

**Instituto Juan March**

Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (CEACS)

**Juan March Institute**

Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (CEACS)

---

## **Economic crisis, globalization, and partisan bias: evidence from Spain**

Author(s): Fernández-Albertos, José; Kuo, Alexander; Bacells, Laia  
Date 2012  
Type Working Paper  
Series Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 2012/267  
City: Madrid  
Publisher: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales

---

Your use of the CEACS Repository indicates your acceptance of individual author and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any document(s) only for academic research and teaching purposes.

# WORKING PAPERS

ECONOMIC CRISIS, GLOBALIZATION, AND  
PARTISAN BIAS: EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN

José Fernández-Albertos, Alexander Kuo, and Laia Balcells

Estudio/Working Paper 2012/267  
May 2012

ECONOMIC CRISIS, GLOBALIZATION, AND PARTISAN BIAS:  
EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN

José Fernández-Albertos, Alexander Kuo, and Laia Balcells

Estudio/Working Paper 2012/267  
May 2012

José Fernández-Albertos is Research Fellow at the *Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos*, Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), and *Doctor Miembro* of the Juan March Institute. Alexander Kuo is Junior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Juan March Institute, Madrid. Laia Balcells is Researcher at the *Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica-CSIC* and Barcelona GSE, and *Doctora Miembro* of the Juan March Institute.

## **Abstract**

*Who do citizens blame for the recent European economic crisis? In this paper we test theories about blame attribution with respect to the economic crisis. We argue that blame for the crisis is partially conditioned by partisan bias and framings of the crisis as being related to globalization. We test the argument with new survey data and a survey experiment from Spain. In the experiment respondents receive different framings of the economic crisis which are endorsed by different political parties. We obtain the following findings: (1) blame for who is responsible for the economic crisis is greatly affected by partisanship; (2) making globalization as a cause of the crisis salient helps exonerate the government of blame, but only for co-partisans of the government; (3) citizens are willing to blame other globalization-related factors for the crisis, in particular, other European governments. The results expand our understanding of public opinion dynamics during major economic recessions, and also suggest conditions under which “scapegoating” globalization can occur.*

## INTRODUCTION

The economic crisis that has hit much of Europe between late 2007 and continues as of 2011 has raised a host of theoretically important and policy-relevant questions regarding the attitudes and preferences of citizens. Who do citizens blame for the crisis? To what extent do citizens blame factors related to the actions of their domestic governments, versus other international actors and globalization? Since the onset of the crisis, average unemployment in the EU member state area has risen to around 10 percent, and average growth across the continent has contracted to 1.5 percent. Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain have been hard hit by the crisis, with concerns about whether large domestic banks and governments in some of these states will default on loans. Recent descriptive overviews of this “Great Recession,” which for some countries is the worst economic downturn since the early 1970s (and for some the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression), conclude that the growth prospects of the most hard hit states remain grim, that the debt crisis will likely worsen, and that further bank defaults or a more prolonged economic recession could possibly lead to the breakup of the Eurozone (Eichengreen, 2009; Hugh, 2010). The crisis has also forced governments to make decisions in a number of domestic and international domains, including austerity (versus fiscal expansion); support for European Union (EU) funded bailouts; default on debts from foreign lenders; domestic banking reform; and reforms of labor market regulations.

In this paper we address the question of who citizens blame for the crisis. Among political elites and within the general public, there has been disagreement about the root causes of the economic crisis, as well as the policies that governments should pursue to exit the crisis.<sup>1</sup> For example, some economists argue that adoption of the euro has significantly worsened the crisis (in particular for Spain and Ireland), while others argue, not necessarily mutually exclusively, that lax

international capital regulations allowed domestic borrowers to borrow irresponsibly, fueling asset bubbles which ultimately crashed. Some analysts argue that these dynamics were worsened by liberalizing policies undertaken by conservative political parties in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Other economists focus on the importance of domestic wage rigidities and fiscal irresponsibility as being roadblocks to the end of the crisis. The roles of each of these causes and the appropriate policy responses remain hotly disputed.

We design a study that leverages the complexity of the crisis and the fact that both globalization-related and domestic-oriented causes of the crisis have been invoked in the public debate. We seek to explain who or what citizens think is to blame for the economic crisis.<sup>2</sup> Understanding who citizens blame for the economic crisis is important for testing theories of voter retrospection that assume that voters make proper attributions when evaluating the performance of the government. The ongoing nature of the crisis and salient public debate about the appropriate government responses make survey data about attitudes regarding the crisis especially valuable.

We argue that existing theories about who citizens blame for negative economic outcomes ignore the important role of *partisan bias* and *competing frames* for explaining attitudes toward the crisis. We theorize that partisan bias should affect which actors citizens hold responsible for or blame for the crisis. In particular, co-partisans of the incumbent government should be more willing to blame the actors that the incumbent government blames for the economic crisis. By blaming other actors, domestic governments can avoid being electorally punished for poor economic performance. This intuition is relevant to the modern economic voting literature which assumes that voters make certain attributions of responsibility before rewarding or punishing incumbent governments. We argue that partisan bias

---

<sup>1</sup> See a summary of discussion in an EU Commission report (2009).

---

<sup>2</sup> In other work we examine what policy responses citizens think should be pursued in response to the economic crisis.

should exist when factors related to globalization are made possible targets of blame. Recent literature argues that under conditions of high economic internationalization, voters punish incumbent governments less (Duch & Stevenson, 2010; Kayser, 2007); we argue that one important causal mechanism for this result is that supporters of the incumbent government are more willing to divert blame towards global factors. We theorize that, when the crisis is perceived as an international phenomenon, citizens should be more willing to exonerate the government and shift blame to other actors.

To test these conjectures, we conducted an original survey of citizens in Spain in autumn 2010, gathering data on attitudes about who is to blame for the economic crisis. Spain is a particularly useful test case of public attitudes regarding the crisis, because of the depth of the economic recession, and the public salience and division over different causes of the crisis. The crisis in Spain began in January 2008 after a rapid fall of asset and housing prices, a crash which had been preceded by the largest period of economic growth since the democratic transition. As of 2011, Spain is among one of the worst performing European economies, with a negative growth rate of 3.7 percent in 2009 and -.1 percent in 2010, and an unemployment rate over 20 percent since January 2011. According to the OECD, although growth is expected to resume in 2011, growth will still remain below 2 per cent in 2012, and the unemployment rate is projected to be still around 17 percent in 2012. The causes of and the policy options to exit the crisis have been the most reported issues in the Spanish media in the last several years, as evidenced recently by the massive public protests in May 2011, which occurred partly due to frustration with the economic situation.

To test our hypotheses, we implemented an experiment embedded in an Internet survey of 1,500 Spanish adult citizens. We use an experimental design to evaluate whether varying the *partisan endorsement* of different *framings* of the crisis affect who citizens think is to blame for the crisis. In the survey experiment, citizens were randomly assigned to treatment groups, with each group reading a different set of

statements regarding blame for the economic crisis. Respondents received statements about the cause of the economic crisis, which either blame globalization or domestic labor market regulations as a cause of the crisis. Additionally, some of these statements are endorsed by either the incumbent left-leaning Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, PSOE) or the right-leaning People's Party (*Partido Popular*, PP), or by a non-partisan group of experts. The random assignment of specifically worded partisan endorsements of different explanations of the crisis allows us to isolate the causal effects of different cues and establish baseline effects of the effect of types of bias on blame attribution. After receiving certain cues, respondents are then asked what factors they think are most responsible for the development of the crisis. This design allows us to evaluate whether simple interventions highlighting factors that have been shown to affect preferences in other domains—partisan endorsement and framings—affect citizen views of the crisis.

We find evidence of substantial partisan polarization regarding blame for the crisis. We also find that partisan endorsement of different framings of the crisis affect citizen blame for the crisis. In particular, individuals who identify as being close to the incumbent left-wing government (PSOE) are more likely to blame other international actors—European governments in particular—once globalization as a cause of the crisis is made salient. We find no symmetrical effects for PP (opposition) supporters. Further, we find that the results are most pronounced among citizens who identify with the PSOE, not among individuals who have left-wing ideological beliefs. Our findings demonstrate the importance of partisan bias and salience of alternative global issues in explaining blame for the great recession. The results also provide one possible explanation for the negative correlation between economic internationalization and economic voting. The results also give us better substantive understanding of citizen preferences during difficult economic times. More generally, the results contribute to the growing

literature on the link between attribution and retrospective voting.

Section two of the paper summarizes recent research on the causes of the economic crisis and presents the theoretical expectations. Section three presents the experimental design and methods of analysis. Section four presents the results. Section five concludes.

## **LITERATURE OVERVIEW AND THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS**

### **Partisan Bias, Blame for the Crisis, and Blame of Globalization**

Despite the long history of the study of retrospection and economic voting (Fiorina, 1981; M. Lewis-Beck, 1988; M. S. Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000), only recently has the outcome of blame (or responsibility attribution) been a subject of study. The negligence of blame is unfortunate, because in order for proper retrospection to occur as theorized, voters are assumed to correctly attribute outcomes to political actors or other factors. Relatively little research related to retrospective voting examines conditions under which citizens blame particular actors for economic performance (such as incumbent governments versus private actors versus non-political factors). Little research explores whether issues related to globalization are in fact blamed for negative outcomes, and whether incumbent governments benefit from blame of global as opposed to domestic factors. These gaps in the blame literature are important because vulnerability to biases in blame (for example partisan bias, or “scapegoating” other actors or causes) can explain variation in subsequent support for incumbent governments, political parties, or public policies.

Recent studies identify the importance of partisan bias in who citizens blame for various outcomes, especially in the US context (Arceneaux, 2003).<sup>3</sup> In non-economic contexts, the presence of partisan

bias has been found to affect blame of public officials (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001; Malhotra & Kuo, 2008). The standard operationalization of partisan bias is the effect of party cues or party endorsements on citizen preferences. Party cues have been found to affect a wide range of political attitudes and assessments of political candidates and policies in the US context (Achen & Bartels, 2006; Ansolabehere, Hirano, Snyder, & Ueda, 2006; Cohen, 2003; Layman, 2002; Malhotra & Kuo, 2008; Malhotra & Margalit, 2010). Far fewer studies assess the role of party cues and partisan bias on policy views in European states (Hobolt, 2007; Ray, 2003; Tilley & Hobolt, 2011).<sup>4</sup>

Despite the longstanding literature on importance of partisan bias on attitudes, and the nascent literature on the role of partisan bias in blame, few studies assess the role of partisan bias (as well as other forms of bias) in who citizens blame in times of economic crisis. Further, as discussed above, given the complex, multi-causal nature of current global economic crisis, we should expect partisan bias to play an important role in who citizens think is responsible. This could be due to incumbent and opposition parties’ promotion and blame of different causes of the crisis. The political consequences of blame during economic recessions remain overlooked in the political science literature; we are not aware of any studies test for the role of partisan bias and blame for the ongoing recession. Further, attitudes that form during recessions have been shown to be persistent over lifetimes (Giuliano & Spilimbergo, 2009).

A parallel literature argues examines the connection between economic openness and economic voting. One finding is that higher openness reduces the amount of economic voting; that is, incumbents either suffer less electorally during bad times or are rewarded less during good times.

---

<sup>3</sup> For an overview of the immense social psychological literature on blame assessment, responsibility attribution, and scapegoating see Shaver (1985). In this paper we use the phrases “blame” and “attribution responsibility” interchangeably.

---

<sup>4</sup> Malhotra and Kuo (2008) argue that in the context of many non-economic policies, party cues do not necessarily provide more meaningful information to the voter; in other contexts, party cues act as a “heuristic” that can provide meaningful information (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998).

However, different causal mechanisms for this finding remain untested. One possible mechanism given is that citizens believe that globalization reduces the capacity of governments to effectively pursue certain policies and are more likely to attribute negative outcomes to fluctuations in the world economy than to national governments (Duch & Stevenson, 2010; Fernández-Albertos, 2006; T Hellwig, 2001).<sup>5</sup> However, this mechanism of attribution is not directly tested in this literature. Another mechanism is that citizens who support the incumbent government find outcomes related to globalization a reason to exonerate the government for undesirable outcomes (Przeworski & Maravall, 2001).

### **Theoretical Expectations and Relevance of Spanish Context**

We delineate some basic expectations about the connection between partisan bias and blame for the economic crisis. These build on existing studies of blame and the literature on globalization preferences. We focus on a set of factors of blame that can be classified as “domestic” causes of the crisis and those related to “globalization.” We hypothesize that citizens who share the partisan affiliation of the incumbent government are more likely to blame factors for the crisis that the government also blames (i.e. not the government). Further, we hypothesize that citizens of the same party of the incumbent government will be more likely to blame globalization factors for the crisis when they are made salient. We also expect that citizens who do not affiliate with the incumbent government will be more likely to blame the incumbent government for the crisis, and be less likely to blame any of the global actors or factors that the incumbent government blames. We specify these hypotheses more precisely after describing our estimation strategy. In the results section, we also describe and test several alternative hypotheses regarding blame of the economic crisis.

---

<sup>5</sup> See also Kayser (2007) for a review. Hellwig’s account (2011) is one of the few that systematically tests the possibility of domestic blame of globalization as opposed to domestic governments for economic outcomes.

### **Theoretical Relevance of Evidence from Spain**

Before describing the specific research design, we briefly discuss the particular relevance of the theoretical framework to the Spanish case, which is substantively important because it has been one of the worst hit countries by the current economic crisis. Within Spain, there has been strong and publicly salient disagreement among economists, pundits, and political parties about the cause of the crisis and what policies should be pursued.<sup>6</sup> As a result, many globalization-related as well as domestic policy issues have been discussed as reasons for the crisis. Some pundits and political elites have argued that under-regulated international capital flows and integration with the EU helped drive the housing price bubble; others have focused on the importance of restrictive domestic labor regulations in preventing Spain from recovering from the crisis (Bentolila, Boldrin, Díaz-Giménez, & Dolado, 2009; Krugman, 2010).

Another important political feature of the economic crisis in Spain is that both of the major political parties have blamed both global (such as the actions of other governments and international investors) and domestic factors (such as labor market regulations) as causes of the crisis.<sup>7</sup> While the opposition PP has been one of the main proponents of the discourse that the rigidity

---

<sup>6</sup> There has been division over whether the government should pursue the following actions: increase or decrease government spending to spur growth; curtail collective bargaining rights of unions; introduce further reforms to allow for easier hiring and firing of workers; pursue further domestic financial regulation; guarantee repayment to domestic banks if they default; and support broader authority of EU institutions to intervene. As representative examples see the debate between the two “manifestos” of economists advocating for different labor market responses to the crisis (Andrés, Bentolila, Dolado, & Felgueroso, 2009; Gómez, 2009).

<sup>7</sup> For the PSOE, see a representative discussion in a report from the prominent PSOE-affiliated IDEAS foundation (2009); for a representative example of PP views on globalization and domestic-based explanations for the crisis, see (FAES, 2008.)



of the Spanish labor market is of central importance in understanding Spanish economic troubles, PSOE party elites have also shared these views, and have recently initiated reforms towards labor market “flexibilization,” which eventually led to the two major union confederations to call a public sector strike in June, 2010, and a general strike in September 2010. Similarly, representatives from both parties have blamed the actions of other European governments and international capital flows for facilitating the asset inflation which was the proximate cause of the economic crash, and have blamed European governments for interfering in domestic banking affairs and for “unfair” banking stress tests, exacerbating investor concerns. Representatives and legislators from both of the main parties have also blamed international ratings agencies for unfairly downgrading Spanish debt (Mallet, 2010).<sup>8</sup> The salient disagreements about the causes of the crisis, and the plausibility that different causes and policy interventions (involving globalization and domestic policy issues) can be attributed to different parties, allows us to use an experimental design that isolates each of these factors—partisan endorsement and framings of the crisis—and observe whether partisan endorsement of different causes of the crisis affects citizen blame.

## RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

To test the above hypotheses regarding the impact of the partisan endorsement of different framings of the crisis on blame and policy preferences, we administered an Internet survey to 1,500 respondents in

---

<sup>8</sup> Fiscal issues and austerity have also been salient issues in the Spanish press. These have been linked to the demands of international bond markets and international debt-ratings agencies. In response to the initial Greek debt crisis, increasing tensions in European debt markets and doubts over the sustainability of state finances in the European periphery led the Spanish government to announce in May 2011 a drastic fiscal austerity plan, which included a 5 per cent nominal wage cut for all workers in the public sector and a freeze on pensions, among other spending cuts.

October and November 2010. The survey was administered by Netquest, a Spanish survey firm. The resulting sample has similar demographic composition to large nationally representative surveys in Spain.<sup>9</sup> Respondents were randomly assigned to a treatment group; the treatment consisted in reading a short and simple statement about the causes of the economic crisis which differed across treatment groups. After reading the statement, they went on to answer a question about blame for the crisis. Demographic survey data was collected at the conclusion of the survey.

## Treatments

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of seven groups, one control and six treatment groups. The treatments vary along two dimensions: the *endorser* of the statement about the crisis, and the *framing* of the statement about the crisis. The endorser can be from a non-partisan source, the incumbent ideologically left-wing PSOE political party, or the opposition ideologically right-wing PP political party. The statement about the crisis is about the role of *globalization* or *domestic labor market regulations* affecting the crisis. The treatment statement template is below, with “/” indicating different text for each treatment group.

“We would like to present to you some conclusions that have been made about the current economic crisis. According to a report made by (non-partisan experts / an institution linked to the Socialist Party (PSOE) / an institution linked to the Popular Party (PP), (a series of

---

<sup>9</sup> The descriptive statistics and distributions of key demographic variables correspond to those of recent nationally representative surveys administered by the official national survey agency, the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (CIS). Also, we included a series of questions on attitudes and vote intention with the same wording as those included in simultaneous surveys conducted by the CIS, and there were no statistically significant differences in the distributions of these variables between the surveys. Appendix A gives an overview of Netquest’s stratification and sampling strategy. Appendix B compares the samples on the relevant demographic characteristics.

international factors related to globalization / regulations in the Spanish labor market) have played a major role in the development of the economic crisis that Spain is undergoing now.”<sup>10</sup>

Table 1 displays the experimental design and classification of each treatment. In the control group, the respondents read no statement about the crisis and simply answered a set of questions about blame and policy questions. In Treatments 2-4 the respondents read the statement about globalization as a cause of the crisis. In Treatment 2 this statement was endorsed by non-partisan experts; in Treatment 3 by the PSOE; and in Treatment 4 by the PP. In

Spain have been affiliated with both types of statements regarding the crisis.

We also code partisanship and demographic characteristics of the respondents; we code all characteristics as binary unless otherwise indicated. Individuals who respond as being closest to the PSOE out of a list of 10 political parties in Spain are coded “1” indicating s/he is a PSOE supporter, and “0” otherwise. The same procedure is used for coding PP supporters.<sup>11</sup> We also code political ideology on a seven point scale of “extreme left, left, center-left, center, center-right, right, extreme right.” We use a binary indicator for “left-wing ideology” if the respondent identifies as either “extreme

**TABLE 1. Experimental Design**

<b>Experimental Group</b>	<b>Information Treatment</b>	<b>Partisan Treatment</b>	<b>Probability of Receiving Treatment</b>
Control Group	None	None	.4
Group 2	Globalization	Non-partisan	.1
Group 3	Globalization	PSOE endorsed	.1
Group 4	Globalization	PP endorsed	.1
Group 5	Domestic	Non-partisan	.1
Group 6	Domestic	PSOE endorsed	.1
Group 7	Domestic	PP endorsed	.1

treatments 5-7 respondents read the statement about labor market regulations as a cause of the crisis. In Treatment 5 this statement was endorsed by non-partisan experts; in Treatment 6 by the PSOE; and in Treatment 7 by the PP. As the above discussion alludes, each treatment is credible in the sense that political parties in

left, left, center-left,” and 0 otherwise. Education is coded as binary where “1” indicates completion of secondary school and “0” indicates all levels below. Income is coded by decile. Gender is coded as 1 for female. We code respondent’s “insider” labor market status as 1 if the worker has a formal labor contract and 0 otherwise.

### **Dependent Variable**

Following the above experimental treatment, we asked respondents which factors they blame most for the crisis. All respondents had to rank three out of six factors that they blame the most for the

<sup>10</sup> The Spanish translation of the statement is: “Ahora le querríamos presentar algunas conclusiones que se han hecho recientemente sobre la actual crisis económica en España. Según un informe de “una institución asociada al Partido Popular (PP)/ el Partido Socialista /un grupo de expertos independientes”, “una serie de factores internacionales relacionados con la globalización/las regulaciones en el mercado de trabajo español” han jugado un papel crucial en el desarrollo de la actual crisis económica que atraviesa España.” Other Spanish translations of survey items are available upon request. Appendix C demonstrates the randomization process was successful.

<sup>11</sup> The question about partisan proximity is consistent with standard Spanish surveys, and reads: “Independently of the party you will end up voting for, to which political party or coalition do you feel closest or you feel closest to your ideas?”

development of the economic crisis. The question was:

“Thinking about the current economic crisis, we would like to know which are, according to you, the three most important factors that have contributed to the crisis among the following six, ranking them from most important to least important: The actions of the current Spanish government; the actions of Spanish banks; the entry of Spain in the euro; the actions of European governments; the actions of international investors; the regulations in the Spanish labor market.”<sup>12</sup>

Respondents chose three out of the six to rank with “1” being most to blame, “2” next, “3” third most; the rest of the response options are unranked.<sup>13</sup> Three of the factors deal with non-domestic causes (the euro, foreign investors, and European governments), and three factors are explicitly about domestic actors (the incumbent government, domestic banks, and labor market regulations).

## Methods

In this section we describe the methods used for analysis. The appropriate model where the dependent variable data are ranked items is the rank-ordered logistic or “exploded logit” model (Allison &

---

<sup>12</sup> The Spanish translation reads as follows: “Pensando en la crisis económica que ha afectado a España, nos gustaría que nos indicara los que, a su juicio, son los tres principales factores que han contribuido a la gravedad de la crisis (ordenándolos de mayor a menor). Sabemos que puede ser difícil ordenarlos, pero por favor hágalo lo mejor que pueda: Las acciones del gobierno español actual. Las acciones de los bancos españoles. La entrada de España en el euro. Las acciones de los gobiernos europeos. Las acciones de los inversores internacionales. Las regulaciones en el mercado de trabajo español.”

<sup>13</sup> We asked respondents only to rank the top three factors, as those three would likely provide a clearer sense of who respondents found more responsible. Previous studies have documented that ranking excessive items is a cognitively difficult task in a survey context; further, we wanted to minimize risk of survey non-completion.

Christakis, 1994; Beggs & Cardell, 1981). This model allows us to assess which variables affect the respondents’ ranking of items relative to other items (for example, blaming the government more so than domestic banks). We then report the likelihood that that the respondent ranks a particular item higher than the other items, which are set as the baseline. Allison & Christakis (1994) and Malhotra and Kuo (2008) provide a relevant application of the model; we draw on summaries of the model here and the latter’s notation (p. 125). The rank-ordered logit model is a generalization of conditional/multinomial logit models; the model explains how the characteristics of the *choosers* and the *items* affect the likelihood of the items being selected. The process of ranking is an aggregation of these individual choices. Here the items are the individual items linked to the crisis as listed above. Ranked data can be statistically modeled by combining together a set of conditional logit models to create the rank-ordered logit model. The likelihood of the rank-ordered logit model is simply the product of the likelihoods of individual conditional logit models.

Consistent with previous applications of this model, we assume that the data are derived from a random utility model where  $BR_{ij}$  represents the latent blame respondent  $i$  has for item  $j$  (out of  $J$  items). We observe  $Y_{ij}$ , which is the blame ranking respondent  $i$  assigns to item  $j$ .<sup>14</sup> Although  $BR_{ij}$  is unobserved, we assume that respondent  $i$  ranks item  $j$  more blameworthy than item  $k$  if  $BR_{ij} > BR_{ik}$ . Each  $BR_{ij}$  is modeled as having a systematic component ( $\mu_{ij}$ ) and a random component ( $\epsilon_{ij}$ ). We estimate variations of a model that account for characteristics of the blame items as well as the partisan affiliation of the respondents. We first estimate a model where we assess whether the fact that an item is related to domestic causes of the crisis (the government, domestic banks, and labor market regulations) is more likely to be ranked higher than global/non-domestic items (the actions of other European

---

<sup>14</sup> This notation is used in Malhotra and Kuo (2008, p. 125) and follows from previously cited works. We coded blame to lie between 1 (least blame) and 4 (most blame).

governments; Spanish membership in the Eurozone, and foreign investors). This equation takes the form of:

$$BR_{ij} = \beta_1 D_j + \beta_2 (D_j \times S_i) + \beta_3 (D_j \times T2_i) + \beta_4 (D_j \times S_i \times T2_i) + \beta_5 (D_j \times T3_i) + \beta_6 (D_j \times S_i \times T3_i) + \beta_7 (D_j \times T4_i) + \beta_8 (D_j \times S_i \times T4_i) + \beta_9 (D_j \times T5_i) + \beta_{10} (D_j \times S_i \times T5_i) + \beta_{11} (D_j \times T6_i) + \beta_{12} (D_j \times S_i \times T6_i) + \beta_{13} (D_j \times T7_i) + \beta_{14} (D_j \times S_i \times T7_i) + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where  $D_j$  is a dummy variable representing whether the item  $j$  is one of the three domestic items,  $S_i$  is a dummy variable representing whether the individual respondent  $i$  feels closest to the PSOE, and  $T2_i$  is the treatment dummy for treatment 2;  $T3$  is the dummy variable for treatment 3, and so on.<sup>15</sup> The condition dummies are indexed by respondent because the treatment was administered at the individual level and does not vary by the blame items.  $D_j$  is indexed by item because the status of being a domestic or global issue is the same for each respondent.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> We do not include the terms  $S_i$ , and  $T_i$  because they do not vary across choices within individuals. The estimating equation must include a variable that distinguishes *within* respondents; thus some aspect of the ranked items must be included for each respondent characteristic. This allows one to assess the conditional impact of respondent characteristics (including assignment of a treatment) on the likelihood of ranking one item higher than another (blaming one item more than another). We can also estimate equation (1) for each treatment group; the sample for each estimation is just the control group and the treatment group of interest, for respondents who identify with either the PSOE or PP. We can then compare across specifications which treatments produce statistically significant changes in blame rankings of domestic versus global items. Equation (1) implies the likelihood,  $L_i$ , of a respondent ranking item  $k$  as more blameworthy than item  $j$ . Let  $\delta_{ijk} = 1$  if  $Y_{ik} \geq Y_{ij}$  and 0 if  $Y_{ik} < Y_{ij}$ . Then,

$$L_i = \prod_{j=1}^J \left[ \frac{\exp(\mu_{ij})}{\sum_{k=1}^J \delta_{ijk} \exp(\mu_{ik})} \right]. \quad (3)$$

The substantive interpretation of the coefficients in equation (1) is as follows.  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_1 + \beta_2$  represent the likelihood of PP and PSOE supporters, respectively, in the control group ranking a domestic issue more blameworthy than the global issues.  $\beta_3$  and  $\beta_3 + \beta_4$  represent the likelihood of PP and PSOE supporters, respectively, in the treatment 2 condition, ranking a domestic item as more blameworthy than a global item, as compared to the control group.  $\beta_5$  and  $\beta_5 + \beta_6$  represent the likelihood of PP and PSOE supporters, respectively, in the treatment 3 condition, ranking a domestic item as more blameworthy than a global item, as compared to the control group. The same interpretation of these coefficients follows for each treatment group:  $\beta_7$  and  $\beta_7 + \beta_8$  for treatment 4;  $\beta_9$  and  $\beta_9 + \beta_{10}$  for treatment 5;  $\beta_{11}$  and  $\beta_{11} + \beta_{12}$  for treatment 6 condition; and finally  $\beta_{13}$  and  $\beta_{13} + \beta_{14}$  for treatment 7. The substantive impact on the likelihood of ranking an item higher than another is found by taking the exponential of the coefficient.

In terms of the theoretical expectations laid out in the previous section, we expect  $\beta_1$  to be positive and  $\beta_1 + \beta_2$  to be zero or negative. That is, we expect that PP supporters should be more likely to blame domestic-related issues than globalization-related issues, where PSOE individuals should either blame them equally or blame globalization issues more. We expect  $\beta_5 + \beta_6$  to be negative; that is, once presented with another set of global actors that are made salient, PSOE supporters should be less likely to blame domestic factors for the crisis.

We also estimate alternative specifications of the rank ordered logit model that allows us to more directly assess which individual characteristics and treatments are more likely to make respondents blame *specific* items more than others. We present an example specification where we examine blame of each item relative to a baseline item of blame of European governments. This means we must estimate a model that includes all binary indicators of the other five items, interacted with partisan affiliation, relative

to the baseline. The example specification takes the form:

$$BR_{ij} = \beta_1 Gov_j + \beta_2 (Gov_j \times S_i) + \beta_3 (Gov_j \times T2_i) + \beta_4 (Gov_j \times S_i \times T2_i) + \beta_5 Ban_j + \beta_6 (Ban_j \times S_i) + \beta_7 (Ban_j \times T2_i) + \beta_8 (Ban_j \times S_i \times T2_i) + \beta_9 Eur_j + \beta_{10} (Eur_j \times S_i) + \beta_{11} (Eur_j \times T2_i) + \beta_{12} (Eur_j \times S_i \times T2_i) + \beta_{13} For_j + \beta_{14} (For_j \times S_i) + \beta_{15} (For_j \times T2_i) + \beta_{16} (For_j \times S_i \times T2_i) + \beta_{17} Lab_j + \beta_{18} (Lab_j \times S_i) + \beta_{19} (Lab_j \times T2_i) + \beta_{20} (Lab_j \times S_i \times T2_i) + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (2)$$

where the variables  $Gov_j$ ,  $Ban_j$ ,  $Eur_j$ ,  $For_j$ ,  $Lab_j$  are binary indicator variables for the items of the domestic government actions, domestic banks, Eurozone membership, international investors, and labor market regulations, respectively; the sample for this estimation is respondents in the control group and those in condition of treatment 2. The baseline is thus the binary indicator of the blame item of European government actions. The interpretation of  $\beta_1$ ,  $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ ,  $\beta_3$ , and  $\beta_3 + \beta_4$ , so on, is similar to that of equation (1), only instead of the impact of domestic versus global issues on respondent rankings, we can evaluate whether each respondent ranks each item (domestic government actions, domestic banks, Eurozone membership, international investors, and labor market regulations) as more blameworthy relative to the item of the actions of European governments. Further, as with equation 1, we can determine the impact of being a PP versus PSOE supporter and the impact of treatment 2 on the likelihood of ranking each item in equation (2) as more blameworthy than that of European governments.<sup>17</sup> Equation (2) can also be estimated by including all treatment categories (T2 through T7), to evaluate the impact of each treatment on blame. For tractability and ease of reading purposes, we display the results from estimation of equation (2) in Table 5 where the baseline is the item of European governments, and include all treatment (T2 through T7) In the

<sup>17</sup> Equation (2) can be estimated with a different blame item as a baseline to evaluate the likelihood of blaming one item relative to another baseline item. The substantive results do not change. The full model which gives equivalent results includes 120 coefficients.

results section, we discuss implications of results where the treatment had little impact on the relationship between partisanship and blame of specific items for the crisis.

## RESULTS

In this section we present the results of the study. We begin with discussion of the control group. We first present descriptive statistics of the control group and then examine determinants of blame within the control group. After discussion of the results for the control group, we turn to the experimental results. Overall, we find evidence of partisan differences regarding blame of the crisis; making globalization salient exonerates the government for PSOE voters and increases blame of European governments and foreign investors. We show that this result is confined only to PSOE supporters, and not to left-leaning ideological citizens.

### Evidence from the Control Group

**Demographics of the Control Group.** We briefly summarize the descriptive statistics from the control group and discuss the baseline effects and results from the control group. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the entire sample of respondents. Consistent with results from other nationally representative samples (e.g. CIS), only a slight majority of respondents identify with one of the two main political parties: 30 percent of the control group list themselves as closest to the socialist party (PSOE); 23 percent of the group lists themselves as closest to the conservatives (PP).

**Blame of the crisis overall.** We start with the patterns of blame within the control group. Which combination of blame items were most often placed in the top three? Recall the six factors that respondents had to choose to rank as the three most important were the actions of the incumbent government, the actions of domestic banks, existing labor market regulations, foreign investors, other European governments, and the euro. Figure 1 displays the frequency of the twenty possible three-factor combinations within the control group. Among all respondents, nearly 60 percent


**TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics of Sample**

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Proximity to PP	1501	.25	.43	0	1
Proximity to PSOE	1501	.29	.45	0	1
Income (decile)	1431	6.28	2.66	1	10
Female	1501	.51	.50	0	1
Age	1501	40.10	13.13	18	78
No education	1488	.0034	.058	0	1
Education (primary & lower sec)	1488	.11	.31	0	1
Education (secondary)	1488	.38	.49	0	1
Education (tertiary)	1488	.51	.50	0	1
Labor Market Insider	1501	.44	.50	0	1

chose only four combinations of factors out of twenty possible combinations. The modal combination was the government, domestic banks, and foreign investors; followed by (2) the actions of the government, domestic banks, and labor regulations; (3) the government, banks, and Spanish membership in the Eurozone, (4) domestic banks, foreign investors, and Spanish membership in the Eurozone.

questions of which factors respondents placed in the top three list of most to blame for the economic crisis, and demonstrate the important role that partisanship plays in people’s assessment of the crisis: partisan identification greatly determines which factors people think are most responsible. These factors are for most cases more important than demographic variables alone.

**FIGURE 1. Who is to Blame? Distribution of Combinations of Items Ranked in Top 3**




These combinations however do not give us a sense of which individual factors were blamed most. We address now the

Figure 2 displays the patterns of blame of the crisis for the entire group and the blame decomposed by partisan affiliation.

Two-thirds of respondents (67 percent) blame the incumbent government as a top three factor explaining the crisis. 73 percent of respondents blame the actions of domestic banks as a top three factor of the respondent.<sup>18</sup> Over half of the respondents (56 percent) put the actions of foreign investors as a top three factor, whereas Spain's adoption of the euro, the actions of other European governments, and labor regulations were less blamed (33 percent, 26 percent, and 40 percent, respectively). In terms of the factor that was put as the top factor contributing to the crisis, the actions of the government, domestic banks, and foreign investors were the most blamed (28 percent, 27 percent, and 27 percent respectively).

differ greatly in their views on the crisis. Partisanship greatly distinguishes who respondents blame for the crisis for all factors of blame, except for the factor of Spanish entry in the Eurozone. Overall, PP supporters are more likely to blame the government and labor market regulations, followed by domestic banks, and put those as top blameworthy factors. PSOE partisans are more likely to blame domestic banks, the actions of European governments, and foreign investors. They are willing to blame the government, but far less so than PP supporters. For PSOE supporters, the most blamed combination (domestic banks, European governments and foreign investors) does not include the government. Specifically, about half of PSOE

**FIGURE 2. Who is to Blame? Percentage Ranking Factor as Top 3, by Partisan ID**



Note: Bars refer to percentages ranking factor as top three to blame for the crisis, for the control group.

**Blame of the crisis by partisanship.** As Figure 2 shows, PSOE and PP supporters

partisans (51 percent) listed the government as one of the top three factors for the crisis, whereas 93 percent of PP partisans listed the government as a top three factor ( $p < .001$ ). 78 percent of PSOE partisans blame the banks as a top three factor as opposed to 61 percent of PP partisans ( $p < .001$ ). 65 percent of PSOE partisans

<sup>18</sup> Note that these differences do not reveal whether respondents consistently ranked banks as more blameworthy than the government, only that more respondents placed the banks as a top three factor.

blame the actions of foreign investors as opposed to 36 percent of PP partisans. 37 percent of PSOE partisans blame the actions of European governments, as opposed to 16 percent of PP supporters ( $p < .05$ ). Regarding domestic labor regulations, only 36 percent of PSOE supporters list them as a top three factor, whereas over half (54 percent) of PP supporters do so ( $p < .05$ ). The only factor for which partisan differences do not exist is blame of the euro. If we examine how partisanship affects the *top* ranked factor that is blamed, and the patterns are even starker. Only 12 percent of PSOE supporters list the government as a most blameworthy, in comparison to 61 percent of PP supporters) ( $p < .001$ ). The difference in views by partisanship on banks' responsibilities is larger as well: 37 percent of PSOE supporters put the banks as the top factor to blame, in contrast to only 11 percent of PP supporters ( $p < .001$ ). 33 percent of PSOE supporters blamed the actions of foreign investors most, in contrast to 12 percent of PP supporters ( $p < .001$ ).

These partisan differences remain when controlling for the demographic variables of education, income, age, gender, and labor market status. As Table 3 shows, partisan identity best explains which factor is blamed. The table displays logistic estimations where the dependent variable is whether each factor is ranked as a top three factor for the crisis; we estimate separate equations where the binary party identification variable is compared to the baseline of the rest of the respondents in the control group. For each independent variable, with the exception of the euro, the coefficients for the binary variables of PSOE and PP affiliation are statistically significant. The coefficient for PSOE supporter is positively correlated with blame of the domestic banks, foreign investors, and other European governments. PSOE individuals are less likely to blame the incumbent government and labor market regulations. PP supporters, consistent with the bivariate cross tabulations reported above, are more likely to blame the government and labor market regulations, and less likely to blame

domestic banks, international investors, and European governments.

Partisan affiliation matters much more than other demographic characteristics in explaining blame for the crisis. Income is positively correlated with blaming domestic banks, whereas more educated and wealthier respondents are less likely to blame the euro. More educated individuals are more likely to blame foreign investors. In conclusion, from the control group we learn that PSOE individuals blame the following factors: banks; foreign investors; and European governments. They are much less likely to blame the government (though some PSOE supporters still do). By contrast PP individuals are much more likely to blame the government and labor market regulations, and less likely to blame the banks, international investors, and European governments. The euro is the only issue where partisan identity does not affect whether it is blamed as a top 3 factor.

### Experimental results

We now turn to the results of the estimations of equations (1) and (2), examining whether partisan identification affects the blame of some causes of the crisis over others, and whether the experimental treatments affected blame. Table 4 (equation 1) and Table 5 (equation 2) shows the results of this analysis. In Model 1 in Table 4 we present a baseline result to illustrate the importance of partisan bias. If we consider the sample of respondents who support either the PSOE or PP within the control group, across both groups of respondents, domestic issues relative to globalization related issues are 1.9 times more likely to be ranked higher ( $\beta_1 = .64$ ,  $p < .001$ ). But supporters of the PSOE and PP individuals blame the domestic and global issues differently. PSOE respondents are 1.3 times as likely to rank domestic issues as more blameworthy than global issues ( $\beta_1 + \beta_2 = .25$ ,  $p < .005$ ), whereas PP respondents are 3.3 times as likely to rank domestic issues as more blameworthy ( $\beta_1 = 1.19$ ,  $p < .001$ ). This partisan gap is unsurprising, given the discussion of Figure 2 and the higher blame that PP respondents assign to the role of the government and labor market regulations.



**TABLE 3. Logistic Regressions Explaining Blame of Each Factor, Control Group**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Government		Domestic Banks		Eurozone		Foreign Investors		European Governments		Labor Regulations	
Income	0.018 (0.033)	0.0031 (0.034)	0.080** (0.034)	0.089** (0.034)	-0.064** (0.032)	-0.064** (0.032)	0.035 (0.031)	0.049 (0.032)	0.0035 (0.035)	0.0081 (0.035)	0.014 (0.031)	0.0061 (0.031)
Education	0.041 (0.14)	0.046 (0.14)	-0.15 (0.15)	-0.15 (0.15)	-0.44** (0.14)	-0.44** (0.14)	0.45** (0.14)	0.46** (0.14)	-0.084 (0.15)	-0.093 (0.15)	0.062 (0.14)	0.060 (0.14)
Gender	0.063 (0.18)	-0.040 (0.19)	-0.20 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.19)	0.47** (0.18)	0.46** (0.18)	-0.32* (0.17)	-0.25 (0.18)	-0.065 (0.19)	-0.018 (0.19)	0.060 (0.17)	0.017 (0.17)
Age	-0.0031 (0.0069)	-0.0017 (0.0071)	-0.0077 (0.0072)	-0.0086 (0.0072)	-0.014** (0.0070)	-0.014** (0.0070)	0.021** (0.0068)	0.021** (0.0069)	-0.0023 (0.0073)	-0.0029 (0.0073)	-0.0054 (0.0066)	-0.0049 (0.0067)
Insider	-1.00** (0.19)		0.39* (0.21)		-0.078 (0.20)		0.56** (0.19)		0.70** (0.20)		-0.22 (0.18)	
Prox.PSOE	0.14 (0.19)	0.23 (0.19)	0.21 (0.20)	0.17 (0.20)	-0.27 (0.19)	-0.27 (0.19)	-0.088 (0.18)	-0.16 (0.18)	-0.19 (0.20)	-0.21 (0.20)	0.015 (0.17)	0.066 (0.18)
Prox. PP		2.22** (0.34)		-0.71** (0.21)		0.039 (0.21)		-1.17** (0.21)		-0.74** (0.25)		0.76** (0.20)
Constant	0.87* (0.46)	0.22 (0.46)	1.10** (0.48)	1.38** (0.48)	1.19** (0.46)	1.16** (0.45)	-1.83** (0.45)	-1.50** (0.45)	-0.89* (0.48)	-0.50 (0.47)	-0.40 (0.43)	-0.62 (0.44)
<i>N</i>	597	597	597	597	597	597	597	597	597	597	597	597
pseudo <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.041	0.090	0.020	0.030	0.048	0.048	0.043	0.072	0.021	0.016	0.004	0.020

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$

Model 2 of Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation 1. We examine whether there is partisan bias in blaming domestic versus global factors and whether the treatments affect such blame. We present results for just PSOE or PP supporters. The most substantively important result is the impact of treatment 3 on blame rankings. Treatment 3 (the PSOE endorsement of globalization as a cause of the crisis) has a statistically significant impact on PSOE respondents' likelihood of ranking domestic issues as more blameworthy than global issues, relative to the control group. As discussed above, within the control group, PP partisans blame domestic issues more so than global issues, relative to PSOE partisans. But once respondents receive a PSOE endorsement as globalization as the cause of the crisis, PSOE respondents are more likely to rank domestic issues as *less* blameworthy than global issues, relative to the control group. In fact, they are roughly 1.6 times *less* likely to blame domestic issues ( $\beta_5 + \beta_6 = -.47, p < .02$ ). Consistent with our theoretical expectation, there is no symmetric effect for PP partisans regarding the impact of treatment 4 on PP supporters;  $\beta_7 = .11, p < .48$  (treatment 4 is the PP endorsement of globalization as a cause of the crisis). The endorsement of globalization as a cause of the crisis by the PSOE helps exonerate the government for the crisis, but only for those who share the party label of the government. However, citizens who affiliate with the opposition party are not affected by this particular endorsement. Model 2 also shows that PP supporters tend to blame domestic factors more when labor market regulations are made salient by the PSOE (Treatment 6) ( $\beta_{11} = .51, p < .05$ ). This effect does not exist for PSOE supporters ( $\beta_{11} + \beta_{12} = .11, p < .59$ ). We discuss this result below. This evidence indicates that when presented with intra-party endorsement of alternative explanations for the crisis, PSOE supporters are willing to shift blame to global actors, and blame domestic factors less. But to whom specifically do these respondents shift their blame?

**Blame of specific items.** We now turn to estimations that allow us to assess which

individual characteristics and treatments are more likely to make respondents blame specific items higher than others; specifically, we examine blame of each factor relative to a baseline of blame of European governments, equation (2). Table 5 presents the results. For PSOE respondents, exposure to treatment 3—PSOE endorsement of globalization as a cause of the crisis—reduces their blame of the government relative to European governments. PSOE respondents are more likely to blame the actions of European governments when receiving the statement endorsed by the PSOE that globalization factors are responsible for the economic crisis.  $\beta_1$  is positive (2.95,  $p < .001$ ), indicating PP respondents are 19 times more likely to blame the government more so than European governments. PSOE supporters are far less likely to blame the government relative to European governments (1.5 times as likely) ( $\beta_1 + \beta_2 = .38, p < .02$ ). Treatment 3—exposure to PSOE endorsement of globalization as a cause of the crisis—reduces PSOE blame of the government relative to European governments. PSOE respondents in this treatment condition are 1.6 times *less* likely than in the control group of blaming the government over European governments ( $\beta_5 + \beta_6 = -.47, p < .03$ ). We do not find substantive effects of the treatment on changing the relative blame of the other items relative to European governments.

We now examine whether the effects of the treatment are determined by political ideology, as opposed to party affiliation. Some literature suggests that more left-wing ideological citizens are more skeptical of globalization; this could be because of the belief that globalization harms workers, or that it unfairly constrains governments (Cerny, 1995; Fernández-Albertos, 2006; Garrett, 1998). We test this account by estimating equations (1) and (2) and interacting the treatments with left-wing ideology of the respondent (as opposed to party affiliation). The results are displayed in the third column of Table 4 and Table 6. In both models, the results demonstrate that the PSOE endorsement of framings of the crisis does not distinguish left-wing versus right-wing respondents regarding blame of the crisis. Left-wing respondents are not

**TABLE 4. Results of Rank Ordered Estimations: Domestic v. Global Items**

	(1) Control Group	(2) Equation 1	(3) Equation 1 (with ideology)
Domestic	1.19** (0.11)	1.19** (0.11)	0.90** (0.08)
Domestic * PSOE proximity	-0.94** (0.14)	-0.94** (0.14)	
Domestic * Left			-0.61** (0.10)
Domestic * Treatment 2		0.18 (0.23)	0.33* (0.17)
Domestic * Treatment 2 * PSOE		-0.060 (0.30)	
Domestic * Treatment 2 * Left			-0.16 (0.23)
Domestic * Treatment 3		0.25 (0.24)	0.21 (0.18)
Domestic * Treatment 3 * PSOE		-0.71** (0.31)	
Domestic * Treatment 3 * Left			-0.43* (0.23)
Domestic * Treatment 4		0.11 (0.24)	0.17 (0.16)
Domestic * Treatment 4 * PSOE		-0.27 (0.31)	
Domestic * Treatment 4 * Left			-0.20 (0.23)
Domestic * Treatment 5		-0.11 (0.26)	-0.019 (0.18)
Domestic * Treatment 5 * PSOE		0.20 (0.33)	
Domestic * Treatment 5 * Left			0.18 (0.24)
Domestic * Treatment 6		0.51** (0.26)	0.39** (0.17)
Domestic * Treatment 6 * PSOE		-0.40 (0.33)	
Domestic * Treatment 6 * Left			-0.21 (0.23)
Domestic * Treatment 7		0.27 (0.26)	0.49** (0.19)
Domestic * Treatment 7 * PSOE		-0.028 (0.34)	
Domestic * Treatment 7 * Left			-0.37 (0.25)
<i>N</i>	1920	4782	8634
Pseudo R square	0.045	0.058	0.042
Log-likelihood	-1463.72	-3594.35	-6598.78
LR chi square	136.56** (2 df)	442.55** (14 df)	580.85** (14 df)

**TABLE 5. Results of Rank Ordered Estimations. Equation 2**

	Item (baseline category: European governments)				
	<i>Government</i>	<i>Banks</i>	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Foreign investors</i>	<i>Labor market</i>
Item	2.95** (0.25)	1.58** (0.24)	0.79** (0.25)	0.86** (0.25)	1.32** (0.24)
Item* PSOE proximity	-2.57** (0.29)	-0.29 (0.28)	-0.87** (0.31)	0.052 (0.30)	-1.34** (0.30)
Item * Treatment 2	-0.39 (0.48)	0.23 (0.47)	-0.38 (0.52)	-0.13 (0.50)	0.0063 (0.47)
Item * Treatment 2 * PSOE	0.42 (0.61)	-0.10 (0.59)	0.59 (0.66)	-0.12 (0.62)	0.11 (0.61)
Item * Treatment 3	0.44 (0.60)	0.91 (0.59)	0.056 (0.65)	0.76 (0.61)	0.59 (0.59)
Item * Treatment 3 * PSOE	-1.25* (0.71)	-1.36** (0.68)	-0.37 (0.76)	-0.60 (0.70)	-1.15 (0.72)
Item * Treatment 4	0.15 (0.54)	0.41 (0.51)	-0.26 (0.58)	0.30 (0.54)	0.011 (0.52)
Item * Treatment 4 * PSOE	-1.00 (0.65)	-0.75 (0.61)	-0.37 (0.70)	-0.82 (0.64)	-0.51 (0.64)
Item * Treatment 5	0.31 (0.68)	0.60 (0.67)	0.56 (0.70)	0.86 (0.69)	0.39 (0.68)
Item * Treatment 5 * PSOE	-0.14 (0.77)	-0.70 (0.76)	-1.00 (0.84)	-0.75 (0.78)	-0.35 (0.79)
Item * Treatment 6	1.36* (0.70)	0.74 (0.66)	0.33 (0.71)	0.66 (0.69)	1.18* (0.66)
Item * Treatment 6 * PSOE	-1.40* (0.78)	-0.98 (0.75)	-0.54 (0.82)	-1.22 (0.77)	-1.36* (0.76)
Item * Treatment 7	0.048 (0.57)	0.43 (0.55)	-0.0099 (0.60)	-0.087 (0.60)	0.15 (0.56)
Item * Treatment 7 * PSOE	0.37 (0.69)	-0.28 (0.68)	0.17 (0.75)	-0.14 (0.72)	-0.12 (0.71)
N			4782		
Pseudo R square			0.14		
Log Likelihood			-3273.862		
LR chi square (70 df)			1083.54**		
Standard errors in parentheses					
* $p < 0.10$ , ** $p < 0.05$					

**TABLE 6. Effect of Treatments on Blame of Individual Items by Political Ideology**

	Item (baseline category: European governments)				
	<i>Government</i>	<i>Banks</i>	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Foreign investors</i>	<i>Labor market</i>
Item	2.33** (0.17)	1.61** (0.17)	0.78** (0.18)	1.12** (0.17)	1.02** (0.17)
Item * Left	-1.85** (0.21)	-0.20 (0.21)	-0.80** (0.23)	-0.097 (0.21)	-0.97** (0.22)
Item * Treatment 2	0.046 (0.37)	0.30 (0.37)	-0.18 (0.40)	-0.17 (0.38)	0.27 (0.37)
Item * Treatment 2 * Left	0.34 (0.48)	-0.22 (0.47)	0.57 (0.52)	0.078 (0.49)	-0.019 (0.49)
Item * Treatment 3	-0.26 (0.36)	0.12 (0.35)	-0.54 (0.40)	-0.22 (0.37)	0.0036 (0.36)
Item * Treatment 3 * Left	-0.16 (0.45)	-0.44 (0.43)	0.22 (0.50)	0.35 (0.45)	-0.26 (0.46)
Item * Treatment 4	-0.17 (0.34)	0.21 (0.34)	-0.23 (0.37)	-0.24 (0.36)	-0.079 (0.35)
Item * Treatment 4 * Left	-0.22 (0.44)	-0.38 (0.43)	-0.29 (0.49)	-0.063 (0.45)	-0.31 (0.46)
Item * Treatment 5	0.083 (0.40)	0.12 (0.40)	0.040 (0.42)	0.092 (0.41)	-0.18 (0.42)
Item * Treatment 5 * Left	0.14 (0.49)	-0.21 (0.48)	-0.31 (0.54)	-0.089 (0.50)	0.37 (0.52)
Item * Treatment 6	0.60 (0.42)	0.70* (0.42)	-0.0012 (0.47)	0.50 (0.43)	-1.08** (0.50)
Item * Treatment 6 * Left	-0.56 (0.50)	-1.08** (0.49)	-0.31 (0.55)	-1.08** (0.50)	0.73* (0.42)
Item * Treatment 7	0.58 (0.43)	0.63 (0.42)	0.047 (0.47)	0.13 (0.44)	0.60 (0.43)
Item * Treatment 7 * Left	-0.61 (0.52)	-0.73 (0.51)	-0.15 (0.57)	-0.51 (0.53)	-0.56 (0.53)
N			8634		
Pseudo R square			0.11		
Log Likelihood			-6111.44		
LR chi-square (70df)			1552.52**		
Standard errors in parentheses					
* $p < 0.10$ , ** $p < 0.05$					

less likely to blame domestic issues when exposed to treatment 3; nor does exposure to treatment 3 make them more likely to exonerate the government. This indicates that the impact of the treatment operates through partisan affiliation, not ideological beliefs about the role of globalization.<sup>19</sup>

***Determining top three items blamed.*** We turn to an alternative set of analyses that examine whether the treatments affected respondents' choice of which items were top three elements to blame or not. We confirm the findings from the rank ordered analysis. Consistent with the hypotheses and rank-ordered estimations, we find that treatments affect which factors are blamed for the crisis. Table 7 presents logistic estimations predicting whether different factors are blamed as top three causes of the crisis. These estimations are conditioned on PSOE or PP affiliated respondents. The key variables of interest are the binary variables indicating exposure to a particular treatment, and whether that treatment makes PSOE or PP respondents more or less likely to blame the factor in question.

When PSOE respondents are exposed to Treatment 3, they are far less likely to put the government as a top three factor. Controlling for the standard covariates, exposure to treatment 3 (PSOE advocacy of globalization as a cause) reduces the probability of blaming the government by 16 percentage points. Equivalently, exposure to treatment 3 increases the probability of blaming the actions of other European governments by 16 percentage points ( $p < .07$ ). Those affiliated with the incumbent government shift blame for the crisis away from the government and towards other European governments once the issue of globalization as a possible target of blame is made salient by the incumbent party. Importantly, blame is not shifted towards all other actors; the lion's

share of the blame shift goes towards other governments, and foreign investors, domestic banks, or the euro. However, we do not find similar effects when the PSOE endorses labor-market reasons for the crisis.

We also find some effects for citizens who affiliate with the main opposition party. PP supporters respond to Treatment 2 (non-partisan experts blaming globalization for the crisis) by blaming the government less. PP supporters also respond to Treatment 6 (PSOE blaming Spanish labor market regulations) by blaming labor market regulations more. The positive effect of the PSOE endorsed labor market explanation for the crisis could be more powerful because the statement is viewed as a shift in position for the PSOE by PP respondents, while the absence of an effect of the PP endorsed labor market explanation on blame of labor market regulations could be because PP respondents have already internalized this framing of the crisis.

As in the rank-ordered analysis, we interpret these results as suggesting that party endorsement of different framings of the crisis can affect blame of the crisis, and these effects differ by partisan affiliation. These results suggest that if the incumbent government blames globalization, respondents are more likely to exonerate the government if they are co-partisans of the government. This effect does not hold for citizens who support the opposing party. Rather, if a non-partisan source blames globalization, even supporters of the opposing party are willing to blame the government less for negative economic outcomes.

## CONCLUSIONS

Who do citizens blame for the recent European economic crisis? What explains why they blame some factors over others? The recent substantial economic hardships already suffered in many European economies have their roots in domestic as well as global factors, and there remains much debate about the root causes as well as appropriate policy responses. As of this writing, considerable uncertainty exists as to whether EU funded bailouts will be sufficient to prevent government defaults,

---

<sup>19</sup> Across the entire sample, 49 percent of ideologically left-wing respondents identify with the PSOE. The results do not substantively change if we consider alternate codings of partisan identification; nor do they change based on ideology if we use alternative binary classifications of "left-wing" to include the "center" category.

**TABLE 7. Logistic Regressions of Treatment on Blaming Item in the Top Three**

	PSOE supporters						PP supporters					
	Govt	European Govts	Foreign Investors	Domestic Banks	Labor Regulations	Eurozone	Govt	European Govts	Foreign Investors	Domestic Banks	Labor Regulations	Eurozone
Education	0.24 (0.15)	0.051 (0.15)	0.49** (0.16)	-0.090 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.16)	-0.52** (0.16)	0.099 (0.30)	0.15 (0.27)	0.26 (0.19)	-0.10 (0.19)	0.072 (0.18)	-0.23 (0.19)
Income	-0.021 (0.039)	0.069* (0.040)	0.055 (0.041)	0.036 (0.047)	-0.027 (0.040)	-0.11** (0.042)	0.11 (0.074)	0.022 (0.061)	0.065 (0.044)	0.052 (0.044)	-0.040 (0.043)	-0.096** (0.046)
Gender	0.19 (0.20)	-0.15 (0.21)	-0.56** (0.22)	-0.44* (0.25)	0.35* (0.21)	0.40* (0.22)	-0.45 (0.40)	0.73** (0.33)	-0.20 (0.23)	-0.15 (0.23)	-0.40* (0.22)	0.47* (0.25)
Insider	-0.17 (0.21)	-0.41* (0.22)	-0.19 (0.23)	0.26 (0.27)	0.61** (0.22)	-0.058 (0.24)	0.088 (0.41)	-0.27 (0.33)	-0.17 (0.23)	0.24 (0.24)	-0.13 (0.22)	-0.23 (0.25)
Age	-0.015* (0.0078)	0.0065 (0.0079)	0.031** (0.0086)	0.026** (0.0098)	-0.018** (0.0083)	-0.029** (0.0088)	0.019 (0.016)	-0.043** (0.014)	0.0015 (0.0089)	-0.0083 (0.0091)	0.0060 (0.0087)	0.0023 (0.0095)
Treatment 2	-0.079 (0.35)	-0.0044 (0.36)	-0.48 (0.36)	0.23 (0.44)	0.17 (0.35)	0.033 (0.37)	-0.90* (0.54)	0.12 (0.47)	-0.063 (0.36)	0.36 (0.38)	0.18 (0.35)	-0.30 (0.39)
Treatment 3	-0.68* (0.38)	0.70* (0.36)	0.68 (0.42)	-0.27 (0.42)	-0.28 (0.39)	-0.036 (0.39)	-0.61 (0.64)	-0.29 (0.60)	0.34 (0.37)	0.37 (0.40)	0.22 (0.37)	-0.39 (0.43)
Treatment 4	-0.53 (0.36)	0.60* (0.35)	-0.30 (0.37)	0.36 (0.49)	0.043 (0.37)	0.033 (0.39)	-0.40 (0.63)	-0.070 (0.52)	0.28 (0.37)	0.72* (0.42)	-0.13 (0.37)	-0.56 (0.43)
Treatment 5	0.19 (0.35)	0.0021 (0.37)	0.26 (0.39)	-0.13 (0.42)	0.066 (0.37)	-0.45 (0.43)	0.050 (0.81)	-0.46 (0.67)	0.54 (0.42)	-0.0076 (0.42)	-0.12 (0.41)	-0.0081 (0.44)
Treatment 6	0.17 (0.33)	0.36 (0.35)	-0.58 (0.36)	-0.054 (0.41)	0.078 (0.36)	0.047 (0.38)	0.40 (0.81)	-0.98 (0.66)	-0.042 (0.39)	-0.017 (0.38)	0.80** (0.40)	-0.61 (0.44)
Treatment 7	0.45 (0.37)	-0.22 (0.39)	-0.42 (0.38)	0.32 (0.46)	-0.043 (0.38)	0.045 (0.39)	0.024 (0.81)	-0.076 (0.56)	-0.29 (0.43)	0.39 (0.44)	0.22 (0.40)	-0.062 (0.44)
Constant	0.18 (0.51)	-1.10** (0.53)	-1.68** (0.55)	0.40 (0.62)	0.19 (0.53)	2.06** (0.57)	1.21 (0.99)	-0.86 (0.85)	-1.51** (0.61)	0.75 (0.61)	0.27 (0.58)	0.20 (0.63)
<i>N</i>	430	430	430	430	430	430	365	365	365	365	365	365
pseudo <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.035	0.026	0.074	0.036	0.027	0.076	0.047	0.072	0.024	0.023	0.019	0.047

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$

which would considerably endanger the European monetary union. Extreme pessimism persists regarding the ability of European economies to ultimately recover from the worst economic crisis in over thirty years. These events, and the controversy surrounding the role of international actors and processes in the crisis, demonstrate the importance of non-domestic factors in shaping citizen perceptions of the crisis. Understanding variation in blame for the crisis is an important foundational task for explaining variation in responses to the crisis.

In this paper we tested theories about blame attribution and policy preferences with respect to the economic crisis, with evidence from the important case of Spain. We argue that blame for the crisis is partially conditioned by partisan bias and framings of the crisis as being related to globalization. We find that different framings about causes of the crisis, endorsed by different political parties, do affect who people blame for the crisis. Consistent with recent literature that documents the impact of partisan bias on policy preferences, we show that partisan attachments greatly determine people's views about the economic crisis.

We find that partisan attachments explain a great deal of who do people think is responsible for the crisis: while supporters of the conservative party in the opposition tend to blame the government, those who identify with the incumbent party tend to blame foreign investors and domestic banks instead. Importantly, incumbent party endorsement about globalization's role in the crisis has an effect on the supporters of that party: they exonerate the government, and blame other European governments more. Moreover, even for citizens who support the opposition party, non-partisan endorsement of globalization as a cause can help reduce blame for the incumbent government. This suggests that it is not difficult, given the minimal nature of the treatment, to induce a specific subset of citizens to "scapegoat" globalization in difficult economic times. These results are not driven by ideological views of citizens, but rather by partisan affiliation.

These findings have implications for understanding the burgeoning literature on how globalization attenuates the economic vote. This study suggests one plausible mechanism for this finding: partisan bias leads voters to blame global actors more so for economic crises than incumbent governments. We find that this effect only holds for co-partisans of the incumbent government. But, no similar scapegoating effect holds for those who might be expected to be ideologically sympathetic to specific endorsements. These findings are notable given the simplicity of the treatments. Our findings suggest that for some citizens, inciting protectionist views may not be difficult, and that such views can help reduce the culpability of the government.

The theory, design, and results presented raise additional questions that future research should build upon. For the supporters of the incumbent government, we find stronger evidence of treatments related to globalization shifting blame towards other European governments, rather than to foreign investors or the common currency. Future work should examine why specific global actors are targeted for blame, and not others, and whether more specific framings of the crisis affect that blame. We also find that for citizens who support the opposition party, these citizens can also be responsive to explanations endorsed by the incumbent party and blame actors for the crisis that could consistent with their partisan preferences (in this case, higher blame of domestic labor market regulations). One explanation for this finding is that these citizens are more swayed by what they view as a possible shift in the incumbent party's explanations, or because it reinforces pre-existing knowledge or blame preferences. Future research should disentangle between these explanations and theorize under what conditions are citizens likely to be responsive to the "other party's" explanations for negative outcomes.

Another extension could be the addition of items that are targets of blame that could vary along other theoretically relevant dimensions. Specific items might be decomposed (for example, distinguishing



among different European governments or different international or pan-European organizations). An alternative design could test whether partisan endorsements of other kinds of framings or explanations of the crisis (such as blame of specific countries) also affect blame for the crisis. A natural extension to this study could address whether changes in attribution of a crisis lead to different preferences over policies to end the crisis. Finally, our results are particularly relevant to the current European economic crisis, but they may extend to other conditions of less acute recessions.

## APPENDICES

### Appendix A Netquest Survey Protocol

The Netquest survey uses opt-in panels, based on existing databases of nationally representative samples of residents of Spain. The panel is constrained to individuals at least 18 years of age. The sample is stratified with representative quotas of the Spanish population by geographical area (seven geographical areas), age group, and gender. Netquest compensates economically all participants with vouchers that can be used later to purchase goods at Netquest's online store. Full documentation on sample compilation is available upon request.

### Appendix B Comparison of Samples

Variable	Netquest survey	National Representative Survey	Survey*
Household monthly income in euros	<900 8.8 901-1400 20.8 1401-1900 17.3 1901-2700 27.6 >2700 25.6	<900 euros 17.5 901-1400 31.4 1401-1900 26.5 1901-2700 15.6 >2700 11.1	European Social Survey, 4th Wave, April 2010
Gender	Woman: 51.0	Women: 51.0	CIS 2553. November 2010
Age	18-24: 13.7 25-34: 25.2 35-44: 24.6 45-55: 21.2 55+: 15.4	18-24: 9.2 25-34: 19.9 35-44: 20.8 45-54: 16.7 55+: 33.6	CIS 2853. November 2010
Vote recall	PSOE 38.8 PP 26.5	PSOE 38.2 PP 26.4	CIS 2853. November 2010
Ideology (1-10)	4.6 (sd: 2.1)	4.8 (sd: 1.9)	CIS 2853. November 2010
Vote intention	PSOE 19.8 PP 24.8	PSOE 18.7 PP 24.8	CIS 2847. October 2010
Closest party	PSOE 26.3 PP 22.9	PSOE 28.8 PP 24.6	CIS 2847. October 2010

\*The closest survey available was the November 2010 Barometer (CIS 2853). However, this survey did not include questions on vote intention and party closeness, so for these questions we use the next closes survey, CIS 2847, conducted in October 2010.

**Appendix C**  
**Randomization Check**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Treatment 2	Treatment 3	Treatment 4	Treatment 5	Treatment 6	Treatment 7
Education	-0.016 (0.18)	-0.16 (0.18)	-0.27 (0.18)	0.16 (0.19)	0.25 (0.18)	-0.080 (0.19)
Income	-0.020 (0.031)	0.042 (0.031)	0.039 (0.031)	0.037 (0.033)	-0.054 (0.030)	0.037 (0.033)
Gender	-0.099 (0.17)	-0.16 (0.17)	-0.23 (0.17)	0.23 (0.18)	0.12 (0.17)	0.25 (0.18)
Age	-0.0067 (0.0067)	0.016* (0.0064)	0.0039 (0.0064)	-0.011 (0.0071)	-0.0028 (0.0065)	-0.0099 (0.0071)
PSOE partisan	0.20 (0.21)	-0.21 (0.21)	-0.064 (0.21)	0.017 (0.21)	-0.080 (0.20)	-0.055 (0.22)
PP partisan	0.40 (0.26)	0.28 (0.26)	-0.21 (0.25)	-0.21 (0.28)	-0.29 (0.25)	-0.037 (0.28)
Ideology (L-R)	0.0019 (0.052)	-0.088 (0.050)	0.088 (0.050)	0.0057 (0.054)	0.081 (0.049)	-0.0054 (0.054)
Constant	-1.92** (0.38)	-2.50** (0.38)	-2.63** (0.39)	-2.29** (0.40)	-2.17** (0.37)	-2.19** (0.40)
<i>N</i>	1501	1501	1501	1501	1501	1501
pseudo $R^2$	0.006	0.012	0.010	0.007	0.008	0.005

Estimations are logistic regressions predicting respondent placement in each of the seven experimental groups.

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

## REFERENCES

- Achen, C. H., & Bartels, L. M. (2006). *It feels like we're thinking: The rationalizing voter and electoral democracy*.
- Allison, P. D., & Christakis, N. A. (1994). Logit models for sets of ranked items. *Sociological methodology*, 24(1994), 199-228.
- Andrés, J., Bentolila, S., Dolado, J. J., & Felgueroso, F. (2009). Propuesta para la reactivación laboral en España, *El País*. Retrieved from [http://www.elpais.com/articulo/primer/plano/Propuesta/reactivacion/laboral/Espana/elpepueconeg/20090426elpneglse\\_16/Tes](http://www.elpais.com/articulo/primer/plano/Propuesta/reactivacion/laboral/Espana/elpepueconeg/20090426elpneglse_16/Tes)
- Ansolabehere, S., Hirano, S., Snyder, J. M., & Ueda, M. (2006). Party and Incumbency Cues in Voting: Are They Substitutes? *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 1, 119-137.
- Arceneaux, K. (2003). The Conditional Impact of Blame Attribution on the Relationship between Economic Adversity and Turnout. *Political Research Quarterly*, 56(1), 67-75.
- Beggs, S., & Cardell, J. (1981). Assessing the potential demand for electric cars\* 1. *Journal of Econometrics*, 17(1), 1-19.
- Cerny, P. G. (1995). Globalization and the changing logic of collective action. *International Organization*, 49(04), 595-625.
- Cohen, G. L. (2003). Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85(5), 807-822.
- Commission, E. (2009). *Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Response*. Luxembourg: European Commission Retrieved from [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/publications/publication15887\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15887_en.pdf).
- Duch, R. M., & Stevenson, R. (2010). The Global Economy, Competency, and the Economic Vote. *Journal of Politics*, 72(1), 105-123.
- Eichengreen, B. (2009). The Crisis and the Euro. *University of California, Berkeley, April*, 1-09.
- FAES. (2008.). *La Crisis Financiera. Orígenes y Soluciones*.
- Fernández-Albertos, J. (2006). Does Internationalization Blur Responsibility? Economic Voting and Economic Openness in 15 European Countries. *West European Politics*, 29(1), 28-46.
- Fiorina, M. (1981). *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Garrett, G. (1998). *Partisan politics in the global economy*: Cambridge Univ Pr.
- Giuliano, P., & Spilimbergo, A. (2009). Growing up in a Recession: Beliefs and the Macroeconomy: National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA.
- Gómez, M. V. (2009). Los sindicatos movilizan a 700 expertos contra la rebaja del despido, *El País*.
- Haider-Markel, D. P., & Joslyn, M. R. (2001). Gun policy, opinion, tragedy, and blame attribution: the conditional influence of issue frames. *Journal of Politics*, 63(2), 520-543.
- Hellwig, T. (2001). Interdependence, Government Constraints, and Economic Voting. *Journal of Politics*, 63(4), 1141-1162.
- Hellwig, T. (2011). *The World Economy, Political Control, and Responsibility for Economic Performance*. Politics of the Economic Crisis Spring 2011.
- Hobolt, S. B. (2007). Taking cues on Europe? Voter competence and party endorsements in referendums on European integration. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(2), 151-182.
- Hugh, E. (2010). Spain on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown. *Foreign Policy*, Dec 3.
- IDEAS, F. (2009). Nuevas ideas para mejorar el funcionamiento de los mercados financieros y la economía mundial.
- Kayser, M. A. (2007). How Domestic Is Domestic Politics? Globalization and Elections. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10, 341-362.
- Layman, G. C. a. T. M. C. (2002). Party Polarization and 'Conflict Extension' in the American Electorate. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(4), 786-802.
- Lewis-Beck, M. (1988). *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. *Political Science*, 3(1), 183.
- Lupia, A., & McCubbins, M. (1998). *The Democratic Dilemma*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Malhotra, N., & Kuo, A. G. (2008). Attributing blame: The public's response to Hurricane Katrina. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(01), 120-135.
- Malhotra, N., & Margalit, Y. (2010). Short-Term Communication Effects or Longstanding Dispositions? The Public's Response to the Financial Crisis of 2008. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(03), 852-867.
- Mallet, V. (2010). Spain's credit rating cut over growth fears, *Financial Times*.
- Przeworski, A., & Maravall, J. M. (2001). Political Reactions to the Economy: The Spanish Experience. In S. Stokes (Ed.), *Public Support for Market Reforms in New Democracies* (pp. 35-76). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Ray, L. (2003). When parties matter: The conditional influence of party positions on voter opinions about European integration. *Journal of Politics*, 65(4), 978-994.
- Shaver, K. G. (1985). *The attribution of blame: Causality, responsibility, and blameworthiness*: Springer-Verlag.
- Tilley, J., & Hobolt, S. B. (2011). Is the government to blame? An experimental test of how partisanship shapes perceptions of performance and responsibility. *Journal of Politics*, 72(2), 1-15.

Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (<http://www.march.es/ceacs/ingles/ceacs.asp>)  
WORKING PAPERS

Series Editor: Andrew Richards

Most recent titles:

<u>Working Paper</u>	<u>Author</u>	<u>Title</u>
2009/248	Amat, F., Jurado, I., and León, S.	<i>A Political Theory of Decentralization Dynamics.</i>
2010/249	Kselman, D. M.	<i>Electoral Institutions, Legislative Accountability, and Political Corruption.</i>
2010/250	Pop-Eleches, G. and Tucker, J. A.	<i>After the Party: Legacies and Left-Right Distinctions in Post-Communist Countries.</i>
2010/251	Urquizu, I.	<i>Moderate Voters and Internal Party Factionalism.</i>
2010/252	Kuo, A. and Margalit, Y.	<i>Measuring Individual Identity: Experimental Evidence.</i>
2010/253	Kuo, A.	<i>Explaining Employer Coordination: Evidence from the US Inter-War Period.</i>
2011/254	Falcó-Gimeno, A.	<i>Portfolio Allocation and Time out of Office in Coalition Governments.</i>
2011/255	Gorodzeisky, A. and Semyonov, M.	<i>Occupational Incorporation of Immigrants in Western European Countries.</i>
2011/256	Brader, T. A. and Tucker, A.	<i>Follow the Leader: Party Cues, Policy Opinion, and the Power of Partisanship in Three Multiparty Systems.</i>
2011/257	De la Calle, L. and Roussias, N.	<i>Independents and Vote Choice: Spatial or Performance Voting?</i>
2011/258	Lapuenta, V.	<i>Trade-Offs in Corporate Governance.</i>
2011/259	Lago, I.	<i>Why (Not) National Party Systems?</i>
2011/260	Burgoon, B.	<i>Immigration, Integration and Support for Redistribution in Europe.</i>
2011/261	Kelly, J., Hamann, K., and Johnston, A.	<i>Unions against Governments: Explaining General Strikes in Western Europe, 1980-2006.</i>
2011/262	Riera, P.	<i>Electoral Coordination in Mixed-Member Systems: Does the Level of Democratic Consolidation Matter?</i>
2011/263	Aguilar, P.	<i>Authoritarian Repression, Judicial System and Transitional Justice: The Spanish Case in Comparative Perspective.</i>
2011/264	Cebolla, H. and Finotelli, C.	<i>Integration beyond Models: An Empirical Outlook to the Impact of Integration Models.</i>
2011/265	Rivero, G.	<i>Integrity and Separability in Multidimensional Voting Models: Ideology and Nationalism in Spanish Regional Elections.</i>
2011/266	Hierro, M. J.	<i>Parents and School: Agents of 'National' Socialization?</i>