

Instituto Juan March

Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (CEACS)

Juan March Institute

Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (CEACS)

Integration beyond Models: An Empirical Outlook to the Impact of Integration

Models

Author(s): Cebolla Boado, Héctor
Finotelli, Claudia

Date 2011

Type Working Paper

Series Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones,
Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 264 (2011)

City: Madrid

Publisher: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales

Your use of the CEACS Repository indicates your acceptance of individual author and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any document(s) only for academic research and teaching purposes.

WORKING PAPERS

INTEGRATION BEYOND MODELS:
AN EMPIRICAL OUTLOOK TO THE IMPACT OF
INTEGRATION MODELS

Héctor Cebolla and Claudia Finotelli

Estudio/Working Paper 2011/264
December 2011

INTEGRATION BEYOND MODELS:
AN EMPIRICAL OUTLOOK TO THE IMPACT OF INTEGRATION MODELS

Héctor Cebolla and Claudia Finotelli

Estudio/Working Paper 2011/264
December 2011

Héctor Cebolla is Assistant Professor of Sociology, UNED, and *Doctor Miembro* of the Juan March Institute. Claudia Finotelli is Ramón y Cajal Researcher in the Sociology II Department at the Complutense University of Madrid.

Abstract

Integration models are often viewed as a necessary tool for framing integration policies, and for measuring integration efficiency. Aside from these applications, however, there is still a striking lack of empirical work exploring the impact these models have on specific integration outcomes in given countries. The objective of this article is to evaluate the role national contexts play in observed variations on the 'model dimension,' using on two empirical indicators: labour market participation and educational performance. By using a multilevel approach and high quality comparable data (European labour Force Survey and the Program for International Student Assessment), this paper compares outcomes in a number of immigration countries and seeks to rank them according to their overall approach to integration. In doing so, this paper proposes the relevance of relating integration outcomes to specific institutions in the labour market and educational system.

INTRODUCTION*

Since the beginning of the 1990s, different models of integration—commonly thought of as sets of policies and practices that are often embedded in a given integration philosophy—have been designed to explain how nation states, “as a distinct ‘society’, a unified organic, bounded entity [...] can encompass and hold together the diversity and divisions of people sharing the same territory” (Favell 2001: 4). Therefore, integration models that shape integration policies are often understood as a necessary tool not only for explaining how integration actually works, but also for measuring the efficiency of measures aimed at integrating immigrants.

Nevertheless, for many years the question of whether or not integration models matter (and how they matter) has been limited to a theoretical discussion, and rarely treated as an empirical problem with respect to individual outcomes.¹ Relatively little has been said about indicators of inclusion—such as labor market participation, educational performance, and ethnic segregation—from a cross-national perspective. More recently, the limited attention paid to integration processes and their mechanisms has been described as one of the main shortcomings in international comparative research, with critics arguing that existing research has focused too exclusively on integration models (Favell 2003; Banton 2001). In response, new studies on this topic have come out with the objective of filling this gap, and linking policies with integration outcomes. Their results, however, still yield only a fuzzy picture of these relationships. If the positive economic impact of citizenship acquisition on immigrants’ economic integration has been highlighted in the Canadian case (Devoretz and Pivneko 2006), national

policies do not seem to play a relevant role in the quality of labour market insertion in most European countries (Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007). Other studies have highlighted the relevance of additional contextual factors in evaluating immigrants’ integration. In 2003 for instance, Crul and Vermeulen pointed to the relevance of national institutional arrangements for the education and labour market performances of young Turks in Europe. Immigration experience has also been mentioned as an additional factor for explaining cross-national differences in immigrants’ educational achievement, since it seems that a countries with a longer immigration experience are ‘better equipped to deal with immigration’ (Levels and Drockers 2008: 1422) than new immigration countries. Further research conducted on the second generation of immigrants in Europe seems to suggest that ‘the idea that you can have an integration model that has a positive effect on all these domains [education, labour market and identification A/N] doesn’t come through’ (Crul 2009). By contrast, Koopmans (2010) recently demonstrated the relevance of policies showing a certain (albeit non-intended) impact on the socio-economic integration processes of immigrants—but only in cases where certain types of policies were combined with certain types of welfare regimes. Despite these latest results regarding integration processes, contributions on this topic remain scant compared to the general scope of the political and philosophical discussion on integration models.

With this in mind, this paper aims to ground the theoretical debate on integration models in its empirical relevance for a larger number of countries. Our goal is thus to evaluate the performance of selected national contexts in which variation exists along the so-called ‘integration models dimension.’ That is why we have decided to include not only classic ‘integration nations’ in our analysis (Favell 2003), but also those countries where no explicit choice of integration models has been made and whose integration policies are thus not embedded in an established integration philosophy. This is, for instance, the case of ‘new’ immigration countries, such as the

* This paper benefitted from the funding of the international research network: “The heuristic potential of models of citizenship and immigrant integration for international comparisons” funded by the German Research Council, and hosted by the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

¹ For such debate see, among others, Kymlika 1995 and Glazer 1997.

Southern European countries and Ireland.² With respect to outcomes, we set out to employ two empirical indicators of integration: labour market outcomes and educational performance, since both are to be seen as privileged avenues to social advancement. The overall research question we intend to address concerns the empirical impact of broad integration models and policies on these selected indicators of integration: do national models of integration matter at all? As such, this research question is analytically obscure, since it ignores the existence of specific causal mechanisms that relate models and outcomes. We acknowledge this limitation, which is generally shared by the empirical research that tackles this issue. However, its relevance is affirmed by the intense attention that the academic- and policy-oriented literature devotes to the inclusion potential of integration models—and, in particular, to the social and political consequences of granting equality rights to individuals or cultural groups, as in the cases of assimilationism and multiculturalism respectively.

The article is organized as follows. First, we justify our selection of cases, making claims about our views on the national models of integration that prevail in the various countries used in our empirical analyses. Subsequently, we propose a plan for empirical research, including the selection of comparable national samples in selected datasets. The second part of the article deals with the analysis of data on labour market integration and education performance in the aforementioned countries. In the third part of the article, we discuss the main results: evaluating the impact that institutional factors in the labour market or the education system have on integration in the countries in question. In the final part of this paper, we consider how—even if integration policies alone cannot shape immigrant integration—other, relevant, institutional arrangements and structural dynamics might be taken into account to explain how integration works.

² Unfortunately, because of data constraints we are unable to consider the migrants' countries of origin in our analyses.

THE SELECTION OF CASES

To test our assumptions, a large set of countries is, of course, preferable. Therefore, whenever the available data allowed it, we decided to consider all 15 West European countries, plus Norway and Switzerland. We are aware that a country's preference for a particular citizenship regime or integration model does not always rest on 'firm empirical grounds' (Koopmanns *et al.* 2005: 32). However, the available literature on this topic presents a highly variegated 'integration panorama' in Europe that might well prove useful for our task.

France still embodies the paradigmatic case of assimilationism, based on the assumption that successful integration can only occur if immigrants assimilate culturally into French society. Nevertheless, in France, assimilationist aims are combined with a more inclusive civic notion of citizenship acquisition—something that has lead scholars to define the French model as universalistic, rather than assimilationist (Koopmans *et al.* 2005). Britain and the Netherlands, together with Belgium, still occupy a place quite close to the multicultural pole of the spectrum (Koopmans *et al.* 2005; Moodod and Meer 2006; Martiniello 1998) while most Nordic countries are described as having open and tolerant models, despite recent changes aimed at combining immigrants' 'rights' with 'duties' by linking a successful integration process with obtaining welfare provisions (Hagelund 2002; Brochmann and Hagelund 2010). In particular, Sweden seems to have accomplished this, with its 'explicit goal to work at eliminating discrimination against migrants as well as inequality between migrants and native Swedes' (Rydgren 2004: 697), creating an exceptional model with an ambitious integration policy (De los Reyes and Kamali 2005). Among all Scandinavian countries, only Denmark is criticized for having limited legal equality guarantees to go along with a political discourse where assimilationist purposes seem to prevail (Jensen 2008; Kestila 2006). In general, German-speaking countries—such as Austria, Switzerland and Germany—have often been defined as

segregationist, since they do not seem to favor the inclusion of immigrants. This is also why they are sometimes viewed as forming the ‘negative’ pole of the integration models spectrum (Joppke 2007). Nevertheless, the notion of German-speaking countries’ ‘segregationism’ has recently been called obsolete, amid suggestions that German-speaking countries are in fact more assimilationist than segregationist (Koopmans *et al.* 2005).

Finally, new immigration countries—especially the Southern European ones—are often excluded from the integration debate because of their recent history of immigration and their lack of established integration policies and practices, to say nothing of identifiable integration ideologies (Koopmans *et al.* 2005; Koopmans 2010). It is often suggested that in Southern European countries, a ‘non-model’ of integration prevails, and that these countries lack of the systematic frameworks of integration policies and practices that are typically seen in old immigration countries.³ Their ‘young’ immigration experience and their alleged lack of interest in ambitious integration designs, are typically invoked to suggest that Southern European integration regimes may be “perilously close to a *de facto* policy of differential exclusion” (Freeman, 2004: 961)—a state where mere socio-economic integration is the main goal. There are differences that should be mentioned within Southern Europe, however. Greece in particular has been criticized for its marked lack of integration policies, commonly thought of as the product of a mono-cultural (prevailing *ius sanguinis*) and monoreligious (prevailing Orthodox Church) national self-understanding (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2009).⁴ By contrast, the relatively inclusive

and cosmopolitan concept of nationhood that prevails in Portugal—commonly thought to be the product of colonial and post-colonial experience—seems to position Portugal as a multicultural society, with signs of a national ideology of integration.⁵

In addition, Ireland and Finland—the other two ‘new’ immigration countries—still lack an established frame for their integration policies. Nevertheless, there seems to be a strong push towards a multicultural approach in Finland (Pitkänen and Kouki 2002; Holm and Londen 2010). In Ireland, by contrast, a mono-cultural and mono-religious self-understanding (linked to the ideology of Irishness and the centrality of Catholicism respectively) seems to be leading integration and citizenship policies in an exclusionary direction, as shown by the restrictive citizenship reform of 2004 (Fanning and Mutwarasibo 2007).

In sum, research conducted so far allows us to assume that a given country might be closer to one ideal-type (or integration pole) than another (See Table 1).⁶

However, there are still difficulties involved in clustering the countries along such ‘model’ dimensions, according to the literature on this topic. For this reason, we have decided to complement the available literature with the data provided by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). This index measures integration policy indicators in 25 European and 3 Non-European countries. Policy measures are assessed in the six main fields of i) anti-discrimination ii) labor market access iii) family reunion iv) political participation v) access to nationality and vi) long-term residence. A specific focus is given to the sectorial ranking of countries according to the openness of their labour markets in the appropriate section.

³ For integration in Southern Europe see Zincone 2004; Zapata-Barrero 2004 and Vermeulen 2004.

⁴ Nevertheless, the Greek Parliament has approved in March 2010 a comprehensive reform of the Greek Citizenship Law, which introduces the *ius soli* as well as the procedure of ‘citizenship by declaration’ for young foreign children born in Greece to parents with a permanent residence permit. For more details on the reform see: www.eudo.citizenship.eu.

⁵ As Joppke (2005:130) put it, “Portugal became the torchbearer of ‘racial equality’ and ‘multiracialism’ long before such vocabulary became standard in the liberal democracies of the west.

⁶ So, as Koopmans *et al.* (2005: 9) outlined, models appear more as ‘conceptual spaces’ than as rigid regimes.

TABLE 1. Country Clusters along the Model-Dimension

Multiculturalism	Universalism/ Assimilationism	Assimilationism /Segregationism	'New' immigration countries / 'Socio-economic' Model
United Kingdom	France	Germany	Italy
Sweden		Austria	Spain
The Netherlands		Switzerland	Greece
Belgium		Denmark	Portugal
Norway			Ireland
			Finland

Source: Own elaboration based on secondary literature.

We are aware of the fact that the MIPEX considers only the individual dimension of citizenship—leaving out, for instance, the relevance of education policies, or the group dimension of cultural rights. As a consequence, we have added the Cultural

Southern European regimes into account. In the Mipex, however, most of the Southern European countries score very high with respect to labour market participation, and (with the exception of Portugal) quite low with respect to the other variables,

TABLE 2. Country Classification according Mipex (General and Labour Market Ranking) and the Koopmans *et al.*'s Cultural Rights Classification

Mipex (Overall classification)	Mipex (access to lab. market)	Cultural Rights Classification
Sweden	Sweden	Sweden
Portugal	Spain/Portugal	UK
Belgium	Italy	Netherlands
Netherlands	Belgium	Belgium
Finland	Finland/Netherlands/Norway	Norway
Italy	UK	France
Norway	Germany/France	Germany
UK	Denmark/Greece	Denmark
Spain	-	Austria
France	-	-
Luxembourg	-	-
Germany	-	-
Ireland	-	-
Switzerland	-	-
Greece	-	-
Denmark	-	-
Austria	-	-

Source: Own elaboration.

Rights Classification (CRC) by Koopmans *et al.* (2010)—taking into account dimensions such as cultural requirements for naturalizations, and the existence of religious rights outside of public institutions. As can be seen in Table 2, countries that are traditionally thought of as practicing multiculturalism score considerably higher with respect to individual equality rights and citizenship rights. The performance of German speaking countries by contrast is remarkably worse—both in the CRC and in the MIPEX overall classification. Unfortunately, the CRC does not take

confirming their alleged trend towards 'differential exclusion' (Tables 2).

Naturally, certain cases prove more difficult to evaluate. Germany, for instance, does slightly better than other German-speaking countries, having eased its *ius sanguinis* principle, while Austria and Switzerland remain at the bottom of the overall ranking. Portugal, on the other hand, seems to have developed highly progressive legislation on individuals' access to citizenship rights, in marked contrast to the restrictive trends evident in other Southern European countries. In general, however, the rankings provided by MIPEX and CRC

suggest a certain consistency among the country clusters proposed by the literature on this topic. Our goal is to contrast these differentiated country-classifications with what the outcomes tell us with respect to integration.⁷

DATA

Empirical research comparing the specific outcomes of integration policies in European countries is constrained by the lack of appropriate datasets; it remains difficult to minimize the distortions that stem from different sampling frameworks, statistical definitions of the relevant (immigrant) populations (Koopmanns, 2008: 15), and other sources of bias resulting from different national ideologies imposed on data-production (Favell, 2003: 27).

Labour market performance and educational attainment stand as two well-established determinants of life chances in advanced economies. And while studies on the socioeconomic integration of immigrants tend to concentrate on labour market aspects of integration, the relevance of immigrants-natives differentials in education cannot be denied, since education is partially responsible for imposing further disadvantage on the offspring of former immigrants—thereby putting receiving societies at the risk of concurrent class *and* ethnic stratification. In this study, we plan to use different datasets, promoting the proper definition of the dependent variables we are interested in.

In the matter of labour market integration, the most important empirical tool available for use is the European Labour Force Survey (ELFS, Eurostat), which combines each national Labour

Force Survey into a single dataset, minimizing the lack of comparability. Besides its suitability for comparability, one of the most important advantages of this dataset is the large size of its national samples—something that ensures proper representation of immigrant populations. The ELFS provides key information on labour market attachment, including stability in employment, number of hours worked per week, wages, and occupational status. In addition, the ELFS allows us to expand the list of countries in our study, and provides relevant information about respondents' migration history. For the sake of simplicity we have decided to present analyses for a single dependent variable in this paper—namely, the likelihood of a respondent being unemployed. Other dependent variables are, of course, relevant, especially temporality and activity. However, the results we present here have been confirmed, more or less, by secondary analyses on other relevant variables.⁸

In addition, our paper's analytical interests extend to dependent variables that are *not* labour-market related. The way formal education is distributed across social groups is probably among the most important determinants of future social cohesion. Immigrants' educational disadvantages are thus a central concern for integration policies. For our analysis, we employ the OCDE's Program for International Student Assessment (PISA, 2006 edition), which provides crucial information on competences at age 15, just before the end of compulsory education in advanced democracies. PISA samples schools across the country, taking a random sample of up to 35 students for each one. It offers a rich range of individual, household, and school level indicators. The 2006 PISA edition does not contain information about parental country of origin. Yet, this surprising limitation could be less of a problem, given that ethnicity appears to be a residual partial explanation of attainment in many Western European countries (Heath and Birnbaum, 2007). PISA 2006—which we used for this study—included 1062 (53.46% of the sample) foreign-born students in Spain, 343 (7.36%) in Germany,

⁷ Other widely known international classifications were also tried in the coming empirical analysis. In particular, the Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) by Howard (2009), which proved to have no predictive impact in the outcomes of integration. The CPI is based on a systematic analysis of citizenship policies in 27 countries, and takes into account three main factors of citizenship: i) whether a *ius soli* is granted, ii) what naturalization requirements must be fulfilled, and, iii) whether dual citizenship is granted.

⁸ These models are available upon request.

France 238 (5.20%), Italy 1103 (5.12%), Netherlands, 267 (5.55%). Intriguingly, PISA also allows us to look at second generations.

While competences are sometimes criticized as an abstract dependent variable—one that cannot reflect educational attainment directly—they are highly correlated to every other relevant proxy of school performance, including grades and transition rates to non-compulsory education. PISA's obvious dependent variables are the students' scores in three different sets of tests, in mathematics, reading and science. For each, PISA registers five plausible values corresponding to the student's expected result. The OECD suggests that PISA is a competence-based test and not a proper exercise to evaluate the successful adaptation of a student to the school system requirements. This is doubtful, however, and, in any case, refers to a dimension of learning that is highly correlated to school attainment.⁹

METHOD

In principle, multilevel regression analyses are employed to measure the impact of national contexts on different dependent variables, taking into consideration the appropriate list of individual and ecological controls required by each dependent variable. However, given that our list of countries is not large enough, the results of these equations will be compared to estimates obtained from standard linear and logistic regression analysis, estimated using country dummies.

The combination of individual and any group-level variables into a single analysis requires using a method that allows disentangling individual and group level variation, and the proper estimation of standard errors. This is what a multilevel regression adds to the standard OLS. The

standard one-level regression includes a single residual (R_{ij}).

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} X_{ij} + R_{ij}$$

A multiple-level regression allows adding as many random elements as we need to model between groups. The simplest multilevel regression is a random intercept model, which only has an extra random parameter associated with the intercept, which for this research represents the average value of a randomly chosen school in the PISA sample. The intercept is composed of an average value for the groups (γ_{00}) and a random one that reflects the variation across groups (U_{0j})

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + U_{0j}$$

The intercept could be explained using group level independent variables or level-2 predictors (Z_j):

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} Z_j + U_{0j}$$

in which case $\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}$ have the same interpretation as estimates in a standard regression. Thus, our final model specification will be as follows

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} Z_j + U_{0j} + \beta_{1j} X_{ij} + R_{ij}$$

where the random effects are R_{ij} (the unexplained individual level residual), and U_{0j} (the group level one). β_{1j} is a fixed effect that can be interpreted as a regular coefficient in a standard regression. Accordingly, X_{ij} is the vector of student and school level fixed effects that will be used to explain the relative over-ratings used as dependent variables.

One final methodological clarification is necessary. The interpretation of country level effects is, indeed, a problematic aspect of cross-country comparative research. Countries (including the ones included in our analysis) vary broadly along many dimensions, such as their migration history, macroeconomics and, as we well know, their integration philosophies. The underlying logic of our empirical strategy implies that any unexplained residual variation at the country level (or any ecological variable) is to be attributed to the overall country approach to integration,

⁹ In the following section we present the results obtained from the estimation, using test scores in mathematics as the dependent variable. Mathematics is a more universal and culture-blind language, and is thought to minimize ethnic differentials in attainment. The results from the reading and the science test scores are available upon request.

once equations are properly specified (i.e. the required controls are considered). In other words if, controlling for economic growth and labour market or school system characteristics, significant variation remains at the country level, we are to claim to have isolated the impact of integration models. However, the very nature of our research design complicates the task of making coherent and analytically rigorous inferences, since we will unavoidably encounter simultaneous variation in a number of country level variables. We acknowledge that our assumption may seem far too aggressive to part of our potential audience. However, the only way of elucidating the impact of national integration models is to estimate net country level effects, or at least net of composition effects, and the largest number of ecological variables possible. This difficulty is inherent in both quantitative and qualitative empirical research, although awareness of this difficulty is more widespread among researchers using quantitative methods where useful lists of controls are often available.

EMPIRICS

In presenting our results, we divide our analysis into two blocks: one on education, and one on unemployment. In each of these blocks, we first present an aggregate (country-level) analysis of the impact that integration policies have on outcomes, and then a more detailed individual-level look at the net impact that integration indexes have on cognitive test scores and the likelihood of unemployment.

Education

The following graphs present a country-level analysis of the potential that national approaches to integration have, in accounting for immigrants' disadvantage in educational outcomes.

The vertical axis represents the value of a regression coefficient calculated for the average disadvantage of the children of two immigrant parents in each of the selected countries in the mathematical competence test (otherwise β_1 in a standard linear regression; scores in mathematics = $\beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{immigrant status} + \epsilon$). And the


horizontal axis displays the position that each country is given in the MIPEX overall classification (Graph 1) and the Cultural Rights Classification (Graph 2). In the graphs, there is substantial dispersion around the regression line, suggesting that the association between our dependent variable and the integration policies is, at best, very weak. MIPEX classification actually proves essentially useless for understanding why the distance between immigrants and natives in the selected countries' educational systems is as it is.¹⁰ The regression line is almost plain, with no slope associated with the country position in the overall MIPEX index. In the case of the association between our dependent variable and the Koopmans-et-al. classification of country recognition by cultural rights, we see a more inclined regression line, with a negative slope. This suggests that countries where cultural rights are more openly recognized are those where the children of immigrants are less disadvantaged, relative to their native counter-parts.

Analyses at the aggregate level may obscure complexity, especially if there are interactions between the characteristics of the educational systems and migrant status. Because of this, we present the results of a multivariate analysis where some individual level controls and country level variables are employed to refine the size and the significance of our estimates.


Our models are structured stepwise, following a theoretical logic. Model 1 simply estimates the average disadvantage associated with the children of two immigrants and the children of mixed parental couples, using the rest of the sample (natives) as the reference category. Model 2 refines this estimation, adding a number of controls measured at the individual level, including length of residence (proxied by the students' year of arrival to her country of residence), sex (a determinant control when using dependent variables measuring competences in

¹⁰ Note that in the latest available MIPEX classification, education was not one of the policies considered. This is the reason why our analysis looks at the overall MIPEX classification in our education analysis.

GRAPH 1. Impact of the MIPEX classification on immigrant-native differentials in mathematics test scores



GRAPH 2. Impact of Koopmans' *et al.* classification of cultural rights on the same differentials



mathematics, since girls are known to be less successful than boys) and the individual-1 and school-level impact of parental education measured by the highest level of parental education, i.e., the highest of father and mother (codified respecting the original ISCED classification). Note that this last variable is built from information provided at the household level, and therefore is more reliable when the number of students in the school sample is larger.

Model 3 adds country level independent variables. With these variables, we intend to test whether the size of the immigrant effect in mathematical competences is due to institutional features of the school system. The first of these controls is the country average in the overall PISA classification in mathematics. This variable helps us to test whether the gap between immigrants and natives is larger in educational systems that are more demanding; in other words, it helps us see whether immigrants are more affected than the children of autochthonous families in the documented trade off between equity and quality of educational systems. Another country level control is the percentage of public schools. This variable models the segmentation of the school market and helps us to consider institutional-level variables affecting equity considerations, factors that are widely thought to affect educational outcomes through market segmentation. The third control at the country level is the percentage of citizens

between 20 and 24 who have managed to complete upper secondary schooling. Through this variable, we plan to test the effect of educational system openness in non-compulsory stages. A final, mandatory, control is added in this model, to account for the empirical effect of state level expenditure in education (% of the total GDP devoted to education). Note that this model includes an interaction between the country average in mathematics and the children of two immigrant parental couples. This is done to account for migrant status differences in the impact of our list of country level controls. While we present only this interactive term, other estimates performed for relevant nationwide controls and migrant status have yielded similar insights in the explanation of competences in mathematics.

Models 4 and 5 estimate the impact of country classification in our two integration indexes upon our selected outcome. The effect of each index is modeled through an additive term (its effect on the children of non-immigrant parental couples) and an interaction (which, added to the first part of the effect, results in the final impact that integration policies have on the outcomes of children of immigrant origin).

Our results from model 1 confirm the existence of a significant disadvantage in the results of the children of immigrant parental couples, compared to the children of non-immigrant ones. Note that this effect is extremely pronounced for the children of non-mixed couples (on average these

		M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Migrant status (ref. natives)	Child of 2 imm.	-60.53***	-46.46***	219.19***	-52.98***	-51.58***
	Mixed mixto	-6.18***	-8.40***	-7.66***	-8.42***	-11.63***
	T. of residence		-2.21***	-2.44***	-2.22***	-2.77***
Other indiv controls	Sex sexo		-12.84***	-12.84***	-12.84***	-12.89***
	Highest parental education (iscd)		12.67***	12.41***	12.66***	13.50***
School characteristics	Average parental education in school		29.78***	29.56***	29.78***	20.08***
Educ. Syst characteristics	Country average in maths			1.04***		1.32***
	Country av*inm			-0.52***		
	Country standard dev. in maths			0.68***		0.45***
	% public schools			0.06**		0.25***
	% 20-24 yrs in upper secondary			-0.44***		0.16*
	Public expenditure in education % GDP			-2.44***		-2.26***
	Integration indexes	MIPEX mipex				0.01
	MIPEX*inm				0.11	
	Koopmans' cultural rights					-4.75**
	KCR*inm					19.06***
	Constant	512.94***	337.89***	-198.89***	337.56***	-347.97***
	N. of countries	17	17	17	17	10
	N of students	127340	127340	127340	127340	63997
	chi2	4989.77	16093.55	19200.11	16095.92	10231.61

Legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

students achieve scores some 61 points higher), while the children of mixed couples obtain nearly the same results than those born to autochthonous couples (-6 points). The random effects also suggest that, in terms of education, most of the variation is likely due to explanatory factors at the individual level. Still, variation remains to be explained at the country level.

In model 2, a significant portion of the immigrant effect associated with the children of two immigrants is explained once we control for individual-level independent variables and the average level of parental education at the school level (the estimate drops from -61 to -46). All our controls behave as expected.

Model 4 reveals the importance of considering the characteristics of the

educational systems along with the comparative explanation of immigrants' disadvantages in education. As we have mentioned, the simple inclusion of each of these variables in an equation would tell us little about their potential to explain migrant status differentials in test scores. For this reason, we have sought to identify interaction effects between educational system characteristics and the most relevant migrant status dummy. Only one is presented in the table, chosen for its level of exigency. This interactive effect appears to be highly significant, revealing that the trade off between educational systems' quality and equity is of key relevance for explaining international differences in attainment. Note that the main effect estimated for the children of two migrants now turns out to be highly positive and

significant. This parameter now captures the average effect of migrant status in a country where the national average in mathematics is 0. The parameter obtained for the country average in mathematics is positive (1.04), but its effect on the children of migrant families appears to be negative and highly statistically significant (-0.52). This indicates that when the national average score increases by 1 point, the gap between the children of native born parents and immigrant households grows by more than ½ point. Other interactions between the migrant status dummy and educational system characteristics are also significant—but we have decided not to include them since the interpretation of multiple interactive terms results would be fairly complicated for our purposes. Note that, in any case, adding interactions one by one also helps demonstrate how essential this list of variables is for understanding international differences in the extent to which immigrants are educationally disadvantaged in their host countries.¹¹



In contrast to the clear impact of the features of educational systems, indexes of

(meaning that its effect would reduce the gap between migrants and natives). The final model decreases the sample size to 63997 students from the 10 available countries for which Koopman's classification of cultural rights provides a value. Strikingly, this classification improves our capacity to predict differences in the test scores of the children of immigrant and native households in different countries. The interactive term here is significant—however, it is *negative*, which implies that the higher the country value is in this classification, the poorer the results of its immigrant-origin students.

Labour Market

We will follow the same protocol, of incrementally introducing variables, for our presentation of the results obtained from analyses conducted using the European Labour Force Survey. The following graphs depict the impact of the MIPEX (as defined by the specific labour market subclassification) and the Cultural Rights Classification in a selected dependent

GRAPHS 3 and 4. Impact of the MIPEX and Koopmans' *et al.* classification on immigrant-native propensity to being unemployed



integration policies do not appear relevant to the task of accounting for variation in the size of migrants' educational disadvantage. The MIPEX variable appears to be non significant if modeled as an additive effect. The 4th model also suggests that its interaction with migrant status is not significant, although it appears positive

variable, shown on the vertical axis. As in the previous block of analysis, we employ a number of (logistic) regressions to estimate the relative disadvantage of immigrants with respect to natives in a single relevant measure of integration—in this case, the likelihood of being unemployed in 2006. Readers will likely note that the association between integration classifications and our outcome is weak, just as it was in the case of education. Indeed, as before, dispersion

¹¹ Again, the results of these models are available upon request.

		M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Non EU-25	(ref. is other)	0.058***	0.019***	0.039***	-0.022***	0.063***
Individual level controls	Age		-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.002***
	Female		0.025***	0.025***	0.025***	0.008***
	Education		-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.018***
	EU-25		-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002
	Years residence		0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.004***
Macroeconomics	GDP PPP			-0.000	-0.000	-0.001***
	% GDP growth			0.005	0.004	-0.020***
	Non EU-25 *%GDP growth			-0.006***		
Integration policies	MIPEX				-0.000	
	Non EU-25*MIPEX				0.001***	
	Cultural rights					0.025***
	Non EU-25*cultural rights					0.057***
Constant		0.066***	0.216***	0.255***	0.270**	0.407***
N		1087651	1087651	1087651	1087651	532070
N.countries		14	14	14	14	9
Chi 2		1777.712	3.2e+04	3.2e+04	3.2e+04	1.7e+04

Multilevel regression. Dep var is 1(unemployed) 0 (employed). Only active population.
 Legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

around the regression lines is extreme, and the slope of the effect appears to be close to 0.

As before, proper analysis calls for a careful survey of the microdata. We now present a number of stepwise multilevel probit regressions, organized as follows. The first model is used to quantify the average disadvantage associated with nationals from non-EU25 countries (the appropriate reference here is others). Model 2 adds relevant individual level controls, including age, sex and education. Two other migrant status controls are also introduced here: the number of years of residence in the respective destination country, and a dummy for migrants born in the EU (25) but settled outside their home country. Romanians and Bulgarians are, then, not included in this category since they represent an important subgroup of economic immigrants in some new immigration destinations, such as Italy and Spain.

Model 3 explains differences by adding country level independent variables that are relevant to countries' overall economic performance. These include the GDP (measured as PPP) and its growth over time

(lag: 1 year). This information has been taken directly from Eurostat, and refers to the year 2006. As before, we only describe one variable's interaction with migrant status here (in this case, the change in the GDP). However, other interactions have proven equally significant.¹² Finally, models 4 and 5 investigate interaction with integration policies indexes for the non-EU25 category.

Our results are in line with our expectations. On average, immigrants are worse off than natives in terms of risk of unemployment. Their likelihood of being jobless in 2006—before the current economic crisis—was around 0.06 (probit coefficient) across countries. As in the case of the models presented for education, unexplained variation exists at the international level, both within and between countries. The non-EU25 estimate dramatically decreases in model 2 once we control for all the selected individual-level independent variables. These controls behave as predicted.

Macroeconomic controls do not always confirm our expectations when introduced

¹² Results are available upon request.

as additive effects, but they appear to be significant in the form of interactions with the non EU 25 dummy. In model 3, the reader may notice that, in countries where the GDP increased more, immigrants from this group of non EU nationalities were less likely to be unemployed. This suggesting that—at least in terms of employment—immigrants have benefitted more from economic prosperity than natives.

The integration policies behave strikingly in our analyses. Both appear to interact with our migrant status category in a positive way. In other words, increases along the integration classification ranges are associated with an increase in immigrants' propensity to be unemployed, relative to natives. Although this effect appears to be significant in both cases, its magnitude is almost negligible—which could be interpreted as a proof that these two variables might be irrelevant for understanding the labour market outcomes of immigrants in European countries.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The main goal of this article has been to evaluate whether or not different integration policy frames play a role in immigrants' integration processes. We have decided to evaluate this impact in the areas of education and labour market participation. According to the results of our multilevel regression analyses, there is *no relevant correlation between the two major avenues of integration*—education performance and labour market integration—and different conceptualizations of integration policies. Yet, in the case of education, the reduction of immigrants' educational disadvantage with respect to natives seems mainly dependent on the equity and the quality of the educational system; policy indexes are not helpful in predicting migrants' cognitive disadvantage here. The only exception to this general trend can be seen in the significant and negative interaction between the Cultural Rights Index and the migrant status—implying that as more cultural rights are granted, educational disadvantage increases. The negligible role of policy frames is even more evident in the case of labour market performance, where immigrants' risk of unemployment is

mainly dependent on macroeconomic variables, such as GDP growth. In sum, degrees of labour market insertion and educational attainment of immigrants with respect to natives seem to depend more closely on individual characteristics—and, above all, on institutional arrangements in a given country—than on how policies are framed. Second, our results also suggest that immigrants' performance in 'old' immigration countries with well-established integration models may be even worse than the immigrants' performance in 'new' immigration countries, that lack a clear integration ideology to refer to. In sum, the existence of a more or less inclusive integration policy can hardly predict the educational performance of immigrants or their performance in the labor market.

Paraphrasing Kingsley Davis (1988: 245), our results would therefore suggest that immigrants' integration processes are "opaque to theoretical reasoning in general, and to formal models in particular". As a matter of fact, one of the main conclusions that can be drawn from our results is that the discussion of whether or not integration models matter has been distracting from the specific importance of other socio-economic and individual variables. 'Country-destination' effects are present, but they seem to have more to do with context-related institutional arrangements than with different types of integration policies or ideologies. As we have seen, institutional arrangements (such as the type of the school system), or structural conditions (such as the GDP growth) in particular seem to have a relevant empirical impact on integration processes. Apart from the relevance of institutional country-level effects, our analyses' results also bring to mind the widespread debate on the gap between policy goals and outcomes in the study of international migration. In the 1990s, the public and scholarly debate focused on the fundamental contradiction between restrictive goals and the expansionist outcomes of control policies (Joppke 1999; Freemann 1994; 2005). Yet, a similar contradiction seems to affect integration policies and how they are framed. States must not only 'communicate' that they are able to control immigrants' entry, but also guarantee these

migrants' adaptation to the host society through a series of integration policies defining the rights and duties of immigrants. However, there seems to be a certain inconsistency between the great expectations linked to integration principles and policies, and the actual outcomes. As a matter of fact, the existence of specific frames or models of integration policies seems to be more closely related to the symbolic function of such policies.¹³ Following from this idea, the reproduction of integration models—and the conception of policies that fit in such models—would seem to reflect the 'political semantics of integration' (Bommes 2009), aimed at determining the rights and duties of immigrants relevant to the state. In this respect, the association between integration policies and given outcomes can be seen as part of a symbolic compromise that is necessary for creating a loyalty relationship between immigrants and the state, but that does not necessarily correspond to social reality, as our outcomes tell us.

In any case, by referring to the 'symbolic' dimension of integration, we do not aim to criticize—or even neglect—the role state policies play in immigrants' social and economic participation. The apparent gap between policies and outcomes does not diminish the need for state policies in different institutional domains, or for pragmatic arrangements that might be more effective than general 'declarations of principles' on integration. States are required to act in different social contexts in order to ensure equality of participation, or to correct situations where inequality is apparent. In addition, the results of multilevel regression analyses have shown the existence of an interesting correlation between different approaches to cultural rights and the educational performance of immigrants in the considered countries. Certainly, such results do not allow a representative conclusion with respect to the relationship between models and outcomes, due to of the restricted number of countries included in

the cultural rights index. However, this result remains intriguing and demonstrates that the question of the relationship between states and immigrants—and, in particular, between state action and integration outcomes—is still far from having a definitive answer; research on this topic certainly deserves further efforts.

¹³ For the relevance of the symbolic use of policies to understand how states deal with immigration has been also highlighted by Bade and Bommes 2000 and Kolb 2004.

REFERENCES

- Bade, K., M. Bommes. 2000. "Migration und Politische Kultur im Nicht-Einwanderungsland", Bade, K. & M. Bommes (eds), *Migrationsreport 2000*. Frankfurt, 163-204.
- Banton, M. 2001. 'National Integration in France and Britain', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27: 151-168.
- Bommes, M. 2009. "Integration findet vor Ort statt" - über die Neugestaltung kommunaler Integrationspolitik', in M. Bommes & M. Krüger-Potratz (eds.) *Migrationsreport 2008. Fakten - Analysen - Perspektiven*, Frankfurt a.M./New York: Campus: 159-195.
- Hagelund, A. & G. Brochmann. 2010. "From rights to duties? Welfare and citizenship for immigrants and refugees in Scandinavia", in P. Baert, S. Koniorodos, G. Procacci & C. Ruzza (eds.) *Conflict, Citizenship and Civil Society*, London: Routledge/ESA Studies in European Societies. Pp.
- Crul, M. quoted in: *Defying the Integration Models – The Second Generation in Europe*, Innovations-Report, published on 12 January 2009.
- Crul M. & Vermeulen, H. 2003. "The Second Generation in Europe", *International Migration Review*, 37(4): 965-986.
- De los Reyes, P., Kamali, M. 2005. *Bortom Vi och Dom: Teoretiska reflektioner om makt, integration och strukturell diskriminering*. Rapport av Utredningen om makt, integration och strukturell diskriminering. Stockholm: SOU.
- Devoretz, D., Pivneko, S. 2006. The Economics of Canadian Citizenship` *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 6:(3/4): 435-468.
- Favell, A. 2001. 'Multicultural Nation-Building: 'integration' as a public philosophy and research paradigm in Western Europe', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 7:2, 116-127.
- Favell, A. 2003. 'Integration Nations: The Nation-State and Research on Immigrants in Western Europe in The Multicultural Challenge', *Comparative Social Research*, 22: 13-42.
- Fanning, B., F. Mutwarasibo. 2007. "Nationals/Non-Nationals. Immigration, Citizenship and Politics in the Republic of Ireland", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 30(3): 439-460.
- Fleischmann, F., Dronckers, J. 2007. *The Effects of Social and Labour Market Policies of EU-countries on the Socio-Economic Integration of First and Second Generation Immigrants from Different Countries of Origin*. Florence: EUI.
- Freemann, G. 1995. 'Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States', *International Migration Review*, 29(4): 881-902.
- Freemann, G. 2004, Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies, *International Migration Review*, 38(3): 945-969.
- Freemann, G. 2005. Political Science in Comparative Immigration Policies, in: Bommes, M. & E. Morawska (eds.), *International Migration Research*. Aldershot: Ashgate: 111-128.
- Holm, G., M. Lunde. 2010. "The discourse on multicultural education in Finland: education for whom?", *Intercultural education*, 21(2), 107-120.
- Hagelund, A. 2002. "Problematising Culture: Discourses on Integration in Norway", *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 3(3-4), 401-415.
- Heath, A., Yaël Birnbaum (eds.). 2007. "The New Second Generation". *Ethnicities*, 7: (special issue).
- Howard, M.M. 2009. *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jensen, T.G. 2008. 'To Be 'Danish', Becoming 'Muslim': Contestations of National Identity?', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34: 3: 389-409.
- Joppke, C. 1999. *Immigration and the Nation State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Joppke, C. 2007. Beyond national models: civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe, *West European Politics*, 30, No. 1-22
- Joppke, C. 2005. *Selecting by Origin. Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Kestila, E. 2006. Is There Demand for Radical Right Populism in the Finnish Electorate?, *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 29(3):1 69-191.
- Kolb, H. 2004. *Einwanderung zwischen wohlverstandenen Eigeninteresse und symbolischer Politik*. Münster.
- Koopmans, R., P. Statham, Paul, M. Giugni, F. Passy. 2005. *Contested Citizenship. Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*, Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Koopmans, R. 2008. Tradeoffs between equality and difference – the failure of Dutch multiculturalism in cross-national perspective“, WZB Discussion Paper.
- Koopmans, R. 2010. 'Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36(1):1-26.

- Ruud Koopmans, Ines Michalowski, Stine Waibel (2010), *Citizenship Rights for Immigrants: National Paths and Cross-National Convergence in Western Europe, 1980-2008*, WZB Discussion Paper SP IV 2010-703, Berlin.
- Levels, M., J. Dronckers 2008. 'Educational performance of native and immigrant children from various countries of origin', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31(8): 1404-1425.
- Martiniello, M. (ed.) 1998. *Multicultural policies and the state: A comparison of two European Societies*. Utrecht.
- Moodod, T., N. Meer. 2009. 'The Multicultural State We Are In: Muslims, 'Multiculture' and the 'Civic re-balancing' of British Multiculturalisms,' *Political Studies*, early view available on the Political Studies website.
- Pitkänen, M., S. Kouki. 2002. "Meeting foreign cultures: a survey of the attitudes of Finnish authorities towards immigrants and immigration", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 28(1), 103-118.
- Rydgren, J. 2004. 'Mechanisms of exclusion: ethnic discrimination in the Swedish labour market', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30: 4, 697-716.
- Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R. 2009. 'Constructing Difference: The Mosque Debates in Greece', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 35: 6, 957-975.
- Vermeulen, H. 2004. "Models and Modes of Immigrant Integration...and where does Southern Europe fit" in C. Inglessi, A. Lyberaki, H. Vermeulen & G. J. van Wijnngaarden, *Immigration and Integration in Northern versus Southern Europe*, Athens, pp. 27-39.
- Zapata-Barrero, V. 2004. *Existe una política de la acomodación en España? Inmigración y procesos de cambio en España a partir del 2000*
(http://dcpis.upf.edu/~ricardzapata/Existe%20pol_acomodacion_DocTreball%20-%20CIDOB.pdf).
- Zincone, G. 2000. "A Model of 'Reasonable Integration'", *International Migration Review*, 40(1): 104-132.

Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (<http://www.march.es/ceacs/ingles/ceacs.asp>)
WORKING PAPERS

Series Editor: Andrew Richards

Most recent titles:

<u>Working Paper</u>	<u>Author</u>	<u>Title</u>
2009/244	Sánchez-Cuenca, I.	<i>Terrorism and Territory.</i>
2009/245	Ortega, F. and Polavieja, J. G.	<i>Labor-Market Exposure as a Determinant of Attitudes toward Immigration.</i>
2009/246	Amat, F. and Wibbels, E.	<i>Electoral Incentives, Group Identity and Preferences for Redistribution.</i>
2009/247	Alonso, S. and Claro da Fonseca, S.	<i>Immigration, Left and Right.</i>
2009/248	Amat, F., Jurado, I., and León, S.	<i>A Political Theory of Decentralization Dynamics.</i>
2010/249	Kselman, D. M.	<i>Electoral Institutions, Legislative Accountability, and Political Corruption.</i>
2010/250	Pop-Eleches, G. and Tucker, J. A.	<i>After the Party: Legacies and Left-Right Distinctions in Post-Communist Countries.</i>
2010/251	Urquizu, I.	<i>Moderate Voters and Internal Party Factionalism.</i>
2010/252	Kuo, A. and Margalit, Y.	<i>Measuring Individual Identity: Experimental Evidence.</i>
2010/253	Kuo, A.	<i>Explaining Employer Coordination: Evidence from the US Inter-War Period.</i>
2011/254	Falcó-Gimeno, A.	<i>Portfolio Allocation and Time out of Office in Coalition Governments.</i>
2011/255	Gorodzeisky, A. and Semyonov, M.	<i>Occupational Incorporation of Immigrants in Western European Countries.</i>
2011/256	Brader, T. A. and Tucker, A.	<i>Follow the Leader: Party Cues, Policy Opinion, and the Power of Partisanship in Three Multiparty Systems.</i>
2011/257	De la Calle, L. and Roussias, N.	<i>Independents and Vote Choice: Spatial or Performance Voting?</i>
2011/258	Lapuente, V.	Trade-Offs in Corporate Governance.
2011/259	Lago, I.	Why (Not) National Party Systems?
2011/260	Burgoon, B.	Immigration, Integration and Support for Redistribution in Europe.
2011/261	Kelly, J., Hamann, K., and Johnston, A.	Unions against Governments: Explaining General Strikes in Western Europe, 1980-2006.
2011/262	Riera, P.	Electoral Coordination in Mixed-Member Systems: Does the Level of Democratic Consolidation Matter?
2011/263	Aguilar, P.	Authoritarian Repression, Judicial System and Transitional Justice: The Spanish Case in Comparative Perspective.