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Follow the leader party cues, policy opinion, and the power of partisanship

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OF PARTISANSHIP IN THREE MULTIPARTY SYSTEMS

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Abstract

In the United States, considerable evidence documents the power of partisanship to shape voter preferences. But does partisanship have similar powers beyond American shores? Observational evidence has led some in this old debate to answer yes, but others to contend partisanship merely restates party vote. Experimentation can help to clarify what powers, if any, partisanship wields over voters in specific countries. If effects differ across countries, then scholars can turn their attention to explaining why. We present evidence from experiments designed to test whether party identifiers follow their party's lead in expressing policy preferences. We conducted these survey experiments in three countries where multiple parties viably compete for legislative seats: Great Britain, Hungary, and Poland. We find that party cues can influence the policy preferences of partisans in these countries. Moreover, the pattern of results suggests that this power may strengthen with party system crystallization.

INTRODUCTION

Partisanship has long been considered one of the most important determinants of mass political behavior in democratic polities. Although scholars have provided different explanations for the formation and malleability of partisanship, competing theoretical accounts largely agree that it is a predisposition that heavily influences the short-term choices of voters (Achen 2002; Campbell *et al.* 1960; Converse 1969; Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Green *et al.* 2002). Some theories stress the heuristic function of partisanship, i.e., its ability to serve as a shortcut by which citizens can make up their minds regarding both how to vote and where to stand on policy issues (Downs 1957; Shively 1979). Extensive research in the U.S. shows a strong link between party identification and both candidate choice and issue opinions (Bartels 2000; Green *et al.* 2002; Miller and Shanks 1996).

The spread of electoral democracy and the globalization of opinion research in recent years has expanded the study of partisanship far beyond its earlier confines. In many studies, researchers measure party identification and incorporate it into models of political behavior in a manner similar, if not identical, to the way students of American politics have done. Scholars are also taking advantage of the existence of comparable measures across countries—like those available as part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project—to shed light on how institutional factors or other elements of the political context shape the formation and relevance of partisanship (e.g., Huber *et al.* 2005). Still others seek to document and explain the emergence (or not) of party attachments in new democracies, thereby strengthening our knowledge of how and why partisanship develops in formative periods (Brader and Tucker 2001; Lupu and Stokes 2007; Samuels 2004).

In this rush to globalize the study of partisanship and other aspects of political behavior, much less attention has been paid to whether the concept(s) mean the same thing in different polities. When a citizen in France claims to identify with a political party, one might wonder if she is

expressing a similar self-understanding (truly thinks of herself as a partisan) in the same way as a citizen giving the same answer in Germany. The issue of comparable self-conceptions, although potentially related, is distinct from a second concern: Does the fact that these hypothetical French and German citizens both claim to be partisan have similar implications for their opinions and behavior? In other words, will we observe similar effects from their self-professed partisanship? We suspect political scientists are ultimately more concerned about the latter and that is our focus here.

Bartels (2000) has observed that the significance of partisanship depends both on the level of partisanship in the electorate and the extent to which partisanship influences behavior. Received wisdom suggests that partisanship is more prevalent and has a greater impact on political behavior in older democracies where parties are more established (Barnes *et al.* 1985; Converse 1969) and a weaker effect in newer, less stable party systems (Dalton 2006). A look at recent data, however, raises doubts about either the survey measures or the received wisdom. For example, the most recent wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) indicates that Albania has nearly as many self-proclaimed partisans as the U.S. (74% vs. 79%), while Slovaks claim stronger party ties than either the Germans or Dutch. If self-reports do accurately convey the prevalence and strength of partisanship, we must completely revise our notions of how fast partisanship develops.¹ If not, then we need better ways of assessing the nature of partisanship within and across societies.

Moreover, these concerns are underscored by a small but persistent set of voices that have long dissented on the portability of partisanship even to other established democracies (Budge *et al.* 1976; Holmberg 2008; Johnston 2006; Thomassen 1976; Thomassen and Rosema 2006). The view of American institutional and cultural exceptionalism—myth to

¹ We use the terms partisanship, party identification, and party attachments interchangeably.

some, gospel to others—fuels doubts about the worldwide relevance of partisanship.

Despite marked increases in available data and the usage of sophisticated methods, resolution of this debate has proven elusive because often both sides can point to the same evidence as supporting their claims. Proponents of regarding partisanship as comparable, for example, point to the ready adoption of party labels or identities across democracies and its potency in predicting votes and political attitudes (Dalton 2006). Dissenters from this view argue that the correspondence between vote choice and party identification is *so high* that the two can scarcely mean something different. Thomassen and Rosema (2006) recognize that near-perfect correlations could reflect two quite opposite states of the world: a world in which partisanship is an all but meaningless restatement of current preferences, and a world in which partisanship is so powerful that it rarely permits deviations. They contend, however, that either way, so long as partisanship is very highly correlated with the vote, the concept has little use as a distinct analytical tool (relative to party preference) in voting models (Berglund *et al.* 2005). While this argument is fairly persuasive where predicting votes is concerned, it ignores the many reputed effects of partisanship beyond serving as a default vote choice. These effects include its impact on opinion formation (e.g., policy opinions or evaluations of government performance), memory, inferences, factual perceptions, and the motivation to take political action.²

One way forward, therefore, is to examine the broader impacts of partisanship in other countries. Observational studies in many countries have established strong associations between party position-taking and partisan opinion formation (e.g., see Clarke *et al.* 1997, 2005; Hobolt, 2007; Jacoby 1988). Unfortunately, concerns about endogeneity—for example, that partisanship may both influence and be influenced by issue opinions and evaluations—cannot confidently be resolved by standard survey evidence, even

panel studies (Conover and Feldman 1989; cf. also Bartels 2002; Franklin and Jackson 1993). In the face of such concerns, researchers increasingly turn to experiments, which offer the ability to isolate causality with confidence, and thus complement the robust estimation of the strength of associations in the population from observational studies. However, most prior experiments on the effects of partisanship were run in the U.S. Even in the U.S., experimental evidence is surprisingly thin relative to the strong beliefs about the impact of party identification. The largest body of such evidence concerns the impact of party labels or cues as a guide to either opinion formation or candidate preference (Arceneaux 2008; Bullock 2006b; Coan *et al.* 2008; Cohen 2003; Druckman 2001; Kam 2005; Rahn 1993; Van Houweling and Sniderman 2005).

Our goal is to reinvigorate the comparative study of partisan effects, deepening and broadening our understanding of the nature of partisanship with methods well-suited to isolating effects and carried out in multiple polities (not just the U.S.). We argue that comparative scholars should move past protracted debates over the meaning of correlations and collect experimental data to ascertain what powers, if any, partisanship wields over voters in the countries they study. If such evidence suggests that partisanship “means” something different (i.e., has distinct effects) across countries, as some have claimed, then scholars can begin to use the same new data to explain why. In this paper, we seek to push that project forward by presenting results from a series of experiments designed to test whether party identifiers adopt policy preferences to match those of their party. The survey experiments were administered in three countries where, unlike the U.S., multiple parties viably compete for legislative seats on a regular basis. These countries include Great Britain, which has one of the oldest and most stable party systems in the world, and two relatively new post-communist democracies, Hungary and Poland. In Hungary, the party-system had been relatively stable at the time of our

² See Bartels 2002; Bullock 2006a; Cohen 2003; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Westen *et al.* 2006.

experiments since the collapse of communism, while in Poland it has been much less so.³

The present study makes several contributions to our understanding of partisanship and party cues. First, we are unaware of any prior studies that experimentally test the impact of partisanship in new democracies generally or in these three countries in particular. Thus, each experimental study, by comparing the responses of partisans and other party supporters, reveals for the first time whether, for the country in question, partisanship induces citizens to follow the lead of their party in forming policy opinions. Second, by conducting original experiments in three multiparty systems, we inject new and more diagnostic evidence into long-running debates about the applicability of partisanship (as a strong predisposing force) to countries outside the U.S. Third, this constitutes a first step toward explaining how and why the meaning or effectiveness of partisanship varies, if it indeed it does, across party systems. Fourth and finally, we extend prior experimental research on party cue effects by adapting experimental tests to reflect more fully a multiparty context.

Consistent with work in the U.S., we find that party cues can influence the policy preferences of citizens in Great Britain, Hungary, and Poland. Moreover, these effects are clearer and stronger among party identifiers than among others who simply prefer the party. These findings suggest that self-reported identification signals a qualitatively similar form of partisanship in new and old democracies, at least in the sense that partisans tend to follow their party's lead on matters of policy. However, this holds more true for Hungary and especially Britain more than for Poland. Indeed, a broader look at the cross-national pattern of results suggests that the distinctive power of partisanship over policy opinions may emerge and strengthen with party system crystallization.

³ The Hungarian experiments reported here occurred before the Hungarian parliamentary elections of 2010, the results of which may signal changes in the stability of the Hungarian party system.

PARTISANSHIP, PARTY CUES, AND POLICY OPINION

Scholars have attributed numerous effects to party identification. For example, partisanship is thought to influence both electoral choices and policy opinions, to bias perceptions of fact and attributions of political responsibility, to motivate selective exposure to information and selective memory for political details, and to spur greater political involvement. It is worth noting that these reputed *effects* of partisanship are consistent with a variety of different theories about the nature and *causes* of partisanship: adherents of the so-called Michigan school (Campbell *et al.* 1960), the rational-revisionist “running tally” challenge to the Michigan school (Achen 2002; Fiorina 1981) or more recent “social identity” approaches to partisanship (Gerber and Green 1998; Green *et al.* 2002) all express interest in the study of partisanship because of its potentially profound effects on political behavior.⁴ We focus here on the idea that partisanship influences policy preferences. Partisans, it is claimed, adopt or adjust their own policy views to match those of their party (Miller and Shanks 1996; Zaller 2002). No one suggests that partisanship completely determines policy opinions, but only that partisans should display a marked tendency to follow their party's lead.

Our first two hypotheses, therefore, stem from the view that party labels can serve as useful heuristics and from the view that partisanship matters for opinion formation, respectively:

H1. When policy positions are endorsed by or similarly linked to a political party, citizens who trust, like, or otherwise prefer that party are more likely to support (and less likely to oppose) that policy position.

⁴ These theoretical approaches may suggest some differences, such as the precise degree of individual-level partisan stability and corresponding nature of partisan dynamics (Clarke and McCutcheon 2009). but they make similar claims about many facets of partisanship.

H2. Self-identified partisans are especially likely to adjust their policy preferences to fit the positions of their party.

Neither hypothesis is terribly new. Scholars have espoused such views about party cues and partisanship for decades. Research providing clear causal evidence about either hypothesis (or especially both simultaneously), however, has been surprisingly rare. Although one could explore many dimensions of the first hypothesis (e.g., reactions to cues from other parties), we focus more heavily here on the second hypothesis and its implications for partisanship.

Prior experimental studies on the impact of party cues have focused on one country at a time. The vast majority of those were carried out in the U.S., where researchers typically find moderate to dramatic effects of party cues on evaluations of candidates or incumbents (Arceneaux 2008; Malhotra and Kuo 2008; Rahn 1993; Rudolph 2006; Stroud *et al.* 2005), and on policy opinions (Borges and Clarke 2008; Bullock 2006b; Coan *et al.* 2008; Cohen 2003; Druckman 2001; Kam 2005). Recent experiments also suggest that party cues can affect policy preferences in Canada (Merolla *et al.* 2008), Great Britain (Sanders *et al.* 2008), Mexico (Merolla *et al.* 2007), and even quasi-democratic Russia (Brader and Tucker 2009).

In addition to testing directly the effect of party labels, prior studies have examined whether those effects are conditioned by factors such as issue difficulty, issue salience, amount of policy information available, consistency with party reputation, and an individual's political sophistication. Most of these studies, however, simply assume, as part of their analysis, that party identifiers are the ones who follow the cues. As a result, published results typically have not distinguished the reactions of partisans from the reactions of other citizens in a way that might shed light on the meaning of self-identification within or across countries. Research by Merolla and colleagues (2007, 2008) offers an exception. In Mexico, they found limited evidence that party identification matters for cue-taking. In Canada, they discovered that, while identifiers are more responsive

to their party's cues, they are nearly as apt to move in the opposite direction as to follow their party's lead. It is possible these findings—by turns, modestly consistent with and contrary to expectations—owe something to Mexico's young party system and instability in the Canadian party system, respectively. However, in both cases, study participants were college students, raising questions about how well their behavior reflects that of the rest of the electorate (Sears 1986). Although studies have found mixed evidence as to whether education or political sophistication condition one's responsiveness to party cues,⁵ there has been a broad consensus that young adults have weaker partisanship than more mature citizens (Achen 2002; Converse 1969; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Jennings *et al.* 2009).

Like Merolla and colleagues, our focus is not simply on testing the impact of party cues on policy preferences, but also on ascertaining the implications of self-identified partisanship for such behavior. We extend this research to three new countries: Britain, Hungary, and Poland. In an effort to draw more confident conclusions about the efficacy of partisanship and party cues among citizens generally, we rely on evidence from samples that are more broadly representative of adult populations.

By considering party systems that differ markedly in maturity and stability, we can also begin to explore whether such distinctions might matter for partisan cue-taking. Of course, a full-scale systematic analysis bent on isolating how party system and institutional factors shape the impact of partisanship or party cues would require comparable experimental data from dozens of countries, but this of course well beyond the scope of what we can accomplish in the present paper. Nonetheless, we follow-up our separate investigations in each country by leveraging what we can from the distinctiveness and similarities across settings to draw preliminary inferences

⁵ Some studies have found larger cue effects among subjects who possess less political knowledge (Bullock 2006; Kam 2005) or education (Malhotra and Kuo 2008).

about the relationship between party system and partisan cue-taking.

Previous scholarship calls attention to at least two distinct sets of expectations for cross-national differences in partisanship. At the broadest level, of course, there are simply the dueling contentions that partisanship is a more-or-less similar political force everywhere, stemming perhaps from the human tendency to form group identities or socially-reinforced predispositions from a young age (Campbell *et al.* 1960; Green *et al.* 2002; Zuckerman *et al.* 2007), or alternatively that it is a special product of a fairly unique U.S. political system that does not function similarly in many (or any) other places (Berglund *et al.* 2005; Budge *et al.* 1976; Holmberg 2008; Johnston 2006; Thomassen 1976; Thomassen and Rosema 2006). For brevity, we refer to these as the *universalist proposition* and the *exceptionalist proposition*, respectively. Data from three new countries will of course not end this debate, but positive findings would further support those skeptical of the *exceptionalist proposition*.

A second set of expectations focuses less on qualitative differences in the relevance or meaning of partisanship and more on the quantitative differences in the strength of identification. Converse (1969) offered perhaps the most influential argument of this sort. He claimed that party identities “crystallize” and strengthen over long periods of attachment that are made possible when the same parties compete in election after election. Thus, in older stable party systems, partisanship is inherited from parents during childhood, crystallizes during political experiences in early adulthood, strengthens over the life cycle (see also Achen 2002; Dalton and Weldon 2007; Fiorina 1981; Green *et al.* 2002). Volatility in party systems—by disrupting those processes—undercuts the continuity and value of partisanship (Dalton 2006). Both the original and subsequent studies tested this hypothesis by directly measuring self-reported strength of identification. But we are more concerned about the actual strength of partisanship (i.e., its consequences) than with its nominal strength. To that end, we extend Converse’s

crystallization hypothesis to predictions about partisan cue-taking:

H3. The tendency of partisans to adjust their policy preferences to fit with the positions of their party will be less apparent and weaker in younger, less stable party systems and more apparent in older, stable party systems.

To be perfectly clear, with experiments from only three countries, any conclusions in regard to H3 should be considered preliminary at best. That being said, given how little we know about the effects of partisanship on opinion formation cross-nationally, any observations we can make in this regard ought to represent a significant increase in our understanding of the topic.

To summarize, we seek to answer the following three questions. First, do party cues influence policy opinions in Great Britain, Hungary, and Poland? Second, are such effects especially present among self-identified partisans? Finally, to the extent that the answers to preceding questions are yes, do the effects differ across the three countries in ways that shed light on claims about cross-national differences in the meaning of partisanship?

DATA

Our evidence comes from survey experiments carried out in Poland in the summer of 2006, Hungary in the summer of 2007, and Great Britain in the winter of 2009. We worked with professional survey firms in each country: the Center for the Study of Public Opinion (CBOS) in Poland, Ipsos-Szonda in Hungary, and YouGov in Great Britain. In Poland, the survey of a national probability sample consisted of face-to-face interviews in respondents’ homes that lasted close to an hour on average. The Hungarian survey also relied on nearly hour-long, face-to-face interviews with a probability sample of the Budapest metropolitan area. The British survey was conducted over the Internet, took approximately a half-hour to complete, and was administered to a sample that was randomly drawn from a large opt-in panel and weighted to reflect the adult population

in Great Britain. The surveys were completed by 409 respondents in Hungary, and 607 respondents in Poland, and 2301 respondents in Great Britain.⁶ The surveys contained numerous questions about policies, parties, and politics. The battery of policy questions making up the focal experiments in this paper appeared at the midway point of the interview. Questions soliciting party preference were asked earlier in the survey. We would have preferred not to have switched interview modes, but prior research suggests that most of our questions should not be susceptible to strong mode effects (Chang and Krosnick 2003; Malhotra and Krosnick 2007; Sanders *et al.* 2007).⁷

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT

Our goal in this paper is to test whether party cues influence policy opinions, especially among partisans, beyond the U.S. For this purpose, we designed two types of experimental manipulations. Each uses a simple 2-cell design in which the presence of party cues is varied: in the *treatment* condition, party cues are embedded in the survey question; in the *control* condition, there are no party cues. For some questions, the manipulation involved inserting only a single party cue (SPC), while for other questions we inserted multiple party cues (MPC). We carried out four SPC and three MPC

experimental manipulations in each country's survey.

The SPC experiments contain the simpler of the two types of manipulations. Respondents in both conditions are told about a policy proposal and asked whether they support it, oppose it, or neither. In the treatment group, this proposal is attributed to a specific political party. The proposal in the control group is attributed to anonymous "experts" or no attribution is given ("A bill has been proposed...").

The party assigned for the treatment cue matched the respondent's *party preference*, which had been ascertained earlier in the survey. We measured preferences by asking respondents to indicate which of the major parties they "like the best." By this method, we obtained a party preference for 78% of respondents in Hungary, 87% in Poland, and 93% in Britain. By tying the cues to preferences broadly, we can examine whether cue-taking becomes more apparent as one moves from simply preferring a party to consistently identifying with that party. Our analyses of the SPC experiments, therefore, include only those respondents in both the control and treatment conditions who indicated some sort of explicit party preference.⁸

One restriction on the SPC experiments is that it must be plausible to link the policy proposals to any of the major parties, or at the very least the endorsement must not be wildly implausible. In practice, this primarily means avoiding highly salient policies on which major parties have taken clear and well-known positions. Although this requirement rules out many important issues in a country, the effects of cues are questionable when party-issue associations are strong enough to come implicitly or automatically to the minds of voters. Our experiments featured bread-and-butter issues such as new taxes or fees to pay for infrastructure improvements, education reform, drinking age laws, personal data security, and foreign relations. We did not ask identical questions in each country, because the meaning and relevance of the questions would be altered by shifts in context anyway. Instead, we strove to make

⁶ Overall response rates were 48.9% for the Hungarian survey and 50.8% for the Polish survey, based on the Response Rate 1 definition stipulated by the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR). The cooperation rates were 70.4% and 74.7%, respectively (AAPOR Cooperation Rate 1). The British Internet survey had a completion rate of 38.4%.

⁷ It is often preferable to have more comparable sample sizes, to minimize the concern that any differences in the presence or number of "significant" findings across settings is merely an artifact of statistical power. Separate funding sources and platform costs placed constraints on sample size and generally we sought the largest sample feasible. Fortunately, our results do not at all appear to be driven by variation in the number of participants across countries. See note 21 as well.

⁸ Respondents who did not provide a preferred party were omitted from analysis.

the questions largely comparable in the spread of policy domains, diversity of opinion, and question format. One exception is that all three surveys solicited support for a vague policy described only as the “Primary Education Restructuring Act.”⁹

Voters may be largely on the lookout for cues from reliable sources, such as their own party (Druckman 2001; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). In many polities, however, voters will often be alerted to the rival positions of several parties and, unlike the bipolar environment that prevails in two-party systems, voters cannot always assume that unmentioned parties will take an opposite, opposing stance. We therefore designed the more complicated MPC questions to reflect a reality in which multiple cues are competing for citizens’ attention from all over the “ideological map.” The questions present respondents with information about a particular policy proposal or debate, on which people have staked out a variety of positions and/or rationales for their stances. In the treatment condition, each position is attributed to one of the major political parties. In the control group, these positions are variously attributed to vague groups of people or experts (e.g., “some experts espouse..., while some prefer...”). Our goal is to examine whether partisans are more likely to adopt the positions we associate with their party in the treatment condition than they are to adopt that same position in the control group where no party cues are present.

Designing the MPC experiments does not require finding a single position plausible for all parties. Instead, we need a constellation of positions that can be attributed simultaneously to different parties such that the overall pattern is plausible. We use the MPC set-up to include issues that are somewhat more salient or on “hot-button” topics, as well as to raise the threshold for party cue effects. MPC questions attribute to each party a position that maps reasonably well onto its ideology or pattern of actual positions, if not to an explicit position it actually

adopted. As a result, they constitute a harder test for party cue effects, because party supporters may be drawn to the same position even in the control group precisely because the position is consistent with what they liked about the party in the first place. These questions cover a range of issues, including health care reform, highway tolls, nuclear power, reform of political institutions, and international partnerships. We again have one topic that appears on all three surveys, which is a question related to immigration and guest permits for foreign workers.¹⁰

A few additional details of the experiments are worth noting. First, respondents were randomly assigned to either the treatment or control group for all seven of the experiments, so they did *not* get party cues for some policy issues and not for others. Second, we could not include cues for every party. Choosing where to draw this line involves trade-offs between including more parties (and thus more respondents) and complicating the design, length, and plausibility of the questions. For the three countries in this study, the choice of parties was relatively clear. We included under our broad definition of “major parties” six parties in Poland,¹¹ four parties in Hungary,¹² and four parties in Great Britain.¹³ In the British case, we then added

¹⁰ All of the policy proposals for both the SPC and MPC experiments were created by the authors for the purpose of the study. The positions attributed to parties were based on thorough research of party positions from both primary sources (such as platforms and party websites), secondary sources (in particular descriptions of parties’ positions on issues from articles by both academics and journalists), and consultation with the survey organizations and country experts. All respondents were debriefed following the survey regarding the constructed nature of these proposals.

¹¹ Citizen’s Platform, Law and Justice, Samoobrona RP, the Democratic Left Alliance, the League of Polish Families, and the Polish Peasant’s Party.

¹² The Hungarian Socialist Party, FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party, the Alliance of Free Democrats, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum.

¹³ Labor, Conservative, and the Liberal Democrats were included for all respondents. Plaid Cymru was included in the surveys

⁹ See the online appendix for complete question wording and the distributions of responses.

a fourth party that varied by England, Scotland, and Wales, so as not to exclude the major Scottish and Welsh national parties. Although one might prefer to use the same number of parties in all three countries, this simply reflects a reality of cross-national differences in party systems that may (or may not) affect the impact of partisanship.

Finally, we need to distinguish party identifiers from others who like a party. In light of questions about the appropriateness of any particular measure of party identification, especially in new democracies (Brader and Tucker 2001; Green *et al.* 2002), we rely on multiple measures to isolate those who consistently identify with the same party (Green and Schickler 1993). For purposes of the analyses that follow, we treat as “partisans” anyone who not only mentions they prefer a party but also claims to identify with that same party in response to two sets of self-identification questions presented earlier in the survey.¹⁴ As expected, this group of partisans is much smaller than the total number of people who prefer a party: 39% of Hungarians, 46% of Poles, and 56% of the British met our criteria for being treated as a self-identified partisan.

administered in Wales and the Scottish Nationalist Party was included in surveys administered in Scotland. To mimic this idea of a nationalist party in England, we included the UK Independence Party as the fourth party in England.

¹⁴ One self-identification measure is the fairly common “closeness” (“Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party...”) battery used in the CSES as well as other surveys (Barnes *et al.* 1988; Huber *et al.* 2005). The second measure is a battery developed by Colton (2000) for countries with multiple parties where there may not be language of identification: “Please tell me, is there any one among the present parties, movements, and associations about which you would say, ‘This is my party, my movement, my association’?” The “close party” and “my party” questions both have follow up components designed to give the respondent a second chance to provide an answer to the question. We include in our analyses respondents who provide a party to either the first or second version of the question.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

In this section we present the results from the seven experiments we conducted in Great Britain, then the seven we conducted in Hungary, and finally the seven we conducted in Poland. We conclude with a brief assessment of the implications of these findings in association with one another. Given that we are presenting data from only three countries, we intend these observations in the final section to be suggestive at best. That being said, we chose three particular countries precisely because of the variation they provided in terms of age and stability of party systems. Figure 1 show average party age in 2006, weighted by party support in the electorate, for all European and North Atlantic countries included in the second wave of the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset.¹⁵

Of course scholars expect the most critical phases of partisan development to occur in the first generation or two of democracy (Converse 1969), which leads nicely to post-communist democracies. Turning again to Figure 1, we see that all of the post-communist democracies are bunched together in the far left of the figure in the last plateau of the youngest party systems in the region. Figure 2 therefore adds an additional dimension of party system stability by adding electoral volatility on the X-axis for the post-communist countries in the CSES.¹⁶ Of these countries, Hungary has had the most stable party system when taking into

¹⁵ We limited ourselves to CSES countries because of the opportunities for follow up comparative analysis, which we explore elsewhere. CSES data include a variable for party age. But the data are incomplete and plagued by inconsistencies. We recoded the data with a consistent definition of party age cross-nationally (citation omitted).

¹⁶ We measure electoral volatility using the standard Pedersen Index of volatility, or Volatility = $(\sum_{i=1}^n |p_{it} - p_{i(t+1)}|)/2$ where n is number of parties and p_i represents the percentage of votes received by that party in time periods t and $t+1$. As volatility requires a pair of elections, the measures are calculated starting with the second election since the collapse of communism in 1989 through the summer of 2009.

FIGURE 1. Average Party Age by Country as of 2006 of Countries in CSES





FIGURE 2. Average Party Age and Average Electoral Volatility in East-Central European Democracies in CSES



account both average party age and electoral volatility.¹⁷ Poland, in contrast, is anchored on the opposite end of the scale. Thus our cases provide (1) an old established democracy (Great Britain), (2) one of the most stable of the new democracies of East-Central Europe (Hungary), and (3) one of the least stable of the new democracies of East-Central Europe (Poland).¹⁸

Great Britain

Table 1 presents the results of the seven experiments we conducted in Great Britain. The figures in each cell represent the average treatment effect of our experimental stimuli: for the Single Party Cue (SPC) experiments this represents the average difference in support for the policy proposition in question among respondents

¹⁷ Here we use the term “party system” in its most general sense: a way of summarizing the relationships among political parties in the political system of a country (Ware 1996). Party systems may be described by a number of attributes, including the number of competitive parties or “size” of the system, its degree of fragmentation, its age or stability, the social or issue cleavages that define the bases of party support (Sartori 1976; Sundquist 1983). By a more “stable” party system, we refer to one in which the primary parties have been viably contesting for votes for a longer period of time. While the current *electoral* systems in Poland and Hungary emerged in 1989-90, the parties currently making up the Hungarian party system are on average older than those in Poland and – until the 2010 Hungarian elections, which took place after our study – elections in Hungary featured less electoral volatility than in Poland.

¹⁸ Of course, there is a well-established literature on partisan dealignment in established democracies (Dalton 1984; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000) and in Britain in particular (Crewe *et al.* 1977; Mughan 2009). However, we expect the effects of partisanship even in a dealigning Britain to be stronger than in the new democracies of Poland and Hungary. Nonetheless, those who disagree can consider an alternative hypothesis to H3 (call it H3a) that, due to dealignment, we should not see significant differences between the effects of partisanship in Britain compared to Hungary and Poland. As we will demonstrate in this section, though, such a hypothesis would find no support in our data.

receiving a cue that their preferred party supported the policy in question from those who were simply presented with the policy proposition; for the Multi-Party Cue (MPC) experiments, this represents the difference in the proportion of respondents in the treatment and control groups who picked the *same* policy preference as their preferred party.

As noted previously, the respondents identified as partisans in the second column of Table 1 are those who (1) identified a party as “my party”, and (2) identified themselves as “close” to the *same* party in a separate survey question, and (3) in yet another question identified that same party as the “party liked best” out of a list of parties. In contrast, respondents in the first column – “non-partisans supporters” – are those who did not provide a party to either the “my party” or “close party” question, but did pick a party they liked best (or disliked least) from a list of parties. The fact that we are forced to include respondents who refuse to identify a preferred at all makes our attempts to find a difference in the effects of party cues and partisans and non-partisans, if anything, a bit more conservative: we would expect to find even more of a divergence between partisans and true independents than between partisans and our non-partisan supporters.

The classic prediction is for party labels to guide the opinions of partisans. Beginning with the SPC experiments, we find statistically significant effects across all four issue areas for British partisans, with an average shift of 0.19 points, which amounts to 5% of the length of the scale. Particularly large effects can be found when considering the question of the privacy of electronic data, which leads to a shift of .27, or 7% of the length of the scale ($p < .01$), as well as for raising the drinking age for wine and spirit (.23 points, or 6% of the scale, $p < .01$). Similarly, two of the three MPC experiments also produced statistically significant effects in the predicted direction among partisans. Partisans receiving party cues were 7% more likely to share the same position as their party on imposing tolls on roads ($p < .01$) and 4% more likely to share their party’s position on immigration ($p < .05$). In the final MPC experiment, on

TABLE 1. Effects of Party Cues on Support for Proposed Policies in Great Britain

Type of Cue / Issue	Non-Partisan Supporters	Partisans
<i>SINGLE PARTY CUES</i>		
Lifting EU arms embargo to China	+0.10 [.08] (p=.11)	+0.09* [.06] (p=.08)
Prohibiting storage of electronic data without individual consent	+0.06 [.09] (p=.24)	+0.27*** [.07] (p<.01)
Raising the drinking age for wine and spirits to 21	+0.04 [.10] (p=.35)	+0.23*** [.08] (p<.01)
“Primary Education Restructuring Act”	+0.13*** [.05] (p<.01)	+0.18*** [.04] (p<.01)
<i>MULTIPLE PARTY CUES</i>		
Imposing tolls on roads	+0.02 [.03] (p=.22)	+0.07*** [.03] (p<.01)
Use of nuclear power	+0.02 [.03] (p=.27)	+0.04** [.02] (p=.045)
Establishing limits on immigration	+0.03* [.03] (p=.09)	+0.03 [.03] (p=.12)
<i>N</i>	768	1282

Note: Cell entries are the effect of the party cue (i.e., Support in Treatment – Support in Control for SPC; Proportion Matching Party's Position in Treatment – Proportion Match Party's Position in Control for MPC). Standard errors are in [brackets]; p-values for one-tailed t-tests are in (parentheses).

*p < .10; **p < .05, ***p < .01

immigration, respondents receiving party cues were 3% more likely to share their party's position, although our confidence in this effect is just below conventional measures of statistical significance ($p=.12$).¹⁹

Thus clearly our British experiments demonstrate that partisans receiving cues about their party's position are more likely to provide a positive assessment of that policy (SPC) or to match their party's position on that policy (MPC). What, then, of the distinction between partisans and non-partisans? Is this party cue effect uniform across partisans and non-partisans, or is it more pronounced among partisans, as our second hypothesis predicts?

A quick glance at Table 1 suggests clear support for this hypothesis as well, although not uniformly across every experiment. More specifically, for three of the seven experiments, the effects look fairly similar across non-partisan supporters and partisans with similar magnitudes of effects and p-values: lifting an EU arms embargo against China, the vaguely titled "Primary Education Restructuring Act", and establishing limits on immigration. For the remaining four issues, however, the effects are clearly larger for partisans than they are non-partisans: consider especially the SPC experiments regarding the storage of electronic data and raising the drinking age, where the effects are more than four and five times as large, respectively. Moreover, while the effects are in the correctly predicted direction for non-partisans for these four issues, in all four cases the standard errors exceed the size of the predicted effect. In contrast, we find statistically significant effects at a $p<.01$ level for three of these four issues among partisans; in the remaining issue (use of nuclear power), we still have confidence that the effect is larger in the treatment group at a level of $p<.05$ among partisans.

Taken together, the British experiments demonstrate that partisan cues clearly appear to have the ability to influence public opinion in a stable, established multi-party democracy, and they seem to

have a disproportionately stronger effect on partisans than on non-partisans. Our next task, then, is to revisit these questions in a newer, albeit still fairly stable, multi-party system.

Hungary

As is apparent from Table 2, a number of our Hungarian experiments generate empirical support for our hypotheses. In the SPC experiments, we observe a more favorable attitude toward the proposed policy in three of the four treatment conditions among partisans – the fourth is marginally positive, but of a tiny magnitude – two of which come within range of statistical significance. Interestingly, the size of these two effects are even (slightly) larger than the largest effects in the British surveys. When party cues are present, Hungarian partisans become more supportive of an expansion in Internet access in return for higher computer fees (+0.29 on the four point scale, or an increase of 7% of the length of the scale, $p = .09$) and of the vague "Primary Education Restructuring Act" (+0.34, 9% of the scale, $p = .03$). Even in the case of increasing defense spending, partisans receiving a party cue indicated support that was on average 0.14 points higher than those who did not receive the party cue, although the size of the standard error in this case does not allow us to be confident in this effect.

Turning to the MPC experiments, we find a statistically significant effect in the correctly predicted direction in only one of the three experiments. However, the size of this effect – Hungarian partisans are 16% more likely to match their party in the presence of a party cue on the issue of increasing the number of guest workers in the country than partisans who did not receive the party cue – is the largest we find in any of the MPC experiments. The other two MPC experiments, though, fail to even produce positive effects from the party cue among partisans, and in both cases the standard errors are larger than the coefficients.²⁰

¹⁹ Note that that due to rounding p-values in the table may differ even when the ratio between coefficients and standard errors appears similar.

²⁰ It is worth noting that the oil pipeline issue is structured a bit differently than the rest of the MPC experiments; see the online appendices for details.

TABLE 2. Effects of Party Cues on Support for Proposed Policies in Hungary

Type of Cue / Issue	Non-Partisan Supporters	Partisans
<i>SINGLE PARTY CUES</i>		
Expand Internet Access & Computer Fee Hike	- 0.07 [.21] (p = .64)	+ 0.29* [.22] (p = .09)
Metro Improvement & Fare Hike	+ 0.17 [.19] (p = .18)	+ 0.00 [.21] (p = .49)
Increase Defense Spending to NATO Levels	+0.01 [.21] (p = .49)	+ 0.14 [.20] (p = .24)
“Primary Education Restructuring Act”	+ 0.01 [.20] (p = .49)	+ 0.34** [.18] (p = .03)
<i>MULTIPLE PARTY CUES</i>		
Reform of Healthcare Services	- .10 [.08] (p = .89)	- .05 [.08] (p = .74)
Support Russian Pipeline Project Relative to EU Pipeline Project	.05 [.08] (p = .28)	-.02 [.08] (p = .58)
Increase Number of Guest Workers	- .02 [.07] (p = .62)	+ .16** [.07] (p = .01)
<i>N</i>	<i>143</i>	<i>160</i>

Note: Cell entries are the effect of the party cue (i.e., Support in Treatment – Support in Control for SPC; Proportion Matching Party's Position in Treatment – Proportion Match Party's Position in Control for MPC). Standard errors are in [brackets]; p-values for one-tailed t-tests are in (parentheses).

*p < .10; **p < .05, ***p < .01

In terms of the distinction between partisans and non-partisans, we certainly find some evidence to suggest that the effects of party cues are more pronounced among partisans than non-partisans in Hungary. Perhaps most clearly, there is not a single instance of a statistically significant effect in the correctly predicted direction for the party cues among Hungarian non-partisans; in contrast, we found such effects for the three of the experiments among partisans. Indeed, three of the effects among non-partisans are in the wrong direction, and two of the effects in the correct direction are miniscule (and are of course therefore statistically insignificant). There are two sets of results, however, that suggest caution in overestimating the extent of these findings. For the SPC Metro experiment, non-partisans were likely to offer more support for proposed fare hike when given a party cue – although this effect fails to meet conventional levels of statistical significance ($p=.18$) – while the cue had no effect upon partisans. Second, non-partisan were more likely to match their party's position in the MPC experiment regarding support for a proposed Russian pipeline when receiving a party cue while partisans were actually less likely to do so when receiving a party cue; in neither case, though, were these effects statistically significant.

All told, then, in Hungary, we do find repeated instances both of party cues making partisans more likely to support particular proposals and to match the position of their preferred party, and we similarly find evidence of these cues having an effect on the opinions of partisans but not of non-partisans. Over that time, however, the Hungarian party system had remained relatively stable. With this in mind, we turn in our final set of experiments to a new post-communist democracy where the party system has been much less stable: Poland.

Poland

The Polish results look quite different from the previous two countries. Among partisans, only one of the four SPC experiments produces an effect in the correct direction that even approaches

statistical significance: Polish partisans are more likely to support an increase in auto fees to fund road improvements ($p=.11$). Of the remaining three experiments, one, the vaguely worded education act, has an effect in the correctly predicted direction, although the standard error of this effect is larger than the effect itself; the other two experiments produce statistically insignificant effects in the wrong direction. Similarly, we only find statistically significant effect for party cues support among partisans in one Polish MPC experiments: Polish partisans are more likely to match their party on proposal to revamp legislative elections when receiving a party cue than when not receiving a cue.

At most, therefore, we can conclude therefore that there is weak support for the claim that party cues influence opinion formation in Poland among partisans: one SPC and one MPC experiment turn out largely the way the hypothesis predicted. In contrast, Poland provides essentially no empirical support for the prediction that these effects should be stronger among partisans than non-partisans: we just do not find consistently stronger support for party cues among Polish partisans as compared to Polish non-partisans. In particular, our experiments regarding attitudes toward providing financial support for opposition movements in Belarus produced a pattern unseen in any of the twenty other experiments we conducted: there was a positive, statistically significant effect for party cues among *non-partisans*, but a sizable negative – albeit not statistically significant—effect among partisans. Two of the remaining experiments did produce positive predicted effects for partisans and negative effects for non-partisans – the education act and increasing the number of guest workers – but in neither of these experiments were either of the effects close to conventional measures of statistical significance.

Overall, the Polish experiments offer evidence of yet another country where partisan cues can lead respondents to be more supportive of an issue (SPC) or more likely to match their party's preference on an issue (MPC). The number of experiments in which this occurred, especially among partisans, is of course less

TABLE 3. Effects of Party Cues on Support for Proposed Policies in Poland

Type of Cue / Issue	Non-Partisan Supporters	Partisans
<i>SINGLE PARTY CUES</i>		
Road Improvements & Auto Fee Hike	+ 0.39*** [.14] (p < .01)	+ 0.17 [.14] (p = .11)
Joint Military Exercises with Russia	- 0.11 [.14] (p = .77)	- 0.11 [.12] (p = .81)
Funding for Opposition Forces in Belarus	+ 0.25** [.13] (p = .02)	-0.13 [.13] (p = .83)
“Primary Education Restructuring Act”	- 0.03 [.08] (p = .66)	+ 0.06 [.09] (p = .25)
<i>MULTIPLE PARTY CUES</i>		
High School Exchange (w/Germany)	- 0.04 [.03] (p = .89)	- 0.00 [.03] (p = .53)
Reduce Number of Legislators & Switch to Single Member District Legislative Voting	-0.01 [.05] (p = .57)	+ 0.08** [.05] (p = .05)
Increase Number of Guest Workers	-0.01 [.05] (p = .56)	+ 0.04 [.05] (p = .20)
N	225	282

Note: Cell entries are the effect of the party cue (i.e., Support in Treatment – Support in Control for SPC; Proportion Matching Party's Position in Treatment – Proportion Match Party's Position in Control for MPC). Standard errors are in [brackets]; p-values for one-tailed t-tests are in (parentheses).

*p < .10; **p < .05, ***p < .01

than in Hungary and especially less than in Great Britain, but it did occur. In contrast, Poland provides no empirical support for our second hypothesis: in Poland, at least in 2006, being a partisan made one no more susceptible to party cues than being a non-partisan.

DISCUSSION

The first empirical goal of this paper is to begin the process of assessing whether partisanship “matters” outside of the United States, or, to use language employed earlier, whether partisanship is largely a feature of American exceptionalism or a more universal phenomenon. After conducting 21 experiments in three countries, we can

report with great confidence that there exists empirical support for the claim that partisanship “matters” outside of the United States. While not every experiment in all three countries generated results in line with our predictions, to suggest that partisan cues do not influence public opinion outside of the United States would seem to be a serious mistake. As previously noted, we are not the first to make this observation, but by adding evidence from three additional countries we have essentially doubled the number of countries outside the United States in which these types of conclusions can be made. Even more novel, though, is our second major conclusion, which is that we can also report that the effects of party cues have a systematically more consistent effect on the opinions of partisans than on the opinions of non-partisans in two countries outside of the United States: Hungary and especially Great Britain. And as all of our “non-partisans” had to be willing to indicate a preferred party at some point for us to carry out our analyses, this conclusion is likely to be, if anything, conservative. Truly indifferent non-partisans ought to be even less influenced by party cues than the “preference expressing” non-partisans in our analyses.

Of course, not all countries or party systems are the same, and we did not just select the countries included in our analyses randomly. As described previously, the extant theoretical literature suggests that the effects of partisanship should be larger in older and more stable party systems. With this in mind, we selected one country with an old and stable party system (Great Britain), one with a new but relatively stable party system (Hungary), and one with a new and fairly unstable party system (Poland). From this framework, the results of the experiments are almost perfectly in line with expectations laid out in our third hypothesis. The most consistent empirical support for both of our primary hypotheses is provided by the experiments in Great Britain. The Hungarian experiments provide less consistent support for the hypotheses than the experiments in Britain, but they nevertheless do provide additional empirical support for both hypotheses. Finally, the Polish experiments provide the

weakest support for our first hypothesis and no support for our second.

To reiterate, with three cases we cannot provide a systematic test of the effect of either party system age or stability on the effects of partisanship. At the same time, though, if we consider these cases as the first of many in a growing effort to measure the effects of partisanship outside of the United States, it is very interesting to note that these initial results line up exactly as we would expect.

Moreover, when examining the results of the SPC experiments, one cannot help but be struck by the fact that the Hungarian results more closely resemble the British results than they do the Polish results. This suggests that the effect of partisanship on issue opinions may indeed strengthen with one’s experience with parties, but that much of the growth in the effect of partisanship may come in the first couple of decades rather than over generations (cf. Converse 1969). The findings also underscore the importance of party system stability for the development of partisanship in new democracies. However, this result disappears when we turn to the MPC experiments, with the results looking fairly similar in Poland and Hungary. So for now our conclusions in this regard must be guarded, but the findings are certainly suggestive enough to warrant further investigation.²¹

²¹ A quick word about the power of the different experiments is in order. As is evident from the tables, we have different numbers of subjects in the different categories. (This was due to (1) the fact that we have more partisans than non-partisans in all three surveys and (2) the ways in which we were able to stretch our budget in different countries to secure additional subjects.) Were we to only find statistically significant effects in the groups with largest number of subjects, we would have reason for concern. However, a number of the patterns we find are reassuring in this regard. Perhaps most importantly, the non-partisan British category has more subjects than any of the Polish or Hungarian categories, and yet we have multiple examples here where results are statistically insignificant. Similarly, the fewest statistically significant effects among partisans are in the Polish experiments, yet it is the Hungarian experiments that have fewest number of subjects.

CONCLUSION

Our manuscript had three primary goals. First, we sought to address enduring questions about whether partisanship “means” anything outside of the U.S., and, in particular, in multiparty systems. Second, we wanted to take to take modest but important steps toward explaining how and why the meaning or effectiveness of partisanship varies, if it indeed it does, across different countries. And third, we aimed to contribute to general knowledge about the impact of party cues on opinion formation by expanding experimental tests to multiparty systems. All three efforts have been fruitful.

In view of these goals, we posed a number of questions, which we are now in a position to answer. First, both the SPC and MPC experiments returned repeated examples of party cues affecting policy opinions of partisans in countries outside of the U.S. Second, both the SPC and MPC experiments revealed important distinctions in the effects of party cues on partisans and non-partisans outside of the U.S. Taken together, these two findings provide strong support for the *universalist proposition* at the expense of the *exceptionalist proposition*: for at least the effects we have examined in this particular manuscript, claims that the effects of partisanship stop at the borders of the U.S. ring hollow.

So what about our final hypothesis, that we might expect to find stronger and more consistent partisan effects in more stable and established party systems? Here we must approach our findings carefully. On the one hand, we have conducted experiments in only three countries, far too few to be able to generalize much beyond these cases for reasons we have already noted. On the other hand, the results – at least for these three cases – came out exactly as we would have expected based on party system maturity and stability: the experiments in Great Britain provided both the clearest evidence of party cues influencing opinion formation, as well as the sharpest distinction in these effects across partisan and non-partisans; the Polish experiments provided the weakest evidence; and the Hungarian results fell somewhere in between.

By observing the portability of partisanship and its effects across societies, we also take the first important steps toward a clearer understanding of how political context shapes the effectiveness of partisanship, as well as of course shedding light on how partisanship functions in these particular polities. A single paper covering three countries can hardly make a definitive statement on system-level explanations. But, while we have taken only modest steps toward that much larger goal, at the same time this paper presents more experimental tests across more countries than any previous study of party cues or partisanship. The result is a comparative experimental study that significantly increases the scope of what we know about the causal power of partisanship. We find broad evidence that party cues can affect policy preferences, and such effects appear to become especially prominent among self-identified partisans as party systems stabilize and endure. From this perspective, partisanship seems to take on some similar functions across countries, functions that seem to develop after only a few years of competitive elections among the same parties. Further research is needed not only to validate this claim among a larger set of countries, but also to investigate other proposed effects of partisanship. The present study suggests that students of political behavior have much to gain from collecting comparable experimental data across a much broader range of political systems.

APPENDIX A

Question Wording: Party Cue Manipulations

A) Great Britain

Single Party Cue Questions

1a) Treatment: The [party] has proposed lifting the European Union (EU) arms embargo on China. The embargo blocked the sale of weapons to China in response to China's suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Supporters of this proposal argue that lifting the outdated embargo would greatly improve relations with an important trading partner.

Do you support or oppose the proposal to lift the European Union arms embargo on China?

1b) Control: A proposal has been made to lift the European Union (EU) arms embargo on China. The embargo blocked the sale of weapons to China in response to China's suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Supporters of this proposal argue that lifting the outdated embargo would greatly improve relations with an important trading partner.

Do you support or oppose the proposal to lift the European Union arms embargo on China?

2a) Treatment: New questions have been raised about data protection in the UK. Recent security lapses resulted in the accidental release of large amounts of computerised personal information. The [party] has proposed a new policy prohibiting electronic storage of individual data without hand-written authorisation by the individual. Continued storage would also have to be re-authorised in writing every twelve months. Opponents of the proposal believe that these restrictions will result in higher prices and delay the

delivery of important services, especially for transactions that occur over the phone or Internet.

Do you support or oppose a new policy requiring written authorisation for storage of personal data?

2b) Control: New questions have been raised about data protection in the UK. Recent security lapses resulted in the accidental release of large amounts of computerised personal information.

Some people have proposed a new policy prohibiting electronic storage of individual data without hand-written authorisation by the individual. Continued storage would also have to be re-authorised in writing every twelve months. Opponents of the proposal believe that these restrictions will result in higher prices and delay the delivery of important services, especially for transactions that occur over the phone or Internet.

Do you support or oppose a new policy requiring written authorisation for storage of personal data?

3a) Treatment: The [party] has recently proposed increasing the legal drinking age for wines and spirits to 21, in order to reduce problems of teenage binge drinking.

Do you support or oppose the proposal to increase the legal drinking age for wines and spirits to 21?

3b) Control: Public health experts have recently proposed increasing the legal drinking age for wines and spirits to 21, in order to reduce problems of teenage binge drinking.

Do you support or oppose the proposal to increase the legal drinking age for wines and spirits to 21?

4a) Treatment: [Party] has recently announced its support for the Primary Education Restructuring Act.

Please tell us how strongly you support the Primary Education Restructuring Act?

4b) Control: Please tell us how strongly you support the Primary Education Restructuring Act?

Multiple Party Cue Questions

1a) Treatment There has been recent political debate about the future of Britain's road network.

The Labour Party supports a system of road tolls, arguing that the fees will cut both congestion and pollution by discouraging unnecessary use of the roads.

The Liberal Democrats also support road tolls, in order to help pay for new investments in public transport and environmentally sustainable options like railways.

The Conservative Party believes that, while road tolls may be necessary, it is equally important to build new roads to cope with demand from motorists.

The UK Independence Party rejects road tolls completely, arguing that British citizens should be free to drive on British roads. (only England)

The Scottish National Party rejects road tolls completely, arguing that it is better to coax drivers out of their cars through improved public transport and an expansion of park-and-ride schemes. (only Scotland)

Plaid Cymru rejects road tolls completely, arguing that it is better to coax drivers out of their cars through an improved, integrated public transport system. (only Wales)

Which of these opinions best describes your view about road tolls?

1b) Control: There has been recent political debate about the future of Britain's road network.

Some people support a system of road tolls, arguing that the fees will cut both congestion and pollution by discouraging unnecessary use of the roads.

Others support road tolls in order to help pay for new investments in public transport and environmentally sustainable options like railways.

Still others believe that, while road tolls may be necessary, it is equally important to build new roads to cope with demand from motorists.

Finally, some people reject road tolls completely, arguing that British citizens should be free to drive on British roads. (only England)

Finally, some people reject road tolls completely, arguing that it is better to coax drivers out of their cars through improved public transport and an expansion of park-and-ride schemes. (only Scotland)

Finally, some people reject road tolls completely, arguing that it is better to coax drivers out of their cars through an improved, integrated public transport system. (only Wales)

Which of these opinions best describes your view about road tolls?

2a) Treatment: Another recent debate concerns energy policy and the future of nuclear power.

The Labour Party supports the development of a new generation of nuclear power stations, to provide Britain with clean, secure and affordable energy supplies.

The Conservative Party favours letting industry decide whether to invest in nuclear or other forms of energy, while opposing government subsidies for nuclear power.

The UK Independence Party believes that nuclear power is the best option to reduce

British dependence on imported energy resources. (only England)

The Scottish National Party opposes the construction of new nuclear power stations in areas where abundant renewable resources such as wind and tidal capacity can be exploited first. (only Scotland)

Plaid Cymru favours the development of renewable energy sources over new nuclear power stations, but argues that renewable energy projects must be located carefully to preserve the natural beauty of the land. (only Wales)

The Liberal Democrat Party completely opposes the construction of new nuclear power stations, arguing that it will hinder development of renewable energy sources.

Which of the following best reflects your opinion on British energy policy?

2b) Control: Another recent debate concerns energy policy and the future of nuclear power.

Some experts support the development of a new generation of nuclear power stations, to provide Britain with clean, secure and affordable energy supplies.

Others prefer letting industry decide whether to invest in nuclear or other forms of energy, while opposing government subsidies for nuclear power.

Some experts believe that nuclear power is the best option to reduce British dependence on imported energy resources. (only England)

Some experts oppose the construction of new nuclear power stations in areas where abundant renewable resources such as wind and tidal capacity can be exploited first. (only Scotland)

Some experts favour the development of renewable energy sources over new nuclear power stations, but argue that renewable energy projects must be located carefully to preserve the natural beauty of the land. (only Wales)

Still others completely oppose the construction of new nuclear power stations, arguing that it will hinder development of renewable energy sources.

Which of the following best reflects your opinion on British energy policy?

3a) Treatment : In recent debates over immigration policy, the Conservative Party has proposed setting specific limits (or quotas) on the number of legal immigrants in order to reduce competition for public services and ease community tensions over immigration.

The Labour Party opposes fixed limits, because immigration has economic and social benefits, and prefers a points system that allows only migrants who have skills needed in the UK.

The Liberal Democrats also oppose quotas, while preferring a policy that encourages high skilled migrants and better integration of immigrants into the British way of life.

The UK Independence Party argues that quotas are not enough and that Britain should freeze all immigration for now, in order to focus on the needs of its own population. (only England)

The Scottish National Party opposes limits on the number of legal immigrants because this would harm areas of Britain that rely on migrant workers. (only Scotland)

Plaid Cymru opposes limits on the number of legal immigrants because this would harm areas of Britain that rely on migrant workers. (only Wales)

Which of the following statements best reflects your views regarding immigration policy?

B) Poland

Single Party Cue Experiments

1a) Treatment: Poland has recently received over 300 million euros worth of loans from the World Bank and the European

Investment Bank to pay for road modernization. <PARTY> has proposed setting up a special fund to repay these loans based on a new fee to be paid during the purchase of new cars and trucks over the next 10 years. If this fee is collected, the loans will not need to be repaid from the general state budget, leaving more money for other priorities, but the cost of buying a new car or truck will rise for individuals and businesses.

1b) Control: Poland has recently received over 300 million euros worth of loans from the World Bank and the European Investment Bank to pay for road modernization. Some experts have proposed setting up a special fund to repay these loans based on a new fee to be paid during the purchase of new cars and trucks over the next 10 years. If this fee is collected, the loans will not need to be repaid from the general state budget, leaving more money for other priorities, but the cost of buying a new car or truck will rise for individuals and businesses.

Please tell us how strongly you support the proposal to repay the loans for road modernization on the basis of fees paid by new car and truck owners over the next 10 years?:

2a) Treatment: Following the recent meeting of the Polish and Russian Foreign Ministers in Russia, Polish relations with Russia appear to be improving. This perception has been enhanced by the fact that Poland and Russia plan to carry out joint Naval military exercises in the Baltic Sea this September. With this in mind, <PARTY> has proposed that Polish and Russian military forces carry out a series of joint military exercises over the next year to improve regional security.

2b) Control: Following the recent meeting of the Polish and Russian Foreign Ministers in Russia, Polish relations with Russia appear to be improving. This perception has been enhanced by the fact that Poland and Russia plan to carry out joint Naval military exercises in the Baltic Sea this September.

Some experts have even proposed that Polish and Russian military forces should carry out a series of joint military exercises over the next year to improve regional security.

Please tell us how strongly you personally support continuing joint military exercises between Poland and Russian in the coming year?

3a) Treatment: <PARTY> has recently proposed that Poland commit 100 million PLN over the next three years to supporting opposition forces in Belarus. It argues that Poland has a moral obligation to help Belarussian opposition movements in their struggle for freedom, and especially Poles living in Belarus. Opponents of the proposal believe that while it is important to provide support for the Belarussian opposition, this is just too much money at a time when Poland has so many other pressing needs.

3b) Control: It has recently been proposed that Poland commit 100 million PLN over the next three years to supporting opposition forces in Belarus. It argues that Poland has a moral obligation to help Belarussian opposition movements in their struggle for freedom, and especially Poles living in Belarus. Opponents of the proposal believe that while it is important to provide support for the Belarussian opposition, this is just too much money at a time when Poland has so many other pressing needs.

Please tell us how strongly you personally support the proposal to spend 100 million PLN over the next three years to support opposition forces in Belarus:

4a) Treatment: <PARTY> has recently announced its support for the "Primary Education Restructuring Act".

Please tell us how strongly you personally support the "Primary Education Restructuring Act"?

4b) Control Please tell us how strongly you personally support the “Primary Education Restructuring Act”?

B) Multiple Party Cues

1a) Treatment: It has recently been proposed that German and Poland establish an exchange program for high school students. Under the terms of the proposal, 5000 German high school students would study in Poland every year, and 5000 Polish students would study in Germany. The costs of the program would be split between the German and Polish governments. Reaction to the proposal among Poland’s political parties has been mixed. Law and Order supports the proposal, because they believe it would help more Poles learn about a country where the government has been able to successfully fight corruption. The Democratic Left Alliance supports the proposal because they think it will help deepen ties between Poland and an important western ally in the long run. Civic Platform also supports the proposal, because they believe that it will be a good opportunity for Polish students to learn Western business techniques. The Polish Peasant Party, however, opposes the measure because it believes that it will only benefit children from wealthy urban families. Samoobrona opposes the measure because they think it is going to end up helping Germany much more than Poland. The League of Polish Families also opposes the proposal because it will expose Polish students to a godless culture that lacks proper religious values.

1b) Control: It has recently been proposed that German and Poland establish an exchange program for high school students. Under the terms of the proposal, 5000 German high school students would study in Poland every year, and 5000 Polish students would study in Germany. The costs of the program would be split between the German and Polish governments. Reaction to the proposal has been mixed. Some support the proposal because they believe it would help more Poles learn about a country where the government has been able to successfully fight corruption. Others support the proposal because they

think it will help deepen ties between Poland and an important western ally in the long run. Still others support the proposal, because they believe that it will be a good opportunity for Polish students to learn Western business techniques. Some, however, oppose the measure because it believes that it will only benefit children from wealthy urban families. Others oppose the measure because they think it is going to end up helping Germany much more than Poland. Still others oppose it because they fear it will expose Polish students to a godless culture that lacks proper religious values.

Which of these opinions best describes your views of the proposed exchange program between Polish and German students?

2a) Treatment: One recent proposal for reforming politics in Poland involved cutting the number of deputies elected to the Sejm in half, from 460 to 230, and having them elected from individual districts as opposed to on party lists. Civic Platform supports this proposal because it will reduce the size of a growing “political class” of full time politicians that are increasingly detached from the real population of Poland. Law and Justice supports the proposal because it believes that it will lead to more accountable deputies, and thus fewer opportunities for corruption. Samoobrona supports the proposal because it believes the current system allows MPs to ignore the voices of the people. The Polish Peasant Party supports the measure because they believe it will strengthen the importance of deputies from agricultural regions of the country. The Democratic Left Alliance supports the proposal because it will bring Poland more in line the United States and Great Britain. Finally, the League of Polish Families supports the proposal because it will ensure the conservative Catholic communities can elect conservative Catholic MPs.

2b) Control: One recent proposal for reforming politics in Poland involved cutting the number of deputies elected to the Sejm in half, from 460 to 230, and

having them elected from individual districts as opposed to on party lists. Supporters have advocated a number of advantages of such a change. Some believe it will reduce the size of a growing “political class” of full time politicians that are increasingly detached from the real population of Poland. Others think that it will lead to more accountable deputies, and thus fewer opportunities for corruption; Some believe the change will be positive because the current system allows MPs to ignore the voices of the people. Still others have made the argument that it will strengthen the importance of deputies from agricultural regions of the country. Another argument that has been made in favor of the proposal is that it will make Poland more like the United States and Great Britain. Finally, some think the change will help Poland by allowing the conservative Catholic communities can elect conservative Catholic MPs.

Which of the following best reflects your views regarding the effect of reducing the number of deputies in the Sejm by half and electing MPs from individual districts in Poland?

3a) Treatment: In the 1990s, Poland issued approximately 10,000 – 15,000 work permits for foreigners to come to Poland to work legally in Poland. With growing numbers of Poles leaving Poland to work in the West, it has recently been suggested that the number of guest permits issued each year be increased to at least 30,000 per year to make up for possible labor shortfalls. Civic Platform support this proposal because it will help the economy continue to grow by providing low cost labor for jobs that Poles do not want to perform. The Democratic Left Alliance supports the proposal because it should reduce the number of illegal immigrants driving down wages for Polish workers. The Law and Justice party opposes the proposal because more foreigners could lead to more crime. Samoobrona opposes the proposal because there are not enough jobs for Poles as it is, so there is no reason to bring more foreigners into the country to

take away jobs from Poles. The Polish Peasant Party opposes the proposal because it is likely to only effect urban areas, and thus do nothing to help problems facing citizens living in rural areas. Finally, the League of Polish Families opposes the program because it will increase the number of non-Catholics living in the country.

3b) Control: In the 1990s, Poland issued approximately 10,000 – 15,000 work permits for foreigners to come to Poland to work legally in Poland. With growing numbers of Poles leaving Poland to work in the West, it has recently been suggested that the number of guest permits issued each year be increased to at least 30,000 per year to make up for possible labor shortfalls. Supporters of the measure believe that it will help the economy continue to grow by providing low cost labor for jobs that Poles do not want to perform, and that it should reduce the number of illegal immigrants driving down wages for Polish workers. Others have opposed the measure because they believe that it could lead to a rise in crime, take away jobs from Poles at a time when there are not enough jobs in Poland as it is, increase the number of non-Catholics living in Poland, and that it will do nothing to help rural residents.

Which of the following best reflects your views regarding the proposal to increase the number of legal workers from other countries in Poland?

C. Hungary

Single Party Cues

1a) Treatment: Hungary is eligible to receive 10 million euros worth of loans from the World Bank and the European Investment Bank to pay for improving access to the Internet in Hungary. <PARTY> has proposed setting up a special fund to repay these loans based on a new fee to be paid during the purchase of new computers and computer equipment over the next 10 years. If this fee is collected, the loans will not need to be

repaid from the general state budget, leaving more money for other priorities, but the cost of buying a new computer will rise for individuals and businesses.

1b) Control: Hungary is eligible to receive 10 million euros worth of loans from the World Bank and the European Investment Bank to pay for improving access to the Internet in Hungary. Experts have proposed setting up a special fund to repay these loans based on a new fee to be paid during the purchase of new computers and computer equipment over the next 10 years. If this fee is collected, the loans will not need to be repaid from the general state budget, leaving more money for other priorities, but the cost of buying a new computer will rise for individuals and businesses.

Please tell us how strongly you support the proposal to repay the loans for road modernization on the basis of fees paid by new car and truck owners over the next 10 years?:

2a) Treatment: <PARTY> has recently proposed raising fares on the Budapest Metro to pay for a number of improvements to the Metro.

2b) Control: A bill has been proposed that will raise fares on the Budapest Metro to pay for a number of improvements to the Metro.

Please tell us how strongly you personally support the proposal to make improvements to the Budapest Metro and pay for them by raising fares:

3a) Treatment: <PARTY> has recently proposed that Hungary increase its defense spending over the next 3 years so that it meets the NATO requirement that member countries spend at least 2% of GDP on defense and so that Hungary does not risk having its membership in NATO suspended. Opponents of the proposal believe that while it is important for

Hungary to meet its commitments to NATO, this is just too much money at a time when Hungary is facing a fiscal crisis and has so many other pressing needs.

3b) Control: Foreign policy experts have proposed that Hungary increase its defense spending over the next 3 years so that it meets the NATO requirement that member countries spend at least 2% of GDP on defense and so that Hungary does not risk having its membership in NATO suspended. Opponents of the proposal believe that while it is important for Hungary to meet its commitments to NATO, this is just too much money at a time when Hungary is facing a fiscal crisis and has so many other pressing needs.

Please tell us how strongly you personally support the proposal to increase Hungarian defense spending to 2% of GDP over the next three years.

4a) Treatment: <PARTY> has recently announced its support for the "Primary Education Restructuring Act". Please tell us how strongly you personally support the "Primary Education Restructuring Act"?

4b) Control: Please tell us how strongly you personally support the "Primary Education Restructuring Act"?

Multiple Party Cues

1a) Treatment: One important topic of recent political debate concerns reform of the healthcare services. The Hungarian Socialist Party has argued for the importance of introducing "co-payments" for doctors visits, in order to make the health care system more financially viable. The Alliance of Free Democrats believes that changes must be even larger, involving private health insurance companies competing with the state to pay for health care. Fidesz, on the other hand, believes the state should not reduce in any way the financial support if provides for healthcare in Hungary, and that all co-payments for doctors visits ought to be eliminated. The Hungarian Democratic Forum believes that

healthcare is so important to Hungarian citizens that all decisions made by the parliament should require a 2/3 majority, so that the government can not simply implement its position on its own.

1b) Control: One important topic of recent political debate concerns reform of the healthcare services. Some have argued for the importance of introducing “co-payments” for doctors visits, in order to make the health care system more financially viable. Others believe that changes must be even larger, involving private health insurance companies competing with the state to pay for health care. On the other hand, some believe that the state should not reduce in any way the financial support if provides for healthcare in Hungary, and that all co-payments for doctors visits ought to be eliminated. Another suggestion has been that healthcare is so important to Hungarian citizens that all decisions made by the parliament should require a 2/3 majority, so that the government can not simply implement its position on its own.

Which of these opinions best describes your of healthcare reform?

2b) Treatment: Another recent political debate in Hungary concerns the “Blue Stream” natural gas pipeline project sponsored by Russia’s state gas monopoly, Gazprom, and the “Nabucco” pipeline proposed by the EU. The Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance for Free Democrats both support the Russian “Blue Stream” project because they believe it has the best chance of increasing the amount of gas available to Hungary, as the EU’s “Nabucco” project has already experienced significant delays. Fidesz and the Hungarian Democratic Forum, however, are concerned that the Blue Stream project will increase Hungary’s dependence on Russia for its energy needs, and would prefer to see Hungary support the EU’s Nabucco project.

2b) Control: Another recent political debate in Hungary concerns the “Blue Stream”

natural gas pipeline project sponsored by Russia’s state gas monopoly, Gazprom, and the “Nabucco” pipeline proposed by the EU. Some believe Hungary should support the Russian “Blue Stream” project because they believe it has the best chance of increasing the amount of gas available to Hungary, as the EU’s “Nabucco” project has already experienced significant delays. Others, however, are concerned that the Blue Stream project will increase Hungary’s dependence on Russia for its energy needs, and would prefer to see Hungary support the EU’s Nabucco project.

Which of the following best reflects your views regarding whether Hungary should support the “Blue Stream” or “Nabucco” pipeline projects?

3a) Treatment: In previous years, Hungary has issued permits to approximately 80,000 foreigners to work in Hungary. With growing numbers of Hungarians leaving Hungary to work in the West, experts have suggested that the number of guest permits issued each year be increased to at least 120,000 per year to make up for possible labor shortfalls. The Hungarian Socialist Party support this proposal because it will help the economy continue to grow and therefore reduce the budget deficit. The Alliance of Free Democrats supports the proposal because it will strengthen the rule of law by reducing the incentive for foreigners to work illegally in Hungary. Fidesz supports the proposal, but only if the additional work permits are reserved for ethnic Hungarians. The Hungarian Democratic Forum supports the proposal, but only if the extra work permits are restricted to workers from Judeo-Christian countries.

3b) Control: In previous years, Hungary has issued permits to approximately 80,000 foreigners to work in Hungary. With growing numbers of Hungarians leaving Hungary to work in the West, experts have suggested that the number of guest permits issued each year be increased to at least 120,000 per year to make up for possible labor shortfalls. Some support this proposal

because it will help the economy continue to grow and therefore reduce the budget deficit. Other support the proposal because it will strengthen the rule of law by reducing the incentive for foreigners to work illegally in Hungary. Still others support the proposal, but only if the additional work permits are reserved for ethnic Hungarians or for workers from Judeo-Christian countries.

Which of the following best reflects your views regarding the proposal to increase the number of legal workers from other countries in Hungary?

APPENDIX B Descriptive Data on the Experimental Questions

FIGURE B1. Distribution of Responses to SPC Policy Questions





FIGURE B2. Distribution of Responses to MPC Policy Questions



APPENDIX C Raw Experimental Results by Country

FIGURE C1. Mean Responses by Experimental Condition and Partisanship in Britain




FIGURE C2. Mean Responses by Experimental Condition and Partisanship in Hungary





FIGURE C3. Mean Responses by Experimental Condition and Partisanship in Poland



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