

**Instituto Juan March**

Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (CEACS)

**Juan March Institute**

Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (CEACS)

---

**Unions against governments explaining general strikes in Western Europe, 1980-2006**

Author(s): Kelly, John E., 1952-; Hamann, Kerstin; Johnston, Alison

Date 2011

Type Working Paper

Series Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 2011/261

City: Madrid

Publisher: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales

---

Your use of the CEACS Repository indicates your acceptance of individual author and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any document(s) only for academic research and teaching purposes.

# WORKING PAPERS

UNIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENTS:  
EXPLAINING GENERAL STRIKES IN WESTERN  
EUROPE, 1980-2006

John Kelly, Kerstin Hamann and Alison Johnston

Estudio/Working Paper 2011/261  
June 2011

UNIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENTS:  
EXPLAINING GENERAL STRIKES IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1980-2006

John Kelly, Kerstin Hamann and Alison Johnston

Estudio/Working Paper 2011/261  
June 2011

John Kelly is Professor of Industrial Relations in the School of Management, Birkbeck College, at the University of London. Kerstin Hamann is Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida. Alison Johnston is a Graduate Student in the European Institute at the London School of Economics.

This paper is based on a seminar presented by John Kelly at the Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Juan March Institute, on 23 October 2009.

## **Abstract**

*Across Western Europe, unions have increasingly engaged in staging general strikes against governments since 1980. This increase in general strikes is puzzling as it has occurred at the same time as economic strikes have been on the decline. We posit that theories developed to explain economic strikes hold little explanatory power in accounting for variation in general strikes across countries and over time. Instead, we develop a framework based on political variables, in particular, whether governments have included or excluded unions in framing policy reforms; the party position of the government; and the type of government. Our empirical analysis, based on a conditional fixed-effects logit estimation of 84 general strikes between 1980 and 2006, shows that union exclusion and the party position of the government can provide an initial explanation for the occurrence of general strikes.*

## INTRODUCTION

Between 1980 and 1989, trade unions staged 18 general strikes against governments in 16 Western European countries (EU 15 plus Norway), a number that increased to 26 in the following decade and to 28 in the seven years between 2000 and 2006. In addition, unions threatened to stage a general strike a dozen times (see Figure 1 and Table 1). While one case, Greece, certainly contributed significantly to the number of general strikes, both the upward trend in strike occurrence and the turning points in strike frequency persist even if we exclude Greece. This phenomenon of a rising trend in the number of general strikes is particularly interesting for three reasons: first, the rise in the number of general strikes has coincided with the reemergence of concertation, particularly in the form of social pacts between governments, unions, and employers (Hamann and Kelly 2011; Hassel 2006). These pacts have often focused on the design and implementation of contentious reforms to pensions, welfare systems, and employment protection laws, and the inclusion of trade unions might be expected to reduce the level of anti-government protests, such as general strikes, which are often directed against these and similar issues. Second, the rise in general strikes has occurred against a background of a sharp decline in strike activity against employers and also in trade union density in Western Europe. Between 1980 and 1982 an average of 16.6 working days per 10,000 employees were lost to strike action each year in 12 countries of the EU15 plus Norway; by 1989-91 the figure had dropped to 4.5 days per 10,000 and by 2004-06 it had fallen to 1.1 days per 10,000 (see Figure 1). At the same time, union density has also declined in a majority of these cases. The discrepant trends in general strikes, trade union density, and strikes against employers challenge some of our conventional ideas about trade union decline and union weakness. Third, although some of the countries with a relatively high level of general strikes also tend to have relatively high levels of economic strike activity (e.g. Greece, Italy, and Spain), general strikes

have similarly been called in countries with historically low levels of strike activity, such as Austria and the Netherlands (Table 1). This suggests that theories accounting for economic strikes cannot easily be applied to explain the increase in general strikes.


Based on these observations, we are interested in two related questions: How can we explain the increase in general strikes in Western Europe over time? And which factors can account for the variation across countries in the incidence of general strikes? To explore these questions, we construct a database for 16 Western European countries (EU 15 plus Norway). As general strikes are directed against governments and their (proposed) policies, our argument centers on political variables and the political context surrounding such events. In particular, we examine the degree of union inclusion or exclusion from government policy formation; the party composition of the government; and the strength of the government. We posit that these variables are better suited than economic and industrial relations variables to explain variation in general strikes both across time and across cases.

The next section defines general strikes and provides an overview of empirical patterns of general strikes across Western Europe. We then briefly outline why existing theories of strike action are of limited value in explaining the patterns of general strikes and then presents our own framework for analysis. The subsequent section discusses our data and methods, and we then present our results. The final section discusses our findings and concludes.

## PATTERNS OF GENERAL STRIKES

There is no generally agreed definition of the term “general strike” or its various synonyms, such as “political strike” or “protest strike” (see, e.g., Walsh 1983). We therefore revise Hyman’s (1989: 17) standard definition of a strike and define a general strike as “a temporary, national stoppage of work by workers from many industries, directed against the executive or legislative arms of government, to enforce a

**FIGURE 1. General and Economic Strikes in Western Europe, 1980-2006**



*Note:* General strikes are reported for the EU15 plus Norway; economic strikes are reported for Norway and the EU15 but exclude Belgium, Greece, and Luxembourg. Consistent strike time series are not available for these countries because of long gaps in data in the 1980s (Belgium and Luxembourg) and since the early 1990s (Greece).

*Sources:* General strikes: author dataset; economic strikes: Bird (1991: Table 1); Davies (2001: Table 1); Hale (2008: Table 1).

**TABLE 1. General Strikes Descriptive Statistics, 1980-2006**

	Strike Years (including threats)	Strike Years (excluding threats)	Number of Strikes (including threats)	Number of Strikes (excluding threats)
<i>Total Panel</i>	58	50	84	72
<i>Austria</i>	1	1	1	1
<i>Belgium</i>	6	6	8	8
<i>Denmark</i>	0	0	0	0
<i>Finland</i>	3	0	3	0
<i>France</i>	5	5	7	7
<i>Germany</i>	0	0	0	0
<i>Greece</i>	18	18	34	33
<i>Ireland</i>	0	0	0	0
<i>Italy</i>	10	8	15	11
<i>Luxembourg</i>	4	1	4	1
<i>Netherlands</i>	2	2	2	2
<i>Norway</i>	1	1	1	1
<i>Portugal</i>	2	2	2	2
<i>Spain</i>	6	6	7	6
<i>Sweden</i>	0	0	0	0
<i>UK</i>	0	0	0	0

*Note:* Table indicates number of years that contain strikes 1980 and 2006.

*Source:* As for Figure 1.

demand or give voice to a grievance.” A general strike involves the mobilization by one or more national confederations of the whole of its membership, as well as non-union members, typically in protest against a proposed or adopted government policy reform, or following a breakdown in negotiations with the government (and sometimes also employers) about policy reform. Given this definition the following actions would *not* count as general strikes: a stoppage by just one group of workers protesting government intervention; a stoppage by public sector employees protesting against the government in its capacity as employer; a national demonstration that did not include a general strike. Although general strikes can also be called to protest regional government policy, we focus here on general strikes at the national level directed against the national government only and exclude regional general strikes from our analysis. Typically a general strike will be a one-off action on a particular issue or set of issues. However, when a union confederation has called a series of general strikes on the same issue over a short space of time, each strike constitutes a separate mobilization.

The downturn in economic strikes is conventionally dated starting approximately in 1980 (e.g. Edwards and Hyman 1994; Shalev 1992). Consequently, we trace general strikes from January 1980 until December 2006.<sup>1</sup> During that time, a total of 72 general strikes and an additional 12 threats to stage a general strike took place.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> While our database of general strikes runs until December 2010, data on most of our independent variables are only available until December 2006. We only report data until 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Sometimes the mere threat of strike action can induce a response from government. Therefore, we also look at general strike threats even where the strike did not actually take place. To count as a “threat” a trade union or union confederation leadership had to declare its intention to call a general strike on a particular issue(s) and on a given date. Unions issued a total of 12 credible general strike threats, but called off the action in response to fresh government proposals: once during the 1980s, ten times in the 1990s, and once after 2000. Three threats occurred in Finland, where no actual strike was held, and four in Luxembourg,

Figure 1 displays a general upward trend with peaks in the early 1990s and early to mid-2000s.<sup>3</sup> Because 34 of these strike and strike threats occurred in just one country – Greece – Figure 1 also displays data excluding the Greek case; yet, excluding Greece alters neither the upward trend nor the presence and timing of the peaks. Table 1 reveals the national distribution of general strikes and documents their concentration in the Southern European economies of Greece, France, Italy, Spain, and to a lesser degree Portugal. These five countries alone account for 77% (65) of the 84 strikes and strike threats in this period. The remaining strike events (19) were organized in countries that have for many years recorded some of the lowest levels of industrial conflict in Europe: Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway, while several countries that have recently ranked high on economic strikes stand out for their absence of general strikes, e.g. Denmark and Ireland. Five countries experienced no general strikes or strike threats: Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, and the UK. In some of these cases such actions are unlawful, e.g. in Germany and the UK.

General strikes have been called in response to a wide range of planned or actual policy reforms by national governments. We classified these policies under the following six categories: 1) wages, including basic rates, overtime, and holiday pay; 2) labor market reform, including bargaining structures, legal regulation of dismissals and redundancies, and non-wage issues such as work time; 3) pensions; 4) other welfare issues, including sickness and unemployment benefits; 5) economic policy; 6) a miscellaneous category for issues that did not fit any of the

where only one actual general strike was staged. Our measure of strike frequency includes both actual strikes and strike threats (the number of threats is too small to analyze separately) because in almost all of our statistical tests the inclusion or exclusion of strike threats did not alter the patterns of coefficients that were significant. However, where this is not the case we report two sets of results.

<sup>3</sup> The inclusion of more recent data shows another strike peak in the late 2000s, with 10 strikes 2007-2009 and 14 strikes in 2010 alone.

other categories, such as protests against the Iraq War. Many general strikes were organized around one major issue but a substantial minority featured a variety of issues. Figure 2 displays the distribution of the issues that motivated general strikes (including strike threats). If more than one issue led to a strike or a strike threat, each issue was counted separately; consequently, the total number of issues exceeds the total number of strikes and strike threats.


Figure 2 shows that government intervention to restrain the level of wage settlements has played only a modest part in the genesis of general strikes, particularly in countries other than Greece, where labor market, welfare, and pension reforms have precipitated the majority of general strikes. Furthermore, although numerous general strikes were called to protest against economic policy on issues such as taxation and public expenditure, Figure 2 illustrates

to account for the substantial variation in general strikes across countries and over time.

## GENERAL STRIKES: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Existing strike theories were developed to account for variations in the occurrence of strikes launched against employers, i.e. “economic” strikes. Theories of economic strikes can be grouped into four categories depending on their main explanatory variables: economic (business cycle, economic globalization), labor force composition, industrial relations institutions (union structure, bargaining coverage and coordination), and power resources (Brandl and Traxler 2010; Edwards and Hyman 1994; Piazza 2005; Scheuer 2006). These theories address different facets of strike activity (frequency, workers involved, days

**FIGURE 2. General Strikes Issues, 1980-2006**



Source: As for Figure 1.

that the overwhelming majority of these have occurred in Greece.

Since most general strikes protest against government measures, the next section develops a framework for analysis

lost) and are not logically exclusive; therefore, they have sometimes been combined in models of strike activity (e.g. Franzosi 1995). However, theories developed to explain the existence, rise, or

decline of economic strikes are poorly equipped to account for general strikes. For one, the empirical patterns displayed in Figure 1 demonstrate that patterns of general strikes diverge sharply from those of economic strikes. Insofar as economic or institutional variables can successfully account for the dramatic decline in levels of strikes against employers in Western Europe since the early 1980s, they cannot therefore explain why another class of strike action has become more frequent. This is perhaps not surprising because general strikes differ fundamentally from economic strikes: the former are directed against governments and their (proposed) policies rather than employers; they are often organized around broad, rather than sectional or occupational issues, of concern to large segments of the population beyond those employed in specific firms or sectors; the issues that motivate general strikes, such as welfare benefits, are not generally those that are subject to regular collective bargaining processes; and general strike mobilizations may well extend beyond the unions' membership and activist base to include many non-union employees. Thus, it makes little sense to expect that explanations developed to account for workplace, company, or even industry-wide strikes will also be able to illuminate the causes and patterns of general strikes.

Under what conditions, then, are unions more likely to react to government policies with a general strike? Theories of general strikes are rare. Existing research draws on social movement theorists such as Tarrow (1994) and Tilly (1978). Lindvall (2011) focuses on trade union power, arguing that general strikes are most likely to occur in countries where the union movement is moderately strong, approximately 30-40% measured by union density: weak movements will be unable to strike against governments while strong movements will not need to strike because governments will factor in union reactions when they formulate policies. Whereas the argument is plausible and fits the Greek and Italian cases particularly well (34.1% and 38.8% respectively), it is not clear why general strikes and strike threats also occur in countries with low union density (France 10.3%, Spain 12.5%) as well as in countries

with relatively high density (Belgium 53.9%, and Finland 72.5%) (all density figures for 1990 from OECD n.d., a). One possibility is that union density is not the best measure of union strength, particularly for countries such as France and Spain, which combine low membership density with high mobilizing capacity (Bouquin 2007; Hamann 2011). Nam (2006) argues that "protests," a category that includes but is not coterminous with general strikes, should be more likely in countries with a poorly developed political opportunity structure and less likely in countries that offer citizens numerous channels through which they can pursue their demands (see also Tarrow 1994). Measuring opportunity structure by the strength of the legislature in relation to the executive and the judiciary, Nam finds that protests are more widespread in countries with weak legislatures, such as France and Greece. However, his data evince that several countries with strong legislatures also have unexpectedly high levels of general strikes (Belgium, Italy, and Spain, for example).

In addition, specific literatures on conflict in some of the most strike-prone countries, such as Greece, identify a series of institutional and political factors that may be associated with trade union protest: poorly developed corporatist structures that limit union influence on policymaking; a cross-party consensus on welfare and labor market reform that also limits the scope for trade union influence; governments that have been willing to legislate reforms rather than negotiate with the social partners; and unions that are well organized in essential services, especially the public sector, and that therefore have the capacity to mount effective strikes (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008; Lavdas 2005; Matsaganis 2007; Pagoulatos 2005). These are potentially valuable insights into particular events in a particular country that have informed our own thinking in developing a framework of analysis applicable to a larger set of cases.

Our framework to explain the patterns of general strikes conceptualizes such strikes as political events as they are directed against governments and their (proposed) policies and therefore looks at political variables to explain them. We focus on

three main factors: whether governments include or exclude trade unions in the formation of policies on contentious issues that affect the interests of their members; the party composition of the government; and the strength and cohesion of the government. We expect other variables, such as the nature of the issue or the strength of the trade union movement to matter less because theoretically, they are less clearly linked to general strikes. For example, union density is less likely to affect a decision to call a general strike because the target audience extends beyond union membership.

### **Union Inclusion in Shaping Government Policies**

The policies of many governments in Western Europe since the early 1980s have involved downward pressure both on direct wage costs and on indirect costs, such as social security and pension contributions by employers. Welfare and pension reforms have often involved some combination of cutbacks in benefit levels, restricted eligibility, and increased employee contributions (Immergut *et al.* 2007). In addition, many governments have also sought to increase labor market flexibility by amending employment protection and working time laws or by adjusting collective bargaining structures. In pursuing such policies governments can choose to include unions in negotiations, for example through social pacts, or to exclude them and attempt to enact reforms through legislation (Hamann and Kelly 2011). Union inclusion may assist in “blame avoidance” (Pierson 1994), a process through which governments try to protect themselves from potential electoral backlash to unpopular reforms, in this case by sharing responsibility with the social partners. Alternatively, parties in government may respond to electoral competition by distancing themselves from unions and enacting reforms unilaterally, excluding trade unions from policy formation. However, while governments may initially choose to include unions in negotiations on a social pact, we cannot assume that negotiations will be successful. When negotiations break down, governments are

faced with a fresh dilemma: whether to abandon their reforms, or revert to legislation. Unions may therefore end up being excluded through two rather different routes.

Unions might react negatively to exclusion for three reasons: first, the industrial relations systems of many West European countries have institutionalized extensive trade union involvement in the regulation of terms and conditions of employment. Collective bargaining coverage averages approximately 80% in the EU15 plus Norway (although it is much lower in liberal market economies such as the UK). Union leaders in these countries may therefore expect to be involved in discussions on contentious policies that affect their members and may react negatively to exclusion. Second, trade unions have been analyzed as agents of job regulation whose principal objective is to participate in the process of drafting rules to regulate the employment relationship (e.g. Dunlop 1958; Edwards 2003; Flanders 1970). From this perspective, too, it would follow that unions would react negatively to their exclusion from processes of rule creation on issues such as pensions or employment protection. Third, social pacts have re-emerged in almost every country in Western Europe since the early 1980s (the UK is the exception), arguably reinforcing the role of unions as valuable partners for governments anxious to engage in “blame avoidance” for contentious policies and reinforcing the role of unions as a participant in the process of policy formation.

### **Party Composition of Government**

Second, we contend that the type of government matters, in particular, the type of party or parties in government. One line of argument suggests that general strikes overall should be more frequently directed against conservative governments than against leftist governments. Many unions are ideologically and organizationally closer to leftist parties and might be less likely to protest with a national work stoppage against leftist governments than against conservative governments (e.g. Allern 2010 on Norway; Anthonsen *et al.*

2011 on Denmark and Sweden). This hypothesis is also consistent with the corporatism literature, which asserts that leftist-led governments provide more room for unions to influence governmental policies through both party and governmental channels, making it less likely that unions will protest such governments (Molina and Rhodes 2002).

However, since the 1980s, in several West European countries social democratic parties have experienced two sets of changes that may be linked to the rise in general strikes and to variation in strike incidence across countries. First, a number of these parties have reevaluated their policies on issues such as welfare spending and labor market flexibility and have become more centrist, approximating the policies of their Christian Democrat and conservative competitors (see, for example, Callaghan 2000; Kitschelt 1994; Piazza 2001). Second, some social democratic parties have weakened their organizational links with trade unions as they have sought to broaden their electoral appeal well beyond the declining ranks of organized unions (Burgess 2004; Howell 2001; Hindley 1997; Piazza 2001). Together, these processes suggest that as the special relationship between unions and social democratic parties has atrophied, unions may become just as willing to strike against social democratic as against conservative governments.

### **Government Strength**

Previous research has shown that governmental strength influences the likelihood of union inclusion in policy formation through social pacts (Baccaro and Lim 2007; Baccaro and Simoni 2008; Hamann and Kelly 2011). Governmental weakness may also be compounded if the administration comprises a coalition of parties. Empirical research on Western Europe has evinced coalition governments to be shorter-lived, on average, than single-party majority governments, though they have proven to be more durable than minority governments (Strom 1990: 116). In particular, on average, surplus majority coalitions (462 days) as well as minority coalitions (410 days) tend to be short-lived

while minimal winning coalitions (814 days) tend to stay in office longer, to be outlasted by single-party majority governments (953 days) (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2006: 410). Consequently, other things equal minority and coalition governments will be more likely to include unions in policy formation in an attempt to bolster their support outside of parliament (Hamann and Kelly 2011) and are therefore likely to face fewer general strikes than single-party majority administrations.

However, from a union perspective, rather than from a government perspective, social movement theory leads to very different predictions. Tarrow (1994) argues that the probability of protest action against government is greater if the government is weakened by divisions or by instability associated with minority status because rational union leaders will calculate that the probability of securing concessions is enhanced by governmental weakness. Whether this effect still holds if governments include unions in policy formation is unclear. If we combine the arguments about the incentives for coalition governments and for unions, we might expect coalition governments to lean towards union inclusion in policy formation, while trade unions would be more likely to deploy sanctions such as general strikes in order to bring pressure on such governments.

In sum, we propose the following hypotheses:

*H1: The incidence of general strikes will be positively associated with unilateral reform through legislation, an indicator of union exclusion, compared to the benchmark of no legislation.*

*H2: The incidence of general strikes will be positively associated with rejected social pacts, an indicator of union exclusion compared to the benchmark of no pacts.*

*H3: The incidence of general strikes will be negatively associated with accepted social pacts, an indicator of union inclusion compared to the benchmark of no pacts.*

*H4: The incidence of general strikes will be related to the policy position of the government on a unidimensional left-right scale.*

*H5: The incidence of general strikes will be associated with governmental strength.*

*H6: The incidence of general strikes will differ between minority governments and coalition governments compared to single-party majority governments.*

The next sections evaluate these hypotheses to explain variation in the patterns of general strikes across cases and across time.

## DATA, METHODS, AND ANALYSIS

As noted earlier, we define a general strike as “a temporary, national stoppage of work by workers from many industries, directed against the executive or legislative arms of government, to enforce a demand or give voice to a grievance.” Working days lost and workers involved per 1,000 employees are the most commonly used measures of strike activity in preference to simple frequency counts (see, e.g., Monger 2005; van der Velden *et al.* 2007). Concerning general strikes, as with all large, multi-workplace strikes, data on days lost and workers involved are extremely unreliable (Lyddon 2007). Therefore, we use the frequency of general strikes instead. Data on general strikes are difficult to collect because some countries exclude what they call “political strikes” from their national statistics, e.g. Belgium, France, or the UK, while other countries include them but do not distinguish them from economic strikes directed against employers, e.g. Denmark or Italy (Walsh 1983: 50-51). Eastern European strike statistics are not available for the 1980s and post-1990 data are sometimes based on narrow definitions of strike action or supplied by trade union sources whose reliability is unknown (EIRO 2005). We therefore confine our sample to the EU15, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, in addition to Norway. We used the monthly *European Industrial Relations Review (EIRR)* and the online *European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO)* as our main sources. We also consulted the Protest and Coercion Database at the

University of Kansas, which contains daily logs of numerous forms of protest in many West European countries from 1980 to 1995.<sup>4</sup> In addition we drew on monographs and edited collections on the types of national policy reforms that have often provoked general strikes, e.g. Immergut *et al.* (2007) on pension reforms in Western Europe. Discrepancies between these different sources occur because the Kansas dataset employs a very broad definition of general strikes, including regional and purely public sector stoppages. We recorded only those strikes that conformed to the definition provided above; if in doubt about a particular action, we erred on the side of caution and excluded it. Given that a general strike is both a rare and dramatic event we are confident that our sources provide comprehensive and complete data.

The data include 84 total general strikes (including strike threats) within 58 individual years in 16 countries (EU15 plus Norway) over a 27-year time span (1980-2006). Of these 58 individual years, strike frequency is greater than 1 in 20 individual years; that is, more than one general strike occurred in a country in a given year.<sup>5</sup> Given the lack of variation in annual strikes above two (only 4 out of 432 yearly observations witnessed more than two strikes), we chose a time-series logistical regression estimator for our empirical analysis, rather than an OLS or tobit model; hence our dependent variable is whether a strike occurred within a given year, not the number of strikes in one year. The baseline logit model is as follows:

$$\Pr(y_{i,t} = 1 \mid x_{i,t}) = \Lambda [\beta_1(PR_{i,t}) + \beta_2(PA_{i,t}) + \beta_3(L_{i,t}) + \beta_4(LR_{i,t}) + \beta_5(VS_{i,t}) + \beta_6(GC_{i,t}) + \sum_k \beta_k X_{k,i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}]$$

where  $\Lambda$  is the logit estimator:  $e^\beta / (1 + e^\beta)$ .  $Y_{i,t}$  measures whether a strike has occurred in country  $i$  in year  $t$ . To overcome possible concerns regarding the inclusion of strike threat years in  $y_{i,t}$ , we also conducted regressions, presented in Columns I-III of

<sup>4</sup> These sources are available online at [www.eiro.eurofound.ie](http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie) and <http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/>.

<sup>5</sup> The full dataset is available on request from the authors.

Table 3, which exclude strike threats from the dependent variable. The independent variables include social pacts and legislation:  $PR_{i,t}$  measures whether a pact was rejected (1 for yes, 0 for no) in country  $i$  in year  $t$ ;  $PA_{i,t}$  measures whether a pact was accepted – hence, the baseline dummy category is the absence of a proposed pact;  $L_{i,t}$  measures the presence of (unilateral) legislative reforms without union involvement in country  $i$  in year  $t$  (1 = yes, 0 = no). Pact rejection and legislative proposals are taken as indicators of union exclusion and we therefore expect them to be positively associated with general strike incidence. Of the 20 strike years that had multiple strikes, 7 had no legislative or pact activity, and hence did not require the matching of these developments to their respective strikes. In 9 of the 20 multiple strike years, only one legislative/pact development occurred, yet on all 9 occasions, the multiple strikes were related to the same reform issue and hence were connected to the same legislative/pact action. In the remaining 4 of the 20 multiple strike years, 3 of the 4 were repeated strike and legislative/pact developments on the same issue; put otherwise, legislative/pact proposals were followed by a general strike more than once in a given year, yet both developments were related to government's original reform proposals. Only on one occasion, in Spain in 1992, did multiple strike events (one strike and one strike threat) and legislative/pact developments that were unrelated to each other occur in the same year. To account for these two different types of strikes, both observations were run in separate regressions; the 1992 general strike was included in the models presented in Columns I-III in Table 3 (i.e. models excluding strike threats), while the 1992 strike threat was included in the models presented in Columns I-V in Table 2. Data on pact proposals, and their subsequent rejection/acceptance, and on legislation, were taken from the Hamann-Kelly pacts database (Hamann and Kelly 2011).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The Hamann/Kelly dataset includes reforms that are potentially unpopular with large parts of the electorate in the areas of welfare reform including pensions, wages, and labor market

While strike data are available from 1980 to 2010, data on party position and social pacts are only available until 2006. Therefore the latter time period serves as the time scale for our panel.  $LR_{i,t}$  measures the left-right position of the ruling party, based upon its manifesto, in country  $i$  in year  $t$ , and ranges from -40.12 (extreme left) to 51.7 (extreme right). Data on party positions were taken from Budge *et al.* (2001) and Klingemann *et al.* (2006).  $VS_{i,t}$  measures the ruling party's share of the popular vote in country  $i$  in year  $t$ .  $GC_{i,t}$ , government composition in country  $i$  at time  $t$ , is a dummy variable distinguishing between single-party majority governments (those where a single party commands 50%+1 of the seats in the lower house of parliament), multi-party majority coalition governments (coalitions with 50%+1 of the seats in the lower house), and minority governments (comprising single-party minority as well as minority coalition governments); single-party majority governments serve as our benchmark. If the government in power is a coalition, the ruling party is defined as the main coalition partner, i.e. the party from which the prime minister hails. In years containing multiple governments but no general strikes, party position, ruling party vote share and the government composition dummies were weighted according to each government's (monthly) tenure within that year. In years containing multiple governments and a general strike, the party position, vote share, and the government composition dummy of the government in power at the time of the strike was used.

$\Sigma_k \beta_k X_{k,i,t}$  is a vector of economic and institutional controls for country  $i$  in year  $t$ . Economic controls used include real GDP growth and the (lagged) unemployment rate. Higher GDP growth is expected to lessen the incidence of strikes, while higher unemployment is expected to increase it;

policies. The dataset codes the government's first option to reform either through legislation or by extending a pact offer to unions; legislation following failed pact negotiations are not included. The dataset also includes information on whether pact negotiations resulted in a successful pact or failed. It comprises the same cases and years used in this analysis.

unemployment was run on a one year lag to avoid multicollinearity problems with real GDP growth. Net government lending as a percentage of GDP was run on a lag to avoid multicollinearity problems with real GDP growth,<sup>7</sup> and was included in our initial baseline regressions (Column II in Table 2). Yet, it was significantly correlated with the presence of unilateral legislation not only over the entire dataset, but also within individual panels.<sup>8</sup> Because this multicollinearity problem depressed the significance of the legislation and the lagged unemployment variables in (some) subsequent models, we excluded it. Net lending is expected to lessen the incidence of general strikes; in times of fiscal surplus, compared to fiscal deficit, government should be less incentivized to initiate welfare, pension, or wage reform, which in turn lessens the likelihood of reform-induced general strikes. GDP growth and unemployment data were taken from the OECD (n.d., b), while fiscal data were taken from the EU's Annual Macroeconomic Database (AMECO 2010).

Institutional controls include trade union density and union confederal authority (Jacobs 2007). While union density is not trend-stationary within most panels, we included a time trend to control for this, enabling us to examine the impact of trade union density levels (rather than changes)

on general strikes.<sup>9</sup> Data on trade union density were obtained from the OECD (n.d., a). Finally, high union confederal authority, that is the authority of peak confederations over its affiliates, could either increase or decrease general strike incidence. On the one hand, highly encompassing and centralized union confederations will bear the costs of collective action, and are therefore more likely to negotiate agreements without resort to collective action (Olson 1982). On the other hand, social movement theory would predict that centralization of power provides union leadership with the capacity to mobilize its membership and engage in collective action (Tilly 1978). In our sample, confederal authority ranges from 10%, low confederal authority, to 90%, high confederal authority; the measure is time-variant in all countries except the UK. Data on union confederal authority were taken from Visser's ICTWSS database (2009).<sup>10</sup>

Three regression models were used to test our hypotheses: one including strike threats in the dependent variable (Columns I-V in Table 2); one excluding strike threats (Columns I-III in Table 3), and; one excluding Greek strikes (Columns IV-VI in Table 3). We employed a conditional, fixed-effects logistical regression model, as a Hausman specification test indicated that we could reject the idea that differences between a random effects and conditional fixed effects estimator were not systematic.<sup>11</sup> The conditional fixed-effects estimator automatically excludes countries with no strike action over the 27 year period; hence our sample was reduced to 11 countries when strike threats were included (our original sample of 16 minus Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Sweden and the UK) and

---

<sup>7</sup> Pair-wise correlations between real GDP growth and net lending for the entire panel were 0.27 (p-value: 0.0000). Within individual countries, the correlation between the two was strikingly higher. Nine out of 16 countries had significant correlations between the two variables. Finland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands had correlation coefficients higher than 0.3, Germany had a coefficient higher than 0.4, the UK had a correlation higher than 0.5, France and Greece had coefficients higher than 0.6, and Ireland and Spain had coefficients higher than 0.7.

<sup>8</sup> Pair-wise correlations between (lagged) net lending and the presence of legislation was -0.1939 (p-value = 0.0000), indicating that unilateral legislation was more persistent in years with high (previous) fiscal deficits. Within some panels, this correlation was markedly higher (in Belgium, the corresponding pair-wise co-efficient was -0.6605, p-value = 0.0000).

---

<sup>9</sup> While pair-wise correlations between trade-union density and a time-trend was weakly negative for the sample as a whole, 12 out of 16 countries witnessed pair-wise correlation coefficients of -0.8 or higher, indicating a strong negative trend in union density over time within panels.

<sup>10</sup> To keep the scale consistent with other institutional variables, confederal authority is reported on a scale of 0-100 rather than 0-1, as in Visser's database.

<sup>11</sup>  $\chi^2(8) = 29.67$ , p-value = 0.0002.

10 when strike threats were excluded (the above five countries plus Finland). Finally, we include a time trend to control for the lack of time-stationarity within our dependent variable.

## RESULTS

Tables 2 and 3 present results for the baseline conditional fixed-effects model. Beta coefficients have been converted to odds ratios; hence, values greater/less than 1 indicate that a marginal change in the independent variable increases/decreases strike incidence. As the odds ratios in both tables reveal, the ratification of a legislative act, which entails union exclusion and is significant across all models, increases the likelihood of a general strike/strike-threat by a factor of roughly 2.5 to 4, lending some evidence for hypothesis 1. The presence of a rejected pact, relative to no pact offered, holds the expected correlation with strike incidence, and is associated with a significantly increased likelihood of a general strike in three of eleven of our models, providing weak substantiation for hypothesis 2. The variable loses significance when Greece is excluded and when industrial relations institutions and government composition dummies are included. The presence of an accepted pact, relative to no pact, was significantly associated with greater general strike incidence in four of the eleven models, contrary to hypothesis 3. While these results appear to run counter to the argument that union inclusion is associated with a *lower* incidence of general strikes, their explanation can be attributed to reverse causation. In other words, general strikes have sometimes been called by unions in the midst of social pact negotiations and have eventually resulted in an agreement between the social partners (see Hamann and Kelly 2011: 102-04, 126-30). In these cases, accepted pacts represent a *strike outcome* linked to union inclusion rather than a *strike cause*. Within our dataset, accepted pacts succeeded a general strike or strike threat on 14 of the 18 occasions where both events occurred within the same year.

Party position is significantly correlated with higher strike incidence, substantiating

hypothesis 4. Across ten of eleven models, a one-point increase in the ruling party's position towards the right of the political spectrum increases the probability of strikes by a factor of 1.03 to 1.06. The ratios increase when Greece is excluded, possibly because the incidence of general strikes is no different under conservative and social democratic governments in that country, so the party position coefficient is dampened. Ruling party vote share also holds the predicted sign across both dependent variables, substantiating hypothesis 5. Larger ruling parties are significantly associated with higher strike incidence, and their significance does not wane when Greece is excluded from the sample. This finding is also corroborated with the government composition dummies. Minority governments are associated with significantly reduced strike incidence, relative to single-party majority governments regardless of sample exclusions.

The remaining economic and institutional controls either performed as expected or failed to exhibit significance. Positive GDP growth was significantly associated with lessened strike incidence across all models. High (lagged) unemployment was also significantly associated with greater strike incidence across all models, with the exception of the baseline model that included lagged net lending, due to multi-collinearity problems mentioned above. (Lagged) net lending as a percentage of GDP was significantly associated with reduced strike incidence in the baseline model, as expected. Regarding industrial relations controls, trade union density was insignificant, yet high confederal authority was significantly associated with greater strike incidence. Finally, in line with our summary data, the inclusion of a linear trend indicates that general strike incidence is significantly increasing over time; the time trend is significantly greater than 1 in nine of the eleven models.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

General strikes called by trade unions to protest government policy is a topic that has been somewhat neglected in both the

**TABLE 2. Logit Results for General Strikes Estimation (Odds Ratios)**

<b>Independent Variable</b>	<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>	<b>V</b>
<i>LR Position</i>	1.039*** (0.002)	1.037 (0.119)	1.040*** (0.001)	1.043*** (0.001)	1.048*** (0.003)
<i>Proposed Pact Rejected</i> (1=yes; 0=no)	2.433 (0.116)	2.923* (0.096)	2.477 (0.129)	2.066 (0.232)	2.723* (0.087)
<i>Proposed Pact Accepted</i> (1=yes; 0=no)	1.685* (0.063)	1.690 (0.188)	1.452 (0.180)	1.841** (0.040)	1.853** (0.015)
<i>Legislative Acts Passed</i> (1=yes; 0=no)	3.803*** (0.000)	2.438* (0.078)	3.668*** (0.001)	3.357*** (0.001)	3.619*** (0.003)
<i>GDP Growth</i>	0.723*** (0.007)	0.707* (0.063)	0.713*** (0.004)	0.709*** (0.005)	0.702*** (0.007)
<i>Unemployment (Lag)</i>	1.181** (0.012)	1.063 (0.566)	1.204*** (0.003)	1.227*** (0.002)	1.225*** (0.003)
<i>Time Trend</i>	1.049** (0.012)	1.107** (0.017)	1.037** (0.048)	1.048** (0.021)	1.066*** (0.008)
<i>Net Lending (Lag)</i>		0.858* (0.071)			
<i>Union Density</i>			0.988 (0.778)		
<i>Confederal Authority</i>			1.043** (0.014)		
<i>Minority Government</i> (1=yes; 0=no)				0.144*** (0.002)	
<i>Coalition Majority</i> (1=yes; 0=no)				0.636 (0.280)	
<i>Ruling Party Vote Share</i>					1.104** (0.027)
<i>Exclusions</i>	None	None	None	None	None
<i>Pseudo R Squared</i>	0.1599	0.1766	0.1723	0.1796	0.1937
<i>Wald Chi Squared</i>	137.48	96.02	128.05	293.56	182.99
<i>Observations</i>	286	242	285	286	286
<i>Number of Countries</i>	11	11	11	11	11

Estimation Method is conditional fixed-effects logit model with country clustered standard errors. Robust p-values listed below odds ratios. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance on a 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval.

**TABLE 3. Robustness Checks for Logit Results for General Strikes Estimation (Odds Ratios)**

<b>Independent Variable</b>	<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>IV</b>
<i>LR Position</i>	1.034*** (0.002)	1.035*** (0.001)	1.043*** (0.009)	1.052*** (0.000)	1.057*** (0.000)	1.064*** (0.000)
<i>Proposed Pact Rejected (1=yes; 0=no)</i>	2.696 (0.121)	2.310 (0.188)	3.036* (0.071)	2.154 (0.212)	1.822 (0.354)	2.317 (0.188)
<i>Proposed Pact Accepted (1=yes; 0=no)</i>	1.302 (0.433)	1.629 (0.233)	1.645* (0.075)	1.335 (0.394)	1.686 (0.140)	1.639 (0.112)
<i>Legislative Acts Passed (1=yes; 0=no)</i>	4.203*** (0.000)	4.003*** (0.000)	4.296*** (0.001)	3.171*** (0.008)	2.795** (0.015)	2.968** (0.037)
<i>GDP Growth</i>	0.768* (0.074)	0.762* (0.085)	0.752* (0.081)	0.657*** (0.000)	0.649*** (0.000)	0.634*** (0.000)
<i>Unemployment (Lag)</i>	1.102** (0.011)	1.127** (0.013)	1.149*** (0.004)	1.207** (0.012)	1.243** (0.014)	1.249** (0.014)
<i>Time Trend</i>	1.026 (0.118)	1.046 (0.105)	1.064* (0.055)	1.041** (0.049)	1.045** (0.036)	1.067** (0.014)
<i>Union Density</i>	0.961 (0.283)			1.004 (0.920)		
<i>Confederal Authority</i>	1.032* (0.068)			1.034** (0.031)		
<i>Minority Government (1=yes; 0=no)</i>		0.215** (0.011)			0.120*** (0.000)	
<i>Coalition Majority (1=yes; 0=no)</i>		0.765 (0.592)			0.626 (0.259)	
<i>Ruling Party Vote Share</i>			1.112* (0.079)			1.123** (0.014)
<i>Exclusions</i>	Strike Threats	Strike Threats	Strike Threats	Greece	Greece	Greece
<i>Pseudo R Squared</i>	0.1526	0.1590	0.1845	0.1867	0.2047	0.2266
<i>Wald Chi Squared</i>	358.17	99.81	108.60	5480.03	1157.34	279.80
<i>Observations</i>	258	259	259	261	262	262
<i>Number of Countries</i>	9	9	9	10	10	10

Estimation Method is conditional fixed-effects logit model with country clustered standard errors. Robust p-values listed below odds ratios. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance on a 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval.

political science and industrial relations literatures, even though this form of protest has become more common since the early 1980s. The resurgence of general strikes has coincided with a growth of contentious governmental reforms of welfare, pensions, and labor markets, and union protests have therefore sometimes been analyzed as a defensive and self-interested response by sectional interest groups (e.g. Matsaganis 2007). Yet the variation in general strike incidence over time and across countries suggests the significance of other factors. Our analysis demonstrates that while in many cases, unions use general strikes to react to governmental policy proposals, a far better predictor of trade union behavior is the exclusion of unions from government policymaking on these issues. Where governments excluded unions by opting for legislation, the probability of strike action was significantly greater. Our pacts/legislation and strike dataset contains examples of legislation leading directly to a general strike on various occasions in six countries: Belgium 1984, France 1995 and 2005, Greece (various years), Italy 1989 and 2003, Luxembourg 1982, and Spain 1988. Governments also legislated when social pact negotiations broke down; as our data show, governments followed a breakdown in pact talks with proposed legislation on 27 occasions. On nine of these occasions trade unions responded to the announcement of legislation with a general strike (in Austria 2003, Belgium 1993 and 1996, Greece 2000, Portugal 1988, the Netherlands 1982, and Spain 1985, 1994, and 2002). Our evidence also indicates that even when governments included unions in pact negotiations on contentious reforms, this policy did not eliminate union protests entirely. Indeed on no less than 17 occasions trade unions deployed general strikes as negotiations were under way, mostly to pressure the government into delivering more concessions (Belgium 2005, Finland 1992 and 1996, France 2003, Greece 1996-97, Italy 1991, 1998 and 2001-02, Luxembourg 2001, and Portugal 2002). In several cases the general strike was a direct response to a government threat to abandon talks (Finland 1993, Italy 1990, the Netherlands 1991) or was intended to instigate talks

from a government reluctant to open negotiations with the social partners (Italy 1994, Norway 1998, Spain 1992). Overall, our research indicates that union exclusion from the process of policymaking has proved to be at least as contentious as the substantive content of government policies and reforms and is closely correlated with general strikes.

We also found a strong party family effect – the more rightist the government on the left-right policy dimension, the greater the likelihood of general strikes. Focusing on two of the most strike-prone countries, Italy and France, 10 of the 15 general strikes in Italy were against conservative governments, as were six of the seven general strikes in France. However, the party family effect is far from overwhelming, as the odds ratios suggest: half the Greek general strikes (17 out of 34) and five of the seven Spanish general strikes were called against socialist governments.

Turning to other characteristics of government, we noted that different literatures led to different predictions about the propensity of coalition and minority governments to face general strikes. The multi-party status of coalition administrations with the possibility of inter-party divisions suggests they would be more willing to include unions and thereby reduce the likelihood of union protests. By the same token, the social movement literature proposes that coalition and minority governments might prove to be more attractive targets compared to single-party majority administrations. We find that minority governments tend to be associated with reduced strike incidence, contrary to the social movement theory prediction. This finding might also be related to the fact that minority governments are more likely to include unions in policy formulation on contentious issues (Hamann and Kelly 2011), which in turn is negatively related to the likelihood of strikes.

Finally, the organizational capacity of the trade union movement is also critical: union movements with a high degree of authority over their affiliates are more prone to call general strikes than more fragmented movements. Interestingly, union density, a conventional if problematic

measure of union power, does not correlate at all with general strike incidence, perhaps reflecting the fact that general strikes target a much larger participant base than union members alone.

Our findings suggest some interesting future lines of inquiry. In several countries union movements have protested government policies through demonstrations rather than strikes – Ireland, Denmark, and Sweden, for example (Fajertag and Pochet 2000). The restriction of our analysis to general strikes will certainly lead to an underestimation of union opposition to government policies; whether it has biased the coefficients on our key variables is less clear and would require further research.

Our findings are consistent with Pierson's (1994) argument that governments attempting to enact unpopular reforms in the context of increasingly volatile electorates have strong incentives to pursue policies of "blame avoidance." Social pacts can be interpreted as a classic mechanism of blame avoidance while the exclusion of unions from policy formation could deprive governments of the electoral benefits of blame avoidance strategies. The level and intensity of social unrest generated by a general strike potentially represents a high risk for any government and is consistent with the analysis of Pierson and others on the difficulties of retrenching popular welfare and pension systems. In light of our data, it would be interesting to explore the degree to which union exclusion and general strikes lead voters to actually punish such governments in subsequent elections.

Finally, our analysis has interesting implications for the literature on trade union decline and revitalization (e.g. Frege and Kelly 2004; Phelan 2007). If we analyze trade unions as agents of collective bargaining and worker representation at the place of work, their capacity to perform these roles effectively does appear to have diminished significantly in recent years. Declining trends in union density and strike rates have already been referred to and are well known, although some commentators have also noted the persistence of high levels of collective bargaining coverage throughout much of Western Europe (the

UK and Ireland are the exceptions) (e.g. Pontusson 2005; Soskice 2007). Yet, if we turn from evidence on the extent of the bargaining process to evidence on bargaining outcomes, the impression of union resilience is called into question. The wage share in national income, a widely-used measure to proxy union "pushfulness" in collective bargaining, has been declining steadily since the late 1970s (Glyn 2006: 7). A low degree of income inequality, normally measured by the 90:10 ratio, has also been used as a measure of union power on the grounds that it captures the ability of unions to push up wages at the bottom end of the earnings distribution, restrain rises at the top end, and maintain substantial income shares for wage earners at the expense of owners of capital. Yet the 90:10 ratio began to rise significantly in a few countries in the early 1980s and the trend has spread to most of Western Europe since the early 2000s (Glyn 2006: 167-70), consistent with the idea of a decline in unions' mobilizing capacity and bargaining power. Our evidence on general strikes hints that the decline in unions' mobilizing capacities may have been overestimated because the ability of unions to operate within the political arena in relation to governments has been largely neglected. General strikes are only one means by which unions seek to exercise political influence and by no means as frequent as lobbying of ministers or voter mobilization (Hamann and Kelly 2004). Nonetheless the resilience of this mode of action at a time when union influence in collective bargaining appears rather limited underlines the importance of recognizing that union action in the political system may be at least as significant in gauging their strength as collective action within the industrial relations system. Further research on the outcomes of general strikes could explore the effectiveness of general strikes in more detail.

In conclusion, our analysis has provided some novel insights into the reasons for the pattern of increasing frequency of general strikes across Western Europe that stands in sharp relief to the pattern of declining economic strikes in the same set of countries. While established theories of strikes are poorly equipped to account for

the occurrence of general strikes, our comparative longitudinal analysis provides initial evidence that political and institutional factors are better at explaining the national and temporal patterns of general strikes.

## APPENDIX

### General Strikes by Country and Date

Country	Strike date
Austria	June 3, 2003
Belgium	Oct 28, 2005 Oct 7, 2005 Oct 28, 1996 Dec 10, 1993 Nov 26, 1993 April 3, 1984 March 26, 1982 Feb 17, 1981
Finland	May 10, 1996 (Threat) May 19, 1993 (Threat) Nov 26, 1992 (Threat)
France	Oct 4, 2005 Mar 10, 2005 May 13, 2003 Nov 14, 1995 Oct 24, 1991 May 15, 1980 April 26, 1980
Greece	Dec 13, 2006 Mar 15, 2006 Dec 14, 2005 May 11, 2005 Mar 17, 2005 Dec 13, 2004 June 18, 2002 May 17, 2001 April 26, 2001 Dec 7, 2000 Oct 10, 2000 Dec 15, 1998 April 9, 1998 Oct 23, 1997 Jan 23, 1997 Nov 28, 1996 Dec 14, 1994 Sept 8, 1992 Aug 27, 1992 Dec 17, 1991 Nov 8, 1991 May 30, 1991 (Threat) Dec 5, 1990 Sept 11, 1990 June 6, 1990 May 22, 1990 Jan 26, 1990 Feb 2, 1989 Feb 16, 1987 Jan 15, 1987

	Dec 1985* Oct 24, 1985 Jan 19, 1983 Nov 15, 1980
Italy	Nov 25, 2005 Nov 30, 2004 Mar 26, 2004 Oct 24, 2003 Mar 21, 2003 Oct 18, 2002 April 16, 2002 Dec 5, 2001 Mar 1998 (Threat)* Dec 2, 1994 (Threat) Oct 14, 1994 Oct 22, 1991 July 11, 1990 (Threat) May 10, 1989 Jan 31, 1989 (Threat)
Luxembourg	Oct 9, 2001 (Threat) April 1992 (Threat)* Oct 9, 1990 (Threat) April 8, 1982
Netherlands	Sept 17, 1991 Feb 4, 1982
Norway	Oct 15, 1998
Portugal	Dec 10, 2002 Mar 28, 1988
Spain	April 10, 2003 June 20, 2002 Jan 27, 1994 Oct 1992 (Threat)* May 28, 1992 Dec 14, 1988 June 20, 1985

Sources: EIRO; EIRR; European Protest and Coercion Database.

Note: \* We were unable to identify the exact day of the strike or strike threat.

## REFERENCES

- Allern, Elin Haugsgjerd (2010) *Political Parties And Interest Groups In Norway*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Anthonsen, Mette, Johannes Lindvall & Ulrich Schmidt-Hansen (2011) "Social Democrats, Unions And Corporatism: Denmark And Sweden Compared", *Party Politics*, 17(1): 118-134.
- Baccaro, Lucio and Sang-Hoon Lim (2007) "Social Pacts as Coalitions of the Weak and Moderate: Ireland, Italy and South Korea in Comparative Perspective", *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 13(1): 27-46.
- Baccaro, Lucio and Marco Simoni (2008) "Policy Concertation in Europe: Understanding Government Choice", *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(10): 1323-48.
- Bird, Derek (1991) "International Comparisons of Industrial Disputes in 1989 and 1990", *Employment Gazette*, 99(12): 653-658.
- Bouquin, Stephen (2007) "Strikes in France: Strong Social Eruptions and a Weak Tradition of Collective Bargaining". In Sjaak van der Velden, Heiner Dribbusch, Dave Lyddon and Kurt Vandaele (eds), *Strikes Around The World, 1968-2005: Case-Studies Of 15 Countries*. Amsterdam: Aksant.
- Brandl, Bernd and Franz Traxler (2010) "Labor Conflicts: A Cross-National Analysis of Economic and Institutional Determinants, 1970-2002", *European Sociological Review*, in press.
- Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum (2001) *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burgess, Katrina (2004) *Parties and Unions in the New Global Economy*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Callaghan, John (2000) *The Retreat of Social Democracy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Davies, Jackie (2001) "International Comparisons of Labor Disputes in 1999", *Labor Market Trends*, 109(4): 195-201.
- Dunlop, John D. (1958) *Industrial Relations Systems*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Edwards, Paul (2003) "The Future of Industrial Relations". In Peter Ackers and Adrian Wilkinson (eds), *Understanding Work and Employment: Industrial Relations in Transition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Edwards, Paul K. and Richard Hyman (1994) "Strikes and Industrial Conflict: Peace in Europe?". In Richard Hyman and Anthony Ferner (eds), *New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- EIRO (2005) "Developments in Industrial Action 2000-04". <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/06/update/tn0506101u.htm>, accessed Oct 2, 2009.
- European Commission's Annual Macroeconomic Database (AMECO). (2010). Last updated: April 20, 2010. [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/db\\_indicators/ameco/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/ameco/index_en.htm), accessed July 20, 2010.
- Fajertag, Giuseppe and Philippe Pochet (Eds) (2000) *Social Pacts in Europe – New Dynamics 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.* Brussels: European Trade Union Institute.
- Featherstone, Kevin and Dimitris Papadimitriou (2008) *The Limits of Europeanization: Reform Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Flanders, Allan (1970) *Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Franzosi, Roberto (1995) *The Puzzle of Strikes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Frege, Carola and John Kelly (eds) (2004) *Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union Revitalization in a Globalizing Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair (2006) *Representative Government in Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties, and Governments*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Glyn, Andrew (2006) *Capitalism Unleashed: Finance, Globalization, and Welfare*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hale, Dominic (2008) "International Comparisons of Labor Disputes in 2006", *Economic and Labor Market Review*, 2(4): 32-39.
- Hamann, Kerstin (2011) *The Politics of Industrial Relations: Labor Unions in Spain*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Hamann, Kerstin and John Kelly (2011) *Parties, Elections and Policy Reforms in Western Europe: Voting for Social Pacts*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Hamann, Kerstin and John Kelly (2004) "Unions as Political Actors: A Recipe for Revitalization?" In Carola Frege and John Kelly (eds) (2004) *Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union Revitalization in a Globalizing Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hassel, Anke (2006) *Wage Setting, Social Pacts and the Euro: A New Role for the State*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Hindley, Michael (1997) *Trade Unions and Political Funding in Europe*. London: Labor Research Department.

- Howell, Chris. 2001. "The End of the Relationship Between Social Democratic Parties and Trade Unions?" *Studies in Political Economy* 65 (Summer):7-37.
- Hyman, Richard (1989) *Strikes 4<sup>th</sup> edn*. London: Macmillan.
- Immergut, Ellen M., Karen M. Anderson and Isabelle Schulze (eds) (2007) *The Handbook of West European Pension Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jacobs, Antoine J.M. (2007) "The Law of Strikes and Lockouts". In Roger Blanpain (ed.), *Comparative Labor Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies*. The Hague: Kluwer.
- Kitschelt, Herbert (1994) *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Ian Budge (2006) *Mapping Policy Preferences 11: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lavdas, Kostas A. (2005) "Interest Groups in Disjointed Corporatism: Social Dialogue in Greece and European 'Competitive Corporatism'", *West European Politics*, 28(2): 297-316.
- Lindvall, Johannes (2011) "The Institutional Foundations of Trust and Mistrust: Reforms and Protests in France", *West European Politics*, in press.
- Lyddon, Dave (2007) "Strike Statistics and The Problems of International Comparison". In Sjaak van der Velden, Heiner Dribbusch, Dave Lyddon and Kurt Vandaele (eds) (2007) *Strikes Around the World, 1968-2005: Case-Studies of 15 Countries*. Amsterdam: Aksant, pp. 24-39.
- Matsaganis, Manos (2007) "Union Structures and Pension Outcomes in Greece", *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 45(3): 537-555.
- Molina, Oscar and Martin Rhodes (2002) "Corporatism: The Past, Present, and Future of a Concept", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5(June): 305-31.
- Monger, Joanne (2005) "International Comparisons of Labor Disputes in 2003", *Labor Market Trends*, 113(4): 159-68.
- Nam, Taehyun (2007) "Rough Days in Democracies: Comparing Protests in Democracies", *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(1): 97-120.
- OECD. (n.d., a) Online OECD Employment Database. Trade Union Density in OECD Countries, 1960-2008. [http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3343,en\\_2649\\_33927\\_40917154\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html#union](http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3343,en_2649_33927_40917154_1_1_1_1,00.html#union). Accessed July 20, 2010.
- OECD (n.d., b) *Annual Labor Force Statistics*. Paris: OECD. <http://www.oecd.org/std/labor>. Accessed July 20, 2010.
- OECD *National Accounts*, Paris: OECD. <http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=26646>. Accessed July 20, 2010.
- Olson, Mancur (1982) *The Rise and Decline of Nations*. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press.
- Pagoulatos, George (2005) "The Politics of Privatization: Redrawing the Public-Private Boundary", *West European Politics*, 28(2): 352-380.
- Phelan, Craig (ed.) (2007) *Trade Union Revitalisation: Trends and Prospects in 34 Countries*. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Piazza, James (2005) "Globalizing Quiescence: Globalization, Union Density and Strikes in 15 Industrialized Countries", *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 26(2): 289-314.
- Piazza, James (2001) "De-Linking Labor: Labor Unions and Social Democratic Parties Under Globalization", *Party Politics*, 7(4): 413-35.
- Pierson, Paul (1994) *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pontusson, Jonas (2005) *Inequality and Prosperity: Social Europe vs. Liberal America*. Ithaca, NT: Cornell University Press.
- Scheuer, Steen (2006) "A Novel Calculus? Institutional Change, Globalization and Industrial Conflict in Europe", *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 12(2): 143-64.
- Shalev, Michael (1992) "The Resurgence of Labor Quiescence". In Marino Regini (ed.), *The Future of Labor Movements*. London: Sage.
- Soskice, David (2007) "Macroeconomics and Varieties of Capitalism." In Bob Hancké, Martin Rhodes and Mark Thatcher (eds) *Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contradictions, and Complementarities in the European Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 89-121.
- Strøm, Kaare (1990) *Minority Government and Majority Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney (1994) *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, Charles (1978) *From Mobilization to Revolution*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Van Der Velden, Sjaak, Heiner Dribbusch, Dave Lyddon and Kurt Vandaele (eds) (2007) *Strikes Around the World, 1968-2005: Case-Studies of 15 Countries*. Amsterdam: Aksant.

Visser, Jelle (2009) *Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS)*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labor Studies. Last updated: January, 2009, <http://www.uva-aiaas.net/207>. Accessed July 20, 2010.

Walsh, Kenneth (1983) *Strikes in Europe and the United States*. London: Pinter.

Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (<http://www.march.es/ceacs/ingles/ceacs.asp>)  
WORKING PAPERS

Series Editor: Andrew Richards

Most recent titles:

Working Paper	Author	Title
2009/241	Queralto, D.	<i>Learning the Mechanical Effect of Electoral Systems.</i>
2009/242	Astudillo, J.	<i>Neopopulismo, y respuesta sindical a las reformas económicas en América Latina.</i>
2009/243	Aguilar, P., Balcells, L., and Cebolla, H.	<i>Determinants of Attitudes towards Transitional Justice: An Empirical Analysis of the Spanish Case.</i>
2009/244	Sánchez-Cuenca, I.	<i>Terrorism and Territory.</i>
2009/245	Ortega, F. and Polavieja, J. G.	<i>Labor-Market Exposure as a Determinant of Attitudes toward Immigration.</i>
2009/246	Amat, F. and Wibbels, E.	<i>Electoral Incentives, Group Identity and Preferences for Redistribution.</i>
2009/247	Alonso, S. and Claro da Fonseca, S.	<i>Immigration, Left and Right.</i>
2009/248	Amat, F., Jurado, I., and León, S.	<i>A Political Theory of Decentralization Dynamics.</i>
2010/249	Kselman, D. M.	<i>Electoral Institutions, Legislative Accountability, and Political Corruption.</i>
2010/250	Pop-Eleches, G. and Tucker, J. A.	<i>After the Party: Legacies and Left-Right Distinctions in Post-Communist Countries.</i>
2010/251	Urquizu, I.	<i>Moderate Voters and Internal Party Factionalism.</i>
2010/252	Kuo, A. and Margalit, Y.	<i>Measuring Individual Identity: Experimental Evidence.</i>
2010/253	Kuo, A.	<i>Explaining Employer Coordination: Evidence from the US Inter-War Period.</i>
2011/254	Falcó-Gimeno, A.	<i>Portfolio Allocation and Time out of Office in Coalition Governments.</i>
2011/255	Gorodzeisky, A. and Semyonov, M.	<i>Occupational Incorporation of Immigrants in Western European Countries.</i>
2011/256	Brader, T. A. and Tucker, A.	<i>Follow the Leader: Party Cues, Policy Opinion, and the Power of Partisanship in Three Multiparty Systems.</i>
2011/257	De la Calle, L. and Roussias, N.	<i>Independents and Vote Choice: Spatial or Performance Voting?</i>
2011/258	Lapiente, V.	<i>Trade-Offs in Corporate Governance.</i>
2011/259	Lago, I.	<i>Why (Not) National Party Systems?</i>
2011/260	Burgoon, B.	<i>Immigration, Integration and Support for Redistribution in Europe.</i>