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Author:	Laia Balcells and Abbey Steele
Year:	2012
Type:	Working Paper
Series:	Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 2012/274
City:	Madrid
Publisher:	Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales

Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences

WORKING PAPERS

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Laia Balcells is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Duke University, and *Doctora Miembro* of the Juan March Institute, Madrid. Abbey Steele is Assistant Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.

ISSN: 2174-4971

Abstract

This paper explores the causes of displacement during civil wars. Recent scholarship has shown that conventional civil wars – those in which forces are relatively balanced – and irregular civil wars – those in which one side is substantially stronger than the other – exhibit different patterns of violence. We hypothesize that, while the mode of violence differs, the form of displacement should be consistent across the wars: displacement is a tactic of war that armed groups use to conquer new territories. By expelling civilians associated with rivals, armed groups improve their odds of gaining control of contested territory. This implies that members of a group are targeted for displacement because of their identity and presumed loyalties. We test the theory using two fine-grained datasets on individuals displaced during a conventional civil war, in Spain (1936-1939), and an irregular civil war, in Colombia (1964-). In both cases, the war cleavage was reflected in national elections: thus, where political parties received support indicated which populations were sympathetic to rivals. In both civil wars, we observe higher levels of displacement in locations where more sympathizers of rival armed groups reside. The paper makes three contributions. First, it shows that the microfoundations of displacement are similar in two types of civil wars. Second, it is the first comparison to our knowledge of the sub-national dynamics of displacement within two different civil wars. Third, it explains macro-level differences with a coherent micro-level framework.[*]

Keywords: violence, civil war, displacement, Colombia, Spain.

[*] We thank Ana Arjona, Zeynep Bulutgil, and Roger Petersen for comments and suggestions to previous versions of this paper. Laia Balcells gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Institut Català Internacional per la Pau (ICIP) through project 2011RICIP18, and from the Spanish government through project ECO2011-25293. Abbey Steele is grateful to the National Science Foundation, the Fulbright DDRA Program, and The MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale, which supported fieldwork in Colombia 2006-2007 and 2008.

INTRODUCTION

How many people have fled the Syrian conflict since violence began in March 2011? Where have they gone? How will receiving states and international organizations manage the refugee influx? Will it lead to further violence? To date, most scholarship has sought to address questions like these (e.g., Azam & Hoeffler, 2002; Davenport *et al.*, 2003; Melander *et al.* 2009; Moore & Shellman, 2006; Schmeidl, 1997; Saleyhan and Gleditsch 2006; Kenyon Lischer 2005). Displacement - civilian migration during war that is provoked, directly or indirectly, by the actions of one or several armed groups (Steele 2010) - is a serious humanitarian and political challenge for countries undergoing conflict, as well as for their neighbors. As such, the focus is usually on the scale and potential interventions to address the problem, leaving the underlying causes of displacement unexplored. Indeed, press accounts of Syria (and Libya, last year) can easily lead to the flawed conclusion that displacement is a byproduct of violence: after a set of violent events, people flee, and usually create problems in receiving regions or countries (Al Jazeera, 2011; Fahim, 2012a; Cumming-Bruce 2012). In short, refugees are victims of violence around, but unrelated to it. Yet, refugees are also political actors, whose identities, we argue, are crucial to their displacement. In the case of Libya, foreign workers of the oil industry – many of whom resembled mercenaries fighting for Qaddafi – were the first to flee. Then ethnic Berbers, a minority group of suspected collaborators of the anti-Qaddafi rebels, followed. In the case of Syria, Sunni Muslims represent the biggest share of the refugees, and they are identified as supporters of the rebels by the Assad regime (Anderson, 2012; MacFarquhar, 2012).

These examples are instances of a pattern in civil wars: armed groups attempt to expel people who are associated with their rivals. We argue that they do it in order to gain control of territories. The association can be based on ethnic group, sect, tribe, profession, or political affiliation – whatever indicates loyalties to one side or the other engaged in fighting. We test the argument using fine-grained, intra-country variation in combination with a small-n comparison of two very different civil wars: Spain (1936-1939) and Colombia (1964-). This approach allows us to capture the micro-foundations of displacement and to explore how they interact with distinct forms of warfare to produce divergent patterns. We argue that in irregular civil wars, characterized by fluid frontlines and fragmented military control, displacement will be provoked by armed groups (and, mostly, incumbents) anywhere that contestation takes place. In conventional civil wars, it tends to be employed by armed groups as the frontline advances. In both cases, cleansing territories of suspected enemies is useful for groups attempting to rule them. We argue that the mechanisms that produce displacement in both types of wars are the same, even though the broader, macro-level patterns diverge.

The Spanish Civil War (thereafter, also SCW) was fought conventionally, and was also possibly the first contemporary civil war witnessing mass displacement as a war tactic. Indeed, it has been argued that armed groups deliberately promoted displacement in order to cleanse territories (Prada, 2010). Over 440,000 people left Spain during the conflict and right after its end (Marrus, 2002). The decades-long irregular civil war in Colombia has produced one of the largest populations of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the world, estimated at roughly 4 million. The current war spans roughly 50 years, during which time several leftist insurgent groups have formed. Paramilitary groups coalesced to fight them in the early 1980s. Later in that decade, displacement emerged as a tactic in the war: paramilitaries found it was effective for penetrating guerrilla strongholds, while insurgents tried to employ it to retain control. As the war expanded throughout the country, so did the number of internally displaced people.

This article constitutes an effort to advance the violence in civil war research agenda by turning the focus to explaining variation in displacement within civil wars. Conceptual and empirical work has advanced our understanding of lethal violence during civil wars, which depends

on factors such as warfare type, or how rival armed groups fight one another, and territorial control (Valentino *et al.* 2004; Kalyvas, 2006; Balcells & Kalyvas 2012). Though displacement is a type of violence usually overshadowed by lethal forms, it has substantial repercussions for peace and state-building, so it merits scholarly attention. The paper proceeds as follows: the next section presents the theory, and presents a hypothesis that derives from it. Section three presents the cases and tests the hypothesis using sub-national data from each case, and discusses the results. Section four concludes.

THEORY / HYPOTHESES

Scholarship on warfare suggests that violence varies across different types of civil wars. Kalyvas (2005) and (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010) distinguish conventional and irregular civil wars based on the relative resources of the two primary adversaries.[1] Conventional civil wars feature two relatively evenly matched armies, while irregular civil wars involve a relatively weak rebel group fighting stronger state armed forces. In the former, frontlines are likely to form, demarcating the territory held by both sides of the fight. However, in the latter, insurgent organizations have to avoid head-to-head fighting because of their relative weakness. Instead, they blend into civilian populations to hide from their enemies. As a result, no clear frontlines form. These different characteristics lead to different logics of intentional violence against civilians. In irregular civil wars, Kalyvas (2006) argues that levels of territorial control by armed groups explain the extent of selective violence (such as assassinations) against civilians, and also indicates where indiscriminate violence is likely.[2] Balcells (2010) argues that military control cannot explain violence against civilians in conventional civil wars because levels of control do not vary behind the frontlines. She distinguishes further between direct and indirect violence, and finds that political cleavages that pre-date the war explain where and to what extent these two forms of violence against civilians occur. While executions (or direct violence) are explained by the degree of prewar competition (i.e. parity between groups) at the local level, bombings (or indirect violence) are explained by the level of support for the enemy group at the local level, in addition to strategic military factors.

The literature on displacement instead has focused on macro-level factors.[3] The predominant conclusion is that more violence leads to higher levels of displacement, across all types of wars (Moore & Shellman, 2006: Melander and Oberg, 2006). While this may be strictly true, it also obscures important variation. Steele (2011) argues that the relationship is in fact reversed: armed groups increase violence in order to expel civilians perceived to be disloyal and successfully conquer a territory. When armed groups target members of the disloyal group – or target collectively – the best response of any given individual sharing a targeted trait depends on the response of everyone else similarly targeted (Steele 2009). If everyone stays, it reduces any one individual's risk of suffering violence. However, given sustained violence directed at their group, individuals have strong incentives to leave, which only increase if others begin to do so: it creates a cascade effect.[4] Importantly, the violence and

[1] We do not focus on a third category identified by Kalyvas & Balcells (2010): symmetric non-conventional, which are less common (12.24% of all civil wars between 1944 and 2004). Our expectations regarding this category resemble those for conventional civil wars, for these are both symmetric types of conflicts. In SNC, however, armed actors are more fragmented (Kalyvas & Balcells 2012), and therefore they are less capable of undertaking strategic actions such as forced displacement.

[2] For Kalyvas (2006), indiscriminate violence is unrelated to individuals' behavior, but could be based on group-level factors. See Steele (2009) for a different terminology.

[3] Exceptions are Ibáñez (2008) and Adhikari (2012), who study household-level characteristics but do not consider group-level attributes or the behavior of armed groups.

[4] If the armed group with which they are linked offers protection, staying could be an option. An

accompanying group dynamic can trigger a range of individual-level mechanisms leading people to leave their homes. Some individuals will fear the possibility of violence more than others, and opt to leave before shots are even fired. Others may wait for a more immediate threat to their safety, or leave only when they have made arrangements to stay with relatives elsewhere. We do not aim to parse these possible mechanisms among individuals (and as such, we sidestep the "push-pull" debate in the displacement literature (e.g., Petersen 1958; Lee 1966)). Instead, we assume that armed groups have expectations about civilians' cascade behavior, and will implement collective targeting to generate displacement of a subset of the community for a strategic advantage. The tactics that armed groups employ range from lethal violence directed at members of a group because of their membership in that group, to threats of lethal violence, such as graffiti warnings and leaflet distribution.

The question becomes, what explains when and where armed groups engage in collective targeting to displace? Further, does displacement respond to different logics in irregular and conventional civil wars, as with lethal violence? Steele's theory explains displacement during irregular civil wars. Armed groups expel those who are suspected, for one reason or another, of supporting their rivals, during contestation with another armed group for territorial control.[5] The logic holds in these civil wars because insurgents depend on civilians for survival; and targeting them is an effective way to target insurgents.[6] Civilians' behavior and loyalties are also relevant in conventional civil wars, and they explain violence in rearguard territories (Balcells 2010; 2011). Supporters of the enemy are possible collaborators and fifth columnists, and they can be particularly helpful to their group when the territory is contested: they can provide much-needed intelligence, and run interference with the rival armed group. As such, armed groups also have reason to attempt to expel those who they perceive to be disloyal when they are fighting to gain territory. When the territory is uncontested, these individuals can be targeted for strategic reasons (i.e. long-term considerations), but not so much for short-term tactical reasons, because they are not integral to which armed group wins. Furthermore, when an armed group has full control of a territory, it can perpetrate selective lethal violence against the supporters of the enemy. This is safer than displacing because an expelled person could provide valuable intelligence to the enemy.[7]

Figure 1 summarizes the existing literature on violence and displacement in different types of civil war. This article's contribution is highlighted in the bottom right quadrant: we expect displacement to follow collective targeting both in conventional and irregular civil wars, in militarily contested territories. By targeting

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alternative would be to defect to the targeting group.

[5] When armed groups have control, according to Steele (2011), they do not need to target civilians collectively. They have more information and can expel or assassinate defectors, and generate incentives for civilians to comply.

[6] Gaining control of a territory occurs through both direct and indirect channels. If civilian sympathizers are no longer living in the area, they can no longer offer direct support to insurgents (Wood, 2003). Further, removing civilian allies of the insurgents may allow their neighbors who dislike the insurgents to denounce those who remain, and to actively collaborate with the incoming rival armed group. Given the goal of the armed group to gain territorial control, strategic displacement is less costly than mass killing for two reasons. First, at least in contemporary civil wars, mass killing invites condemnation that could lead to intervention, and jeopardize an armed group's ability to control a territory. Second, because displacement is frequently perceived to be a by-product of violence rather than a strategy, armed groups, especially state armed forces, can deny responsibility more easily than when using lethal violence.

[7] Also, in conventional civil wars, when the frontlines are stable, civilians are usually absent from areas close to the frontline, and only combatants are potentially targeted in these areas. However, when the frontlines move during phases of conquest, civilians are caught on the battlefield, and they become a possible target of armed groups.

FIGURE 1. Violence and Displacement in Conventional and Irregular Civil Wars

Warfare Type	Lethal Violence against Civilians	Displacement of Civilians
Irregular (Asymmetric)	Selective violence in militarily contested areas; indiscriminate violence in poorly controlled areas.	Collective targeting of disloyal civilians in militarily contested areas.
Conventional (Symmetric)	Behind the frontlines: direct violence in politically contested areas; indirect violence in enclaves of the enemy.	**Collective targeting of disloyal civilians in militarily contested areas.**

collectively those who are identified with the rival group, armed organizations pave the way to conquer and control these areas.

Our hypothesis follows:

H1 In both conventional and irregular civil wars, in militarily contested territories, the localities that will observe higher levels of displacement should be those with a greater number of people perceived to be loyal to the rivals of the challenging armed group

Yet armed groups face a challenge: if collective targeting implies identifying groups that are suspected of being loyal to a rival armed group, how are loyalties detected? Like ascriptive traits, such as those associated with ethnic groups, political identities can be used to infer where people's loyalties lie. People may collaborate with an armed group because of their political beliefs, or they may do so because it is safer given their association with a political party, group, or identity (Kalyvas & Kocher 2007). Either way, armed groups and fellow civilians infer who is going to collaborate with whom based on group identities like political affiliation. This is particularly the case in highly mobilized settings, in which political identities become visible and often as sticky as ethnic identities.

EMPIRICS

Cases

Spain and Colombia are ideal cases for comparing sub-national patterns of displacement within different types of civil war. First, as mentioned above, Spain was a conventional civil war, while Colombia is an irregular one. Second, both wars feature a central cleavage related to political parties and to left-right ideology, not ethnic identity. Third, they both had elections previous to events of violence and displacement, which allow for a fine-grained measurement of the political composition of localities.[8]

Spain Overview. The Spanish Civil War (hereafter, also SCW) began as a military coup against a legally constituted democratic government. It lasted for almost three years (18 July 1936-1 April 1939) and generated around 800,000 deaths.[9] Two

[8] The civil war began much earlier in Colombia than the introduction of a political party associated with insurgents (i.e. the FARC), as well as local-level elections. As we will see below, both changes permitted the identification of civilian sympathizers (of insurgents) and rivals (of paramilitaries), in turn prompting the use of displacement as a tactic (Steele, 2010).

[9] Data on total deaths during the civil war is still incomplete, and historians are involved in

main political blocs fought the war: 1) the army of the Republican government or Loyalists, which also included militias of political parties, trade unions, and the International Brigades. We include all of them under the label of the "left," even though there were important differences among them, including intense rivalries that eventually led to violent clashes in May 1937; and 2) the army of the rebels – Francoists or Nationalists – which also included factions of the regular army and various militias. We include them under the label of the "right." The right won the war, and Spain became a military dictatorship led by General Francisco Franco that lasted until 1975, when Franco died and a successful transition process to democracy began.

The main cleavage of the civil war in Spain was a left-right cleavage that mapped the electoral contestation of the February 1936 elections, in which two pre-electoral coalitions grouping left- and right-wing candidates competed (the Popular Front, on the left, and the CEDA, on the right). The religious cleavage fully overlapped with the left-right cleavage. In Catalonia and the Basque Countries, ethnic cleavages cross-cut political ones, but ideology (and not ethnicity) was the master cleavage before and after the civil war outbreak within these regions. The February 1936 elections in Spain were preceded by high levels of political mobilization: "During the periods preceding the elections, and very especially in February 1936, all the political parties (including the anarchists) were involved in intense campaigning and they organized a large number of rallies . . . .The propaganda was unprecedented in Spanish politics, especially that of the CEDA, with large posters showing the figure of their leader Gil Robles" (Chaves 1995: 25). The level of participation in the 1936 elections, in which the anarchists joined the Popular Front coalition (they had asked for "abstention" in the 1933 elections), was the highest of the Second Republic period: around 71% of the Spanish adult population cast a vote. In the campaign for the 1936 elections, verbal violence was intense, and, according to some historians, it was a presage of what was to occur afterwards (Vicente Alós 1978: 19). Due to this mobilization, political identities were visible at the local level. In other words, supporters of the blocs became easily identifiable by local rivals. Also, armed groups could easily acquire information on the political alignment of localities as they were entering them. For example, there is evidence showing that indirect violence (i.e. bombings) was perpetrated based on political identities, and that groups intentionally targeted enclaves of the enemy (Balcells, 2011). These bombings were based on collective targeting, which we argue produced displacement. As they were entering new territories, groups targeted enemies' enclaves; they spread fear, and they promoted displacement of their enemies to gain control of these territories.

Colombia Overview. The civil war in Colombia has a long history with a multitude of protagonists. After *La Violencia* (The Violence), a civil war of partisan violence and banditry roughly spanning 1946-1964, guerrilla groups emerged including the two largest that still exist today, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* – FARC) and the National Liberation Army (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional* - ELN).[10] In the early 1980s, during failed peace talks between

debates about estimations (Prada, 2010; Preston, 1986). Hence, we should take this as an orientation number. With the application of the recent Law of Historical Memory (approved by the Spanish Parliament in December 2007), the exhumation of mass graves, and increased disclosure of information by victims and/or perpetrators, the data will have to be surely updated.

[10] Other groups also emerged over the years. An early split within the Communist Party lead to the formation of the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (*Partido Comunista de Colombia - Marxista Leninista* - PCC-ML); it formed an armed wing known as the *Ejército Popular de Liberación* (Popular Liberation Army - EPL), of which one band is still active. In 1974, rebel Jamie Bateman broke off from the FARC to launch a more innovative, urban-based group, the M-19. It demobilized in 1989. The *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army - ELN) was formed independently, inspired by Castro's success in Cuba.

the Betancur administration and the FARC, a few military officers started to support small regional paramilitary groups, operating in some areas of the country where local elites and narco-traffickers sought to combat the FARC (Romero, 2000). After a massive intensification of violence between the "left" (i.e., insurgent organizations) and the "right" (i.e., paramilitary groups and the military) throughout the 1990s and early 2000s,[11] the majority of the paramilitary blocs agreed to demobilize between 2003 and 2006. Since then, new groups have emerged to compete for abandoned territory and drug trafficking routes. While insurgents' strength has declined from its peak in the 1990s, they remain viable through access to narcotics and extortion revenue. The FARC has recently entertained the possibility of peace talks with the Santos administration, and the ELN continues its talks with the government. An estimated 200,000 people have been killed in Colombia since the 1960s.

As with many irregular civil wars that do not feature an ethnic cleavage, in Colombia it is impossible to directly observe insurgent supporters. Further, though the war is broadly along a "left-right" cleavage, political party identities have not mapped on to the conflict very well. Colombia's democratic institutions have persisted in spite of the civil war, and the insurgent groups have remained largely peripheral to the political process. The exception was an electoral experiment that the FARC launched as part of a negotiated agreement with the government in 1985: it formed the Unión Patriótica (UP), which contested the presidential election in 1986, and participated in local elections when they began in 1988. Beginning in May 1985, all fronts of the FARC were ordered to organize the UP in their area through "*Juntas Patrióticas*" (JPs) (Dudley, 2006, 60). At the same time, an important aspect of its success was the party's appeal to citizens who were hoping that the UP would lead to peace (Dudley, 2006, 61). By the second presidential election in which they participated (1990), the leaders of the UP were distancing themselves from the FARC, questioning the combination of "all forms of the fight." The rift, however, did not alter the perception among its detractors that the UP was a vehicle for the FARC. Newly formed paramilitary groups used the information revealed by local elections, and provided by local elites threatened by the arrival of the UP on the political scene, to plan the conquest of FARC-influenced areas. Importantly, while individuals' votes were secret, local councilmembers were elected by district. As a result, it was straightforward to infer which neighborhoods supported the UP by the party affiliation of their councilmember. We argue that these neighborhoods were more likely to be targeted than others by paramilitaries seeking to gain control of the area.[12]

Analyses

We now turn to the analyses of our hypothesis with econometric analyses that explore the determinants of variation in displacement across localities for both Spain and Colombia. We present each case independently and return to the implications of both sets of results in the discussion section. In the analyses, *displacement* is the dependent variable, and it is measured by the number of people who leave a locality. Our main independent variable is percent of supporters of the rival group at the local level. As a proxy for this, we use percent electoral support for a bloc in the elections, in both cases (percent support for the left-wing coalition in the prewar 1936 elections in Spain; average percent support for UP in the 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1997 elections in Colombia – the period before displacement was registered). In both cases, we use a similar set of control variables, but the indicators vary slightly due to data collection constraints.

[11] As in Spain, these were not unified fronts – groups within them frequently fought one another as well.

[12] We do not consider FARC-induced displacement. Though insurgents also displace civilians, it is usually not a tactic of conquest, because insurgents are weaker than the incumbents in an irregular conflict and so typically cannot conquer territories by force. Rather, they use tactics such as evasion, attrition and state-building (Kalyvas 2006).

Spain (Catalonia). Despite the importance of the phenomenon, data on displaced in the Spanish civil war are still fragmentary, and they are not reliable for research purposes. This is particularly striking as far as local-level data is concerned. Most studies on refugees have used unsystematic, patchy data at the county level or they are local case studies; partly as a consequence of a scarcity of data, no systematic study of displacement has been done to date. In this paper, we focus on the region of Catalonia, the only region for which we could obtain reliable estimates of displacement at the local level. Additionally, Catalonia had the advantage of having been a rearguard territory during a relatively long period of the civil war, before having eventually been conquered by the Nationalist army.[13] It had a large number of displaced people, and the scale varied across the territory. The region also presents variation in a large number of covariates such as urbanization, political support for the right (and for the left), and geographical characteristics. Because of the wide variation in the independent and dependent variables, the results obtained in this region are likely to travel well to other regions of Spain.

Catalonia is located in the northeast of the Iberian Peninsula. It is delimited by the Mediterranean Sea in the east, France and Andorra to the north, and the region of Aragon to the west. During the SCW, one of the most stable frontlines was the one created along the Ebro River, in the West of Catalonia, which divided the region of Aragon into two. Catalonia was under Republican control during most of the war, and it was conquered by the Nationalist army in an offensive that started right after the Nationalist victory in the battle of the Ebro (Reverte, 2006). The use of aerial attacks, combined with well-organized land forces, made it a ferocious occupation, leading to the surrender of the region on 13 February 1939. For the purposes of this paper, we will focus on the displacement that took place at the end of the war in Catalonia, which was the most significant in terms of quantity: the so-called *1939 Displacement*. To estimate displacement, we use the index calculated in (Balcells, 2012), which is based on the difference in the population censuses of 1940 and 1936,[14] from which all those people who disappeared for reasons other than migration/exile and natural death are subtracted.[15] The displacement index covers 654 municipalities; the minimum value is 0, the maximum is 2,094, and the median is 34 individuals. (In alternative specifications, we use the total number of people missing in 1940 vis-à-vis 1936, and the total number of cases is a bit larger: 750.) The index has the advantage of being the first estimate of displaced people in the Spanish civil war for a significant number of localities; it has the disadvantage of being based on census data which have inevitable problems because of biases related to wartime (Gil & Garcia, 2009),[16] and which have an important number of missing cases. Map A1 shows the distribution of this estimate across Catalan localities, which shows the significant variation in displacement within counties and provinces. Those provinces with highest number of missing cases are Lleida

[13] Lethal violence against civilians took place in Catalonia in two stages: first (from July 1936 to 1938/39), violence was perpetrated by leftist militias and the Republican army; later, the Nationalist army and right-wing militias perpetrated violence during the period of conquest and after it. The Nationalists also perpetrated strategic aerial bombings in across most of the Catalan territory since 1937 and until they occupied the region.

[14] In approximately 80% of the localities of Catalonia, the 1940 population was smaller than 1936 population.

[15] Mortality is assumed to cancel birth rate in a context of a civil war where there was no natural population growth. Only non-natural deaths (i.e. people killed in combat, executions, bombings, and war-related accidents) are subtracted from the index. The sources for these variables are multiple, and they are listed in Balcells (2012) and available upon request.

[16] During wartime, there is both a problem of under-registering of births and deaths, and of a delay in inscribing (Gil & Garcia, 2009, 54). At the same time, despite concerns raised regarding the validity of the Spanish 1940 census, recent research has shown that this is reliable regarding total population figures (Gil & Garcia, 2009, 63).

(in the North-West) and Girona (in the North-East).[17]

Political Variables

We use three different proxies for perceived disloyalty at the local level. In this case, we expect leftist support at the local level to have a positive impact on collective targeting by the right, and therefore on displacement. The main independent variable in the models is *Support left 1936*, which is the percent support for the Popular Front in the 1936 general elections (Vilanova 2005), at the local level. This captures in a precise way the relative number of leftist supporters in a locality. *CNT Affiliation* is the proportion of inhabitants affiliated with the CNT in a locality (CNT, 1936; Cucó Giner, 1970), and captures the presence of anarchists (i.e. leftist supporters) in a locality. *UGT Affiliation* is the proportion of inhabitants affiliated with the UGT, a socialist trade union, in a locality (UGT 1931). This is another proxy for leftist supporters. *Catholic Center* is a dummy variable, with value 1 if the municipality had an archbishop in 1936, and 0 otherwise (Conferencia Episcopal Española). This indicates the extent to which rightist supporters lived in a locality. Locations with archbishops had significantly more members of the clergy living in them than other localities, and active Catholics and members of the clergy sided with the Nationalists. *Competition* is an index from 0 (minimum parity) to 1 (maximum parity), measured with quadratic formula: 1-[(%Vote Left36 - %Vote Right/100)].[2] It captures the extent to which the locality was divided across the right-left cleavage line. We include it to test for the alternative hypothesis that parity between groups, which accounts for violence in conventional civil wars, also explains displacement.

Geographical and Other Variables

We include a set of geographical indicators as control variables. They capture presence of natural resources, proximity to the frontline, to the sea and to the French border, and therefore they allow measurement of different factors that can explain levels of displacement at the local level. *Latitude*, in degrees (UTM, fus 31, datum ED50) (Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya), captures proximity to the French border, which was an exit option for refugees. *Longitude*, in degrees (UTM, fus 31, datum ED50) (Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya), captures proximity to the Frontline, which was to the west of all localities in Catalonia during almost the entirety of the war, as well as proximity to the sea, another possible exit to the east. *Altitude* of the municipality, in meters (Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya), captures accessibility of the locality. Higher altitude localities were less accessible (i.e. further away from major roads), but they were also safer during wartime because they were less strategic from a military point of view. Finally, we include *Population*, the number of inhabitants of the municipality in 1936 (SGE, Generalitat de Catalunya). This captures size of the municipality, which is likely to have a positive impact on the total number of refugees.

Violence

Different measures of lethal violence at the local level are included in order to account for the potential relationship between killings and displacement. *Executed Left* is the total number of people executed by the left in a locality in the 1936-39 period (Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya, 2003). It captures the extent to which the locality was violent during the period of Republican control.[18] People in localities where the left had perpetrated violence could be more fearful of retaliation by the incoming right wing forces, and therefore could be more prone to flee. *Clergy Killed* is a dummy variable coded as 1 if any member of the clergy (e.g. priest, nun, bishop) was killed in the locality in the 1936-39 period, 0 if not (Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya, 2003). This also measures the extent to which the locality was violent in the Republican period because it captures anti-clerical violence, which was usually publicized and very

[17] The reason that 312 cases are lost is that there are no data from the 1940 census for these localities. We have checked, and there are no systematic explanations for the missing cases in these census data.

[18] The lion's share of these killings took place during the summer of 1936.

visible to the inhabitants of the locality. *Bombings* captures the extent to which the locality experienced indirect violence. We will use different measures of bombings in a locality: bombings in a particular year (e.g. 1937), or bombings during the totality of the civil war, including those that were simultaneous to the conquest, and therefore to the displacement (Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya, 2003) We do not include executions by the Nationalists because, in Catalonia, most of these killings took place when the war was already over (Solé i Sabaté 2000), and were therefore posterior to displacement.

Results

Figure 2 is a scatterplot of 1939 Displacement (in % inhabitants of the locality) and Support Left, for all Catalan localities. It depicts a positive relationship between the proportion of leftists in a locality and local percent of displacement - consistent with our first hypothesis.

leaving a locality increases with support to the leftist bloc in the prewar elections. Specifically, a 10% increase in Support Left 1936 is associated with an average increase of 12 individuals in the number of displaced. A change from 36% to 70.15% Support Left (one standard deviation below and above the mean of Support Left in the sample), increases the number of displaced by 40 individuals.[19] Hence, the impact is substantive. This is an intuitive finding, and consistent with our hypothesis. CNT affiliation also has a very significant impact on levels of displacement, which implies that places with an anarchist presence observed higher displacement; this is also consistent with our hypothesis; in addition to collective targeting, there is an alternative mechanism that might account for this: places with CNT affiliation observed high levels of violence against right-wingers in the previous period, and many militants and their families may have

FIGURE 2. Estimated % Displaced 1939 and % Support Left 1936, Catalonia



Table 1 displays the results of the OLS regressions on 1939 Displacement. Consistent with our first hypothesis (and with Figure 2), Support Left 1936 has a positive impact on displacement. In other words, the number of displaced people left out of fear of reprisals as the frontline began to shift. Interestingly, UGT affiliation is not significant; Catholic

[19] These post estimations are done using Clarify package (King *et al.* 2000).

Center, which proxies for right-wing support is not significant either. This is unexpected, as these variables proxy presence of left and right wing supporters; yet, the variable Support Left might be already capturing their effect. The geographical variables are not relevant: Altitude is negative and significant in some models (indicating that displacement was greater in lower places), but not in all of them. Neither Competition nor Executed by the Left are significant, but Clergy Killed has a very strong and significant effect, suggesting that anti-clerical violence during the Republican period provoked targeting by the right during conquest, and therefore displacement.[20] Total number of Bombings in a locality does not have a positive impact on displacement. This might be because bombings generated in Catalonia floating refugees, who come back to their homes once they are over. Nonetheless, when disaggregated by years (Table A1 of the Appendix), 1937 Bombings are significant for explaining displacement, and they have a positive effect.

The results in Table 1 are robust to the inclusion of county fixed effects, which allow for capturing unobservables and help avoiding omitted variable bias.[21] They are also robust to a differently specified dependent variable (i.e. absent people in the locality).[22]

Colombia. In Colombia, the Catholic Church and the Bogotá-based NGO CODHES (Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement) have been documenting displacement since the mid-1980s. The state began registering internally displaced people (IDPs) about a decade later, in 1998. The registry, known as SUR, the Sistema Único de Registro, contains 2,169,874 registrations through June 2007.[23] CODHES, which approximates the arrival of IDPs to municipalities based on its local contacts, estimates that between 1986 and 2007, over 3.8 million people were displaced. Figure A1 of the Appendix compares the scale of displacement as registered by the government and CODHES between 1988 and 2006.

To test our hypothesis in Colombia, we compare local electoral results for the UP during the 1990s across municipalities with displacement in those municipalities in subsequent years. The cross-sectional dataset includes 1,056 observations - for each municipality in Colombia that existed in 1998. The data on displacement come from the SUR.[24] Each registration includes the municipality of origin and resettlement.[25] We use the database put together by (Steele, 2010), who aggregates the individual-level SUR displacement registrations by municipality of origin between 1998 and 2006 to create *IDPs*. Although the data on the displaced in Colombia are among the best in the world, one concern with using observational data

[20] Support Left 1936 and Clergy Killed remain significant and take similar values if included in the same model.

[21] There were 38 counties in Catalonia, with 20 localities each on average.

[22] In addition, while there is spatial autocorrelation in the data, we control for it by including latitude and longitude in the models. The results are also consistent if the estimations are made with spatial econometrics, either with a spatial lag specification, or with a spatial error term specification (all the results of these robustness checks are available upon request).

[23] The government registers displaced households and individuals when they arrive to a state agency office, and groups of households when they are displaced together. Displaced individuals must respond to a questionnaire; government officials in regional offices then review the questionnaire to assess whether or not the claim of displacement is credible. If the application is found to be plausible, then the household enters into the SUR and becomes eligible for humanitarian assistance from the government. Once registered as an IDP, the household is entitled to three months of rent and groceries. Groups of 10 households or 50 individuals constitute "mass displacement," and a state representative is supposed to attend to them.

[24] The database was provided to the Center for the Study of Development Economics (CEDE) at the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá.

[25] It is important to note that though both units in Spain and Colombia are referred to as "municipalities," in Spain, municipalities are communities, while in Colombia, they are more similar to counties in the US, comprising several rural communities and typically a town or city similar to a county seat (*cabecera*).

TABLE 1. OLS on 1939 Displaced in Catalonia

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Support Left 36	1.17***					1.13***
	(0.30)					(0.29)
CNT Affiliation	13.6***	13.8***	13.8***	13.4***	12.9***	13.6***
	(3.91)	(4.00)	(4.00)	(3.53)	(3.76)	(3.90)
UGT Affiliation	3.33	3.32	3.32	0.48	2.70	2.49
	(11.3)	(11.5)	(11.5)	(10.6)	(11.1)	(11.3)
Latitude	0.056	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.044
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Longitude	-0.24	-0.27*	-0.27*	-0.22	-0.22	-0.24
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Population (*1000)	-0.25	-0.21	-0.21	-7.91	-0.21	-1.59
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(7.94)	(0.29)	(4.05)
Altitude (*1000)	-41.5*	-58.5**	-58.5**	-53.3**	-44.4*	-39.2*
	(24.5)	(24.5)	(24.5)	(25.4)	(25.1)	(22.7)
Catholic Center	52.8	37.6	37.6	-205.9	17.0	57.8
	(118.2)	(113.1)	(113.1)	(323.4)	(110.1)	(119.1)
Competition		32.5	32.5			
		(35.0)	(35.0)			
Executed by the Left				2.22		
				(2.27)		
Clergy Killed					50.6***	
					(11.7)	
Total Bombings						4.03
						(11.9)
Constant	-134.3	-568.5	-568.5	-461.6	-568.0	-75.7
	(820.3)	(801.3)	(801.3)	(809.5)	(819.4)	(757.0)
Observations	621	621	621	621	621	621
R^2	0.130	0.119	0.119	0.142	0.138	0.132

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

such as these is that biases may be systematic over time, or across space. While the Colombian Supreme Court found the SUR as not adequately counting all of the displaced, a study has found that under-counting appears to be unsystematic (Ibáñez & Velásquez, 2006). The data represent a vast improvement over data available at the cross-national level.

Political Variables

Our main variable of interest is perceived disloyalty; to measure this in Colombia, we use the local-level electoral share for *Unión Patriótica* (UP). *Concejos*, or councils, manage the affairs of municipalities as the local legislative body. The local electoral outcomes are accurate indicators of our primary independent variable, and have the

added advantage of being systematically collected across the country.[26] *UP Vote Share:* To indicate the presence of UP supporters, we take the average UP vote share from the 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1997 elections, by municipality. We also use an alternative indicator - a dummy variable equal to 1 if the UP won votes in any of these elections (*UP Dummy)*. The UP won some percentage of the council vote in 205 municipalities, and won at least one seat in 141. In other words, the party established some kind of presence in roughly 20% of the municipalities of the country, but had actual political representation at the local level in about 15% of the country. The average UP vote share across all municipalities is 1%.

Another political variable we include, *Third Party Vote Share*, is the average third party vote share between 1990 and 1997 – a variable similar to the indicator that Acemoglu *et al.* (2009) employ to proxy for paramilitary presence.[27] We constructed the variable by taking the average vote share for all non-traditional, non-leftist, non-Christian parties for *concejo* elections, based on the same data from the *Registraduría Nacional* used to calculate the UP vote share. We expect displacement to be negatively associated with this variable, because in this period, paramilitaries were expanding and would not target their own supporters. A final variable we include to indicate leftist presence is *Strikes*: the total number of labor strikes between 1982 and 1997 in the municipality. These data were collected by CINEP, a Bogotá-based NGO.

[26] Data on electoral outcomes come from the *Registraduría Nacional* in Bogotá - the institution responsible for administering and monitoring elections in Colombia. We thank Fabio Sánchez for sharing the data. Elections for council are closed list, proportional representation. The data include the vote share for each party in the election and the number of municipal council seats won by party. Data on local elections were not available for Spain, which is why we use higher-level elections.

[27] The logic is that paramilitaries engaged in political dominance at the local level in communities they controlled, by forming new, local parties that they retained control over (Acemoglu *et al.*, 2009).

Geographical and Other Variables[28]

Like we did for Spain, we include a series of controls that may have an impact on the levels of displacement across Colombia: *Altitude, in meters (*CEDE) to control for accessibility of the location; municipal population in 1993 (1993 *Population*), based on the census (DANE), to control for size; geographical coordinates – *Latitude* and *Longitude* – to control for location (Calculated by ArcGIS).

Violence

The confrontation between the FARC and the United Self-Defense Forces of

[28] In Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix, we include additional controls: *Homicide Rate* is a measure of the average homicide rate for each municipality over the 1998-2006 time period (the data was obtained from the *Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística*; National Administrative Department of Statistics - DANE); these data do not include FARC or Paramilitary victims, but it captures lethal violence in the locality. Municipalities that are poorer may be more likely to produce displacement because there are fewer incentives for civilians to risk violence and stay. Ibáñez (2008) finds that municipalities with high levels of poverty have higher levels of displacement after 1998. It could be that poorer peasants are likelier to be targeted or displaced because they do not have titles, so their land is more easily usurped (Reyes, 2009). For these reasons we include *Municipal GDP*. We also include *Soil Aptitude* because some authors suggest that areas with mineral deposits or particular value for crops such as African palm attracted paramilitaries that in turn displaced residents in order to gain access to the lucrative land (e.g., Reyes, 2009). (Data on municipal GDP and soil aptitude were provided by the CEDE, and originally gathered by the DANE.) The presence of coca has also been linked to displacement, because people have left areas fumigated by the government. It might also capture presence of illegal armed groups, and disputes over territory. Although such displacement should not be registered in the SUR, we include a dummy indicated if any coca was detected in the municipality (*Coca Dummy*) to control for the possibilities. (The data were also provided by the CEDE, and originally collected by the UNODC.) *Rurality* (calculated by the percentage of the rural population over the size of the municipality), and *Roads* (the presence of roads in 1995) are also included as controls for accessibility (the data were provided by CEDE).

Colombia (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* - AUC) escalated in peripheral regions of the country in the 1990s. Homicides, kidnappings, and massacres increased substantially, as did both groups' involvement in narcotrafficking. Further, the FARC dealt significant blows to the state armed forces throughout the 1990s.[29] According to Echandía (2006, 28), the FARC had a presence in roughly 173 municipalities in 1985, and by 1995 expanded to 622. The military had "operational independence" in the periphery, which frequently translated to collaboration with paramilitaries (Romero 2000, 87). We thus also include data on violence by each of the groups:[30] *Paramilitary Victims* is the aggregate of victims of lethal violence attributed to paramilitary groups by municipality between 1998 and 2006; *FARC Victims* is the same, but for those victims attributed to the FARC (*Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad* (Administrative Department of Security - DAS).[31]

Results

Figure 3 shows the bivariate relationship between the average share of votes that the UP won in four local elections between 1990 and 1997 and the total number of individuals displaced from a municipality between 1998 and 2006. The graph displays a positive and linear relationship, consistent with our hypothesis 1, and it is consistent with Figure 2, displaying a similar relationship in Catalonia.

The models in Table 2, which is an approximation of Table 1,[32] show that UP vote share has a positive and significant effect on the level of displacement from a municipality. Simulations of model 1 in Table 2 indicate that moving from a municipality with no vote share for the UP (the rough equivalent of one standard deviation below the mean, which is 0.07) to one which had an average of 8% of the vote (one standard deviation above the mean), increases the predicted level of displacement by 871 individuals, holding all other independent variables at their mean. The effect is thus quite substantial.

Several other variables in the model are also significant. The only one that is as substantively large as UP vote share is the average third party vote share. However, the effect is in the opposite direction; this is consistent with the theory, because communities that supported such third parties would be more likely to support paramilitaries over the insurgents. As such, they would be less likely to be displaced. Paramilitary violence – proxied by the total number of victims between 1998 and 2006 – is positively correlated with displacement. Yet, this has a smaller effect than UP vote share. Total labor strikes between 1982 and 1997, an additional indicator for leftist presence, also has a positive effect on displacement. Finally, latitude is also positively correlated with displacement, indicating that southern municipalities were more likely to experience higher levels of displacement. This makes sense for the time period studied: before 1998, paramilitary groups challenged insurgents in the northern part of the country and then moved to the south, to departments like Meta and Putumayo to target FARC strongholds there.

The findings are robust to different specifications and measures. Table A2 includes several additional control variables. While both the magnitude of the effect and the significance of the UP vote share variable decrease, the effect remains quite substantial. The variables significant in the models in Table 2 remain so. Average homicide rates are positively associated with higher levels of displacement, unless FARC victims

[29] See Echandía (2006) for a thorough description.

[30] We thank Fabio Sánchez and Ana María Ibáñez for sharing the data.

[31] These data were compiled by Fabio Sánchez, based on the reports issued by the Observatorio de Derechos Humanos in the office of the Vice President of Colombia. Events-based data by type of event are also available. For consistency with the data available for Catalonia, we use only the victims data for Colombia as well. However, the models were also run with the events data as a robustness check, and results do not change very much.

[32] Even if some of the indicators are different, we make the closest possible comparison between the analyses of the displacement in the two wars.

FIGURE 3. UP Average % Vote Share in Local Elections, 1990-1997 and Cumulative IDPs, 1998-2006



TABLE 2. OLS on Estimated Displacement within Colombia, 1998-2006

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
UP Vote Share	10912.3***			11778.5***	6837.3***
	(2190.4)			(2514.6)	(2361.7)
Paramilitary Victims	5.04***	5.12***			2.62**
	(0.83)	(0.85)			(1.05)
Strikes	156.8*	164.9*	228.5**	218.8**	174.7**
	(91.1)	(90.4)	(95.9)	(96.4)	(78.6)
Latitude	-420.8***	-420.9***	-322.4***	-324.0***	-369.6***
	(86.7)	(90.2)	(94.1)	(89.9)	(76.2)
Longitude	75.3	39.3	27.0	65.3	163.2**
	(82.7)	(84.9)	(90.2)	(88.1)	(79.5)
1993 Population (*1000)	-3.39	-3.72	-5.66	-5.28	-4.49
	(4.35)	(4.29)	(4.75)	(4.80)	(3.95)
Altitude	-0.59**	-0.68**	-0.80**	-0.70**	-0.64**
	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.27)
Third Party Vote Share	-41068.3***	-37926.1***	-46282.6***	-49554.1***	
	(10693.6)	(10212.4)	(11909.0)	(12505.4)	
FARC Victims					1.09***
					(0.30)
Constant	-28360.0***	-27951.8***	-19809.3***	-20377.6***	-26286.8***
	(6734.2)	(7053.3)	(7386.7)	(7005.2)	(6103.8)
Observations	1041	1046	1046	1041	1041
R^2	0.323	0.300	0.184	0.210	0.437

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

between 1998 and 2006 are taken into account. The rural indicator is weakly negatively associated with displacement, suggesting that more urban (and thus more densely populated) municipalities suffered higher levels of displacement. (Though it's interesting to note that larger populations do not have a statistically significant association with displacement.) Kilometers of roads within the municipality in 1995 is positively associated with displacement, suggesting that especially difficult-to-reach communities were relatively safer; or that it was simply harder for community members to leave the municipality. The NBI poverty indicator for 1995 is positively associated with displacement. Finally, displacement is negatively associated with the 2002 soil aptitude index – a somewhat surprising finding, given the popular and scholarly perception that displacement was a byproduct of paramilitary expropriation of land for industrial agriculture projects (e.g., Reyes, 2009).

Finally, we also provide an analysis with a dichotomous measure of UP presence (i.e. a dummy variable with value 1 if there was any support for the UP in the locality, and value 0 if not). Table A3 depicts the results. Here, the effect is even more striking: the UP dummy has a strong and significant effect on displacement. In sum, UP municipalities seem to have been specifically targeted for displacement by the paramilitaries.

Discussion

In this section, we have used empirical evidence from Spain and Colombia to test our two theoretical hypotheses. We have worked with cross-sectional datasets including electoral data previous to the events of displacement and violence.

Because of the differences between these two civil wars and the nature of the available data, we have used different indicators in each of the cases. For example, while in both cases we have relied on electoral results to measure the proportion of supporters for armed groups at the local level, the data is slightly different in each of the cases: in the case of Spain, we have used municipal level results of one pre-war national election (that of February 16th 1936); in the case of Colombia, we have used data of wartime municipal elections (i.e. the average results in several that took place in the 1990s). Similarly, we have also used different proxies for some of the control variables in the regressions: even if theoretically justified, their inclusion has depended upon the data available in each of the cases. Our dependent variable is also slightly different in each of the cases: while for Colombia we have fine-grained data on displaced people at the municipal level for the totality of the country from registered sources; for Spain we have only been able to obtain an estimate of local level displacement for a region in it (Catalonia). All this has been conditioned by the problematic nature of data on wartime indicators and on displacement, which is even more salient in a civil war that was fought in the 1930s. Overall, our objective has been to use the best data available at the finest level of detail, in both countries.

The quantitative evidence from Spain and Colombia is overall supportive of our hypothesis on the spatial variation of displacement: in both cases, we find that displacement is more prevalent in localities where a rival's political base exists. In the case of Spain, we have observed that the number of displaced at the local level when the right enters the localities of Catalonia increases with the proportion of support for the left in the 1936 elections –and thus, with the number of left-wing supporters. Displacement is also higher in places where an anarchist trade union was present before the war. All this is consistent with our microfoundations: leftists were those collectively targeted by the Francoists, and thus they were those more likely to leave as the Francoist army was conquering the territory. In Colombia, we also observe that displacement is positively associated with support for the UP –the political party associated with the FARC. Controlling for the available indicators on economic inequality, wartime violence, urbanization and geographical location, the political variables are highly significant –and coherent with our hypothesis- in both cases. We argue that if displacement were simply a by-product of two warring parties, or an unintended consequence of lethal violence,

then the patterns we would observe would be different: political factors would not be statistically significant, and they would not be as robust as they are in our analyses.

MECHANISMS

While our results are strong, we are aware that alternative mechanisms could account for them. In this section, we present evidence that collective targeting took place. In addition, we discuss and discard alternative possibilities.

In Spain, both sides targeted groups that were suspected of disloyalty – or collectively targeted –but this was particularly salient in conquest phases, such as during the conquest of Catalonia by the Francoist army, which we have analyzed quantitatively above. In other areas of Spain displacement also took place as armed groups were conquering new territory, as the frontline was moving. Displacement was simultaneous to terrorizing campaigns of violence, which often accompanied conquest by the Francoist army (Preston, 2011, 19). That was the case, for example, of the Nationalist so-called "Death column" that conquered Andalusia and Extremadura (on its way to Madrid from Morocco): this Francoist column made widespread use of collective violence against alleged leftists, which was public in many occasions (i.e. leaving the corpses in the open for the neighbors to collect). After this violence "many people opted to leave towards Republican territory, hide in the mountains, or hide in the most unbelievable places" (Prada, 2010, 120). The people fleeing were sympathizers and/or militants of political parties of the Popular Front and leftist political parties, those targeted by the Nationalists (Preston, 2011, 412). Even if at a smaller scale, the anarchists and socialists were also targeting collectively in phases of conquest, for example, in localities close to the Aragon frontline, which were contested between the Francoists, on the one hand, and anarchist and communist columns coming from Catalonia, on the other. Suspected right-wingers were threatened and killed in these localities; and many of those who feared for their lives because they did not share the anarchists views (even sympathizers of the moderate left) fled towards Catalonia, Nationalist Aragon, or France (Ledesma, 2003; Maldonado, 2007).

In Colombia, the descriptions of displacement beginning in 1986 linked it to paramilitaries targeting the UP and those accused of being collaborators of the guerrilla (Pastoral Social, 2001, 15). A brutal example took place in the municipality of Segovia in 1988. A group of paramilitaries arrived in Segovia where "names of people were replaced by names of blocks" that displayed yellow and green banners - the colors of the UP (Dudley, 2006, 123-124). Pamphlets were circulated, warning citizens to leave or die. The violence was targeted to known areas where UP sympathizers gathered or lived: paramilitaries lobbed grenades and opened fire. In all, 43 people were killed (Dudley, 2006, 124). The key is that pamphlets were circulated, which indicates that the aim was not to kill all inhabitants of the neighborhood, but to expel them. A similar tactic is to graffiti neighborhoods, warning residents to leave. Steele (2011) documents such measures in specific neighborhoods that voted for the UP in one northern municipality. The neighborhoods' residents were collectively targeted for expulsion.

The first alternative possibility is that people flee in anticipation of the violence, and in fact the armed groups do not use collective targeting to provoke flight. However, instances of pamphlets warning residents to leave targeted neighborhoods and towns abound. Why would armed groups distribute such threats if they did not aim to expel suspect groups?

The second alternative is that in fact armed groups are targeting their rival armed group, not the civilians who live in these territories. This alternative is a possibility for irregular civil wars, but not for conventional ones, in which soldiers are distinct from civilians. In the former case, some people do become "part-time" combatants and remain in their neighborhoods and villages, and some combatants do hide among civilians. These insurgents could be targeted by incoming challengers that do not aim to displace the civilians they live among. Such a form of targeting would be likely to be accompanied by overtures to the civilians to

remain in their homes in spite of the violence directed at the combatants. However, in the case of Colombia, we have not found any evidence that armed groups seek to expel combatants but retain civilians – the pamphlets and graffiti used were directed against UP members – not the FARC only (Steele, 2011).

IMPLICATIONS

In this paper, we have presented evidence that armed groups employ displacement under similar circumstances within both conventional and irregular civil wars: it is used to expel the disloyal in order to gain or retain territorial control. Yet given the characteristics of the two types of wars, we should expect the underlying logic to produce different aggregate patterns. We briefly consider the implications in conventional and irregular civil wars for two dimensions: timing and scale of displacement.

Timing

We argue that displacement is associated with the conquest of territories. In conventional wars, displacement is likely to be concentrated in waves, following phases of conquest in which the frontline moves. In irregular wars, as long as loyalties are identified, displacement is likely to occur in a more uneven, sporadic way throughout the war. In Spain, we do indeed observe waves of displacement that were connected to conquest. For example, in Catalonia, there were two main phases of displacement: the so-called *Exile of 1936* affected mostly people identified with right-wing political parties, landlords and members of the bourgeoisie, members of the clergy, and even people identified with left-wing political parties that were threatened by the anarchist militias. This took place early on in the war, as the frontlines were establishing. The second phase was the so-called *Exile of 1939*, which we have analyzed above, and which affected mostly people who identified as supporters of leftist political parties, or trade unions, as well as IDPs who arrived to Catalonia during the war. This displacement corresponds to the moment in which the frontline was moving and the Nationalist army was conquering Catalonia. Even though we do not have data on the precise population movements, the historical accounts overwhelmingly indicate that, quite intuitively, they were moving towards the North, as the frontline was advancing and the Republican army was withdrawing.[33] In Colombia, displacement was not a major feature of the low-grade insurgency until the late 1980s. Once the UP contested elections and its supporters revealed where they lived, displacement became a tactic that armed groups could employ to challenge insurgents for territorial control. As the counterinsurgent paramilitaries expanded, they displaced people who they perceived to be disloyal – and displacement continued to increase steadily over time and across space. Because of the nature of contestation in irregular war, displacement took place in a scattered way throughout the Colombian territory. There is also evidence that the FARC displaced during conquest attempts by the paramilitaries, but this was as a reactive measure to attempt to retain control of their territories.

Scale

The scale of displacement in both types of civil war depends, obviously, on how well identified the likely insurgent sympathizers are, and the proportion of the population they represent. The scale of displacement in conventional civil wars is however also likely to depend on the amount of times the frontlines shift between actors – with each shift likely to lead to additional displacement. Similarly, the scale in irregular wars is likely to depend on how unstable territorial control is: the more stable the territorial control, the lower the displacement. Finally, given all this, since irregular civil wars are significantly longer than conventional (Balcells & Kalyvas 2012), we can expect the former to generate a greater number of refugees. Indeed, despite the Spanish civil war generated a large number of refugees, the Colombian

[33] Indeed, among these refugees, there were a large number of combatants of the Republican army that fled after the military defeats. Yet, there were also a large number of noncombatants, including women and children.

war has significantly surpassed them (by 10 times), and this is partly due to the much longer duration of the latter.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have explored the causes of displacement in the context of two different types of civil wars, irregular and conventional. Recent scholarship has indicated that the causes of violence diverge between these types of civil wars; we have hypothesized that the causes of displacement do not differ, and that in both cases displacement issues from collective targeting, which is used as a war tactic. We have shown that, in irregular civil wars, collective targeting takes place over the course of the conflict, insofar as political identities are known, and in areas that are militarily contested between the armed groups. In conventional wars, instead, collective targeting leading to displacement is focused in phases of conquest, and in the areas that armed groups are conquering (that is, it does not affect rearguard territories). In both cases, collective targeting implies that those affected by displacement are primarily identified supporters of the rival group in the war. Both in Colombia and in Spain, the macro-cleavage of the war was an ideological (i.e. left-right) cleavage. We argue that the dynamics should not be different in civil wars with other macro-cleavages (e.g., ethnic, religious). Indeed, ethnic cleansing may be just one facet of a broader phenomenon: political cleansing (Steele, 2010). Political loyalties should also help explain variation in displacement in the context of ethnic civil wars. In fact, Bulutgil (2009) finds that this was the case in Bosnia: support for particular political parties explained the timing of ethnic cleansing. Overall, our results suggest that there are not major differences between ideological and ethnic cleavages, and that – once activated – the former operate very similarly to the latter.

This paper makes several contributions. On the one hand, it highlights the importance of distinguishing civil wars by the nature of their warfare, in order to better understand their internal dynamics. While the logic of displacement is similar in all types of civil wars, we have shown that the nature of warfare limits the conditions under which displacement can be used as a war tactic: for example, it is not feasible in rearguard areas of conventional civil wars, where displacing people to areas controlled by the opponent can be too costly and even too risky for the armed groups. In irregular civil wars, because conquest and insurgent presence are less stable, displacement is *more* constant throughout time, and it is also more widespread across the territory. Yet, at the same time, displacement is not plausible in irregular civil wars unless loyalties have been identified: the study of Colombia indicates that displacement has only been particularly striking after the emergence of the *Unión Patriótica* (UP).

The paper is also, to our knowledge, the first small-n comparison of displacement at the sub-national level. The two-case comparison not only has allowed us to connect micro-level processes to macro-level ones, but it has also enabled us to achieve greater external validity than if we had limited the research to a single case study. We have hypothesized that the microfoundations of displacement are similar across civil wars, and we have provided evidence supporting the observable implications in two very different cases. Finally, from a micro-level framework, the paper has made some advancement in the understanding of displacement at the macro-level. For example, our approach has clear implications concerning why displacement is more prevalent in some wars than in others, and why displacement is spread throughout conflict areas and time periods in some wars (i.e. irregular, as in Colombia, El Salvador or the current conflict in Afghanistan), and more concentrated in areas and time periods in other wars (i.e. conventional, as in the recent wars in Ivory Coast or Libya). These insights shed light on broad patterns of displacement in civil wars.

APPENDIX

MAP A1. 1939 Displacement in Catalonia



MAP A2. Displacement from Municipalities in Colombia, 1990-2006



FIGURE A1. Estimated Displacement – Colombian Government (AS) and CODHES, 1985-2006



TABLE A1. OLS on 1939 Displacement in Catalonia, with Disaggregated Bombings

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Support Left 1936	0.95***	1.19***	1.15***	1.13***	1.12***
	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.29)
CNT Affiliation	13.6***	13.3***	13.5***	13.6***	13.3***
	(3.90)	(3.69)	(3.97)	(3.90)	(3.90)
UGT Affiliation	1.03	4.15	2.80	2.49	2.18
	(11.3)	(11.7)	(11.3)	(11.3)	(10.0)
Latitude	0.017	0.073	0.053	0.044	0.042
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Longitude	-0.25*	-0.25	-0.24	-0.24	-0.23
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Population (*1000)	-2.19**	2.05	-0.41	-1.59	-0.25
	(0.88)	(4.92)	(0.60)	(4.05)	(0.29)
Altitude (*1000)	-30.0	-43.8*	-40.8*	-39.2*	-39.3
	(22.1)	(23.5)	(24.3)	(22.7)	(24.6)
Catholic Center	4.50	37.6	55.3	57.8	50.9
	(159.8)	(134.2)	(117.9)	(119.1)	(119.1)
1937 Bombings	53.6**				
	(21.6)				
1938 Bombings		-8.33			
		(17.4)			
1939 Bombings			7.94		
			(22.8)		
Total Bombings				4.03	
				(11.9)	
Deaths in Bombings					2.71
					(3.31)
Constant	57.6	-206.1	-115.6	-75.7	-69.7
	(730.6)	(782.8)	(809.7)	(757.0)	(816.4)
Observations	621	621	621	621	621
R^2	0.178	0.134	0.130	0.132	0.132

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A2. OLS on Registered Displacement within Colombia, 1998-2006 with Additional Controls

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
UP Vote Share	5402.8**			5584.3**	3459.0
	(2223.1)			(2358.7)	(2135.9)
Paramilitary Victims	4.01***	4.02***			1.93**
	(0.82)	(0.82)			(0.93)
Strikes	151.7*	157.8*	190.6**	184.2**	142.9***
	(85.4)	(84.2)	(88.1)	(89.1)	(53.8)
Latitude	-504.1***	-507.3***	-450.4***	-447.2***	-425.0***
	(91.0)	(92.6)	(94.4)	(92.5)	(76.1)
Longitude	152.3**	139.3*	138.0*	151.1**	173.4***
	(73.3)	(73.5)	(74.3)	(74.1)	(66.7)
1993 Population (*1000)	-6.61	-6.48	-10.9	-11.0	-10.9
	(10.4)	(10.3)	(8.71)	(8.74)	(9.14)
Altitude	-0.12*	-0.13*	-0.16**	-0.14*	-0.17**
	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.076)	(0.077)
Third Party Vote Share	-32792.5***	-32070.3***	-37007.9***	-37792.1***	-31207.5***
	(9711.6)	(9505.7)	(10058.2)	(10315.6)	(8879.1)
Homicide Rate	6.54***	6.77***	10.0***	9.75***	2.98
	(1.64)	(1.65)	(2.30)	(2.25)	(1.90)
Municipal GDP	0.0010	0.00089	0.0020	0.0021	0.0023
	(0.0037)	(0.0037)	(0.0033)	(0.0033)	(0.0031)
Rural indicator	-22.5***	-22.5***	-23.1***	-23.1***	-23.9***
	(5.97)	(5.96)	(6.62)	(6.64)	(5.59)
Area	0.27**	0.28**	0.30**	0.28**	0.19**
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.080)
Roads	0.42**	0.41*	0.65**	0.66**	0.46**
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.20)
Coca Dummy	2191.5***	2339.3***	2498.2***	2347.8***	1826.3***
	(400.6)	(381.3)	(391.0)	(409.2)	(376.2)
Poverty Indicator	31.7***	33.3***	36.0***	34.3***	29.0***
	(7.96)	(8.04)	(8.57)	(8.46)	(6.79)
Soil Aptitude	-136.4*	-118.1	-123.3	-142.9*	-127.3*
	(80.1)	(77.8)	(81.4)	(84.1)	(70.7)
FARC Victims					0.97***
					(0.27)
Constant	-36811.3***	-37076.5***	-32835.9***	-32564.3***	-30637.4***
	(6909.1)	(7032.0)	(7150.0)	(7010.5)	(5803.5)
Observations	1039	1044	1044	1039	1039
R^2	0.429	0.423	0.359	0.365	0.523

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A3. OLS on Registered Displacement in Colombia, with UP Dummy and Additional Controls

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
UP Dummy	1900.8***			1890.3***	1488.7***
	(344.2)			(363.0)	(336.0)
Paramilitary Victims	4.03***	4.02***			2.06**
	(0.80)	(0.82)			(0.90)
Strikes	140.4*	157.8*	190.6**	173.3**	134.7**
	(83.7)	(84.2)	(88.1)	(87.4)	(53.8)
Latitude	-489.8***	-507.3***	-450.4***	-432.9***	-423.5***
	(90.1)	(92.6)	(94.4)	(92.0)	(77.7)
Longitude	193.6***	139.3*	138.0*	191.7***	215.4***
	(71.8)	(73.5)	(74.3)	(72.8)	(67.3)
1993 Population (*1000)	-6.28	-6.48	-10.9	-10.7	-10.1
	(10.2)	(10.3)	(8.71)	(8.53)	(9.12)
Altitude	-0.11*	-0.13*	-0.16**	-0.14*	-0.18**
	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.075)	(0.077)
Third Party Vote Share	-26677.1***	-32070.3***	-37007.9***	-31682.9***	
	(9019.7)	(9505.7)	(10058.2)	(9542.7)	
Homicide Rate	5.78***	6.77***	10.0***	9.02***	2.14
	(1.67)	(1.65)	(2.30)	(2.28)	(1.92)
Municipal GDP	0.00095	0.00089	0.0020	0.0021	0.0021
	(0.0037)	(0.0037)	(0.0033)	(0.0032)	(0.0031)
Rural indicator	-16.4***	-22.5***	-23.1***	-17.1***	-25.0***
	(5.74)	(5.96)	(6.62)	(6.41)	(5.61)
Area	0.28**	0.28**	0.30**	0.29**	0.22***
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.083)
Roads	0.36*	0.41*	0.65**	0.60**	0.46**
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.20)
Coca Dummy	2113.1***	2339.3***	2498.2***	2277.0***	1832.8***
	(374.6)	(381.3)	(391.0)	(385.1)	(367.3)
Poverty indicator	34.0***	33.3***	36.0***	36.7***	27.1***
	(7.93)	(8.04)	(8.57)	(8.47)	(6.31)
Soil aptitude	-126.6*	-118.1	-123.3	-132.2*	-107.5
	(76.4)	(77.8)	(81.4)	(80.2)	(68.4)
FARC Victims					0.94***
					(0.27)
Constant	-36831.7***	-37076.5***	-32835.9***	-32576.1***	-31653.0***
	(6838.4)	(7032.0)	(7150.0)	(6959.0)	(5931.3)
Observations	1039	1044	1044	1039	1039
R^2	0.444	0.423	0.359	0.379	0.527

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A4. Descriptive Statistics. Catalonia Dataset

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
1939 Displacement	621	91.01449	174.5783	0	2094
Absent People 1940	621	106.0886	192.3106	0	2329
Bombings 1937	621	0.1288245	1.223226	0	24
Bombings 1938	621	0.5394525	7.155449	0	175
Bombings 1939	621	0.1272142	0.7415656	0	13
Total Bombings	621	0.7954911	8.789384	0	212
Total Deaths Bombings	621	0.8369919	3.185709	0	36.8305
Support Left 1936	621	53.35267	16.79254	2.5	93.2
CNT Affiliation	621	0.7936599	4.114405	0	71.92755
UGT Affiliation	621	0.0921921	1.045727	0	20.36492
Latitude	621	4615.789	47.53704	4491.4	4745.55
Longitude	621	389.9123	65.5017	269.05	522.85
Population (*1000))	621	2.216686	25.69396	0.05	637.841
Altitude (*1000)	621	0.3605121	0.3213873	0.003	1.539
Catholic Center	621	0.0064412	0.0800628	0	1
Competition	621	0.8828897	0.147399	0.0975	1
Executed Left	621	9.793881	95.28673	0	2328
Clergy Killed	621	0.5040258	0.5003868	0	1
N	1065				

TABLE A5. Descriptive Statistics. Colombia Dataset

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
IDPs	1118	2,241.14	4,715.79	0	56,926
UP Vote Share	1060	0.02	0.07	0	0.726
FARC Victims	1118	409.03	1,752.72	0	32,542
Paramilitary Victims (88-97)	1118	0.30	2.78	0	63
Paramilitary Victims (98-06)	1118	70.26	322.59	0	4,994
Homicide Rate	1119	62.76	82.85	0	1,063.7
1993 Population (*1000)	1111	33.16	188.08	0	5,413.3
Municipal GDP	1097	71,852.31	603,574.15	0	16,455,590
Latitude	1116	74.62	1.66	67.03	78.59
Longitude	1116	5.58	2.63	-3.642	12.00
Rural indicator	1082	61.95	23.44	0.231	100
Area	1061	1003.01	2809.62	15	42,178
Altitude	1061	1,180.26	1,162.33	2	25,221
Strikes	1119	1.36	9.94	0	227
Roads	1061	664.98	874.87	0	9,626.0
Coca Dummy	1061	0.20	0.40	0	1
Third Party Vote Share	1099	0.03	0.02	0.00307	0.292
N	1120				

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