



Instituto Juan March

Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (CEACS)

Juan March Institute

Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (CEACS)

Migration, integration and support for redistribution in Europe

Author(s): Burgoon, Brian

Date 2011

Type Working Paper

Series Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones,
Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 2011/260

City: Madrid

Publisher: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales

Your use of the CEACS Repository indicates your acceptance of individual author and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any document(s) only for academic research and teaching purposes.

Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences

WORKING PAPERS

IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND SUPPORT FOR
REDISTRIBUTION IN EUROPE

Brian Burgoon

Estudio/Working Paper 2011/260
June 2011

Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones

IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION IN EUROPE

Brian Burgoon

Estudio/Working Paper 2011/260
June 2011

Brian Burgoon is Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam.

This paper is based on a seminar presented at the Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Juan March Institute, on 14 February 2011.

© Brian Burgoon

Abstract

Immigration can be expected to have offsetting implications for public support for redistribution. On the one hand, immigration poses individual or collective economic risks that might make citizens more likely to support government redistribution, but on the other it can generate fiscal pressure or undermine social solidarity to diminish such support. These offsetting conditions may be responsible for the substantively and statistically modest net effects of redistribution for welfare state politics in existing studies. This paper argues that these effects are strongly mediated by the economic and social integration of immigrants – the degree to which they have unemployment levels, reliance on the welfare state, and harbor social attitudes in line with those of the native population. Such integration should influence how immigration affects solidarity and poses fiscal and macro-economic pressures but not so much how immigration spurs economic risks. In societies where immigrants are more integrated by such measures, proportionately higher foreign-born population should have less negative or more positive implications for native support for government redistribution than where immigrants are less integrated. The paper finds support for this argument in European Social Survey data of publics in 22 European countries between 2002 and 2008. The economic and social integration of immigrants, hence, may be crucial to dampening any negative effects that immigration has for redistributive policies and welfare states.

Among the most salient issues in contemporary politics involves how immigration affects social and economic life of receiving countries. Such consequences include welfare states and income redistribution to address economic inequalities. Policymakers, media commentators, and scholars have all developed arguments about how and whether immigration affects social, economic and political relations in ways that might alter welfare and tax systems (Nannestad 2007). On the one hand, immigration might well undermine social solidarity or altruism prevailing in a country, or might increase the costs of redistribution efforts, all in ways that undermine public support for redistribution (Freeman 1986; Luttmer 2001; Eger 2009). On the other hand, such exposure poses individual and collective economic risks of income or employment loss that might in turn increase support for redistribution as a way to indemnify risks (van Oorschot 2008; Finseraas 2009; Burgoon *et al.* 2010). Empirical studies, though still modest in number, provide support for both of these views, and have suggested the immigration's implications might be mediated by host-country attitudes towards immigration or concerns about the economic consequences of immigration (Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Senik *et al.* 2009). The jury remains very much out, however, what the net effects of immigration are for redistribution, or what social and economic conditions in host societies might mediate such effects.

This study seeks to clarify the relationship between immigration and social policy by exploring how social and economic integration of immigrants in host societies mediates that relationship. Observable aspects of such integration – the degree to which immigrants have unemployment levels, depend on the welfare state, and harbor social attitudes in line with those of the native population – should strongly influence how immigration affects redistributive politics. They should do so, this paper argues, by strongly influencing how immigration affects solidarity and/or poses fiscal and macro-economic pressures, while *not* strongly influencing how immigration can spur

individual economic risks. The broad hypothesis defended, here, is simple: where immigrants are more integrated by such measures, proportionately higher foreign-born populations should have less negative or more positive implications for native support for government redistribution than where immigrants are less well integrated.

The paper empirically tests this argument on European Social Survey data of publics in 22 European countries between 2002 and 2008. Estimation of support for government redistribution in these data suggests that higher foreign-born shares of the population tend to diminish support for redistribution among natives. But this effect is substantially and statistically-significantly more strongly negative when immigrant populations have higher unemployment rates, dependency on social benefits, and harbor different social values than their native counterparts – all integration characteristics that cannot be reduced to origin of immigration. The analysis also finds support for a number of the intervening links clarifying how it is that integration measures reshape the way immigration plays out for redistributive politics. The economic and social integration of immigrants, hence, may be crucial to dampening any negative effects that immigration has for the maintenance and development of redistributive policies and welfare states in Europe.

IMMIGRATION'S OFFSETTING AND UNCERTAIN IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT REDISTRIBUTION

Immigration involves people from abroad settling in a country to live and work, with a great many implications for the political, social and economic life of host countries. Among those implications are those for the politics of redistribution and the welfare state. As existing research has already made clear, immigration can be expected to have offsetting implications for such politics, in some ways increasing and in other ways decreasing support for redistribution. Understanding these reasonably well-known links is crucial to understanding the as-yet understudied ways in which social and economic integration might mediate

immigration's implications for redistributive politics.

Perhaps the best-known links between immigration and redistributive politics involve broad economic and social implications of immigration that spell bad news for support for redistribution. The economic implications are principally fiscal in nature. Immigrants into European countries tend to be less educated and to perform on standardized tests more poorly than the native population into which they move (OECD 2008; OECD 2009a). They tend to find employment, further, in sectors in which unemployment waves with cyclical downturns have been hardest hit (OECD 2009a). The result is that foreign-born residents often have significantly lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates than their native counterparts. In late 2008, for instance, foreign-born unemployment rates for OECD countries were appreciably higher (averaging 8.5 percent) than those for the native population (5.3 percent) (OECD 2009a, p.72, own calculations).

These socioeconomic characteristics lead quite predictably to higher dependence on many social policy programs and relatively low contributions to the revenue base, such that immigrants are often seen as net fiscal burdens (Gilens 1995; Gilens 1996; Luttmer 2001). Immigrants tend to rely less on contributory transfers and services, such as pension programs financed through payroll taxes. However, given that immigrants tend to have more children, and to have higher unemployment rates and longer unemployment spells, they tend to rely more than do natives on non-contributory government services and welfare programs – such as social assistance, housing benefits, and public schooling. According to one recent estimate pooling the experiences of nine EU countries, migrants are 20 percent more likely to rely on such non-contributory benefits (Boeri 2009, p.14). As for net tax contributions, migrants tend to pay substantially lower share of total revenue than their native counterparts. Boeri (2009) calculates that in nine countries surveyed migrants pay on average only 57 percent of the level proportional to their share of the population – that number being most

downward skewed in Nordic countries (30 percent in Finland and Norway) and least in Spain (where immigrants pay slightly more than their share of total revenue (p.13).

What this all means for net fiscal burden or contribution is difficult to judge, given the offsetting reliance on contributory and non-contributory programs. Studies have varied substantially in their estimates of such net contributions, though for European countries the majority have found a modest net burden, particularly recently (mostly less than 1 percent of average national GDP) (c.f. Rowthorn 2008; Fehr *et al.* 2004). In any event, pluralities of European polities surveyed consider immigrants to contribute less in taxes than they receive in social benefits (47.3 %) and that they are bad for the economy as a whole (38.6%) (own calculations, based on ESS 2008wave). Hanson *et al.* (2005) find fuller evidence in line with such patterns, where the higher costs of immigration in settings where redistributive policies are burdened by immigrants yield lower support for immigration in such settings, compared to those with less generous such policies. The reality or belief that immigrants pose a net fiscal burden, particularly with respect to skewed dependence on non-contributory social-policy benefits, make European publics facing higher immigration tend to see government redistribution as more economically costly. Hence, more immigration might well tend to lower support for government redistribution, all other things equal, out of concern for the latter's higher net cost under high-immigration conditions.

Separate from such fiscal calculations, immigration might also lower support for government redistribution due to more social implications. There are good reasons and empirical evidence to hypothesize that polities experiencing more immigration tend to experience feelings of difference and interact less with one another, even among their own ethnic or regional group. Such patterns inform the findings of some that immigration, particularly that constituting ethnic heterogeneity, may lower solidarity, trust and social capital – though this is now a matter of quite fierce theoretical and empirical debate (c.f. Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina *et al.*

2001; De Beer and Koster 2009; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Banting *et al.* 2006; Putnam 2007; Hooghe *et al.* 2008). If immigration really is bad news for solidarity, such rising immigration could spell problems for support for government redistribution, since trust and solidarity are significantly positively related to support for social policy (Habyarimana *et al.* 2006; van Oorschot and Uunk 2007; Alesina and Glaeser 2004).

Related to such solidarity links are the native attitudes about social-protection deservingness of immigrants as opposed to other groups. There is also evidence that native groups in Europe tend to see immigrants as generally and substantially less deserving of social benefits and protections than are other groups, such as the elderly, disabled, or the unemployed (van Oorschot 2006; van Oorschot and Uunk 2007). To the extent that this is true, rising immigration can be expected to increase the less-deserving proportion of the population pool, in turn diminishing support for social protection and redistribution.

These economic and social channels through which immigration might undermine support for government redistribution are not the whole story, however. Studies of international political economy have long articulated channels by which immigration can be expected to spur rather than stall support for redistribution. The Stolper-Samuelson or specific-factor Ricardo-Viner models focused on factor or sector profiles underlying international economic movements expect factor-price equalization to result from migration as well as from goods and capital. It doesn't matter to factor-price equalization if we are talking about trade moving jobs to people, or about immigration moving people to jobs. Both should yield convergence of wages and working conditions between the sending and receiving labor markets. In OECD countries where the scarce factor tends to be un and semi-skilled workers and the abundant factors skilled workers and capital, the expected consequences of higher immigration should be up-skilling. Such implies higher labor supply of un- and semi-skilled workers and hence lower wages and working conditions, and higher

risks of unemployment and income loss among these groups. This implies stronger interest in and support for redistribution to indemnify against such risks for un and semi-skilled workers – but less so for skilled workers and capital owners. Such effects, however, are likely to be moderated by the degree to which immigration takes place among countries with similar factor profiles and to the extent that effects on consumer-product prices are skewed to benefit lower income workers (Baker 2007).

Separate from such levels of labor supply and demand, however, immigration may, like other faces of globalization, increase *elasticity* of labor supply and demand – regardless of the relative factor-profiles of sending and receiving countries. And the effects are thus likely to involve increased income and employment insecurities regardless of skill level of the workers in the immigration-receiving countries. These conditions suggest that immigration, like other faces of globalization, might increase insecurities that spur support for government interventions (Burgoon 2012 forthcoming).

Finally, immigration can also be expected to pose collective risks for a society, by implication of such individual risks or as artifacts of economic problems that might be upstream to fiscal problems with redistribution. All such (negative) economic implications could create inequalities and social exclusion that are themselves recognized as problems in need of mitigation or compensation. Such collective risks associated with immigration, hence, might at the margins provoke support for social policy protections and government redistribution. At the level of theory, hence, immigration might for reasons of collective- or individual-risk tend to boost rather than be a burden to the political sustainability of government redistribution.

As an empirical matter, however, most studies have revealed the net relationship between and immigration and actual or supported social policy protection or redistribution to be more negative than positive. On the other hand, these have also tended to be substantively modest relationships, perhaps reflecting the

offsetting character of immigration's implications, as articulated above. Soroka *et al.* (2006), for instance, find evidence that higher proportions of foreign-born in the population tend to decrease growth in social policy spending at the level of country-years. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) find that ethnic heterogeneity tends to correlate negatively with support for redistribution. And Mau and Burkhardt (2009) find that European countries with higher foreign-born proportions, and particularly higher non-western foreign-born proportions, tend to be modestly less supportive of government redistribution. Senik *et al.* (2004) find similar broad patterns of modest negative effects. In addition to the modesty of the relationships, furthermore, most of these studies have also suggested that background conditions might mediate such negative effects – mediating conditions such as welfare state types (Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Finseraas 2008), or anti-immigrant sentiment (Senik *et al.* 2008), or concern about economic effects of immigration (Ibid.).

However, neither these nor any other studies (to my knowledge) have articulated how the effects of immigration on redistributive and welfare politics might be mediated by the variations in the social and economic integration of immigrants. This is an important silence because a number of the arguments about how immigration is thought to either undermine or spur support for redistribution touches on conditions related to integration, conditions that are treated as broad constants but clearly vary across countries and time. For instance, immigration might pose problems for solidarity or fiscal health, or might spur individual economic risks only to the extent that immigrants are not integrated into labor markets or the assimilated into the cultural mores of the host society. Might any negative implications of immigration for the welfare state be confined to polities where immigrants are poorly integrated socially or economically? Might improvements in immigrant integration help sustain public support for existing welfare and redistributive systems in the face of immigration?

ARGUMENT: HOW INTEGRATION MEDIATES THE REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION


Answering such questions requires clarifying the nature and implications of immigrant integration for redistributive politics. Doing so fully is a complex task beyond the reach of this paper in light of integration's many, subtle and contingent dimensions in the social, economic and political fabric of host societies. However, clarifying a few observable aspects of social and economic integration of immigrants and their implications for redistributive politics *is* possible. To get a purchase on labor-market and economic integration of immigrants, one could focus on a range of wage, employment, unemployment, and socio-economic conditions. For instance, one important gap is between foreign-born unemployment and native-born unemployment – for instance, the former as a ratio of the latter, where higher values imply higher unemployment among foreign-born than the native population – which captures the degree to which a nation's foreign-born population is successful in the labor market than the native population. A second important gap is the gap or ration between foreign-born and native dependency on (non-contributory) social benefits – capturing more downstream dependence on, and hence pressure on, fiscal costs of social policies and redistribution. Separate from such economic integration, in any event, is social or cultural integration or assimilation of immigrant populations, for instance captured by enduring differences of foreign-born and native populations in their respective attitudes about gender relations, religion, political values, etc. All these aspects of integration can be expected to vary plenty across countries and time, and this variation is likely to reflect a combination of factors – from attributes and backgrounds of the immigrants themselves, to labor-market and integration policies in the host countries (Causa and Jean 2006).

In any event, all three likely affect redistributive politics. They may do so directly, of course, though it is not clear that this should be significantly so. What is clear is that each aspect of integration can

be expected to alter the various channels discussed above, channels by which immigration can be expected to undermine or undergird particularly native support for redistribution. Although the aspects of integration certainly differ from one another in such implications, all three can be expected to more significantly intensify immigration's negative effects for redistribution than to intensify its positive effects. In particular, gaps in unemployment, social-benefit dependency, and in social values can all be expected to amplify the degree to which immigration undermines solidarity and raises macroeconomic costs of redistribution, while having only modest and uncertain implications for individual and collective economic risks thought to spur support for government redistribution. This argument is graphically summarized in Figure One below. But each hypothesized relationship deserves clarification.

spark concerns in a polity about collective risks – as gaps in unemployment manifest inequalities and social exclusion in labor-market experience and economic life. Given this possibility, any mediating role played by this particular aspect of (lack of) integration might well intensify any tendency of immigration to spur support for redistribution – to the extent that it can raise socio-tropic concern about collective inequalities. Such a pattern is captured in Figure One by a positive sign for mediating role captured by arrow “b”. Gaps in foreign-born and native unemployment have less clear implications for individual economic risks, however. It is not clear whether natives facing such labor-market gaps are likely to see their own job or income risks changed, at least if one thinks in terms of the level and elasticity of labor supply and demand as discussed above (hence a null effect for arrow “a” in Figure One).

FIGURE One. How Integration Mediates Immigration's Effects on Support for Redistribution



Gap in unemployment. If immigrants have higher unemployment than their native counterparts, higher immigration may well

In contrast, unemployment gaps can be expected to alter how immigration affects the solidarity and altruism or the macro-

economic costs of redistribution and thereby support for redistribution (arrows “c” and “d”, respectively, in Figure One). Having higher unemployment among immigrants means, in the first instance, that rising immigration levels will lower the proportion of society paying into taxes and implies also a likely greater reliance on social benefits. Such can be expected to in any event affect perceptions of fiscal cost of immigration, regardless of the general level of unemployment. Conversely, a situation where foreign-born have lower unemployment than their native counterparts could encourage natives to see immigration making marginal positive contributions to productivity and fiscal sustainability of redistribution. Such logic anticipates, hence, a strong positive mediation between immigration and gaps in unemployment (a positive sign for arrow “d” in Figure One). Finally, separate from explicitly economic calculations resulting from higher foreign-born unemployment are important social implications with respect to solidarity and altruism. One can expect that the greater reliance and lack of labor-market integration captured by significant unemployment gap will tend, at the margins, to tarnish native feelings of solidarity and deservingness for those struggling in labor markets and needing social assistance. Hence, relatively high foreign-born unemployment should intensify any negative effect of immigration on solidarity and altruism and, hence, support for redistribution (captured by the negative sign for arrow “c” in Figure One). This underlies the following first hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS ONE: *Gaps in unemployment (e.g. higher unemployment rates than natives) should enhance tendency of immigration to increase fiscal costs of redistribution and/or diminish social trust and solidarity in a polity, thereby to decrease support for government redistribution.*

Gap in social-benefit dependency. The story should be similar for the more downstream integration issue of immigrants relying more on government-provided social benefits than their native counterparts. Such reliance could stem, of

course, from a gap in unemployment, but also from lower inactivity, higher reliance on child allowances, or sickness and disability, or other sources of take-up rates or welfare dependency. Or it could reflect variations in access given to immigrants in different social policy settings (Sainsbury 2006). Any gap in dependency, in any event, ought to have more modest implications for individual and, even, collective economic risks than that hypothesized to emerge from gaps in unemployment, because the former manifests society doing something to address any problems of inequality or social exclusion. Hence, gaps in social-benefit dependency ought to have very little or no mediating affect in altering how immigration affects support for redistribution via individual or collective risks (null signs for arrows “a” and “b”).

On the other hand, a gap in social-benefit dependency might, more than is true for gaps in unemployment, exacerbate how immigration may lower solidarity or altruism among natives, and in turn native support for redistribution (an equally negative sign for arrow “c”). And given that a gap in social-benefit dependency directly captures fiscal pressure on the spending side (and presumably also less revenue contribution), gaps in social-benefit dependency ought to more significantly and directly increase fiscal pressure resulting from higher immigration – more so than the mediating role of gaps in unemployment (a more positive arrow “d”). These considerations translate into the expectation that gaps in social-benefit dependency should (perhaps more than gaps in unemployment) make immigration more negatively or less positively affect support for redistribution.

HYPOTHESIS TWO: *Gaps in social-benefit dependency (e.g. foreign-born being more dependent on social benefits than natives) should enhance tendency of immigration to increase fiscal costs of redistribution and/or diminish social trust and solidarity in a polity, thereby to decrease support for government redistribution.*

Gap in social values. More simply than economic aspects of integration, social

aspects of integration can also strongly influence how immigration plays out in redistributive politics. In particular, one can expect gaps in or clashes of social values held by immigrant populations and those held by natives to strongly intensify the degree to which immigration diminishes social solidarity or altruism among populations. The idea, here, is that immigration involving introduction of clearly foreign and different values than the host population is likely to generate diversity and undermine broad feelings of social unity and solidarism. Of course, this is a complicated matter, depending on which aspects of social values one addresses. The broad point, however, is that differences on any combination of values on all social, cultural or political issues should intensify immigration's negative effect on solidarity (negative sign for arrow "c"). Unlike the other aspects of integration, however, any gaps in social values can be expected to have only modest or no implications for how immigration affects either individual or collective risks, or even fiscal costs of redistribution. The end result is the same broad expectation, however, that gaps in values should make immigration more negatively or less positively influence support for redistribution.

HYPOTHESIS THREE: *Gaps in social values of foreign-born population relative to native (e.g. different attitudes on religion, gender relations, sexuality) should enhance tendency of immigration to diminish social trust and solidarity in a polity, thereby to decrease support for government redistribution.*

In sum, various aspects of economic and social integration can be expected to strongly mediate how immigration plays out in redistributive politics. The arguments constitute testable hypotheses that can be stated as a broad composite expectation – that lower social or economic integration ought to make the effects of immigration on support for redistribution more negative or less positive than when such integration is higher. Furthermore, each hypothesis implicates intervening conditions – for instance, with respect to solidarity/altruism and fiscal pressure resulting from an

interaction between immigration and integration – that are themselves observable and constitute testable hypotheses.

SURVEY EVIDENCE IN EUROPE

I test these various expectations on a cross national panel of individual attitudes in 22 countries in Europe, combining the four existing waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) (ESS Combined File 2011). The dataset encompasses between one and four waves of eighteen Western European advanced democracies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and five Central and East European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). This yields a combined sample of some 150,000 respondents. This dataset is particularly suitable for testing the arguments above, because it harbors substantial longitudinal, national and individual variation in support for government redistribution, and provides a basis for exploring variation in national-level exposure to immigration over a substantial cross-section of different countries and at least a modest longitudinal dimension – which together provide substantial leverage to explore the arguments developed above.

Dependent Variables

I seek to explain public support for government redistribution of income, something that the ESS data, in all waves, directly surveys. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "Government should reduce differences in income" (ESS 4-2008 Appendix A3, Q.B30, p.26). I recoded the answers to create two measures of support for government redistribution. The first, simpler version is a binary variable *Support Redistribution (binary)* (1= strongly agree or somewhat agree; 0=strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, or neither agree nor disagree). The second is an ordinal measure *Support Redistribution (ordinal)* ranging from 1 to 5 (1=strongly disagree; 2 somewhat disagree; somewhat agree;

3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=somewhat agree; 5=strongly agree).¹ How such redistribution ought to be accomplished is left unstated, here. Government redistribution in practice occurs via some combination of more or less progressive taxation, including negative income taxes, and the provision of various income transfers or social services. I interpret the question to be addressing the broad principle of redistribution, involving either no practical considerations or considerations of some combination of the specific tax or spend provisions.


Figure Two provides a snapshot of the national sample means (not weighted for population but weighted for sampling) for *Support redistribution (binary)* in 2002 and 2008. The grand mean is .722 (standard deviation 0.448), suggesting a significant majority of Europeans supporting

ranging from a low of .41 in Denmark in 2008 to a high of .92 in Greece in the same year. Such a distribution is a reminder that respondent support for government redistribution is likely influenced, at least in part, by existing levels of inequality and/or actual redistribution. The over-time developments captured in these data suggest also significant changes in support for redistribution, averaging out as a very modest decline (an average decline of two percentage-points), but significant differences across countries – for instance, where Norway experienced a drop in support of ten percentage points, and Germany an increase in ten percentage points.

Independent Variables

Foreign-born percent. Our principal explanatory variable is the most reliable

FIGURE Two. Proportion of National Samples Supporting Government Redistribution in 2002 and 2008



Source: ESS, own calculations.

government redistribution of income.² But the national averages vary substantially,

¹ For both versions of the measure, “Don’t know or refused” were coded as missing (including less than 0.5 percent of the sample).

² Summary statistics for this and all other variables in the analysis is available in

and cross-nationally valid measure of international immigration for the sample countries, *Foreign-born % population* (OECD 2009, OECD 2010). This measure is preferable to alternative measures such as


Appendix One: Summary Statistics. For *Support redistribution (categorical)* is 3.85 (s.d. 1.039).

asylum seekers, immigration flows, non-citizens, or net migration, because it has better country coverage and is less sensitive to annually and nationally-varying differences in measurement (OECD 2006). Figure Three summarizes the national values in 2001 and 2007, revealing significant cross national and temporal variation in the European sample (for which both years are available). Across the national samples, we see large differences, ranging from less than three percent for Hungary in 2002 to more than 36 percent for Luxembourg in 2007. And equally important is the substantial and almost uniform increase in the proportion of foreign-born stocks over this relatively modest period – more than a doubling in the foreign-born proportion in the case of Spain and Slovakia, and averaging several percentage points across the sample (Germany and Portugal being the exceptions).

market integration, is also the simplest, because it has been well measured in OECD countries and is comparable over time and across these national samples: *Gap in unemployment*, the ratio of foreign-born unemployment to native unemployment (OECD 2010). Figure Four shows the country means for the four years used in the analysis (2001, 2003, 2005, 2007). By this measure, we see that in all but two countries the foreign-born population has higher unemployment than their native counterparts. The exceptions are Hungary and Italy, and in the former the foreign-born population has forty percent less unemployed than the native population. At the other end of the spectrum we see Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland, whose foreign-born populations are two-and-a-half times more likely to be unemployed than their native counterparts.

More difficult to measure is the social-benefit dependency of the foreign-born

FIGURE Three. Foreign-Born Population as Percentage of Total Population, 2002 and 2008




Source: OECD 2010.

Equally central to the analysis, however, are the integration measures that Hypotheses One through Three expect ought to mediate how *foreign-born percent* or other immigration measures influence *Support for redistribution*. The first integration measure, focused on labor-

versus the native-born population. This is important to measure as it is a face of integration of clear significance to how immigration plays out in redistributive politics – and is downstream from unemployment levels, given how it says as much about the structure and

FIGURE Four. *Gap in Unemployment (Ratio of Foreign-Born Unemployment to Native Unemployment), 2001-7 Average*




Source: ESS and OECD, own calculations.

implementation of social policy benefits (vis a vis immigrants) as it does about labor-market performance of immigrants. It is difficult to measure, however, given the lack of comparable, systematic measures across OECD countries in the take-up rates or use of various faces of social policy, at least for a significant number of countries and time. As an approximation of such dependency, I use the leverage provided by the ESS dataset itself, by estimating the likelihood that foreign-born respondents rely on social benefits for their income. Such estimation is based on respondent answers to a question in the ESS panel on sources of income of respondents, including the possibilities of “unemployment or redundancy benefits” and other “government social benefits.” Based on these answers, I construct the individual-level measure of the incidence of (non-pension) *Social-benefit dependency* (1=income mainly from unemployment/redundancy benefit or other social benefits; 0=other sources of income). I then estimate using probit analysis the marginal likelihood that a respondent’s being *foreign-born* (1=born abroad; 0=born in country of residence) predicts that respondents rely on social benefits for their income (i.e. *Social-benefit dependency*=1), net of education, age, and gender of

respondents. The results provide the basis for the country-year-specific integration measure *Gap in social-benefit dependence*: Marginal effect ($\partial F/\partial x$) that being *foreign-born* predicts *social-benefit dependency*. Figure Five below summarizes the resulting sample distribution of country means across the four survey years (no lags possible, of course, given the survey’s basis of this measure). The resulting estimates correlate highly with studies of social benefits based on larger samples from a smaller cross-section of countries and years, such as Boeri’s (2009) study. And the results also correlate significantly and positively with nation-year *Gap in unemployment*, as expected (nation-year sample coefficient of correlation of 0.38). But consistent with the idea that social-benefit dependence reflects many other conditions, such as those of social policy systems and accessibility to such policy for immigrants, there are plenty of outliers, such as Hungary or Switzerland. As measured, in any event, *Gap in social-benefit dependency* is lowest in Italy and highest in the Netherlands.

Most difficult to measure are cultural features of integration, the broad social attitudes or values of foreign-born versus native populations relevant to assimilation into host societies. My approach to estimate such cultural or social values I again use the

FIGURE Five. *Gap in Social-Benefit Dependency: Marginal Probability that Foreign-Born More Likely than Natives to Depend on Social Benefits (Country Means, 2002-2008)*



Source: ESS, own calculations.


leverage provided by the ESS panel, focusing on respondent answers to a number of social values that often divide immigrant and native populations, including attitudes towards women, sexual preference, and religion. With respect to such questions, I first calculate the sub-population averages for *foreign-born* respondents and *native* respondents in answers to these questions (after standardizing their scales and taking account of sample weighting). I then calculate the sum of the absolute values of the differences between those sub-population averages for a particular country-year in the survey. The results give *Gap in social values*, which capture the average difference between native and foreign-born populations within a given country and year with respect to attitudes towards women (belief that women should prioritize childcare over work more than do men), gay rights (that gays should have the same rights as heterosexuals), and religiosity (subjective attitudes on level of religiosity and frequency of attending religious services). Figure Six shows the country means for the four years of the sample. As is clear, the cross-national distribution looks quite different than the more economic aspects of integration –

evidenced by how Italy scores highest in the *Gap in social values* and lowest in terms of *Gap in social-benefit dependency*. Taking the full sample, however, there is simply no statistically significant relationship between *Gap in social values* and the other two measures.

At this juncture it is worth emphasizing that the above three measures of economic and social (lack of) integration are not mere artifacts of the basic national background of immigrant populations. For instance, we can consider how the three measures correlate with the proportion of foreign-born populations of different countries that are of non-Western origin (more specifically, were born in Latin America, Asia or Africa rather than Europe or North America, or the Antipodes). The result is in all cases statistically insignificant. Figure Seven provides an overview of this relationship, where the relationship involving *Gap in social values* is positive but insignificant, but that involving *Gap in social-benefit dependency* is not even a positive one.


As controls I include a range of individual and nation-year parameters that plausibly influence both support for government redistribution and ex ante shares of foreign born in the population

FIGURE Six. Gap in Social Values towards Women, Gays and Religion, 2002-2008



Source: ESS, own calculations.

FIGURE Seven. Non-Western Percent of Foreign-Born and Gaps in Social-Benefit Dependency and in Social Values, 2002-2008



and economy. *Age* in number of years can be expected to affect economic interests in and values towards government redistribution. *Female* gender captures occupational selection and has long been found to spur support for social policy interventions and redistribution (Orloff *et al.* 2002; Rehm 2009). *Education* affects occupational selection and conditions whether respondents are likely to be net beneficiaries or benefactors of redistribution. *Household income* has direct implications for work choices and for redistribution, and as a possible consequence of immigration patterns will tend to lead us to understate implications of

the latter for attitudes on redistribution. *Married* respondents have income sources and responsibilities that affect work choices and social policy attitudes. *Employed* captures labor-market vulnerability generally and hence taste for redistribution. And more directly, *Dependent on social-benefits* captures reliance on spending measures that manifest redistribution. Finally, *Union member* captures organizational interest that affects redistributive attitudes. I also consider a couple of crucial national-level controls: *ex ante* total social expenditures (as a share of GDP), to control for the possibility of diminishing marginal returns to

redistribution³; and *Unemployment rate*, the standardized percentage of total unemployment in the population year, relevant to economic demand and supply of redistribution, as well as to possible attraction of immigrants.

Estimation Strategy

To explore the three Hypotheses, I fit models of *Support for redistribution* among the native population, taking account not only the within-country-year variation across respondents in a given year of the survey but also nation-year measures of and interaction among the integration and immigration measures. Ignoring the multilevel nature of the data violates the assumption of independent errors and can lead to underestimation of the standard errors associated with contextual variables (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). To address such problems, I fit random-intercept maximum-likelihood logit models grouped by country, with nationally-varying intercepts and all variances and covariance's distinctly estimated. The models take the following general form:

$$\text{Support government redistribution}_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\text{Foreign-born percent}_j + \gamma_{02}\text{Gap measure}_j + \gamma_{03}\text{Foreign-born perc.} \times \text{Gap measure}_j + \gamma_{04}\text{Aggregate-controls}_j + \gamma_{10}\text{Individual-level-controls}_{ij} + u_{0j}$$

The main effects of interest are the conditional effects of *Foreign-born percent* as a function of varying gap measures (i.e. *Gap in unemployment*, *Gap in social-benefit dependency*, or *Gap in social values*), with the gap measures and their interactions estimated in separate models due to limited degrees of freedom for the country-year variables of interest. I report the models with the full set of controls described above, plus year dummies. In addition to these basic models, I considered a range of sensitivity and robustness tests discussed below, as well as further exploration of the causal interconnections

³ Measures of income redistribution, such as those from the Luxembourg Income Study, are available for only 11 sample countries. Such correlate significantly positively with the ESS-measured support for redistribution.

putatively underlying the possible interactions between foreign-born and integration measures in shaping support for redistribution.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table One summarizes the main results focused on *Support for redistribution (binary)*. The first model considers how *foreign-born percentage* influences the incidence of *Support for redistribution (binary)* directly, and the remaining models consider how this influence is mediated by measures of integration. The controls consistently perform in line with expectation. Hence, respondents who are older, female, those dependent on social benefits, and union-members tend to be more supportive of government redistribution than their counterparts. And more educated, wealthier, married, and employed respondents tend to be less supportive of redistribution. As for the aggregate-level controls, national unemployment tends to spur support for redistribution, consistent with the idea that macroeconomic downturns inspire redistributive tastes, while *ex ante* social expenditures tend to diminish such support, consistent with the possibility of diminishing marginal returns to redistributive effort. Year dummies are highly jointly significant.

The main results are also consistent with Hypotheses One through Three. Model one shows that the direct effects of *Foreign-born percentage*, ignoring possible interactions with integration parameters, tends to statistically-significantly diminish support for redistribution, and in this panel setting somewhat more strongly than previous studies have found in focusing on only one wave of ESS data (Senik *et al.* 2008; Mau and Burkhardt 2009). More importantly, each of the integration measures statistically significantly diminishes the degree to which *foreign-born percent* has this effect. This can be seen by the significant interaction terms in model 2 for interaction with *Gap in unemployment* (Hypothesis One); in model 3 for interaction with *Gap in social-benefit dependency* (Hypothesis Two); and in model 4 for interaction with *Gap in social*

TABLE One. Immigration, Integration and Support for Government Redistribution
DV: Support Government Redistribution (Binary)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Foreign-born population	-0.022*** (0.009)	0.016 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.020** (0.009)	0.054** (0.026)
Gap in unemployment		0.249*** (0.073)			
Foreign-born × Gap unemployment		-0.026*** (0.007)			
Gap in social-benefit dependency			6.409*** (1.018)		
Foreign-born × Gap welfare depend.			-0.532*** (0.111)		
Gap in social values				0.097*** (0.026)	
Foreign-born × Gap social values				-0.009*** (0.003)	
“Immigrants receive more than give”					0.020 (0.016)
Foreign-born × Immig.receive					-0.003** (0.001)
<i>Individual-level controls</i>					
Age	0.008*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.001)
Female	0.286*** (0.013)	0.288*** (0.014)	0.287*** (0.013)	0.283*** (0.014)	0.251*** (0.028)
Educated	-0.475*** (0.016)	-0.459*** (0.016)	-0.465*** (0.016)	-0.471*** (0.016)	-0.472*** (0.033)
High income	-0.473*** (0.015)	-0.470*** (0.015)	-0.472*** (0.015)	-0.476*** (0.015)	-0.537*** (0.032)
Married	-0.089*** (0.019)	-0.088*** (0.020)	-0.093*** (0.020)	-0.101*** (0.020)	-0.104*** (0.020)
Union member	0.373*** (0.018)	0.372*** (0.018)	0.373*** (0.018)	0.384*** (0.019)	0.412*** (0.040)
Employed	-0.085*** (0.016)	-0.087*** (0.016)	-0.086*** (0.016)	-0.095*** (0.016)	-0.109*** (0.033)
Social-benefit beneficiary	0.380*** (0.035)	0.371*** (0.035)	0.383*** (0.035)	0.390*** (0.035)	0.361*** (0.078)
<i>Country-year level controls</i>					
Unemployment rate	0.016* (0.009)	0.009 (0.011)	0.020** (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)	0.192*** (0.057)
Social expenditures	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.005 (0.010)	0.016 (0.034)
Constant	1.251*** (0.238)	1.018*** (0.273)	0.981*** (0.263)	0.912*** (0.273)	-1.478 (1.022)
-2 × Log-likelihood	139976.1	113647.3	128829.1	128791.3	134323.4
Observations	122,166	116,342	119,163	116,366	27,493
Number of groups	22	21	21	22	17

Multi-level random-intercept maximum-likelihood logit models with logit coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). Results for year dummies not shown.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

values (Hypothesis Three). The substantive meaning of these interactions are unclear, of course, since the conditional coefficients reflect the effect of *Foreign-born percent* where the lack-of-integration measure is zero (a value that is within the sample only for model 3 for social-benefit dependency). But the basic pattern is certainly in line with expectation. Simulations based on the reported models reveal the point in the distribution of the relevant integration measures where *Foreign-born percent* turns significantly negative (not shown but available in Supplemental Appendix Two): for *Gap in unemployment* that is when the gap is above 1.4 at roughly the thirtieth percentile of the sample distribution; for *Gap in social-benefit dependency* that point is when the marginal probability of foreign-born population being dependent reaches .03 (roughly the fifty-fifth percentile of the sample distribution); and for *Gap in social values* that point is reached, though substantively weak, at even the lowest within-sample differences in values.


More revealing, perhaps, is what Figure Eight graphically captures: the substantive effects of varying *Foreign-born percent* where gaps between foreign-born and native respondents are low (tenth percentile) compared to such effects where gaps are high (ninetieth percentile) (holding the other parameters at their means or medians). To ease comparison across the three interactions, the scales of the axes measuring the probability of *supporting redistribution* and *foreign-born percent* are the same for each panel. Where the *Gap in unemployment* is high, the full range in *foreign born percent* (from the 1st to the 99th percentile in the sample distribution) predicts a drop from .82 probability of supporting redistribution to a .39 probability, some thirty percent of the sample's variation in chance of supporting redistribution. The results for a more reasonable variation in foreign-born percent are of course more modest, captured by the broken vertical lines at the 50th and 90th percentiles – here predicting a drop from .72 to .56 in probability of supporting redistribution. These results are substantively a bit stronger than those where the interaction involves *Gap in social-benefit dependency* (right-hand

panel) and *Gap in social values* (lower left panel). But in all cases, variations in foreign-born percent can be expected to yield substantively meaningful declines in support for redistribution under conditions where foreign-born populations are less integrated socially and economically in the host societies. Where foreign-born populations *are* well integrated, particularly with respect to *gap in unemployment* and *gap in social-benefit dependency*, such a negative effect is substantively much more modest or non-existent.

Table One's final model considers an alternative specification of the test of the logic underlying Hypotheses One and Two, where lack of economic integration can be expected to raise concerns about the economic costs of immigrants. The fourth wave of the ESS allows explicit measurement of such concern, which allows a test of whether individual-level concern of such a sort actually changes how a nation's foreign-born percent affects support for redistribution. A respondent's conviction that immigrants are bad for the nation's economy is, as expected, empirically positively and significantly influenced by gap in unemployment and gap in social-benefit dependency (results not shown). As model 5 shows, further, such heightened concern – wherever it comes from, actual patterns or integration, racism or elsewhere – does tend to make the effects of foreign-born percent on support for redistribution more negative.

Table Two, in any event, summarizes the most obvious and important robustness tests, to see if the patterns of interaction discussed above with respect to *Support for redistribution (binary)* also applies to the more nuanced measure *Support for redistribution (categorical)*. These models are estimated using the random intercept maximum-likelihood least squares regression. To save space and since the controls perform very much in line with those reported in Table One, I report only the main results. As is clear from all five models, the results are broadly similar in terms of the basic signs and significance of the *Foreign-born percent* and its interaction with the measures of integration. This applies as well for the interactions between *foreign-born percent* and individually-

FIGURE Eight. Predicted Support for Redistribution as a Function of Foreign-Born Percent and Varying Levels of Integration



varying conviction that immigrants are bad for the economy.

Table Three explores the logic that putatively underlies Hypotheses One through Three and finds support in the principal estimates of how foreign-born percent and integration measures interact in shaping support for redistribution. It does so by focusing on the two principal intervening conditions that Section Two above emphasized to connect immigration with support for redistribution: broad social altruism/solidarity; and concern about how redistribution or welfare protections might overly burden the economy. Two questions from the fourth wave of the ESS capture (parts of) these issues.⁴ And these are the basis of the six models in Table Three.

⁴ The ESS has a number of questions relevant to the broad politics of immigration and redistribution, but most are inappropriate for the present analysis of these key intervening links by implicating the other links as well, such as concern about individual economic risk or about inequalities/social exclusion.

Models 1-3 analyze how *foreign-born percent* and the integration measures interact in shaping concern about the fiscal and other economic costs of social benefits – a crucial part of the logic connecting immigration to support for redistribution. The ESS Round 4 has a very good question explicitly addressing such concern: whether respondents agree that “social benefits and services place too great a strain on the economy” (question sbstrec, with answers on a five-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” and for the reported analysis recoded as 1=“strongly agree” or “agree” and 0=“disagree strongly,” “disagree” or “neither agree nor disagree”). The arguments developed above suggest that individual-level conviction that social benefits are an economic strain (*Social benefits a strain*) should negatively affect *Support for redistribution*, something that is strongly and significantly so in separate analysis (not shown but available upon request).

The main expectation, here, is also that *Gap in unemployment* and *Gap in social-benefit dependency* ought to make *Foreign-*

**TABLE Two. Immigration, Integration and Support for Government Redistribution
DV: Support Government Redistribution (Categorical)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Foreign-born population	-0.009*** (0.003)	0.009 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.02* (0.01)
Gap in unemployment		0.166*** (0.031)			
Foreign-born × Gap unemployment		-0.015*** (0.003)			
Gap in social-benefit dependency			1.989*** (0.400)		
Foreign-born × Gap welfare depend.			-0.179*** (0.045)		
Gap in social values				0.043*** (0.011)	
Foreign-born × Gap social values				-0.005*** (0.001)	
“Immigrants receive more than give”					0.02* (0.014)
Foreign-born × Immig.receive					-0.012*** (0.004)
Constant	3.949*** (0.103)	3.763*** (0.119)	3.896*** (0.113)	3.879*** (0.116)	-2.452 (2.113)
Observations	122,166	116,342	119,163	122,166	27,493
Number of groups	22	21	21	22	17

Multi-level random-intercept maximum-likelihood models with ols coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). Results for controls and year dummies not shown.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

TABLE Three. Immigration, Integration and Belief in Social-Benefit Strain and Altruism

	<i>Social benefits a burden</i>			<i>Altruism</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Foreign-born population	-0.081* (0.046)	-0.056* (0.030)	-0.011 (0.042)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.020*** (0.004)
Gap in unemployment	-0.857*** (0.298)			0.022 (0.031)		
Foreign-born × Gap unemployment	0.043** (0.020)			-0.006* (0.003)		
Gap in social-benefit dependency		-23.717** (10.170)			-0.645 (0.395)	
Foreign-born × Gap welfare depend.		1.942* (1.015)			0.104** (0.045)	
Gap in social values			-0.140 (0.326)			0.053*** (0.010)
Foreign-born × Gap social values			0.014 (0.024)			-0.005*** (0.001)
Observations	26,157	27,734	29,176	111,408	114,220	113,232
Number of groups	15	16	17	21	21	22

Multi-level random-intercept maximum-likelihood models with ols coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). Results for controls and year dummies not shown.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

born percent more positively or less negatively affect *Social benefit a strain*. Importantly, the argument above does *not* expect *Gap in social values* to have any such mediating effect. The results of such analysis are strongly in line with this expectation. Shown are only the results for the main components and interaction (full results available upon request). In countries and periods when either *Gap in unemployment* or *Gap in social-benefit dependency* is higher, *Foreign-born percent* has a more positive effect on *Social benefits a strain* than when such gaps are lower. And as expected, such an mediated effect does not hold when interacting *foreign-born percent* with *Gap in social values*.

Models 4-6, further, analyze a measure of *Altruism*, focusing on whether respondents consider themselves as individuals for whom “it is important to help the people around you...[and] to care for others’ well-being.” (question iphlpl, answers on a six-point scale ranging from “not at all like me” to “very much like me”, and for the reported analysis recoded to binary 1=“very much like me”, “Like me”, or “Somewhat like me”; and 0=“Not at all like me”; “Not like me” or a “Little like me”). Neither this nor any other questions in the survey addresses directly issues of social solidarity, but it does address altruism – concern for and priority given to helping others, a condition that should in turn positively affect support for redistribution and be more negatively (or less positively) affected by immigration as the gaps between foreign-born and native populations grows (see Figure One above). In separate analysis (again not shown but available upon request), I find that such *Altruism* strongly and significantly increases *Support for Redistribution*.

Models 4 through 6 in Table Three, however, consider the interaction part of the argument, focusing on the hypotheses that foreign-born percent should have a more negative or less positive effect on the binary measure of *Altruism* as the *Gap in unemployment*, *Gap in social-benefit dependency*, and especially the *Gap in social values* rises. The results are partly though not unanimously in line with expectation. *Gap in unemployment* and *Gap in social values* quite strongly negatively

mediate how *Foreign-born percent* affects such *Altruism*. But *Gap in social-benefit dependency* tends to significantly *positively* mediate how *Foreign-born percent* affects *Altruism*. Despite this discrepancy, it is particularly the effect of *gap in social values* where this factor is key to the arguments above.

Altogether, such patterns lend plausibility to the causal argument underlying the main findings above – that gaps in unemployment, social-benefit dependency, and in social values exacerbate how immigration undermines support for redistribution. Lending further support is that the integration measures do *not* significantly mediate how immigration measures affect measures in the ESS data of concern about individual employment or income risk (results not shown but available upon request).

In any event, the reported main results in Table One also stand up to a range of further robustness and sensitivity tests. For instance, the results are very similar if one considers other mixes of controls, removes outliers in any of the key variables, or removes any single country or year of the panel. And the results are robust to alternative measures of support for social policy (based on 2008 ESS measures of support for more social benefits and higher taxes over fewer benefits and lower taxes), alternative measures of integration (based on additional questions about political values among foreign-born and native populations), or alternative measures of immigration (foreigners in nation, asylum seekers, etc.). They are also robust to alternative estimators, such as ordered probit or ordered logit multilevel models with and without country fixed effects and with and without clustering of standard errors.

CONCLUSION

This paper explores how the economic and social integration of immigrant populations can strongly mediate how immigration plays out in the politics of redistribution. Despite theoretical reasons to expect immigration to have offsetting implications for such politics, the empirical analysis here suggests that the negative implications tend

to predominate in the net, such that higher foreign-born shares tend to lower support among natives in host societies for government redistribution. But the study identifies how and why measures of social and economic integration of immigrants – gap in unemployment of foreign-born and native populations, gap in social-benefit dependency, and gap in socio-cultural values – tend to exacerbate any negative effects that immigration may have on such support. The key links by which this may be the case involve how such measures of low integration tend to exacerbate how immigration can spark concerns about the fiscal viability of welfare states and undermine solidarity and altruism in host societies, while doing little to alter how immigration affects concerns about individual or social risks.

Such theoretical and empirical analysis, to be sure, only begins to explore how integration and immigration interact to affect the politics of redistribution and the welfare state. Much can be done to directly explore how other and perhaps better measures of integration influence redistribution politics, given the complexity of social and economic integration of immigrants. Much more could be done, further, to explore the intervening links putatively connecting integration to how immigration affects support for the welfare state and redistribution. And more should be done to consider the upstream conditions that might plausibly influence levels of integration – net of and beyond the broad characteristics of immigrant populations themselves. For instance, a fruitful line of inquiry would explore how different integration policies and regulations of European states alter the way immigration plays out in redistribution politics. Finally, an important extension of this research agenda is to consider how and whether broad public attitudes putatively shaped by immigration, and the interaction between immigration and integration, actually influence party and policymaking agendas and ultimate revenue and spending policies of states.

In the meantime, this study reminds us that national-level measures of immigration may have important implications for social policy and politics, but in ways that are



mediated by integration. It may be that national-level measures of immigration tend to undermine broad social support for government redistribution, net of a range of individual and national economic and social conditions. But higher levels of integration of immigrants into the labor markets and social fabric of host societies can strongly diminish these negative effects. Integration can mean the difference between having to choose between preserving social protection for economic risks on the one hand, and on the other hand preserving open societies towards the most human face of globalization.

APPENDIX

Supplemental Appendix One Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Support redistribution	180519	3.850	1.039	1	5
Support redistribution (binary)	180519	0.722	0.448	0	1
Foreign-born (% population)	149330	10.197	5.856	1.819	32.997
Non-western (% foreign born)	139107	31.152	22.791	1.692	70.745
Gap in unemployment	151349	1.775	0.618	0.567	3.008
Gap in social-benefit dependency	173999	0.030	0.029	-0.012	0.100
Gap in social values	184988	2.386	1.147	0.421	5.576
Dependent on social benefits	179138	0.046	0.209	0	1
Age	184038	45.566	18.553	14	92
Female	184745	0.538	0.499	0	1
Educated	183988	0.247	0.431	0	1
High income	179362	0.281	0.450	0	1
Union	184988	0.193	0.395	0	1
Employed	184988	0.515	0.500	0	1
Married	186966	0.260	0.439	0	1
Unemployment rate	175663	7.343	3.423	1.733	19.986
Social expenditures (% gdp)	167293	24.326	4.956	12.294	32.214

Supplemental Appendix Two Marginal Interaction between Integration and Foreign-Born Percent



REFERENCES

- Alesina, Alberto, and Edward L. Glaeser. (2004) *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe. A World of Difference*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Alesina, A. and E. La Ferrara (2005). Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities. *Journal of Public Economics* 89(5-6), 897–931.
- Arts, Wil, and John Gelissen. (2001) ‘Welfare States, Solidarity and Justice Principles: Does the Type Really Matter?’ *Acta Sociologica* 44 (4): 283-300.
- Banting, Keith G., Richard Johnston, Will Kymlicka, and Stuart Soroka. (2006) ‘Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State? An Empirical Analysis’, in *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies*, edited by Keith G. Banting, and Will Kymlicka. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Boeri, Tito. (2009) *Immigration to the Land of Redistribution*. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4273. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434607>
- Boeri, Tito, Gordon Hanson and Barry McCormick (eds) (2002) *Immigration Policy and the Welfare System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burgoon, Brian. (2012 forthcoming). “Partisan Embedding of Liberalism: How Trade, Investment and Immigration Affect Party Support for the Welfare State” *Comparative Political Studies* 45 (5).
- Burgoon, Brian, Ferry Koster and Marcel van Egmond. (2010). “Support for Redistribution and the Paradox of Immigration”, Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
- Causa, Orsetta and Sebastien Jean. 2006. “Immigrants’ Integration in OECD Countries: Does Labour Market Policy Matter?” Mimeo. Paris: OECD.
- Crepaz, Markus, M.L. (2008) *Trust beyond Borders. Immigration, the Welfare State, and Identity in Modern Societies*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- De Beer, Paul, and Ferry Koster. (2009) *Sticking Together or Falling Apart. Solidarity in an Era of Individualization and Globalization*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- William Easterly and Ross Levine. (1997) Africa’s growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic divisions. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4): 1203–50.
- Eger, Maureen, A. forthcoming, 2011. ‘Even in Sweden. The Effects of Immigration on Support for Welfare State Spending’, *European Sociological Review*.
- Fehr, Hans, Saine Jokish, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff. (2004) *The Role of Immigration in Dealing with the Developed World’s Demographic Transition*. Working Paper 10512, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Finseraas, Henning. 2008. “Immigration and Preferences for Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis of European Survey Data”. *Comparative European Politics* 6(4): 407–431.
- Freeman, Gary P. (1986) Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 485 (1): 51-63.
- Gilens, Martin. (1995) ‘Racial Attitudes and Opposition to Welfare’, *Journal of Politics* 57(4): 994-1014.
- Gilens, Martin. (1996) “‘Race Coding’ and White Opposition to Welfare”, *American Political Science Review* 90(3): 851-871.
- James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein. Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? an experimental approach. IZA Discussion Papers 2272, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), August 2006.
- Hanson, Gordon H., Kenneth F. Scheve, and Matthew H. Slaughter. (2005) *Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies*. Working Paper W11028, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Hooghe, Marc, Ann Trappers, Bart Meuleman, and Tim Reeskens. (2008) ‘Migration to European Countries. A Structural Explanation of Patterns, 1980-2004’, *International Migration Review* 42 (2): 476-504.
- Luttmer, Erzo, F.P. (2001) ‘Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution’, *Journal of Political Economy* 109(3): 500-528.
- Mau, Steffen, and Christoph Burkhardt. (2009) ‘Migration and Welfare State Solidarity in Western Europe’, *Journal of European Social Policy* 19 (3): 213-229.
- Nannestad, Peter. (2007) “Immigration and Welfare States: A Survey of 15 Years of Research”, *European Journal of Political Economy* 23 (2): 512-533.
- Newman, Katherine D., and Chauncy Lennon. (1995) *Finding Work in the Inner City: How Hard is it Now? How Hard Will it be for AFDC Recipients?* Working Paper 76, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- OECD. (2010) Unemployment rate for Foreign Born and Native workers. Source: Annex I.A.1 *International Migration Outlook*. Paris: OECD. ISBN 978-92-64-05661-10.

- <-----> (2010). *OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics - ISBN 92-64-05604-1 OECD 2009*).
- Okkerse, Liesbet. (2008) 'How to Measure Labour Market Effects of Immigration: A Review', *Journal of Economic Surveys* 22 (1): 1-30.
- Putnam, Robert. (2007) 'E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century', *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30 (2): 137-174.
- Rowthorn, Robert. (2008) 'The Fiscal Impact of Immigration on the Advanced Economies', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 24 (3): 560-580.
- Sainsbury, Diane. (2006) 'Immigrants' Social Rights in Comparative Perspective: Welfare Regimes, Forms in Immigration and Immigration Policy Regimes', *Journal of European Social Policy* 16 (3): 229-244.
- Senik, Claudia, Holger Stichnoth, and Karine van der Straeten. (2009) 'Immigration and Natives' Attitudes towards the Welfare State: Evidence from the European Social Survey', *Social Indicators Research* 91(3): 345-370.
- Soroka, Stuart, Keith, G. Banting, and Richard Johnston. (2006) 'Immigration and Redistribution in a Global Era', in *Globalization and Egalitarian Redistribution*, edited by Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles, and Michael Wallerstein. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Steenbergen, Marco and Bradford S. Jones (2002) 'Modeling Multilevel Data Structures', *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (1): 218-237.
- Stichnoth, Holger and Karine Van der Straeten. (2009). Ethnic Diversity and Attitudes Towards Redistribution: A Review of the Literature. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 09-036.
- van Oorschot, Wim. (2006) 'Making the Difference in Social Europe: Deservingness Perceptions among Citizens of European Welfare States', *Journal of European Social Policy* 16 (1): 23-42.
- van Oorschot, Wim, and Wilfred Uunk. (2007) 'Multi-level Determinants of the Public's Informal Solidarity towards Immigrants in European Welfare States', in *Legitimacy and the Welfare State*, edited by Steffen Mau, and Benjamin Veghte (eds). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- van Oorschot, Wim. (2008) 'Solidarity towards Immigrants in European Welfare States', *International Journal of Social Welfare* 17(1): 3-14.

Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (<http://www.march.es/ceacs/ingles/ceacs.asp>)
WORKING PAPERS

Series Editor: Andrew Richards

Most recent titles:

<u>Working Paper</u>	<u>Author</u>	<u>Title</u>
2009/240	Fernández-Vázquez, P.	<i>The Influence of Electoral Manifestos on Citizen Perceptions of Parties' Ideological Preferences. Results for European Parties (EU-15) between 1989 and 2004.</i>
2009/241	Queralt, D.	<i>Learning the Mechanical Effect of Electoral Systems.</i>
2009/242	Astudillo, J.	<i>Neopopulismo, y respuesta sindical a las reformas económicas en América Latina.</i>
2009/243	Aguilar, P., Balcells, L., and Cebolla, H.	<i>Determinants of Attitudes towards Transitional Justice: An Empirical Analysis of the Spanish Case.</i>
2009/244	Sánchez-Cuenca, I.	<i>Terrorism and Territory.</i>
2009/245	Ortega, F. and Polavieja, J. G.	<i>Labor-Market Exposure as a Determinant of Attitudes toward Immigration.</i>
2009/246	Amat, F. and Wibbels, E.	<i>Electoral Incentives, Group Identity and Preferences for Redistribution.</i>
2009/247	Alonso, S. and Claro da Fonseca, S.	<i>Immigration, Left and Right.</i>
2009/248	Amat, F., Jurado, I., and León, S.	<i>A Political Theory of Decentralization Dynamics.</i>
2010/249	Kselman, D. M.	<i>Electoral Institutions, Legislative Accountability, and Political Corruption.</i>
2010/250	Pop-Eleches, G. and Tucker, J. A.	<i>After the Party: Legacies and Left-Right Distinctions in Post-Communist Countries.</i>
2010/251	Urquizu, I.	<i>Moderate Voters and Internal Party Factionalism.</i>
2010/252	Kuo, A. and Margalit, Y.	<i>Measuring Individual Identity: Experimental Evidence.</i>
2010/253	Kuo, A.	<i>Explaining Employer Coordination: Evidence from the US Inter-War Period.</i>
2011/254	Falcó-Gimeno, A.	<i>Portfolio Allocation and Time out of Office in Coalition Governments.</i>
2011/255	Gorodzeisky, A. and Semyonov, M.	<i>Occupational Incorporation of Immigrants in Western European Countries.</i>
2011/256	Brader, T. A. and Tucker, A.	<i>Follow the Leader: Party Cues, Policy Opinion, and the Power of Partisanship in Three Multiparty Systems.</i>
2011/257	De la Calle, L. and Roussias, N.	<i>Independents and Vote Choice: Spatial or Performance Voting?</i>
2011/258	Lapiente, V.	Trade-Offs in Corporate Governance.
2011/259	Lago, I.	Why (Not) National Party Systems?