>mixed couples | 1            | 1                          | 9                      | 2                          | 4           | 17    |
| Immigrants  | 2            | 2                          | 7                      | 0                          | 2           | 13    |
| Total   | 3            | 3                          | 17                     | 5                          | 10          | 38    |

*Table 7.4. Vote recall in last regional elections before the interview*

|           | N  |
|-----------|----|
| CiU       | 7  |
| PSC       | 12 |
| ERC       | 6  |
| ICV       | 7  |
| PP        | 4  |
| Ciutadans | 2  |
| Total     | 38 |

### *7.2.3. Interviews structure and themes covered*

The interviews consisted of a number of topics, and a series of open questions. After the interview, I administered a follow-up questionnaire to respondents with questions on their socio-

demographic characteristics and ideological leanings. If the answer to these closed questions had emerged in the course of the interview, I avoid asking these questions again. Although the sequence of the topics in the interview had a chronological order, this order was very often altered to accommodate the flow of the conversation. In the first phase, the topics covered included respondents' origin, their arrival to Catalonia (in the case of immigrants), the origin characteristics of their familial, social and working networks, their educational processes, their language practices, issues of cultural distance and *identificational* transmission, their feelings of attachment to Spain and Catalonia, the meanings they attributed to their identification, their ideological leanings, and their perception regarding the success of their (or their parents') migratory process.

In the second and third phases of the fieldwork, I introduced other topics through which I expected to learn about change in national identification, and socialization processes. These topics were: socialization experiences, language practices, the respondents' experiences in the university, decisions regarding their children's education, the political events which have marked them, their experiences during the transition to democracy, their political leanings, their opinions regarding the institutional relationship between the Catalan and Spanish governments, whether they had followed the negotiation of the Statute and their opinion on it, their opinion regarding the Ruling of the Constitutional Court on the Statute, and whether they participated in demonstrations in support of the Statute or celebrations of the Spanish national team's World Cup victory.

All interviewees were briefed on the issues of anonymity and confidentiality, and on reasons for the interview. I framed the interviews as centered on the issue of national identification in Catalonia. Despite this, when the interview reached issues of self-identification, some of the interviewees tried to turn away from the topic, as they thought that national labels were not appropriate for describing them (see section 7.5).

7.2.4. *Analysis*

All the interviews were transcribed. However, in some cases, the interviewees made use of personal tales that were not relevant to the object of study. In those cases, the interview was transcribed with a lesser degree of detail, as the information interviewees provided was not relevant to the object of study.

After the transcription, the second step in the analysis process was to establish the relevant categories for the analysis. In the design of the questionnaire, I had sketched an outline of topics. However, not all the topics covered in the interviews would be finally used. Therefore, in the analysis of the interviewees' discourses, I focused on the following issues: examples of *identificational* stability and change (*identificational* assimilation within the immigrant generation, and between the immigrant and the second generation, and reactive changes), the meanings interviewees attribute to their Spanish or Catalan identification, the salience of national identification vis-à-vis other forms of identification, and the influence of the political context on individuals' identification or on their political preferences.<sup>4</sup>

My interest in these aspects was directly related with the double purpose of this chapter: to exemplify processes of change in national identification and to learn about the mechanisms that lie behind short-term changes in the category of identification. These topics are the ones that will be examined in this chapter.

Additionally, an issue that emerged very clearly in some interviews with immigrants and second generations was the "under-representativeness" of their national positions and political disaffection. This issue will be briefly examined in the analytical sections of this chapter.

Beside these issues, the interviews were rich in other topics: political discontent due to the way in which political parties were

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<sup>4</sup> In the interviews, I touched on other issues, such as parents' decisions over their children's education, which I have used in other parts of this dissertation (see chapter 5).

dealing with the economic crisis was very possibly the issue which appeared most frequently in the flow of the conversations (specially, in the second phase of the fieldwork). As the interviewees' comments on this issue were not relevant for the object of study of my dissertation, I have left it out of my analysis.

The oldest interviewee of my sample brought into the conversation her memories about the Spanish Civil War. She also recounted her father's, a leader of Catholic Action in Barcelona, persecution by the "Rojos". Others recalled the dictatorship's repression, indoctrination in the Franco Regime's public schools, their or others' involvement in subversive activities during the dictatorship, their experiences of the transition, as well as their migratory experiences. Some young interviewees also recalled stories their parents had explained to them about the transition (the 1977 *Llibertat, Amnistia, Estatut d'Autonomia* demonstration) or their parents' migratory experiences. Some of the events evoked in the interviews have become part of Catalans' collective memory. Although these topics will not be discussed here (unless they are specifically related to my argument), I would like to highlight that their richness could serve for the purpose of a secondary analysis of the qualitative materials.

The transcribed interviews were coded with special attention to the topics of interest. Here, it is important to highlight once again that the purpose of these interviews was not to carry out a quantitative treatment of the interviews, nor to produce a theory or make general statements, but rather to exemplify processes of change, and to illustrate the mechanisms that lie behind process of *reactive reaffirmation* and *reactive change*. For this particular reason, the analysis of the interviews was mainly descriptive and interpretative.

7.2.5. *Problematic issues: evasion, social desirability and ex-post rationalizations*

In this section, I would like mentioning some problems that have emerged in the course of the interviews. These problems are frequently found when interviews deal with sensitive questions (Fujii 2010).

I have named the first of these problems *evasion*. Some of the interviewees decided not to reveal their opinions regarding topics that I brought in to the interview (i.e. the reform of the Statute, the ruling of the Constitutional Court on the Statute). One of my interviewees specifically told me that she did not want to discuss these topics because she was not interested in them. Other interviewees were too general in their discourses, or they turned things around just to avoid being clear on what they really thought. All these conscious or unconscious strategies of evasion made it difficult to understand where these interviewees stood regarding the reform of the Statute, for example.

As I mentioned in a previous chapter, the Statute reform was an issue that attracted a lot attention during many months. It was also an issue that caused a lot of conflict, and political parties and political elites' oppositional stances on the Statute produced an atmosphere of acute political tension. This might help to explain the emergence of two kinds of feelings that became apparent in the course of my conversations with the interviewees: tiredness or exhaustion (people were bored of hearing/speaking about an issue which they had never been that interested in) or annoyance (people were angry with the disappointing results of an issue they were very interested in). Although annoyance appeared much more clearly in the interviews, my suspicion is that the expressed feeling of tiredness was actually reflecting interviewees' lack of interest in the reform of the Statute and, on some occasions, their positions against the reform of the Statute or the Statute itself. As an example of this, I would like to mention that some of my interviewees argued that they did not remember whether they had voted in the referendum on the Statute or not.

Certainly, interviewees' evading revealing their true opinions could also reflect the absence of rapport or confidence on the part of the interviewee, or it could just reflect another problem which has been at play in some interviews: *social desirability*.

Social desirability is also a major problem in an issue such as the one I am dealing with. While *Catalanist* ideas are part of the mainstream and are, therefore, socially well considered, opinions against the mainstream are often exposed to social scorn in Catalonia. Of course, this depends on the context where these ideas are expressed. Thus, in the interviewees' immediate context, it may happen that the mainstream ideas are minority ideas, and minority views can be expressed freely without social pressure. Two reasons can explain why social desirability may not have always been overcome in the interviews. First, it might have happened that rapport was not achieved between the interviewer and the interviewee. Second, it might have also happened that interviewees have accommodated to and internalized the "mainstream language". The following quote reflects that political correctness very often conditions the use of language:

-How would you define Catalonia: as a country, an Autonomous Community, a region, a nation, otherwise?

-Me? Well, I don't know, don't know how to define it. I have no definition. On the one hand, definitions... The word nation has a pejorative connotation. Politically, it is a little bit strong, right? It provokes clashes. And, on the other hand, I do not feel as I am part of any nation. I don't know how to tell you, I live in Spain, but I am very careful not to say "España", "el país" (she laughs). I do not know, I would say Països Catalans, Països. There are things that you're used to say and I use them, and I say that.

[Quote #1, Interview #22, Milagros,<sup>5</sup> immigrant, born in 1956]

In addition, due to the political and social discredit of the Spanish right in Catalonia, which results from certain Popular

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<sup>5</sup> The names of the interviewees are fictitious to guarantee their anonymity.

Party leaders' past relations with Franco's regime, the party's emphasis on Spanish nationalism, its belligerent attitude towards Catalan nationalism and the fact that it has traditionally appeared as the main opponent to decentralization, people in Catalonia tend to hide their sympathies to the Popular Party.<sup>6</sup> This has also meant that, in certain occasions, when I asked people about their political leanings or vote choices, respondents resorted to silence before answering, and even half-truths.

These two problems make the analysis and the interpretation of meta-data, that is, interviewees' "spoken and unspoken thoughts and feelings which they do not always articulate in their stories or interview responses" (Fujii 2010) even more important.

Finally, and before finishing this section, I would like to raise an additional problem that might affect the results of the analysis of the interviews. In order to learn about individuals' change/stability in their national identification, in the interviews I had to collect retrospective information on the interviewees' opinions, beliefs and attachments. When retrospective information is collected, there is always the risk that individuals will make ex-post rationalizations and try to appear consistent (i.e. that they not change). By the same token, it could happen that the "observed" reactive changes reported by interviewees were, in fact, ex-post rationalizations of individuals' exclusive attachment to Spain/Catalonia. This would imply, for example, that an individual who has always felt Catalan, reports having experienced a change (from identifying both with Spain and Catalonia to identifying as "only Catalan"), and blames Spanish elites' mistreatment of Catalonia for his or her "radicalization".

My argument here is, however, that despite the imperfection of the measurement instruments, the quantitative and qualitative evidence this dissertation has provided reflect that fluctuations in individuals' identification do actually occur.

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<sup>6</sup> As Dinas (forthcoming) has shown, this has also caused the Popular Party to be seen as more right-wing than in the rest of Spain.

### 7.3. Processes of *identificational assimilation*

In this section, I first review some studies from the literature on immigration, which have looked at the processes of identificational assimilation within immigrant generations. I also refer to other studies, which have specifically examined immigrant generations in Catalonia, and I bring in some of the findings of my own research. I next illustrate these processes using qualitative evidence from my interviews.

#### 7.3.1. *Examining identificational assimilation and inter-generational changes within immigrants families*

When the concept of *identificational* assimilation was originally coined, it was conceived as the final stage of a process which was supposed to occur in first generation immigrants (Gordon 1964). *Identificational* assimilation, as Gordon understood it, implied the abandonment of immigrants' original category of national/ethnic identification and the adoption of the host society national identification. The normative outlook and the linearity assumption of assimilation theory fostered intensive criticisms, and caused the emergence of alternative approaches to study immigrants' incorporation into the receiving society. For example, in "Acculturation as varieties of adaptation", Berry (1984) argued that immigrants follow very different tracks in their incorporation into the host society. The possible outcomes of these different tracks could be, according to this author, assimilation, integration, separation, or marginalization.

Focusing on the children of immigrants, Portes and Zhou (1993) also proposed that second generations follow segmented tracks (segmented assimilation) in their maturity processes: acculturation and integration in the middle-class, assimilation into the underclass, or economic advancement within ethnic enclaves.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Wimmer (2007) has argued that the segmented assimilation theory is, in fact, a neo-assimilationist theory, which explains the incorporation



Building on Berry's (1984) acculturation typology, Bourhis et al (1997) have also developed a model which starts from the idea that immigrants' incorporation into the receiving society is an interactive process that depends on both the immigrants' willingness of being included in a particular national group and adopting aspects of the host majority culture and the host society's willingness to incorporate immigrants into its group. The interaction of immigrants' strategies of integration (assimilation, separation, anomie or individualism), on the one side, and the host community strategies (integration, assimilation, segregation, exclusion or individualism), on the other side, determine the outcome of immigrants' incorporation.

Despite criticisms, assimilation theory is still considered to be a valid theoretical framework to explain inter-generational transformations among the new immigrants in the United States and beyond (Alba 1990; Alba and Nee 1997; Brubaker 2001). From this theoretical framework, inter and intra-generational *identificational* change has been found to be related to age at arrival, generation, years of residence, years of education in the host society, language fluency, cultural distance, household size, immigrants' residential concentration, intermarriage and social mobility (Dustmann 1996; Gans 2007; Rogler, Cooney, and Ortiz 1980; Waters and Jiménez 2005). In addition, certain personality traits, such as individuals' openness to new experiences, have also been considered to have an important role when facilitating individuals' social assimilation (Dustmann 1996; Taft 1967)

Assimilation theory has also been the theoretical framework of classical and recent studies on Spanish immigrants' incorporation into Catalonia (Maluquer i Sostres 1963; Pinilla de las Heras 1973; Solé 1981a; Comas and Pujadas 1991; de la Calle and Miley 2008; Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a; Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 2008b).<sup>8</sup> The question of whether Spanish

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of immigrants to the receiving society with the same framework as the assimilation theory.

<sup>8</sup> From the mid nineties, the massive arrival of immigrants from other parts of the world to Catalonia displaced politicians and

immigrants and their children have been assimilated in Catalonia and the Basque Country has been re-examined in two recent studies which have stressed the important role that language policies have had on this process (Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a; de la Calle and Miley 2008). These two studies, which have already been referred to in previous chapters, have, however, reached opposite conclusions. On the one side, Aspachs-Bracons et al (2008a) have found that compulsory education in Catalan has fostered identification with Catalonia among the children of immigrants, while voluntary education in Basque language has not fostered a more Basque oriented identification among this group. On the other side, de la Calle and Miley (2008) have found that even though linguistic assimilation has been more important in Catalonia, assimilation into feelings of subjective identification and the support for nationalist views and aspirations (ideological assimilation) have been more important in the Basque Country.<sup>9</sup>

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researchers' concerns from Spanish immigrants in Catalonia to immigrants from abroad. Actually, as has been highlighted elsewhere, the idea that the term "immigrant" is not appropriate anymore to refer to those people who were originally from other regions of Spain but have been living in Catalonia for most of their lives has also gained support (Fernández González 2005; Pascual and Cardelús 1987, 1998).

<sup>9</sup> In de la Calle and Miley's work, ideological assimilation (or "Catalanization", using Solé's terminology) would be the outcome of a process that leads immigrants to identify with the beliefs and goals of Catalan nationalism (i.e. the belief that Catalonia is a nation, self-determination preferences, etc.). However, when examining the issue of Spanish immigrants' incorporation into Catalonia, Solé (1981b) already warned that integration has to be differentiated from "Catalanization", and that the two processes can occur separately. Actually, it is worth highlighting here that the assumption that assimilation is only reached when immigrants adjust to Catalan nationalist aspirations mistakenly presupposes that all Catalan "natives" share these nationalist aspirations. Due to this, in this dissertation, I have defined national identification change as the acquisition or the loss of a category of identification, without making aprioristic assumptions on whether these changes are accompanied by an ideological change.

Interestingly, de la Calle and Miley attribute these differences to the fact that, in the Basque Country, regional governments have promoted the use of the Basque language in a “less intense and conflictual way”.

My own research in this dissertation provides limited evidence in favor of the idea that the language policies implemented by Catalan governments has led to a more Catalan oriented identification among the second generations, the group which was mainly targeted by the Catalan government language policies.<sup>10</sup> As my analyses in chapter 3 have shown, the association between being able to speak or write Catalan and identifying as primarily Catalan has decreased over time in this group, which suggests that learning Catalan has lost leverage as a determinant of Catalan identification. On the other hand, chapter 5 has shown that immigrant families’ residential concentration in immigrant neighborhoods has prevented the school from having a more *assimilationist* function. More specifically, the results of chapter 5 have revealed that the years of schooling can promote a bi-national identification among the children of immigrants, but cannot cause second generations to develop a more Catalan oriented identification unless children of immigrants attend schools in neighborhoods in which the proportion of the autochthonous population is significantly greater than the proportion of immigrants.

Chapter 5 has also provided some insights on the issue of (intergenerational and intra-generational) *identificational* assimilation. And so, that chapter’s analyses have shown that immigrant families’ economic progress, their residential integration and their children’s interaction with children of autochthonous in school are factors which reinforce and foster the *identificational* assimilation of second generation individuals.

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<sup>10</sup> Many immigrants arrived in Catalonia after having finished school and, therefore, were not educated in Catalonia. The autochthonous and the children of mixed couples, on the other hand, can learn Catalan at home. This makes that the second-generation group becomes the main targeted group of the language policies implemented in school.

7.3.2. *Illustrating identificational change among Spanish immigrants in Catalonia*

In this section, I illustrate the *identificational* evolution of Spanish immigrants in Catalonia. I show that, as Solé (1984) anticipated, the development of bonds of attachment towards Catalonia among immigrants has not necessarily been accompanied by a process of *Catalanization*, defined as immigrants' identification with Catalan symbols and Catalan nationalist aspirations. I report, as well, divergent trajectories that have led to very different identificational outcomes.

Most of the interviewees who were born outside Catalonia have developed some degree of fondness towards Catalonia. They have incorporated a new (acquired) category of identification that has been added to their Spanish adscriptive identification. However, the replacement or the substitution of one category for another has been rarely evidenced in the interviews, what might be explained because this kind of change is psychologically very demanding, as the following quote from Ana's interview shows:

"I am Spanish, and I cannot deny my identity. I cannot and, moreover, I do not want to deny my identity. So, I am Spanish, I am not Catalan. And I have always passed this on to my children. It emerges from inside, it is something that is yours, and I do not have reason to deny it. I am what I am, and I do not want to deny it either. It would mean that I deny myself, and my family, and I will never do that." [Quote #2, Interview #4, Ana, immigrant, born in 1952]

Ana, who married an autochthonous Catalan thirty-one years ago, distinguishes, however, between *feeling* Catalan and *being* Catalan.<sup>11</sup> So, even though she recognizes she is not Catalan (as her husband or her children are), she feels both Spanish and Catalan now. She speaks Catalan and she identifies with some of the symbols of Catalonia. She recognizes, for example, that

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<sup>11</sup> Immigrants' distinction between *being* and *feeling* Catalan has also been highlighted in Barrera (1985) and Woolard (1989).

Catalonia is a nation and she used to hang out the *Senyera*, as well as the flag from her region of origin, to commemorate September 11<sup>th</sup> (she does not do it anymore because the neighbors of the building do it now jointly).

In general, immigrants and also some second generations relate their attachment to Catalonia to their lived experiences. They have spent most of their lives in Catalonia, and they feel well living in Catalonia. However, their attachment to Catalonia seems to be less deeply rooted than is their attachment to the place where they were born.

“I have been living in Catalonia for many years, I have been very well here, for this reason I have continued living here, and I love this land.” [Quote #3, Interview #14, Juan, immigrant, born in 1940]

“I feel Catalan because I have spent many years living here, working here. I have developed my life here. I am sixty years old now, and I have been here for thirty-seven years. So, I feel myself Catalan as concerns the development of my life, and my work.” [Quote #4, Interview #2, Pedro, immigrant, born in 1948]

“Actually, I think this [my feeling] has less to do with the territory, as it has to do with the feeling that I belong here, because I have my home here, I have my friends, I have my links here, that’s what it makes me feel from here. That is, it is not so much the territory of Catalonia.” [Quote #5, Interview #12, Alicia, second generation, born in 1976]

“I am in part from here now. Well, if you ask me, as if you had been born here? Then, the answer is no. I still have my roots where I was born, my father lives there, I go there every year. And well, my brothers live there, my nephews live there...” [Quote #6, Interview #6, Fernando, immigrant, born in 1946]

While most immigrants seem to have developed some feelings of attachment to Catalonia and have even integrated socially, they have rarely attained Catalanization, i.e. identification with Catalan nationalist aspirations. Milagros, for example, is a prototypical

case of successful social and linguistic integration. She is a highly educated immigrant from Aragon. Her reason for emigrating was completely different from that of most immigrants: she came to Catalonia because she was eager to live in a big city such as Barcelona. When she decided to migrate in 1982, she was aware that she would have to learn Catalan in order to find a job as a teacher. So the first thing she did when she arrived in Barcelona was to enroll in a Catalan course. Milagros witnessed how hard it was for many of her co-workers, teachers as well, to learn Catalan out of obligation. She thinks her open attitude was crucial for her feeling comfortable living in Catalonia, and making many friends, even Catalan “nationalists”. However, she does not identify with the goals of Catalan nationalism.

“My place is now Catalonia, right? I am Catalan from adoption. I speak Catalan, all my work is in Catalan, I am delighted to live here, and I love a lot Catalonia, but I do not have a nationalist feeling, maybe because that is something more visceral, very emotional, and I have not lived that. I did not spend the first part of my life here.”  
[Quote #7, Interview #22, Milagros, immigrant, born in 1956]

Actually, Catalan nationalism has made some immigrants and their children feel alienated from Catalan politics. This became evident when I introduced the issue of the Statute reform into the conversation. Some of the interviewees claimed not to be interested in this issue, not to have followed the news regarding it, and not to have participated in the demonstrations in support of the Statute. The reasons why these interviewees do not involve themselves in Catalan politics emerges very clearly from their discourses:

“It [the Statute] has not affected my life. Maybe if it had affected my life in some personal way... But it does not affect me, it does not affect my relationships, neither does it affect my work. Well, now the Tripartit rules; if the law changes, I adapt myself. I fight for those things that I think matter to me, my co-workers, my students, right?”  
[Quote #8, Interview #22, Milagros, immigrant, born in 1956]

“It [the Statute] has not changed my life at all. I can tell you, as a worker, my situation and the situation of the people who is closed to me, of every working person that I know has changed very little.” [Quote #9, Interview #23, Eva, second generation, born in 1971]

“The Statute has not given me anything. To me, as Catalan, as someone who lives here, the Statute has not given me anything. That is the truth. I have not felt that I have more rights or less rights now, neither have I felt myself more Catalan, or less Catalan. I have not felt anything even close to that. And regarding the Ruling of the Constitutional Court, in practical terms, it did not change my life at all.” [Quote #10, Interview #38, Juan José, second generation, born in 1983]

“I hardly ever vote in the regional elections. They are so radical that I hardly ever vote. No, no, no. There is not any party I can vote for... Oh, well, four years ago I voted for Albert Rivera [Ciutadans’ leader].” [Quote #11, Interview #24, Isabel, immigrant, born in 1932]

Isabel’s words reveal an idea that is shared by other immigrants and second generations. According to this idea, regional politics is “too focused” on Catalan-specific, “radical” nationalist issues. Besides, as they feel there is not a political party that represents their positions, they prefer not to vote. This idea, which was behind the emergence of Ciutadans in 2006 and explains its electoral success, is expressed with more detail in the following quote by a PP voter:

“Almost 50% of the population does not feel they are represented [in the Catalan institutions]. And the evidence of this is that a high percentage of them do not vote. It is bad that they do not vote, but they do not vote because they think everyone is the same, all the politicians. I am a little bit shocked because there was a referendum to vote the Statute, and 50 percent, more than the 50 percent did not vote.” [Quote #12, Interview #14, Juan, immigrant, born in 1940]

The perception that Catalan nationalism has gained terrain over the years has even reinforced the Spanish identification of some interviewees and the rejection of any expression of *Catalanism*. Antonio, who was a very active trade unionist in the seventies and is a grass-root member of the PSC-PSOE,<sup>12</sup> has experienced a regression in his attachment to Catalonia due to this process.<sup>13</sup> So, today he claims to be only Spanish, and to feel less attached to Catalonia than in the past.

“Yes, I went to welcome [Josep] Tarradellas... I supported the Statute and the autonomy of Catalonia. And today, I regret it. I regret it. I feel sorry for having participated [in those demonstrations], because they used me. I thought I was fighting to gain democratic rights for Spain, and then I realized that I was participating in sectarian Catalanism.” [Quote #13, Interview #13, Antonio, immigrant, born in 1951]

In chapter 4, I explained that, during the seventies, leftwing parties and trade unions in Catalonia linked together the struggle for improving the working class labor conditions, the struggle for democracy and the struggle for self-government. The working class, made up of Spanish immigrants, was actively involved in those struggles. However, thirty years later, those parties’ social bases seem to have changed their outlooks, as this other interviewee talks about her father who was also a trade unionist.

“During Franco’s regime, my father was one of those activists... you know? He was the most Catalan possible. I don’t understand,

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<sup>12</sup> In the interview, he emphasized that he was member of the PSC-PSOE, and not the PSC which he considers to be too *Catalanist*.

<sup>13</sup> A similar process is experienced by one of the participants of the focus group organized by Béjar (2008, 53). As Béjar explains, Pepe, a fifty year old man from Barcelona, who was a progressive anti-Francoist and rejected Spanish nationalism, decided to abandon the Republican flag and to embrace the Spanish flag during the Olympic games held in Barcelona. Pepe’s change is presented as a reaction to a pro-independence campaign that took place during that year.



because he is now very, very Spanish. It was the time to make demands, so he demanded.” [Quote #14, Interview #29, Sara, second generation, born in 1980]

“He is now Spanish. But he was one of the first who placed the Senyera on the top of the mountain. Every September 11th, an enormous Senyera was hoisted on the mountain in Pallars, and he was one of the first who did it, I even think that it was on his initiative. And now... I cannot understand how he has become so Spanish.” [Quote #15, Interview #29, Sara, second generation, born in 1980]

Yet, immigrants have also experienced opposite changes as the story from the following interviewee reflects. José Carlos’ trajectory is a trajectory of progressive *identificational* assimilation, which seems to be motivated by a feeling of gratitude towards Catalonia.

-I am going to tell you something, I am not... maybe this is the Stockholm syndrome, we live here and so... But me, myself, without speaking Catalan, I almost feel more Catalan than from Aragon, I do not deny it, but I almost feel more Catalan.

-How many years have you been living here?

-For more than forty years.

-That’s a long time...

-That’s a long time. But moreover, Catalonia has always treated me very well. Catalonia and the Catalans, I must say.

-In which sense?

-In every sense. I have never had a conflict with Catalans because I was not from here. I have never felt underestimated for being from Aragon or for not being Catalan, let’s say. Never, never... And now, I am working for a Catalan company. On the contrary, I have been with the technical director of my company and he speaks to me in Spanish, he doesn’t even think about speaking to me in Catalan. And sometimes, it has happened that he was speaking to me in Spanish, and I was speaking Catalan. Absurd situations. And I spoke bad Catalan, of course [Quote #16, Interview #18, José Carlos, immigrant, born in 1950]

The processes of *identificational* change experienced by Antonio and the one experienced by José Carlos had gone in opposite directions. This is somehow surprising if we think that the two interviewees are about the same age (Antonio was born in 1951 and José Carlos was born in 1950), the two went through vocational training education in their regions of origin, the two arrived in Catalonia when they were 18 years old, and the two of them are PSC-PSOE voters. Marriage differentiated them a little bit. Antonio got married with his hometown girlfriend and José Carlos got married with a woman whose parents were from Andalusia, but who had been born in Catalonia. In contrast to Antonio's wife, José Carlos's wife spent her childhood in a village where the percentage of immigrants was very small, so she learned Catalan when she was a child.

Antonio and José Carlos' working trajectories have also been very distinct. When Antonio was 19 years old he started to work in SEAT, where he was surrounded only by immigrants. He spent his whole working life there, until he took early retirement. José Carlos, in contrast, started his working life in a small enterprise, in which the proportion of Catalans and immigrants was more balanced. He then worked in different medium-sized businesses, and when he was 35 years old he began to work for the Catalan Public Television until he took early retirement. In addition, Antonio has always lived in a town where the percentage of immigrants is very high, and the presence of Andalusian and Extremaduran associations is very important. Actually, he has been an active member of one of these associations and he has gotten his family involved as well. José Carlos, in contrast, has lived in a primarily Catalan-speaking area since his wife got a position as a teacher in a public school there twenty-five years ago.

José Carlos's work in Catalan television, his social mobility, and his belief that Catalonia has always treated him very well seem to be behind his process of *Catalanization*. This process has led him not only to vote for the new Statute in the referendum, but also to declare his disagreement with the Constitutional Court

Ruling, and to even vote for independence in the unofficial referendum on Catalan independence from Spain that was organized in the municipality where he lives in 2010.<sup>14</sup>

Antonio regards those who hide their origins distrustfully. José Carlos, on the contrary, does not like that there are people living in Catalonia who complain about Catalonia and the Catalans.

“I joined one of the Extremaduran Associations, the first one I saw, because I met a person who was originally from the same village I was from and he denied Extremadura, he was embarrassed, very ashamed of having born in Extremadura. Maybe, because he had a past that he probably did not like, he spoke Catalan and was integrated in a Catalan village. He did not want to know anything about Extremadura; he felt Catalan.” [Quote #17, Interview #13, Antonio, immigrant, born in 1951]

“These are people who do not feel from here. I know some people like that. And I tell them, I don’t know why you are here, I tell them frankly. Because these people like to provoke, there are some people like that, they like to provoke and say: ‘Catalans are bastards’” [Quote #18, Interview #18, José Carlos, immigrant, born in 1950]

The stories of Antonio and José Luis illustrate the occurrence of a change in opposite directions. Generally, it could be said that these interviewees’ secondary socialization, their work experiences, their residential choices and, more generally, their life trajectories have oriented their opposite *identificational* changes.<sup>15</sup> The two following cases also support this argument.

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<sup>14</sup> In September 2009, an unofficial referendum for Catalonia’s independence took place in Arenys de Munt. After this referendum took place, similar referendums were organized in 465 out of 946 Catalan municipalities (Lago and Montero 2010, 407).

<sup>15</sup> We know that in Catalonia, individuals’ origin and their social status partly overlap (see table 1.3). Now, immigrants’ economic and social mobility can lead them to enter into a high-status group (the autochthonous group), and to become more similar to this group. When this social mobility is accompanied by an external attribution (“gratitude

Mari Tere and Enrique's lives were parallel for many years in many regards. Mari Tere was born in 1947 and Enrique was born in 1949. Their parents were from other regions of Spain; their families arrived in Catalonia when they were small children (Mari Tere was four years old and Enrique was two years old). In their homes the two spoke Spanish with their parents. However, in the villages where their parents settled, the presence of other immigrants was symbolic, so they both learned Catalan very early in their interaction with other children. Yet, at some point in time, Mari Tere and Enrique's trajectories diverged. Mari Tere studied first to be a teacher, and then she studied history at the university.

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toward" Catalonia for one's success), this mobility can cause immigrants to adopt the lifestyles of high status autochthonous (Gans 2007). Extending the argument, it could be suggested that immigrants not only adopt the high-status autochthonous' lifestyles, but they also develop the feelings of attachment to the host society that the autochthonous possess. Although chapter five only speculated on the mechanism which explains the relationship between immigrant families' positive economic performance and the *identificational* assimilation of the offspring, the comparison of Antonio and José Carlos's trajectories give us some clues regarding the mechanism which might be at play. José Carlos's economic and social mobility seems to lie behind his feelings of gratitude toward the receiving society ("Catalonia has always treated me very well") and his identification as Catalan. As I argued in chapter 5, immigrants' feelings of gratitude toward the receiving society and their identification with it can be passed on to their children, fostering, in this way, a stronger identification with Catalonia in the latter. Reitz and Sklar (1997) have argued that the relationship goes in the opposite direction. According to these authors, immigrants' attachment to their places of origin (i.e. retention of their original language or maintenance of ethnic networks) has an economic cost among the European-origin immigrants in Toronto. The translation of Reitz and Sklar's argument to the Catalan context would imply that Spanish immigrants' maintenance of their attachment to Spain, expressed as their resistance to learn Catalan, negatively affects theirs and their children's labor and social opportunities. However, looking at the trajectory of José Carlos and taking into account that he never learned to speak Catalan, it seems that the causal relation might go the other way.

“The fact of having studied history and, moreover, contemporary history and knowing the history of Catalonia helped me to look at things in a particular way.” [Quote #19, Interview #5, Mari Tere, immigrant, born in 1947]

The university marked her trajectory, but not only because she studied the history of Catalonia, but also because it gave her the opportunity to interact with people who were originally from Catalonia. At a time when very few people went to university, and when the majority who did so was of Catalan origin, her university experience impacted significantly on her way of thinking. At the university, she met her husband who was originally from Catalonia and who spoke Catalan with his parents. When her husband was doing his military service, they both made the decision to write letters to each other in Catalan. As Franco’s regime had forbidden the teaching of Catalan in schools, very few people could write Catalan at that time (around 1965). Therefore, Mari Tere and her husband’s linguistic activism already reflected a strong commitment to the core value of Catalan identity.

Mari Tere feels only Catalan, but she reports having felt the same since she was young. She has not experienced any change in her national identification. Actually her Catalanness is not only a feeling, but also a willing of being.

“I feel Catalan. But I always say I have been born in that place [a different region from Catalonia], so people know it. But the feeling and what I want to be is Catalan.” [Quote #20, Interview #5, Mari Tere, immigrant, born in 1947]

Mari Tere has very strong group identification, and she has made hers the aspirations of Catalan nationalism. In her discourse, she reproduces many of the arguments used by the Catalan nationalist parties, for whom she usually votes, when they support Catalonia’s self-determination or independence. And so, she refers to Spain’s economic plundering of Catalonia, the grudge of Spain against Catalonia when banning a Catalan national team, that

Spanish institutions ignored the Catalan Parliament's will in the parliamentary procedure on the Catalan Statute, etc.

Enrique's political evolution has been completely the opposite. He remained in his village, and he studied tourism at a university close to his village. He reports not having lived, or witnessed the student movement, or the dictatorship's repression.

"All I did was study, later on I found a good job, and then, all I did was to work. That's it". [Quote #21, Interview #35, Enrique, immigrant, born in 1949]

Enrique started working as a hotel manager, and later on he became the owner of a hotel. He got married to a woman who was born in Catalonia, from a mixed couple, and who spoke Catalan to her parents. However, Enrique and his wife speak Spanish to each other, and they speak Spanish to their children too. Although speaking Spanish at home was not a conscious decision, he recognizes he is very satisfied with that, as he claims that many young people cannot speak Spanish properly nowadays. He claims his political ideas were shaped over the years, maybe somehow inspired by the teachings he received in the public high school he attended in his village during Franco's dictatorship. When Enrique was around forty years old (around 1989), he was invited to participate more actively in politics, and to appear in the Partido Popular's lists of his village's city hall. He accepted. His decision to be an active member of the PP is striking if we take into account his familial context.

"My father said nothing, because I already knew what he thought. He was different. He had more Republican thoughts. My mother told me that I should not enter into politics. You know... those kinds of things. But I don't regret anything. This gave me the opportunity to explain and say what I think and tell many people: you lie, what you are telling me is not true." [Quote #22, Interview #35, Enrique, immigrant, born in 1949]

Enrique feels both Spanish and Catalan, nor does he report having changed his identification with Spain and Catalonia over time. He explains to me that he is constantly accused of being against Catalonia and the Catalan language. However, he does consider himself Catalan as well:

“They also tell me: you are against the Catalan language. I then say, see I have studied in Catalonia, I have worked in Catalonia, I got married in Catalonia, and my children are Catalan. Do you really think that I do not want the best for Catalonia? Naturally, I want the best for Catalonia. But what I think is the best is not what you are doing.” [Quote #23, Interview #35, Enrique, immigrant, born in 1949]

Enrique complains that Spanish is not taught well in school, that the Spanish flag is not raised in his village’s city hall, or that some streets and squares’ names have been renamed in order to delete the presence of Spain in his village. His discourse coincides, in this way, with the Popular Party’s complaints regarding Catalan nationalists’ harassment of the Spanish language and of Spanish symbols in Catalonia.

These four interviewees’ stories illustrate the occurrence of both change, as well as stability. Why did some of these immigrants’ identification evolve over time, while remaining the same in other cases? We know that Antonio (interview #13) and José Carlos (interview #18) arrived in Catalonia at a time when its national identification was, very possibly, not fully crystallized. Their migratory experience, therefore, significantly affected the strength of their attachments. On the contrary, Mari Tere (interview #5) and Enrique (interview #35) arrived in Catalonia when they were small children, so they followed a process of socialization that was not affected by their migratory experience. Therefore, undergoing a migratory experience as a young adult could be an important factor when explaining change and stability in immigrants’ national identification. Nevertheless, further research should be conducted to confirm this hypothesis.

*7.3.3. Illustrating identificational change between immigrants and their children*

In summer 2008, I carried out ten interviews with parents and children of the same family. These interviews have helped me to look into the *identificational* similarities and differences of two generations. Direct questions about the feelings of attachment towards Spain and Catalonia of the interviewees' parents were also posed to native and second generations to learn about the similarities and differences between the parents and their offspring. Interviews with parents and children from the same family provide qualitative evidence of the intergenerational transmission of national allegiances, something that the descriptive analyses presented in chapter 5 already highlighted. Despite this, some second generations also report having experienced a radical switch in relation to their parents' identification.

In the interviews I conducted with parents and children from the same family, four out of five cases reflect that parents and children agree in their national self-categorization. Differences in parent/child identification were only relevant in the case of Antonio (Interview #13) and his daughter Alicia. While the former feels "only Spanish", Alicia feels both Spanish and Catalan. Alicia's feelings of attachment with Catalonia are, however, more similar to her mother's, Angela. Angela was present in the interview with her husband, and she interrupted him on several occasions to make clear that she did not feel the same as her husband and that she also felt Catalan. However, even if Alicia does not resemble her father regarding her identification with Catalonia, she resembles him in how she defines Catalonia (as a region) and in the fact that the two of them are against Catalonia's independence.

Within the second generations and also among the children of mixed couples I interviewed, I have found significant differences not only in their attachment to Spain and Catalonia, but also in how compatible or incompatible they perceive to be these



attachments (Benet-Martínez and Haritatos 2005; Benet-Martínez et al. 2002).

Some interviewees, children of mixed couples or second generations, who self-identify as both Spanish and Catalan, emphasized their Spanishness over the course of the interview to make clear that they are not distinct from people in other regions of Spain. These interviewees consider Catalonia to be part of Spain, and they organize their identification with Spain and Catalonia in concentric circles, with their Catalan identification being nested in their Spanish identification.

“I was born in Catalonia and I feel Catalan. However, when I travel around Spain, or when I am in Salamanca or anywhere else, then I feel as Asturian as the people from Asturias, or as Galician... I’m comfortable when I go there, and I also really enjoy traveling around Spain” [Quote #24, Interview #15, Carlos, second generation, born in 1972]

“I am as Spanish as a guy from Asturias, as a boy from Asturias, or as a person from Extremadura” [Quote #25, Interview #9, Mario, second generation, born in 1970]

Carlos’ identification with Spain concurs with their parents’. Carlos is the son of a mixed couple. Carlos’ father, Juan, feels “a little bit more Spanish than Catalan, because I spent my youth in my village and my roots are there”. Juan’s wife also seems to be very attached to her Spanish identification:

“My wife is more Spanish than I am. I do guarantee it. And she is originally from Catalonia, and from a very Catalan family, but she does not want to hear about she having to give up being Spanish.” [Quote #26, Interview #14, Juan, immigrant, born in 1940]

Carlos’ feelings of attachment have changed over the years, so today he feels less Spanish and less Catalan than he felt five years ago, “precisely because of all these circumstances [which surrounded the reform of the Statute]”. Carlos, who speaks Catalan with his mother and at work, is neither very attached to

the Catalan language. In the interview, he complains that English is today much more important than Catalan is, and he states that he would prefer his daughter to learn English well, and that Catalan was only an optional subject in school. Although Carlos voted for conservative parties in the latter elections, he has also experienced a process of alienation from politics as a result of the reform of the Statute, and he looks very suspiciously to all politicians.

Mario, on the other hand, is the son of two Andalusians. He never learned Catalan properly because he “was not good at it”. This, however, is causing him problems in consolidating the position he has in the Catalan police. Although Mario complains that Catalan institutions should not require a proof of competence in Catalan, as no proof of competence in Spanish is required, he claims he is not upset with this regulation. Actually, Mario reports that over the years he has become less extreme in his opinions towards the Catalan government language regulations.

These second-generation interviewees’ identification with Catalonia seems to be independent of their language practices. In fact, as the case of Carlos shows, being competent in Catalan and having Catalan as mother tongue does not mean that people always feel more Catalan oriented. Conversely, not being competent in Catalan is not incompatible with the fact that some second generations have “Catalanized”, and share some of the values, beliefs and goals that nationalist parties defend.

The case of Sara is of interest here. Sara, who was born in 1980, is the daughter of two Andalusians. Her parents arrived in Catalonia when they were small kids, but as they have been always surrounded by other Andalusians, they never learned Catalan. As mentioned above, Sara’s father was a trade unionist and activist who opposed Franco’s regime. According to her, her father feels only Spanish today. Nevertheless, she feels only Catalan. When I ask her about any event that she thinks has

marked her in some way, she refers to the Ruling of the Constitutional Court on the Catalan Statute.<sup>16</sup>

“The Ruling on the Statute has made me more Catalanist. I cannot understand how a law which was passed, well a law which was cut back [in its processing in the Spanish Parliament], but it was approved in a referendum by the people, a law that people voted for, a law which was passed in the Catalan Parliament...How is it possible that a party [the PP] which hates Catalonia comes and say: “we do not want this”. And some judges, whose terms had already expired in some cases at the moment they voted the Ruling, say that the Statute is not ok. This causes one to feel powerless, and one wonders where democracy is. I do not understand it. So it is because of this that I feel that I do not want to know anything about Spain. I am Catalan and I am pro-secession. I am not of those who say “to hell with Spain”. On the contrary, Spain is my parents’ country; I am fond of Spain because of my parents and because I lived there, but I am Catalan. My feeling is that they do not want us, therefore, I do not want to be Spanish, and after the Statute, even less. This is outrageous.” [Quote #27, Interview #29, Sara, second generation, born in 1980]

According to Sara’s tale, the Ruling did not only end up re-affirming her identification as “only Catalan”, but it also caused her to become more “Catalanist”, to the point where she is now in favor of Catalonia’s secession from Spain. Yet her position is compatible with the fact that she speaks Catalan very poorly and she never speaks Catalan in front of friends because she is ashamed. Despite this, she is now making the effort to speak Catalan at work, and to speak Catalan to her small daughter

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<sup>16</sup> In the interview, I asked the interviewees whether they could mention a political, national or international event that they consider to be important in recent history and which had affected them in some particular way. This question was posed before the questions on the reform of the Statute or the Constitutional Court Ruling were posed. I am grateful to Carolina Galais for her suggestion to incorporate this question in the interview outline.

because Sara does not want her to end up not being competent in Catalan.<sup>17</sup>

Sara's story is very similar to Álvaro's. Álvaro's parents came to Catalonia when they were very young. When Álvaro introduces to me his family, he makes very clear that his parents feel Andalusian, although he feels Catalan, as his brother does. Similar to Sara, Álvaro is not proficient in Catalan. In the interview, he explains that at his primary school most courses were taught in Spanish, so when he went to high school it was very difficult for him to adapt to a context in which only Catalan was spoken. However, Álvaro does not report having had any problems with this. Over the conversation, he emphasizes his rejection of any expression of Spanish nationalism, and he brings in several examples that have reinforced his identification with Catalonia.

"I remember a campaign to sign a petition; I remember that there were two elderly people [on the TV news]. They were asked the reason why they had come to sign. The woman said "[we have come to sign] against the Catalans." The husband corrected her: "no, no, against the [Catalan] Statute." And she said: "You can say what you want, but this is against the Catalans." And there were a lot of people surrounding them who were insulting Catalonia, in general.<sup>18</sup> Bad moment for going on vacation outside of Catalonia. You see how much they can piss us off organizing an act like that one... This was promoted by a political party [the PP] which had passed statutes,

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<sup>17</sup> Sara's case exemplifies that identification shifts might precede linguistic shifts and that the relationship is endogenous.

<sup>18</sup> Here the interviewee refers to a campaign to sign a petition organized by the Popular Party in 2006 in different regions of Spain. The signatures were aimed to support a legislative initiative organized by the PP to ask to the Spanish government that it organize a referendum asking the following question: "Do you think that Spain should continue to be a single nation in which all its citizens have equal rights, obligations and access to public benefits?" According to the PP, the text of the Catalan Statute would affect other regions' finances and rights, and this meant that people from other regions had the right to take a position regarding the Catalan Statute.

such as Valencia's Statute, which included a clause saying that anything adopted in the Statute of Catalonia would be applied automatically in Valencia."<sup>19</sup> [Quote #28, Interview #30, Álvaro, second generation, born in 1976]

Second generations and children of mixed families are "bi-culturalists" who have internalized more than one culture (Benet-Martínez and Haritatos 2005). In the Catalan context, however, confrontation along the cleavage very often pushes people to choose between one or the other side, between Spain and Catalonia. This has consequences on the way people organize their national allegiances. In some cases, second generations make a choice, reject Spain as a valid category of identification for them, and self-identify as only Catalan (Interviews #29 Sara, and #30 Álvaro). Other second generations embed their Catalan identification within their Spanish identification (Interviews #9 Mario, and #15 Carlos). Some second generations perceive the two cultures as compatible and complementary; others, on the contrary, perceive them as oppositional and contradictory (Haritatos and Benet-Martínez 2002; Benet-Martínez et al. 2002) and they end up defining themselves in "opposition" to others.

-Would you say you identify as only Spanish, more Spanish than Catalan, as Spanish as Catalan, as more Catalan than Spanish, or only Catalan?

-Now, just to bother... If I had to answer this question in a survey I would tell you "only Spanish". But then, this question is biased. First, what does it mean to be Spanish and what does it mean to be Catalan?

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<sup>19</sup> The Statute of the Autonomous Community of Valencia was also reformed in 2006. It includes a clause (Disposición Adicional Segunda, Ley Orgánica 1/2006, de 10 de abril, de Reforma de la Ley Orgánica 5/1982, de 1 de junio, de Estatuto de Autonomía de la Comunidad Valenciana) which specifies that the Autonomous Community of Valencia's regional government will guarantee that the region's self-government rights will be updated on equal terms to those of other regions.

-That was the following question. What makes you identify with Spain, and what...?

-In the present situation this is difficult to say. There was a wise man who said that you don't realize that you are a nationalist until you come cross another nationalist, so then you become nationalist but of the opposite side (...)

-So, how would you define yourself then?

-Me? Yugoslavian. It all depends on the references.

[Quote #29, Interview #20, Andrés, child of a mixed couple, born in 1975]

Some other second generations experience difficulties to self-categorize themselves.<sup>20</sup> Birth makes them Catalan. However, their familial context makes them Spanish. This is, for example, the case of Juan José. Juan José is the middle child of a couple, consisting of two skilled professionals who came to Catalonia around 1980, after immigration rates had declined. Juan José's education at a state-aided private school was mainly in Spanish, although he took some courses in Catalan. He speaks Catalan with friends and with some co-workers, but he feels more comfortable speaking Spanish. In the interview, he seems to have problems classifying himself as either Catalan or Spanish. At some point during the interview, it becomes evident that even though he recognizes that he is Catalan because he was born in Catalonia ("I am the first Catalan in the family"), he feels more Spanish than Catalan. The importance of the family context is exemplified in the following quote:

"At the end of the day, that is what I have always experienced, what I have experienced at home. At home, we have never listened to Catalan singers. To me, Raimon or Lluís Llach are unknown, I have never listened to them. I mean, I have never listened to them, and I have no interest in listening to them, that is the truth. Now, that I have grown up, I am starting to listen to Els Amics de les Arts or Manel. I listen to them, and I like them. But then, the radio and the

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<sup>20</sup> Barrera (1985) and Woolard (1989) have also reported ambivalent identities among second generations.

television... I rarely watch TV3. Well, the truth is that I almost never watch TV now, but this is what I have experienced, and I feel good with it. At the end, I feel good with that because my family is from outside Catalonia” [Quote #30, Interview #38, Juan José, second generation, born in 1983].

Parents, therefore, seem to have a significant influence on shaping their children’s identification with Spain. This identification is sometimes intentionally promoted. And so, some parents involve their children in cultural regional associations:

“They [my daughters] have participated in theater groups, choir groups; they have learned the Extremadura dances; they have worn the regional costumes. So they have lived the culture from Extremadura very closely” [Quote #31, Interview #13, Antonio, immigrant, born in 1951].

In addition, the second generations who maintain strong attachments to Spain (despite feeling Catalan, at the same time) have very often had a close relationship with their parents’ places of origin. Juan José (interview #38), for example, used to spend around two or three months (Christmas, summer time) every year in his parents’ place of origin, and he did so until his two grandmothers died. Therefore, for many second generations, their attachment to Spain is not only inherited from their parents, but also built upon their own experiences. Additionally, it is important to highlight that many of these children have grown up in neighborhoods where most people were of immigrant origin, so they had little opportunities to socialize with children of autochthonous. This separation was sometimes reproduced in the high school.

“[In my high school] there were two separate worlds. There was even a bar where Castilian speakers met and a bar where Catalan speakers met” [Quote #32, Interview #1, Arantxa, second generation, born in 1979]

All these elements (contact with the parents' place of origin, participation in cultural associations, or residential concentration of immigrants in certain neighborhoods) reinforce immigrants' transmission of their Spanish identification.

Despite this, as the cases of Sara (interview #29) and Álvaro (interview #30) show, second generations sometimes experience radical switches in relation to their parents. Taking into account the impact that the Statute issue and some of the divisive campaigns which were organized around it (e.g. the PP campaign to sign a petition against the Catalan Statute) have had on these two interviewees, we can imagine that these events acted as catalysts of these interviewees' Catalan identification. Although this idea is consistent with the argument that events socialize individuals' attitudes in the specific domains that these events make salient (Sears and Valentino 1997), more research should be done to learn about the impact that the Statute reform had on young adults and on how these events interact with other variables (parents' identification).

#### **7.4. Processes of *reactive change***

To this point I have illustrated the occurrence of process of *identificational* stability and *identificational* assimilation within the immigrants' generation and between immigrants and their children.

*Identificational* assimilation is the result of a long-term process. However, other changes can occur more rapidly. These kind of changes, which I have referred to in this dissertation as short-term changes can be seen as individuals' reaction to elites' activation of the cleavage. This section is devoted to exemplify processes of *reactive reaffirmation* and *reactive change* and to illustrate the mechanism that lies behind them.



7.4.1. *Explaining reactive changes*

The term *reactive* change is based on the concept of *reactive ethnicity* coined by Portes and Rumbaut (2001). Reactive ethnicity refers to a process of *ethnic identification reaffirmation* that emerges when second generations are confronted with hostile receiving societies, or when second generations perceive that their ethnic group is being threatened, persecuted or excluded.<sup>21</sup> Building on this concept, I call *reactive changes* those changes which occur when individuals who have dual group identifications perceive that one of the groups they identify with is being mistreated or attacked by the other and, accordingly, they react reaffirming the identification which is being mistreated or attacked, and rejecting the other identification.

When two conditions hold, that is, when the number of these *reactive* changes is numerically important, and when they occur in the same direction (or the number of changes in one direction exceeds the number of changes in the other directions), these changes produce aggregate changes. As chapter 3 showed, aggregate fluctuations in national identification have been significantly important over the last thirty years both in Catalan society as a whole, but especially in the autochthonous population (see table 3.11).

In the dissertation, I have argued that the individual changes behind these aggregate fluctuations are related to changes in the context and, in particular, to elites' activation of the centre-periphery cleavage. In chapter 4, I argued that confrontation between Spanish and Catalan parties regarding issues related to the center-periphery cleavage (e.g. language policy reforms, decentralization of responsibilities, transfers of financial resources, the reform of the Catalan Statute, the Constitutional

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<sup>21</sup> Portes and Rumbaut (2001) explain, for example, that some of their Mexican interviewees' ethnic self-identity was reinforced when Proposition 187, a law that bans illegal immigrants' use of health care, public education, and other social services in California, was passed in a referendum in 1994.

Court Ruling on the Catalan statute, etc.) was behind these kinds of changes. The results of chapter 4, although modest, suggested that when the levels of confrontation between Spanish and Catalan elites were very high then natives tended to exhibit a more Catalan oriented identification, while second generations tended to exhibit a more Spanish oriented identification.

Although in chapter 4 I did not go into depth on the mechanism which explains this association, I suggested that Spanish and Catalan parties' opposite stances regarding identity-framed issues mobilize individuals' identification. This mobilization has a twofold effect: it pushes the autochthonous to re-affirm their Catalan identification at the expense of their Spanish identification, and it causes second generations, who hold dual identifications but still maintain strong bonds of attachment to Spain, to re-affirm their Spanish identification at the expense of their Catalan identification. Unfortunately, the use of cross-sectional data limits the proper test of this argument as I lacked information on individuals' prior-identification.

In the previous chapter, I examined more deeply short-term individual changes in national identification using individual panel data. The analysis focused on a period of high political confrontation between Spanish and Catalan political parties over the Popular Party's majority government and the reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. In that chapter, I argued that political parties' activation of the cleavage, channelled by Spanish and Catalan television broadcasters, led those who self-identified as both Spanish and Catalan in  $t_1$  (2004) to redefine their identification in  $t_2$  (2005). In line with Chapter 4's argument, I argued that the media and, in particular, television channel Spanish and Catalan elites' opposite stances regarding identity-framed issues. Individuals' exposure to political elites' polarizing messages regarding the reform of the Statute pushed those individuals who held dual identifications and watched Catalan television's news to give priority to their Catalan identification over their Spanish identification. Nevertheless, the analyses did not find the opposite effect for Spanish television,

possibly due to the fact that Catalan television gives much greater attention to issues which confront Spanish and Catalan political parties along the cleavage.<sup>22</sup>

According to Portes and Rumbaut's (2001) formulation of the concept of *reactive ethnicity*, an individual's ethnic identity is reaffirmed when some event affects the group in a particular negative way. In the Catalan context, the events or issues that cause an alteration of individuals' national identification are very often related to the center-periphery cleavage.

In my interviews, the event that emerged most clearly as the one causing such kind of changes was the negotiation over the new Statute of Autonomy and the Spanish Constitutional Court Ruling on the new Statute. In chapter 4, I already described the process behind the reform of the Statute, from its origin to the approval of the Statute in the 2006 referendum. In chapter 6, I also argued that political parties adopted antagonist positions and framed the debate so that those who were against the new Statute were in fact denying Catalonia's rights, and those who were in favor of the Statute were breaking up Spain.

After the Statute was approved, the Popular Party, the Spanish Ombudsman and the Popular Party regional government of Murcia appealed to the Spanish Constitutional Court against the Statute<sup>23</sup>. The regional governments of La Rioja, Valencia, Aragón and the Balearic Islands (all from the Popular Party) also appealed against some of the Catalan Statute's articles.

While the Constitutional Court was deciding on the Catalan Statute, a series of unofficial referendums on independence from Spain were organized in Catalan municipalities. The first referendum took place in September 2009 in Arenys de Mar, a town of 8,000 inhabitants. After this referendum took place, the initiative spread to other municipalities so that between 2009 and 2011 around one half of Catalonia's municipalities held similar

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<sup>22</sup> I will come back to this point in next section.

<sup>23</sup> The number of articles being appealed ranged from 187 in the case of the PP to 117 in the case of the Murcia government.

queries. Although originally promoted by civil society, these referendums were also backed by Catalan nationalist parties and, in particular, the CiU and the ERC. The overall turnout in these referendums was around 18 percent, although participation was unevenly distributed, with a minimum turnout of 5 percent and a maximum turnout of 90 percent in some localities (Muñoz and Guinjoan 2012).

Four years after the PP appealed against the Catalonia Statute, the Spanish Constitutional Court reached a consensus and pronounced a ruling. The ruling declared the greater part of the text constitutional. Nevertheless, it stated that the Preamble, which defined Catalonia as a nation, had no legal effectiveness. In addition, it declared 14 articles unconstitutional and it reinterpreted others. Some of the articles the Spanish Constitutional Court reinterpreted were related to Catalonia's historic rights, to Catalonia's national symbols, and to the promotion of the Catalan language.

Catalan parties framed the Constitutional Court Ruling as an attack on the nation of Catalonia and on the will of its citizens, as Catalan citizens had endorsed the Statute in a referendum four years earlier. *Omnium Cultural* organized a demonstration in Barcelona on July 10, 2010 with the motto "Som una nació, nosaltres decidim".<sup>24</sup> The aim of the demonstration was to protest against the Constitutional Court Ruling, and to demand the right of Catalans to decide on those issues that specifically concern Catalonia. The Catalan parties, with the exception of the PP and

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<sup>24</sup> *Omnium Cultural* is an organization that was created in 1961 to promote Catalan culture and the Catalan language, as well as the national identity of Catalonia. Although its activities were banned during the dictatorship, it continued working underground. Since the arrival of democracy, *Omnium Cultural* has played an important role in promoting Catalan culture and the Catalan language. More recently, the organization has also played a leading role in demanding Catalonia's right to self-determination and secession.

Ciutadans, supported the demonstration. As a result of these events, people mobilized and demanded their right to decide.<sup>25</sup>

Now, the question to be asked here would be: How do these kinds of events, which made the cleavage salient, end up affecting individuals' identification? To answer this question we have to look towards the political parties, which very often set themselves up as spokespersons of the Catalan or the Spanish people. Political parties' leaders or spokesperson's reactions to these issues take the form of political demands or stances on the collective group position, and are very often framed as offenses to the group identity.

As I have already mentioned, Catalan parties framed the reform of the Catalan Statute as a way to express "Catalonia's willingness to be, and further advance in the recognition of its collective identity".<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, the Spanish Constitutional Court Ruling was claimed to be a "collective humiliation".<sup>27</sup> The Popular Party, however, argued that the Catalan Statute was "unacceptable" and that it broke the 1978

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<sup>25</sup> Interestingly, one day after this demonstration took place, the Spanish National Team won the FIFA World Cup. People mobilized and celebrated the Spanish National Team victory. During those weeks, the *Senyeras* hanging out from the windows or the balconies of many people's apartments competed with the Spanish flags that hung from the windows or the balconies of other peoples' apartments.

<sup>26</sup> Avui Catalunya, en el seu procés de construcció nacional, expressa la seva voluntat d'ésser i de continuar avançant en el reconeixement de la seva identitat col·lectiva i en el perfeccionament i l'ampliació de l'autogovern per mitjà d'aquest nou Estatut. [Preamble of the Statute. *Proposta de reforma de l'Estatut d'autonomia de Catalunya. Presentació i defensa al Congrés dels Diputats*. Text de la Proposta en castellà, anglès i català Barcelona, 2006 Quaderns de l'Estatut, 2.]

<sup>27</sup> Pujol, Jordi (2010) La reacción no puede ser más espasmódica. Article retrieved from the Centre d'Estudis Jordi Pujol on April 6, 2012 [[www.jordipujol.cat/es/jp/articles/8466](http://www.jordipujol.cat/es/jp/articles/8466)]

Constitutional agreement.<sup>28</sup> The PP also contended that the PSOE's national government's concessions to the nationalist Catalan parties were threatening Spain's national nature and were contributing to the "Balkanization of Spain",<sup>29</sup> while the Ruling of the Constitutional Court on the Statute ratified the Spanish Constitution and preserved the Spanish nation.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Mariano Rajoy, the PP leader's statements in Cadiz on January 31, 2006 in an act sponsored by the PP to start the campaign to gather support against the Catalan Statute.

<sup>29</sup> Statement of José María Aznar, the PP leader and president of the Spanish government between 1996 and 2004, in an interview with the Argentinian newspaper "La Nación". Retrieved on April 6, 2012 from [<http://www.lanacion.com.ar/736627-jose-maria-aznar-espana-esta-en-riesgo-de-balkanizacion>]

<sup>30</sup> This is obviously an oversimplification of the political confrontation that occurred over those years. Spanish parties and Catalan parties did not adopt monolithic stands regarding the reform of the Statute or the Constitutional Court Ruling. Neither did people adopt such clear-cut stances (see Béjar 2008, 101-102). As I have already mentioned, the PP leaders in Catalonia rejected the reform of the Statute, which they considered to be an unnecessary reform and to be against the Spanish Constitution. The Ciutadans platform, which would later become a political party and participate in the 2006 regional elections standing against Catalan nationalism, was also against the Statute. Within the PSOE, some leaders and, in particular, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the Spanish prime minister between 2004 and 2011, took a position in favor of the Statute. Other regional leaders of the PSOE were against it (i.e. Juan José Rodríguez Ibarra, Extremadura's regional president between 1982 and 2007, requested that the Catalan Statute proceedings be stopped in the Spanish parliament). The PSOE ended up supporting the Statute after some articles of the Statute submitted by the Catalan Parliament to the Spanish Parliament were modified. This said, it is worth highlighting that one of the main consequences of the cleavage was its ability to reduce the complexity of political competition to two sides: them and us, those who are in favor of the Statute reform and against the Constitutional Court Ruling (Catalonia and the Catalan people), and those who are against the Statute and for the Constitutional Court Ruling (Spain and the Spanish people).

Now, political parties' confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage does not take place in a vacuum. Confrontation is very often surrounded by campaigns that seek to make individuals' national identities salient by mobilizing individuals for or against a contested issue.<sup>31</sup> These campaigns, which are very often divisive campaigns, "accentuate group differences, heighten group consciousness of those differences, and promote ethnic group solidarity and political mobilization" (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, 148).

Media usually play a fundamental role in broadcasting these campaigns. Actually, television and radio broadcasters and, in particular, political commentators sometimes deepen the centre-periphery cleavage far beyond political leaders' statements.

In the next section, I illustrate the occurrence of *reactive* changes. The excerpts I present provide some clues that help us to understand how the activation of the center-periphery cleavage around particular issues affects interviewees' identification with Spain and Catalonia. Interviews reveal that those stances interviewees' perceive as affecting in some negative way their group identity provoke an emotional reaction, and either reinforce their identification, or cause changes. Whether individuals' identification is reaffirmed or change will depend on whether individuals have an exclusive Spanish or Catalan identification, or

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<sup>31</sup> In chapter 6, I already made reference to certain divisive campaigns which were promoted by the Spanish rightwing media or by the Popular Party itself: e.g. the 2004 boycott against the consumption of Catalan cava, the 2005 campaign in favour of the unity of the Spanish Civil War Archive and against the return of documents that had been confiscated by the Franco government to the government of Catalonia and to some Catalan families, or the 2006 gathering of signatures to organize a referendum against the Catalan Statute. Other campaigns or acts were organized in those years to mobilize people in favor the Statute: demonstrations with the motto "Som una nació, nosaltres decidim" and unofficial referendums for Catalan independence. These latter initiatives were also intended to reveal the deepening conflict between Spain and Catalonia.

whether they identify with both Spain and Catalonia, at least, to some extent. The interviewees' stories will also show that these stances, which are broadcast by the media, reach them directly or indirectly in a two-step flow of communication (Katz 1957).

Here, it is worth advancing that the issues referred to above did not only cause people's identification to be reaffirmed or to change. For some immigrants and second generations, the reform of the Statute did not have consequences on their feelings of identification with Spain or Catalonia, but it did reinforce their disaffection from Catalan politics (see quotes #8, #9 and #10 above). Individuals' prior interest in Catalan politics emerged here as a key moderating element. The analyses of the interviews as a whole suggest that when immigrants or second generations are very much politicized and pay attention to Catalan-specific issues, then stances or expressions of Catalan nationalism cause them to reaffirm their Spanish identification. On the contrary, when immigrants or second generations' are estranged from issues that are related to Catalan politics, confrontation on the aforementioned issues (i.e. the reform of the Statute, the Constitutional Court Ruling on the Statute, the referendums on the Catalonia independence, etc.) does not apparently alter their identification with Spain and Catalonia, but it does reinforce their estrangement from Catalan politics.

#### *7.4.2. Illustrating reactive changes*

The two following excerpts illustrate a process that led the interviewees to feel less Spanish and more Catalan, in the first case, and to reaffirm Catalan identification, in the second. In the first excerpt, I reproduce part of my conversation with Flor. Flor comes from a mixed family. Her father was from Catalonia, but her mother was originally from La Mancha. Flor was brought up in a bilingual environment in which their parents talked to her in Catalan, and her maternal grandmother, who lived with her family during her childhood, transmitted the Spanish language to her. In



the interview, she evokes the time when she protested against the killings of Manuel Fernández Márquez (a worker of the Besós Heat Station who was killed by the Guardia Civil in 1973) and Salvador Puig-Antich (1974). She also explains that she was a member of the CNT for many years. In her discourse, she appears to have experienced a process of *reactive change*. In her case, the Cava boycott, the Constitutional Court Ruling on the Statute and Catalonia's fiscal mistreatment are presented as the issues having caused her to change. She names these events as "serious attacks on the Catalan people" and to herself, as part of the Catalan people.

-I feel primarily Catalan. But I have some bonds of attachment to Spain because I have a part, part of my roots are from La Mancha and, I do not deny those roots. However, my Catalan part has been more attacked and, maybe because of that I have reacted, reaffirming it more.

-Would you say then that you ever felt more identified with Spain than you identify now?

-Yes, yes. No so many years ago I felt myself Catalan, but part of the Spanish State.

-And now, you don't feel that anymore?

-Now less and less.

-From when would you say?

-Maybe, in the last ten years [since 2002].

-For any reason?

-Yes. I remember that, before, when someone said that Spanish people had something against the Catalans, I told myself: "that's nonsense, how paranoid we are!" (...) But from some years ago... I remember I went to Zamora once to see my aunt, for a celebration. [She describes that she wanted to buy Cava in Zamora, a city in Castile, but that this was not possible because at that time there was a boycott against the Catalan Cava, and the shop assistants told her that they did not sell Cava from Catalonia] (...) So then, I started to listen to some things I had not wanted to listen to before. I started to listen to some radio stations I had never tuned in before. And then I thought: "oh my god! How can it be? How can it be that they speak like that about us, and that people accept it and they believe it?" And, later on, the Ruling on the Statute, and the attitude that the

central government had regarding Catalonia's financial system and other things, I consider these serious attacks on the Catalan people, so to us.

-Let's talk about that moment, the reform of the Statute. How did you live that period, politically speaking?

-Painful. First, the Court took a long time to pronounce a Ruling. Second, the way the PP behaved, that they acted afterwards as if they had done nothing. I found it embarrassing. I think that it was as a result of all these kinds of things I've been feeling less Spanish and more Catalan, let's say. Before I felt Catalan and Spanish at the same time, but now I feel less and less Spanish. [Quote #33, Interview #37, Flor, mixed couple child, born in 1949]

A similar process is experienced by Mari Antonia, the daughter of an autochthonous couple. Maria Antonia attended a public school at the time of Franco's dictatorship (between 1948 and 1958). She recalls singing the "Cara al Sol" and repeating phrases like: "What is democracy? It is the political system which is ruining the world". Maria Antonia learned to love Catalonia when she incidentally became involved in a group of Catholic scouts. In the scouts, she learned Catalan songs, a sense of homeland and Catalan history. In the course of the conversation, however, she introduces herself as a non-Catalanist, who is for a federal state.

-Would you say you identify as only Spanish, more Spanish than Catalan, as Spanish as Catalan, as more Catalan than Spanish, or only Catalan?

-More Catalan than Spanish.

-And, what would you say causes you to identify so?

-Now, I feel more Catalan for the misunderstanding. Now I have reaffirmed my Catalan identity. I have had to live in many parts of Spain because of my husband's work. I lived in Madrid, I lived in Almeria (...). And so, this lack of communication that many Catalans have had [with Spanish people] I have not ever experienced that. I made good friends everywhere, I felt welcome, I demystified much of what happened there ... but of course, now I do not see it like that. Now the positions are much more radicalized. I feel more Catalan because I love my traditions, I love my language, I love my

culture, but this does not mean I am also not part, because of the territory, of a larger country (...)

-You have told me that you have reaffirmed your identity. Since when did this happen?

-Since the PP majority government (2000-2004).

-Why? What happened then?

-Well there was a great campaign to discredit us: contempt, manipulation, and continuous attacks on everyone who appeared to be Catalan. Nor do I want to get into the politicians game, because they play with people's opinions, but I saw clearly that they were manipulating us, they were discrediting us and they were making us a clear minority. As we are now.

-And would you say that this caused you to change?

-It encouraged [my feelings] more, let's say. I became more aware.

-Before I thought, bah! It is the same everywhere. But it is not true. It is not the same (...) Even with some friends from Almería... I used to phone these friends every Christmas to learn how they were. Last time, the first thing they told me was "Listen, how is Carod<sup>32</sup>? And I answered: "Hey, I am calling to ask about your children, and I assume that you want to ask me about mine?" They have turned very "peperos".<sup>33</sup> They are very tense.

-So, would you say you feel more Catalan now than 15 years ago, let's say?

-Yes, of course, much more.

[Quote #34, Interview #36, Mari Antonia, native, born in 1944]

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<sup>32</sup> Josep Lluís Carod Rovira was the ERC leader between 2004 and 2008 and the vice-president of the second *Tripartit* government between 2006 and 2010. During those years, Carod Rovira became the main target of some Spanish political commentators because of some of the acts he was involved in or statements he made. In January 2004, Carod Rovira had a covert meeting with some representatives of the ETA terrorist group to exclude Catalonia and its citizens from ETA targets. The meeting was publicly aired some days later causing a crisis in the regional government. His stands in favor of Catalonia's independence, and a statement against Madrid's candidacy to host the Olympic Games in 2012, after the aspirations of the Catalanian hockey team to compete as a national team were frustrated, has been referred to as provoking the Spanish boycott of Catalan cava.

<sup>33</sup> Peperos is a pejorative way to refer to Partido Popular' supporters.

As Maria Antonia says, her reactive reaffirmation went back to the PP majority government (2000-2004).<sup>34</sup> But as in the case of Flor, Maria Antonia refers to the contempt, and to the attacks Catalan people have suffered. Unlike Flor, Mari Antonia's reactive change does not seem to have caused her to change her identification with Spain and Catalonia, but it has made it more salient, and it has reaffirmed it. Maria Antonia has not become pro-independence. Flor, on the contrary, explains that she has also changed her political preferences. In this regard, it could be stated that for many people these changes are politically consequential.

-What is the organization of the state you are more comfortable with, thinking about Spain and Catalonia?

-Until recently, a multinational state, like the United States, which respected each of the countries have their own laws, their own organization. I had never considered myself a secessionist. I was Catalanist, but I was not pro-secession. I must say that in recent times I have also shifted towards secessionism.

[Quote #35, Interview #37, Flor, mixed couple child, born in 1949]

As Mari Antonia's words show, political contestation can also affect individuals' relationships with out-group members. Similar clashes are often reported by people who were born in other regions of Spain when they go back to their regions of origin for holidays or to visit the part of their family that remains there. José Carlos, for example, explained to me that every time he goes back to his region of origin, he argues with his sister and his brother-in-law because they have an idea of Catalonia that is prevalent in the rest of Spain [the idea that Catalonia is always a problem for Spain].

Negative comments about Catalonia do not necessarily come from their own families, but from friends or acquaintances. These

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<sup>34</sup> In her study, Béjar (2008) has also found that the Partido Popular's attempt to reaffirm the Spanish national sentiment during its majority government, irritated many people.

kinds of comments are very often based on the idea that Catalonia is selfish, or on the idea that the Spanish language is forbidden or persecuted in Catalonia. Many of my interviewees attribute such comments to people's ignorance and to the lack of knowledge about Catalonia, as well as to Spanish broadcasters' manipulation of the information that people in Spain receive about Catalonia. In general, such comments annoy them and upset them. Some interviewees, however, consider that such comments are justified because they are reactions against Catalan nationalists' attitudes or policies (interviews #13 Antonio, and #14 Juan).

People's negative experiences with members of the out-group are very often interpreted as a confirmation of their prior belief. They cause them to reinforce their original identification, avoiding *identificational* change and fostering stability. This is the case of Antonio who, as reported above, became disillusioned with the nationalist drift that Catalan politics took after the transition to democracy.

"I asked once for a subvention to organize a play in Castilian, and I was denied it because the play was in Castilian, and the Catalan plays were subsidized" [Quote #36, Interview #13, Antonio, immigrant, born in 1951]

This reinforcing mechanism, which produces a reactive reaffirmation of individuals' prior-identification, operates in the two directions: it reinforces prior Spanish identification or prior Catalan identification. And it does not only operate among those who are of an immigrant origin, but it also operates among interviewees born in Catalonia when they interact with Spanish people.

"I try not to prejudge, but when my girlfriend and I are victims of prejudice, the truth is that that makes me angry. I remember, for example, we went to La Rioja, to Santo Domingo de la Calzada, and for a number of reasons we could not stay in the guesthouse where we had thought to stay. It was too late, so we went outside to a campsite. When we gave the receptionist my girlfriend's ID, the

guy's face physically changed and he said "Catalan?" We said "yes". He said "look, I have only this plot left". The plot was behind the toilet, on a slope, on top of an anthill." [Quote #37, Interview #30, Álvaro, second generation, born in 1976]

Another of my interviewees, Elia, who was born in Catalonia, but whose parents were from other regions of Spain, reports negative experiences at her work (she works for the Catalan branch of a Spanish company) or in her travels around Spain. Two of these negative experiences seem to have left a lasting mark upon her. The first one took place after the Atocha bombing on March 11, 2004. That day there was a co-worker from Madrid visiting Barcelona's branch.

"I remember he looked at us and said "This is Carod's [Josep Lluís Carod Rovira] responsibility". But he said it with such hate... See, I perceived such hatred, that I even broke into tears. I realized how much they hate us". [Quote #38, Interview #25, Elia, second generation, 1953]

The other experience was apparently less traumatic for her, but also very hurting. It happened during holidays in Cordoba. She and her husband went into Cordoba during the evening and her child, a teenager, stayed at the rural house they had hired for the holidays. When they got back from Cordoba, they found their daughter outside the house, because she had left and had forgotten the keys inside.

"There was a house a little bit isolated and, again, the same kind of jokes: Well, if you want to come in, even though you are Catalans, we will allow you to come in" [Quote #39, Interview #25, Elia, second generation, 1953]

Such negative experiences with out-group members reinforce interviewees' alienation from Catalonia (in the case of interviewee #13 Antonio) and from Spain (in the case of interviewees #30 Álvaro and #25 Elia), forge a reactive identification and foster

stability. Experiences of positive interactions, however, are selectively filtered or not taken into consideration.

In any case, immigrants can also experience reactive changes towards a more Catalan oriented-identification. The following excerpt from my interview with José Carlos shows that he has felt more Catalan, the more he perceived the Spanish media or Spanish people were attacking Catalonia. He refers to this change as a “defensive syndrome”.

-And, may I ask you, how do you feel: only Spanish, more Spanish than Catalan, as Spanish as Catalan, more Catalan than Spanish or only Catalan?

-Well, for a long time I felt as Spanish as Catalan, equally. But right now, I almost feel more Catalan than Spanish.

-And why would you say this is so?

-Well, as things have developed, I feel as if, I don't know. When I hear politicians or Spanish nationalists, it is as if..., I feel as if they attacked Catalonia, and that makes me be more Catalan, to say something. I don't know. It is like a defensive syndrome, I don't know. But the truth is that, sometimes, when you hear some statements...

-From whom?

-From people, Spanish politicians, or well, in Intereconomía [a far-right TV channel] I only see the clips that appear on the zapping shows, but with that I have enough (...)

-But do you still feel Spanish in some way?

-Well, the truth is that I feel less Spanish now, at most from Aragon.

-From Aragon, because I love it. I have not denied the fact that I am from Aragon, from the cradle. But the “Españolismo” does not attract me much. Because when you hear some people who say “those Catalan nationalist”, those who say so are, in turn, Spanish nationalists, and that never counts. [Quote #40, Interview #18, José Carlos, immigrant, born in 1950]

Change can also occur in the other direction (towards a more Spanish identification) as the case of Andrés shows. Andrés is the son of a mixed couple. However, even if his mother was born in Catalonia, his mother's parents were from Almeria and she cannot

speak Catalan correctly. Although he has always spoken Spanish to his parents and brother, he made the decision to speak Catalan to his wife (the daughter of a mixed couple herself). Andrés grew up in a city with a high percentage of Spanish immigrants, close to Barcelona. His contact with autochthonous was very limited until he went to university, where he was involved in politics and became a member of the *Esquerra Unida i Alternativa* (EUiA).<sup>35</sup> As he explains it, his involvement in politics has much to do with the fact that his father worked at the SEAT factory and was very close to the *Comisiones Obreras* (CC.OO) trade union and the PSUC. Andrés campaigned in favor of the Statute, partly because the party he is member of campaigned in favor of the Statute. However, over those years, he became disappointed with the *Tripartit* government. According to his tale, the *Tripartit* put so much effort on the reform of the Statute that this issue end-up frustrating a left-oriented project in Catalonia and, beyond this, his own expectations of the *Tripartit* government. As a result of this:

“Now I exaggerate more my nationality, without being irrational, which is what you can never do. But, now, I even see the Spanish flag sympathetically, when I never experienced that in the past.”  
[Quote #41, Interview #20, Andrés, child of a mixed couple, born in 1975]

Parallel to this change, Andrés has also changed his preferences regarding the territorial organization of the state to the point that he even agrees with the *Ciutadans*’ Political Party stances in these issues (“I sometimes “*Ciudadaneo*” a little bit”).

“If some people have become pro-independence [as a result of the Statute reform], I have approached more centralist positions”.  
[Quote #42, Interview #20, Andrés, child of a mixed couple, born in 1975]

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<sup>35</sup> EUiA is a left wing Catalan political party which was created in 1998. It comes from the PSUC and the *Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya*. Since 2002, EUiA is part of the coalition *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds – Esquerra Unida I Alternativa*.



According to Andrés' story, his change is a reaction to the approach that "many people" adopted regarding the reform of the Statute.

"I was annoyed because many people considered it as a pre-constitution. I was annoyed because self-determination is very often understood as only one part [separatists] does what they want without counting on the other part [those who are not separatist]" [Quote #43, Interview #20, Andrés, child of a mixed couple, born in 1975]

The regressive process that Andrés seems to have experienced in his identification with Catalonia is similar to the process experienced by Antonio (quote #13, interview #13) years ago. Both Andrés and Antonio have reaffirmed their Spanish identification in a reactive way. They have responded against Catalan nationalism or against pro-independence campaigns that, as they explained to me, receive "disproportionate" media coverage, while the preferences of the population of an immigrant origin are not taken into account.

Now, beyond the changes described so far –apparently, enduring changes – change can be more circumstantial and less enduring. This seems to be the case of the following interviewee, to which I have already referred above. When the Statute was being negotiated in the Spanish Parliament, Juan José was abroad on an Erasmus stay. There he met other Catalan and Spanish students with whom he talked about the Statute issue.<sup>36</sup>

-There were people from other parts of Spain, from Madrid or Andalusia, who took an anti-Catalan attitude, in the sense that... I think that this issue was not well sold, not from one side, not from

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<sup>36</sup> The negotiations over the reform of the Statute of Catalonia mobilized not only people in Catalonia, but also people from outside Catalonia. Very often the Statute of Catalonia monopolized conversations outside Catalonia and, as the following excerpt from my conversation with Juan José reflects, this had consequences on individuals' identification.

the other, right? But their comments were a bit..., they said things like: you are part of a people who want independence (...). They resented it. In the end, they used connotations and stereotypes like the Catalans are mean, unsupportive (...). I had never felt strange being Catalan, and then I thought: I am Catalan.

-Did this bother you?

-Yes, it bothered me, while I was staying abroad that bothered me. Then here, as I caught up a little more with the subject, I did not feel upset anymore. But, yes, there, I was annoyed, because we were speaking about it everyday. Let's say I had to go outside Catalonia to feel Catalan (...) I had to live abroad for me to feel Catalan. Because at the end of the day, if we are all bad people, then I felt a little bit Catalan. I mean I feel Catalan, but there I felt more. I felt much more. [Quote #44, Interview #38, Juan José, second generation, born in 1983]

As I have already described above, Juan José is a second-generation young man with an ambivalent identification with Spain and Catalonia. Although he was born in Catalonia, he feels mainly Spanish because his familial and cultural referents are all Spanish. However, out of his familial context, when his Catalan identification was attacked, he also reacted reaffirming it. When he returned to Catalonia after his six months Erasmus stay, he "very quickly caught up with what was happening". When I asked him in the interview (which took place in 2012) whether he voted for or against the referendum on the Statute, he told me that he did not remember, although he did remember voting against Catalan independence in the referendum that took place in Barcelona in April 11th, 2011.

As argued in previous chapter, media have a fundamental role when channeling political parties, and elites' stances regarding contested issues. Besides this, television and radio broadcasters and, in particular, political commentators sometimes contribute to the conflict deepening. Many of my interviewees, for example,

referred to the negative role that the Cope radio station and Tele Madrid channel played during the Statute reform.<sup>37</sup>

“There was a lot of tension, it was a shame that Mr. Rajoy went to Andalusia putting a table in the markets and... I saw TV clips in which you saw a couple saying “Is this against the Catalan Statute?” “Ah, so this is against the Catalans, then yes, I will sign” [M<sup>a</sup> Carmen is here referring to the same news story that was mentioned above in interview # 20 Álvaro] Are they stupid? In Catalonia, there are people who vote for the PP, all sorts of people, right? But I mean, this malicious way to create division covertly, and not so covertly. Subtly, they wanted to predispose people against us... And I don’t know what they thought the Statute was. Of course, there was misinformation and manipulation. There were times when the COPE was day after day filled with an incendiary discourse, always against the Catalans, and the truth is that I felt very uncomfortable. Very uncomfortable, to the point that even if I am not for the Catalonia’s secession, I now realize that they [the PP, the COPE] were promoting it. I mean they were forcing people to be pro-seccionist!” [Quote #45, Interview #36, Mari Antonia, autochthonous, born in 1944].

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<sup>37</sup> The Cope is a radio station own by the Spanish Catholic church. Between 2003 and 2009, Federico Jiménez Losantos directed and presented a morning program on the COPE. As a political commentator, he has always argued against Catalonia’s linguistic policies, which he argues are discriminatory for Spanish speakers. He opposed the Catalan Statute, among other reasons, because it questioned the Spanish nation. During some years, the COPE was not allowed to broadcast in Catalonia. The regional government did not renew its broadcasting license because the radio station did not fulfill the laws regarding broadcasting in the Catalan language. Tele Madrid is the public television channel of the region of Madrid. This channel has also broadcast controversial documentaries that claimed that the Spanish language was being persecuted in Catalonia. These documentaries spread around on the Internet so everybody could have access to them. Tele Madrid cannot be watched in Catalonia.

Yet, when asked about the radio station or TV channels interviewees listen to or watch the news on most often, they very often state they do not listen to those radio stations or watch those TV channels they accuse of promoting confrontation. Negative stands against the Statute or, more generally, against Catalonia, made by out-group elites, out-group political commentators or simply by the Spanish people reach people in Catalonia in two different ways: in a two-step flow of communication or through “clips” from other broadcasters which were reproduced on Catalan radio or television. In the first case, negative-framed messages broadcast by the media first reach “intermediaries” who pass on these statements to their friends, relatives or co-workers (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Katz 1957).

“People told me things that I thought were not possible, but I didn’t want to listen to the COPE” [Quote #46, Interview #37, Flor, child of a mixed couple, born in 1949]

On some occasions, interviewees checked themselves whether these things they had been told by friends or relatives were actually true. In these cases, they themselves tuned into these radio stations or TV channels.

“So, then one day, while I was driving I decided to change the radio station and I turned on the COPE and I thought: Oh my God! How can it be? How can it be that they speak like that about us, and that people accept it and they believe it?” [Quote #47, Interview #20, Flor, child of a mixed couple, born in 1949]

“Sometimes, I watch radical things against me [radical broadcasters which have an ideological outlook opposite to him]. For example, I watch Intereconomía [a far-right TV broadcaster since 2008] and I go to bed with a high degree of alteration (laughing)” [Quote #47, Interview #28, Robert, autochthonous, born in 1968]

Yet, selective exposure to one-side information does not prevent interviewees from receiving negative-framed messages

against Catalonia. On the contrary, negative messages or negative claims regarding the in-group also stem from the media they consume and, in particular, from Catalan broadcasters. Many of my interviewees refer, for example, to those TV “shows” on the Catalan TV that consist of putting together “clips” of programs from other television channels. These programs sometimes selectively reproduce the negative statements made by political leaders or political commentators about Catalonia or about other issues related to Catalan politics.<sup>38</sup>

“Sometimes there are shows... In Telemadrid, specifically, there is such a great hate that when you see those clips on TV, they produce aggression in you” [Quote #48, Interview #25, Elia, second generation, born in 1953]

-The truth is that sometimes, when you hear certain statements....  
-From whom?  
-From people, Spanish politicians, or well, on Intereconomía, I only see the clips which appear on those programs which show clips from other programs, but that’s enough [...]  
[Quote #49, Interview #18, José Carlos, immigrant, born in 1951]

In addition, interviewees also referred to talk shows in which commentators discuss the political news, and mobilize people in favor of the Statute and against the Constitutional Court Ruling.

“I use to listen to RAC 1 [a Catalan radio station]. Every morning there is a talk show on politics, and before the Ruling they followed the status of the Catalan Statute in the Constitutional Court. They followed it so, well, this issue gets under your skin and when it explodes, you are already heated” [Quote #50, Interview #29, Sara, second generation, born in 1980]

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<sup>38</sup> Clips from Catalan television programs are also shown on some Spanish rightwing channels (especially, Intereconomía). However, none of my interviewees made reference to them.

Radio and television broadcasters are also being selective when broadcasting the news, and favoring certain issues over others. Andrés, for example, complained that while the demonstration organized to protest against the Constitutional Court Ruling of the Statute, or the unofficial referendum on Catalonia independence in Arenys de Munt received very wide coverage on Catalan public television, the celebration of the national soccer team's victory in the FIFA World Cup was not properly covered. According to Andrés, this shows that Catalan elites and the Catalan media intentionally provide a biased portrayal of Catalan society.

“Before the demonstration of the Statute [“Som una nació, nosaltres decidim”], there was another demonstration, and it was clear that this demonstration had a broad [Catalan] nationalistic content. And it was clear that there were people from Catalunya Radio, Jordi Basté... It was clear that he was trying to rally people to that demonstration.... It seems clear that the latest demonstration in favor of the Statute, it was also supported by the media... I think it is obvious that the TV [Catalan Public Television] connected all the time with that demonstration. I am not stupid, nobody is. It is self-evident” [Quote #51, Interview #20, Andrés, son of mixed couple, born in 1976]

In the previous chapter, I showed that the effect of individuals' exposure to Catalan television was significantly more important than the effect of exposure to Spanish television in explaining changes in individuals' national identification. The interviewees' stories regarding the role of the media suggest that Catalan television makes a greater contribution to channeling the cleavage and mobilizing viewers' Catalan identification.

All in all, the excerpts presented here illustrate a mechanism that connects the activation of the center-periphery cleavage with changes in individuals' national identification. The reform of the Statute of Catalonia and the Constitutional Court Ruling on the Statute are only two of the many issues that have confronted Spanish and Catalan political parties over the last thirty years.

Party leaders' opposite stances on these issues make the cleavage salient. The media broadcast negative statements regarding the group or regarding the group's interests, which have been previously defined by Spanish and Catalan parties. Confrontation and divisiveness has a polarizing and backlash effect. People receives these negative-frame stances directly or indirectly and they react to the mobilization of the cleavage in two ways: either by reaffirming their exclusive Catalan or Spanish identification, when they have a very strong and crystallized identification; or by prioritizing their identification with the group which they perceive is being attacked or mistreated, when they hold dual identifications. In the first case, the activation of the cleavage reinforces individuals' identification. In the second case, it causes change.

This effect might be even more important on generations which were exposed to higher levels of confrontation during their "impressionable years", as Sara (interview #29) and Álvaro's (interview #29) cases suggest. For this generation, these issues might become catalysts for pre-adult socialization (Sears and Valentino 1997). Of course, this does not deny the possibility that over the years, the identification of these individuals can change; however, as long as these events remain deep in their minds, it might be more difficult for a change to occur.

Finally, polarization and divisiveness around the cleavage can have a secondary effect on some people's identification. For those individuals who are disaffected from Catalan politics, political elites' confrontation along the cleavage can cause them to end up "feeling less Spanish, and less Catalan" (Interview #14 Carlos, child of a mixed couple, born in 1972).

The following table summarizes the findings of the analyses of the interviews.

Table 7.5 Reactive change and reactive reaffirmation in national identification

|  | Reactive effects on national identification   |   |   | Other outcomes   |   |
|--|---|---|---|--|---|
|  | Change in Spanish direction (previously felt both Spanish and Catalan) <sup>1</sup> | Reaffirmation of Catalan identification                               | Change in Catalan direction (previously felt both Spanish and Catalan) <sup>1</sup> | Reinforce alienation from Catalan-specific issues              | No reactive change reported in the interviews                               |
| Autochthonous                                    |   | #17 Clara<br>#28 Robert<br>#34 Asunción<br>#36 M <sup>a</sup> Antonia | #16 Jordi<br>#37 Flor   |  | #21 Pere<br>#31 Marc<br>#33 Rafael  |
| Second Generations and children of mixed couples | #20 Andrés  | # 25 Elia<br># 29 Sara<br># 30 Álvaro                                 | #11 Fátima<br>#19 Anna  | #12 Alicia<br>#15 Carlos<br>#20 Andrés<br>#23 Eva<br>#26 Elena | #1 Arancha<br>#3 Bernat<br>#7 Miguel  |
| Immigrants                                       | #13 Antonio   | #5 Mari Tere  | #18 José Carlos<br>#38 Juan José (no lasting effect)                                | #10 Dolores<br>#22 Milagros<br>#27 Angela                      | #2 Pedro<br>#4 Ana<br>#6 Fernando<br>#8 Sandra<br>#32 Victor<br>#35 Enrique |

Notes <sup>1</sup>: These interviewees felt both Spanish and Catalan in different degrees. Changes in the Spanish direction are more common when individuals feel both Spanish and Catalan but still are more Spanish oriented and vice versa.



### **7.5. A brief note on the national identification saliency**

Even though this dissertation has examined self-categorization and not saliency, I would like to make a brief comment on this issue. In chapter two, I already mentioned that individuals identify with different social categories (e.g. gender, ethnicity, nationality, religion), and that the salience of national identification over other forms of identification is contingent on the broader social context.

In the context of Catalonia, the center-periphery cleavage makes national identity a highly salient form of identification. Now, as I have argued in this dissertation, there have been moments when conflict regarding issues which confronted Spanish and Catalan political parties (e.g. the negotiation of language policies in the Catalan parliament, the reform of the Catalan Statute, or the Constitutional Court Ruling on the new Catalan Statute, etc.) have caused the salience of this form of identification to increase.

However, the salience of individuals' identification with the nation varies. And this has become evident in some of the interviews, even though all of them were framed as being focused on the issue of national identity.

“When you wake up in the morning, do you wake up thinking about whether you are Catalan or Spanish? No. You are thinking that you have to go to work, or about your kid's kindergarten.” [Quote #52, Interview #20, Andrés, child of mixed couple, born in 1975]

The greater relevance of role identities (as worker, as parent) vis à vis national identity does not imply that respondents do not have a national identity. Although some of the interviewees did not feel comfortable or avoided classifying themselves as Catalan or Spanish when I directly asked them about it.

“I consider myself from the world, a human being, a person from the world, from the Planet Earth. And I am not going to categorized myself using any nationality.” [Quote #53, Interview #23, Eva, second generation, born in 1941]

“The truth is that I do not have a feeling of belonging. I don’t feel... When people speaks about Spain, exacerbating their feelings, or about Catalonia, or Barcelona... I do not feel this. I feel that I am more an inhabitant of the planet, someone who wants to live in, who wants that people in the world understand each other” [Quote #54, Interview #27, Angela, immigrant, born in 1958]

“I do not feel Catalan, or Castilian, or Spanish, right? So if someone asks me, are you from this nation or from this other nation? Well, no. And there are many people like me. And I know many people who do not feel (...). I think most people or at least most of the people with whom I relate make no difference, nation, country, whatever.” [Quote #55, Interview #22, Milagros, immigrant, born in 1956]

Moreover, in some interviews it became clear that even though people had preferences regarding nation-related issues (i.e self-determination, secession), they gave greater importance to issues that were related to the left-right cleavage.

“For me there are much more important things than secession. I do not want the secession of Catalonia if there are still social inequalities, income inequalities. If this is so, Catalonia’s secession is useless to me.” [Quote #56, Interview #19, Anna, child of mixed couple, born in 1981]

This position contrasts with the position of other interviewees who claim to frame everything in national terms.

“[When I think about politics] I always place myself on the national question” [Quote #57, Interview #31, Marc, autochthonous, born in 1983]

Or those who interpreted every question from the interview in national terms, as becomes clear from the following excerpt of one of my interviews:

-I would like you to think about a political event, national or international, which you think has been important in recent history.

- Well, it would make me happy to vote for Catalan independence.
  - But this is something that has not yet happened.
  - Well, yes, but there has been a movement. In some villages, it has already been done.
  - Are you referring to the self-determination referendums?
  - Of course, (...).
  - Ok, and now, can you mention an international event that has been important in recent history?
  - You know what we really commemorate on September 11th. People think that it is a celebration, oh great! When we lost everything, on September 11th. So, well, I know that it will be very difficult to get secession from Spain, but I do not feel myself valued [as Catalan], and since I do not feel myself valued I would vote for the secession of Catalonia”.
- [Quote #58, Interview #25, Elia, second generation, born in 1953]

Generally, those interviewees who have a more Catalan oriented identification are also those whose national identification seems to be more salient. The asymmetry in the distribution of political parties along the cleavage, and the fact that only the Popular Party and, more recently, the Ciutadans mobilize Spanish identification could account for these differences.

## **7.6. Conclusions**

In chapter 3, I tracked the evolution of identification with Spain and Catalonia from 1984 to 2010. The depiction of aggregate national identification revealed different processes of changes: a progressive slight decrease in the percent of immigrants who feel primarily Spanish, a progressive (see table 3.10) and more significant decrease in the percent of autochthonous who feel “as Spanish as Catalan” (see table 3.11) and fluctuations between the “as Spanish as Catalan”, the “more Spanish than Catalan” and the “only Catalan” categories (see figures 3.1 and 3.2)

This dissertation has tried to account for the individual changes which lie behind these aggregate changes. Although in

the previous chapters I have examined both long-term and short-term changes in national identification, my genuine interest in this dissertation has been to shed light over the causes of short-term changes (period changes). In this regard, over the dissertation I have tried to provide some evidence in favor of my main hypothesis: political parties' activation of the center-periphery cleavage alters individuals' national identification.

This chapter has illustrated two kinds of processes: processes of *identificational* assimilation and *stability* and processes of *reactive reaffirmation* and *reactive change*. While *identificational assimilation* has been presented as the result of long-term processes with many intervening variables, *reactive changes* have been argued to be motivated by a more direct cause: the activation of the national cleavage by political parties and political elites.

Making use of qualitative materials collected in thirty-eight semi-structured interviews, I have illustrated the occurrence of both long-term and short-term changes in national identification.

The excerpts from the interviews suggest that immigrants' attachment to Catalonia is based on their lived experiences in Catalonia, and that this attachment is very often less deeply rooted than their attachment to their places of origin. The development of this attachment has sometimes led to immigrants and second generations' Catalanization (ideological assimilation). Catalanization can occur in different ways. It can involve immigrants assimilating linguistically, and recognizing the Catalan nation and its symbols, without losing their original identification (quote #2 interview #4 Ana). But it can also mean that they lose their original identification with Spain, recognize Catalonia's national character and support Catalonia's right for self-determination, without having assimilated linguistically (quote #16 interview #18 José Carlos).

On other occasions, immigrants' and second generations attachment to Catalonia does not preclude a sentiment of disaffection from Catalan politics (quote #8 interview #22 Milagros, quote #9 interview #23 Eva, quote #10 interview #38 Juan José) or, even more, a feeling that their national positions are

not being properly represented (quote #11 interview #24 Isabel, quote #12 interview #14 Juan). This latter feeling can possibly explain why some individuals experience a regression in their identification with Catalonia and reaffirm their original Spanish identification (quote #13 interview #13 Antonio, quote #41 interview #20 Andrés).

Interviews with parents and children from the same family and with second generations also show that children's attachment with Spain is shaped through direct and indirect conditioning. Immigrant parents intentionally or unintentionally try to retain their children's attachment to Spain (quote #2 interview #4 Ana, quote #31 interview #13 Antonio, interview #35 Enrique). However, immigrant parents can also transmit their attachment to Catalonia to their children's. Thus, even though second generations' identification as Catalans is very often based on their origin; their emotional attachment to Catalonia can be also inherited from their parents. This usually happens when the first generation has experienced an *identificational* switch.

The interviews have also revealed that second generations sometimes radically shift their identification in relation to their parents' (Interviews #29 Sara, #30 Álvaro). Although these shifts seem to be related to the experience or to their exposure to particular events (e.g. the reform of the Statute, the gathering of signatures organized by the PP, the Constitutional Court Ruling on the Statute, etc), further research should be done to learn how the political context interacts with individual characteristics to produce inter-generational changes.

The overall analyses of the interviews have shown that individuals' response to political parties' activation of the national cleavage and reaffirm their identifications, when they hold crystallized and exclusive identifications (e.g. interviews #5 Mari Tere, #24 Isabel, #25 Elia, quote #34 interview #36 Mari Antonia), or change their prior identifications with Spain and Catalonia, when they hold dual identifications (quote #13 interview #13 Antonio, quote 33 interview #37 Flor, quote #40 interview #18 José Carlos, quote #41 interview #20 Andrés).

The analysis of the interviews has also shown that individuals who feel both Spanish and Catalan, but have a more Catalan oriented identification are more susceptible to experience these kinds of *reactive* changes (see table 7.5). Conversely, those who feel both Spanish and Catalan, but have a more Spanish oriented identification very often feel alienated from Catalan-specific issues. Only those individuals who are more Spanish oriented and are, at the same time, very involved in politics seem to be affected negatively by expressions of Catalan nationalism (interviews #13 Antonio and #20 Andrés).

The interviews with individuals from different profiles have also shown that change in national identification is sometimes accompanied by changes in individuals' political preferences and, in particular, in their preferences for the territorial organization of the state and Catalonia's independence (Interview #18 José Carlos, quote #42 interview #20 Andrés, quote #35 interview #37 Flor).

Individuals' responses in surveys are snapshots that reflect what individuals' feel at the moment they are surveyed. The panel data used in a previous chapter showed that some individuals felt differently in 2001/02 than they felt in 2004 or 2005. My contention is that these differences reflect *reactive* changes that occurred as a result of political elites' activation of the cleavage.

Lacking an instrument that permits me to check individuals' reaction to political elites' stances on issues related to the cleavage, here I have proposed a plausible mechanism to explain how political elites' statements, actions or policies affect individuals' identification. Focusing on the reform of the Catalan Statute and the Constitutional Court Ruling on the Statute as examples, I have argued that both Spanish and Catalan political elites provide an identity frame for these issues. Elites' stances reach people either through a two-step flow of communication or directly through their exposure to one-side information. Individuals' perceptions that political elites' statements or actions are an attack on the group they identify provoke an emotional reaction. As a result, when individuals have dual identifications

they react re-affirming their identification with the group they feel is being attacked or mistreated, and losing their identification with the other group in case they were somehow attached to it.

Individual changes do not necessarily occur from one day to the other, and their durability might depend on the importance of the event or the intensity of the divisive campaign that triggers it. Yet, when *reactive* changes are numerically important and they occur in the same direction (or the number of changes which occur in one direction is greater than the number of changes which occur in the other direction), then we should observe aggregate fluctuations.

## **CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS**

### **8.1. Main findings and contributions**

In this section I will go over the main findings of this research and I will highlight its main contributions. This dissertation has sought to improve our knowledge on the factors that lie behind change in national identification, particularly, in contexts in which there is a center-periphery cleavage. In doing so, the present study generally contributes to a growing literature that is concerned with the study of identity change and, more specifically, national identity change.

In the dissertation, I have offered a conceptual and analytical framework for the study of individual change in national identification (chapter 2). In line with Brubaker and Cooper (2000), I have proposed to center research on individual identification, which is easier to operationalize than identity, and I have provided a definition of the concept of national identification. I have argued that national identification is anchored in two elements: the nation's territorial character and its political nature. These two elements make individuals' identification with the nation different from other forms of identification and, ethnic identification in particular.

The chapter has also contended that previous research dealing with the issue of identity change has tackled different dimensions of change, without explicitly stating it. This has introduced some conceptual confusion and it has limited the advance of research on this issue. In order to overcome this shortcoming, I have proposed



distinguishing between four different dimensions along which change can occur (self-categorization, content, salience and intensity).

In chapter 2, I have also elaborated on the grounds or conditions that render change in these different dimensions possible. Here, I have referred to institutional changes that entail either a redefinition of the national boundaries or a change in the nation's symbolic referents; to events such as wars or natural catastrophes; to the existence of a repertoire of nations with which individuals can identify; or to other individual circumstances, such as immigration and conscription.

All in all, the conceptual and analytical framework that I have provided in the dissertation leaves us in a better position to cope with the study of the causes and consequences of individual change in national identification.

As concerns the main research question –What lies behind change in national identification in contexts in which there is a center-periphery cleavage?–, this dissertation has offered an alternative and complementary explanation to the decentralization argument. Previous studies have argued that in multinational countries, political decentralization lies behind aggregate changes in national identification (Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2009; Guibernau 2006, 2007). Individuals' exposure to regional institutions' actions and interactions with them account for the gradual increase of regional oriented identification and the progressive decrease of identification with the overarching state. While the decentralization explanation accounts for the long-term trends observed in aggregate national identification, the explanation I have proposed here provides a better account for the fluctuations that are observed when national identification is tracked over time.

Building on the in-depth analysis of the Catalan case, I have argued that change in national identification is driven by political parties' activation of the center-periphery cleavage. Although the center-periphery conflict structures political competition in a permanent way, there are some periods in which a particular

policy or issue (e.g. language policies, the Statute reform, etc.) exacerbates the conflict. Individuals react to political parties' stances on these issues by updating their identification. When individual changes occur in the same direction (or the changes which occur in one direction are greater than the changes which occur in the other direction) and when these changes are numerically important, then a period change in the aggregate identification with Spain and Catalonia is observed.

This argument has been tested in different ways, making use of different sources of data, and both quantitative and qualitative techniques.

In chapter 4, I have analyzed longitudinal cross-sectional data to learn whether changes in the political context have been associated with the aggregate changes described in chapter 3. Two hypotheses have been posed and tested in chapter 4: first, aggregate levels of identification with Catalonia have increased when Catalan nationalist parties' incentives to activate the cleavage have been greater, and have decreased when nationalist parties' incentives to activate the conflict have been lower. Second, Spanish and Catalan parties' conflict over cleavage-related issues have affected individuals' identification and fostered polarization.

Regarding the first hypothesis, I have argued that the CiU has had greater incentives to activate the cleavage to maximize nationalist vote in the next election when this party bargaining power was low (i.e. when the PSOE and the PP held a majority in the Spanish parliament, or when the PSOE has resorted to the support of other small parliamentary parties). Conversely, the CiU has had fewer incentives to do so when it has been crucial to forming majorities in the Spanish parliament, and its capabilities to influence legislative production (and to get some kind of compensation in exchange for its support) have increased.

Regarding the second hypothesis, I have argued that the effect of confrontation between political parties has been different depending on individuals' prior-identification. In particular, I have argued that when confrontation has increased identification with

Catalonia has been reinforced among Catalan-oriented individuals. On the contrary, confrontation has contributed to reinforcing Spanish identification among Spanish-oriented individuals. As longitudinal cross-sectional data did not allow me to examine the heterogeneous effects of political confrontation conditioning on individuals' prior identification, in these analyses I proxied prior-identification by individuals' family origins.

The results of chapter 4 have yielded mixed results. It has been shown that during the period in which the CiU supported the PSOE minority government, identification with Catalonia declined. However, a similar effect was not found for the period during which the CiU supported the PP minority government (although the sign of the coefficient was in the expected direction). Now, as concerns to the period during which the PSOE ruled with the alternative support of minority parties, the results of the hierarchical analyses have show that the average identification with Catalonia has not been significantly different from the period when the PSOE and the PP were majority in the Parliament.

Also the level of confrontation between Catalan and Spanish parties on issues related to the center-periphery conflict was found to matter. And so, autochthonous' identification with Catalonia has strengthened, and second generations' has weakened when confrontation has grown higher. Although the effect of confrontation has not been found to be significant in the immigrants and the children of mixed couples, the sign of the coefficient is in the expected direction. Altogether, these results suggest that high levels of confrontation polarize individuals' identification.

A second test of the dissertation's main argument has been provided in chapter 6. This time the analyses have relied on a panel study (*Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya*) that covered a highly contested period of time during negotiations over the new Catalan Statute. The use of panel data has allowed dealing with some of the problems of cross-sectional data and has provided evidence on the occurrence of individual short-time changes.

In this regard, the descriptive analyses in chapter 6 have shown that twenty-three percent of those who self-identified as “as Spanish as Catalan” in 2001/02 switched their national identification in 2004. Although the magnitude of individual change was lower between 2004 and 2005, it was still surprisingly important for a one-year period. Eighteen percent of those who felt as Spanish as Catalan in 2004 have changed their identification when they were re-interviewed the following year. In this later case, change was evenly distributed among those who made a switch in the Spanish direction and those who made a switch in the Catalan direction. As a consequence, aggregate change was significantly low between those two years: changes in one direction were cancelled out by changes in the other direction.

After the descriptive analyses, chapter 6 has got back to the main argument of the dissertation and has argued that regional and national televisions channel political confrontation and mobilize viewers’ regional or national identification, respectively. Now, taking into account that the relationship between individuals’ Spanish (or Catalan) identification and exposure to one-side information from Spanish (or Catalan) television is endogenous, I have tested this hypothesis among those individuals who felt “as Catalan as Spanish” in  $t_1$  (2004).

The chapter has also tested the hypotheses that party identification orients individuals’ identification, especially when a cleavage-related issue centers partisan debate and political parties adopt clear-cut positions on the conflict. The cognitive connectedness between individuals’ positions regarding the cleavage and their identification with Spain or Catalonia, along with individuals’ need to conform their position to the party’s they felt close to are the assumptions behind this expectation.

The results of these analyses have shown that exposure to Catalan television news has a strong influence on individuals’ identification: it prevents change in the Spanish direction and fosters change in the Catalan direction. Nevertheless, a similar effect has not been found for the Spanish television. Evidence from the qualitative interviews suggests that Catalan television has

a greater ability to channel the cleavage and to mobilize its viewers' Catalan identification. As illustrated in the qualitative chapter, Catalan television channeled conflict in two ways: by giving more coverage to initiatives or acts in which Catalan identification was mobilized and, more importantly, by selectively transmitting claims made against Catalonia by Spanish politicians or Spanish broadcasters political commentators.

Moreover, and contrary to my expectations, the chapter findings provide limited evidence in favor of the hypothesis that party identification cues national identification when the cleavage is highly salient. A possibly explanation to this finding, which challenges Dancey and Goren's (2010) findings, could be that in Catalonia individuals' attachments to parties are looser and, accordingly, individuals are less constrained to conform their national identification to the political party they feel close to. Evidence regarding the weakness of partisan identification in other European countries suggests that this might be a plausible explanation for this non-finding (Fleury and Lewis-Beck 201). In addition, and in agreement with some of the interview discourses, we could state that identification shifts are not caused by individuals' preferred party claims, but by other political parties' messages against one's group identity.

Finally, the qualitative chapter (chapter 7) has also dealt with the argument that individuals' identification with Spain and Catalonia is shaped in relation to political elites' activation of the center-periphery cleavage. Making use of qualitative information collected in thirty-eight interviews conducted with individuals from different backgrounds and with different profiles, chapter 7 has illustrated the mechanism that causally connects political confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage and individual change in national identification. This mechanism, I contend, is generalizable to other contexts in which deep political cleavages structure political competition.

The excerpts presented in chapter 7 provide evidence suggesting that negative identity framed messages made by political elites reach individuals directly (by exposure to one-side

information) or indirectly (through a two-step flow of communication). Individuals' perception that their group identity is being attacked provokes an emotional reaction that is contingent on individuals' prior identification. When individuals feel exclusively Spanish or exclusively Catalan, they *react reaffirming* these identifications. Conversely, when people identify with both Spain and Catalonia, they prioritize their identification with the group they perceive as being mistreated and weaken their identification with the elite group making the negative-framed claim. In this way, confrontation has a polarizing effect on individuals' identification.

Although the qualitative evidence has suggested that processes of *reactive reaffirmation* and *reactive change* are more common among the autochthonous and children of mixed couples, or among individuals who had a more Catalan oriented identification, *reactive reaffirmation* and *reactive change* has also occurred among immigrants and second generations who had a more Spanish oriented identification. In this case, individuals react mainly against expressions of Catalan nationalism. Moreover, evidence from the qualitative interviews have also suggested that some immigrants and second generations' belief that Catalan-specific issues receive disproportionate attention has reinforced their disaffection with Catalan politics and the feeling that their positions are not properly represented.

Beyond the argument that individual change in national identification is driven by political parties' or political elites' activation of the center-periphery cleavage, this dissertation has also examined other questions related to the issue of *identificational* change: the *identificational assimilation* of immigrants and second generations, and the intra-generational transmission of national identification within Catalan families.

Regarding the first question, in chapter 4, I have analyzed whether Catalan parties' overt definition of Catalanness and the language policies that were promoted by the CiU governments to build a single Catalan-speaking community affected individuals' identification with Catalonia. In particular, I have tested whether

the adscriptive components of identity (descent and origin) have lost importance in favor of the “learned” language when predicting individuals’ identification with Catalonia. Evidence in favor of this hypothesis would have demonstrated that the Catalan parties’ strategy to de-primordialize Catalan identity and to assimilate second generations, the group which was mainly targeted by the language policies, has been successful.

My analyses have shown, however, that the adscriptive elements of identity continue to be an important determinant of individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia. Actually, contrary to my expectations, origin and descent today seem to be more important than they were in 1987. This has been caused by the autochthonous population greater proneness to identify as “only Catalan”, and the second generations’ lower likelihood to self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish”. The results have also revealed that the “learned language” is of less importance today in predicting identification with Catalonia among the second generations.

Altogether, these results suggest that the policies implemented by the CiU governments have contributed to reinforcing the Catalan identification of the autochthonous population. However, Catalan parties’ choice for an overt non-primordial definition of Catalaness, and the CiU’s assimilationist language policies have not got that the immigrants and the second generations’ prioritize their identification to Catalonia to their identification to Spain.

Regarding the second question, chapter 5 has dealt thoroughly with the issue of intergenerational change and stability within the family. The chapter has also compared the influence of parents and school on forging individuals’ identification. Although the impact of parents and schools on national socialization is usually in the same direction, in Catalonia, variation in parents’ identification allows us to tease out the impact of each of these two socialization agents.

The results of the descriptive analyses of this chapter, which draw on the household data of the Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya, confirm the occurrence of intergenerational changes

within families in Catalonia. Children are more Catalan oriented than their mothers and their fathers, regardless of the parents' origin.

The empirical analyses of the chapter have also shown, in agreement with Aspachs-Bracons et al (2008a, 2008b), that the 1983 language reform has contributed to explaining the decrease in the levels of primarily Spanish identifiers in the generation which was educated after the language reformed was implemented. However, my analyses have also shown that the influence of the school is less important than argued in classical studies of nationalism and in more recent empirical studies, and that the parents and the family background characteristics are key determinants of individuals' identification. The omission of relevant variables related to individuals' family characteristics has been the cause of previous studies overestimating the influence of the school.

Three main findings have supported this argument. First, the children of immigrant families, which are economically successful, are more prone to self-identify as "more Catalan than Spanish". This finding suggests that the economic mobility of immigrant parents and the feelings of gratitude towards the receiving society that this economic progress generates have fostered their children's identification with Catalonia. Secondly, the neighborhood in which the family lives affects individuals' identification directly and indirectly. When children grow up in neighborhoods in which the proportion of immigrants is relatively high, then they are less likely to self-identify as primarily Catalan. In addition, the leverage that school has on national identification varies depending on the neighborhood in which the family lives. Thus, in those neighborhoods in which the number of autochthonous is moderate, the years of schooling increase the odds that individuals self-identify as "more Catalan than Spanish". Altogether, these two latter findings suggest that contact between children of autochthonous and children of immigrants is an efficient mechanism to promote the *identificational* assimilation of the latter. Thirdly, when the leverage of parents and school are



compared, parents' identification is found to be the main element affecting individuals' Catalan oriented identification. Therefore, even though years of schooling have contributed to encouraging a dual identification with Spain and Catalonia, what determines that individuals feel primarily Catalan (i.e. "more Catalan than Spanish" or "only Catalan") is that their parents feel the same way. Evidence from the qualitative interviews show, moreover, that the parents can deliberately lessen the impact that a predominantly immigrant context have on their children by sending their children to private Catalan oriented schools.

All in all, this chapter's results qualify previous studies' findings (Aspachs-Bracons 2008a,b) and suggest that the Catalan school's ability to instill a Catalan oriented identification in students is more limited than previously claimed.

Here, I want to highlight that an important contribution of this dissertation is that it has empirically tested the leverage of the school and the media on individuals' identification with the nation. The idea that the school and the mass media are the state's main instrument of national socialization is pervasive in the literature. Classical studies of nationalism have repeatedly pointed to education as a key agent fostering collective national consciousness (Anderson 1983; Breuilly 1982; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1991; Smith 1979; Weber 1976). Previous studies have also contended that the mass media have a fundamental role in the "flagging" or "reminding" of nationhood (Billig 1995). However, these studies have rarely tested empirically the extent of these socialization agents' influence. My dissertation, therefore, has contributed to filling this gap in previous research.

Thus the results of my research on this matter suggest that, in contexts in which the center-periphery cleavage structures political competition, television mobilizes individuals' identification significantly. However, whereas public regional television seems to be a very effective instrument to channel conflict and prioritize individuals' regional attachment of dual identifiers, the banal nationalism of the public national television seems to have a less influential role, at least in the short-run. In

addition, as already stated, my research has shown that the impact of the school is less important once that parents' characteristics are taken into consideration. Among the children of the autochthonous, the school only reinforces parents' national socialization. Among the children of immigrants, the school can only foster a more Catalan oriented identification when children attend schools in which the proportion of autochthonous is sufficiently high. This finding has important political implications: avoiding segregation of autochthonous and immigrant population groups in schools is key to fostering the latter's *identificational* assimilation.

This dissertation has also made a methodological contribution. Making use of novel sources of panel and household data and combining the analysis of this data with qualitative data, I have been able to solve some of the shortcomings of previous research. In particular, the in-depth examination of this data has solved the problem of ecological inference that previous research suffers from.

In short, and before concluding, it can be stated that this dissertation has generally helped to identify some macro and micro factors that foster change in the individual category of identification in contexts in which there is a center-periphery cleavage, and immigrant context. These findings are generalizable to other contexts that share these characteristics with Catalonia.

The following table summarizes the dissertation main findings.

*Table 8.1. Determinants of stability and change in context with a center-periphery cleavage and immigrant contexts*

| <i>Macro-factors</i>   | <i>Individuals characteristics</i> | <i>Micro-factors</i>                      | <i>Mechanism</i>   | <i>Direction of change</i> | <i>Aggregate Outcome</i> |
|--|------------------------------------|---|--|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| Political parties' confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage | Autochthonous                      | Alleged exposure to one-sided information | Individuals' perception that their group identity is being mistreated or attacked by out-group members causes individuals' reactive change | Catalan                    | Polarization*            |
|  | Second Generations                 |   |  | Spanish                    |                          |
|  | Spanish Identifiers                | Exposure to Spanish media                 | Reactive Reaffirmation   | Stability                  |                          |
|  | Dual Identifiers                   | Exposure to Spanish media                 | Reactive change  | No effect                  |                          |
|  |                                    | Exposure to Catalan media                 |  | Catalan                    |                          |
|  | Catalan Identifiers                | Exposure to Catalan media                 | Reactive re-affirmation  | Stability                  |                          |

Table 8.1. *Determinants of stability and change in context with a center-periphery cleavage and immigrant contexts (continued)*

|                    | Parents' feeling of gratitude towards the host society and transmission of these feelings to their children |            |                |   |
|--------------------|---|------------|----------------|---|
|                    | Immigrant families' economic mobility   | Catalan    | Identification | assimilation                                |
| Second generations | Low levels of autochthonous in the neighborhood & the school children of immigrants attend                  | Separation | Stability      | Inter-generational identification stability |
|                    | High levels of autochthonous in the neighborhood & the school children of immigrants attend                 | Contact    | Catalan        | Identification assimilation                 |

\* Only observed when individuals' changes occur in the same direction (or the changes which occur in one direction are greater than the changes which occur in the other direction) and when these changes are numerically important.

## **8.2. Limitations and directions for further research**

Before concluding, I would like to mention some of the limitations of my research and to stress how the research initiated with this dissertation should be pushed forward.

As stated above, this dissertation sought to improve our knowledge about the factors that foster change in the individual category of self-identification in contexts in which political competition is organized along the center-periphery cleavage. The dissertation has focused, however, on the demand side, and it has devoted much less attention to the supply side. My decision to focus on the demand side responded to a deliberate and practical reason: to make my research feasible. Hence, further research should concentrate on the supply side.

In the introductory chapter, I mentioned that the cleavage has radicalized when Catalan nationalist parties' have implemented centrifugal strategies or particular policies; when national parties, and the Popular Party in particular, have resisted moving the decentralization process forward; when Spanish and Catalan party leaders and media commentators have made negative claims on cleavage-related issues, or when divisive campaigns have been promoted to mobilize and oppose Catalan and Spanish identities. Additional efforts should be made to detail the strategies that political parties make use of to activate the cleavage, and to learn about the role that the different parties have in this play.

Related to this, it would be worthwhile to go in depth on the issue of elite agency and intentionality. When political parties develop these strategies are they really looking to alter individuals' identification or are they just moved by vote-seeking interests? In chapter 4, I used qualitative evidence to show that the main Catalan parties agreed to promote an overt non-primordial definition of Catalanness and to develop language-immersion policies to assimilate the children of Spanish immigrants. The Catalan parties' ultimate goal was to build a single Catalan-speaking community and to avoid any ethnic division in Catalan society. Beyond this, in this same chapter, I argued that nationalist

parties' and, the CiU's, in particular, incentives to activate the cleavage increase when they are in a worse position to influence legislative policies in the Spanish Parliament, and the incentives to do so decrease when they are in a better position. Although chapter 4 tested the main implications of this assumption (i.e. that aggregate identification with Catalonia increases when nationalist parties cannot influence legislative production, and decreases when they are in a position to get some kind of compensation from supporting minority governments), additional evidence should be provided to sustain this chapter's assumption. In this regard, future versions of this work should investigate this issue more deeply.

On another matter, chapter 5 showed, in line with previous research (Rico and Jennings, forthcoming), that the family has an important influence over individuals' national identification. Parents' characteristics and the composition of the neighborhood in which families live were found to reinforce parents' national socialization. These two factors were also found to determine the school children attend. This finding implies that parents not only influence their children's national identification directly, but they also influence it indirectly. While the dissertation has helped to explain how national identification is reproduced within the family, the issue of what lies behind inter-generational change within families requires greater attention. Chapter 5 revealed, in agreement with Aspachs-Bracons et al (2008a, 2008b), that the language reform implemented in 1983 in Catalan schools account for part of the decrease in the levels of primarily Spanish identifiers. However, we still have to investigate more deeply what explains inter-generational change within the autochthonous families and the immigrant families. Here, it could be mentioned that Chapter 7 has provided some cues that should be examined further to shed light on this issue. In this regard, we should examine more thoroughly how political confrontation forges the national identification of those individuals who experience high levels of conflict during their impressionable years, and how this interacts with individuals' characteristics.

An additional issue that has been posed in chapter 5 and for which I have provided some evidence in chapter 7 requires more refinement: the argument that economic mobility fosters the *identificational* assimilation of the children of immigrants. Research to accurately test this hypothesis making use of more appropriate panel data should be carried out as well.

In addition to all this, this dissertation has raised new questions that should be advanced inter-disciplinarily and making use of new methodologies. For example, how enduring is change and what causes some individuals to be more prone to change than others? The answer to these questions leads us to the discipline of social psychology, and requires that we examine the role that emotions and individual personality traits play on *identificational* change.

Also and related to this, it is worth mentioning here that political scientists dealing with the issue of ethnic change have all considered it to be the outcome of a rational decision (Chandra 2004; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Kalyvas 2008; Laitin 1998). Rational explanations of group identity change exclude the possibility that change can be the consequence of non-motivational mechanisms. Against this, my dissertation has suggested that more attention should be paid to the role that emotions play as mediators of individuals' stability and change. The qualitative interviews have revealed that political claims made by political parties or media commentators provoke an emotional reaction and that this emotional reaction orientates *reactive reaffirmation* and *reactive change*. More research is needed to learn about the emotional reactions that positive and negative claims made by in-group and out-group elites provoke, and to understand how these emotional reactions mediate in the process of *identificational* change. Experimental techniques could help to advance this research. Actually, this methodology could also be useful to solve some of the problems of causality that my research with observational data has not been able to deal with.

Finally, and thinking more broadly, this dissertation has established a framework from which change in national

identification can be studied. Although this research has focused on the study of changes in individuals' category of national identification in contexts in which a center-periphery cleavage is present, the floor is open to study what triggers change in other contexts and in other dimensions (content, salience and intensity).

All this considered I feel compelled to recognize here that this dissertation does not close the question of what causes change in national identification, but it opens new directions to continue research on this topic.





# APPENDIX

## Chapter 1. Additional tables and figures

Table A.1.1. Association between bi-directional indicators and other measures of identification

|                          | Only Spanish |      |           | More Spanish than Catalan |      |           | As Spanish as Catalan |      |           | More Catalan than Spanish |      |           | Only Catalan |      |           |
|--------------------------|--------------|------|-----------|---------------------------|------|-----------|-----------------------|------|-----------|---------------------------|------|-----------|--------------|------|-----------|
|                          | N            | Mean | Std. Dev. | N                         | Mean | Std. Dev. | N                     | Mean | Std. Dev. | N                         | Mean | Std. Dev. | N            | Mean | Std. Dev. |
| Catalonia <sup>a</sup>   | 45           | 7.33 | 2.08      | 44                        | 6.84 | 2.67      | 240                   | 8.68 | 1.61      | 155                       | 9.05 | 1.29      | 82           | 9.52 | 0.97      |
| Spain <sup>b</sup>       | 45           | 8.95 | 1.48      | 44                        | 8.75 | 2         | 239                   | 8.19 | 1.94      | 153                       | 6.06 | 2.25      | 81           | 3.9  | 2.82      |
| Nationalism <sup>c</sup> | 41           | 2.22 | 2.38      | 44                        | 2.93 | 2.53      | 224                   | 4.79 | 2.79      | 153                       | 7.09 | 2.02      | 82           | 8.84 | 1.53      |

Note: The table reports the mean values of different measures of identification for those individuals who identify as “only Spanish”, “more Spanish than Catalan”, “as Spanish as Catalan”, “more Catalan than Spanish”, and “only Catalan”.

<sup>a</sup> To what extent do you feel identified with Catalonia? To answer, use this scale where 0 means that you feel “not identified” and 10 means “very identified”.


<sup>b</sup> To what extent do you feel identified with Spain? To answer, use this scale where 0 means that you feel “not identified” and 10 means “very identified”.

<sup>c</sup> In relation to a Catalan nationalist feeling, could you please tell me, where would you place yourself on this scale where 0 means “minimum nationalism” and 10 “maximum nationalism”.

<sup>d</sup> And in relation to feeling Spanish, could you please tell me, where would you place yourself on this scale where 0 means “minimum Spanishness” and 10 “maximum Spanishness”.


Source: CIS, Study # 2667, 2007

Figure A.1.1. *Evolution of major political parties in Catalonia since 1977*



Note: \*ICV and EUiA merged again in 2003


Figure A.1.2. Pride of Being Spanish by National Identification (Percent)



Note: the wording of the Pride of Being Spanish question was as follows. To what extent are you proud of being Spanish? Do you feel “very proud”, “quite proud”, “not very proud” or “not proud at all”.

Source: CIS, Study # 2667, 2007


*Figure A.1.3. Pride of Being Catalan by National Identification (Percent)*



Note: the wording of the Pride of Being Catalan question was as follows. To what extent are you proud of being Catalan? Do you feel “very proud”, “quite proud”, “not very proud” or “not proud at all”?

Source: CIS, Study # 2667, 2007

Figure A.1.4 Preferences regarding the Institutional Organization of the State by National Identification (Frequencies)



Note:

The wording of this question is as follows:

I will now show you some alternative formula regarding the organization of the state in Spain. Please tell me, which one do you prefer? The answer categories for this question are: A state with a Central Government without Autonomous Communities (Centralism), a state with Autonomous Communities as at present (Status-quo), a state in which Autonomous Communities could have greater autonomy than at present (>Autonomy), or a state that would recognize the Autonomous Communities the possibility of becoming independent states (Secession).

Source: CIS, Study # 2667, 2007

**Chapter 3. Additional tables and figures**  
*Table A.3.1. CIS Series of data*

| Study n°                     | 1403 | 1412  | 1719 | 1750 | 1978 | 1987 | 2052  |
|------------------------------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| <i>Month</i>                 | Mar. | April | Dec. | June | Oct. | Jan. | April |
| <i>Year</i>                  | 1984 | 1984  | 1987 | 1988 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993  |
| <i>National Id.</i>          | X    | X     | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| <i>Origin</i>                | X    | X     | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| <i>Parents' Origin</i>       |      | X     | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| <i>Catalan</i>               | X    | X     | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| <i>Age</i>                   | X    |       | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| <i>Sex</i>                   | X    | X     | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| <i>Education</i>             | X    | X     | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| <i>Question</i> <sup>2</sup> | A    | A     | A    | B    | C    | C    | D     |
| <i>Answer</i> <sup>3</sup>   | =    | =     | =    | =    | =    | =    | =     |
| <i>Sample size</i>           | 1484 | 2281  | 2891 | 2899 | 2500 | 2484 | 1007  |
| <i>No - news</i>             | -    | -     | 4    | 1    | 12   | 2    | 2     |
| <i>No + News</i>             | -    | -     | 3    | 4    | 5    | 1    | 1     |

Table A.3.1. CIS Series of data (continued)

| Study n°              | 2137  | 2228  | 2298 | 2374 | 2410 | 2450 | 2543  |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Month                 | Mar.  | April | Dec. | June | Oct. | Jan. | April |
| Year                  | 19841 | 1984  | 1987 | 1988 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993  |
| National Id.          | X     | X     | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| Origin                | X     | X     | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| Parents' Origin       |       | X     | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| Catalan               | X     | X     | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| Age                   | X     |       | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| Sex                   | X     | X     | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| Education             | X     | X     | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     |
| Question <sup>2</sup> | A     | A     | A    | B    | C    | C    | D     |
| Answer <sup>3</sup>   | =     | =     | =    | =    | =    | =    | =     |
| Sample size           | 1484  | 2281  | 2891 | 2899 | 2500 | 2484 | 1007  |
| No - news             | -     | -     | 4    | 1    | 12   | 2    | 2     |
| No + News             | -     | -     | 3    | 4    | 5    | 1    | 1     |




Table A.3.1. CIS Series of data (continued)

| Study n°                     | 2610 | 2643 | 2667 | 2734 | 2799  | 2852 | 2857 |
|------------------------------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|
| <i>Month</i>                 | Dec. | May  | Jan. | Jan. | April | Oct. | Dec  |
| <i>Year</i>                  | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009  | 2010 | 2010 |
| <i>National Id.</i>          | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     | X    | X    |
| <i>Origin</i>                | X    | X    | X    |      | X     | X    | X    |
| <i>Parents' Origin</i>       | X    | X    | X    |      | X     | X    | X    |
| <i>Catalan</i>               |      |      | X    |      |       |      | X    |
| <i>Age</i>                   | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     | X    | X    |
| <i>Sex</i>                   | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     | X    | X    |
| <i>Education</i>             | X    | X    | X    | X    | X     | X    | X    |
| <i>Question</i> <sup>2</sup> | C    | C    | D    | C    | D     | D    | D    |
| <i>Answer</i> <sup>3</sup>   | =    | =    | =    | =    | =     | =    | =    |
| <i>Sample size</i>           | 920  | 1494 | 587  | 1500 | 902   | 3061 | 2966 |
| <i>No - news</i>             | 19   | 1    | 8    | -    | 5     | 4    | 14   |
| <i>No + News</i>             | 6    | 3    | 3    | -    | 3     | 0    | 3    |



*Figure A.3.1. Comparison of data from ICPS and CIS (Only Spanish)*



*Figure A.3.2. Comparison of data from ICPS and CIS (More Spanish than Catalan)*




Figure A.3.3. Comparison of data from ICPS and CIS (As Spanish as Catalan)




Figure A.3.4. Comparison of data from ICPS and CIS (More Catalan than Spanish)




Figure A.3.5. Comparison of data from ICPS and CIS (Only Catalan)





Figure A.3.6. Comparison of data from ICPS and CIS (Don't know/ don't answer)



## Chapter 4. Additional Tables and Analysis

Table A.4.1 Historical Electoral Performance of Major Catalan Parties

|                    | 1980                    |       | 1984                    |       | 1988                    |       | 1992                    |       | 1995                    |       | 1999                    |       | 2003                                    |       | 2006                                     |       | 2010                    |       |
|--------------------|-------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|---|-------|--|-------|-------------------------|-------|
|                    | seats                   | %     | seats                   | %     | seats                   | %     | seats                   | %     | seats                   | %     | seats                   | %     | seats                                   | %     | seats                                    | %     | seats                   | %     |
| CiU                | 43                      | 27.83 | 72                      | 46.80 | 69                      | 45.72 | 70                      | 46.19 | 60                      | 40.95 | 56                      | 37.70 | 46                                      | 30.94 | 48                                       | 31.52 | 62                      | 38.43 |
| PSC-PSOE           | 33                      | 22.43 | 41                      | 30.11 | 42                      | 29.78 | 40                      | 27.55 | 34                      | 24.88 | 36                      | 30.33 | 42                                      | 31.16 | 37                                       | 26.82 | 28                      | 18.38 |
| ICV i EUiA         | 25                      | 18.77 | 6                       | 5.58  | 9                       | 7.76  | 7                       | 6.50  | 11                      | 9.71  | 3                       | 2.51  | 9                                       | 7.28  | 14                                       | 10.65 | 10                      | 7.37  |
| ERC                | 14                      | 8.90  | 5                       | 4.41  | 6                       | 4.14  | 11                      | 7.96  | 13                      | 9.49  | 12                      | 8.67  | 23                                      | 16.44 | 12                                       | 9.52  | 10                      | 7.00  |
| PP                 |                         |       | 11                      | 7.70  | 6                       | 5.31  | 7                       | 5.97  | 17                      | 13.08 | 12                      | 9.51  | 15                                      | 11.89 | 21                                       | 14.03 | 18                      | 12.37 |
| PSC-ICV            |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       | 16                      | 7.52  |   |       |  |       |                         |       |
| UCD                | 18                      | 10.61 |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |   |       |  |       |                         |       |
| PSA                | 2                       | 2.66  |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |   |       |  |       |                         |       |
| CDS                |                         |       |                         |       | 3                       | 3.83  |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |   |       | 3  | 3.03  | 3                       | 3.39  |
| Ciutadans          |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |   |       |  |       |                         |       |
| SI                 |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |                         |       |   |       |  | 4     | 3.29                    |       |
| Type of Government | CiU minority government |       | CiU majority government |       | CiU majority government |       | CiU majority government |       | CiU minority government |       | CiU minority government |       | Coalition Tripartit I (PSC + ERC + ICV) |       | Coalition Tripartit II (PSC + ERC + ICV) |       | CiU minority government |       |

Note: Convergència i Unió (CiU), Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC-PSOE), Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV) -Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (EUiA), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), Partido Popular (PP), PSC-Ciutadans pel Canvi- IC-Verds (PSC-ICV), Centristes de Catalunya-(UCD), Partido Socialista de Andalucía-Partido Andaluz (PSA), Centro Democrático Social (CDS), Ciutadans-Partido de la ciudadanía, Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència (SI).

**Chapter 6. Additional Tables and Analysis**

*Analysis of the no answers and of the “don’t know” and “none of them” answers*

Table A.6.1 presents detailed information on the 2001/02 identification of the “none of them” category in 2004 and 2005. The results show that the “none of them” category is made up of many of the “as Catalan as Spanish” identifiers in 2001.

*Table A.6.1. National Identification in 2001 if none of them in 2004 or 2005 (%)*

|                           | <b>2004</b> | <b>2005</b> |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Only Spanish              | 6.56        | 5.00        |
| More Spanish than Catalan | 6.56        | 5.00        |
| As Spanish as Catalan     | 47.54       | 48.33       |
| More Catalan than Spanish | 9.84        | 8.33        |
| Only Catalan              | 6.56        | 6.67        |
| Don’t Know                | 16.39       | 18.33       |
| No Answer                 | 6.56        | 8.33        |
| <b>Total</b>              | <b>61</b>   | <b>60</b>   |

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Only those individuals who participated in the three waves are presented here.

<sup>2</sup> I have excluded from the analysis those individuals whose parents and themselves were born outside of Spain as for these individuals identification with other nations may be at play.

Source: “Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya -FJB, 2001-05”

Table A.6.2 displays the trajectories of those who answered “don’t know” or did not answer in 2001/02. The trajectories of those who answered “don’t know” or did not answer in 2001 differ. Those who did not answer in 2001 chose first the “more Spanish than Catalan” category in 2004 and the “as Spanish as Catalan category” in 2005. Conversely, those who answered “don’t know” in 2001 chose first the “as Spanish as Catalan” category in 2004 and the “none of them category” in 2005.

Table A.6.2. National Identification in 2004 and 2005 if DN or NA in 2001 (%)

|                           | No Answer |           | Don't Know |           |
|---------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|
|                           | 2004      | 2005      | 2004       | 2005      |
| Only Spanish              | 32.43     |           | 5.71       |           |
| More Spanish than Catalan | 39.19     | 35.14     | 11.43      | 17.14     |
| As Spanish as Catalan     | 18.92     | 39.19     | 37.14      | 25.71     |
| More Catalan than Spanish | 1.35      | 14.86     | 8.57       | 11.43     |
| Only Catalan              | 2.70      | 2.70      | 8.57       | 5.71      |
| None of them              | 5.41      | 6.76      | 28.57      | 31.43     |
| Don't Know                |           | 1.35      |            | 8.57      |
| No Answer                 |           |           |            |           |
| <b>Total</b>              | <b>74</b> | <b>74</b> | <b>71</b>  | <b>63</b> |

See notes in Table A.6.1

Source: "Panel de Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya -FJB, 2001-05"

Although the analyses are not shown here, those who did not answer the national identification item in any of the waves differ with those who did answer in the three waves only in the age distribution. The sample of those who answered "don't know" or answered "none of them" and those who answered in all the three waves differ also in the education distribution. Interestingly, those who are more educated seem to be more uncomfortable with the response categories that the item offers.



**Chapter 7. Additional Table***Table A.7.1 Quotes: Projected number of interviews*

| <b>Autochthonous (N)</b> |                              |            |       |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|------------|-------|
| Cohort                   | Education                    |            |       |
|                          | Secondary Education or lower | University | Total |
| After 1980               | 2                            | 1          | 3     |
| Between 1960 and 1979    | 2                            | 2          | 4     |
| Before 1959              | 4                            | 1          | 5     |
| Total                    | 8                            | 4          | 12    |

| <b>Second Generations and children of mixed couples (N)</b> |                              |            |       |
|---|------------------------------|------------|-------|
| Cohort  | Education                    |            |       |
|   | Secondary Education or lower | University | Total |
| After 1980  | 2                            | 1          | 3     |
| Between 1960 and 1979                                       | 4                            | 1          | 5     |
| Before 1959   | 2                            | 1          | 3     |
| Total   | 8                            | 3          | 11    |

| <b>Immigrants (N)</b> |                              |            |       |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|------------|-------|
| Cohort                | Education                    |            |       |
|                       | Secondary Education or lower | University | Total |
| After 1980            | 0                            | 0          | 0     |
| Between 1960 and 1979 | 1                            | 1          | 2     |
| Before 1959           | 5                            | 0          | 5     |
| Total                 | 6                            | 1          | 7     |

Note: Quotes were established from the ICPS survey (2009)

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