

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Author(s): Pop-Eleches, Grigore;Tucker, Joshua A. (Joshua Aaron), 1971-
Date 2010
Type Working Paper
Series Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 2010/250
City: Madrid
Publisher: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales

Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences

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INTRODUCTION*

The left-right political spectrum sits at the heart of political analysis.[1] Large comparative surveys such as the World Values Study always contain a question asking respondents to locate themselves on a left-right dimension. Expert surveys on party positions (e.g., Benoit and Laver 2007) also always include party placements on this left-right dimension. Most formal models of elections and voting are built on the left-right dimension (Osborne 1995). Indeed, one could credibly argue that it is impossible to discuss electoral or party politics anywhere – and especially in competitive multiparty systems – without making use of the left-right spectrum as part of this discussion.

Yet questions remain as to the appropriateness of the left-right spectrum for the *comparative* analysis of party systems: does the left-right spectrum mean the same thing in different political contexts? Huber (1989) answered affirmatively in regard to eight West European countries, arguing that since left-right self placement is fundamentally a function of issue attitudes as opposed to partisanship (ie., determined on a country by country basis), it was legitimate to compare these scales cross-nationally. Thorrisdottir *et al.* (2007), however, cast doubt on whether this comparability of left-right scales extends to central and eastern Europe, finding a number of characteristics of left-right self-placement that seem to differ between the established democracies of Western Europe and their post-communist counterparts (although it should be noted that their study contained only four post-communist countries).[2] This research seemed to confirm earlier speculation that post-communist citizens would have a weak understanding of the left-right spectrum (Evans and Whitefield 1993, see works cited on p.530) or that they might be more likely to think of politics as structured around parties' relationship to the transition away from communism than around traditional left-right divides (Tismaneanu 1998, Tucker 2006).

In this paper, we advance our understanding of this topic in three important directions. First, we revisit the question of the appropriateness of comparing left-right self-placement in post-communist countries with left-right self-placement in other countries in a much more thorough empirical framework, namely a pooled dataset of the second, third, and fourth waves of the World Values Survey (hereafter WVS). This allows us to compare 57 surveys from 24 post-communist countries with 100 surveys from 42 non-post-communist countries from 1990-2002. We are thus able to bring much more data to bear on this question than previous work. With these data, we demonstrate that while post-communist citizens have no more difficulty placing themselves on a left-right scale than other citizens once we control for socio-political development levels, citizens of post-communist countries are more likely to rely primarily on economic attitudes in making these placements than citizens elsewhere, who bring a combination of economic and social attitudes to bear on their left-right self placement.

Second, in a more novel vein, we explore the socio-demographic make-up of the left and the right in the post-communist context as compared to the rest of the world, and make three important observations. First, while elsewhere older citizens tend to have a right-wing bias, in post-communist countries older citizens

*We are grateful for the many helpful comments we received on this paper following presentations at the Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Fundación Juan March, Madrid, Spain and Princeton University in Princeton, New Jersey, both of which took place in April, 2010. We also wish to thank Chris Bellaire, Dominik Duell, Rebecca Greenberg, and Gabriel Kreindler for excellent research assistance.

[1] For a survey of the literature in both the political and psychological traditions, see Jost *et al.* (2009).

[2] See as well Todosijevic and Enyedi (2008), who while not employing a comparative analysis, do find a different relationship between authoritarian personality traits and ideological orientation in Hungary than expected based on research from established democracies.

posses a left-wing bias. Conversely, while in the rest of the world more educated and more democratically inclined citizens on average have a left-wing bias, in post-communist countries both of these types of respondents have a right-wing bias. Moreover, these results are robust using a reconceptualized left-right scale, which estimates left-right placements as if post-communist and non-communist citizens had placed the same weight on economic and social attitudes in their left-right assessments.

Finally, and most importantly from a theoretical standpoint, we do not merely demonstrate these distinctions, but rather seek to answer the question of why they exist. More specifically, we apply a theoretical framework we have previously developed (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010) for analyzing the effects of communist era *legacies* on political values, attitudes, and behavior in post-communist countries. This framework is designed to provide specific testable and falsifiable hypotheses concerning the effects of communist era legacies through an exhaustive set of possible mechanism by which these legacies can act on values and behavior in the present, including individual level experiences with communism and the transition, institutional legacies from communism, and socio-economic legacies of communism. We lay out this framework in Section 3 of the paper, address the particularly hypotheses we develop for understanding distinctive patterns of left-right self-placement in post-communist countries in Section 4, and present results in Section 5.

LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT IN EX-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

In this section, we demonstrate the following three characteristics of left-right self-placement in post-communist countries. First, post-communist citizens are no less likely to place themselves on a left-right scale than respondents from other countries, once we control for social-political development. Second, while citizens from non-post-communist countries use both social and economic policy concerns to place themselves on left-right scales, citizens in post-communist countries rely more heavily on economic policy issues. Finally, while in the rest of the world younger, more educated, and more democratic citizens exhibit a left wing bias on average, in post-communist countries it is just the opposite.

Our first task is to examine whether post-communist citizens have more trouble placing themselves on the left-right spectrum by the simplest of measures: do more of them answer "Don't Know" when asked to self-place in a survey question?[3] Model 1 of Table 1 shows that when we simply look at the level of Don't Knows in the population, we do indeed find that more post-communist citizens answer "Don't Know" to the self-placement question; the size of this gap is actually exacerbated a bit by adding a standard set of demographic controls (Model 2). However, once we add controls for religion, the size of the effect drops significantly, so much so that it pushes the effect below conventional measures of statistical significance. Moreover, once we control for economic (Models 4 and 5) and political (Models 5 and 6) conditions, the size of the effect for the post-communist dummy variable drops below its standard error (and the sign even reverses in Models 4 and 5), thus essentially making the difference between respondents in post-communist countries and elsewhere disappear.

So given that controlling for economic and political conditions post-communist citizens have no more difficulty placing themselves on a left-right scale than people living elsewhere, our next step is to determine whether they do so based on the same set of issue concerns as people living in other countries. Historically, political scientists have tended to think of left-right self placement as being a function of two different sets of policy concerns: economic and social (Benoit and Laver 2007,

[3] There are of course a variety of reasons why one could choose to answer "Don't Know"; see for example Berinsky (2004); in the post-communist context, see Berinsky and Tucker (2006).

TABLE 1. Who Answers "Don't Know" When Asked to Place Self on Left-Right Scale?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post Communist	.171**	.202***	.123	-.0505	-.0893	.0332
	(.0773)	(.0774)	(.0801)	(.130)	(.127)	(.110)
Wave 2	-.0572	-.0687	-.106	-.121	-.127	-.177*
	(.0874)	(.0892)	(.0900)	(.0979)	(.100)	(.0999)
Wave 3	.125	.0968	.0305	.0317	.0262	-.0450
	(.106)	(.102)	(.0904)	(.0896)	(.0971)	(.0918)
Age		-.00299***	-.00194**	-.000562	-.000625	-.000738
		(.00105)	(.000752)	(.000652)	(.000590)	(.000661)
Income		-.0539***	-.0511***	-.0456***	-.0451***	-.0446***
		(.00660)	(.00669)	(.00646)	(.00600)	(.00656)
Live in City		-.0261	-.0441	-.0336	-.0365	-.0568
		(.0503)	(.0477)	(.0468)	(.0473)	(.0514)
Town		-.0641	-.0645	-.0548	-.0460	-.0525
		(.0468)	(.0437)	(.0440)	(.0409)	(.0419)
Male		-.280***	-.294***	-.304***	-.304***	-.299***
		(.0147)	(.0134)	(.0132)	(.0130)	(.0135)
Muslim			.139	-.0243	-.0787	-.0384
			(.143)	(.132)	(.127)	(.127)
Orthodox			.0820	.0102	-.0436	.0252
			(.0695)	(.0655)	(.0629)	(.0730)
Western Christian			-.226***	-.200***	-.176***	-.186***
			(.0669)	(.0605)	(.0502)	(.0493)
Tertiary Education		-.506***	-.513***	-.495***	-.511***	-.516***
		(.0580)	(.0531)	(.0499)	(.0438)	(.0438)
Secondary Education		-.264***	-.262***	-.250***	-.268***	-.269***
		(.0514)	(.0452)	(.0418)	(.0357)	(.0374)
Gini Coefficient				-.00502	-.00850	
				(.00524)	(.00530)	
Log GDP Per Capita				-.170***	-.115*	
				(.0555)	(.0644)	
Log Inflation					.0190	
					(.0411)	
Change in GDP					-.00582***	
					(.00218)	
Unemployment					-.00224	
					(.0290)	
Age Democracy					.173	.0361
					(.114)	(.0992)
Freedom House Democracy Score					-.0414*	-.0538***
					(.0222)	(.0202)
Pres System					.00643	-.00939
					(.0906)	(.0941)
Mixed System					.216*	.175
					(.114)	(.116)
Presid					.0530	.0222
					(.111)	(.104)
Semi-presid					.259**	.246**
					(.101)	(.107)
Observations	220,295	212,130	212,130	207,105	206,326	209,499

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Note: Income and urban resident included mean replacement for missing data, and an additional dummy variable (not reported) identifying respondents for whom the mean replacement was employed *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Kitschelt 1991, Huber 1989).[4] The WVS allows us to test the extent to which this is true cross-nationally through the use of five socially oriented questions and three questions about economic preferences. The socially oriented questions load nicely onto a single dimension (Cronbach's alpha = .81), so we combine them into a single *social liberalism index*.[5] The economic preference questions do not load well onto a single dimension (Cronbach's alpha < .4), so we include them individually in our analyses; these questions address the extent to which the respondent believes individuals or the government should be responsible for making sure everyone is provided for (*government responsibility)*, whether private or government ownership of business and industry should be increased (*government ownership)*, and whether incomes should be made more or less equal (*incomes equal)*.

In Table 2, we run our models both without control variables (Models 1-4) and with a standard set of individual demographic control variables (Models 5-8). The models examine the effect of the social liberalism index and our economic preference variables on left-right self placement in post-communist countries (Models 1,5) and all countries besides the post-communist countries (Models 2,6). We then further sub-divided the "all other" category of countries into new democracies (Models 3,7) and established democracies (Models 4,8). The way we set up Table 2 – with the more left wing views on both social and economic indicators being positive – we expect the coefficient on all of these variables to be negative, as the left right scale runs from 1 (left) to 10 (right).

The findings are relatively clear. The world over, the economic preference questions map nicely onto left right self-placement: as we would expect, more statist and pro-equality views correspond with, on average, more leftist self-placement. More importantly for the sake of this particular discussion, there does not appear to be any real systematic distinction in the nature of these effects in post-communist countries as compared to other parts of the world.

We find a different pattern when we turn to the social liberalism index. On the one hand, the coefficient on the variable is indeed negative in all specifications of the model, at it should be. However, it is equally apparent that the social liberalism is much less closely aligned with left-right self-placement in post-communist countries than it is in other parts of the world. While this is inherently interesting unto itself, it raises questions about the appropriateness of cross-national comparisons of left-right self placement in samples that include post-communist and non-communist cases. Therefore, we have created a second version of our left-right self-placement variable, which essentially imputes how post-communist citizens would have placed themselves on the left-right scale had they *attached the same degree of importance to social considerations* as people in the rest of the world. More specifically, we run a completely pooled regression with all respondents in which we regress left-right self placement on economic and social variables included in Models 1-4.[6] On the basis of this regression, we calculate the predicted left-right self-placement (ie., $\hat{y}$) for all individuals in the data set. This variable can then be interpreted as a globally consistent measure of left- right self placement if everyone in the world weighted economic and social

[4] This stands somewhat in contrast to psychologists, who tend to focus on an economic dimension (acceptance of inequality/hierarchy) and "traditionalism", or resistance to change (Thorisdottir *et al.* 2007; Jost *et al.* 2007). Psychologists also focus on the extent to which right wing ideology is function of an "authoritarian personality" (Adorno *et al.* 1950; Todosijevic and Enyedi 2008).

[5] Questions address the extent that the respondent is accepting of the following: homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, divorce and euthanasia.

[6] In order to avoid problems associated with missing data here, we use mean replacement for missing data and then include variable-specific dummy variable identifying each of the respondents who do not answer this question. In this way, we do not have to resort to listwise deletion, but at the same time the estimates for the economic and social variables are made based only on the basis of respondents who actually answered those questions.

TABLE 2. Left Right Self-Placement by Social and Economic Preferences and Region

	(1) PC	(2) All non-PC	(3) New Non-PC	(4) Old Democ	(5) PC	(6) All not PC	(7) New, not PC	(8) Old Democ
Social Liberalism Index	-0.042**	-0.163***	-0.168***	-0.167***	-0.033**	-0.153***	-0.134***	-0.169***
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.035)	(0.014)
Government Responsibility	-0.051***	-0.060***	-0.061***	-0.049***	-0.053***	-0.060***	-0.064***	-0.046***
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.009)
Government Ownership	-0.086***	-0.039***	-0.004	-0.086***	-0.082***	-0.036***	-0.003	-0.082***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.020)
Incomes Equal	-0.074***	-0.096***	-0.062***	-0.132***	-0.090***	-0.095***	-0.058***	-0.136***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Wave 2					0.099	0.325***	0.272	0.463***
					(0.105)	(0.113)	(0.195)	(0.141)
Wave 3					0.189	0.250	0.352	0.209*
					(0.134)	(0.182)	(0.333)	(0.115)
Age					-0.005***	0.008***	0.012***	0.005**
					(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Income					0.017	0.037***	0.062**	0.016*
					(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.009)
City					0.091*	-0.175	-0.435	0.079
					(0.050)	(0.151)	(0.302)	(0.061)
Town					-0.005	-0.041	-0.214	0.093
					(0.054)	(0.099)	(0.176)	(0.058)
Male					-0.018	-0.042	-0.087*	-0.001
					(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.028)
Muslim					0.282	0.313	0.131	-0.006
					(0.181)	(0.311)	(0.457)	(0.277)
Orthodox					0.098	0.219	0.312	-0.060
					(0.097)	(0.234)	(0.302)	(0.166)
Western Christian					0.486***	0.063	-0.198	0.333***
					(0.073)	(0.144)	(0.225)	(0.085)
Post-Secondary Education					-0.126*	-0.069	-0.236	0.076
					(0.069)	(0.083)	(0.157)	(0.047)
Secondary Education					-0.107*	-0.070	-0.181*	0.080*
					(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.097)	(0.046)
Constant	6.667***	7.347***	7.010***	7.696***	6.664***	6.688***	6.451***	6.862***
	(0.164)	(0.183)	(0.321)	(0.150)	(0.141)	(0.334)	(0.534)	(0.197)
Observations	46,962	96,608	47,640	51,033	44,303	93,447	45,322	50,163
R-squared	0.033	0.054	0.035	0.088	0.051	0.063	0.052	0.104

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Note: Income and urban resident included mean replacement for missing data, and an additional dummy variable identifying respondents for whom the mean replacement was employed; dummy variables not shown in the table.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

considerations equally.[7] We can then look at how this "normalized left-right position" varies by region, and, even more importantly, how the predictors of normalized left-right position vary by region.

With this in mind, Tables 3 and 4 present the results of regressing left-right self placement (Table 3) and normalized left-right position (Table 4) on key socio-economic variables along with a series of both individual and country-level control variables. Readers should note that unlike in Table 2, we are now pooling all of the data in a single dataset. Thus the way in which we can identify differences in post-

[7] We thank John Londregan for his feedback on the construction of this measure.

TABLE 3. Socio-Economic Determinants of Left Right Self-Placement

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post-Communist	-.426**	-.247	.330*	-.370**	-.358**
	(.167)	(.154)	(.183)	(.174)	(.176)
Tertiary Education X Post-Com				.246**	
				(.103)	
Secondary Education X Post-Com				.152*	
				(.088)	
Age X Post-Com			-.015***		
			(.002)		
Democracy Index X Post-Com					.665***
					(.108)
Age	.005***	.005***	.010***	.005***	.003**
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)
Muslim		.688***	.677***	.690***	.585***
		(.174)	(.174)	(.174)	(.172)
Orthodox Christianity		.029	.040	.027	.031
		(.102)	(.104)	(.102)	(.106)
Western Christianity		.354***	.360***	.356***	.299***
		(.063)	(.064)	(.064)	(.069)
Tertiary Education	-.082	-.038	-.027	-.114	-.082
	(.054)	(.053)	(.053)	(.074)	(.062)
Secondary Education	-.087*	-.051	-.049	-.099	-.049
	(.045)	(.045)	(.046)	(.061)	(.049)
Individual Democracy Index					-.282***
					(.067)
Income inequality	-.005	-.003	-.004	-.004	-.005
	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.007)
Log GDP per capita	-.365***	-.344***	-.371***	-.344***	-.412***
	(.099)	(.090)	(.091)	(.089)	(.107)
Inflation	-.013	-.010	-.002	-.010	-.008
	(.041)	(.035)	(.035)	(.035)	(.057)
GDP Change	-.000	-.001	-.001	-.001	-.001
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Unemployed	-.122**	-.118**	-.137**	-.117**	-.103*
	(.054)	(.053)	(.053)	(.053)	(.058)
Age of democracy	.170	.175	.179	.176	.300**
	(.116)	(.118)	(.121)	(.119)	(.150)
FH democracy	.052**	.066**	.068**	.067**	.065**
	(.026)	(.027)	(.027)	(.027)	(.029)
PR system	.165	.169*	.171*	.164	.227
	(.109)	(.100)	(.101)	(.101)	(.138)
Mixed system	.042	.082	.072	.081	.144
	(.132)	(.125)	(.126)	(.125)	(.152)
Presidential system	.211*	.237**	.228**	.237**	.172*
	(.107)	(.095)	(.096)	(.095)	(.102)
Semi-presidential system	-.044	-.076	-.060	-.080	-.003
	(.090)	(.094)	(.098)	(.095)	(.120)
Income	.041***	.040***	.039***	.041***	.037***
	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.008)
City resident	-.141*	-.080	-.078	-.085	-.016
	(.074)	(.072)	(.073)	(.072)	(.075)
Town resident	-.109**	-.066	-.066	-.071	-.031
	(.052)	(.052)	(.052)	(.052)	(.053)
Male	.019	.032*	.031*	.033*	.047**
	(.018)	(.018)	(.018)	(.018)	(.021)
Observations	161,396	161,396	161,396	161,396	117,557
R-squared	.014	.023	.025	.023	.032

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE 4. Socio-Economic Determinants of Normalized Left Right Position

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post-Communist	-.154***	-.108***	.010	-.138***	-.140***
	(.037)	(.037)	(.042)	(.040)	(.046)
Age X Post-Com			-.003***		
			(.000)		
Tertiary Education X Post-Com				.103***	
				(.022)	
Secondary Education X Post-Com				.018	
				(.019)	
Democracy Index X Post-Com					.094***
					(.020)
Age	.002***	.002***	.003***	.002***	.002***
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Tertiary Educaiton	.028**	.036***	.038***	.002	.036***
	(.014)	(.013)	(.013)	(.017)	(.014)
Secondary Education	.016	.023**	.023**	.019	.027**
	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.013)	(.011)
Democracy Index					-.020
					(.013)
Muslim		.157***	.155***	.158***	.142***
		(.035)	(.036)	(.036)	(.038)
Orthodox Christianity		.008	.012	.010	.029
		(.021)	(.021)	(.021)	(.025)
Western Christianity		.072***	.073***	.073***	.059***
		(.016)	(.016)	(.016)	(.018)
Income inequality	-.000	.000	.000	.000	.001
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Log GDP per capita	-.101***	-.093***	-.097***	-.094***	-.099***
	(.024)	(.022)	(.022)	(.022)	(.028)
Inflation	-.008	-.007	-.005	-.006	-.010
	(.012)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.015)
GDP Change	.000	-.000	-.000	-.000	-.000
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Unemployed	-.060***	-.060***	-.063***	-.059***	-.055***
	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.009)
Age of democracy	.046	.050	.050	.051	.058
	(.037)	(.036)	(.036)	(.036)	(.047)
FH democracy	-.015**	-.012*	-.011	-.011	-.014*
	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.008)
PR system	-.054*	-.054*	-.055*	-.055*	-.022
	(.030)	(.029)	(.029)	(.029)	(.036)
Mixed system	-.048	-.040	-.042	-.040	-.004
	(.032)	(.032)	(.033)	(.032)	(.039)
Presidential system	.047	.053*	.051*	.052*	.033
	(.031)	(.030)	(.030)	(.030)	(.035)
Semi-presidential system	.018	.010	.013	.010	.056
	(.034)	(.033)	(.033)	(.033)	(.040)
Income	.008***	.008***	.008***	.009***	.006***
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
City resident	-.052***	-.040***	-.040***	-.042***	-.043**
	(.015)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.018)
Town resident	-.022**	-.014	-.014	-.016	-.017
	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.013)
Male	.043***	.045***	.045***	.046***	.041***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Observations	218500	218500	218500	218500	157936
R-squared	.096	.106	.109	.108	.122

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

communist countries is through the use of a post-communist dummy variable; correspondingly, to test for different effects for covariates in post-communist countries, we need to interact these covariate with the post-communist dummy variable. These models are estimated using OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country.[8]

Model 1 of Table 3 confirms that even when controlling for a large number of socio-economic, political, and institutional variables, post-communist citizens are more likely to be left-wing than citizens in the rest of the world (ie., the post-communist dummy variable is negative).[9] Interestingly, though, a substantial part of this effect is due to religion (see Model 2). In Models 3-5, by contrast, we do not add further control variables, but instead look at whether three individual covariates have different effects in the post-communist context. Quite interestingly, we see that age (Model 3), education (Model 4) and democratic values[10] (Model 5) all have different effects on left-right self placement (position) in post-communist countries than they do in the rest of the world! Outside of the post-communist world, we find a leftist bias among younger citizens, more educated citizens, and more democratically inclined citizens. In post-communist countries, however, the pattern is exactly the opposite. (Table 4 demonstrates that fairly similar findings when we include normalized left-right position in the model instead).[11] The goal of the rest of this to paper is to ascertain why.

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF LEGACY EFFECTS

It seems natural to suspect that these patterns are somehow due to the fact that post-communist countries had previously experienced anywhere from 4-7 decades communist rule; in other words, the past probably matters. However, as Kopstein (2003) has noted "the concept of legacy is especially slippery. If the weight of the past affects the present, at a minimum, it is necessary to specify which past" (p.233). With this admonition in mind, we have established the following systematic framework for investigating what we argue is an exhaustive set of pathways by which the legacy of communism could be predicted to affect political values, attitudes, and behavior in post-communist societies. Crucially, this framework is designed to produce empirically testable and falsifiable hypotheses. In the remainder of this section, we lay out this theoretical framework of legacy effects generally, without regard to the specific question of left-right self-placement. In the following section (Section 4) we then utilize the framework to develop a set of hypotheses specifically tailored to testing explanations for the patterns of post-communist exceptionalism in terms of left-right positioning identified in the previous section.

We start from a very basic understanding of attitudes and behavior as involving the interaction between an individual and a particular political environment. As a first cut, we distinguish

[8] We will eventually rerun our final version of these models in a hierarchical framework as a robustness test; however, given the large size of our Level II observations (surveys are usually at least 1000 people) and our prior experiences working with these types of models using WVS data, we doubt that there will be much of a noticeable difference in the final results. Moreover, Gelman and Hill (2007) note that multilevel modeling is most effective "when the groups are very similar to each other" (p.270); this may very well not be the case when using the WVS.

[9] Although it should be noted that this leftward bias only starts in the second wave (mid 1990s) of the survey. In the first wave, there is no leftward bias.

[10] Democratic proclivity is an index created by the authors based on seven questions on the world values survey regarding attitudes towards democracy that load nicely onto a single dimension (Cronbach alpha = .72).

[11] For age, the model shows a right-wing bias for older citizens outside of the post-communist world but no effect in the post-communist world. For education, the model shows no effect for higher education outside of the post-communist world but a right-wing bias in the post-communist world. The effects for democracy are the same: a left-wing bias outside of the post-communist world for more pro-democratic respondents, and a right-wing bias in the post-communist in post-communist countries.

between the individual-level legacies of Communism and its effects on the broader post-communist political environment. In turn, individual legacies may be of a demographic nature (reflecting the social and educational consequences of communist modernization efforts), or they may reflect the psychological repercussions of the experience of living through communism and its aftermath. With respect to the post-communist political environment, we distinguish between the objective features of formal and informal institutions, which may directly alter the incentives for individual behavioral, and a set of contextual factors, such as economic performance and media coverage, which may only partially reflect the performance of key post-communist public institutions but which are more easily observable and, therefore, significantly shape individual perceptions of political reality. We discuss each in turn.

Individual Experiences

Perhaps the most direct legacies of communism on post-communist political values and behavior are likely to be through the different personal experiences of citizens of the former communist countries. The two most obvious sources of different prior experiences would be (1) the effect of having lived under communist rule and (2) the effect of having lived through the collapse of communism. Such an approach could predict variation not only *across countries* but also *across citizens* within post-communist countries. For example, if we believed an effect was the result of an individual having lived through communism, then we should expect that effect to be more pronounced in countries with a longer history of communist rule and among individuals who had lived more of their lives under communism.

Of course, years lived under communist rule is not the only source of individual variation in the experiential legacy of Communism: arguably *the nature of one's experience with the communist regime* mediates the strength of the predicted legacy effect. Thus in some case we might expect legacy effects to differ for a person who was persecuted by the communist regime from someone who led her life with minimal interference from either the regime or the Communist Party.

Similarly, living through the collapse of communism and its hectic aftermath might also leave a lasting effect on how individuals approach politics. Conceptually, such an individual transition-based legacy ought to differ from an individual communism-based legacy on three dimensions. First, we should expect greater variation across post-communist countries that experienced different types of extraction from communist rule (Kitschelt *et al.* 1999). Second, if post-communist exceptionalism is driven primarily by the experience of the post-communist transition, we should expect less variation in effects across age groups. In fact, to the extent that we see variation in post-communist political values and behavior from the legacy of having lived through the transition, we might be more likely to expect it to vary across transition "winners and losers" than across different age groups (Tucker *et al.* 2002; Herzog and Tucker 2010). We might also expect to see different values or behavior from a "post-transition" generation that has no direct memory of the transition itself. Finally, transition-based legacy effects should exhibit a very different temporal pattern than legacies from living through Communism. While we should expect the latter to diminish gradually as the memory of life under Communism fades into the past, an individual's impression of the transition is likely to vary much more unevenly over time, as well as to be a function of a country's political and economic trajectory.

A second broad set of individual-level communist legacies are related to the grand developmental project of Communism, which arguably left behind individuals with a distinctive set of demographic characteristics. For now, we highlight four such possible socio-economic legacies. First, communism left behind societies that were significantly poorer than their West European neighbors (Janos 2000). Second, communism produced highly literate societies with lower levels of income inequality. Third, communism in many places greatly increased the number of

atheists. Finally, communism resulted in a rapid but distorted industrialization, which created pockets of industrial concentration.

The demographic imprint of communist development could matter in two distinctive ways. First, it may affect national patterns of political behavior because post-communist countries may have different concentrations of certain types of citizens (e.g. a greater prevalence of highly educated but relatively poor citizens or greater proportions of atheists). If that is the case, then post-communist and non-post-communist citizens with similar demographic profiles could display similar patterns of behavior, but collective political outcomes could still be very different in post-communist countries than elsewhere. Alternatively, it is conceivable that particular demographic characteristics may have different individual behavioral implications in ex-communist countries due to the distinctive patterns of communist modernization efforts.

Institutional Legacies

A second, different, way that communist era legacies could affect political values and behavior in post-communist countries would be if there are distinctive institutional legacies of communism, *and* if these institutions have a subsequent effect on political values and behavior. Consider first formal institutions. In some instances, we can speak of *distinctly post-communist institutions*, such as communist successor parties, which are simply not present in non post-communist countries. Alternatively, we can refer to particular institutional patterns that emerged in post-communist countries, such as strong presidential systems in many of the former Soviet republics. In the latter case, it would be incumbent on whoever is arguing that this is a legacy effect to demonstrate that *post-communist institutions in question be distinctly linked to communism and/or its collapse*; otherwise institutional choices should be treated as alternative explanations rather than as legacy mechanisms.

In addition to formal political institutions, consider formal economic institutions as well. While it is somewhat harder to speak of an exclusively post-communist economic institution, there are clearly very distinct economic institutions that are more likely to be found in post-communist countries that are directly linked to economic practices under communism: geographically diverse supply chains for industry and companies that also provide housing and healthcare would be appear to be two of the more obvious in this regard.

Similarly, we can examine the effect of *informal institutions* inherited from the Communist era. One example is the extent to which "protest repertoires" developed under communism continue to shape political participation and social protest in the post-communist era (Ekiert and Kubik 1998). Another line of research explores the extent to which pre-communist social networks were or were not eradicated under Communism, and then predicts aspects of political behavior based on membership in such networks (Howard 2003; Badescu and Sum 2005; Wittenberg 2006).

Regardless of whether the focus is on formal or informal institutions, the institutional approach to legacies presupposes a very different mechanism than the individual experiences approach. In the case of individual experiences, it is the fact that the individual in question experienced communism (or the post-communist transition) that drives him or her to behave in a distinctive manner. In the institutional framework, the key factor is the presence of peculiar institutions – rooted in communism – that exist in post-communist countries. This has important implications for hypothesizing about the presence of legacy induced values or behavior, namely that the key variation needs to be on the presence of the particular institution and the relevance of that institution in the individual's life.

It is also important to note that political values and behavior are shaped not only by objective institutional features but by the subjective process by which citizens form their views about these institutions. Since the direct exposure of most individuals to key political institutions is usually quite limited and episodic, much of the process through which citizens evaluate and react to political institutions depends on various cognitive shortcuts, which as well may be shaped by the communist past. One

common shortcut is to judge institutions and public officials based on certain highly visible and salient outputs, such as economic performance. While this practice is obviously not a post-communist peculiarity, it may nevertheless produce peculiar patterns of political behavior given the severity of the post-communist economic crisis and social dislocation. While the pain associated with this socio-economic transformation was obviously exacerbated by weak institutions and corrupt/incompetent officials, some of the transitional losses were almost certainly the consequences of communist developmental distortions. This does not necessarily mean that post-communist citizens hold their governments to higher standards and are, therefore, more critical of governments of the same quality than citizens elsewhere, but rather only that the types of signals citizens world-wide use to identify poor governance might be stronger than usual in post-communist countries due to the very nature of the transition away from communism. To the extent that some of these signals – such as economic performance – are the inevitable economic consequences of moving from a planned to a market economy, then it seems legitimate to consider such outcomes as a legacy of communism. Therefore, the political values or behaviors triggered by these outcomes are at least in part communist legacies.

Legacies and Causal Pathways

Taken together, we now have six potential pathways by which the "past" in post-communist countries could be said to influence political values and behavior in post-communist countries: (1) the individual-level experience of *living through communist rule*; (2) the individual-level experience of *living through the collapse of communism* and the transition that followed it; (3) a changed *socio-demographic landscape* from years of communist rule; (4) the existence of *formal institutions* from the communist era that continue to exist in the post-communist era and exert an influence on political values or behavior; (5) the existence of *informal institutions* from the communist era that continue to exist in the post-communist era and exert an influence on political values or behavior; and (6) particular socio-economic and political outcomes that serve as criteria for citizens when evaluating post-communist institutions, but are shaped by communist-era legacies.

EFFECTS OF LEGACIES ON LEFT-RIGHT POSITIONING

In this section we apply the theoretical framework laid out above to explain the empirical puzzles raised by the patterns of left-right positioning by post-communist citizens which we demonstrated earlier: the overall leftist bias of post-communist citizens; and the fact that younger, highly educated and pro-democratic citizens in the former communist countries have a rightist bias. In particular we will focus on four of the six legacy pathways we have identified above: the individual experience of living through communism and through the post-communist transition, the role of formal institutions, and the importance of post-communist economic performance.[12]

Individual legacies and post-communist economic performance

There are two different ways of thinking about individual left-right positions. The first view is to treat them as a fundamental *political value*, in which case we would expect left-right positions to be shaped relatively early in life by a combination of family and political socialization (especially through the education system), but to be relatively immune to short-term political fluctuations. Alternatively, left-right positions may be interpreted as a *political attitude,* in which case individuals may change their positions relatively quickly in response to new information about how different type of policies align with their

[12] The importance of a fifth pathway – a changed demographic landscape – was briefly discussed in section 2, when we showed that the post-communist leftist bias was due in part to the lower religiosity of ex-communist citizens. The final pathway – informal institutions – does not seem particularly important for the question at hand, so we omit it from the present analysis.

own ideal and material interests.[13] These two perspectives have radically different implications for how we would expect both communist and post-communist individual experiences to affect left-right positions after the fall of communism.

From the "left-right as value" perspective, the leftist bias among post-communist citizens would be interpreted as the result of the successful large-scale ideological indoctrination of entire generations of East Europeans by their communist regimes. While it is certainly true that these regimes spent a significant amount of effort and resources to persuade their citizens of the ideological superiority of the communist model, there is a fair amount of evidence that starting in the 1970s these efforts had become increasingly formulaic and ineffective in much of the Communist bloc. If this interpretation is correct, then we should observe the strongest leftist bias immediately after the collapse of communism (and the end of its indoctrination efforts), followed by a gradual decline of this bias. Moreover, we should expect to find less of a leftist bias among the younger generation who was exposed to less and more half-hearted indoctrination (at least as part of the education system), as well as possibly for East Europeans old enough to have reached adulthood prior to the arrival of Communism. Following the same logic, we should expect to see stronger leftist biases among individuals who received their education during the heyday of Communism (until the mid 1950s, and possibly until the late 1960s), whereas those educated either before Communism arrived or after it fell should exhibit less of a leftist bias, and possibly even a rightist bias.[14] Finally, we would expect to see the strongest correlation between democratic values and left-right positioning among these same age cohorts (aged roughly 40 to 65 in 1989), for which the communist economic and political model has the highest salience because they reached adulthood during the period of the greatest ideological indoctrination.

If, by contrast, left-right positions are reflective of relatively short-term policy preferences – along the lines of the view of partisanship as a running tally (Fiorina 1981) – then we would predict very different left-right alignment patterns both over time and across different demographic groups. First, given that the legitimacy of the communist regimes had deteriorated sharply in most of the Soviet bloc by the late 1980s, a short-term view of ideology would suggest – contrary to the indoctrination hypothesis – that in the early 1990s we should see a rightist bias among newly post-communist citizens, who were likely to reject leftist ideology along with the political regimes which had ostensibly been built on these ideological foundations. We would expect this rightist bias to be stronger among younger cohorts, who have a shorter political memory, and are therefore likely to weigh the disappointing economic and political performance of the 1980s more heavily than older generations. Moreover, such a perspective would predict greater heterogeneity within age cohorts, depending on how particular individuals evaluated their own and their country's situation under Communism: thus, citizens who were very discontent with the late communist economic and political status quo should experience a much stronger rightist bias than their more satisfied fellow citizens.

Second, a short-term view of ideology would predict a leftist shift after 1990, as the social and economic toll of the post-communist transition started to undermine the appeal of the pro-market ideology that had dominated the early transition discourse

[13] One way to think about this is as analogous to debates in the partisanship literature as to whether partisanship represents more of a psychological attachment to and/or identity with a party (Campbell *et al.* 1960) or its supporters (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), as opposed to a more rationalist "running tally" (Fiorina 1981) of one's preference for one political party over others, due either to shared policy preferences or evaluations of governing competence (Franklin and Jackson 1983; Achen 2002).

[14] For an interesting argument about the link between pre-communist education and anti-communist voting in the post-communist period, see Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006).

in most of Eastern Europe (Greskovits 1998). An additional temporal implication of this theory is that we should expect the leftist bias to weaken again by the late 1990s as the improving economic conditions in much of the post-communist region should have helped to rehabilitate the market economy model.[15]

Finally, the short-term view of ideology would predict significant heterogeneity among post-communist citizens as a function of how the transition has affected individual and/or societal welfare for any given respondent. Thus, the theory incorporates an additional legacy pathway – post-communist economic performance – and diverges from the predictions of the indoctrination theory, which would expect economic performance to have a modest impact on ideological orientations. More specifically, we should expect individuals whose economic fortunes declined or stagnated during the transition to engage in ideological "updating" about the relative benefits of market vs. statist economic policies, and therefore drift towards the left of the ideological spectrum. Similarly, economic "winners" from the transition would be expected to gravitate toward the right of the political spectrum. Moreover, countries with disappointing post-communist economic trajectories should experience greater aggregate shifts to the left, both because such countries presumably have larger proportions of transition losers (who are likely to shift leftwards due to the pocketbook reasons discussed above) and because in such countries even a sociotropic comparison of communist and post-communist economic performance is likely to lead to a rejection of market-friendly economic policies.[16]

The idea that left-right attitudes are a reflection of short-to-medium term economic outcomes can also be used to explain the distinctively post-communist left-right effects of age, education and democratic values. From this perspective, the peculiar demographic and democratic covariates of ideological attitudes could simply reflect the greater concentration of certain demographic groups among transitional winners or losers, which would explain their left-right orientation from a purely economic self-interest perspective (rather than a more complicated psychological mechanism rooted in communist era indoctrination). For example, if young, highly educated and pro-democratic individuals are more likely to be economically satisfied in ex-communist countries than elsewhere,[17] then this could explain why these groups are also more likely to subscribe to rightist ideological positions than their non-communist counterparts. If this is true, then controlling for indicators of personal economic satisfaction should reduce or even eliminate the post-communist exceptionalism suggested by the large and significant interaction terms in models 3-5 in Table 3.

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[15] If we could perfectly control for all aspects of the economic collapse in the 1990s, we would expect these temporal effects to go away. However, the types of economic control variables we are able to use are largely broad, macro-economic measures of societal changes, and thus we will likely still be able to observe some evidence of these temporal trends.

[16] It is, of course, possible that these costs were an unavoidable legacy of communist-era economic distortions which were exacerbated by partial reforms (Hellman 1998), in which case the best policy response would have been an acceleration of market reforms, but such a view arguably required a lot of sophistication (and faith) from an impoverished and disoriented population. See as well the similar discussion in Stokes (1996) concerning whether rational voters ought to reward incumbent governments for poor economic performance in the early days of serious economic reform, although see Tucker's (2006, 72) discussion of the applicability of Stokes' argument in the post-communist context.

[17] A quick look at the correlations between personal economic satisfaction and age, education and democratic values suggests that such differences indeed exist: thus, older respondents were significantly more satisfied in non-communist countries but significantly less satisfied in ex-communist countries. Higher education was associated with greater satisfaction everywhere (though the effects were slightly smaller in transition countries) but secondary education had a negative effect among ex-communists and a positive effect elsewhere. Democrats were much more economically satisfied in ex-communist countries but not elsewhere.

Institutional explanations

With respect to the institutional mechanisms of legacy transmission, there are at least two distinctive ways in which institutions could affect the post-communist ideological map. The first one is relatively narrow and focuses on highly visible institutional reminders of the communist era – and especially on the survival of more or less reformed ex-communist parties. At the most basic level, a visible presence of such parties could serve to reinforce communist-era memories among both supporters and opponents of the old regime and should therefore prolong the half-life of distinctively post-communist patterns of left-right alignments. For example, as long as the ideological left is associated with a political party with clear continuity to the communist past, it may be very difficult for committed democrats to embrace leftist ideologies even if they may share the left's concerns with inequality and redistribution.[18] However, the aggregate effect of a strong communist successor party on left-right positions in a given country is uncertain, since such parties serve simultaneously as institutional vehicles for articulating and reinforcing leftist tendencies among transition losers and as catalysts for coordination among anti-communist political forces, which may reinforce rightist tendencies among their supporters.[19]

This last point suggests a complementary mechanism through which communist successor parties may influence the post-communist ideological landscape even after their actual importance as electoral contestants has diminished or even vanished. Thus, given that East European political parties have often defined themselves primarily in opposition to the prior political party establishment (Pop-Eleches 2010), it is possible that the configuration of political party systems will bear the imprint of the initial communist vs. anti-communist cleavage for a much longer period of time (Tucker 2006). While these imprints may differ across post-communist countries as a function of the particular nature of the Communist Party's organizational structure and political repertoire,[20] they are nevertheless likely to set ex-communist party systems apart from those found in other democracies. These particular party system configurations may in turn affect the structure of public opinion independently of any individual experiential legacies of communism. For example, given that (with the exception of Ceausescu's draconian pro-natalist policies in Romania) Communist Parties had generally championed fairly liberal social policies with respect to abortion, divorce and women's rights, and that with a few exceptions (e.g. anti-abortion views in Poland) East European citizens largely endorsed these policies, social issues were not a very attractive political strategy for anti-communist opposition parties hoping to attract voters in the early 1990s.[21] As a result social issues received relatively little political attention during the early post-communist period, which may explain why they played a minor role in East Europeans' understanding of left-right issues (which we discussed in section 2).[22]

The second pathway takes a much broader view of how institutional legacies can be expected to affect the left-right positions of post-communist citizens. Given that left-right positions may reflect a wide range of fundamental questions about the role of the state in the economy and in the private lives of individuals, the list of potential institutional candidates – which fulfill the theoretical requirement of being

[18] Anecdotal evidence from authors' interviews in multiple post-communist countries has repeatedly suggested the importance of being aware of this possibility.

[19] For an interesting discussion of this mechanism, see Grzymala-Busse's (2007) analysis of the role of communist successor parties in driving robust party competition in Eastern Europe.

[20] See for example, Grzymala-Busse (2002), Pop-Eleches (1999).

[21] The story was of course very different with respect to other social issues, such as prostitution and especially gay rights, but here too the electoral payoffs of challenging the communist policies were low, given that vast majorities of East Europeans opposed more liberal policies in this respect (as the World Values Survey data confirms).

[22] The issue of abortion in Poland is a noticeable exception (Millard 2010).

both shaped by the Communist regimes and potentially relevant for explaining individual left-right positions – is virtually endless. Among the more obvious examples, it is worth mentioning welfare state institutions and churches. Thus, since the extensive communist welfare states played an important role in both legitimating communist regimes and in creating greater individual expectations about the role of the state, both welfare state persistence and retrenchment should be expected to influence ideological dynamics in the post-communist period.[23] Similarly, churches, which can play an important role in politicizing social issues and in mobilizing their members to support or oppose certain political issues, were oppressed (to varying extents) by the communist regimes, which should have a significant impact on the ideological landscape of post-communism.[24]

While we hope to address at least some of these broader institutional influences in greater detail in future versions of this paper, for the purpose of the present analysis we will use an alternative approach by focusing on an indicator of convergence towards the Western economic and political institutions: the extent to which countries have progressed towards the goal of EU membership. This approach is justified by the fact that the EU accession progress required candidate countries to adopt extensive reforms of political and economic institutions in order to satisfy the enlargement conditions. Therefore, we would expect that countries that are further along in the accession process to have achieved greater institutional convergence to the Western model and, implicitly, to have moved further away from the institutional legacies of communism (even though these differences are likely to persist in many areas until well after accession.) Therefore, if the institutional story is correct, we should expect to observe a weaker post-communist imprint on the left-right landscape of advanced EU candidates, including a weaker leftist bias, and weaker interaction effects with age, education and democratic values.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

As a first step towards testing the individual mechanisms of ideology formation and updating, in Table 5 we present a series of regression models that focus on the temporal evolution and demographic/political patterns of left-right positioning of several age cohorts. In line with our theoretical approach, the age cohorts are defined in terms of the respondents' age in 1989 (when Communism collapsed in most of the region) rather than the age at the time of the interview. We differentiate between seven age cohorts: (1) individuals who were 12 years or younger in 1989, and whose political socialization happened mostly after the fall of Communism; (2) individuals who were between 13 and 18 in 1989, and who were thus exposed to some extent of communist indoctrination efforts in the late 1980s but whose adult political life essentially started during or after the fall of communism; (3) individuals who were between 19 and 25 in 1989, whose entire secondary education (and much of their post-secondary education) took place under communism, but during the period of ideological doubts and economic decline of the Gorbachev period; (4) individuals who were between 26 and 40 in 1989, who were largely educated and socialized during the Brezhnev era, which had been marked by a steadfast but increasingly hollow commitment to ideological orthodoxy; (5) individuals who were between 41 and 55 in 1989, who were largely educated and socialized during the Khrushchev era, a period marked by some ideological uncertainty following Khrushchev's Secret Speech but nonetheless characterized by Communist self-confidence and economic success; (6) individuals who were between 56 and 65 in 1989, who were largely educated and socialized during the repressive and ideologically assertive late

[23] See, for example Kitschelt and Bustokova (2009) on the impact of welfare state retrenchment on the success of radical right parties in Eastern Europe.

[24] Poland, again, with its strong Catholic Church -- which has attempted to influence the abortion debate (as well as other social issues) -- is the exception (Millard 2010). See as well Wittenberg (2006) for more on the role of churches in transmitting partisan preferences.

Stalinist period and (7) individuals who were over 65 in 1989, and for whom we distinguish between East Europeans who were socialized under a variety of non-communist regimes in the 1930s and early 1940s, and citizens of interwar Soviet republics, who were exposed to the ideological purges of Stalin's Great Terror.[25]

In line with our earlier theoretical discussion, from an early political socialization perspective we would expect to see increasingly greater leftist biases among older age cohorts in line with the greater ideological intensity of their early political socialization. The only exception to this age trend should be the oldest East European age cohort, which should be expected to have less of a leftist bias than subsequent age cohorts, since it was politically socialized in the pre-communist period. Moreover, we would expect to see a significant reduction in the leftist bias among those socialized during and after the Brezhnev period, in which ideology played an increasingly marginal role in the self-legitimation efforts of the communist regimes. Finally, we should observe the greatest leftist bias in the immediate post-communist period, followed by a gradual rightward shift over the course of the transition (especially among the youngest cohorts), as communist indoctrination is replaced by different ideological narratives.

From the ideology-as-running-tally perspective, given the moral and economic crisis of communism the 1980s we would not necessarily expect a post-communist leftist bias in the immediate aftermath of the fall of communism, and we may even expect to see a rightist bias among those age cohorts whose personal experience of communism was limited to this period of decline (i.e. the youngest three age cohorts). However, in response to the pain of the market reforms of the early and mid 1990s, we would expect a leftward shift by the second (and possibly third) survey wave, as post-communist citizens update their views about the relative desirability of leftist and rightists approaches to economic policy. This leftward shift should also be greater for younger citizens, who have a shorter tally to draw on and are therefore likely to place a greater weight on the most recent (i.e. post-communist period). On the other hand, this effect may be cancelled out by the fact that the elderly generally fared worse during the transition, they may have stronger economic incentives to reject post-communist economic reforms. Finally, we should not see much of a difference between the ideological positions of the oldest East Europeans and ex-Soviets, given that the experiences from half a century ago should be heavily discounted in such a model.

Due to space considerations and in order to facilitate comparisons, in Table 5 we only present the relevant coefficients for each of the regressions but not the results for the other demographic controls. The regressions were run separately for each age cohort, which allows us to assess the nature and the extent of post-communist exceptionalism across different cohorts. However, we obtained very similar results pooling the data across cohorts and using a series of interaction terms between the post-communist dummy and the different age cohorts (results omitted). Note as well that the dependent variable in these regressions is the normalized left-right position as described in Section 3.

According to the temporal patterns of left-right alignments in the first three sets of regressions in Table 5, we find somewhat stronger support for the "running tally" view of ideological formation and updating. Most importantly, with the exception of interwar citizens of the Soviet Union, ex-communist citizens did not experience a leftist bias during the immediate post-communist period and for younger respondents we even detected a statistically significant and fairly large rightist bias. This pattern suggests that any communist indoctrination had essentially been wiped out by the experience of the mid to late 1980s for all but the oldest communist subjects. Instead, the leftist shift occurred sometime in the early to mid 1990s and was remarkably uniform across the different age cohorts: as a result, the significant initial rightist bias of the third and fourth cohort

[25] Note that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are *not* included as interwar Soviet Republics, as they were only added to the Soviet Union followin the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

TABLE 5. Left-Right Positions across Cohorts and Time Periods

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age in 1989	<12	13-18	19-25	26-40	41-55	56-65	> 65 (EE)	>65 (FSU)
1. First wave								
Ex-communist	NA	.062	.089*	.104*	.009	-.022	-.034	-.128**
		(.047)	(.040)	(.043)	(.044)	(.041)	(.044)	(.027)
2. Second wave								
Ex-communist	-.033	-.078	-.086#	-.082#	-.163**	-.199**	-.186**	-.199**
	(.046)	(.063)	(.051)	(.048)	(.041)	(.043)	(.054)	(.045)
3. Third wave								
Ex-communist	-.128*	-.107#	-.071	-.062	-.092*	-.113**	-.106*	-.054
	(.051)	(.055)	(.053)	(.050)	(.045)	(.042)	(.042)	(.063)
4. Education interactions								
Ex-communist*	.121*	.167**	.140**	.171**	.124**	.094**	.058	.140#
Tertiary education	(.058)	(.045)	(.036)	(.033)	(.035)	(.036)	(.049)	(.083)
Ex-communist*	.045	.093*	.055	.049#	-.022	-.055*	-.024	.032
Secondary education	(.042)	(.039)	(.035)	(.028)	(.027)	(.028)	(.045)	(.044)
Ex-communist	-.179**	-.178**	-.112**	-.106**	-.117**	-.125**	-.117**	-.238**
	(.054)	(.050)	(.042)	(.037)	(.034)	(.034)	(.040)	(.055)
Tertiary education	-.004	-.079*	-.014	-.017	.016	.047#	.068*	
	(.054)	(.039)	(.029)	(.026)	(.028)	(.027)	(.028)	
Secondary education	-.012	-.048	-.007	-.008	.034#	.040#	.020	
	(.038)	(.034)	(.027)	(.021)	(.021)	(.021)	(.025)	
5. Democracy interaction								
Ex-communist*	.051	.091**	.108**	.142**	.138**	.092**	.099**	.182**
Dem values index	(.033)	(.035)	(.031)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.033)	(.041)
Ex-communist	-.127**	-.105*	-.087*	-.080*	-.131**	-.152**	-.175**	-.097#
	(.045)	(.042)	(.037)	(.035)	(.033)	(.033)	(.040)	(.053)
Dem values index	-.015	-.058*	-.062*	-.073**	-.068**	-.027	-0.056*	
	(.022)	(.029)	(.024)	(.022)	(.020)	(.019)	(0.023)	

OLS regression coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1
Note: Also included in regressions but not reported were all the demographic and institutional controls included in Table 1.
a. Question was not asked in the 1990 wave.

(aged 19-40 in 1989) had turned into a marginally significant leftist bias by the mid 1990s, which suggests a much larger degree of ideological updating than the early socialization theory would predict.

The running tally theory also outperforms the early socialization theory in explaining several other findings: first, by the second wave, the difference between the oldest Eastern European and Soviet citizens had vanished (see model 7 vs. 8), which suggests that the downward mobility experienced by most pensioners in the inflationary environment of the early 1990s had erased any initial differences in political socialization between the two groups. Indeed, this finding is fairly damaging to the communist-era socialization approach, as we would have expected the formative years of these two groups to be quite different from one another; seeing such similar results suggests the leftward bias is much more a function of actually being older than communist (or non-communist, in the case of Eastern Europe) era socialization. Of course, age could either be telling us something about the effect of having lived under communist rule for 40+ years or the effect of being old during the post-communist period. However, had it been the former explanation, we would have expected this bias to show up in the first wave of the survey, which it clearly does not for the East European cohort.

Second, by the late 1990s the post-communist leftist bias was actually stronger for the two youngest age cohorts (aged 18 or less in 1989) than for then next two cohorts (aged 19-40 in 1989). This pattern

runs against the indoctrination hypothesis (since there was less communist indoctrination in the 1990s than the previous two decades) but it is compatible with the running tally explanation, since the youngest cohorts had less of a comparative reference for the economic malaise of the early 1990s than their slightly older compatriots. Finally, the age gradient of the early and mid 1990s virtually disappears by the late 1990s, a finding which is more in line with the short-term updating model (which would predict growing noise due to the heterogeneous transition experience of different countries and individuals, rather than the relative uniformity and durability expected from socialization effects).

The only finding that can be explained better by the early socialization theory is the significant difference between the significant leftist bias of elderly residents from the interwar Soviet republics compared to the much smaller and statistically insignificant effect for the same age cohort in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. One explanation for this difference is that at least in the chaotic environment following the collapse of communism, the political environments in which these individuals received their early education and political bearings made a difference in how they approached politics almost five decades later. However, as mentioned before, this difference vanished by the mid 1990s, presumably because the interwar non-communist memories of East Europeans were eclipsed by the trauma of the early transition years. Moreover, it is also plausible that the manner in which communism collapsed in Eastern Europe – mainly popular protest movement with a larger degree of national liberation as a them leading to free and fair elections – may have more quickly legitimized the right in the eyes of these countries' oldest citizens.

The next set of statistical tests focuses on the age cohort-specific ideological effects of different levels of education in ex-communist countries compared to the non-communist world. To interpret these results, it is important to keep in mind that the ex-communist indicator essentially captures the ideological effect of communism on respondents with no secondary or higher (tertiary) education, while the effects on individuals with secondary or higher education have to be calculated as the sum of coefficients for the ex-communist dummy and the corresponding interaction term.

First, it is worth noting that the least educated ex-communist citizens exhibited a consistently significant leftist bias across all age cohorts, a finding which is compatible with both the indoctrination hypothesis (since communism was supposed to be geared towards helping the working classes) and the running tally theory (since uneducated ex-communist citizens tended to fare worse during the transition). The cross-cohort differences provide a more mixed picture: on the one hand, the slightly higher leftist bias among the two youngest cohorts is only compatible with the running-tally hypothesis, whereas the significantly higher leftist bias of interwar Soviet citizens is more compatible with early socialization/indoctrination.[26]

The positive and generally statistically significant interaction between tertiary education and ex-communism suggests that the leftist bias of post-communist citizens does not apply to the most educated individuals (with the exception of the 65+ post-Soviet citizens none of the joint effects were significantly negative.) Instead, among respondents from the third and fourth cohorts, highly educated ex-communist citizens actually exhibited a rightist bias, which was at least marginally significant among 26-40 year-olds at the time of the transition. This pattern can be explained from both an indoctrination perspective (highly educated individuals are harder to indoctrinate) and from a running tally perspective (higher education was

[26] The only way to explain this difference from a running tally perspective would be if this group fared substantially worse than either their East European counterparts or their slightly younger compatriots during the post-communist transition. While the WVS data suggests that this group was indeed noticeably more dissatisfied with their economic situation (a 1.3 point difference on a 10 point scale), the magnitude of the difference was not sufficiently large to account for the ideological difference between the groups (based on the coefficients for models 2-4 in table 6).

associated with more frustrations under communism and with greater opportunities afterwards) so further tests are necessary to determine which one of these explanations has greater empirical support.

The interactions between secondary education and ex-communism suggest a much greater degree of cross-cohort heterogeneity. Thus, the interaction effects are positive for the four youngest age cohorts (and are at least marginally significant for two of them), whereas they are negative for three of the four older age cohorts (and significantly so for 56-65 year olds). When comparing the joint effects across cohorts, the post-communist leftist bias was roughly three times larger for secondary education beneficiaries from the late communist period (who were 13-40 in 1989) than among those from the early post-war period (41-65 year olds in 1989). This difference is in broadly in line with the predictions of the indoctrination hypothesis, given the previously discussed decline in ideological persuasion efforts since the mid 1960s. These patterns are, however, also compatible with a running tally explanation, given that the Brezhnev era also marked a sharp decline in social mobility for the working classes, which may explain the lower legitimacy of the communist regime and hence the weaker leftist bias for the later cohorts.

The final set of regressions in Table 5 focuses on the relationship between democratic values and left-right positions. The findings confirm that for all but the youngest age cohort, the democratic values have opposite effects in ex-communist and non-communist countries, being associated with a rightist bias in the former and a leftist bias in the latter. These findings confirm that the communist economic and political model represented an essential reference point for most East Europeans, making it very difficult to separate the old system's leftist economic policies from its authoritarian practices. It should be noted that the magnitude of the positive interaction effect declined for the youngest cohorts, and was no longer statistically significant for those ex-communist citizens who very 12 or younger in 1989, and thus probably had relatively few personal political memories of communism. While we need to be careful about drawing definitive conclusions from the fairly small number of respondents from the youngest cohort, this decline nevertheless suggests the importance of personal experience in explaining why ex-communist citizens seem to have a hard time reconciling leftist ideology and democratic ideals. In other words, even though, as we discussed earlier, the communist regimes were not particularly effective in inculcating leftist ideals in the majority of their citizens, they seem to have persuaded most of them that redistributive economic policies are bundled together with authoritarian politics (or "people's democracy"), and thus made "social democracy" sound like an oxymoron to many East Europeans. It is, of course, conceivable that this association was reinforced by the dubious democratic credentials of many communist successor parties, and we will test this possibility in Table 7.

In the previous sections, we noted a second manner in which individual experiences could affect left-right positioning among post-communist citizens, which was to focus more on the *quality* of one's interaction with both the communist era regime and the post-communist transitional experience. Table 6 presents a variety of evidence supporting this perspective. Turning first to Model 1, which by necessity compares post-communist countries only with other new democracies, we see that while in the rest of the world those who rate the previous political system highly have a rightist bias, in post-communist countries the effect is in the opposite direction. This is of course not surprising, as non-democratic regimes outside of the post-communist regime tended to be of a more right-wing orientation, but it does confirm that within the post-communist world there is a strong link between one's view of the communist era political system and one's post-communist left-right position. Note as well that we control for age in these regressions, so we are not simply picking up more nostalgia for the old regime among the elderly. So we have a first example of *quality* of experience having an impact independent of length of experience.

TABLE 6. Economic performance and left-right positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post-communist	-.019	.201*	-.269**	-.153#	-.483**
	(.064)	(.093)	(.083)	(.090)	(.125)
Post-communist* Previous regime satisfaction	-.040**				
	(.005)				
Previous regime satisfaction	.011**				
	(.004)				
Post-communist* Pers. financial satisfaction		-.010*	.017**	.001	
		(.005)	(.004)	(.006)	
Pers. financial satisfaction		.023**	.010*	.014**	
		(.003)	(.004)	(.003)	
Post-communist* GDP as % of 1989 levels					.329**
					(.109)
GDP as % of 1989 levels					-.106
					(.081)
Institutional controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
WVS survey wave	2&3[a]	1	2	3	1&2&3
Countries	New democracies	All	All	All	All
Observations	90374	52664	68221	51155	218500
R-squared	.126	.071	.116	.125	.083

OLS regression coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1
Note: Also included in regressions but not reported were all the demographic and institutional controls included in Table 1.
a. Question was not asked in the 1990 wave.

Models 2-4 of Table 6 examine the effects of personal financial satisfaction on left-right position. As these analyses feature interactive effects, we interpret the effect of financial satisfaction on left-right position outside of the post-communist world as the coefficient on *personal financial satisfaction* and the effect on left-right position in the post-communist world as the sum of the coefficients on *personal financial satisfaction* and the interaction of *post-communist * personal financial satisfaction.* Four points are worth noting. First, outside of the post-communist world, those who are more satisfied with their personal financial situation, all else being equal, have a right-wing bias, much as we might suspect. In the post-communist world, however, we find different patterns and interesting temporal variations. In the early 1990s, financial satisfaction had a significantly weaker rightward impact for ex-communist citizens than for their non-communist counterpart. Consequently, the rightist bias of ex-communist citizens was twice as large for the least financially satisfied among them than for those expressing high degrees of satisfaction (and for the latter the effect was no longer statistically significant.) This finding is consistent with the picture of the earliest beneficiaries of communism's collapse being well-placed *nomenklatura* bureaucrats, who would likely have been more leftist than the average citizen but also probably doing better financially in the early years of the transition.

By mid 1990s, however, the trend had been reversed: those who were doing well during the transition – the financial "winners" – were exhibiting a significant rightward bias compared to their compatriots (and a weaker leftist bias compared to the rest of the world[27]), even

[27] Note the large negative coefficient on the post-communist dummy in Model 3, which means that by the mid 1990s ex-communist

above and beyond the effect of personal financial satisfaction in the rest of the world. This remarkable shift is compatible with two different mechanisms: either it is due to the ideological "conversion" of the former communist regime beneficiaries, or it is driven by the fairly rapid replacement of communist elites with new pro-market economic elites. While further research – ideally using panel survey data – is required to settle this question, both mechanisms are in line with the running tally approach, whereby individuals adjust their ideology based on their recent personal economic experiences (which in this case would predict a right-ward shift among beneficiaries of the rightward shift in economic policies during the early 1990s). By the late 1990s (Model 4), the interaction effect between post-communism and financial satisfaction disappears, which suggests that at this point the ideological impact of personal economic considerations no longer bore the clear imprint of communist legacies.[28]

The final model in Table 6 shifts from individual to country-level heterogeneity in transition-era economic trajectories. To capture the large cross-country differences in post-communist economic performance, we calculated the country's GDP in the preceding year as a percentage of the country's GDP levels in 1989 (before the start of the massive output collapse in much of the Soviet bloc.) From a running tally perspective, we would expect to see leftist bias to be much greater among the ex-communist countries which suffered the greatest economic losses after 1989, and this expectation is strongly confirmed by the large and positive interaction effect between the post-communism dummy and *GDP as % of 1989* in model 5. Looking at the conditional effects of post-communism for different output trajectories provides a stark contrast: thus, the predicted leftist bias for one of the poorest performers in the sample (Moldova in 2001, which was at 37% of its 1989 GDP levels) was roughly five times larger than for one of the best post-communist performers (Poland in 1998, which was at 124% of its 1989 GDP levels), and the effect was no longer statistically significant for the latter.

Overall, then, the results in Table 6 confirm that the uneven transition experience across both individuals and countries is clearly reflected in the left-right positions of post-communist citizens, with transition losers much more likely to revert to leftist convictions than their more economically fortunate counterparts. However, it is important to note that while the quality of the communist and post-communist experience provides some useful qualifications to the unavoidable generalizations inherent in broad cross-regional comparisons, the results in Table 6 also suggest that the broad regional trends discussed earlier – such as the rightist bias among younger cohorts of the early 1990s and the subsequent leftist bias (especially of older cohorts) of the mid and late 1990s – actually holds for the majority of ex-communist countries and individuals even though the magnitude and statistical significance of these differences may vary as a function of economic performance.[29] Furthermore, controlling for individual and country-level economic performance did not affect the magnitude or statistical significance of the peculiar age, education and democratic value patterns of left-right placement in post-communist countries.[30] These (non)findings suggest that the greater leftist bias among the elderly, the uneducated and anti-democrats in ex-communist countries cannot be simply attributed to the fact that these groups were

citizens had a significant leftist bias for all but the most financially satisfied among them.

[28] Of course, it is conceivable that such legacies persist in some of the former communist countries – a possibility which we intend to explore in future versions of this paper. Moreover, this statistical convergence does not necessarily mean that ex-communist economically satisfied citizens tend to espouse rightist ideological convictions for the same reasons as their non-communist counterparts.

[29] Thus, the post-communist rightist bias in model 2 and the leftist bias in model 3 was at least marginally statistically significant for all but the most economically satisfied individuals (who account for only 3.2% of ex-communist respondents). Similar patterns emerge for the other 3 models in table 6.

[30] Results omitted but available from the authors.

TABLE 7. Institutions and left-right positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Unreformed Communist (>10%)	.052 (.036)	-.002 (.031)				
Reformed ex-Communist (>20%)	.109* (.043)					
Unref. Comm (>10%)* Democ Index		.055* (.024)				
Democracy Index		.057** (.016)		-.022 (.015)		
EU candidate*Democ Index				.053 (.034)		
Potential EU cand*Democ Index				.096** (.028)		
Other post-comm*Democ Index				.100** (.024)		
EU candidate			-.172** (.054)	-.128* (.063)		
Potential EU candidate			-.081* (.041)	-.122* (.053)		
Other post-communist			-.283** (.047)	-.233** (.053)		
Post-communist					.678* (.307)	-.811* (.354)
Post-communist* Avg. party social conservatism					-.068** (.023)	
Avg. party social conservatism					.079** (.019)	
Post-communist* Avg. party econ conservatism						.055# (.031)
Avg. party economic conservatism						-.036 (.026)
Institutional controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
WVS survey wave	1&2&3	2&3 [a]	1&2&3	2&3 [a]	3	3
Countries	Ex-comm only	Ex-comm only	All	All	All	All
Observations	71740	53967	218500	155976	50110	51110
R-squared	.107	.075	.086	.114	.117	.090

OLS regression coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1
Note: Also included in regressions but not reported were all the demographic and institutional controls included in Table 1.
a. Question was not asked in the 1990 wave.

over-represented among the transition losers.

The statistical tests in Table 7 turn to the question about the role of institutions in mediating the formation and adaptation of ideological positions. In line with the earlier theoretical discussion, the first two models focus on what is probably the most visible institutional legacy of communism for the post-communist ideological spectrum: communist successor parties. To assess their effect, we coded each ex-communist country as to whether or not in the election immediately preceding the survey a communist successor party had managed to obtain at least 10% of the vote share.

Furthermore, in line with earlier studies, which noted the different implications of whether the communist successor party was reformed or unreformed, we differentiated between these two types of parties (since we may expect unreformed communists to have either stronger anchoring or stronger repellent effects than their reformed counterparts.)

According to Model 1, the presence of communist successor parties exerts a significant *rightward* influence on the ideological positions of post-communist citizens.[31] The impact is particularly pronounced for reformist ex-communist parties, suggesting that rather than activating leftist attitudes among the many reform losers, the visible presence of institutional heirs to the once-dominant Communist parties seem to persuade the average ex-communist citizen to drift further to the right.[32] Given that the effect is sharper for reformists ex-communist parties as opposed to unreformed ex-communist parties, this would suggest more of a "persuasive" effect than a "repellent" effect (which we would expect to be stronger among the unreformed post-communist parties. Of course, it is conceivable that ex-communist parties would simultaneously mobilize both leftist supporters and rightist opponents and that the aggregate right shift simply reflects the greater numbers of the latter. However, two (albeit preliminary) additional tests[33] suggest that this is not the case: thus, we found the rightward effect of communist successor parties to hold even for voters of ex-communist parties, and we found that the presence of successor parties was associated with a significant increase in right-wing but not left-wing positions.[34] Therefore, it appears that despite their occasional anti-market rhetoric, communist successor parties are not the reason for the leftist bias of post-communist voters!

In Model 2 we test whether the presence of the most vivid reminder of the undemocratic communist past – an unreformed communist successor party – helps to reinforce citizens' association about the tension between leftist ideology and democratic politics. The large and positive interaction effect in Model 2 confirms that this is indeed the case: the rightward bias among post-communist democrats was indeed roughly twice as large in countries with a visible unreformed ex-communist party. However, the large and significant positive effect of *democracy index* in model 2 indicates that even when such institutional reminders were absent, the peculiarly post-communist mental association between democracy and rightist ideology persisted well into the transition period.

In the next two models we turn to a set of indicators that do not capture communist institutional continuity but instead its reverse: the extent to which a country has progressed towards convergence to Western economic and political institutions. To do so, we coded whether at the time of the survey a given country was an EU candidate, a potential future candidate or a post-communist country with minimal membership prospects for the foreseeable future. Given that EU accession is predicated on the adoption of an extensive set of reforms geared towards achieving such institutional convergence we would expect candidate countries to be the furthest along in this process. Therefore, to the

[31] The sample was limited to ex-communist countries, since it is unclear to what extent communist successor parties in Eastern Europe are comparable to their Communist and Socialist counterparts in the non-communist world.

[32] Astute readers will notice that we code a significant post-communist party as one with more than 20% of the vote for reformed post-communist parties and more than 10% of the vote for un-reformed post-communist parties. Our preference is to use the 20% threshold in both cases, but the reality of post-communist election results is that a 20% threshold for unreformed post-communist parties leaves us with very few countries that meet this threshold. So rather than dilute our measure for unreformed post-communist parties, we for now use the two different thresholds. Future versions of the paper will deal with this issue in a more satisfying manner!

[33] Results omitted but available from the authors.

[34] For the purpose of the current tests, we defined left-wing as the lowest 10% of our corrected left-right scale, and right-wing as the highest 10%.

extent to which individual ideological positions are driven by institutional differences between ex-communist and non-communist countries, we should expect the post-communist exceptionalism to be weaker among candidate countries (and to a lesser extent among potential candidates).

These expectations are at least partially confirmed by the results in Model 3 of Table 7: thus, the leftist bias is significantly lower among actual and potential candidates than for other post-communist countries, which faced much weaker incentives for institutional convergence as part of the European integration process. On the other hand, the leftist bias was actually marginally higher among candidates than among potential candidates, a finding which does not fit as comfortably with an institutional convergence explanation.

By comparison, Model 4 provides stronger statistical support for the institutional account, given that the rightward bias among democrats is significant and of very similar magnitude for both long-shots and potential candidates, whereas in candidate countries the bias is roughly half the magnitude and is no longer statistically significant. This suggests that the greater institutional convergence among these most advanced EU hopefuls has weakened the institutional mechanisms that reproduced the combination of statist economic policies and non-democratic politics elsewhere in the region. Taking a closer look at the interaction effects in Model 4 also provides a tentative answer to the puzzle above about the lower leftist bias in potential candidate countries compared to actual EU candidates: thus, judging by the predicted ideological positions for different levels of democratic values, the relative leftist bias for candidate countries only occurs among their most democratically minded citizens but not among the non-democrats, as we would expect from a pure legacy perspective. In other words, it appears that in the EU candidate countries, the greater institutional distance from the communist past – probably including the lower probability of a drastic reversal of post-communist economic and political reforms – allowed democratic citizens greater "mental" space to choose their ideological orientation independently of the relatively recent association of left ideology and authoritarianism in their own countries, and as a result we may finally be observing the emergence of a hitherto rare political species in Eastern Europe: that of a leftist democrat.

Finally, we turn to the question of whether individual ideological positions are shaped by the policy positions taken by political parties. To the extent that parties can shape public opinion, differences in individual positions may simply be a reflection of systematic differences in party positions rather than being rooted in individual-level communist legacies. To test this possibility we used data from Benoit and Laver's (2007) expert survey of party positions in 19 ex-communist and 28 non-communist countries. In particular, we focused on two salient policy positions, which were available for most of the countries in their dataset, and which correspond to the two dimensions of left-right positioning in our paper: a question evaluating the party's economic position on spending vs. taxes and one evaluating the party's policy positions regarding "matters such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia." Each party was scored on a 20 point scale for these two dimensions, with higher scores indicating a more conservative (right) position. Since our unit of analysis is the country rather than a political party, we calculated country-level weighted averages of party positions[35] for the two dimensions and then merged these scores with the individual-level WVS data. Since the expert survey roughly refers to the 1999-2003 period, we limited our analysis to survey data from the third WVS wave, which covers roughly the same time period. As one would have expected, on average ex-communist parties advocated higher taxes and spending levels than their non-communist counterparts (with a mean difference of roughly one standard deviation). On the other hand, however, ex-communist parties actually had slightly

[35] We weighted party positions by their vote share in the most recent election, to make sure that the country averages accounted for the greater visibility of larger parties.

more *conservative* social platforms than their non-communist counterparts (but the two means were only one third of a standard deviation apart).

The country's party system average for each of the dimensions, along with an interaction term with the ex-communist dummy indicator (to allow for heterogeneous effects) were run separately in the last two models in Table 7. The results are consistent with the greater ideological importance of economic rather than social issues in ex-communist countries: thus, according to model 5, more socially conservative party positions translated into significantly more rightist positions in non-communist democracies but this effect disappears for ex-communist countries, due to the large negative interaction effect between party positions and ex-communism. In other words, ex-communist citizens were much less responsive to party social platforms than their non-communist counterparts.

On the other hand, model 6 suggests a very different picture with respect to taxation and spending issues. In this respect, the average party system position actually pointed in the wrong direction for non-communist countries – a finding which suggests that citizens try to counteract the biases of their political parties. Meanwhile, the positive and marginally significant interaction effect between post-communism and party system economic position suggests greater responsiveness among ex-communist voters. However, it should be noted that the joint effect of party economic positions on the individual left-right positions of post-communist voters is actually very modest (and statistically insignificant).

Overall, the findings in the last two models suggest a very modest role for party positions on the ideological positions of post-communist voters, a conclusion that confirms earlier arguments about the social disconnectedness of East European parties (Innes 2002). Nonetheless, political parties are not completely irrelevant for post-communist voters: however, what seems to matter is not their policy platform but the extent to which they reinforce communist-era mental reflexes and associations among both supporters and opponents.

CONCLUSIONS: IDEOLOGY AND LEGACIES

This paper was motivated by two primary goals. First, we aimed to provide a systematic, large-scale comparative analysis of the extent to which left-right self placement in the post-communist world deviated from patterns found elsewhere. Second, we wanted to understand to what extent to which these distinctions could be cast as *legacies* from the communist era, and, if so, which pathways the effects of these legacies followed.

Regarding the first goal, we demonstrated three distinctly post-communist patterns of left-right positioning. First, there is overall a left-wing bias in post-communist countries as compared to the rest of the world, although it only develops from the mid 1990s (ie., is not present in the first wave of WVS surveys). Second, left-right self-placement is less a function of social issues in post-communist countries than it is the rest of the world, although it appears to be just as influenced by economic preferences as it is elsewhere. Third, there are important covariates of less right-self placement that have the opposite effect in post-communist countries: while in the rest of the world younger, more educated, and more democratically inclined voters trend to the left, in post-communist countries they have a right-wing bias.

In order to explain these patterns, we presented a series of hypotheses concerning how the communist past might account for these distinctions. More specifically, we considered individual experiences under communism, individual experiences during the transition, institutional legacies, and economic conditions. Our results are nuanced, but overall fairly clear. We find little evidence that simply living longer under communist rule and/or being socialized at the high water mark of Stalinist rule was the primary cause of the distinctions we observed. In contrast, the shift from an initial rightist bias in the early 1990s to a leftist bias in the mid to late 1990s, combined with consistent evidence that those who were doing better during the transition gravitated to the right regardless of their age, suggest that far from being

captives of the past, post-communist citizens were adjusting their ideological preferences as a response to their own experience and interests in a rapidly changing society. Moreover, these effects were also enhanced by a number of particular institutional features. First, the presence of a large reformed post-communist party pushed everyone to the right. As we have noted, this might have been a repellant effect for those who opposed communism, but it may also very well have been the outgrowth of communist supporters and sympathizers watching these parties over time become fully engaged with the globalized world of modern capitalism. Second, the presence of a large *unreformed* post-communist party reinforced and strengthened the inclination of democratically inclined post-communist citizens to exhibit a right-wing bias. Finally, as countries moved closer to EU membership – and thus were increasingly surrounded by political and economic institutions looking more like Western Europe – the need for democratically inclined citizens to avoid the left began to diminish. Thus both individual experiences and institutions help us understand why left-right positioning looks different in post-communist countries, but it is apparently more recent individual experiences and interaction with current institutional arrangements that account for these differences as opposed to some sort of permanent altering of the political psyche after years of living under communist rule.

These results also suggest a possible bifurcation of the post-communist ideological space in the years to come. In Central and Eastern Europe, we will likely see greater ideological convergence with Western Europe as political and economic institutions continue to converge: the right will continue to be the domain of the more economically successful, but the left will probably no longer be scorned as much by the more educated and more democratically inclined, and there will probably be increasingly more space for modern social democratic parties enjoying the kind of support they do elsewhere in Western Europe. Still, as recent elections in Poland (2007) and Hungary (2010) demonstrate, it may take a while for this "new left" to find its way. There is a dark side to this as well: as those with authoritarian tendencies are no longer as tightly wedded to leftist parties as they were previously, this should open up opportunities for far right parties in East Central Europe just as they have in Western Europe, as exemplified by the rise of Jobbik in the 2010 Hungarian elections. Conversely, in the post-Soviet space shut out of the EU, we may continue to bear witness to a less educated, more authoritarian, and older core of citizens willing to provide support to statist regimes that offer economic security at the expense of political rights. Here, Putin's Russia is illustrative. In the absence of a strong ex-communist party to continue pushing the anti-communists to the right, United Russia – to the extent that we can even say it has an ideology – has seemed to drift back into the political center, combining authoritarianism with a heavy dose of state intervention in the economy, especially since the Communist Party of the Russian Federation was essentially banished to irrelevancy in the early 2000s. Similar patterns can be found in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Although not a central focus of the paper, the disconnect between parties and voters on social (and to a lesser extent economic) issues suggests that ties between political parties and society continue to be weaker in the post-communist world than elsewhere, confirming claims to critics who have accused political elites of floating above society without engaging it. Interestingly, we found that this effect (or lack thereof) goes both ways: while in the rest of the world having a more socially conservative population in the mid-1990s led parties to become more socially conservative later that decade, in post-communist countries the effect was considerably weaker. Similarly, having more conservative parties did not have much of an impact on subsequent individual ideological positions. Apparently, neither society nor the political parties were particularly responsive to one another on social issues. However, perhaps this is not so surprising in a decade witnessing some of the most dramatic economic upheaval the modern world has ever witnessed. It will be interesting to see

in the future if there is more post-communist convergence along the lines of social issues being incorporated into the left-right orientation of post-communist citizens. Alternatively, it may be that communism left many of these issues – such as abortion – "off the table", and what really is driving this second dimension of left-right self-placement is something like attitudes towards nationalism and national minorities.

Finally, for those interested in the effects of legacies on political values and behavior in the post-communist era, the issue of individual left-right positioning provides yet another example of post-communist exceptionalism, but encouragingly this exceptionalism is explainable with a theoretical framework of legacies. Both individual and institutional features have combined to generate patterns of left-right self-placement that are at least somewhat unique to the post-communist world, but interestingly it is the *post* part of this equation that seems to matter the most. Far from being cemented by experiences under communism, ideology looks rather fluid in the post-communist context, amenable to being shaped by the rather drastic socio-economic transitions of the day.

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